3b4b7023b9
svn path=/trunk/; revision=29184
2018 lines
74 KiB
C
2018 lines
74 KiB
C
/* airpdcap.c
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*
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* $Id$
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* Copyright (c) 2006 CACE Technologies, Davis (California)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors
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* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
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* without specific prior written permission.
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*
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* Alternatively, this software may be distributed under the terms of the
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* GNU General Public License ("GPL") version 2 as published by the Free
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* Software Foundation.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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/****************************************************************************/
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/* File includes */
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#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
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# include "config.h"
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#endif
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#include <epan/tvbuff.h>
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#include <epan/crc32.h>
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#include <epan/strutil.h>
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#include <epan/emem.h>
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#include <epan/pint.h>
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#include <epan/crypt/crypt-rc4.h>
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#include <epan/crypt/airpdcap_rijndael.h>
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#include "airpdcap_system.h"
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#include "airpdcap_int.h"
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#include "crypt-sha1.h"
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#include "crypt-md5.h"
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#include "airpdcap_debug.h"
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#include "wep-wpadefs.h"
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/****************************************************************************/
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/****************************************************************************/
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/* Constant definitions */
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#define AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN 20
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/* EAPOL definitions */
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/**
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* Length of the EAPOL-Key key confirmation key (KCK) used to calculate
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* MIC over EAPOL frame and validate an EAPOL packet (128 bits)
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*/
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#define AIRPDCAP_WPA_KCK_LEN 16
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/**
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*Offset of the Key MIC in the EAPOL packet body
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*/
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#define AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_OFFSET 77
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/**
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* Maximum length of the EAPOL packet (it depends on the maximum MAC
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* frame size)
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*/
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#define AIRPDCAP_WPA_MAX_EAPOL_LEN 4095
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/**
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* EAPOL Key Descriptor Version 1, used for all EAPOL-Key frames to and
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* from a STA when neither the group nor pairwise ciphers are CCMP for
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* Key Descriptor 1.
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* @note
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* Defined in 802.11i-2004, page 78
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*/
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#define AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_NOT_CCMP 1
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/**
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* EAPOL Key Descriptor Version 2, used for all EAPOL-Key frames to and
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* from a STA when either the pairwise or the group cipher is AES-CCMP
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* for Key Descriptor 2.
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* /note
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* Defined in 802.11i-2004, page 78
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*/
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#define AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP 2
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/** Define EAPOL Key Descriptor type values: use 254 for WPA and 2 for WPA2 **/
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#define AIRPDCAP_RSN_WPA_KEY_DESCRIPTOR 254
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#define AIRPDCAP_RSN_WPA2_KEY_DESCRIPTOR 2
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/****************************************************************************/
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/****************************************************************************/
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/* Macro definitions */
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extern const UINT32 crc32_table[256];
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#define CRC(crc, ch) (crc = (crc >> 8) ^ crc32_table[(crc ^ (ch)) & 0xff])
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#define AIRPDCAP_GET_TK(ptk) (ptk + 32)
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/****************************************************************************/
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/****************************************************************************/
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/* Type definitions */
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/* Internal function prototype declarations */
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#ifdef __cplusplus
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extern "C" {
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#endif
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/**
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* It is a step of the PBKDF2 (specifically the PKCS #5 v2.0) defined in
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* the RFC 2898 to derive a key (used as PMK in WPA)
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* @param password [IN] pointer to a password (sequence of between 8 and
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* 63 ASCII encoded characters)
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* @param ssid [IN] pointer to the SSID string encoded in max 32 ASCII
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* encoded characters
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* @param iterations [IN] times to hash the password (4096 for WPA)
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* @param count [IN] ???
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* @param output [OUT] pointer to a preallocated buffer of
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* AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN characters that will contain a part of the key
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*/
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static INT AirPDcapRsnaPwd2PskStep(
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const guint8 *ppbytes,
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const guint passLength,
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const CHAR *ssid,
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const size_t ssidLength,
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const INT iterations,
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const INT count,
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UCHAR *output)
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;
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/**
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* It calculates the passphrase-to-PSK mapping reccomanded for use with
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* RSNAs. This implementation uses the PBKDF2 method defined in the RFC
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* 2898.
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* @param password [IN] pointer to a password (sequence of between 8 and
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* 63 ASCII encoded characters)
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* @param ssid [IN] pointer to the SSID string encoded in max 32 ASCII
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* encoded characters
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* @param output [OUT] calculated PSK (to use as PMK in WPA)
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* @note
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* Described in 802.11i-2004, page 165
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*/
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static INT AirPDcapRsnaPwd2Psk(
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const CHAR *passphrase,
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const CHAR *ssid,
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const size_t ssidLength,
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UCHAR *output)
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;
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static INT AirPDcapRsnaMng(
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UCHAR *decrypt_data,
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guint mac_header_len,
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guint *decrypt_len,
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PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
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AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
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INT offset)
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;
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static INT AirPDcapWepMng(
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PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
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UCHAR *decrypt_data,
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guint mac_header_len,
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guint *decrypt_len,
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PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
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AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
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INT offset)
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;
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static INT AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake(
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PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
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const UCHAR *data,
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AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
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PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
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INT offset)
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;
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/**
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* It checks whether the specified key is corrected or not.
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* @note
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* For a standard WEP key the length will be changed to the standard
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* length, and the type changed in a generic WEP key.
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* @param key [IN] pointer to the key to validate
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* @return
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* - TRUE: the key contains valid fields and values
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* - FALSE: the key has some invalid field or value
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*/
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static INT AirPDcapValidateKey(
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PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key)
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;
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static INT AirPDcapRsnaMicCheck(
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UCHAR *eapol,
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USHORT eapol_len,
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UCHAR KCK[AIRPDCAP_WPA_KCK_LEN],
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USHORT key_ver)
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;
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/**
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* @param ctx [IN] pointer to the current context
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* @param id [IN] id of the association (composed by BSSID and MAC of
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* the station)
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* @return
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* - index of the Security Association structure if found
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* - -1, if the specified addresses pair BSSID-STA MAC has not been found
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*/
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static INT AirPDcapGetSa(
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PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
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AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID *id)
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;
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static INT AirPDcapStoreSa(
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PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
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AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID *id)
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;
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static const UCHAR * AirPDcapGetStaAddress(
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const AIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME_ADDR4 *frame)
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;
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static const UCHAR * AirPDcapGetBssidAddress(
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const AIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME_ADDR4 *frame)
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;
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static void AirPDcapRsnaPrfX(
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AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
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const UCHAR pmk[32],
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const UCHAR snonce[32],
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const INT x, /* for TKIP 512, for CCMP 384 */
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UCHAR *ptk)
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;
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#ifdef __cplusplus
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}
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#endif
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/****************************************************************************/
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/****************************************************************************/
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/* Exported function definitions */
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#ifdef __cplusplus
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extern "C" {
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#endif
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const guint8 broadcast_mac[] = { 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF };
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/* NOTE : this assumes the WPA RSN IE format. If it were to be a generic RSN IE, then
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we would need to change the structure since it could be variable length depending on the number
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of unicast OUI and auth OUI. */
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typedef struct {
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guint8 bElementID;
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guint8 bLength;
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guint8 OUI[4];
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guint16 iVersion;
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guint8 multicastOUI[4];
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guint16 iUnicastCount; /* this should always be 1 for WPA client */
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guint8 unicastOUI[4];
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guint16 iAuthCount; /* this should always be 1 for WPA client */
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guint8 authOUI[4];
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guint16 iWPAcap;
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} RSN_IE;
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#define EAPKEY_MIC_LEN 16 /* length of the MIC key for EAPoL_Key packet's MIC using MD5 */
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#define NONCE_LEN 32
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typedef struct {
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guint8 type;
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guint8 key_information[2]; /* Make this an array to avoid alignment issues */
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guint8 key_length[2]; /* Make this an array to avoid alignment issues */
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guint8 replay_counter[8];
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guint8 key_nonce[NONCE_LEN];
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guint8 key_iv[16];
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guint8 key_sequence_counter[8]; /* also called the RSC */
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guint8 key_id[8];
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guint8 key_mic[EAPKEY_MIC_LEN];
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guint8 key_data_len[2]; /* Make this an array rather than a U16 to avoid alignment shifting */
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guint8 ie[sizeof(RSN_IE)]; /* Make this an array to avoid alignment issues */
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} EAPOL_RSN_KEY, * P_EAPOL_RSN_KEY;
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/* A note about some limitations with the WPA decryption:
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Unless someone takes the time to restructure the current method used for maintaining decryption keys, there
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will be some anomalies observed when using the decryption feature.
