9ec9b1ccb9
Coverity 567. svn path=/trunk/; revision=36248
3031 lines
122 KiB
C
3031 lines
122 KiB
C
/* packet-ntlmssp.c
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* Add-on for better NTLM v1/v2 handling
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* Copyright 2009 Matthieu Patou <matthieu.patou@matws.net>
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* Routines for NTLM Secure Service Provider
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* Devin Heitmueller <dheitmueller@netilla.com>
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* Copyright 2003, Tim Potter <tpot@samba.org>
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*
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* $Id$
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*
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* Wireshark - Network traffic analyzer
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* By Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
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* Copyright 1998 Gerald Combs
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
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* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
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* of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
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* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
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*/
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#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
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# include "config.h"
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#endif
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#ifdef DEBUG_NTLMSSP
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#include <stdio.h>
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#endif
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#include <string.h>
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#include <ctype.h>
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#include <glib.h>
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#include <epan/packet.h>
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#include "packet-windows-common.h"
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#include "packet-smb-common.h"
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#include "packet-frame.h"
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#include <epan/asn1.h>
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#include "packet-kerberos.h"
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#include <epan/prefs.h>
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#include <epan/emem.h>
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#include <epan/tap.h>
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#include <epan/expert.h>
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#include <epan/crypt/crypt-rc4.h>
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#include <epan/crypt/crypt-md4.h>
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#include <epan/crypt/crypt-md5.h>
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#include <epan/crypt/crypt-des.h>
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#include "packet-dcerpc.h"
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#include "packet-gssapi.h"
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#include <epan/crc32.h>
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#include "packet-ntlmssp.h"
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static int ntlmssp_tap = -1;
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/* Message types */
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#define NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE 1
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#define NTLMSSP_CHALLENGE 2
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#define NTLMSSP_AUTH 3
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#define NTLMSSP_UNKNOWN 4
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#define CLIENT_SIGN_TEXT "session key to client-to-server signing key magic constant"
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#define CLIENT_SEAL_TEXT "session key to client-to-server sealing key magic constant"
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#define SERVER_SIGN_TEXT "session key to server-to-client signing key magic constant"
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#define SERVER_SEAL_TEXT "session key to server-to-client sealing key magic constant"
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#define NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN 16
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static const value_string ntlmssp_message_types[] = {
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{ NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE, "NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE" },
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{ NTLMSSP_CHALLENGE, "NTLMSSP_CHALLENGE" },
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{ NTLMSSP_AUTH, "NTLMSSP_AUTH" },
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{ NTLMSSP_UNKNOWN, "NTLMSSP_UNKNOWN" },
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{ 0, NULL }
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};
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typedef struct _md4_pass {
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guint8 md4[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN];
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} md4_pass;
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static unsigned char gbl_zeros[24] = "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0";
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static GHashTable* hash_packet = NULL;
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/*
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* NTLMSSP negotiation flags
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* Taken from Samba
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*
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* See also
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*
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* http://davenport.sourceforge.net/ntlm.html
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*
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* although that document says that:
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*
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* 0x00010000 is "Target Type Domain";
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* 0x00020000 is "Target Type Server"
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* 0x00040000 is "Target Type Share";
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*
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* and that 0x00100000, 0x00200000, and 0x00400000 are
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* "Request Init Response", "Request Accept Response", and
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* "Request Non-NT Session Key", rather than those values shifted
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* right one having those interpretations.
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*
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* UPDATE: Further information obtained from [MS-NLMP]:
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* NT LAN Manager (NTLM) Authentication Protocol Specification
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* http://msdn2.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc236621.aspx
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*
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*/
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#define NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE 0x00000001
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#define NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM 0x00000002
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#define NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET 0x00000004
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#define NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_00000008 0x00000008
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#define NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN 0x00000010
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#define NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL 0x00000020
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#define NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_DATAGRAM 0x00000040
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#define NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY 0x00000080
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#define NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_00000100 0x00000100
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#define NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM 0x00000200
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#define NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NT_ONLY 0x00000400
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#define NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_00000800 0x00000800
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#define NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM_DOMAIN_SUPPLIED 0x00001000
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#define NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM_WORKSTATION_SUPPLIED 0x00002000
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#define NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_00004000 0x00004000
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#define NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN 0x00008000
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#define NTLMSSP_TARGET_TYPE_DOMAIN 0x00010000
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#define NTLMSSP_TARGET_TYPE_SERVER 0x00020000
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#define NTLMSSP_TARGET_TYPE_SHARE 0x00040000
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#define NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SECURITY 0x00080000
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#define NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_IDENTIFY 0x00100000
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#define NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_00200000 0x00200000
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#define NTLMSSP_REQUEST_NON_NT_SESSION 0x00400000
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#define NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO 0x00800000
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#define NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_01000000 0x01000000
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#define NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_VERSION 0x02000000
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#define NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_04000000 0x04000000
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#define NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_08000000 0x08000000
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#define NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_10000000 0x10000000
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#define NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 0x20000000
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#define NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH 0x40000000
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#define NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 0x80000000
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static int proto_ntlmssp = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_auth = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_message_type = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_01 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_02 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_04 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_08 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_10 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_20 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_40 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_80 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_100 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_200 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_400 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_800 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_1000 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_2000 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_4000 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_8000 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_10000 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_20000 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_40000 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_80000 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_100000 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_200000 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_400000 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_800000 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_1000000 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_2000000 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_4000000 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_8000000 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_10000000 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_20000000 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_40000000 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_80000000 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_workstation_strlen = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_workstation_maxlen = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_workstation_buffer = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_workstation = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_domain_strlen = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_domain_maxlen = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_domain_buffer = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_domain = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_ntlm_server_challenge = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_ntlm_client_challenge = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_reserved = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_name = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_auth_username = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_auth_domain = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_auth_hostname = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_auth_lmresponse = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_auth_ntresponse = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_auth_sesskey = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_string_len = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_string_maxlen = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_string_offset = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_blob_len = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_blob_maxlen = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_blob_offset = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_version = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_version_major = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_version_minor = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_version_build_number = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_version_ntlm_current_revision = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_len = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_maxlen = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_offset = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_item_type = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_item_len = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_end = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_nb_computer_name = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_nb_domain_name = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_dns_computer_name = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_dns_domain_name = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_dns_tree_name = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_flags = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_timestamp = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_restrictions = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_target_name =-1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_channel_bindings =-1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_item_type = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_item_len = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_end = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_nb_computer_name = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_nb_domain_name = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_dns_computer_name = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_dns_domain_name = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_dns_tree_name = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_flags = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_timestamp = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_restrictions = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_target_name =-1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_channel_bindings =-1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_message_integrity_code = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_verf = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_verf_vers = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_verf_body = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_verf_randompad = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_verf_hmacmd5 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_verf_crc32 = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_verf_sequence = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_decrypted_payload = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_hmac = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_header = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_reserved = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_time = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_chal = -1;
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static int hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_unknown = -1;
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static gint ett_ntlmssp = -1;
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static gint ett_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags = -1;
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static gint ett_ntlmssp_string = -1;
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static gint ett_ntlmssp_blob = -1;
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static gint ett_ntlmssp_version = -1;
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static gint ett_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info = -1;
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static gint ett_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_item = -1;
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static gint ett_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response = -1;
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static gint ett_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_item = -1;
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/* Configuration variables */
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const char *gbl_nt_password = NULL;
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#define MAX_BLOB_SIZE 256
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typedef struct _ntlmssp_blob {
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guint16 length;
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guint8 contents[MAX_BLOB_SIZE];
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} ntlmssp_blob;
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/* Used in the conversation function */
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typedef struct _ntlmssp_info {
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guint32 flags;
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int is_auth_ntlm_v2;
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rc4_state_struct rc4_state_client;
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rc4_state_struct rc4_state_server;
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guint8 sign_key_client[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN];
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guint8 sign_key_server[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN];
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guint32 server_dest_port;
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unsigned char server_challenge[8];
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unsigned char client_challenge[8];
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int rc4_state_initialized;
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ntlmssp_blob ntlm_response;
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ntlmssp_blob lm_response;
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} ntlmssp_info;
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/* If this struct exists in the payload_decrypt, then we have already
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decrypted it once */
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typedef struct _ntlmssp_packet_info {
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guint8 *decrypted_payload;
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guint8 payload_len;
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guint8 verifier[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN];
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gboolean payload_decrypted;
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gboolean verifier_decrypted;
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} ntlmssp_packet_info;
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#ifdef DEBUG_NTLMSSP
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static void printnbyte(const guint8* tab,int nb,const char* txt,const char* txt2)
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{
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int i=0;
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fprintf(stderr,"%s ",txt);
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for(i=0;i<nb;i++)
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{
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fprintf(stderr,"%02hhX ",*(tab+i));
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}
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fprintf(stderr,"%s",txt2);
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}
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#if 0
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static void printnchar(const guint8* tab,int nb,char* txt,char* txt2)
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{
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int i=0;
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fprintf(stderr,"%s ",txt);
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for(i=0;i<nb;i++)
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{
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fprintf(stderr,"%c",*(tab+i));
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}
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fprintf(stderr,"%s",txt2);
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}
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#endif
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#else
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static void printnbyte(const guint8* tab _U_,int nb _U_, const char* txt _U_,const char* txt2 _U_)
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{
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}
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#endif
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/*
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* GSlist of decrypted payloads.
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*/
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static GSList *decrypted_payloads;
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#if 0
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static int
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LEBE_Convert(int value)
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{
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char a,b,c,d;
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/* Get each byte */
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a=value&0x000000FF;
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b=(value&0x0000FF00) >> 8;
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c=(value&0x00FF0000) >> 16;
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d=(value&0xFF000000) >> 24;
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return (a << 24) | (b << 16) | (c << 8) | d;
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}
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#endif
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/*
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Perform a DES encryption with a 16 bit key and 8bit data item.
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It's in fact 3 susbsequent call to crypt_des_ecb with a 7 bit key.
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Missing bits for the key are replaced by 0;
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Returns output in response, which is expected to be 24 bytes.
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*/
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static int
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crypt_des_ecb_long(guint8 *response,
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const guint8 *key,
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const guint8 *data)
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{
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guint8 pw21[21]; /* 21 bytes place for the needed key */
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memset(pw21, 0, sizeof(pw21));
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memcpy(pw21, key, 16);
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memset(response, 0, 24);
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/* crypt_des_ecb(data,key)*/
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crypt_des_ecb(response, data, pw21, 1);
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crypt_des_ecb(response + 8, data, pw21 + 7, 1);
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crypt_des_ecb(response + 16, data, pw21 + 14, 1);
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return 1;
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}
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/*
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Generate a challenge response, given an eight byte challenge and
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either the NT or the Lan Manager password hash (16 bytes).
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Returns output in response, which is expected to be 24 bytes.
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*/
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static int
|
|
ntlmssp_generate_challenge_response(guint8 *response,
|
|
const guint8 *passhash,
|
|
const guint8 *challenge)
|
|
{
|
|
guint8 pw21[21]; /* Password hash padded to 21 bytes */
|
|
|
|
memset(pw21, 0x0, sizeof(pw21));
|
|
memcpy(pw21, passhash, 16);
|
|
|
|
memset(response, 0, 24);
|
|
|
|
crypt_des_ecb(response, challenge, pw21, 1);
|
|
crypt_des_ecb(response + 8, challenge, pw21 + 7, 1);
|
|
crypt_des_ecb(response + 16, challenge, pw21 + 14, 1);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Ultra simple ainsi to unicode converter, will only work for ascii password ...*/
|
|
static void
|
|
str_to_unicode(const char *nt_password, char *nt_password_unicode)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t password_len = 0;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
password_len = strlen(nt_password);
|
|
if(nt_password_unicode != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
for(i=0;i<(password_len);i++)
|
|
{
|
|
nt_password_unicode[i*2]=nt_password[i];
|
|
nt_password_unicode[i*2+1]=0;
|
|
}
|
|
nt_password_unicode[2*password_len]='\0';
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* This function generate the Key Exchange Key
|
|
* Depending on the flags this key will either be used to crypt the exported session key
|
|
* or will be used directly as exported session key.
|
|
* Exported session key is the key that will be used for sealing and signing communication*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
get_keyexchange_key(unsigned char keyexchangekey[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN],const unsigned char sessionbasekey[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN],const unsigned char lm_challenge_response[24],int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
guint8 basekey[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN];
|
|
guint8 zeros[24];
|
|
|
|
memset(keyexchangekey,0,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN);
|
|
memset(basekey,0,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN);
|
|
/* sessionbasekey is either derived from lm_password_hash or from nt_password_hash depending on the key type negotiated */
|
|
memcpy(basekey,sessionbasekey,8);
|
|
memset(basekey,0xBD,8);
|
|
if(flags&NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY)
|
|
{
|
|
/*data,key*/
|
|
crypt_des_ecb(keyexchangekey,lm_challenge_response,basekey,1);
|
|
crypt_des_ecb(keyexchangekey+8,lm_challenge_response,basekey+7,1);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
if(flags&NTLMSSP_REQUEST_NON_NT_SESSION)
|
|
{
|
|
/*People from samba tends to use the same function in this case than in the previous one but with 0 data
|
|
* it's not clear that it produce the good result
|
|
* memcpy(keyexchangekey,lm_hash,8);
|
|
* Let's trust samba implementation it mights seem weird but they are more often rights than the spec !
|
|
*/
|
|
memset(zeros,0,24);
|
|
crypt_des_ecb(keyexchangekey,zeros,basekey,3);
|
|
crypt_des_ecb(keyexchangekey+8,zeros,basekey+7,1);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* it is stated page 65 of NTLM SSP spec that sessionbasekey should be encrypted with hmac_md5 using the concact of both challenge
|
|
* when it's NTLM v1 + extended security but it turns out to be wrong !
