3801 lines
134 KiB
C
3801 lines
134 KiB
C
/* packet-ssl.c
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* Routines for ssl dissection
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* Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Scott Renfro <scott@renfro.org>
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*
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* $Id$
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*
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* Wireshark - Network traffic analyzer
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* By Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
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* Copyright 1998 Gerald Combs
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
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* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
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* of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
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* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
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*
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* See
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*
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* http://www.netscape.com/eng/security/SSL_2.html
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*
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* for SSL 2.0 specs.
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*
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* See
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*
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* http://www.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/
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*
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* for SSL 3.0 specs.
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*
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* See RFC 2246 for SSL 3.1/TLS 1.0 specs.
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*
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* See (among other places)
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*
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* http://www.graphcomp.com/info/specs/ms/pct.htm
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*
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* for PCT 1 draft specs.
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*
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* See
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*
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* http://research.sun.com/projects/crypto/draft-ietf-tls-ecc-05.txt
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*
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* for Elliptic Curve Cryptography cipher suites.
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*
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* See
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*
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* http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-camellia-04.txt
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*
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* for Camellia-based cipher suites.
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*
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* Notes:
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*
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* - Does not support dissection
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* of frames that would require state maintained between frames
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* (e.g., single ssl records spread across multiple tcp frames)
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*
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* - Identifies, but does not fully dissect the following messages:
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*
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* - SSLv3/TLS (These need more state from previous handshake msgs)
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* - Server Key Exchange
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* - Client Key Exchange
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* - Certificate Verify
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*
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* - SSLv2 (These don't appear in the clear)
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* - Error
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* - Client Finished
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* - Server Verify
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* - Server Finished
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* - Request Certificate
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* - Client Certificate
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*
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* - Decryption is supported only for session that use RSA key exchange,
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* if the host private key is provided via preference.
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*
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* - Decryption need to be performed 'sequentially', so it's done
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* at packet reception time. This may cause a significative packet capture
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* slow down. This also cause do dissect some ssl info that in previous
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* dissector version were dissected only when a proto_tree context was
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* available
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*
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* We are at Packet reception if time pinfo->fd->flags.visited == 0
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*
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*/
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#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
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# include "config.h"
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#endif
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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#endif
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#include <glib.h>
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#include <epan/conversation.h>
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#include <epan/prefs.h>
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#include <epan/inet_v6defs.h>
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#include <epan/dissectors/packet-x509af.h>
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#include <epan/emem.h>
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#include <epan/tap.h>
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#include "packet-ssl.h"
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#include "packet-ssl-utils.h"
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static gboolean ssl_desegment = TRUE;
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static gboolean ssl_desegment_app_data = TRUE;
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/*********************************************************************
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*
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* Protocol Constants, Variables, Data Structures
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*
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*********************************************************************/
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/* Initialize the protocol and registered fields */
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static gint ssl_tap = -1;
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static gint proto_ssl = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_record = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_record_content_type = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_record_version = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_record_length = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_record_appdata = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl2_record = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl2_record_is_escape = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl2_record_padding_length = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl2_msg_type = -1;