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Currently, there is only one pairwise (unicast) key and one group (broadcast) key saved for each security association
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(SA). As a result, if a wireless sniffer session captures the traffic of a station (STA) associating with an AP
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more than once, or captures a STA roaming, then you will not be able to arbitrarilly click on different encrypted
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packets in the trace and observe their internal decrypted structure. This is because when you click on a packet,
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Wireshark immediately performs the decryption routine with whatever the last key used was. It does not maintain a
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cache of all the keys that were used by this STA/AP pairing.
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However, if you are just looking at the summary lines of a capture, it will appear that everything was decrypted properly.
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This is because when first performing a capture or initially reading a capture file, Wireshark will first
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process the packets in order. As it encounters new EAPOL packets, it will update its internal key list with the
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newfound key. Then it will use that key for decrypting subsequent packets. Each time a new key is found, the old key
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is overwritten. So, if you then click on a packet that was previously decrypted properly, it might suddenly no longer
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be decrypted because a later EAPOL key had caused the internal decryption key to be updated.
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For broadcast packets, there is a clunky work-around. If the AP is using group-key rotation, you simply have to find the appropriate
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EAPOL group key packet (usually size is 211 bytes and will have a protocol type of EAPOL and Info field of Key). If you click on it
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and then click on the broadcast packet you are trying to decrypt, the packet will be decrypted properly. By first
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clicking on the EAPOL packet for the group-key, you will force Wireshark to parse that packet and load the group-key it
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contains. That group key will then be used for decrypting all subsequent broadcast packets you click on.
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Ideally, it would be best to maintain an expanding list of SA keys. Perhaps we could associate packet number ranges
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that they apply to. Then, whenever we need to decrypt a packet, we can determine which key to use based on whether
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it is broadcast or unicast and within what packet number range it falls.
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Either that, or store two versions of encrypted packets - the orginal packet and it's successfully
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decrypted version. Then Wireshark wouldn't have to decrypt packets on the fly if they were already successfully decrypted.
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*/
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static void
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AirPDcapDecryptWPABroadcastKey(P_EAPOL_RSN_KEY pEAPKey, guint8 *decryption_key, PAIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION sa)
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{
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guint8 new_key[32];
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guint8 key_version;
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guint8 *szEncryptedKey;
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guint16 key_len = 0;
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static AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM dummy_key; /* needed in case AirPDcapRsnaMng() wants the key structure */
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/* We skip verifying the MIC of the key. If we were implementing a WPA supplicant we'd want to verify, but for a sniffer it's not needed. */
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/* Preparation for decrypting the group key - determine group key data length */
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/* depending on whether it's a TKIP or AES encryption key */
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key_version = AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY_DESCR_VER(pEAPKey->key_information[1]);
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if (key_version == AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_NOT_CCMP){
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/* TKIP */
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key_len = pntohs(pEAPKey->key_length);
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}else if (key_version == AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP){
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/* AES */
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key_len = pntohs(pEAPKey->key_data_len);
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}
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if (key_len > sizeof(RSN_IE) || key_len == 0) { /* Don't read past the end of pEAPKey->ie */
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return;
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}
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/* Encrypted key is in the information element field of the EAPOL key packet */
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szEncryptedKey = g_memdup(pEAPKey->ie, key_len);
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DEBUG_DUMP("Encrypted Broadcast key:", szEncryptedKey, key_len);
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DEBUG_DUMP("KeyIV:", pEAPKey->key_iv, 16);
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DEBUG_DUMP("decryption_key:", decryption_key, 16);
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/* Build the full decryption key based on the IV and part of the pairwise key */
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memcpy(new_key, pEAPKey->key_iv, 16);
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memcpy(new_key+16, decryption_key, 16);
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DEBUG_DUMP("FullDecrKey:", new_key, 32);
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if (key_version == AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_NOT_CCMP){
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guint8 dummy[256];
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/* TKIP key */
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/* Per 802.11i, Draft 3.0 spec, section 8.5.2, p. 97, line 4-8, */
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/* group key is decrypted using RC4. Concatenate the IV with the 16 byte EK (PTK+16) to get the decryption key */
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rc4_state_struct rc4_state;
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crypt_rc4_init(&rc4_state, new_key, sizeof(new_key));
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/* Do dummy 256 iterations of the RC4 algorithm (per 802.11i, Draft 3.0, p. 97 line 6) */
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crypt_rc4(&rc4_state, dummy, 256);
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crypt_rc4(&rc4_state, szEncryptedKey, key_len);
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} else if (key_version == AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP){
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/* AES CCMP key */
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guint8 key_found;
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guint16 key_index;
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guint8 *decrypted_data;
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/* This storage is needed for the AES_unwrap function */
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decrypted_data = (guint8 *) g_malloc(key_len);
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AES_unwrap(decryption_key, 16, szEncryptedKey, key_len, decrypted_data);
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/* With WPA2 what we get after Broadcast Key decryption is an actual RSN structure.
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The key itself is stored as a GTK KDE
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WPA2 IE (1 byte) id = 0xdd, length (1 byte), GTK OUI (4 bytes), key index (1 byte) and 1 reserved byte. Thus we have to
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pass pointer to the actual key with 8 bytes offset */
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key_found = FALSE;
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key_index = 0;
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while(key_index < key_len && !key_found){
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guint8 rsn_id;
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/* Get RSN ID */
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rsn_id = decrypted_data[key_index];
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if (rsn_id != 0xdd){
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key_index += decrypted_data[key_index+1]+2;
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}else{
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key_found = TRUE;
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}
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}
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if (key_found){
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/* Skip over the GTK header info, and don't copy past the end of the encrypted data */
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memcpy(szEncryptedKey, decrypted_data+key_index+8, key_len-key_index-8);
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}
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g_free(decrypted_data);
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}
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/* Decrypted key is now in szEncryptedKey with len of key_len */
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DEBUG_DUMP("Broadcast key:", szEncryptedKey, key_len);
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/* Load the proper key material info into the SA */
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sa->key = &dummy_key; /* we just need key to be not null because it is checked in AirPDcapRsnaMng(). The WPA key materials are actually in the .wpa structure */
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sa->validKey = TRUE;
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sa->wpa.key_ver = key_version;
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/* Since this is a GTK and it's size is only 32 bytes (vs. the 64 byte size of a PTK), we fake it and put it in at a 32-byte offset so the */
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/* AirPDcapRsnaMng() function will extract the right piece of the GTK for decryption. (The first 16 bytes of the GTK are used for decryption.) */
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memset(sa->wpa.ptk, 0, sizeof(sa->wpa.ptk));
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memcpy(sa->wpa.ptk+32, szEncryptedKey, key_len);
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g_free(szEncryptedKey);
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}
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/* Return a pointer the the requested SA. If it doesn't exist create it. */
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PAIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION
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AirPDcapGetSaPtr(
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PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
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AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID *id)
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{
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int sa_index;
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/* search for a cached Security Association for supplied BSSID and STA MAC */
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if ((sa_index=AirPDcapGetSa(ctx, id))==-1) {
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/* create a new Security Association if it doesn't currently exist */
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if ((sa_index=AirPDcapStoreSa(ctx, id))==-1) {
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return NULL;
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}
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}
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/* get the Security Association structure */
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return &ctx->sa[sa_index];
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}