|
|
*/
|
|
memcpy(keyexchangekey,sessionbasekey,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(HAVE_HEIMDAL_KERBEROS) || defined(HAVE_MIT_KERBEROS)
|
|
static guint32
|
|
get_md4pass_list(md4_pass** p_pass_list,const char* nt_password)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
guint32 nb_pass = 0;
|
|
enc_key_t *ek;
|
|
unsigned char nt_password_hash[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN];
|
|
int password_len = 0;
|
|
char nt_password_unicode[256];
|
|
md4_pass* pass_list;
|
|
int i = 0;
|
|
if(!krb_decrypt){
|
|
pass_list=NULL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
read_keytab_file_from_preferences();
|
|
|
|
for(ek=enc_key_list;ek;ek=ek->next){
|
|
if( ek->keylength == NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN ) {
|
|
nb_pass++;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
memset(nt_password_hash,0,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN);
|
|
if (nt_password[0] != '\0' && ( strlen(nt_password) < 129 )) {
|
|
nb_pass++;
|
|
password_len = strlen(nt_password);
|
|
str_to_unicode(nt_password,nt_password_unicode);
|
|
crypt_md4(nt_password_hash,nt_password_unicode,password_len*2);
|
|
}
|
|
if( nb_pass == 0 ) {
|
|
/* Unable to calculate the session key without a password or if password is more than 128 char ......*/
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
i = 0;
|
|
*p_pass_list = ep_alloc(nb_pass*sizeof(md4_pass));
|
|
pass_list=*p_pass_list;
|
|
|
|
if( memcmp(nt_password_hash,gbl_zeros,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN) != 0 ) {
|
|
memcpy(pass_list[i].md4,nt_password_hash,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN);
|
|
i = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
for(ek=enc_key_list;ek;ek=ek->next){
|
|
if( ek->keylength == NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN ) {
|
|
memcpy(pass_list[i].md4,ek->keyvalue,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN);
|
|
i++;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return nb_pass;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Create an NTLMSSP version 2 key
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
create_ntlmssp_v2_key(const char *nt_password _U_, const guint8 *serverchallenge , const guint8 *clientchallenge ,
|
|
guint8 *sessionkey ,const guint8 *encryptedsessionkey , int flags ,
|
|
const ntlmssp_blob *ntlm_response, const ntlmssp_blob *lm_response _U_, ntlmssp_header_t *ntlmssph )
|
|
{
|
|
char domain_name_unicode[256];
|
|
char user_uppercase[256];
|
|
char buf[512];
|
|
/*guint8 md4[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN];*/
|
|
unsigned char nt_password_hash[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN];
|
|
unsigned char nt_proof[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN];
|
|
unsigned char ntowf[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN];
|
|
guint8 sessionbasekey[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN];
|
|
guint8 keyexchangekey[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN];
|
|
guint8 lm_challenge_response[24];
|
|
guint32 i;
|
|
guint32 j;
|
|
rc4_state_struct rc4state;
|
|
size_t user_len;
|
|
size_t domain_len;
|
|
md4_pass *pass_list = NULL;
|
|
guint32 nb_pass = 0;
|
|
int found = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* We are going to try password encrypted in keytab as well, it's an idean of Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
|
|
* The idea is to be able to test all the key of domain in once and to be able to decode the NTLM dialogs */
|
|
|
|
memset(sessionkey, 0, NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN);
|
|
#if defined(HAVE_HEIMDAL_KERBEROS) || defined(HAVE_MIT_KERBEROS)
|
|
nb_pass = get_md4pass_list(&pass_list,nt_password);
|
|
#endif
|
|
i=0;
|
|
memset(user_uppercase,0,256);
|
|
user_len = strlen(ntlmssph->acct_name);
|
|
if( user_len < 129 ) {
|
|
memset(buf,0,512);
|
|
str_to_unicode(ntlmssph->acct_name,buf);
|
|
for (j = 0; j < (2*user_len); j++) {
|
|
if( buf[j] != '\0' ) {
|
|
user_uppercase[j] = toupper(buf[j]);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
/* Unable to calculate the session not enought space in buffer, note this is unlikely to happen but ......*/
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
domain_len = strlen(ntlmssph->domain_name);
|
|
if( domain_len < 129 ) {
|
|
str_to_unicode(ntlmssph->domain_name,domain_name_unicode);
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
/* Unable to calculate the session not enought space in buffer, note this is unlikely to happen but ......*/
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
while (i < nb_pass ) {
|
|
/*fprintf(stderr,"Turn %d, ",i);*/
|
|
memcpy(nt_password_hash,pass_list[i].md4,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN);
|
|
/*printnbyte(nt_password_hash,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN,"Current NT password hash: ","\n");*/
|
|
i++;
|
|
/* ntowf computation */
|
|
memset(buf,0,512);
|
|
memcpy(buf,user_uppercase,user_len*2);
|
|
memcpy(buf+user_len*2,domain_name_unicode,domain_len*2);
|
|
md5_hmac(buf,domain_len*2+user_len*2,nt_password_hash,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN,ntowf);
|
|
/* LM response */
|
|
memset(buf,0,512);
|
|
memcpy(buf,serverchallenge,8);
|
|
memcpy(buf+8,clientchallenge,8);
|
|
md5_hmac(buf,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN,ntowf,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN,lm_challenge_response);
|
|
memcpy(lm_challenge_response+NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN,clientchallenge,8);
|
|
printnbyte(lm_challenge_response,24,"LM Response: ","\n");
|
|
|
|
/* NT proof = First NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN bytes of NT response */
|
|
memset(buf,0,512);
|
|
memcpy(buf,serverchallenge,8);
|
|
memcpy(buf+8,ntlm_response->contents+NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN,ntlm_response->length-NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN);
|
|
md5_hmac(buf,ntlm_response->length-8,ntowf,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN,nt_proof);
|
|
printnbyte(nt_proof,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN,"NT proof: ","\n");
|
|
if( !memcmp(nt_proof,ntlm_response->contents,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN) ) {
|
|
found = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
if( found == 0 ) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
md5_hmac(nt_proof,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN,ntowf,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN,sessionbasekey);
|
|
get_keyexchange_key(keyexchangekey,sessionbasekey,lm_challenge_response,flags);
|
|
/* now decrypt session key if needed and setup sessionkey for decrypting further communications */
|
|
if (flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH)
|
|
{
|
|
memcpy(sessionkey,encryptedsessionkey,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN);
|
|
crypt_rc4_init(&rc4state,keyexchangekey,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN);
|
|
crypt_rc4(&rc4state,sessionkey,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
memcpy(sessionkey,keyexchangekey,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
/* Create an NTLMSSP version 1 key
|
|
* That is more complicated logic and methods and user challenge as well.
|
|
* password points to the ANSI password to encrypt, challenge points to
|
|
* the 8 octet challenge string
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
create_ntlmssp_v1_key(const char *nt_password, const guint8 *serverchallenge, const guint8 *clientchallenge,
|
|
guint8 *sessionkey,const guint8 *encryptedsessionkey, int flags,
|
|
const guint8 *ref_nt_challenge_response,const guint8 *ref_lm_challenge_response)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char lm_password_upper[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN];
|
|
unsigned char lm_password_hash[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN];
|
|
unsigned char nt_password_hash[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN];
|
|
unsigned char challenges_hash[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN];
|
|
unsigned char challenges_hash_first8[8];
|
|
unsigned char challenges[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN];
|
|
guint8 md4[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN];
|
|
guint8 nb_pass = 0;
|
|
guint8 sessionbasekey[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN];
|
|
guint8 keyexchangekey[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN];
|
|
guint8 lm_challenge_response[24];
|
|
guint8 nt_challenge_response[24];
|
|
rc4_state_struct rc4state;
|
|
md5_state_t md5state;
|
|
char nt_password_unicode[256];
|
|
size_t password_len;
|
|
unsigned int i;
|
|
int found = 0;
|
|
md4_pass *pass_list = NULL;
|
|
unsigned char lmhash_key[] =
|
|
{0x4b, 0x47, 0x53, 0x21, 0x40, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25};
|
|
|
|
memset(sessionkey, 0, NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN);
|
|
memset(lm_password_upper, 0, sizeof(lm_password_upper));
|
|
/* lm auth/lm session == (!NTLM_NEGOTIATE_NT_ONLY && NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY) || ! (EXTENDED_SECURITY) || ! NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM*/
|
|
/* Create a Lan Manager hash of the input password */
|
|
if (nt_password[0] != '\0') {
|
|
password_len = strlen(nt_password);
|
|
/*Do not forget to free nt_password_nt*/
|
|
str_to_unicode(nt_password,nt_password_unicode);
|
|
crypt_md4(nt_password_hash,nt_password_unicode,password_len*2);
|
|
/* Truncate password if too long */
|
|
if (password_len > NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN)
|
|
password_len = NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < password_len; i++) {
|
|
lm_password_upper[i] = toupper(nt_password[i]);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* Unable to calculate the session key without a password ... and we will not use one for a keytab*/
|
|
if( !(flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SECURITY )) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if((flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY && !(flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NT_ONLY)) || !(flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SECURITY) || !(flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM)) {
|
|
crypt_des_ecb(lm_password_hash, lmhash_key, lm_password_upper, 1);
|
|
crypt_des_ecb(lm_password_hash+8, lmhash_key, lm_password_upper+7, 1);
|
|
ntlmssp_generate_challenge_response(lm_challenge_response,
|
|
lm_password_hash, serverchallenge);
|
|
memcpy(sessionbasekey,lm_password_hash,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
memset(lm_challenge_response,0,24);
|
|
if( flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SECURITY ) {
|
|
#if defined(HAVE_HEIMDAL_KERBEROS) || defined(HAVE_MIT_KERBEROS)
|
|
nb_pass = get_md4pass_list(&pass_list,nt_password);
|
|
#endif
|
|
i=0;
|
|
while (i < nb_pass ) {
|
|
/*fprintf(stderr,"Turn %d, ",i);*/
|
|
memcpy(nt_password_hash,pass_list[i].md4,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN);
|
|
/*printnbyte(nt_password_hash,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN,"Current NT password hash: ","\n");*/
|
|
i++;
|
|
memcpy(lm_challenge_response,clientchallenge,8);
|
|
md5_init(&md5state);
|
|
md5_append(&md5state,serverchallenge,8);
|
|
md5_append(&md5state,clientchallenge,8);
|
|
md5_finish(&md5state,challenges_hash);
|
|
memcpy(challenges_hash_first8,challenges_hash,8);
|
|
crypt_des_ecb_long(nt_challenge_response,nt_password_hash,challenges_hash_first8);
|
|
if( !memcmp(ref_nt_challenge_response,nt_challenge_response,24) ) {
|
|
found = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
crypt_des_ecb_long(nt_challenge_response,nt_password_hash,serverchallenge);
|
|
if( flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NT_ONLY ) {
|
|
memcpy(lm_challenge_response,nt_challenge_response,24);
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
crypt_des_ecb_long(lm_challenge_response,lm_password_hash,serverchallenge);
|
|
}
|
|
if( !memcmp(ref_nt_challenge_response,nt_challenge_response,24) && !memcmp(ref_lm_challenge_response,lm_challenge_response,24) ) {
|
|
found = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* So it's clearly not like this that's put into NTLMSSP doc but after some digging into samba code I'm quite confident
|
|
* that sessionbasekey should be based md4(nt_password_hash) only in the case of some NT auth
|
|
* Otherwise it should be lm_password_hash ...*/
|
|
crypt_md4(md4,nt_password_hash,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN);
|
|
if (flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SECURITY) {
|
|
memcpy(challenges,serverchallenge,8);
|
|
memcpy(challenges+8,clientchallenge,8);
|
|
/*md5_hmac(text,text_len,key,key_len,digest);*/
|
|
md5_hmac(challenges,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN,md4,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN,sessionbasekey);
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
memcpy(sessionbasekey,md4,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( found == 0 ) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
get_keyexchange_key(keyexchangekey,sessionbasekey,lm_challenge_response,flags);
|
|
memset(sessionkey, 0, NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN);
|
|
/*printnbyte(nt_challenge_response,24,"NT challenge response","\n");
|
|
printnbyte(lm_challenge_response,24,"LM challenge response","\n");*/
|
|
/* now decrypt session key if needed and setup sessionkey for decrypting further communications */
|
|
if (flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH)
|
|
{
|
|
memcpy(sessionkey,encryptedsessionkey,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN);
|
|
crypt_rc4_init(&rc4state,keyexchangekey,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN);
|
|
crypt_rc4(&rc4state,sessionkey,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
memcpy(sessionkey,keyexchangekey,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
get_siging_key(guint8 *sign_key_server,guint8* sign_key_client,const guint8 key[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN], int keylen)
|
|
{
|
|
md5_state_t md5state;
|
|
md5_state_t md5state2;
|
|
memset(sign_key_client,0,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN);
|
|
memset(sign_key_server,0,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN);
|
|
md5_init(&md5state);
|
|
md5_append(&md5state,key,keylen);
|
|
md5_append(&md5state,CLIENT_SIGN_TEXT,strlen(CLIENT_SIGN_TEXT)+1);
|
|
md5_finish(&md5state,sign_key_client);
|
|
md5_init(&md5state2);
|
|
md5_append(&md5state2,key,keylen);
|
|
md5_append(&md5state2,SERVER_SIGN_TEXT,strlen(SERVER_SIGN_TEXT)+1);
|
|
md5_finish(&md5state2,sign_key_server);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We return either a 128 or 64 bit key
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
get_sealing_rc4key(const guint8 exportedsessionkey[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN] ,const int flags ,int *keylen ,
|
|
guint8 *clientsealkey ,guint8 *serversealkey)
|
|
{
|
|
md5_state_t md5state;
|
|
md5_state_t md5state2;
|
|
memset(clientsealkey,0,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN);
|
|
memset(serversealkey,0,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN);
|
|
memcpy(clientsealkey,exportedsessionkey,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN);
|
|
if (flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SECURITY)
|
|
{
|
|
if (flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128)
|
|
{
|
|
/* The exportedsessionkey has already the good length just update the length*/
|
|
*keylen = 16;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
if (flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56)
|
|
{
|
|
memset(clientsealkey+7,0,9);
|
|
*keylen = 7;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
memset(clientsealkey+5,0,11);
|
|
*keylen = 5;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
memcpy(serversealkey,clientsealkey,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN);
|
|
md5_init(&md5state);
|
|
md5_append(&md5state,clientsealkey,*keylen);
|
|
md5_append(&md5state,CLIENT_SEAL_TEXT,strlen(CLIENT_SEAL_TEXT)+1);
|
|
md5_finish(&md5state,clientsealkey);
|
|
md5_init(&md5state2);
|
|
md5_append(&md5state2,serversealkey,*keylen);
|
|
md5_append(&md5state2,SERVER_SEAL_TEXT,strlen(SERVER_SEAL_TEXT)+1);
|
|
md5_finish(&md5state2,serversealkey);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
if (flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128)
|
|
{
|
|
/* The exportedsessionkey has already the good length just update the length*/
|
|
*keylen = 16;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
*keylen = 8;
|
|
if (flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56)
|
|
{
|
|
memset(clientsealkey+7,0,9);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
memset(clientsealkey+5,0,11);
|
|
clientsealkey[5]=0xe5;
|
|
clientsealkey[6]=0x38;
|
|
clientsealkey[7]=0xb0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
serversealkey = memcpy(serversealkey,clientsealkey,*keylen);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Create an NTLMSSP version 1 key.