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static gint hf_pct_msg_type = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_change_cipher_spec = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_alert_message = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_alert_message_level = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_alert_message_description = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_protocol = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_type = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_length = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_client_version = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_server_version = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_random_time = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_random_bytes = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites_len = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suite = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_session_id = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_comp_methods_len = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_comp_methods = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_comp_method = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_extensions_len = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_extension_type = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_extension_len = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_extension_data = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_certificates_len = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_certificates = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_certificate = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_certificate_len = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_cert_types_count = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_cert_types = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_cert_type = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_finished = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_md5_hash = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_sha_hash = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_session_id_len = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_dnames_len = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_dnames = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_dname_len = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl_handshake_dname = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec_len = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_len = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge_len = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key_len = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key_len = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg_len = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_hit = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_cert_type = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id_len = -1;
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static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id = -1;
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static gint hf_pct_handshake_cipher_spec = -1;
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static gint hf_pct_handshake_hash_spec = -1;
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static gint hf_pct_handshake_cert_spec = -1;
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static gint hf_pct_handshake_cert = -1;
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static gint hf_pct_handshake_server_cert = -1;
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static gint hf_pct_handshake_exch_spec = -1;
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static gint hf_pct_handshake_hash = -1;
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static gint hf_pct_handshake_cipher = -1;
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static gint hf_pct_handshake_exch = -1;
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static gint hf_pct_handshake_sig = -1;
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static gint hf_pct_msg_error_type = -1;
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/* Initialize the subtree pointers */
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static gint ett_ssl = -1;
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static gint ett_ssl_record = -1;
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static gint ett_ssl_alert = -1;
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static gint ett_ssl_handshake = -1;
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static gint ett_ssl_cipher_suites = -1;
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static gint ett_ssl_comp_methods = -1;
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static gint ett_ssl_extension = -1;
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static gint ett_ssl_certs = -1;
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static gint ett_ssl_cert_types = -1;
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static gint ett_ssl_dnames = -1;
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static gint ett_ssl_random = -1;
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static gint ett_pct_cipher_suites = -1;
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static gint ett_pct_hash_suites = -1;
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static gint ett_pct_cert_suites = -1;
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static gint ett_pct_exch_suites = -1;
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static GHashTable *ssl_session_hash = NULL;
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static GHashTable *ssl_key_hash = NULL;
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static GTree* ssl_associations = NULL;
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static dissector_handle_t ssl_handle = NULL;
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static StringInfo ssl_decrypted_data = {NULL, 0};
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static gint ssl_decrypted_data_avail = 0;
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static gchar* ssl_keys_list = NULL;
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static gchar* ssl_debug_file_name = NULL;
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/* Forward declaration we need below */
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void proto_reg_handoff_ssl(void);
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/* initialize/reset per capture state data (ssl sessions cache) */
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static void
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ssl_init(void)
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{
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ssl_common_init(&ssl_session_hash, &ssl_decrypted_data);
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}
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/* parse ssl related preferences (private keys and ports association strings) */
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static void
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ssl_parse(void)
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{
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ep_stack_t tmp_stack;
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SslAssociation *tmp_assoc;
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ssl_set_debug(ssl_debug_file_name);
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if (ssl_key_hash)
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{
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g_hash_table_foreach(ssl_key_hash, ssl_private_key_free, NULL);
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g_hash_table_destroy(ssl_key_hash);
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}
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/* remove only associations created from key list */
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tmp_stack = ep_stack_new();
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g_tree_traverse(ssl_associations, ssl_assoc_from_key_list, G_IN_ORDER, tmp_stack);
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while (tmp_assoc = ep_stack_pop(tmp_stack)) {
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ssl_association_remove(ssl_associations, tmp_assoc);
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}
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/* parse private keys string, load available keys and put them in key hash*/
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ssl_key_hash = g_hash_table_new(ssl_private_key_hash,ssl_private_key_equal);
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if (ssl_keys_list && (ssl_keys_list[0] != 0))
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{