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#define GROUP_KEY_PAYLOAD_LEN (8+4+sizeof(EAPOL_RSN_KEY))
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INT AirPDcapScanForGroupKey(
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PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
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const guint8 *data,
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const guint mac_header_len,
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const guint tot_len
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)
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{
|
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const UCHAR *address;
|
|
AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID id;
|
|
guint bodyLength;
|
|
PAIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION sta_sa;
|
|
PAIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION sa;
|
|
int offset = 0;
|
|
const guint8 dot1x_header[] = {
|
|
0xAA, /* DSAP=SNAP */
|
|
0xAA, /* SSAP=SNAP */
|
|
0x03, /* Control field=Unnumbered frame */
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Org. code=encaps. Ethernet */
|
|
0x88, 0x8E /* Type: 802.1X authentication */
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
P_EAPOL_RSN_KEY pEAPKey;
|
|
#ifdef _DEBUG
|
|
CHAR msgbuf[255];
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapScanForGroupKey");
|
|
|
|
if (mac_header_len + GROUP_KEY_PAYLOAD_LEN < tot_len) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForGroupKey", "Message too short", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* cache offset in the packet data */
|
|
offset = mac_header_len;
|
|
|
|
/* check if the packet has an LLC header and the packet is 802.1X authentication (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 24) */
|
|
if (memcmp(data+offset, dot1x_header, 8) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForGroupKey", "Authentication: EAPOL packet", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
|
|
/* skip LLC header */
|
|
offset+=8;
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* check if the packet is a EAPOL-Key (0x03) (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 25) */
|
|
if (data[offset+1]!=3) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForGroupKey", "Not EAPOL-Key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* get and check the body length (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 25) */
|
|
bodyLength=pntohs(data+offset+2);
|
|
if ((tot_len-offset-4) < bodyLength) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForGroupKey", "EAPOL body too short", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* skip EAPOL MPDU and go to the first byte of the body */
|
|
offset+=4;
|
|
|
|
pEAPKey = (P_EAPOL_RSN_KEY) (data+offset);
|
|
|
|
/* check if the key descriptor type is valid (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 27) */
|
|
if (/*pEAPKey->type!=0x1 &&*/ /* RC4 Key Descriptor Type (deprecated) */
|
|
pEAPKey->type != AIRPDCAP_RSN_WPA2_KEY_DESCRIPTOR && /* IEEE 802.11 Key Descriptor Type (WPA2) */
|
|
pEAPKey->type != AIRPDCAP_RSN_WPA_KEY_DESCRIPTOR) /* 254 = RSN_KEY_DESCRIPTOR - WPA, */
|
|
{
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForGroupKey", "Not valid key descriptor type", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* start with descriptor body */
|
|
offset+=1;
|
|
|
|
/* Verify the bitfields: Key = 0(groupwise) Mic = 1 Ack = 1 Secure = 1 */
|
|
if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY(data[offset+1])!=0 ||
|
|
AIRPDCAP_EAP_ACK(data[offset+1])!=1 ||
|
|
AIRPDCAP_EAP_MIC(data[offset]) != 1 ||
|
|
AIRPDCAP_EAP_SEC(data[offset]) != 1){
|
|
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForGroupKey", "Key bitfields not correct", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* get BSSID */
|
|
if ( (address=AirPDcapGetBssidAddress((const AIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME_ADDR4 *)(data))) != NULL) {
|
|
memcpy(id.bssid, address, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
|
|
#ifdef _DEBUG
|
|
sprintf(msgbuf, "BSSID: %2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X\t", id.bssid[0],id.bssid[1],id.bssid[2],id.bssid[3],id.bssid[4],id.bssid[5]);
|
|
#endif
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForGroupKey", msgbuf, AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
} else {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForGroupKey", "BSSID not found", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* force STA address to be the broadcast MAC so we create an SA for the groupkey */
|
|
memcpy(id.sta, broadcast_mac, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
|
|
|
|
/* get the Security Association structure for the broadcast MAC and AP */
|
|
sa = AirPDcapGetSaPtr(ctx, &id);
|
|
if (sa == NULL){
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Get the SA for the STA, since we need its pairwise key to decrpyt the group key */
|
|
|
|
/* get STA address */
|
|
if ( (address=AirPDcapGetStaAddress((const AIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME_ADDR4 *)(data))) != NULL) {
|
|
memcpy(id.sta, address, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
|
|
#ifdef _DEBUG
|
|
sprintf(msgbuf, "ST_MAC: %2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X\t", id.sta[0],id.sta[1],id.sta[2],id.sta[3],id.sta[4],id.sta[5]);
|
|
#endif
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForGroupKey", msgbuf, AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
} else {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForGroupKey", "SA not found", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sta_sa = AirPDcapGetSaPtr(ctx, &id);
|
|
if (sta_sa == NULL){
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Extract the group key and install it in the SA */
|
|
AirPDcapDecryptWPABroadcastKey(pEAPKey, sta_sa->wpa.ptk+16, sa);
|
|
|
|
}else{
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForGroupKey", "Skipping: not an EAPOL packet", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapScanForGroupKey");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
INT AirPDcapPacketProcess(
|
|
PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
|
|
const guint8 *data,
|
|
const guint mac_header_len,
|
|
const guint tot_len,
|
|
UCHAR *decrypt_data,
|
|
guint *decrypt_len,
|
|
PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
|
|
gboolean mngHandshake,
|
|
gboolean mngDecrypt)
|
|
{
|
|
const UCHAR *address;
|
|
AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID id;
|
|
PAIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION sa;
|
|
int offset = 0;
|
|
guint bodyLength;
|
|
const guint8 dot1x_header[] = {
|
|
0xAA, /* DSAP=SNAP */
|
|
0xAA, /* SSAP=SNAP */
|
|
0x03, /* Control field=Unnumbered frame */
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Org. code=encaps. Ethernet */
|
|
0x88, 0x8E /* Type: 802.1X authentication */
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#ifdef _DEBUG
|
|
CHAR msgbuf[255];
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapPacketProcess");
|
|
|
|
if (ctx==NULL) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "NULL context", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapPacketProcess");
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
if (data==NULL || tot_len==0) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "NULL data or length=0", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapPacketProcess");
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* check if the packet is of data type */
|
|
if (AIRPDCAP_TYPE(data[0])!=AIRPDCAP_TYPE_DATA) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "not data packet", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_DATA;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* check correct packet size, to avoid wrong elaboration of encryption algorithms */
|
|
if (tot_len < (UINT)(mac_header_len+AIRPDCAP_CRYPTED_DATA_MINLEN)) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "minimum length violated", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_WRONG_DATA_SIZE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* get BSSID */
|
|
if ( (address=AirPDcapGetBssidAddress((const AIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME_ADDR4 *)(data))) != NULL) {
|
|
memcpy(id.bssid, address, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
|
|
#ifdef _DEBUG
|
|
sprintf(msgbuf, "BSSID: %2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X\t", id.bssid[0],id.bssid[1],id.bssid[2],id.bssid[3],id.bssid[4],id.bssid[5]);
|
|
#endif
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", msgbuf, AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
} else {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "BSSID not found", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* get STA address */
|
|
if ( (address=AirPDcapGetStaAddress((const AIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME_ADDR4 *)(data))) != NULL) {
|
|
memcpy(id.sta, address, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
|
|
#ifdef _DEBUG
|
|
sprintf(msgbuf, "ST_MAC: %2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X\t", id.sta[0],id.sta[1],id.sta[2],id.sta[3],id.sta[4],id.sta[5]);
|
|
#endif
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", msgbuf, AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
} else {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "SA not found", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* get the Security Association structure for the STA and AP */
|
|
sa = AirPDcapGetSaPtr(ctx, &id);
|
|
if (sa == NULL){
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* cache offset in the packet data (to scan encryption data) */
|
|
offset = mac_header_len;
|
|
|
|
/* check if data is encrypted (use the WEP bit in the Frame Control field) */
|
|
if (AIRPDCAP_WEP(data[1])==0)
|
|
{
|
|
if (mngHandshake) {
|
|
/* data is sent in cleartext, check if is an authentication message or end the process */
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "Unencrypted data", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
|
|
/* check if the packet as an LLC header and the packet is 802.1X authentication (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 24) */
|
|
if (memcmp(data+offset, dot1x_header, 8) == 0) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "Authentication: EAPOL packet", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
|
|
/* skip LLC header */
|
|
offset+=8;
|
|
|
|
/* check the version of the EAPOL protocol used (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 24) */
|
|
/* TODO EAPOL protocol version to check? */
|
|
#if 0
|
|
if (data[offset]!=2) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("EAPOL protocol version not recognized", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* check if the packet is a EAPOL-Key (0x03) (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 25) */
|
|
if (data[offset+1]!=3) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "Not EAPOL-Key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* get and check the body length (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 25) */
|
|
bodyLength=pntohs(data+offset+2);
|
|
if ((tot_len-offset-4) < bodyLength) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "EAPOL body too short", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* skip EAPOL MPDU and go to the first byte of the body */
|
|
offset+=4;
|
|
|
|
/* check if the key descriptor type is valid (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 27) */
|
|
if (/*data[offset]!=0x1 &&*/ /* RC4 Key Descriptor Type (deprecated) */
|
|
data[offset]!=0x2 && /* IEEE 802.11 Key Descriptor Type */
|
|
data[offset]!=0xFE) /* TODO what's this value??? */
|
|
{
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "Not valid key descriptor type", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* start with descriptor body */
|
|
offset+=1;
|
|
|
|
/* manage the 4-way handshake to define the key */
|
|
return AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake(ctx, data, sa, key, offset);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* cleartext message, not authentication */
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "No authentication data", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_DATA_ENCRYPTED;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (mngDecrypt) {
|
|
|
|
if (decrypt_data==NULL)
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
/* create new header and data to modify */
|
|
*decrypt_len = tot_len;
|
|
memcpy(decrypt_data, data, *decrypt_len);
|
|
|
|
/* encrypted data */
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "Encrypted data", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
|
|
/* check the Extension IV to distinguish between WEP encryption and WPA encryption */
|
|
/* refer to IEEE 802.11i-2004, 8.2.1.2, pag.35 for WEP, */
|
|
/* IEEE 802.11i-2004, 8.3.2.2, pag. 45 for TKIP, */
|
|
/* IEEE 802.11i-2004, 8.3.3.2, pag. 57 for CCMP */
|
|
if (AIRPDCAP_EXTIV(data[offset+3])==0) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "WEP encryption", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
return AirPDcapWepMng(ctx, decrypt_data, mac_header_len, decrypt_len, key, sa, offset);
|
|
} else {
|
|
INT status;
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "TKIP or CCMP encryption", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
|
|
/* If index >= 1, then use the group key. This will not work if the AP is using
|
|
more than one group key simultaneously. I've not seen this in practice, however.
