GERAN: allow GSM SRES on UMTS AKA challenge

Store the established security context type (GSM or UMTS) instead of the
boolean flag is_authenticated. Provide the previous boolean query with thin
sgsn_mm_ctx_is_authenticated() function.

Knowing which security context was established will be necessary for OS#3224,
i.e. using the proper ciphering key, which is not yet tested properly, and
probably not correct at this stage.

This change will make new SGSN_Tests.TC_attach_umts_aka_gsm_sres pass.

Related: OS#3193 OS#3224
Change-Id: I36807bad3bc55c0030d4f09cb2c369714f24bec7
This commit is contained in:
Neels Hofmeyr 2018-04-22 19:29:41 +02:00
parent 7554fd1b5e
commit aa4ed67164
4 changed files with 34 additions and 24 deletions

View File

@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ struct sgsn_mm_ctx {
* whether one of them can be dropped. */
enum sgsn_auth_state auth_state;
int is_authenticated;
enum osmo_sub_auth_type sec_ctx;
/* the string representation of the current hlr */
char hlr[GSM_EXTENSION_LENGTH];
@ -235,6 +235,17 @@ struct sgsn_mm_ctx {
struct gprs_subscr *subscr;
};
static inline bool sgsn_mm_ctx_is_authenticated(struct sgsn_mm_ctx *ctx)
{
switch (ctx->sec_ctx) {
case OSMO_AUTH_TYPE_GSM:
case OSMO_AUTH_TYPE_UMTS:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
#define LOGMMCTXP(level, mm, fmt, args...) \
LOGP(DMM, level, "MM(%s/%08x) " fmt, (mm) ? (mm)->imsi : "---", \
(mm) ? (mm)->p_tmsi : GSM_RESERVED_TMSI, ## args)