|
|
* password points to the ANSI password to encrypt, challenge points to
|
|
* the 8 octet challenge string, key128 will do a 128 bit key if set to 1,
|
|
* otherwise it will do a 40 bit key. The result is stored in
|
|
* sspkey (expected to be NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN octets)
|
|
*/
|
|
/* dissect a string - header area contains:
|
|
two byte len
|
|
two byte maxlen
|
|
four byte offset of string in data area
|
|
The function returns the offset at the end of the string header,
|
|
but the 'end' parameter returns the offset of the end of the string itself
|
|
The 'start' parameter returns the offset of the beginning of the string
|
|
If there's no string, just use the offset of the end of the tvb as start/end.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
dissect_ntlmssp_string (tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset,
|
|
proto_tree *ntlmssp_tree,
|
|
gboolean unicode_strings,
|
|
int string_hf, int *start, int *end,
|
|
const char **stringp)
|
|
{
|
|
proto_tree *tree = NULL;
|
|
proto_item *tf = NULL;
|
|
gint16 string_length = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
gint16 string_maxlen = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset+2);
|
|
gint32 string_offset = tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset+4);
|
|
const char *string_text = NULL;
|
|
int result_length;
|
|
guint16 bc;
|
|
|
|
*start = (string_offset > offset+8 ? string_offset : (signed)tvb_reported_length(tvb));
|
|
if (0 == string_length) {
|
|
*end = *start;
|
|
if (ntlmssp_tree)
|
|
proto_tree_add_string(ntlmssp_tree, string_hf, tvb,
|
|
offset, 8, "NULL");
|
|
if (stringp != NULL)
|
|
*stringp = "";
|
|
return offset+8;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bc = result_length = string_length;
|
|
string_text = get_unicode_or_ascii_string(tvb, &string_offset,
|
|
unicode_strings, &result_length,
|
|
FALSE, TRUE, &bc);
|
|
|
|
if (stringp != NULL) {
|
|
if (!string_text) string_text = ""; /* Make sure we don't blow up later */
|
|
|
|
*stringp = string_text;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ntlmssp_tree) {
|
|
tf = proto_tree_add_string(ntlmssp_tree, string_hf, tvb,
|
|
string_offset, result_length, string_text);
|
|
tree = proto_item_add_subtree(tf, ett_ntlmssp_string);
|
|
}
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ntlmssp_string_len,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, string_length);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ntlmssp_string_maxlen,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, string_maxlen);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ntlmssp_string_offset,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, string_offset);
|
|
offset += 4;
|
|
|
|
*end = string_offset + string_length;
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* dissect a generic blob - header area contains:
|
|
two byte len
|
|
two byte maxlen
|
|
four byte offset of blob in data area
|
|
The function returns the offset at the end of the blob header,
|
|
but the 'end' parameter returns the offset of the end of the blob itself
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
dissect_ntlmssp_blob (tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset,
|
|
proto_tree *ntlmssp_tree,
|
|
int blob_hf, int *end, ntlmssp_blob *result)
|
|
{
|
|
proto_item *tf = NULL;
|
|
proto_tree *tree = NULL;
|
|
guint16 blob_length = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
guint16 blob_maxlen = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset+2);
|
|
guint32 blob_offset = tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset+4);
|
|
if (0 == blob_length) {
|
|
*end = (blob_offset > ((guint)offset)+8 ? blob_offset : ((guint)offset)+8);
|
|
if (ntlmssp_tree)
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(ntlmssp_tree, tvb, offset, 8, "%s: Empty",
|
|
proto_registrar_get_name(blob_hf));
|
|
return offset+8;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ntlmssp_tree) {
|
|
tf = proto_tree_add_item (ntlmssp_tree, blob_hf, tvb,
|
|
blob_offset, blob_length, FALSE);
|
|
tree = proto_item_add_subtree(tf, ett_ntlmssp_blob);
|
|
}
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ntlmssp_blob_len,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, blob_length);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ntlmssp_blob_maxlen,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, blob_maxlen);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ntlmssp_blob_offset,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, blob_offset);
|
|
offset += 4;
|
|
|
|
*end = blob_offset + blob_length;
|
|
|
|
if (result != NULL) {
|
|
result->length = blob_length;
|
|
memset(result->contents, 0, MAX_BLOB_SIZE);
|
|
if (blob_length < MAX_BLOB_SIZE)
|
|
{
|
|
tvb_memcpy(tvb, result->contents, blob_offset, blob_length);
|
|
if (blob_hf == hf_ntlmssp_auth_lmresponse && !(memcmp(tvb->real_data+blob_offset+8,"\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN)))
|
|
{
|
|
proto_tree_add_item (ntlmssp_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_ntlm_client_challenge,
|
|
tvb, blob_offset, 8, FALSE);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If we are dissecting the NTLM response and it is a NTLMv2
|
|
response call the appropriate dissector. */
|
|
|
|
if (blob_hf == hf_ntlmssp_auth_ntresponse && blob_length > 24)
|
|
{
|
|
proto_tree_add_item (ntlmssp_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_ntlm_client_challenge,
|
|
tvb, blob_offset+32, 8, FALSE);
|
|
dissect_ntlmv2_response(tvb, tree, blob_offset, blob_length);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
dissect_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags (tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset,
|
|
proto_tree *ntlmssp_tree,
|
|
guint32 negotiate_flags)
|
|
{
|
|
proto_tree *negotiate_flags_tree = NULL;
|
|
proto_item *tf = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (ntlmssp_tree) {
|
|
tf = proto_tree_add_uint (ntlmssp_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
negotiate_flags_tree = proto_item_add_subtree (tf, ett_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean (negotiate_flags_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_80000000,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean (negotiate_flags_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_40000000,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean (negotiate_flags_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_20000000,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean (negotiate_flags_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_10000000,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean (negotiate_flags_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_8000000,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean (negotiate_flags_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_4000000,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean (negotiate_flags_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_2000000,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean (negotiate_flags_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_1000000,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean (negotiate_flags_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_800000,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean (negotiate_flags_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_400000,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean (negotiate_flags_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_200000,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean (negotiate_flags_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_100000,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean (negotiate_flags_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_80000,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean (negotiate_flags_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_40000,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean (negotiate_flags_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_20000,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean (negotiate_flags_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_10000,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean (negotiate_flags_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_8000,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean (negotiate_flags_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_4000,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean (negotiate_flags_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_2000,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean (negotiate_flags_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_1000,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean (negotiate_flags_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_800,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean (negotiate_flags_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_400,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean (negotiate_flags_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_200,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean (negotiate_flags_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_100,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean (negotiate_flags_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_80,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean (negotiate_flags_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_40,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean (negotiate_flags_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_20,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean (negotiate_flags_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_10,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean (negotiate_flags_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_08,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean (negotiate_flags_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_04,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean (negotiate_flags_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_02,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean (negotiate_flags_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_01,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, negotiate_flags);
|
|
|
|
return (offset + 4);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Dissect "version" */
|
|
|
|
/* From MS-NLMP:
|
|
0 Major Version Number 1 byte
|
|
1 Minor Version Number 1 byte
|
|
2 Build Number short(LE)
|
|
3 (Reserved) 3 bytes
|
|
4 NTLM Current Revision 1 byte
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
dissect_ntlmssp_version(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset,
|
|
proto_tree *ntlmssp_tree)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ntlmssp_tree) {
|
|
proto_item *tf;
|
|
proto_tree *version_tree;
|
|
tf = proto_tree_add_none_format(ntlmssp_tree, hf_ntlmssp_version, tvb, offset, 8,
|
|
"Version %u.%u (Build %u); NTLM Current Revision %u",
|
|
tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset),
|
|
tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset+1),
|
|
tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset+2),
|
|
tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset+7));
|
|
version_tree = proto_item_add_subtree (tf, ett_ntlmssp_version);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(version_tree, hf_ntlmssp_version_major , tvb, offset , 1, ENC_NA);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(version_tree, hf_ntlmssp_version_minor , tvb, offset+1, 1, ENC_NA);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(version_tree, hf_ntlmssp_version_build_number , tvb, offset+2, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(version_tree, hf_ntlmssp_version_ntlm_current_revision, tvb, offset+7, 1, ENC_NA);
|
|
}
|
|
return offset+8;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Dissect a NTLM response. This is documented at
|
|
http://ubiqx.org/cifs/SMB.html#SMB.8, para 2.8.5.3 */
|
|
|
|
/* Attribute types */
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX - the davenport document says that a type of 5 has been seen,
|
|
* "apparently containing the 'parent' DNS domain for servers in
|
|
* subdomains".
|
|
* XXX: MS-NLMP info is newer than Davenport info;
|
|
* The attribute type list and the attribute names below are
|
|
* based upon MS-NLMP.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define NTLM_TARGET_INFO_END 0x0000
|
|
#define NTLM_TARGET_INFO_NB_COMPUTER_NAME 0x0001
|
|
#define NTLM_TARGET_INFO_NB_DOMAIN_NAME 0x0002
|
|
#define NTLM_TARGET_INFO_DNS_COMPUTER_NAME 0x0003
|
|
#define NTLM_TARGET_INFO_DNS_DOMAIN_NAME 0x0004
|
|
#define NTLM_TARGET_INFO_DNS_TREE_NAME 0x0005
|
|
#define NTLM_TARGET_INFO_FLAGS 0x0006
|
|
#define NTLM_TARGET_INFO_TIMESTAMP 0x0007
|
|
#define NTLM_TARGET_INFO_RESTRICTIONS 0x0008
|
|
#define NTLM_TARGET_INFO_TARGET_NAME 0x0009
|
|
#define NTLM_TARGET_INFO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS 0x000A
|
|
|
|
static const value_string ntlm_name_types[] = {
|
|
{ NTLM_TARGET_INFO_END, "End of list" },
|
|
{ NTLM_TARGET_INFO_NB_COMPUTER_NAME, "NetBIOS computer name" },
|
|
{ NTLM_TARGET_INFO_NB_DOMAIN_NAME, "NetBIOS domain name" },
|
|
{ NTLM_TARGET_INFO_DNS_COMPUTER_NAME, "DNS computer name" },
|
|
{ NTLM_TARGET_INFO_DNS_DOMAIN_NAME, "DNS domain name" },
|
|
{ NTLM_TARGET_INFO_DNS_TREE_NAME, "DNS tree name" },
|
|
{ NTLM_TARGET_INFO_FLAGS, "Flags" },
|
|
{ NTLM_TARGET_INFO_TIMESTAMP, "Timestamp" },
|
|
{ NTLM_TARGET_INFO_RESTRICTIONS, "Restrictions" },
|
|
{ NTLM_TARGET_INFO_TARGET_NAME, "Target Name"},
|
|
{ NTLM_TARGET_INFO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS, "Channel Bindings"},
|
|
{ 0, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/* The following *must* match the order of the list of attribute types */
|
|
/* Assumption: values in the list are a sequence starting with 0 and */
|
|
/* with no gaps allowing a direct access of the array by attribute type */
|
|
static int *ntlmssp_hf_challenge_target_info_hf_ptr_array[] = {
|
|
&hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_end,
|
|
&hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_nb_computer_name,
|
|
&hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_nb_domain_name,
|
|
&hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_dns_computer_name,
|
|
&hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_dns_domain_name,
|
|
&hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_dns_tree_name,
|
|
&hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_flags,
|
|
&hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_timestamp,
|
|
&hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_restrictions,
|
|
&hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_target_name,
|
|
&hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_channel_bindings
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static int *ntlmssp_hf_ntlmv2_response_hf_ptr_array[] = {
|
|
&hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_end,
|
|
&hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_nb_computer_name,
|
|
&hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_nb_domain_name,
|
|
&hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_dns_computer_name,
|
|
&hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_dns_domain_name,
|
|
&hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_dns_tree_name,
|
|
&hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_flags,
|
|
&hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_timestamp,
|
|
&hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_restrictions,
|
|
&hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_target_name,
|
|
&hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_channel_bindings
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
typedef struct _tif {
|
|
gint *ett;
|
|
int *hf_item_type;
|
|
int *hf_item_length;
|
|
int **hf_attr_array_p;
|
|
} tif_t;
|
|
|
|
static tif_t ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_tif = {
|
|
&ett_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_item,
|
|
&hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_item_type,
|
|
&hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_item_len,
|
|
ntlmssp_hf_challenge_target_info_hf_ptr_array
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static tif_t ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_tif = {
|
|
&ett_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_item,
|
|
&hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_item_type,
|
|
&hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_item_len,
|
|
ntlmssp_hf_ntlmv2_response_hf_ptr_array
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
dissect_ntlmssp_target_info_list(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree,
|
|
guint32 target_info_offset, guint16 target_info_length,
|
|
tif_t *tif_p)
|
|
{
|
|
guint32 item_offset;
|
|
guint16 item_type;
|
|
guint16 item_length;
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Now enumerate through the individual items in the list */
|
|
item_offset = target_info_offset;
|
|
|
|
while (item_offset < (target_info_offset + target_info_length)) {
|
|
proto_item *target_info_tf;
|
|
proto_tree *target_info_tree;
|
|
guint32 content_offset;
|
|
guint16 content_length;
|
|
guint32 type_offset;
|
|
guint32 len_offset;
|
|
|
|
int **hf_array_p = tif_p->hf_attr_array_p;
|
|
|
|
/* Content type */
|
|
type_offset = item_offset;
|
|
item_type = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, type_offset);
|
|
|
|
/* Content length */
|
|
len_offset = type_offset + 2;
|
|
content_length = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, len_offset);
|
|
|
|
/* Content value */
|
|
content_offset = len_offset + 2;
|
|
item_length = content_length + 4;
|
|
|
|
target_info_tf = proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, item_offset, item_length, "Attribute: %s",
|
|
val_to_str(item_type, ntlm_name_types, "Unknown (%d)"));
|
|
|
|
target_info_tree = proto_item_add_subtree (target_info_tf, *tif_p->ett);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item (target_info_tree, *tif_p->hf_item_type, tvb, type_offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item (target_info_tree, *tif_p->hf_item_length, tvb, len_offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
|
|
|
|
switch (item_type) {
|
|
case NTLM_TARGET_INFO_NB_COMPUTER_NAME:
|
|
case NTLM_TARGET_INFO_NB_DOMAIN_NAME:
|
|
case NTLM_TARGET_INFO_DNS_COMPUTER_NAME:
|
|
case NTLM_TARGET_INFO_DNS_DOMAIN_NAME:
|
|
case NTLM_TARGET_INFO_DNS_TREE_NAME:
|
|
case NTLM_TARGET_INFO_TARGET_NAME:
|
|
if (content_length > 0) {
|
|
const gchar *text;
|
|
|
|
text = tvb_get_ephemeral_faked_unicode(tvb, content_offset, content_length / 2, TRUE);
|
|
proto_tree_add_string(target_info_tree, *hf_array_p[item_type],
|
|
tvb, content_offset, content_length, text);
|
|
proto_item_append_text(target_info_tf, ": %s", text);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case NTLM_TARGET_INFO_FLAGS:
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(target_info_tree, *hf_array_p[item_type],
|
|
tvb, content_offset, content_length, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case NTLM_TARGET_INFO_TIMESTAMP:
|
|
dissect_nt_64bit_time(tvb, target_info_tree, content_offset, *hf_array_p[item_type]);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case NTLM_TARGET_INFO_RESTRICTIONS:
|
|
case NTLM_TARGET_INFO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS:
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(target_info_tree, *hf_array_p[item_type],
|
|
tvb, content_offset, content_length, ENC_NA);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
item_offset += item_length;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
dissect_ntlmv2_response(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, int offset, int len)
|
|
{
|
|
proto_item *ntlmv2_item = NULL;
|
|
proto_tree *ntlmv2_tree = NULL;
|
|
int orig_offset;
|
|
|
|
/* Dissect NTLMv2 bits&pieces */
|
|
orig_offset = offset;
|
|
|
|
if (tree) {
|
|
ntlmv2_item = proto_tree_add_item(
|
|
tree, hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response, tvb,
|
|
offset, len, TRUE);
|
|
ntlmv2_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(
|
|
ntlmv2_item, ett_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(
|
|
ntlmv2_tree, hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_hmac, tvb,
|
|
offset, 16, TRUE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 16;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(
|
|
ntlmv2_tree, hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_header, tvb,
|
|
offset, 4, TRUE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 4;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(
|
|
ntlmv2_tree, hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_reserved, tvb,
|
|
offset, 4, TRUE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 4;
|
|
|
|
offset = dissect_nt_64bit_time(
|
|
tvb, ntlmv2_tree, offset, hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_time);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(
|
|
ntlmv2_tree, hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_chal, tvb,
|
|
offset, 8, TRUE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 8;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(
|
|
ntlmv2_tree, hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_unknown, tvb,
|
|
offset, 4, TRUE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 4;
|
|
|
|
/* Variable length list of attributes */
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX - Windows puts one or more sets of 4 bytes of additional stuff (all zeros ?)