|
|
Usually an AP will rotate between the two key index values of 1 and 2 whenever
|
|
it needs to change the group key to be used. */
|
|
if (AIRPDCAP_KEY_INDEX(data[offset+3])>=1){
|
|
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "The key index = 1. This is encrypted with a group key.", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
|
|
/* force STA address to broadcast MAC so we load the SA for the groupkey */
|
|
memcpy(id.sta, broadcast_mac, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef _DEBUG
|
|
sprintf(msgbuf, "ST_MAC: %2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X\t", id.sta[0],id.sta[1],id.sta[2],id.sta[3],id.sta[4],id.sta[5]);
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", msgbuf, AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* search for a cached Security Association for current BSSID and broadcast MAC */
|
|
sa = AirPDcapGetSaPtr(ctx, &id);
|
|
if (sa == NULL){
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Decrypt the packet using the appropriate SA */
|
|
status = AirPDcapRsnaMng(decrypt_data, mac_header_len, decrypt_len, key, sa, offset);
|
|
|
|
/* If we successfully decrypted a packet, scan it to see if it contains a group key handshake.
|
|
The group key handshake could be sent at any time the AP wants to change the key (such as when
|
|
it is using key rotation) so we must scan every packet. */
|
|
if (status == AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS)
|
|
AirPDcapScanForGroupKey(ctx, decrypt_data, mac_header_len, *decrypt_len);
|
|
return status;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
INT AirPDcapSetKeys(
|
|
PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
|
|
AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM keys[],
|
|
const size_t keys_nr)
|
|
{
|
|
INT i;
|
|
INT success;
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapSetKeys");
|
|
|
|
if (ctx==NULL || keys==NULL) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapSetKeys", "NULL context or NULL keys array", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapSetKeys");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (keys_nr>AIRPDCAP_MAX_KEYS_NR) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapSetKeys", "Keys number greater than maximum", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapSetKeys");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* clean key and SA collections before setting new ones */
|
|
AirPDcapInitContext(ctx);
|
|
|
|
/* check and insert keys */
|
|
for (i=0, success=0; i<(INT)keys_nr; i++) {
|
|
if (AirPDcapValidateKey(keys+i)==TRUE) {
|
|
if (keys[i].KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapSetKeys", "Set a WPA-PWD key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_4);
|
|
AirPDcapRsnaPwd2Psk(keys[i].UserPwd.Passphrase, keys[i].UserPwd.Ssid, keys[i].UserPwd.SsidLen, keys[i].KeyData.Wpa.Psk);
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef _DEBUG
|
|
else if (keys[i].KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapSetKeys", "Set a WPA-PMK key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_4);
|
|
} else if (keys[i].KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapSetKeys", "Set a WEP key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_4);
|
|
} else {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapSetKeys", "Set a key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_4);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
memcpy(&ctx->keys[success], &keys[i], sizeof(keys[i]));
|
|
success++;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx->keys_nr=success;
|
|
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapSetKeys");
|
|
return success;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
AirPDcapCleanKeys(
|
|
PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapCleanKeys");
|
|
|
|
if (ctx==NULL) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapCleanKeys", "NULL context", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapCleanKeys");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memset(ctx->keys, 0, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM) * AIRPDCAP_MAX_KEYS_NR);
|
|
|
|
ctx->keys_nr=0;
|
|
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapCleanKeys", "Keys collection cleaned!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapCleanKeys");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
INT AirPDcapGetKeys(
|
|
const PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
|
|
AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM keys[],
|
|
const size_t keys_nr)
|
|
{
|
|
UINT i;
|
|
UINT j;
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapGetKeys");
|
|
|
|
if (ctx==NULL) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapGetKeys", "NULL context", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapGetKeys");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
} else if (keys==NULL) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapGetKeys", "NULL keys array", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapGetKeys");
|
|
return (INT)ctx->keys_nr;
|
|
} else {
|
|
for (i=0, j=0; i<ctx->keys_nr && i<keys_nr && i<AIRPDCAP_MAX_KEYS_NR; i++) {
|
|
memcpy(&keys[j], &ctx->keys[i], sizeof(keys[j]));
|
|
j++;
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapGetKeys", "Got a key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapGetKeys");
|
|
return j;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX - This won't be reliable if a packet containing SSID "B" shows
|
|
* up in the middle of a 4-way handshake for SSID "A".
|
|
* We should probably use a small array or hash table to keep multiple
|
|
* SSIDs.
|
|
*/
|
|
INT AirPDcapSetLastSSID(
|
|
PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
|
|
CHAR *pkt_ssid,
|
|
size_t pkt_ssid_len)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!ctx || !pkt_ssid || pkt_ssid_len < 1 || pkt_ssid_len > WPA_SSID_MAX_SIZE)
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(ctx->pkt_ssid, pkt_ssid, pkt_ssid_len);
|
|
ctx->pkt_ssid_len = pkt_ssid_len;
|
|
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
INT AirPDcapInitContext(
|
|
PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapInitContext");
|
|
|
|
if (ctx==NULL) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapInitContext", "NULL context", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapInitContext");
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
AirPDcapCleanKeys(ctx);
|
|
|
|
ctx->first_free_index=0;
|
|
ctx->index=-1;
|
|
ctx->sa_index=-1;
|
|
ctx->pkt_ssid_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
memset(ctx->sa, 0, AIRPDCAP_MAX_SEC_ASSOCIATIONS_NR * sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION));
|
|
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapInitContext", "Context initialized!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapInitContext");
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
INT AirPDcapDestroyContext(
|
|
PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapDestroyContext");
|
|
|
|
if (ctx==NULL) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapDestroyContext", "NULL context", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapDestroyContext");
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
AirPDcapCleanKeys(ctx);
|
|
|
|
ctx->first_free_index=0;
|
|
ctx->index=-1;
|
|
ctx->sa_index=-1;
|
|
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapDestroyContext", "Context destroyed!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapDestroyContext");
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef __cplusplus
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************/
|
|
/* Internal function definitions */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef __cplusplus
|
|
extern "C" {
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static INT
|
|
AirPDcapRsnaMng(
|
|
UCHAR *decrypt_data,
|
|
guint mac_header_len,
|
|
guint *decrypt_len,
|
|
PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
|
|
AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
|
|
INT offset)
|
|
{
|
|
INT ret_value=1;
|
|
UCHAR *try_data;
|
|
|
|
if (sa->key==NULL) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "No key associated", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
|
|
}
|
|
if (sa->validKey==FALSE) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "Key not yet valid", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* allocate a temp buffer for the decryption loop */
|
|
try_data=ep_alloc(*decrypt_len);
|
|
|
|
/* start of loop added by GCS */
|
|
for(/* sa */; sa != NULL && ret_value == 1 ;sa=sa->next) {
|
|
|
|
/* copy the encrypted data into a temp buffer */
|
|
memcpy(try_data, decrypt_data, *decrypt_len);
|
|
|
|
if (sa->wpa.key_ver==1) {
|
|
/* CCMP -> HMAC-MD5 is the EAPOL-Key MIC, RC4 is the EAPOL-Key encryption algorithm */
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "TKIP", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
|
|
DEBUG_DUMP("ptk", sa->wpa.ptk, 64);
|
|
DEBUG_DUMP("ptk portion used", AIRPDCAP_GET_TK(sa->wpa.ptk), 16);
|
|
|
|
ret_value=AirPDcapTkipDecrypt(try_data+offset, *decrypt_len-offset, try_data+AIRPDCAP_TA_OFFSET, AIRPDCAP_GET_TK(sa->wpa.ptk));
|
|
if (ret_value){
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "TKIP failed!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "TKIP DECRYPTED!!!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
/* remove MIC (8bytes) and ICV (4bytes) from the end of packet */
|
|