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@ -662,24 +662,24 @@ static int gsm48_tx_gmm_auth_ciph_rej(struct sgsn_mm_ctx *mm)
}
/* check if the received authentication response matches */
static bool check_auth_resp(struct sgsn_mm_ctx *ctx,
bool is_utran,
const struct osmo_auth_vector *vec,
const uint8_t *res, uint8_t res_len)
static enum osmo_sub_auth_type check_auth_resp(struct sgsn_mm_ctx *ctx,
bool is_utran,
const struct osmo_auth_vector *vec,
const uint8_t *res, uint8_t res_len)
{
const uint8_t *expect_res;
uint8_t expect_res_len;
enum osmo_sub_auth_type expect_type;
const char *expect_str;
if (!vec)
return true; /* really!? */
/* On UTRAN (3G) we always expect UMTS AKA. On GERAN (2G) we sent AUTN
* and expect UMTS AKA if there is R99 capability and our vector
* supports UMTS AKA, otherwise we expect GSM AKA. */
* supports UMTS AKA, otherwise we expect GSM AKA.
* However, on GERAN, even if we sent a UMTS AKA Authentication Request, the MS may decide to
* instead reply with a GSM AKA SRES response. */
if (is_utran
|| (mmctx_is_r99(ctx) && (vec->auth_types & OSMO_AUTH_TYPE_UMTS))) {
|| (mmctx_is_r99(ctx) && (vec->auth_types & OSMO_AUTH_TYPE_UMTS)
&& (res_len > sizeof(vec->sres)))) {
expect_type = OSMO_AUTH_TYPE_UMTS;
expect_str = "UMTS RES";
expect_res = vec->res;
@ -696,7 +696,7 @@ static bool check_auth_resp(struct sgsn_mm_ctx *ctx,
" not provide the expected auth type:"
" expected %s = 0x%x, auth_types are 0x%x\n",
expect_str, expect_type, vec->auth_types);
return false;
return OSMO_AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
}
if (!res)
@ -709,12 +709,12 @@ static bool check_auth_resp(struct sgsn_mm_ctx *ctx,
goto auth_mismatch;
/* Authorized! */
return true;
return expect_type;
auth_mismatch:
LOGMMCTXP(LOGL_ERROR, ctx, "Auth mismatch: expected %s = %s\n",
expect_str, osmo_hexdump_nospc(expect_res, expect_res_len));
return false;
return OSMO_AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
}
/* Section 9.4.10: Authentication and Ciphering Response */
@ -778,15 +778,13 @@ static int gsm48_rx_gmm_auth_ciph_resp(struct sgsn_mm_ctx *ctx,
LOGMMCTXP(LOGL_DEBUG, ctx, "checking auth: received %s = %s\n",
res_name, osmo_hexdump(res, res_len));
rc = check_auth_resp(ctx, false, &at->vec, res, res_len);
if (!rc) {
ctx->sec_ctx = check_auth_resp(ctx, false, &at->vec, res, res_len);
if (!sgsn_mm_ctx_is_authenticated(ctx)) {
rc = gsm48_tx_gmm_auth_ciph_rej(ctx);
mm_ctx_cleanup_free(ctx, "GPRS AUTH AND CIPH REJECT");
return rc;
}
ctx->is_authenticated = 1;
if (ctx->ran_type == MM_CTX_T_UTRAN_Iu)
ctx->iu.new_key = 1;
@ -1026,7 +1024,8 @@ static int gsm48_gmm_authorize(struct sgsn_mm_ctx *ctx)
return 0;
}
if (ctx->auth_state == SGSN_AUTH_AUTHENTICATE && !ctx->is_authenticated) {
if (ctx->auth_state == SGSN_AUTH_AUTHENTICATE
&& !sgsn_mm_ctx_is_authenticated(ctx)) {
struct gsm_auth_tuple *at = &ctx->auth_triplet;
mmctx_timer_start(ctx, 3360, sgsn->cfg.timers.T3360);
@ -1034,7 +1033,7 @@ static int gsm48_gmm_authorize(struct sgsn_mm_ctx *ctx)
false);
}
if (ctx->auth_state == SGSN_AUTH_AUTHENTICATE && ctx->is_authenticated &&
if (ctx->auth_state == SGSN_AUTH_AUTHENTICATE && sgsn_mm_ctx_is_authenticated(ctx) &&
ctx->auth_triplet.key_seq != GSM_KEY_SEQ_INVAL) {
/* Check again for authorization */
sgsn_auth_request(ctx);
@ -1106,7 +1105,7 @@ static int gsm48_gmm_authorize(struct sgsn_mm_ctx *ctx)
void gsm0408_gprs_authenticate(struct sgsn_mm_ctx *ctx)
{
ctx->is_authenticated = 0;
ctx->sec_ctx = OSMO_AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
gsm48_gmm_authorize(ctx);
}
@ -1420,7 +1419,7 @@ static int gsm48_rx_gmm_att_req(struct sgsn_mm_ctx *ctx, struct msgb *msg,
ctx->gb.tlli_new = gprs_tmsi2tlli(ctx->p_tmsi, TLLI_LOCAL);
/* Inform LLC layer about new TLLI but keep old active */
if (ctx->is_authenticated)
if (sgsn_mm_ctx_is_authenticated(ctx))
gprs_llme_copy_key(ctx, ctx->gb.llme);
gprs_llgmm_assign(ctx->gb.llme, ctx->gb.tlli, ctx->gb.tlli_new);

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@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ enum sgsn_auth_state sgsn_auth_state(struct sgsn_mm_ctx *mmctx)
return mmctx->auth_state;
if (sgsn->cfg.require_authentication &&
(!mmctx->is_authenticated ||
(!sgsn_mm_ctx_is_authenticated(mmctx) ||
mmctx->subscr->sgsn_data->auth_triplets_updated))
return SGSN_AUTH_AUTHENTICATE;
@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ int sgsn_auth_request(struct sgsn_mm_ctx *mmctx)
OSMO_ASSERT(mmctx->subscr != NULL);
if (sgsn->cfg.require_authentication && !mmctx->is_authenticated) {
if (sgsn->cfg.require_authentication && !sgsn_mm_ctx_is_authenticated(mmctx)) {
/* Find next tuple */
at = sgsn_auth_get_tuple(mmctx, mmctx->auth_triplet.key_seq);

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@ -1132,7 +1132,7 @@ int my_subscr_request_auth_info_fake_auth(struct sgsn_mm_ctx *mmctx, const uint8
{
/* Fake an authentication */
OSMO_ASSERT(mmctx->subscr);
mmctx->is_authenticated = 1;
mmctx->sec_ctx = OSMO_AUTH_TYPE_GSM;
gprs_subscr_update_auth_info(mmctx->subscr);
return 0;