|
|
* at the end of the attributes.
|
|
* Samba's smbclient doesn't.
|
|
* Both of them appear to be able to connect to W2K SMB
|
|
* servers.
|
|
* The additional stuff will be dissected as extra "end" attributes.
|
|
*
|
|
*/
|
|
dissect_ntlmssp_target_info_list(tvb, ntlmv2_tree,
|
|
offset, len - (offset - orig_offset),
|
|
&ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_tif);
|
|
|
|
return offset+len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* tapping into ntlmssph not yet implemented */
|
|
static int
|
|
dissect_ntlmssp_negotiate (tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, proto_tree *ntlmssp_tree, ntlmssp_header_t *ntlmssph _U_)
|
|
{
|
|
guint32 negotiate_flags;
|
|
int data_start;
|
|
int data_end;
|
|
int item_start;
|
|
int item_end;
|
|
|
|
/* NTLMSSP Negotiate Flags */
|
|
negotiate_flags = tvb_get_letohl (tvb, offset);
|
|
offset = dissect_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags (tvb, offset, ntlmssp_tree,
|
|
negotiate_flags);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX - the davenport document says that these might not be
|
|
* sent at all, presumably meaning the length of the message
|
|
* isn't enough to contain them.
|
|
*/
|
|
offset = dissect_ntlmssp_string(tvb, offset, ntlmssp_tree, FALSE,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_domain,
|
|
&data_start, &data_end, NULL);
|
|
|
|
offset = dissect_ntlmssp_string(tvb, offset, ntlmssp_tree, FALSE,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_workstation,
|
|
&item_start, &item_end, NULL);
|
|
data_start = MIN(data_start, item_start);
|
|
data_end = MAX(data_end, item_end);
|
|
|
|
/* If there are more bytes before the data block dissect a version field */
|
|
if (offset < data_start) {
|
|
offset = dissect_ntlmssp_version(tvb, offset, ntlmssp_tree);
|
|
}
|
|
return data_end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
dissect_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_blob (tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset,
|
|
proto_tree *ntlmssp_tree,
|
|
int *end)
|
|
{
|
|
guint16 challenge_target_info_length = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
guint16 challenge_target_info_maxlen = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset+2);
|
|
guint32 challenge_target_info_offset = tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset+4);
|
|
proto_item *tf = NULL;
|
|
proto_tree *challenge_target_info_tree = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* the target info list is just a blob */
|
|
if (0 == challenge_target_info_length) {
|
|
*end = (challenge_target_info_offset > ((guint)offset)+8 ? challenge_target_info_offset : ((guint)offset)+8);
|
|
if (ntlmssp_tree)
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(ntlmssp_tree, tvb, offset, 8,
|
|
"Target Info List: Empty");
|
|
return offset+8;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ntlmssp_tree) {
|
|
tf = proto_tree_add_item (ntlmssp_tree, hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info, tvb,
|
|
challenge_target_info_offset, challenge_target_info_length, FALSE);
|
|
challenge_target_info_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(tf, ett_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info);
|
|
}
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(challenge_target_info_tree, hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_len,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, challenge_target_info_length);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(challenge_target_info_tree, hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_maxlen,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, challenge_target_info_maxlen);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(challenge_target_info_tree, hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_offset,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, challenge_target_info_offset);
|
|
offset += 4;
|
|
|
|
dissect_ntlmssp_target_info_list(tvb, challenge_target_info_tree,
|
|
challenge_target_info_offset, challenge_target_info_length,
|
|
&ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_tif);
|
|
|
|
*end = challenge_target_info_offset + challenge_target_info_length;
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* tapping into ntlmssph not yet implemented */
|
|
static int
|
|
dissect_ntlmssp_challenge (tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, int offset,
|
|
proto_tree *ntlmssp_tree, ntlmssp_header_t *ntlmssph _U_)
|
|
{
|
|
guint32 negotiate_flags;
|
|
int item_start, item_end;
|
|
int data_start, data_end; /* MIN and MAX seen */
|
|
guint8 clientkey[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN]; /* NTLMSSP cipher key for client */
|
|
guint8 serverkey[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN]; /* NTLMSSP cipher key for server*/
|
|
ntlmssp_info *conv_ntlmssp_info = NULL;
|
|
conversation_t *conversation;
|
|
gboolean unicode_strings = FALSE;
|
|
guint8 challenge[8];
|
|
guint8 tmp[8];
|
|
guint8 sspkey[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN]; /* NTLMSSP cipher key */
|
|
int ssp_key_len; /* Either 8 or 16 (40 bit or 128) */
|
|
|
|
/* need to find unicode flag */
|
|
negotiate_flags = tvb_get_letohl (tvb, offset+8);
|
|
if (negotiate_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE)
|
|
unicode_strings = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
/* Target name */
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX - the davenport document (and MS-NLMP) calls this "Target Name",
|
|
* presumably because non-domain targets are supported.
|
|
* XXX - Original name "domain" changed to "target_name" to match MS-NLMP
|
|
*/
|
|
offset = dissect_ntlmssp_string(tvb, offset, ntlmssp_tree, unicode_strings,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_name,
|
|
&item_start, &item_end, NULL);
|
|
data_start = item_start;
|
|
data_end = item_end;
|
|
|
|
/* NTLMSSP Negotiate Flags */
|
|
offset = dissect_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags (tvb, offset, ntlmssp_tree,
|
|
negotiate_flags);
|
|
|
|
/* NTLMSSP NT Lan Manager Challenge */
|
|
proto_tree_add_item (ntlmssp_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_ntlm_server_challenge,
|
|
tvb, offset, 8, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Store the flags and the RC4 state information with the conversation,
|
|
* as they're needed in order to dissect subsequent messages.
|
|
*/
|
|
conversation = find_or_create_conversation(pinfo);
|
|
|
|
tvb_memcpy(tvb, tmp, offset, 8); /* challenge */
|
|
/* We can face more than one NTLM exchange over the same couple of IP and ports ...*/
|
|
conv_ntlmssp_info = conversation_get_proto_data(conversation, proto_ntlmssp);
|
|
/* XXX: The following code is (re)executed every time a particular frame is dissected
|
|
* (in whatever order). Thus it seems to me that "multiple exchanges" might not be
|
|
* handled well depending on the order that frames are visited after the initial dissection.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!conv_ntlmssp_info || memcmp(tmp,conv_ntlmssp_info->server_challenge,8) != 0) {
|
|
conv_ntlmssp_info = se_alloc(sizeof(ntlmssp_info));
|
|
/* Insert the flags into the conversation */
|
|
conv_ntlmssp_info->flags = negotiate_flags;
|
|
/* Insert the RC4 state information into the conversation */
|
|
tvb_memcpy(tvb, challenge, offset, 8);
|
|
tvb_memcpy(tvb, conv_ntlmssp_info->server_challenge, offset, 8);
|
|
conv_ntlmssp_info->is_auth_ntlm_v2=0;
|
|
/* Between the challenge and the user provided password, we can build the
|
|
NTLMSSP key and initialize the cipher if we are not in EXTENDED SECURITY
|
|
in this case we need the client challenge as well*/
|
|
/* BTW this is true just if we are in LM Authentification if not the logic is a bit different.
|
|
* Right now it's not very clear what is LM Authentification it __seems__ to be when
|
|
* NEGOTIATE NT ONLY is not set and NEGOSIATE EXTENDED SECURITY is not set as well*/
|
|
if (!(conv_ntlmssp_info->flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SECURITY))
|
|
{
|
|
conv_ntlmssp_info->rc4_state_initialized = 0;
|
|
create_ntlmssp_v1_key(gbl_nt_password, conv_ntlmssp_info->server_challenge,NULL, sspkey,NULL,conv_ntlmssp_info->flags,conv_ntlmssp_info->ntlm_response.contents,conv_ntlmssp_info->lm_response.contents);
|
|
if( memcmp(sspkey,gbl_zeros,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN) != 0 ) {
|
|
get_sealing_rc4key(sspkey,conv_ntlmssp_info->flags,&ssp_key_len,clientkey,serverkey);
|
|
crypt_rc4_init(&conv_ntlmssp_info->rc4_state_client, sspkey, ssp_key_len);
|
|
crypt_rc4_init(&conv_ntlmssp_info->rc4_state_server, sspkey, ssp_key_len);
|
|
conv_ntlmssp_info->server_dest_port = pinfo->destport;
|
|
conv_ntlmssp_info->rc4_state_initialized = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
conversation_add_proto_data(conversation, proto_ntlmssp, conv_ntlmssp_info);
|
|
}
|
|
offset += 8;
|
|
|
|
/* If no more bytes (ie: no "reserved", ...) before start of data block, then return */
|
|
/* XXX: According to Davenport "This form is seen in older Win9x-based systems" */
|
|
/* Also: I've seen a capture with an HTTP CONNECT proxy-authentication */
|
|
/* message wherein the challenge from the proxy has this form. */
|
|
if (offset >= data_start) {
|
|
return data_end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Reserved (function not completely known) */
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX - SSP key? The davenport document says
|
|
*
|
|
* The context field is typically populated when Negotiate Local
|
|
* Call is set. It contains an SSPI context handle, which allows
|
|
* the client to "short-circuit" authentication and effectively
|
|
* circumvent responding to the challenge. Physically, the context
|
|
* is two long values. This is covered in greater detail later,
|
|
* in the "Local Authentication" section.
|
|
*
|
|
* It also says that that information may be omitted.
|
|
*/
|
|
proto_tree_add_item (ntlmssp_tree, hf_ntlmssp_reserved,
|
|
tvb, offset, 8, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 8;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The presence or absence of this field is not obviously correlated
|
|
* with any flags in the previous NEGOTIATE message or in this
|
|
* message (other than the "Workstation Supplied" and "Domain
|
|
* Supplied" flags in the NEGOTIATE message, at least in the capture
|
|
* I've seen - but those also correlate with the presence of workstation
|
|
* and domain name fields, so it doesn't seem to make sense that they
|
|
* actually *indicate* whether the subsequent CHALLENGE has an
|
|
* address list).
|
|
*/
|
|
if (offset < data_start) {
|
|
offset = dissect_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_blob(tvb, offset, ntlmssp_tree, &item_end);
|
|
/* XXX: This code assumes that the address list in the data block */
|
|
/* is always after the target name. Is this OK ? */
|
|
data_end = MAX(data_end, item_end);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If there are more bytes before the data block dissect a version field */
|
|
if (offset < data_start) {
|
|
offset = dissect_ntlmssp_version(tvb, offset, ntlmssp_tree);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return MAX(offset, data_end);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
dissect_ntlmssp_auth (tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, int offset,
|
|
proto_tree *ntlmssp_tree, ntlmssp_header_t *ntlmssph)
|
|
{
|
|
int item_start, item_end;
|
|
int data_start, data_end = 0;
|
|
guint32 negotiate_flags;
|
|
guint8 sspkey[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN]; /* exported session key */
|
|
guint8 clientkey[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN]; /* NTLMSSP cipher key for client */
|
|
guint8 serverkey[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN]; /* NTLMSSP cipher key for server*/
|
|
guint8 encryptedsessionkey[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN];
|
|
ntlmssp_blob sessionblob;
|
|
gboolean unicode_strings = FALSE;
|
|
ntlmssp_info *conv_ntlmssp_info = NULL;
|
|
conversation_t *conversation;
|
|
int ssp_key_len;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get flag info from the original negotiate message, if any.
|
|
* This is because the flag information is sometimes missing from
|
|
* the AUTHENTICATE message, so we can't figure out whether
|
|
* strings are Unicode or not by looking at *our* flags.
|
|
* XXX it seems it's more from the CHALLENGE message, which is more clever in fact
|
|
* because the server can change some flags.
|
|
* But according to MS NTLMSSP doc it's not that simple.
|
|
* In case of Conection less mode AUTHENTICATE flags should be used because they
|
|
* reprensent the choice of the client after having been informed of options of the
|
|
* server in the CHALLENGE message.
|
|
* In Connection mode then the CHALLENGE flags should (must ?) be used
|
|
* XXX: MS-NLMP says the flag field in the AUTHENTICATE message "contains the set of bit
|
|
* flags (section 2.2.2.5) negotiated in the previous messages."
|
|
* I read that to mean that the flags for in connection-mode AUTHENTICATE also represent
|
|
* the choice of the client (for the flags which are negotiated).
|
|
* XXX: In the absence of CHALLENGE flags, as a last resort we'll use the flags
|
|
* (if available) from this AUTHENTICATE message.
|
|
* I've seen a capture which does an HTTP CONNECT which:
|
|
* - has the NEGOTIATE & CHALLENGE messages in one TCP connection;
|
|
* - has the AUTHENTICATE message in a second TCP connection;
|
|
* (The authentication aparently succeeded).
|
|
*/
|
|
conv_ntlmssp_info = p_get_proto_data(pinfo->fd, proto_ntlmssp);
|
|
if (conv_ntlmssp_info == NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* There isn't any. Is there any from this conversation? If so,
|
|
* it means this is the first time we've dissected this frame, so
|
|
* we should give it flag info.
|
|
*/
|
|
/* XXX: Create conv_ntlmssp_info & etc if no previous CHALLENGE seen */
|
|
/* so we'll have a place to store flags. */
|
|
/* This is a bit brute-force but looks like it will be OK. */
|
|
conversation = find_or_create_conversation(pinfo);
|
|
conv_ntlmssp_info = conversation_get_proto_data(conversation, proto_ntlmssp);
|
|
if (conv_ntlmssp_info == NULL) {
|
|
conv_ntlmssp_info = se_alloc0(sizeof(ntlmssp_info));
|
|
conversation_add_proto_data(conversation, proto_ntlmssp, conv_ntlmssp_info);
|
|
}
|
|
/* XXX: The *conv_ntlmssp_info struct attached to the frame is the
|
|
same as the one attached to the conversation. That is: *both* point to
|
|
the exact same struct in memory. Is this what is indended ? */
|
|
p_add_proto_data(pinfo->fd, proto_ntlmssp, conv_ntlmssp_info);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (conv_ntlmssp_info != NULL) {
|
|
if (conv_ntlmssp_info->flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE)
|
|
unicode_strings = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Sometimes the session key and flags are missing.
|
|
* Sometimes the session key is present but the flags are missing.
|
|
* XXX Who stay so ? Reading spec I would rather say the opposite: flags are
|
|
* always present, session information are always there as well but sometime
|
|
* session information could be null (in case of no session)
|
|
* Sometimes they're both present.
|
|
*
|
|
* This does not correlate with any flags in the previous CHALLENGE
|
|
* message, and only correlates with "Negotiate Unicode", "Workstation
|
|
* Supplied", and "Domain Supplied" in the NEGOTIATE message - but
|
|
* those don't make sense as flags to use to determine this.