*decrypt_len-=12;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* AES-CCMP -> HMAC-SHA1-128 is the EAPOL-Key MIC, AES wep_key wrap is the EAPOL-Key encryption algorithm */
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "CCMP", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
|
|
ret_value=AirPDcapCcmpDecrypt(try_data, mac_header_len, (INT)*decrypt_len, AIRPDCAP_GET_TK(sa->wpa.ptk));
|
|
if (ret_value)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "CCMP DECRYPTED!!!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
/* remove MIC (8bytes) from the end of packet */
|
|
*decrypt_len-=8;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* end of loop */
|
|
|
|
/* non of the keys workd */
|
|
if(sa == NULL)
|
|
return ret_value;
|
|
|
|
/* copy the decrypted data into the decrypt buffer GCS*/
|
|
memcpy(decrypt_data, try_data, *decrypt_len);
|
|
|
|
/* remove protection bit */
|
|
decrypt_data[1]&=0xBF;
|
|
|
|
/* remove TKIP/CCMP header */
|
|
offset = mac_header_len;
|
|
*decrypt_len-=8;
|
|
memmove(decrypt_data+offset, decrypt_data+offset+8, *decrypt_len-offset);
|
|
|
|
if (key!=NULL) {
|
|
memcpy(key, sa->key, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM));
|
|
|
|
if (sa->wpa.key_ver==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_NOT_CCMP)
|
|
key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_TKIP;
|
|
else if (sa->wpa.key_ver==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP)
|
|
key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_CCMP;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static INT
|
|
AirPDcapWepMng(
|
|
PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
|
|
UCHAR *decrypt_data,
|
|
guint mac_header_len,
|
|
guint *decrypt_len,
|
|
PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
|
|
AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
|
|
INT offset)
|
|
{
|
|
UCHAR wep_key[AIRPDCAP_WEP_KEY_MAXLEN+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN];
|
|
size_t keylen;
|
|
INT ret_value=1;
|
|
INT key_index;
|
|
AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM *tmp_key;
|
|
UINT8 useCache=FALSE;
|
|
UCHAR *try_data = ep_alloc(*decrypt_len);
|
|
|
|
if (sa->key!=NULL)
|
|
useCache=TRUE;
|
|
|
|
for (key_index=0; key_index<(INT)ctx->keys_nr; key_index++) {
|
|
/* use the cached one, or try all keys */
|
|
if (!useCache) {
|
|
tmp_key=&ctx->keys[key_index];
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (sa->key!=NULL && sa->key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapWepMng", "Try cached WEP key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
tmp_key=sa->key;
|
|
} else {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapWepMng", "Cached key is not valid, try another WEP key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
tmp_key=&ctx->keys[key_index];
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* obviously, try only WEP keys... */
|
|
if (tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP)
|
|
{
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapWepMng", "Try WEP key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
|
|
memset(wep_key, 0, sizeof(wep_key));
|
|
memcpy(try_data, decrypt_data, *decrypt_len);
|
|
|
|
/* Costruct the WEP seed: copy the IV in first 3 bytes and then the WEP key (refer to 802-11i-2004, 8.2.1.4.3, pag. 36) */
|
|
memcpy(wep_key, try_data+mac_header_len, AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN);
|
|
keylen=tmp_key->KeyData.Wep.WepKeyLen;
|
|
memcpy(wep_key+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN, tmp_key->KeyData.Wep.WepKey, keylen);
|
|
|
|
ret_value=AirPDcapWepDecrypt(wep_key,
|
|
keylen+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN,
|
|
try_data + (mac_header_len+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN+AIRPDCAP_WEP_KIDLEN),
|
|
*decrypt_len-(mac_header_len+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN+AIRPDCAP_WEP_KIDLEN+AIRPDCAP_CRC_LEN));
|
|
|
|
if (ret_value == AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS)
|
|
memcpy(decrypt_data, try_data, *decrypt_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ret_value && tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP) {
|
|
/* the tried key is the correct one, cached in the Security Association */
|
|
|
|
sa->key=tmp_key;
|
|
|
|
if (key!=NULL) {
|
|
memcpy(key, &sa->key, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM));
|
|
key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* the cached key was not valid, try other keys */
|
|
|
|
if (useCache==TRUE) {
|
|
useCache=FALSE;
|
|
key_index--;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ret_value)
|
|
return ret_value;
|
|
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapWepMng", "WEP DECRYPTED!!!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
|
|
/* remove ICV (4bytes) from the end of packet */
|
|
*decrypt_len-=4;
|
|
|
|
/* remove protection bit */
|
|
decrypt_data[1]&=0xBF;
|
|
|
|
/* remove IC header */
|
|
offset = mac_header_len;
|
|
*decrypt_len-=4;
|
|
memcpy(decrypt_data+offset, decrypt_data+offset+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN+AIRPDCAP_WEP_KIDLEN, *decrypt_len-offset);
|
|
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Refer to IEEE 802.11i-2004, 8.5.3, pag. 85 */
|
|
static INT
|
|
AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake(
|
|
PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
|
|
const UCHAR *data,
|
|
AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
|
|
PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
|
|
INT offset)
|
|
{
|
|
AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM *tmp_key, pkt_key;
|
|
AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *tmp_sa;
|
|
INT key_index;
|
|
INT ret_value=1;
|
|
UCHAR useCache=FALSE;
|
|
UCHAR eapol[AIRPDCAP_EAPOL_MAX_LEN];
|
|
USHORT eapol_len;
|
|
|
|
if (sa->key!=NULL)
|
|
useCache=TRUE;
|
|
|
|
/* a 4-way handshake packet use a Pairwise key type (IEEE 802.11i-2004, pg. 79) */
|
|
if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY(data[offset+1])!=1) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "Group/STAKey message (not used)", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* TODO timeouts? */
|
|
|
|
/* This saves the sa since we are reauthenticating which will overwrite our current sa GCS*/
|
|
if(sa->handshake == 4) {
|
|
tmp_sa=se_alloc(sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION));
|
|
memcpy(tmp_sa, sa, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION));
|
|
sa->next=tmp_sa;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* TODO consider key-index */
|
|
|
|
/* TODO considera Deauthentications */
|
|
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
|
|
|
/* manage 4-way handshake packets; this step completes the 802.1X authentication process (IEEE 802.11i-2004, pag. 85) */
|
|
|
|
/* message 1: Authenticator->Supplicant (Sec=0, Mic=0, Ack=1, Inst=0, Key=1(pairwise), KeyRSC=0, Nonce=ANonce, MIC=0) */
|
|
if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_INST(data[offset+1])==0 &&
|
|
AIRPDCAP_EAP_ACK(data[offset+1])==1 &&
|
|
AIRPDCAP_EAP_MIC(data[offset])==0)
|
|
{
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake message 1", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
|
|
/* On reception of Message 1, the Supplicant determines whether the Key Replay Counter field value has been */
|
|
/* used before with the current PMKSA. If the Key Replay Counter field value is less than or equal to the current */
|
|
/* local value, the Supplicant discards the message. */
|
|
/* -> not checked, the Authenticator will be send another Message 1 (hopefully!) */
|
|
|
|
/* save ANonce (from authenticator) to derive the PTK with the SNonce (from the 2 message) */
|
|
memcpy(sa->wpa.nonce, data+offset+12, 32);
|
|
|
|
/* get the Key Descriptor Version (to select algorithm used in decryption -CCMP or TKIP-) */
|
|
sa->wpa.key_ver=AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY_DESCR_VER(data[offset+1]);
|
|
|
|
sa->handshake=1;
|
|
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* message 2|4: Supplicant->Authenticator (Sec=0|1, Mic=1, Ack=0, Inst=0, Key=1(pairwise), KeyRSC=0, Nonce=SNonce|0, MIC=MIC(KCK,EAPOL)) */
|
|
if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_INST(data[offset+1])==0 &&
|
|
AIRPDCAP_EAP_ACK(data[offset+1])==0 &&
|
|
AIRPDCAP_EAP_MIC(data[offset])==1)
|
|
{
|
|
if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_SEC(data[offset])==0) {
|
|
|
|
/* PATCH: some implementations set secure bit to 0 also in the 4th message */
|
|
/* to recognize which message is this check if wep_key data length is 0 */
|
|
/* in the 4th message */
|
|
if (data[offset+92]!=0 || data[offset+93]!=0) {
|
|
/* message 2 */
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake message 2", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
|
|
/* On reception of Message 2, the Authenticator checks that the key replay counter corresponds to the */
|
|
/* outstanding Message 1. If not, it silently discards the message. */
|
|
/* If the calculated MIC does not match the MIC that the Supplicant included in the EAPOL-Key frame, */
|
|
/* the Authenticator silently discards Message 2. */
|
|
/* -> not checked; the Supplicant will send another message 2 (hopefully!) */
|
|
|
|
/* now you can derive the PTK */
|
|
for (key_index=0; key_index<(INT)ctx->keys_nr || useCache; key_index++) {
|
|
/* use the cached one, or try all keys */
|
|
if (!useCache) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "Try WPA key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
tmp_key=&ctx->keys[key_index];
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* there is a cached key in the security association, if it's a WPA key try it... */