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ssl_parse_key_list(ssl_keys_list,ssl_key_hash,ssl_associations,ssl_handle,TRUE);
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}
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}
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/* function that save app_data during sub protocol reassembling */
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static void
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ssl_add_app_data(SslDecryptSession* ssl, guchar* data, gint data_len){
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StringInfo * app;
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app=&ssl->app_data_segment;
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if(app->data_len!=0){
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guchar* tmp;
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gint tmp_len;
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tmp=g_malloc(app->data_len);
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tmp_len=app->data_len;
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memcpy(tmp,app->data,app->data_len);
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if(app->data!=NULL)
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g_free(app->data);
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app->data_len=0;
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app->data=g_malloc(tmp_len+data_len);
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app->data_len=tmp_len+data_len;
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memcpy(app->data,tmp,tmp_len);
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g_free(tmp);
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memcpy(app->data+tmp_len, data,data_len);
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}
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else{
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/* it's new */
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if(app->data!=NULL)
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g_free(app->data);
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app->data=g_malloc(data_len);
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app->data_len=data_len;
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memcpy(app->data,data,data_len);
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}
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}
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static void
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ssl_desegment_ssl_app_data(SslDecryptSession * ssl, packet_info *pinfo){
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SslPacketInfo* pi;
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SslAssociation* association;
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SslPacketInfo* pi2;
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pi = p_get_proto_data(pinfo->fd, proto_ssl);
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if (pi && pi->app_data.data)
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{
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tvbuff_t* new_tvb;
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packet_info * pp;
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/* find out a dissector using server port*/
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association = ssl_association_find(ssl_associations, pinfo->srcport, pinfo->ptype == PT_TCP);
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association = association ? association: ssl_association_find(ssl_associations, pinfo->destport, pinfo->ptype == PT_TCP);
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/* create a copy of packet_info */
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pp=g_malloc(sizeof(packet_info));
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memcpy(pp, pinfo, sizeof(packet_info));
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if (association && association->handle) {
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/* it's the first SS segmented packet */
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if(ssl->app_data_segment.data==NULL){
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/* create new tvbuff for the decrypted data */
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new_tvb = tvb_new_real_data(pi->app_data.data,
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pi->app_data.data_len, pi->app_data.data_len);
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tvb_set_free_cb(new_tvb, g_free);
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/* we allow subdissector to tell us more bytes */
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pp->can_desegment=2;
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/* subdissector call */
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call_dissector(association->handle, new_tvb, pp, NULL);
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/* if the dissector need more bytes */
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if(pp->desegment_len>0){
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/* we save the actual data to reuse them later */
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ssl_add_app_data(ssl, pi->app_data.data, pi->app_data.data_len);
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/* we remove data to forbid subdissection */
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p_remove_proto_data(pinfo->fd, proto_ssl);
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/* update of COL_INFO */
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if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO)){
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col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "[SSL segment of a reassembled PDU]");
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pinfo->cinfo->writable=FALSE;
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}
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return;
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}
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}
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else
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{
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/* it isn't the first SSL segmented packet */
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/* we add actual data to reuse them later */
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ssl_add_app_data(ssl, pi->app_data.data, pi->app_data.data_len);
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/* create new tvbuff for the decrypted data */
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new_tvb = tvb_new_real_data(ssl->app_data_segment.data,
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ssl->app_data_segment.data_len,
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ssl->app_data_segment.data_len);
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tvb_set_free_cb(new_tvb, g_free);
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/* we allow subdissector to tell us more bytes */
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pp->can_desegment=2;
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/* subdissector call */
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call_dissector(association->handle, new_tvb, pp, NULL);
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/* if the dissector need more bytes */
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if(pp->desegment_len>0){
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/* we remove data to forbid subdissection */
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p_remove_proto_data(pinfo->fd, proto_ssl);
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/* update of COL_INFO */
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if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO)){
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col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "[SSL segment of a reassembled PDU]");
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pinfo->cinfo->writable=FALSE;
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}
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return;
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}
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else
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{
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/* we create SslPacketInfo to save data */
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pi2=g_malloc(sizeof(SslPacketInfo));
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pi2->app_data.data=g_malloc(ssl->app_data_segment.data_len);
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memcpy(pi2->app_data.data,ssl->app_data_segment.data,ssl->app_data_segment.data_len);