|
|
*
|
|
* So we check all of the descriptors to figure out where the data
|
|
* area begins, and if the session key or the flags would be in the
|
|
* middle of the data area, we assume the field in question is
|
|
* missing.
|
|
*
|
|
* XXX - Reading Davenport and MS-NLMP: as I see it the possibilities are:
|
|
* a. No session-key; no flags; no version ("Win9x")
|
|
* b. Session-key & flags.
|
|
* c. Session-key, flags & version.
|
|
* In cases b and c the session key may be "null".
|
|
*
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* Lan Manager response */
|
|
data_start = tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset+4);
|
|
offset = dissect_ntlmssp_blob(tvb, offset, ntlmssp_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_auth_lmresponse,
|
|
&item_end,
|
|
conv_ntlmssp_info == NULL ? NULL :
|
|
&conv_ntlmssp_info->lm_response);
|
|
data_end = MAX(data_end, item_end);
|
|
|
|
/* NTLM response */
|
|
item_start = tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset+4);
|
|
offset = dissect_ntlmssp_blob(tvb, offset, ntlmssp_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_auth_ntresponse,
|
|
&item_end,
|
|
conv_ntlmssp_info == NULL ? NULL :
|
|
&conv_ntlmssp_info->ntlm_response);
|
|
if( conv_ntlmssp_info != NULL && conv_ntlmssp_info->ntlm_response.length > 24 ) {
|
|
memcpy(conv_ntlmssp_info->client_challenge,conv_ntlmssp_info->ntlm_response.contents+32,8);
|
|
}
|
|
data_start = MIN(data_start, item_start);
|
|
data_end = MAX(data_end, item_end);
|
|
if( conv_ntlmssp_info != NULL )
|
|
{
|
|
if( conv_ntlmssp_info->ntlm_response.length > 24 )
|
|
{
|
|
conv_ntlmssp_info->is_auth_ntlm_v2=1;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
conv_ntlmssp_info->is_auth_ntlm_v2=0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* domain name */
|
|
item_start = tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset+4);
|
|
offset = dissect_ntlmssp_string(tvb, offset, ntlmssp_tree,
|
|
unicode_strings,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_auth_domain,
|
|
&item_start, &item_end, &(ntlmssph->domain_name));
|
|
/*ntlmssph->domain_name_len=item_end-item_start;*/
|
|
data_start = MIN(data_start, item_start);
|
|
data_end = MAX(data_end, item_end);
|
|
|
|
/* user name */
|
|
item_start = tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset+4);
|
|
offset = dissect_ntlmssp_string(tvb, offset, ntlmssp_tree,
|
|
unicode_strings,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_auth_username,
|
|
&item_start, &item_end, &(ntlmssph->acct_name));
|
|
/*ntlmssph->acct_name_len=item_end-item_start;*/
|
|
data_start = MIN(data_start, item_start);
|
|
data_end = MAX(data_end, item_end);
|
|
|
|
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", User: %s\\%s",
|
|
ntlmssph->domain_name, ntlmssph->acct_name);
|
|
|
|
/* hostname */
|
|
item_start = tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset+4);
|
|
offset = dissect_ntlmssp_string(tvb, offset, ntlmssp_tree,
|
|
unicode_strings,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_auth_hostname,
|
|
&item_start, &item_end, &(ntlmssph->host_name));
|
|
data_start = MIN(data_start, item_start);
|
|
data_end = MAX(data_end, item_end);
|
|
|
|
memset(sessionblob.contents, 0, MAX_BLOB_SIZE);
|
|
sessionblob.length = 0;
|
|
if (offset < data_start) {
|
|
/* Session Key */
|
|
offset = dissect_ntlmssp_blob(tvb, offset, ntlmssp_tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_auth_sesskey,
|
|
&item_end, &sessionblob);
|
|
data_end = MAX(data_end, item_end);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (offset < data_start) {
|
|
/* NTLMSSP Negotiate Flags */
|
|
negotiate_flags = tvb_get_letohl (tvb, offset);
|
|
offset = dissect_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags (tvb, offset, ntlmssp_tree,
|
|
negotiate_flags);
|
|
/* If no previous flags seen (ie: no previous CHALLENGE) use flags
|
|
from the AUTHENTICATE message).
|
|
Assumption: (flags == 0) means flags not previously seen */
|
|
if ((conv_ntlmssp_info != NULL) && (conv_ntlmssp_info->flags == 0)) {
|
|
conv_ntlmssp_info->flags = negotiate_flags;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If there are more bytes before the data block dissect a version field */
|
|
if (offset < data_start) {
|
|
offset = dissect_ntlmssp_version(tvb, offset, ntlmssp_tree);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If there are still more bytes before the data block dissect an MIC (message integrity_code) field */
|
|
/* (See MS-NLMP) */
|
|
if (offset < data_start) {
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ntlmssp_tree, hf_ntlmssp_message_integrity_code, tvb, offset, 16, ENC_NA);
|
|
offset += 16;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ( sessionblob.length > NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN ) {
|
|
expert_add_info_format(pinfo, NULL, PI_WARN, PI_UNDECODED, "Session blob length too long: %u", sessionblob.length);
|
|
} else if( sessionblob.length != 0 ) {
|
|
memcpy(encryptedsessionkey,sessionblob.contents,sessionblob.length);
|
|
/* Try to attach to an existing conversation if not then it's useless to try to do so
|
|
* because we are missing important information (ie. server challenge)
|
|
*/
|
|
if (conv_ntlmssp_info) {
|
|
/* If we are in EXTENDED SECURITY then we can now initialize cipher */
|
|
if ((conv_ntlmssp_info->flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SECURITY))
|
|
{
|
|
conv_ntlmssp_info->rc4_state_initialized = 0;
|
|
if( conv_ntlmssp_info->is_auth_ntlm_v2 ) {
|
|
create_ntlmssp_v2_key(gbl_nt_password, conv_ntlmssp_info->server_challenge,conv_ntlmssp_info->client_challenge, sspkey,encryptedsessionkey,conv_ntlmssp_info->flags,&conv_ntlmssp_info->ntlm_response,&conv_ntlmssp_info->lm_response,ntlmssph);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
memcpy(conv_ntlmssp_info->client_challenge,conv_ntlmssp_info->lm_response.contents,8);
|
|
create_ntlmssp_v1_key(gbl_nt_password, conv_ntlmssp_info->server_challenge,conv_ntlmssp_info->client_challenge, sspkey,encryptedsessionkey,conv_ntlmssp_info->flags,conv_ntlmssp_info->ntlm_response.contents,conv_ntlmssp_info->lm_response.contents);
|
|
}
|
|
/* ssp is the exported session key */
|
|
if( memcmp(sspkey,gbl_zeros,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN) != 0) {
|
|
get_sealing_rc4key(sspkey,conv_ntlmssp_info->flags,&ssp_key_len,clientkey,serverkey);
|
|
get_siging_key((guint8*)&conv_ntlmssp_info->sign_key_server,(guint8*)&conv_ntlmssp_info->sign_key_client,sspkey,ssp_key_len);
|
|
crypt_rc4_init(&conv_ntlmssp_info->rc4_state_server, serverkey, ssp_key_len);
|
|
crypt_rc4_init(&conv_ntlmssp_info->rc4_state_client, clientkey, ssp_key_len);
|
|
conv_ntlmssp_info->server_dest_port = pinfo->destport;
|
|
conv_ntlmssp_info->rc4_state_initialized = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return MAX(offset, data_end);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static guint8*
|
|
get_sign_key(packet_info *pinfo, int cryptpeer)
|
|
{
|
|
conversation_t *conversation;
|
|
ntlmssp_info *conv_ntlmssp_info;
|
|
|
|
conversation = find_conversation(pinfo->fd->num, &pinfo->src, &pinfo->dst,
|
|
pinfo->ptype, pinfo->srcport,
|
|
pinfo->destport, 0);
|
|
if (conversation == NULL) {
|
|
/* We don't have a conversation. In this case, stop processing
|
|
because we do not have enough info to decrypt the payload */
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
/* We have a conversation, check for encryption state */
|
|
conv_ntlmssp_info = conversation_get_proto_data(conversation,
|
|
proto_ntlmssp);
|
|
if (conv_ntlmssp_info == NULL) {
|
|
/* No encryption state tied to the conversation. Therefore, we
|
|
cannot decrypt the payload */
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
/* We have the encryption state in the conversation. So return the
|
|
crypt state tied to the requested peer
|
|
*/
|
|
if (cryptpeer == 1) {
|
|
return (guint8*)&conv_ntlmssp_info->sign_key_client;
|
|
} else {
|
|
return (guint8*)&conv_ntlmssp_info->sign_key_server;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get the encryption state tied to this conversation. cryptpeer indicates
|
|
* whether to retrieve the client key (1) or the server key (0)
|
|
*/
|
|
static rc4_state_struct *
|
|
get_encrypted_state(packet_info *pinfo, int cryptpeer)
|
|
{
|
|
conversation_t *conversation;
|
|
ntlmssp_info *conv_ntlmssp_info;
|
|
|
|
conversation = find_conversation(pinfo->fd->num, &pinfo->src, &pinfo->dst,
|
|
pinfo->ptype, pinfo->srcport,
|
|
pinfo->destport, 0);
|
|
if (conversation == NULL) {
|
|
/* We don't have a conversation. In this case, stop processing
|
|
because we do not have enough info to decrypt the payload */
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
/* We have a conversation, check for encryption state */
|
|
conv_ntlmssp_info = conversation_get_proto_data(conversation,
|
|
proto_ntlmssp);
|
|
if (conv_ntlmssp_info == NULL) {
|
|
/* No encryption state tied to the conversation. Therefore, we
|
|
cannot decrypt the payload */
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
/* We have the encryption state in the conversation. So return the
|
|
crypt state tied to the requested peer
|
|
*/
|
|
if (cryptpeer == 1) {
|
|
return &conv_ntlmssp_info->rc4_state_client;
|
|
} else {
|
|
return &conv_ntlmssp_info->rc4_state_server;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
decrypt_data_payload(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, guint32 encrypted_block_length,
|
|
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree _U_,gpointer key);
|
|
static void
|
|
decrypt_verifier(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, guint32 encrypted_block_length,
|
|
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,gpointer key);
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
static tvbuff_t *
|
|
dissect_ntlmssp_encrypted_payload(tvbuff_t *data_tvb,
|
|
tvbuff_t *auth_tvb _U_,
|
|
int offset,
|
|
packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
dcerpc_auth_info *auth_info _U_)
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
dissect_ntlmssp_payload(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree )
|
|
{
|
|
volatile int offset = 0;
|
|
proto_tree *volatile ntlmssp_tree = NULL;
|
|
proto_item *tf = NULL;
|
|
guint32 length;
|
|
guint32 encrypted_block_length;
|
|
guint8 key[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN];
|
|
/* the magic ntlm is the identifier of a NTLMSSP packet that's 00 00 00 01
|
|
*/
|
|
guint32 ntlm_magic_size = 4;
|
|
guint32 ntlm_signature_size = 8;
|
|
guint32 ntlm_seq_size = 4;
|
|
void *pd_save;
|
|
|
|
length = tvb_length (tvb);
|
|
/* signature + seq + real payload */
|
|
encrypted_block_length = length - ntlm_magic_size;
|
|
|
|
if (encrypted_block_length < (ntlm_signature_size + ntlm_seq_size)) {
|
|
/* Don't know why this would happen, but if it does, don't even bother
|
|
attempting decryption/dissection */
|
|
return offset + length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Setup a new tree for the NTLMSSP payload */
|
|
if (tree) {
|
|
tf = proto_tree_add_item (tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_verf,
|
|
tvb, offset, -1, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
ntlmssp_tree = proto_item_add_subtree (tf,
|
|
ett_ntlmssp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Catch the ReportedBoundsError exception; the stuff we've been
|
|
* handed doesn't necessarily run to the end of the packet, it's
|
|
* an item inside a packet, so if it happens to be malformed (or
|
|
* we, or a dissector we call, has a bug), so that an exception
|
|
* is thrown, we want to report the error, but return and let
|
|
* our caller dissect the rest of the packet.
|
|
*
|
|
* If it gets a BoundsError, we can stop, as there's nothing more
|
|
* in the packet after our blob to see, so we just re-throw the
|
|
* exception.
|
|
*/
|
|
pd_save = pinfo->private_data;
|
|
TRY {
|
|
/* Version number */
|
|
proto_tree_add_item (ntlmssp_tree, hf_ntlmssp_verf_vers,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, TRUE);
|
|
offset += 4;
|
|
|
|
/* Encrypted body */
|
|
proto_tree_add_item (ntlmssp_tree, hf_ntlmssp_verf_body,
|
|
tvb, offset, ntlm_signature_size + ntlm_seq_size, TRUE);
|
|
tvb_memcpy(tvb, key, offset, ntlm_signature_size + ntlm_seq_size);
|
|
/* Try to decrypt */
|
|
decrypt_data_payload (tvb, offset+(ntlm_signature_size + ntlm_seq_size), encrypted_block_length-(ntlm_signature_size + ntlm_seq_size), pinfo, ntlmssp_tree,key);
|
|
decrypt_verifier (tvb, offset, ntlm_signature_size + ntlm_seq_size, pinfo, ntlmssp_tree,key);
|
|
/* let's try to hook ourselves here */
|
|
|
|
offset += 12;
|
|
} CATCH(BoundsError) {
|
|
RETHROW;
|
|
} CATCH(ReportedBoundsError) {
|
|
/* Restore the private_data structure in case one of the
|
|
* called dissectors modified it (and, due to the exception,
|
|
* was unable to restore it).