|
|
if (sa->key!=NULL &&
|
|
(sa->key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD ||
|
|
sa->key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK ||
|
|
sa->key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK)) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "Try cached WPA key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
tmp_key=sa->key;
|
|
} else {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "Cached key is of a wrong type, try WPA key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
tmp_key=&ctx->keys[key_index];
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* obviously, try only WPA keys... */
|
|
if (tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD ||
|
|
tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK ||
|
|
tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK)
|
|
{
|
|
if (tmp_key->KeyType == AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD && tmp_key->UserPwd.SsidLen == 0 && ctx->pkt_ssid_len > 0 && ctx->pkt_ssid_len <= AIRPDCAP_WPA_SSID_MAX_LEN) {
|
|
/* We have a "wildcard" SSID. Use the one from the packet. */
|
|
memcpy(&pkt_key, tmp_key, sizeof(pkt_key));
|
|
memcpy(&pkt_key.UserPwd.Ssid, ctx->pkt_ssid, ctx->pkt_ssid_len);
|
|
pkt_key.UserPwd.SsidLen = ctx->pkt_ssid_len;
|
|
AirPDcapRsnaPwd2Psk(pkt_key.UserPwd.Passphrase, pkt_key.UserPwd.Ssid,
|
|
pkt_key.UserPwd.SsidLen, pkt_key.KeyData.Wpa.Psk);
|
|
tmp_key = &pkt_key;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* derive the PTK from the BSSID, STA MAC, PMK, SNonce, ANonce */
|
|
AirPDcapRsnaPrfX(sa, /* authenticator nonce, bssid, station mac */
|
|
tmp_key->KeyData.Wpa.Pmk, /* PMK */
|
|
data+offset+12, /* supplicant nonce */
|
|
512,
|
|
sa->wpa.ptk);
|
|
|
|
/* verify the MIC (compare the MIC in the packet included in this message with a MIC calculated with the PTK) */
|
|
eapol_len=pntohs(data+offset-3)+4;
|
|
memcpy(eapol, &data[offset-5], (eapol_len<AIRPDCAP_EAPOL_MAX_LEN?eapol_len:AIRPDCAP_EAPOL_MAX_LEN));
|
|
ret_value=AirPDcapRsnaMicCheck(eapol, /* eapol frame (header also) */
|
|
eapol_len, /* eapol frame length */
|
|
sa->wpa.ptk, /* Key Confirmation Key */
|
|
AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY_DESCR_VER(data[offset+1])); /* EAPOL-Key description version */
|
|
|
|
/* If the MIC is valid, the Authenticator checks that the RSN information element bit-wise matches */
|
|
/* that from the (Re)Association Request message. */
|
|
/* i) TODO If these are not exactly the same, the Authenticator uses MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request */
|
|
/* primitive to terminate the association. */
|
|
/* ii) If they do match bit-wise, the Authenticator constructs Message 3. */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ret_value &&
|
|
(tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD ||
|
|
tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK ||
|
|
tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK))
|
|
{
|
|
/* the temporary key is the correct one, cached in the Security Association */
|
|
|
|
sa->key=tmp_key;
|
|
|
|
if (key!=NULL) {
|
|
memcpy(key, &tmp_key, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM));
|
|
if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY_DESCR_VER(data[offset+1])==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_NOT_CCMP)
|
|
key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_TKIP;
|
|
else if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY_DESCR_VER(data[offset+1])==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP)
|
|
key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_CCMP;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* the cached key was not valid, try other keys */
|
|
|
|
if (useCache==TRUE) {
|
|
useCache=FALSE;
|
|
key_index--;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ret_value) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "handshake step failed", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sa->handshake=2;
|
|
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* message 4 */
|
|
|
|
/* TODO "Note that when the 4-Way Handshake is first used Message 4 is sent in the clear." */
|
|
|
|
/* TODO check MIC and Replay Counter */
|
|
/* On reception of Message 4, the Authenticator verifies that the Key Replay Counter field value is one */
|
|
/* that it used on this 4-Way Handshake; if it is not, it silently discards the message. */
|
|
/* If the calculated MIC does not match the MIC that the Supplicant included in the EAPOL-Key frame, the */
|
|
/* Authenticator silently discards Message 4. */
|
|
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake message 4 (patched)", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
|
|
sa->handshake=4;
|
|
|
|
sa->validKey=TRUE;
|
|
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
}
|
|
/* END OF PATCH */
|
|
/* */
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* message 4 */
|
|
|
|
/* TODO "Note that when the 4-Way Handshake is first used Message 4 is sent in the clear." */
|
|
|
|
/* TODO check MIC and Replay Counter */
|
|
/* On reception of Message 4, the Authenticator verifies that the Key Replay Counter field value is one */
|
|
/* that it used on this 4-Way Handshake; if it is not, it silently discards the message. */
|
|
/* If the calculated MIC does not match the MIC that the Supplicant included in the EAPOL-Key frame, the */
|
|
/* Authenticator silently discards Message 4. */
|
|
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake message 4", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
|
|
sa->handshake=4;
|
|
|
|
sa->validKey=TRUE;
|
|
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* message 3: Authenticator->Supplicant (Sec=1, Mic=1, Ack=1, Inst=0/1, Key=1(pairwise), KeyRSC=???, Nonce=ANonce, MIC=1) */
|
|
if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_ACK(data[offset+1])==1 &&
|
|
AIRPDCAP_EAP_MIC(data[offset])==1)
|
|
{
|
|
P_EAPOL_RSN_KEY pEAPKey;
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake message 3", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
|
|
|
/* On reception of Message 3, the Supplicant silently discards the message if the Key Replay Counter field */
|
|
/* value has already been used or if the ANonce value in Message 3 differs from the ANonce value in Message 1. */
|
|
/* -> not checked, the Authenticator will send another message 3 (hopefully!) */
|
|
|
|
/* TODO check page 88 (RNS) */
|
|
|
|
/* If using WPA2 PSK, message 3 will contain an RSN for the group key (GTK KDE).
|
|
In order to properly support decrypting WPA2-PSK packets, we need to parse this to get the group key. */
|
|
pEAPKey = (P_EAPOL_RSN_KEY)(&(data[offset-1]));
|
|
if (pEAPKey->type == AIRPDCAP_RSN_WPA2_KEY_DESCRIPTOR){
|
|
PAIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION broadcast_sa;
|
|
AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID id;
|
|
|
|
/* Get broadcacst SA for the current BSSID */
|
|
memcpy(id.sta, broadcast_mac, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
|
|
memcpy(id.bssid, sa->saId.bssid, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
|
|
broadcast_sa = AirPDcapGetSaPtr(ctx, &id);
|
|
|
|
if (broadcast_sa == NULL){
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
AirPDcapDecryptWPABroadcastKey(pEAPKey, sa->wpa.ptk+16, broadcast_sa);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static INT
|
|
AirPDcapRsnaMicCheck(
|
|
UCHAR *eapol,
|
|
USHORT eapol_len,
|
|
UCHAR KCK[AIRPDCAP_WPA_KCK_LEN],
|
|
USHORT key_ver)
|
|
{
|
|
UCHAR mic[AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_LEN];
|
|
UCHAR c_mic[20]; /* MIC 16 byte, the HMAC-SHA1 use a buffer of 20 bytes */
|
|
|
|
/* copy the MIC from the EAPOL packet */
|
|
memcpy(mic, eapol+AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_OFFSET+4, AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_LEN);
|
|
|
|
/* set to 0 the MIC in the EAPOL packet (to calculate the MIC) */
|
|
memset(eapol+AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_OFFSET+4, 0, AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_LEN);
|
|
|
|
if (key_ver==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_NOT_CCMP) {
|
|
/* use HMAC-MD5 for the EAPOL-Key MIC */
|
|
md5_hmac(eapol, eapol_len, KCK, AIRPDCAP_WPA_KCK_LEN, c_mic);
|
|
} else if (key_ver==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP) {
|
|
/* use HMAC-SHA1-128 for the EAPOL-Key MIC */
|
|
sha1_hmac(KCK, AIRPDCAP_WPA_KCK_LEN, eapol, eapol_len, c_mic);
|
|
} else
|
|
/* key descriptor version not recognized */
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
/* compare calculated MIC with the Key MIC and return result (0 means success) */
|
|
return memcmp(mic, c_mic, AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static INT
|
|
AirPDcapValidateKey(
|
|
PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
UCHAR ret=TRUE;
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapValidateKey");
|
|
|
|
if (key==NULL) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapValidateKey", "NULL key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapValidateKey");
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (key->KeyType) {
|
|
case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP:
|
|
/* check key size limits */
|
|
len=key->KeyData.Wep.WepKeyLen;
|
|
if (len<AIRPDCAP_WEP_KEY_MINLEN || len>AIRPDCAP_WEP_KEY_MAXLEN) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapValidateKey", "WEP key: key length not accepted", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
|