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pi2->app_data.data_len=ssl->app_data_segment.data_len;
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/* we remove data if it's useful */
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p_remove_proto_data(pinfo->fd, proto_ssl);
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/* we add reassembled subprotocol data */
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p_add_proto_data(pinfo->fd, proto_ssl, pi2);
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/* we delete saved app_data */
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if(ssl->app_data_segment.data)
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g_free(ssl->app_data_segment.data);
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ssl->app_data_segment.data=NULL;
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ssl->app_data_segment.data_len=0;
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}
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}
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/* we delete pp structure */
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g_free(pp);
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}
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}
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}
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/*********************************************************************
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*
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* Forward Declarations
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*
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*********************************************************************/
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/*
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* SSL version 3 and TLS dissectors
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*
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*/
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/* record layer dissector */
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static gint dissect_ssl3_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
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proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
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guint *conv_version,
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gboolean *need_desegmentation,
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SslDecryptSession *conv_data);
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/* change cipher spec dissector */
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static void dissect_ssl3_change_cipher_spec(tvbuff_t *tvb,
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proto_tree *tree,
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guint32 offset,
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guint *conv_version, guint8 content_type);
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/* alert message dissector */
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static void dissect_ssl3_alert(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
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proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
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guint *conv_version);
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/* handshake protocol dissector */
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static void dissect_ssl3_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
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proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
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guint32 record_length,
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guint *conv_version,
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SslDecryptSession *conv_data, guint8 content_type);
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static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
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proto_tree *tree,
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guint32 offset, guint32 length,
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SslDecryptSession* ssl);
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static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
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proto_tree *tree,
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guint32 offset, guint32 length,
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SslDecryptSession* ssl);
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static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert(tvbuff_t *tvb,
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proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo);
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static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert_req(tvbuff_t *tvb,
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proto_tree *tree,
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guint32 offset);
|
|
|
|
static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_finished(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree,
|
|
guint32 offset,
|
|
guint* conv_version);
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* SSL version 2 dissectors
|
|
*
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* record layer dissector */
|
|
static gint dissect_ssl2_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
|
|
guint *conv_version,
|
|
gboolean *need_desegmentation,
|
|
SslDecryptSession* ssl);
|
|
|
|
/* client hello dissector */
|
|
static void dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree,
|
|
guint32 offset,
|
|
SslDecryptSession* ssl);
|
|
|
|
static void dissect_pct_msg_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree,
|
|
guint32 offset);
|
|
|
|
/* client master key dissector */
|
|
static void dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_master_key(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree,
|
|
guint32 offset);
|
|
static void dissect_pct_msg_client_master_key(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree,
|
|
guint32 offset);
|
|
|
|
/* server hello dissector */
|
|
static void dissect_ssl2_hnd_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree,
|
|
guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo);
|
|
static void dissect_pct_msg_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree,
|
|
guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo);
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void dissect_pct_msg_server_verify(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree,
|
|
guint32 offset);
|
|
|
|
static void dissect_pct_msg_error(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree,
|
|
guint32 offset);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Support Functions
|
|
*
|
|
*/
|
|
/*static void ssl_set_conv_version(packet_info *pinfo, guint version);*/
|
|
static gint ssl_is_valid_handshake_type(guint8 type);
|
|
static gint ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(guint16 version);
|
|
static gint ssl_is_authoritative_version_message(guint8 content_type,
|
|
guint8 next_byte);
|
|
static gint ssl_is_v2_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset);
|
|
static gint ssl_looks_like_sslv2(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset);
|
|
static gint ssl_looks_like_sslv3(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset);
|
|
static gint ssl_looks_like_valid_v2_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
guint32 offset,
|
|
guint32 record_length);
|
|
static gint ssl_looks_like_valid_pct_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
guint32 offset,
|
|
guint32 record_length);
|
|
/*********************************************************************
|
|
*
|
|
* Main dissector
|
|
*
|
|
*********************************************************************/
|
|
/*
|
|
* Code to actually dissect the packets
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
dissect_ssl(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
conversation_t *conversation;
|
|
void *conv_data;
|
|
proto_item *ti;
|
|
proto_tree *ssl_tree;
|
|
guint32 offset;
|
|
gboolean first_record_in_frame;
|
|
gboolean need_desegmentation;
|
|
SslDecryptSession* ssl_session;
|
|
guint* conv_version;
|
|
ti = NULL;
|
|
ssl_tree = NULL;
|
|
offset = 0;
|
|
first_record_in_frame = TRUE;
|
|
ssl_session = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Track the version using conversations to reduce the
|
|
* chance that a packet that simply *looks* like a v2 or
|
|
* v3 packet is dissected improperly. This also allows
|
|
* us to more frequently set the protocol column properly
|
|
* for continuation data frames.