|
|
*/
|
|
pinfo->private_data = pd_save;
|
|
show_reported_bounds_error(tvb, pinfo, tree);
|
|
} ENDTRY;
|
|
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
decrypt_data_payload(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, guint32 encrypted_block_length,
|
|
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree _U_,gpointer key)
|
|
{
|
|
tvbuff_t *decr_tvb; /* Used to display decrypted buffer */
|
|
guint8 *peer_block;
|
|
conversation_t *conversation;
|
|
rc4_state_struct *rc4_state;
|
|
rc4_state_struct *rc4_state_peer;
|
|
ntlmssp_info *conv_ntlmssp_info = NULL;
|
|
ntlmssp_packet_info *packet_ntlmssp_info = NULL;
|
|
ntlmssp_packet_info *stored_packet_ntlmssp_info = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Check to see if we already have state for this packet */
|
|
packet_ntlmssp_info = p_get_proto_data(pinfo->fd, proto_ntlmssp);
|
|
if (packet_ntlmssp_info == NULL) {
|
|
/* We don't have any packet state, so create one */
|
|
packet_ntlmssp_info = se_alloc0(sizeof(ntlmssp_packet_info));
|
|
p_add_proto_data(pinfo->fd, proto_ntlmssp, packet_ntlmssp_info);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!packet_ntlmssp_info->payload_decrypted) {
|
|
/* Pull the challenge info from the conversation */
|
|
conversation = find_conversation(pinfo->fd->num, &pinfo->src, &pinfo->dst,
|
|
pinfo->ptype, pinfo->srcport,
|
|
pinfo->destport, 0);
|
|
if (conversation == NULL) {
|
|
/* There is no conversation, thus no encryption state */
|
|
return ;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
conv_ntlmssp_info = conversation_get_proto_data(conversation,
|
|
proto_ntlmssp);
|
|
if (conv_ntlmssp_info == NULL) {
|
|
/* There is no NTLMSSP state tied to the conversation */
|
|
return ;
|
|
}
|
|
if (conv_ntlmssp_info->rc4_state_initialized != 1 ) {
|
|
/* The crypto sybsystem is not initialized. This means that either
|
|
the conversation did not include a challenge, or that we do not have the right password */
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if( key != NULL ){
|
|
stored_packet_ntlmssp_info = g_hash_table_lookup(hash_packet,key);
|
|
}
|
|
if( stored_packet_ntlmssp_info != NULL && stored_packet_ntlmssp_info->payload_decrypted == TRUE)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Mat TBD (stderr,"Found a already decrypted packet\n");*/
|
|
memcpy(packet_ntlmssp_info,stored_packet_ntlmssp_info,sizeof(ntlmssp_packet_info));
|
|
/* Mat TBD printnbyte(packet_ntlmssp_info->decrypted_payload,encrypted_block_length,"Data: ","\n");*/
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* Get the pair of RC4 state structures. One is used for to decrypt the
|
|
payload. The other is used to re-encrypt the payload to represent
|
|
the peer */
|
|
if (conv_ntlmssp_info->server_dest_port == pinfo->destport) {
|
|
/* client */
|
|
rc4_state = get_encrypted_state(pinfo, 1);
|
|
rc4_state_peer = get_encrypted_state(pinfo, 0);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* server */
|
|
rc4_state = get_encrypted_state(pinfo, 0);
|
|
rc4_state_peer = get_encrypted_state(pinfo, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rc4_state == NULL ) {
|
|
/* There is no encryption state, so we cannot decrypt */
|
|
return ;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Store the decrypted contents in the packet state struct
|
|
(of course at this point, they aren't decrypted yet) */
|
|
packet_ntlmssp_info->decrypted_payload = tvb_memdup(tvb, offset,
|
|
encrypted_block_length);
|
|
packet_ntlmssp_info->payload_len = encrypted_block_length;
|
|
decrypted_payloads = g_slist_prepend(decrypted_payloads,
|
|
packet_ntlmssp_info->decrypted_payload);
|
|
if( key != NULL ) {
|
|
g_hash_table_insert(hash_packet,key,packet_ntlmssp_info);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Do the decryption of the payload */
|
|
crypt_rc4(rc4_state, packet_ntlmssp_info->decrypted_payload,
|
|
encrypted_block_length);
|
|
/* decrypt the verifier */
|
|
/*printnchar(packet_ntlmssp_info->decrypted_payload,encrypted_block_length,"data: ","\n");*/
|
|
/* We setup a temporary buffer so we can re-encrypt the payload after
|
|
decryption. This is to update the opposite peer's RC4 state
|
|
it's usefull when we have only one key for both conversation
|
|
in case of KEY_EXCH we have independant key so this is not needed*/
|
|
if( !(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH & conv_ntlmssp_info->flags)) {
|
|
peer_block = ep_memdup(packet_ntlmssp_info->decrypted_payload, encrypted_block_length);
|
|
crypt_rc4(rc4_state_peer, peer_block, encrypted_block_length);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
packet_ntlmssp_info->payload_decrypted = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Show the decrypted buffer in a new window */
|
|
decr_tvb = tvb_new_real_data(packet_ntlmssp_info->decrypted_payload,
|
|
encrypted_block_length,
|
|
encrypted_block_length);
|
|
|
|
tvb_set_child_real_data_tvbuff(tvb, decr_tvb);
|
|
pinfo->gssapi_decrypted_tvb = decr_tvb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
dissect_ntlmssp(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree)
|
|
{
|
|
volatile int offset = 0;
|
|
proto_tree *volatile ntlmssp_tree = NULL;
|
|
proto_item *tf = NULL;
|
|
ntlmssp_header_t *ntlmssph;
|
|
void *pd_save;
|
|
|
|
ntlmssph=ep_alloc(sizeof(ntlmssp_header_t));
|
|
ntlmssph->type=0;
|
|
ntlmssph->domain_name=NULL;
|
|
ntlmssph->acct_name=NULL;
|
|
ntlmssph->host_name=NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Setup a new tree for the NTLMSSP payload */
|
|
if (tree) {
|
|
tf = proto_tree_add_item (tree,
|
|
proto_ntlmssp,
|
|
tvb, offset, -1, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
ntlmssp_tree = proto_item_add_subtree (tf,
|
|
ett_ntlmssp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Catch the ReportedBoundsError exception; the stuff we've been
|
|
* handed doesn't necessarily run to the end of the packet, it's
|
|
* an item inside a packet, so if it happens to be malformed (or
|
|
* we, or a dissector we call, has a bug), so that an exception
|
|
* is thrown, we want to report the error, but return and let
|
|
* our caller dissect the rest of the packet.
|
|
*
|
|
* If it gets a BoundsError, we can stop, as there's nothing more
|
|
* in the packet after our blob to see, so we just re-throw the
|
|
* exception.
|
|
*/
|
|
pd_save = pinfo->private_data;
|
|
TRY {
|
|
/* NTLMSSP constant */
|
|
proto_tree_add_item (ntlmssp_tree, hf_ntlmssp_auth,
|
|
tvb, offset, 8, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 8;
|
|
|
|
/* NTLMSSP Message Type */
|
|
proto_tree_add_item (ntlmssp_tree, hf_ntlmssp_message_type,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, TRUE);
|
|
ntlmssph->type = tvb_get_letohl (tvb, offset);
|
|
offset += 4;
|
|
|
|
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", %s",
|
|
val_to_str(ntlmssph->type,
|
|
ntlmssp_message_types,
|
|
"Unknown message type"));
|
|
|
|
/* Call the appropriate dissector based on the Message Type */
|
|
switch (ntlmssph->type) {
|
|
|
|
case NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE:
|
|
offset = dissect_ntlmssp_negotiate (tvb, offset, ntlmssp_tree, ntlmssph);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case NTLMSSP_CHALLENGE:
|
|
offset = dissect_ntlmssp_challenge (tvb, pinfo, offset, ntlmssp_tree, ntlmssph);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case NTLMSSP_AUTH:
|
|
offset = dissect_ntlmssp_auth (tvb, pinfo, offset, ntlmssp_tree, ntlmssph);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
/* Unrecognized message type */
|
|
proto_tree_add_text (ntlmssp_tree, tvb, offset, -1,
|
|
"Unrecognized NTLMSSP Message");
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
} CATCH(BoundsError) {
|
|
RETHROW;
|
|
} CATCH(ReportedBoundsError) {
|
|
/* Restore the private_data structure in case one of the
|
|
* called dissectors modified it (and, due to the exception,
|
|
* was unable to restore it).
|
|
*/
|
|
pinfo->private_data = pd_save;
|
|
show_reported_bounds_error(tvb, pinfo, tree);
|
|
} ENDTRY;
|
|
|
|
/*tap_queue_packet(ntlmssp_tap, pinfo, ntlmssph);*/
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* See page 45 of "DCE/RPC over SMB" by Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
decrypt_verifier(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, guint32 encrypted_block_length,
|
|
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,gpointer key)
|
|
{
|
|
proto_tree *decr_tree = NULL;
|
|
proto_item *tf = NULL;
|
|
conversation_t *conversation;
|
|
guint8* sign_key;
|
|
rc4_state_struct *rc4_state;
|
|
rc4_state_struct *rc4_state_peer;
|
|
tvbuff_t *decr_tvb; /* Used to display decrypted buffer */
|
|
guint8 *peer_block;
|
|
guint8 *check_buf;
|
|
guint8 calculated_md5[NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN];
|
|
ntlmssp_info *conv_ntlmssp_info = NULL;
|
|
ntlmssp_packet_info *packet_ntlmssp_info = NULL;
|
|
int decrypted_offset = 0;
|
|
int sequence = 0;
|
|
|
|
ntlmssp_packet_info *stored_packet_ntlmssp_info = NULL;
|
|
packet_ntlmssp_info = p_get_proto_data(pinfo->fd, proto_ntlmssp);
|
|
if (packet_ntlmssp_info == NULL) {
|
|
/* We don't have data for this packet */
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
conversation = find_conversation(pinfo->fd->num, &pinfo->src, &pinfo->dst,
|
|
pinfo->ptype, pinfo->srcport,
|
|
pinfo->destport, 0);
|
|
if (conversation == NULL) {
|
|
/* There is no conversation, thus no encryption state */
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
conv_ntlmssp_info = conversation_get_proto_data(conversation,
|
|
proto_ntlmssp);
|
|
if (conv_ntlmssp_info == NULL) {
|
|
/* There is no NTLMSSP state tied to the conversation */
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( key != NULL ){
|
|
stored_packet_ntlmssp_info = g_hash_table_lookup(hash_packet,key);
|
|
}
|
|
if( stored_packet_ntlmssp_info != NULL && stored_packet_ntlmssp_info->verifier_decrypted == TRUE) {
|
|
/* Mat TBD fprintf(stderr,"Found a already decrypted packet\n");*/
|
|
/* In Theory it's aleady the case, and we should be more clever ... like just copying buffers ...*/
|
|
packet_ntlmssp_info = stored_packet_ntlmssp_info;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
if (!packet_ntlmssp_info->verifier_decrypted) {
|
|
if (conv_ntlmssp_info->rc4_state_initialized != 1 ) {
|
|
/* The crypto sybsystem is not initialized. This means that either
|
|
the conversation did not include a challenge, or we are doing
|
|
something other than NTLMSSP v1 */
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (conv_ntlmssp_info->server_dest_port == pinfo->destport) {
|
|
/* client talk to server */
|
|
rc4_state = get_encrypted_state(pinfo, 1);
|
|
sign_key = get_sign_key(pinfo,1);
|
|
rc4_state_peer = get_encrypted_state(pinfo, 0);
|
|
} else {
|
|
rc4_state = get_encrypted_state(pinfo, 0);
|
|
sign_key = get_sign_key(pinfo,0);
|
|
rc4_state_peer = get_encrypted_state(pinfo, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rc4_state == NULL || rc4_state_peer == NULL) {
|
|
/* There is no encryption state, so we cannot decrypt */
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Setup the buffer to decrypt to */
|
|
tvb_memcpy(tvb, packet_ntlmssp_info->verifier,
|
|
offset, encrypted_block_length);
|
|
|
|
/*if( !(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH & packet_ntlmssp_info->flags)) {*/
|
|
if( conv_ntlmssp_info->flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SECURITY ) {
|
|
if( (NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH & conv_ntlmssp_info->flags)) {
|
|
/* The spec says that if we have have a key exchange then we have a the signature that is crypted
|
|
* otherwise it's just a hmac_md5(keysign,concat(message,sequence))[0..7]
|
|
*/
|
|
crypt_rc4(rc4_state, packet_ntlmssp_info->verifier, 8);
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Try to check the HMAC MD5 of the message against those calculated works great with LDAP payload but
|
|
* don't with DCE/RPC calls.
|
|
* Some analysis need to be done ...
|
|
*/
|
|
if( sign_key != NULL ) {
|
|
check_buf = ep_alloc(packet_ntlmssp_info->payload_len+4);
|
|
tvb_memcpy(tvb, &sequence,offset+8,4);
|
|
memcpy(check_buf,&sequence,4);
|
|
memcpy(check_buf+4,packet_ntlmssp_info->decrypted_payload,packet_ntlmssp_info->payload_len);
|
|
md5_hmac(check_buf,(int)(packet_ntlmssp_info->payload_len+4),sign_key,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN,calculated_md5);
|
|
/*
|
|
printnbyte(packet_ntlmssp_info->verifier,8,"HMAC from packet: ","\n");
|
|
printnbyte(calculated_md5,8,"HMAC : ","\n");
|
|
*/
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
/* The packet has a PAD then a checksum then a sequence and they are encoded in this order so we can decrypt all at once */
|
|
/* Do the actual decryption of the verifier */
|
|
crypt_rc4(rc4_state, packet_ntlmssp_info->verifier,
|
|
encrypted_block_length);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We setup a temporary buffer so we can re-encrypt the payload after
|
|
decryption. This is to update the opposite peer's RC4 state
|
|
This is not needed when we just have EXTENDED SECURITY because the signature is not crypted
|
|
and it's also not needed when we have key exchange because server and client have independant keys */
|
|
if( !(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH & conv_ntlmssp_info->flags) && !(NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SECURITY & conv_ntlmssp_info->flags)) {
|
|
peer_block = ep_memdup(packet_ntlmssp_info->verifier, encrypted_block_length);
|
|
crypt_rc4(rc4_state_peer, peer_block, encrypted_block_length);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Mark the packet as decrypted so that subsequent attempts to dissect
|
|
the packet use the already decrypted payload instead of attempting
|
|
to decrypt again */
|
|
packet_ntlmssp_info->verifier_decrypted = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Show the decrypted buffer in a new window */
|
|
decr_tvb = tvb_new_child_real_data(tvb, packet_ntlmssp_info->verifier,
|
|
encrypted_block_length,
|
|
encrypted_block_length);
|
|
add_new_data_source(pinfo, decr_tvb,
|
|
"Decrypted NTLMSSP Verifier");
|
|
|
|
/* Show the decrypted payload in the tree */
|
|
tf = proto_tree_add_text(tree, decr_tvb, 0, -1,
|
|
"Decrypted Verifier (%d byte%s)",
|
|
encrypted_block_length,
|
|
plurality(encrypted_block_length, "", "s"));
|
|
decr_tree = proto_item_add_subtree (tf, ett_ntlmssp);
|
|
|
|
if(( conv_ntlmssp_info->flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SECURITY )) {
|
|
proto_tree_add_item (decr_tree, hf_ntlmssp_verf_hmacmd5,
|
|
decr_tvb, decrypted_offset, 8,TRUE);
|
|
decrypted_offset += 8;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Incrementing sequence number of DCE conversation */
|
|
proto_tree_add_item (decr_tree, hf_ntlmssp_verf_sequence,
|
|
decr_tvb, decrypted_offset, 4, TRUE);
|
|
decrypted_offset += 4;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
/* RANDOM PAD usually it's 0 */
|
|
proto_tree_add_item (decr_tree, hf_ntlmssp_verf_randompad,
|
|
decr_tvb, decrypted_offset, 4, TRUE);
|
|
decrypted_offset += 4;
|
|
|
|
/* CRC32 of the DCE fragment data */
|
|
proto_tree_add_item (decr_tree, hf_ntlmssp_verf_crc32,
|
|
decr_tvb, decrypted_offset, 4, TRUE);
|
|
decrypted_offset += 4;
|
|
|
|
/* Incrementing sequence number of DCE conversation */
|
|
proto_tree_add_item (decr_tree, hf_ntlmssp_verf_sequence,
|
|
decr_tvb, decrypted_offset, 4, TRUE);
|
|
decrypted_offset += 4;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Used when NTLMSSP is done over DCE/RPC because in this case verifier and real payload are not contigious*/
|
|
static int
|
|
dissect_ntlmssp_payload_only(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, _U_ proto_tree *tree)
|
|
{
|
|
volatile int offset = 0;
|
|
proto_tree *volatile ntlmssp_tree = NULL;
|
|
guint32 encrypted_block_length;
|
|
void *pd_save;
|
|
|
|
/* the magic ntlm is the identifier of a NTLMSSP packet that's 00 00 00 01
|
|
*/
|
|
encrypted_block_length = tvb_length (tvb);
|
|
/* signature + seq + real payload */
|
|
|
|
/* Setup a new tree for the NTLMSSP payload */
|
|
#if 0
|
|
if (tree) {
|
|
tf = proto_tree_add_item (tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_verf,
|
|
tvb, offset, -1, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
ntlmssp_tree = proto_item_add_subtree (tf,
|
|
ett_ntlmssp);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
/*
|
|
* Catch the ReportedBoundsError exception; the stuff we've been
|
|
* handed doesn't necessarily run to the end of the packet, it's
|
|
* an item inside a packet, so if it happens to be malformed (or
|
|
* we, or a dissector we call, has a bug), so that an exception
|
|
* is thrown, we want to report the error, but return and let
|
|
* our caller dissect the rest of the packet.