ret=FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP_40:
|
|
/* set the standard length and use a generic WEP key type */
|
|
key->KeyData.Wep.WepKeyLen=AIRPDCAP_WEP_40_KEY_LEN;
|
|
key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP_104:
|
|
/* set the standard length and use a generic WEP key type */
|
|
key->KeyData.Wep.WepKeyLen=AIRPDCAP_WEP_104_KEY_LEN;
|
|
key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD:
|
|
/* check passphrase and SSID size limits */
|
|
len=strlen(key->UserPwd.Passphrase);
|
|
if (len<AIRPDCAP_WPA_PASSPHRASE_MIN_LEN || len>AIRPDCAP_WPA_PASSPHRASE_MAX_LEN) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapValidateKey", "WPA-PWD key: passphrase length not accepted", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
|
ret=FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
len=key->UserPwd.SsidLen;
|
|
if (len>AIRPDCAP_WPA_SSID_MAX_LEN) {
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapValidateKey", "WPA-PWD key: ssid length not accepted", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
|
ret=FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK:
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK:
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
ret=FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapValidateKey");
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static INT
|
|
AirPDcapGetSa(
|
|
PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
|
|
AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID *id)
|
|
{
|
|
INT sa_index;
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->sa_index!=-1) {
|
|
/* at least one association was stored */
|
|
/* search for the association from sa_index to 0 (most recent added) */
|
|
for (sa_index=ctx->sa_index; sa_index>=0; sa_index--) {
|
|
if (ctx->sa[sa_index].used) {
|
|
if (memcmp(id, &(ctx->sa[sa_index].saId), sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID))==0) {
|
|
ctx->index=sa_index;
|
|
return sa_index;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static INT
|
|
AirPDcapStoreSa(
|
|
PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
|
|
AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID *id)
|
|
{
|
|
INT last_free;
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->sa[ctx->first_free_index].used) {
|
|
/* last addition was in the middle of the array (and the first_free_index was just incremented by 1) */
|
|
/* search for a free space from the first_free_index to AIRPDCAP_STA_INFOS_NR (to avoid free blocks in */
|
|
/* the middle) */
|
|
for (last_free=ctx->first_free_index; last_free<AIRPDCAP_MAX_SEC_ASSOCIATIONS_NR; last_free++)
|
|
if (!ctx->sa[last_free].used)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
if (last_free>=AIRPDCAP_MAX_SEC_ASSOCIATIONS_NR) {
|
|
/* there is no empty space available. FAILURE */
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* store first free space index */
|
|
ctx->first_free_index=last_free;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* use this info */
|
|
ctx->index=ctx->first_free_index;
|
|
|
|
/* reset the info structure */
|
|
memset(ctx->sa+ctx->index, 0, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION));
|
|
|
|
ctx->sa[ctx->index].used=1;
|
|
|
|
/* set the info structure */
|
|
memcpy(&(ctx->sa[ctx->index].saId), id, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID));
|
|
|
|
/* increment by 1 the first_free_index (heuristic) */
|
|
ctx->first_free_index++;
|
|
|
|
/* set the sa_index if the added index is greater the the sa_index */
|
|
if (ctx->index > ctx->sa_index)
|
|
ctx->sa_index=ctx->index;
|
|
|
|
return ctx->index;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* AirPDcapGetBssidAddress() and AirPDcapGetBssidAddress() are used for
|
|
* key caching. In each case, it's more important to return a value than
|
|
* to return a _correct_ value, so we fudge addresses in some cases, e.g.
|
|
* the BSSID in bridged connections.
|
|
* FromDS ToDS Sta BSSID
|
|
* 0 0 addr2 addr3
|
|
* 0 1 addr2 addr1
|
|
* 1 0 addr1 addr2
|
|
* 1 1 addr2 addr1
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static const UCHAR *
|
|
AirPDcapGetStaAddress(
|
|
const AIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME_ADDR4 *frame)
|
|
{
|
|
switch(AIRPDCAP_DS_BITS(frame->fc[1])) { /* Bit 1 = FromDS, bit 0 = ToDS */
|
|
case 0:
|
|
case 1:
|
|
case 3:
|
|
return frame->addr2;
|
|
case 2:
|
|
return frame->addr1;
|
|
default:
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const UCHAR *
|
|
AirPDcapGetBssidAddress(
|
|
const AIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME_ADDR4 *frame)
|
|
{
|
|
switch(AIRPDCAP_DS_BITS(frame->fc[1])) { /* Bit 1 = FromDS, bit 0 = ToDS */
|
|
case 0:
|
|
return frame->addr3;
|
|
case 1:
|
|
case 3:
|
|
return frame->addr1;
|
|
case 2:
|
|
return frame->addr2;
|
|
default:
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Function used to derive the PTK. Refer to IEEE 802.11I-2004, pag. 74 */
|
|
static void
|
|
AirPDcapRsnaPrfX(
|
|
AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
|
|
const UCHAR pmk[32],
|
|
const UCHAR snonce[32],
|
|
const INT x, /* for TKIP 512, for CCMP 384 */
|
|
UCHAR *ptk)
|
|
{
|
|
UINT8 i;
|
|
UCHAR R[100];
|
|
INT offset=sizeof("Pairwise key expansion");
|
|
|
|
memset(R, 0, 100);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(R, "Pairwise key expansion", offset);
|
|
|
|
/* Min(AA, SPA) || Max(AA, SPA) */
|
|
if (memcmp(sa->saId.sta, sa->saId.bssid, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN) < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
memcpy(R + offset, sa->saId.sta, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
|
|
memcpy(R + offset+AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN, sa->saId.bssid, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
memcpy(R + offset, sa->saId.bssid, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
|
|
memcpy(R + offset+AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN, sa->saId.sta, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
offset+=AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN*2;
|
|
|
|
/* Min(ANonce,SNonce) || Max(ANonce,SNonce) */
|
|
if( memcmp(snonce, sa->wpa.nonce, 32) < 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
memcpy(R + offset, snonce, 32);
|
|
memcpy(R + offset + 32, sa->wpa.nonce, 32);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
memcpy(R + offset, sa->wpa.nonce, 32);
|
|
memcpy(R + offset + 32, snonce, 32);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
offset+=32*2;
|
|
|
|
for(i = 0; i < (x+159)/160; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
R[offset] = i;
|
|
sha1_hmac(pmk, 32, R, 100, ptk + i * 20);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static INT
|
|
AirPDcapRsnaPwd2PskStep(
|
|
const guint8 *ppBytes,
|
|
const guint ppLength,
|
|
const CHAR *ssid,
|
|
const size_t ssidLength,
|
|
const INT iterations,
|
|
const INT count,
|
|
UCHAR *output)
|
|
{
|
|
UCHAR digest[36], digest1[AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN];
|
|
INT i, j;
|
|
|
|
/* U1 = PRF(P, S || INT(i)) */
|
|
memcpy(digest, ssid, ssidLength);
|
|
digest[ssidLength] = (UCHAR)((count>>24) & 0xff);
|
|
digest[ssidLength+1] = (UCHAR)((count>>16) & 0xff);
|
|
digest[ssidLength+2] = (UCHAR)((count>>8) & 0xff);
|
|
digest[ssidLength+3] = (UCHAR)(count & 0xff);
|
|
sha1_hmac(ppBytes, ppLength, digest, (guint32) ssidLength+4, digest1);
|
|
|
|
/* output = U1 */
|
|
memcpy(output, digest1, AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
for (i = 1; i < iterations; i++) {
|
|
/* Un = PRF(P, Un-1) */
|
|
sha1_hmac(ppBytes, ppLength, digest1, AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN, digest);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(digest1, digest, AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
/* output = output xor Un */
|
|
for (j = 0; j < AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN; j++) {
|
|
output[j] ^= digest[j];
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static INT
|
|
AirPDcapRsnaPwd2Psk(
|
|
const CHAR *passphrase,
|
|
const CHAR *ssid,
|
|
const size_t ssidLength,
|
|
UCHAR *output)
|
|
{
|
|
UCHAR m_output[AIRPDCAP_WPA_PSK_LEN];
|
|
GByteArray *pp_ba = g_byte_array_new();
|
|
|
|
memset(m_output, 0, AIRPDCAP_WPA_PSK_LEN);
|
|
|
|
if (!uri_str_to_bytes(passphrase, pp_ba)) {
|
|
g_byte_array_free(pp_ba, TRUE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
AirPDcapRsnaPwd2PskStep(pp_ba->data, pp_ba->len, ssid, ssidLength, 4096, 1, m_output);
|
|
AirPDcapRsnaPwd2PskStep(pp_ba->data, pp_ba->len, ssid, ssidLength, 4096, 2, &m_output[AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN]);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(output, m_output, AIRPDCAP_WPA_PSK_LEN);
|
|
g_byte_array_free(pp_ba, TRUE);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Returns the decryption_key_t struct given a string describing the key.
|
|
* Returns NULL if the key_string cannot be parsed.
|
|
*/
|
|
decryption_key_t*
|
|
parse_key_string(gchar* input_string)
|
|
{
|
|
gchar *type;
|
|
gchar *key;
|
|
gchar *ssid;
|
|
|
|
GString *key_string = NULL;
|
|
GByteArray *ssid_ba = NULL, *key_ba;
|
|
gboolean res;
|
|
|
|
gchar **tokens;
|
|
guint n = 0;
|
|
decryption_key_t *dk;
|
|
gchar *first_nibble = input_string;
|
|
|
|
if(input_string == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Parse the input_string. It should be in the form
|
|
* <key type>:<key data>[:<ssid>]
|
|
* XXX - For backward compatibility, the a WEP key can be just a string
|
|
* of hexadecimal characters (if WEP key is wrong, null will be
|
|
* returned...).