|
|
*
|
|
* Also: We use the copy in conv_version as our cached copy,
|
|
* so that we don't have to search the conversation
|
|
* table every time we want the version; when setting
|
|
* the conv_version, must set the copy in the conversation
|
|
* in addition to conv_version
|
|
*/
|
|
conversation = find_conversation(pinfo->fd->num, &pinfo->src, &pinfo->dst, pinfo->ptype,
|
|
pinfo->srcport, pinfo->destport, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (!conversation)
|
|
{
|
|
/* create a new conversation */
|
|
conversation = conversation_new(pinfo->fd->num, &pinfo->src, &pinfo->dst, pinfo->ptype,
|
|
pinfo->srcport, pinfo->destport, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
conv_data = conversation_get_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl);
|
|
|
|
/* PAOLO: manage ssl decryption data */
|
|
/*get a valid ssl session pointer*/
|
|
if (conv_data != NULL)
|
|
ssl_session = conv_data;
|
|
else {
|
|
SslService dummy;
|
|
|
|
ssl_session = se_alloc0(sizeof(SslDecryptSession));
|
|
ssl_session_init(ssl_session);
|
|
ssl_session->version = SSL_VER_UNKNOWN;
|
|
conversation_add_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl, ssl_session);
|
|
|
|
/* we need to know witch side of conversation is speaking*/
|
|
if (ssl_packet_from_server(ssl_associations, pinfo->srcport, pinfo->ptype == PT_TCP)) {
|
|
dummy.addr = pinfo->src;
|
|
dummy.port = pinfo->srcport;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
dummy.addr = pinfo->dst;
|
|
dummy.port = pinfo->destport;
|
|
}
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl server %hhd.%hhd.%hhd.%hhd:%d\n",
|
|
dummy.addr.data[0],
|
|
dummy.addr.data[1],dummy.addr.data[2],
|
|
dummy.addr.data[3],dummy.port);
|
|
|
|
/* try to retrive private key for this service. Do it now 'cause pinfo
|
|
* is not always available
|
|
* Note that with HAVE_LIBGNUTLS undefined private_key is allways 0
|
|
* and thus decryption never engaged*/
|
|
ssl_session->private_key = g_hash_table_lookup(ssl_key_hash, &dummy);
|
|
if (!ssl_session->private_key)
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl can't find private key for this server!\n");
|
|
}
|
|
conv_version= & ssl_session->version;
|
|
|
|
/* try decryption only the first time we see this packet
|
|
* (to keep cipher syncronized)and only if we have
|
|
* the server private key*/
|
|
if (!ssl_session->private_key || pinfo->fd->flags.visited)
|
|
ssl_session = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize the protocol column; we'll set it later when we
|
|
* figure out what flavor of SSL it is (assuming we don't
|
|
* throw an exception before we get the chance to do so). */
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL))
|
|
{
|
|
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "SSL");
|
|
}
|
|
/* clear the the info column */
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
|
|
col_clear(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO);
|
|
|
|
/* TCP packets and SSL records are orthogonal.
|
|
* A tcp packet may contain multiple ssl records and an ssl
|
|
* record may be spread across multiple tcp packets.
|
|
*
|
|
* This loop accounts for multiple ssl records in a single
|
|
* frame, but not a single ssl record across multiple tcp
|
|
* packets.