|
|
*
|
|
* If it gets a BoundsError, we can stop, as there's nothing more
|
|
* in the packet after our blob to see, so we just re-throw the
|
|
* exception.
|
|
*/
|
|
pd_save = pinfo->private_data;
|
|
TRY {
|
|
/* Version number */
|
|
|
|
/* Try to decrypt */
|
|
decrypt_data_payload (tvb, offset, encrypted_block_length, pinfo, ntlmssp_tree,NULL);
|
|
/* let's try to hook ourselves here */
|
|
|
|
} CATCH(BoundsError) {
|
|
RETHROW;
|
|
} CATCH(ReportedBoundsError) {
|
|
/* Restore the private_data structure in case one of the
|
|
* called dissectors modified it (and, due to the exception,
|
|
* was unable to restore it).
|
|
*/
|
|
pinfo->private_data = pd_save;
|
|
show_reported_bounds_error(tvb, pinfo, tree);
|
|
} ENDTRY;
|
|
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Used when NTLMSSP is done over DCE/RPC because in this case verifier and real payload are not contigious
|
|
* But in fact this function could be merged with wrap_dissect_ntlmssp_verf because it's only used there
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
dissect_ntlmssp_verf(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree)
|
|
{
|
|
volatile int offset = 0;
|
|
proto_tree *volatile ntlmssp_tree = NULL;
|
|
proto_item *tf = NULL;
|
|
guint32 verifier_length;
|
|
guint32 encrypted_block_length;
|
|
void *pd_save;
|
|
|
|
verifier_length = tvb_length (tvb);
|
|
encrypted_block_length = verifier_length - 4;
|
|
|
|
if (encrypted_block_length < 12) {
|
|
/* Don't know why this would happen, but if it does, don't even bother
|
|
attempting decryption/dissection */
|
|
return offset + verifier_length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Setup a new tree for the NTLMSSP payload */
|
|
if (tree) {
|
|
tf = proto_tree_add_item (tree,
|
|
hf_ntlmssp_verf,
|
|
tvb, offset, -1, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
ntlmssp_tree = proto_item_add_subtree (tf,
|
|
ett_ntlmssp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Catch the ReportedBoundsError exception; the stuff we've been
|
|
* handed doesn't necessarily run to the end of the packet, it's
|
|
* an item inside a packet, so if it happens to be malformed (or
|
|
* we, or a dissector we call, has a bug), so that an exception
|
|
* is thrown, we want to report the error, but return and let
|
|
* our caller dissect the rest of the packet.
|
|
*
|
|
* If it gets a BoundsError, we can stop, as there's nothing more
|
|
* in the packet after our blob to see, so we just re-throw the
|
|
* exception.
|
|
*/
|
|
pd_save = pinfo->private_data;
|
|
TRY {
|
|
/* Version number */
|
|
proto_tree_add_item (ntlmssp_tree, hf_ntlmssp_verf_vers,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, TRUE);
|
|
offset += 4;
|
|
|
|
/* Encrypted body */
|
|
proto_tree_add_item (ntlmssp_tree, hf_ntlmssp_verf_body,
|
|
tvb, offset, encrypted_block_length, TRUE);
|
|
|
|
/* Try to decrypt */
|
|
decrypt_verifier (tvb, offset, encrypted_block_length, pinfo, ntlmssp_tree,NULL);
|
|
/* let's try to hook ourselves here */
|
|
|
|
offset += 12;
|
|
offset += encrypted_block_length;
|
|
} CATCH(BoundsError) {
|
|
RETHROW;
|
|
} CATCH(ReportedBoundsError) {
|
|
/* Restore the private_data structure in case one of the
|
|
* called dissectors modified it (and, due to the exception,
|
|
* was unable to restore it).
|
|
*/
|
|
pinfo->private_data = pd_save;
|
|
show_reported_bounds_error(tvb, pinfo, tree);
|
|
} ENDTRY;
|
|
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static tvbuff_t *
|
|
wrap_dissect_ntlmssp_payload_only(tvbuff_t *tvb,tvbuff_t *auth_tvb _U_,
|
|
int offset, packet_info *pinfo,dcerpc_auth_info *auth_info _U_)
|
|
{
|
|
tvbuff_t *data_tvb;
|
|
|
|
data_tvb = tvb_new_subset(
|
|
tvb, offset, tvb_length_remaining(tvb, offset),
|
|
tvb_length_remaining(tvb, offset));
|
|
dissect_ntlmssp_payload_only(data_tvb, pinfo, NULL);
|
|
return pinfo->gssapi_decrypted_tvb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
static tvbuff_t *
|
|
dissect_ntlmssp_encrypted_payload(tvbuff_t *data_tvb,
|
|
tvbuff_t *auth_tvb _U_,
|
|
int offset,
|
|
packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
dcerpc_auth_info *auth_info _U_)
|
|
{
|
|
/* gssapi_decrypted_tvb=NULL */
|
|
tvbuff_t *decr_tvb; /* Used to display decrypted buffer */
|
|
guint8 *peer_block;
|
|
conversation_t *conversation;
|
|
guint32 encrypted_block_length;
|
|
rc4_state_struct *rc4_state;
|
|
rc4_state_struct *rc4_state_peer;
|
|
ntlmssp_info *conv_ntlmssp_info = NULL;
|
|
ntlmssp_packet_info *packet_ntlmssp_info = NULL;
|
|
encrypted_block_length = tvb_length_remaining (data_tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr,"Called dissect_ntlmssp_encrypted_payload\n");
|
|
/* Check to see if we already have state for this packet */
|
|
packet_ntlmssp_info = p_get_proto_data(pinfo->fd, proto_ntlmssp);
|
|
if (packet_ntlmssp_info == NULL) {
|
|
/* We don't have any packet state, so create one */
|
|
packet_ntlmssp_info = se_alloc0(sizeof(ntlmssp_packet_info));
|
|
p_add_proto_data(pinfo->fd, proto_ntlmssp, packet_ntlmssp_info);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!packet_ntlmssp_info->payload_decrypted) {
|
|
/* Pull the challenge info from the conversation */
|
|
conversation = find_conversation(pinfo->fd->num, &pinfo->src, &pinfo->dst,
|
|
pinfo->ptype, pinfo->srcport,
|
|
pinfo->destport, 0);
|
|
if (conversation == NULL) {
|
|
/* There is no conversation, thus no encryption state */
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
conv_ntlmssp_info = conversation_get_proto_data(conversation,
|
|
proto_ntlmssp);
|
|
if (conv_ntlmssp_info == NULL) {
|
|
/* There is no NTLMSSP state tied to the conversation */
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Get the pair of RC4 state structures. One is used for to decrypt the
|
|
payload. The other is used to re-encrypt the payload to represent
|
|
the peer */
|
|
if (conv_ntlmssp_info->server_dest_port == pinfo->destport) {
|
|
rc4_state = get_encrypted_state(pinfo, 1);
|
|
rc4_state_peer = get_encrypted_state(pinfo, 0);
|
|
} else {
|
|
rc4_state = get_encrypted_state(pinfo, 0);
|
|
rc4_state_peer = get_encrypted_state(pinfo, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rc4_state == NULL || rc4_state_peer == NULL) {
|
|
/* There is no encryption state, so we cannot decrypt */
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Store the decrypted contents in the packet state struct
|
|
(of course at this point, they aren't decrypted yet) */
|
|
packet_ntlmssp_info->decrypted_payload = tvb_memdup(data_tvb, offset,
|
|
encrypted_block_length);
|
|
decrypted_payloads = g_slist_prepend(decrypted_payloads,
|
|
packet_ntlmssp_info->decrypted_payload);
|
|
|
|
/* Do the decryption of the payload */
|
|
crypt_rc4(rc4_state, packet_ntlmssp_info->decrypted_payload,
|
|
encrypted_block_length);
|
|
|
|
/* We setup a temporary buffer so we can re-encrypt the payload after
|
|
decryption. This is to update the opposite peer's RC4 state */
|
|
peer_block = ep_memdup(packet_ntlmssp_info->decrypted_payload, encrypted_block_length);
|
|
crypt_rc4(rc4_state_peer, peer_block, encrypted_block_length);
|
|
|
|
packet_ntlmssp_info->payload_decrypted = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Show the decrypted buffer in a new window */
|
|
decr_tvb = tvb_new_child_real_data(data_tvb, packet_ntlmssp_info->decrypted_payload,
|
|
encrypted_block_length,
|
|
encrypted_block_length);
|
|
|
|
offset += encrypted_block_length;
|
|
|
|
return decr_tvb;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
free_payload(gpointer decrypted_payload, gpointer user_data _U_)
|
|
{
|
|
g_free(decrypted_payload);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static guint
|
|
header_hash(gconstpointer pointer)
|
|
{
|
|
guint32 crc = ~crc32c_calculate(pointer,NTLMSSP_KEY_LEN,CRC32C_PRELOAD);
|
|
/* Mat TBD fprintf(stderr,"Val: %u\n",crc);*/
|
|
return crc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gboolean
|
|
header_equal(gconstpointer pointer1, gconstpointer pointer2)
|
|
{
|
|
if(!memcmp(pointer1,pointer2,16)) {
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
ntlmssp_init_protocol(void)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* Free the decrypted payloads, and then free the list of decrypted
|
|
* payloads.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (decrypted_payloads != NULL) {
|
|
g_slist_foreach(decrypted_payloads, free_payload, NULL);
|
|
g_slist_free(decrypted_payloads);
|
|
decrypted_payloads = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(hash_packet == NULL) {
|
|
hash_packet = g_hash_table_new(header_hash, header_equal);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
wrap_dissect_ntlmssp(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint8 *drep _U_)
|
|
{
|
|
tvbuff_t *auth_tvb;
|
|
|
|
auth_tvb = tvb_new_subset(
|
|
tvb, offset, tvb_length_remaining(tvb, offset),
|
|
tvb_length_remaining(tvb, offset));
|
|
|
|
dissect_ntlmssp(auth_tvb, pinfo, tree);
|
|
|
|
return tvb_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
wrap_dissect_ntlmssp_verf(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint8 *drep _U_)
|
|
{
|
|
tvbuff_t *auth_tvb;
|
|
|
|
auth_tvb = tvb_new_subset(
|
|
tvb, offset, tvb_length_remaining(tvb, offset),
|
|
tvb_length_remaining(tvb, offset));
|
|
return dissect_ntlmssp_verf(auth_tvb, pinfo, tree);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static dcerpc_auth_subdissector_fns ntlmssp_sign_fns = {
|
|
wrap_dissect_ntlmssp, /* Bind */
|
|
wrap_dissect_ntlmssp, /* Bind ACK */
|
|
wrap_dissect_ntlmssp, /* AUTH3 */
|
|
wrap_dissect_ntlmssp_verf, /* Request verifier */
|
|
wrap_dissect_ntlmssp_verf, /* Response verifier */
|
|
NULL, /* Request data */
|
|
NULL /* Response data */
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static dcerpc_auth_subdissector_fns ntlmssp_seal_fns = {
|
|
wrap_dissect_ntlmssp, /* Bind */
|
|
wrap_dissect_ntlmssp, /* Bind ACK */
|
|
wrap_dissect_ntlmssp, /* AUTH3 */
|
|
wrap_dissect_ntlmssp_verf, /* Request verifier */
|
|
wrap_dissect_ntlmssp_verf, /* Response verifier */
|
|
wrap_dissect_ntlmssp_payload_only, /* Request data */
|
|
wrap_dissect_ntlmssp_payload_only /* Response data */
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
proto_register_ntlmssp(void)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
static hf_register_info hf[] = {
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_auth,
|
|
{ "NTLMSSP identifier", "ntlmssp.identifier", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_message_type,
|
|
{ "NTLM Message Type", "ntlmssp.messagetype", FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX, VALS(ntlmssp_message_types), 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags,
|
|
{ "Flags", "ntlmssp.negotiateflags", FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_01,
|
|
{ "Negotiate UNICODE", "ntlmssp.negotiateunicode", FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS (&tfs_set_notset), NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_02,
|
|
{ "Negotiate OEM", "ntlmssp.negotiateoem", FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS (&tfs_set_notset), NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_04,
|
|
{ "Request Target", "ntlmssp.requesttarget", FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS (&tfs_set_notset), NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_08,
|
|
{ "Request 0x00000008", "ntlmssp.negotiate00000008", FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS (&tfs_set_notset), NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_00000008, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_10,
|
|
{ "Negotiate Sign", "ntlmssp.negotiatesign", FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS (&tfs_set_notset), NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_20,
|
|
{ "Negotiate Seal", "ntlmssp.negotiateseal", FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS (&tfs_set_notset), NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_40,
|
|
{ "Negotiate Datagram", "ntlmssp.negotiatedatagram", FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS (&tfs_set_notset), NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_DATAGRAM, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_80,
|
|
{ "Negotiate Lan Manager Key", "ntlmssp.negotiatelmkey", FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS (&tfs_set_notset), NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_100,
|
|
{ "Negotiate 0x00000100", "ntlmssp.negotiate00000100", FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS (&tfs_set_notset), NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_00000100, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_200,
|
|
{ "Negotiate NTLM key", "ntlmssp.negotiatentlm", FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS (&tfs_set_notset), NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_400,
|
|
{ "Negotiate NT Only", "ntlmssp.negotiatentonly", FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS (&tfs_set_notset), NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NT_ONLY, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_800,
|
|
{ "Negotiate 0x00000800", "ntlmssp.negotiate00000800", FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS (&tfs_set_notset), NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_00000800, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_1000,
|
|
{ "Negotiate OEM Domain Supplied", "ntlmssp.negotiateoemdomainsupplied", FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS (&tfs_set_notset), NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM_DOMAIN_SUPPLIED, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_2000,
|
|
{ "Negotiate OEM Workstation Supplied", "ntlmssp.negotiateoemworkstationsupplied", FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS (&tfs_set_notset), NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM_WORKSTATION_SUPPLIED, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_4000,
|
|
{ "Negotiate 0x00004000", "ntlmssp.negotiate00004000", FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS (&tfs_set_notset), NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_00004000, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_8000,
|
|
{ "Negotiate Always Sign", "ntlmssp.negotiatealwayssign", FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS (&tfs_set_notset), NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_10000,
|
|
{ "Target Type Domain", "ntlmssp.targettypedomain", FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS (&tfs_set_notset), NTLMSSP_TARGET_TYPE_DOMAIN, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_20000,
|
|
{ "Target Type Server", "ntlmssp.targettypeserver", FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS (&tfs_set_notset), NTLMSSP_TARGET_TYPE_SERVER, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_40000,
|
|
{ "Target Type Share", "ntlmssp.targettypeshare", FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS (&tfs_set_notset), NTLMSSP_TARGET_TYPE_SHARE, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
|
|
/* Negotiate Flags */
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_80000,
|
|
{ "Negotiate Extended Security", "ntlmssp.negotiatentlm2", FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS (&tfs_set_notset), NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SECURITY, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_100000,
|
|
{ "Negotiate Identify", "ntlmssp.negotiateidentify", FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS (&tfs_set_notset), NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_IDENTIFY, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_200000,
|
|
{ "Negotiate 0x00200000", "ntlmssp.negotiatent00200000", FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS (&tfs_set_notset), NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_00200000, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_400000,
|
|
{ "Request Non-NT Session", "ntlmssp.requestnonntsession", FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS (&tfs_set_notset), NTLMSSP_REQUEST_NON_NT_SESSION, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_800000,
|
|
{ "Negotiate Target Info", "ntlmssp.negotiatetargetinfo", FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS (&tfs_set_notset), NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_1000000,
|
|