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* First, check for a WEP string */
|
|
/* XXX - This duplicates code in packet-ieee80211.c */
|
|
if (g_ascii_strncasecmp(input_string, STRING_KEY_TYPE_WEP ":", 4) == 0) {
|
|
first_nibble += 4;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key_ba = g_byte_array_new();
|
|
res = hex_str_to_bytes(first_nibble, key_ba, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
if (res && key_ba->len > 0) {
|
|
/* Key is correct! It was probably an 'old style' WEP key */
|
|
/* Create the decryption_key_t structure, fill it and return it*/
|
|
dk = g_malloc(sizeof(decryption_key_t));
|
|
|
|
dk->type = AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP;
|
|
/* XXX - The current key handling code in the GUI requires
|
|
* no separators and lower case */
|
|
dk->key = g_string_new(bytes_to_str(key_ba->data, key_ba->len));
|
|
g_string_down(dk->key);
|
|
dk->bits = key_ba->len * 8;
|
|
dk->ssid = NULL;
|
|
|
|
g_byte_array_free(key_ba, TRUE);
|
|
return dk;
|
|
}
|
|
g_byte_array_free(key_ba, TRUE);
|
|
|
|
|
|
tokens = g_strsplit(input_string,":",0);
|
|
|
|
/* Tokens is a null termiated array of strings ... */
|
|
while(tokens[n] != NULL)
|
|
n++;
|
|
|
|
if(n < 2)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Free the array of strings */
|
|
g_strfreev(tokens);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type = g_strdup(tokens[0]);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The second token is the key (right now it doesn't matter
|
|
* if it is a passphrase[+ssid] or an hexadecimal one)
|
|
*/
|
|
key = g_strdup(tokens[1]);
|
|
|
|
ssid = NULL;
|
|
/* Maybe there is a third token (an ssid, if everything else is ok) */
|
|
if(n >= 3)
|
|
{
|
|
ssid = g_strdup(tokens[2]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (g_ascii_strcasecmp(type,STRING_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK) == 0) /* WPA key */
|
|
{
|
|
/* Create a new string */
|
|
key_string = g_string_new(key);
|
|
|
|
key_ba = g_byte_array_new();
|
|
res = hex_str_to_bytes(key, key_ba, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
/* Two tokens means that the user should have entered a WPA-BIN key ... */
|
|
if(!res || ((key_string->len) != WPA_PSK_KEY_CHAR_SIZE))
|
|
{
|
|
g_string_free(key_string, TRUE);
|
|
g_byte_array_free(key_ba, TRUE);
|
|
|
|
g_free(type);
|
|
g_free(key);
|
|
/* No ssid has been created ... */
|
|
/* Free the array of strings */
|
|
g_strfreev(tokens);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Key was correct!!! Create the new decryption_key_t ... */
|
|
dk = (decryption_key_t*)g_malloc(sizeof(decryption_key_t));
|
|
|
|
dk->type = AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK;
|
|
dk->key = g_string_new(key);
|
|
dk->bits = (guint) dk->key->len * 4;
|
|
dk->ssid = NULL;
|
|
|
|
g_string_free(key_string, TRUE);
|
|
g_byte_array_free(key_ba, TRUE);
|
|
g_free(key);
|
|
g_free(type);
|
|
|
|
/* Free the array of strings */
|
|
g_strfreev(tokens);
|
|
return dk;
|
|
}
|
|
else if(g_ascii_strcasecmp(type,STRING_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD) == 0) /* WPA key *//* If the number of tokens is more than three, we accept the string... if the first three tokens are correct... */
|
|
{
|
|
/* Create a new string */
|
|
key_string = g_string_new(key);
|
|
ssid_ba = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Three (or more) tokens mean that the user entered a WPA-PWD key ... */
|
|
if( ((key_string->len) > WPA_KEY_MAX_CHAR_SIZE) || ((key_string->len) < WPA_KEY_MIN_CHAR_SIZE))
|
|
{
|
|
g_string_free(key_string, TRUE);
|
|
|
|
g_free(type);
|
|
g_free(key);
|
|
g_free(ssid);
|
|
|
|
/* Free the array of strings */
|
|
g_strfreev(tokens);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(ssid != NULL) /* more than three tokens found, means that the user specified the ssid */
|
|
{
|
|
ssid_ba = g_byte_array_new();
|
|
if (! uri_str_to_bytes(ssid, ssid_ba)) {
|
|
g_string_free(key_string, TRUE);
|
|
g_byte_array_free(ssid_ba, TRUE);
|
|
g_free(type);
|
|
g_free(key);
|
|
g_free(ssid);
|
|
/* Free the array of strings */
|
|
g_strfreev(tokens);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(ssid_ba->len > WPA_SSID_MAX_CHAR_SIZE)
|
|
{
|
|
g_string_free(key_string, TRUE);
|
|
g_byte_array_free(ssid_ba, TRUE);
|
|
|
|
g_free(type);
|
|
g_free(key);
|
|
g_free(ssid);
|
|
|
|
/* Free the array of strings */
|
|
g_strfreev(tokens);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Key was correct!!! Create the new decryption_key_t ... */
|
|
dk = (decryption_key_t*)g_malloc(sizeof(decryption_key_t));
|
|
|
|
dk->type = AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD;
|
|
dk->key = g_string_new(key);
|
|
dk->bits = 256; /* This is the length of the array pf bytes that will be generated using key+ssid ...*/
|
|
dk->ssid = byte_array_dup(ssid_ba); /* NULL if ssid_ba is NULL */
|
|
|
|
g_string_free(key_string, TRUE);
|
|
if (ssid_ba != NULL)
|
|
g_byte_array_free(ssid_ba, TRUE);
|
|
|
|
g_free(type);
|
|
g_free(key);
|
|
if(ssid != NULL)
|
|
g_free(ssid);
|
|
|
|
/* Free the array of strings */
|
|
g_strfreev(tokens);
|
|
return dk;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Something was wrong ... free everything */
|
|
|
|
g_free(type);
|
|
g_free(key);
|
|
if(ssid != NULL)
|
|
g_free(ssid); /* It is not always present */
|
|
if (ssid_ba != NULL)
|
|
g_byte_array_free(ssid_ba, TRUE);
|
|
|
|
/* Free the array of strings */
|
|
g_strfreev(tokens);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Returns a newly allocated string representing the given decryption_key_t
|
|
* struct, or NULL if something is wrong...
|
|
*/
|
|
gchar*
|
|
get_key_string(decryption_key_t* dk)
|
|
{
|
|
gchar* output_string = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if(dk == NULL || dk->key == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
switch(dk->type) {
|
|
case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP:
|
|
output_string = g_strdup_printf("%s:%s",STRING_KEY_TYPE_WEP,dk->key->str);
|
|
break;
|
|
case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD:
|
|
if(dk->ssid == NULL)
|
|
output_string = g_strdup_printf("%s:%s",STRING_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD,dk->key->str);
|
|
else
|
|
output_string = g_strdup_printf("%s:%s:%s",
|
|
STRING_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD, dk->key->str,
|
|
format_uri(dk->ssid, ":"));
|
|
break;
|
|
case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK:
|
|
output_string = g_strdup_printf("%s:%s",STRING_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK,dk->key->str);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return output_string;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef __cplusplus
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Editor modelines
|
|
*
|
|
* Local Variables:
|
|
* c-basic-offset: 4
|
|
* tab-width: 8
|
|
* indent-tabs-mode: nil
|
|
* End:
|
|
*
|
|
* ex: set shiftwidth=4 tabstop=8 expandtab
|
|
* :indentSize=4:tabSize=8:noTabs=true:
|
|
*/
|