|
|
*
|
|
* Handling the single ssl record across multiple packets
|
|
* may be possible using ethereal conversations, but
|
|
* probably not cleanly. May have to wait for tcp stream
|
|
* reassembly.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* Create display subtree for SSL as a whole */
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
{
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, proto_ssl, tvb, 0, -1, FALSE);
|
|
ssl_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl);
|
|
}
|
|
/* iterate through the records in this tvbuff */
|
|
while (tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
/* on second and subsequent records per frame
|
|
* add a delimiter on info column
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!first_record_in_frame
|
|
&& check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
|
|
{
|
|
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", ");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Assume, for now, that this doesn't need desegmentation.
|
|
*/
|
|
need_desegmentation = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
/* first try to dispatch off the cached version
|
|
* known to be associated with the conversation
|
|
*/
|
|
switch(*conv_version) {
|
|
case SSL_VER_SSLv2:
|
|
case SSL_VER_PCT:
|
|
offset = dissect_ssl2_record(tvb, pinfo, ssl_tree,
|
|
offset, conv_version,
|
|
&need_desegmentation,
|
|
ssl_session);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_VER_SSLv3:
|
|
case SSL_VER_TLS:
|
|
/* the version tracking code works too well ;-)
|
|
* at times, we may visit a v2 client hello after
|
|
* we already know the version of the connection;
|
|
* work around that here by detecting and calling
|
|
* the v2 dissector instead
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ssl_is_v2_client_hello(tvb, offset))
|
|
{
|
|
offset = dissect_ssl2_record(tvb, pinfo, ssl_tree,
|
|
offset, conv_version,
|
|
&need_desegmentation,
|
|
ssl_session);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
offset = dissect_ssl3_record(tvb, pinfo, ssl_tree,
|
|
offset, conv_version,
|
|
&need_desegmentation,
|
|
ssl_session);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
/* that failed, so apply some heuristics based
|
|
* on this individual packet
|
|
*/
|
|
default:
|
|
if (ssl_looks_like_sslv2(tvb, offset))
|
|
{
|
|
/* looks like sslv2 or pct client hello */
|
|
offset = dissect_ssl2_record(tvb, pinfo, ssl_tree,
|
|
offset, conv_version,
|
|
&need_desegmentation,
|
|
ssl_session);
|
|
}
|
|
else if (ssl_looks_like_sslv3(tvb, offset))
|
|
{
|
|
/* looks like sslv3 or tls */
|
|
offset = dissect_ssl3_record(tvb, pinfo, ssl_tree,
|
|
offset, conv_version,
|
|
&need_desegmentation,
|
|
ssl_session);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* looks like something unknown, so lump into
|
|
* continuation data
|
|
*/
|
|
offset = tvb_length(tvb);
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
|
|
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO,
|
|
"Continuation Data");
|
|
|
|
/* Set the protocol column */
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL))
|
|
{
|
|
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL,
|
|
ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version]);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Desegmentation return check */
|
|
if (need_desegmentation)
|
|
return;
|
|
/* set up for next record in frame, if any */
|
|
first_record_in_frame = FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
tap_queue_packet(ssl_tap, pinfo, (gpointer)proto_ssl);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gint
|
|
decrypt_ssl3_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, guint32 offset,
|
|
guint32 record_length, guint8 content_type, SslDecryptSession* ssl,
|
|
gboolean save_plaintext)
|
|
{
|
|
gint ret;
|
|
gint direction;
|
|
SslDecoder* decoder;
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
/* if we can decrypt and decryption have success
|
|
* add decrypted data to this packet info*/
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: app_data len %d ssl state %X\n",
|
|
record_length, ssl->state);
|
|
if (!(ssl->state & SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY)) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: no session key\n");
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* retrive decoder for this packet direction*/
|
|