{ "Negotiate 0x01000000", "ntlmssp.negotiatent01000000", FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS (&tfs_set_notset), NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_01000000, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_2000000,
|
|
{ "Negotiate Version", "ntlmssp.negotiateversion", FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS (&tfs_set_notset), NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_VERSION, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_4000000,
|
|
{ "Negotiate 0x04000000", "ntlmssp.negotiatent04000000", FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS (&tfs_set_notset), NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_04000000, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_8000000,
|
|
{ "Negotiate 0x08000000", "ntlmssp.negotiatent08000000", FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS (&tfs_set_notset), NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_08000000, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_10000000,
|
|
{ "Negotiate 0x10000000", "ntlmssp.negotiatent10000000", FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS (&tfs_set_notset), NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_10000000, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_20000000,
|
|
{ "Negotiate 128", "ntlmssp.negotiate128", FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS (&tfs_set_notset), NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128, "128-bit encryption is supported", HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_40000000,
|
|
{ "Negotiate Key Exchange", "ntlmssp.negotiatekeyexch", FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS (&tfs_set_notset), NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags_80000000,
|
|
{ "Negotiate 56", "ntlmssp.negotiate56", FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS (&tfs_set_notset), NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56, "56-bit encryption is supported", HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_workstation_strlen,
|
|
{ "Calling workstation name length", "ntlmssp.negotiate.callingworkstation.strlen", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_workstation_maxlen,
|
|
{ "Calling workstation name max length", "ntlmssp.negotiate.callingworkstation.maxlen", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_workstation_buffer,
|
|
{ "Calling workstation name buffer", "ntlmssp.negotiate.callingworkstation.buffer", FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_workstation,
|
|
{ "Calling workstation name", "ntlmssp.negotiate.callingworkstation", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_domain_strlen,
|
|
{ "Calling workstation domain length", "ntlmssp.negotiate.domain.strlen", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_domain_maxlen,
|
|
{ "Calling workstation domain max length", "ntlmssp.negotiate.domain.maxlen", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_domain_buffer,
|
|
{ "Calling workstation domain buffer", "ntlmssp.negotiate.domain.buffer", FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_negotiate_domain,
|
|
{ "Calling workstation domain", "ntlmssp.negotiate.domain", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_ntlm_client_challenge,
|
|
{ "NTLM Client Challenge", "ntlmssp.ntlmclientchallenge", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_ntlm_server_challenge,
|
|
{ "NTLM Server Challenge", "ntlmssp.ntlmserverchallenge", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_reserved,
|
|
{ "Reserved", "ntlmssp.reserved", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_name,
|
|
{ "Target Name", "ntlmssp.challenge.target_name", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_auth_domain,
|
|
{ "Domain name", "ntlmssp.auth.domain", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_auth_username,
|
|
{ "User name", "ntlmssp.auth.username", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_auth_hostname,
|
|
{ "Host name", "ntlmssp.auth.hostname", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_auth_lmresponse,
|
|
{ "Lan Manager Response", "ntlmssp.auth.lmresponse", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_auth_ntresponse,
|
|
{ "NTLM Response", "ntlmssp.auth.ntresponse", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_auth_sesskey,
|
|
{ "Session Key", "ntlmssp.auth.sesskey", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_string_len,
|
|
{ "Length", "ntlmssp.string.length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL}},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_string_maxlen,
|
|
{ "Maxlen", "ntlmssp.string.maxlen", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL}},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_string_offset,
|
|
{ "Offset", "ntlmssp.string.offset", FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL}},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_blob_len,
|
|
{ "Length", "ntlmssp.blob.length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL}},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_blob_maxlen,
|
|
{ "Maxlen", "ntlmssp.blob.maxlen", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL}},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_blob_offset,
|
|
{ "Offset", "ntlmssp.blob.offset", FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL}},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_version,
|
|
{ "Version", "ntlmssp.version", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL}},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_version_major,
|
|
{ "Major Version", "ntlmssp.version.major", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL}},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_version_minor,
|
|
{ "Minor Version", "ntlmssp.version.minor", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL}},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_version_build_number,
|
|
{ "Major Version", "ntlmssp.version.build_number", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL}},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_version_ntlm_current_revision,
|
|
{ "NTLM Current Revision", "ntlmssp.version.ntlm_current_revision", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL}},
|
|
|
|
/* Target Info */
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info,
|
|
{ "Target Info", "ntlmssp.challenge.target_info", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL}},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_len,
|
|
{ "Length", "ntlmssp.challenge.target_info.length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL}},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_maxlen,
|
|
{ "Maxlen", "ntlmssp.challenge.target_info.maxlen", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL}},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_offset,
|
|
{ "Offset", "ntlmssp.challenge.target_info.offset", FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL}},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_item_type,
|
|
{ "Target Info Item Type", "ntlmssp.challenge.target_info.item.type", FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(ntlm_name_types), 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_item_len,
|
|
{ "Target Info Item Length", "ntlmssp.challenge.target_info.item.length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL}},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_end,
|
|
{ "List End", "ntlmssp.challenge.target_info.end", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_nb_computer_name,
|
|
{ "NetBIOS Computer Name", "ntlmssp.challenge.target_info.nb_computer_name", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Server NetBIOS Computer Name", HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_nb_domain_name,
|
|
{ "NetBIOS Domain Name", "ntlmssp.challenge.target_info.nb_domain_name", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Server NetBIOS Domain Name", HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_dns_computer_name,
|
|
{ "DNS Computer Name", "ntlmssp.challenge.target_info.dns_computer_name", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_dns_domain_name,
|
|
{ "DNS Domain Name", "ntlmssp.challenge.target_info.dns_domain_name", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_dns_tree_name,
|
|
{ "DNS Tree Name", "ntlmssp.challenge.target_info.dns_tree_name", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_flags,
|
|
{ "Flags", "ntlmssp.challenge.target_info.flags", FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_timestamp,
|
|
{ "Timestamp", "ntlmssp.challenge.target_info.timestamp", FT_ABSOLUTE_TIME, ABSOLUTE_TIME_LOCAL, NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_restrictions,
|
|
{ "Restrictions", "ntlmssp.challenge.target_info.restrictions", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_target_name,
|
|
{ "Target Name", "ntlmssp.challenge.target_info.target_name", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_channel_bindings,
|
|
{ "Channel Bindings", "ntlmssp.challenge.target_info.channel_bindings", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_item_type,
|
|
{ "NTLMV2 Response Item Type", "ntlmssp.ntlmv2_response.item.type", FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(ntlm_name_types), 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_item_len,
|
|
{ "NTLMV2 Response Item Length", "ntlmssp.ntlmv2_response.item.length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL}},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_end,
|
|
{ "List End", "ntlmssp.ntlmv2_response.end", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_nb_computer_name,
|
|
{ "NetBIOS Computer Name", "ntlmssp.ntlmv2_response.nb_computer_name", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Server NetBIOS Computer Name", HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_nb_domain_name,
|
|
{ "NetBIOS Domain Name", "ntlmssp.ntlmv2_response.nb_domain_name", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Server NetBIOS Domain Name", HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_dns_computer_name,
|
|
{ "DNS Computer Name", "ntlmssp.ntlmv2_response.dns_computer_name", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_dns_domain_name,
|
|
{ "DNS Domain Name", "ntlmssp.ntlmv2_response.dns_domain_name", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_dns_tree_name,
|
|
{ "DNS Tree Name", "ntlmssp.ntlmv2_response.dns_tree_name", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_flags,
|
|
{ "Flags", "ntlmssp.ntlmv2_response.flags", FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_timestamp,
|
|
{ "Timestamp", "ntlmssp.ntlmv2_response.timestamp", FT_ABSOLUTE_TIME, ABSOLUTE_TIME_LOCAL, NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_restrictions,
|
|
{ "Restrictions", "ntlmssp.ntlmv2_response.restrictions", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_target_name,
|
|
{ "Target Name", "ntlmssp.ntlmv2_response.target_name", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_channel_bindings,
|
|
{ "Channel Bindings", "ntlmssp.ntlmv2_response.channel_bindings", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_message_integrity_code,
|
|
{ "MIC", "ntlmssp.authenticate.mic", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Message Integrity Code", HFILL}},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_verf,
|
|
{ "NTLMSSP Verifier", "ntlmssp.verf", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_verf_vers,
|
|
{ "Version Number", "ntlmssp.verf.vers", FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_verf_body,
|
|
{ "Verifier Body", "ntlmssp.verf.body", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_decrypted_payload,
|
|
{ "NTLM Decrypted Payload", "ntlmssp.decrypted_payload", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_verf_randompad,
|
|
{ "Random Pad", "ntlmssp.verf.randompad", FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_verf_crc32,
|
|
{ "Verifier CRC32", "ntlmssp.verf.crc32", FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_verf_hmacmd5,
|
|
{ "HMAC MD5", "ntlmssp.verf.hmacmd5", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_verf_sequence,
|
|
{ "Sequence", "ntlmssp.verf.sequence", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response,
|
|
{ "NTLMv2 Response", "ntlmssp.ntlmv2_response", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_hmac,
|
|
{ "HMAC", "ntlmssp.ntlmv2_response.hmac", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_header,
|
|
{ "Header", "ntlmssp.ntlmv2_response.header", FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_reserved,
|
|
{ "Reserved", "ntlmssp.ntlmv2_response.reserved", FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_time,
|
|
{ "Time", "ntlmssp.ntlmv2_response.time", FT_ABSOLUTE_TIME, ABSOLUTE_TIME_LOCAL, NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_chal,
|
|
{ "Client challenge", "ntlmssp.ntlmv2_response.chal", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
|
|
{ &hf_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_unknown,
|
|
{ "Unknown", "ntlmssp.ntlmv2_response.unknown", FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
static gint *ett[] = {
|
|
&ett_ntlmssp,
|
|
&ett_ntlmssp_negotiate_flags,
|
|
&ett_ntlmssp_string,
|
|
&ett_ntlmssp_blob,
|
|
&ett_ntlmssp_version,
|
|
&ett_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info,
|
|
&ett_ntlmssp_challenge_target_info_item,
|
|
&ett_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response,
|
|
&ett_ntlmssp_ntlmv2_response_item,
|
|
};
|
|
module_t *ntlmssp_module;
|
|
|
|
proto_ntlmssp = proto_register_protocol (
|
|
"NTLM Secure Service Provider", /* name */
|
|
"NTLMSSP", /* short name */
|
|
"ntlmssp" /* abbrev */
|
|
);
|
|
proto_register_field_array (proto_ntlmssp, hf, array_length (hf));
|
|
proto_register_subtree_array (ett, array_length (ett));
|
|
register_init_routine(&ntlmssp_init_protocol);
|
|
|
|
ntlmssp_module = prefs_register_protocol(proto_ntlmssp, NULL);
|
|
|
|
prefs_register_string_preference(ntlmssp_module, "nt_password",
|
|
"NT Password",
|
|
"NT Password (used to decrypt payloads)",
|
|
&gbl_nt_password);
|
|
|
|
register_dissector("ntlmssp", dissect_ntlmssp, proto_ntlmssp);
|
|
new_register_dissector("ntlmssp_payload", dissect_ntlmssp_payload, proto_ntlmssp);
|
|
new_register_dissector("ntlmssp_data_only", dissect_ntlmssp_payload_only, proto_ntlmssp);
|
|
new_register_dissector("ntlmssp_verf", dissect_ntlmssp_verf, proto_ntlmssp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
proto_reg_handoff_ntlmssp(void)
|
|
{
|
|
dissector_handle_t ntlmssp_handle, ntlmssp_wrap_handle;
|
|
|
|
/* Register protocol with the GSS-API module */
|
|
|
|
ntlmssp_handle = find_dissector("ntlmssp");
|
|
ntlmssp_wrap_handle = find_dissector("ntlmssp_verf");
|
|
gssapi_init_oid("1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.2.10", proto_ntlmssp, ett_ntlmssp,
|
|
ntlmssp_handle, ntlmssp_wrap_handle,
|
|
"NTLMSSP - Microsoft NTLM Security Support Provider");
|
|
|
|
/* Register authenticated pipe dissector */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX - the verifiers here seem to have a version of 1 and a body of all
|
|
* zeroes.
|
|
*
|
|
* XXX - DCE_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_CONNECT is, according to the DCE RPC 1.1
|
|
* spec, upgraded to DCE_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT. Should we register
|
|
* any other levels here?
|
|
*/
|
|
register_dcerpc_auth_subdissector(DCE_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_CONNECT,
|
|
DCE_C_RPC_AUTHN_PROTOCOL_NTLMSSP,
|
|
&ntlmssp_sign_fns);
|
|
|
|
register_dcerpc_auth_subdissector(DCE_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT,
|
|
DCE_C_RPC_AUTHN_PROTOCOL_NTLMSSP,
|
|
&ntlmssp_sign_fns);
|
|
|
|
register_dcerpc_auth_subdissector(DCE_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_INTEGRITY,
|
|
DCE_C_RPC_AUTHN_PROTOCOL_NTLMSSP,
|
|
&ntlmssp_sign_fns);
|
|
|
|
register_dcerpc_auth_subdissector(DCE_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_PRIVACY,
|
|
DCE_C_RPC_AUTHN_PROTOCOL_NTLMSSP,
|
|
&ntlmssp_seal_fns);
|
|
ntlmssp_tap = register_tap("ntlmssp");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Editor modelines - http://www.wireshark.org/tools/modelines.html
|
|
*
|
|
* Local variables:
|
|
* c-basic-offset: 2
|
|
* tab-width: 8
|
|
* indent-tabs-mode: nil
|
|
* End:
|
|
*
|
|
* vi: set shiftwidth=2 tabstop=8 expandtab
|
|
* :indentSize=2:tabSize=8:noTabs=true:
|
|
*/
|