if ((direction = ssl_packet_from_server(ssl_associations, pinfo->srcport, pinfo->ptype == PT_TCP)) != 0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: using server decoder\n");
|
|
decoder = &ssl->server;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: using client decoder\n");
|
|
decoder = &ssl->client;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ensure we have enough storage space for decrypted data */
|
|
if (record_length > ssl_decrypted_data.data_len)
|
|
{
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: allocating %d bytes"
|
|
" for decrypt data (old len %d)\n",
|
|
record_length + 32, ssl_decrypted_data.data_len);
|
|
ssl_decrypted_data.data = g_realloc(ssl_decrypted_data.data,
|
|
record_length + 32);
|
|
ssl_decrypted_data.data_len = record_length + 32;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* run decryption and add decrypted payload to protocol data, if decryption
|
|
* is successful*/
|
|
ssl_decrypted_data_avail = ssl_decrypted_data.data_len;
|
|
if (ssl_decrypt_record(ssl, decoder,
|
|
content_type, tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, record_length),
|
|
record_length, ssl_decrypted_data.data, &ssl_decrypted_data_avail) == 0)
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
if (ret && save_plaintext)
|
|
{
|
|
SslPacketInfo* pi;
|
|
pi = p_get_proto_data(pinfo->fd, proto_ssl);
|
|
if (!pi)
|
|
{
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: allocating app_data %d "
|
|
"bytes for app data\n", ssl_decrypted_data_avail);
|
|
/* first app data record: allocate and put packet data*/
|
|
pi = se_alloc0(sizeof(SslPacketInfo));
|
|
pi->app_data.data = se_alloc(ssl_decrypted_data_avail);
|
|
pi->app_data.data_len = ssl_decrypted_data_avail;
|
|
memcpy(pi->app_data.data, ssl_decrypted_data.data, ssl_decrypted_data_avail);
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
guchar* store;
|
|
/* update previus record*/
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: reallocating app_data "
|
|
"%d bytes for app data (total %d appdata bytes)\n",
|
|
ssl_decrypted_data_avail, pi->app_data.data_len + ssl_decrypted_data_avail);
|
|
store = se_alloc(pi->app_data.data_len + ssl_decrypted_data_avail);
|
|
memcpy(store, pi->app_data.data, pi->app_data.data_len);
|
|
memcpy(&store[pi->app_data.data_len], ssl_decrypted_data.data, ssl_decrypted_data_avail);
|
|
pi->app_data.data_len += ssl_decrypted_data_avail;
|
|
|
|
/* old decrypted data ptr here appare to be leaked, but it's
|
|
* collected by emem allocator */
|
|
pi->app_data.data = store;
|
|
|
|
/* data ptr is changed, so remove old one and re-add the new one*/
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: removing old app_data ptr\n");
|
|
p_remove_proto_data(pinfo->fd, proto_ssl);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: setting decrypted app_data ptr %p\n",pi);
|
|
p_add_proto_data(pinfo->fd, proto_ssl, pi);
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*********************************************************************
|
|
*
|
|
* SSL version 3 and TLS Dissection Routines
|
|
*
|
|
*********************************************************************/
|
|
static gint
|
|
dissect_ssl3_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
|
|
guint *conv_version, gboolean *need_desegmentation,
|
|
SslDecryptSession* ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* uint8 major, minor;
|
|
* } ProtocolVersion;
|
|
*
|
|
*
|
|
* enum {
|
|
* change_cipher_spec(20), alert(21), handshake(22),
|
|
* application_data(23), (255)
|
|
* } ContentType;
|
|
*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* ContentType type;
|
|
* ProtocolVersion version;
|
|
* uint16 length;
|
|
* opaque fragment[TLSPlaintext.length];
|
|
* } TLSPlaintext;
|
|
*/
|
|
guint32 record_length;
|
|
guint16 version;
|
|
guint8 content_type;
|
|
guint8 next_byte;
|
|
proto_tree *ti;
|
|
proto_tree *ssl_record_tree;
|
|
guint32 available_bytes;
|
|
SslPacketInfo* pi;
|
|
SslAssociation* association;
|
|
ti = NULL;
|
|
ssl_record_tree = NULL;
|
|
available_bytes = 0;
|
|
|
|
available_bytes = tvb_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Can we do reassembly?
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ssl_desegment && pinfo->can_desegment) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Yes - is the record header split across segment boundaries?
|
|
*/
|
|
if (available_bytes < 5) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Yes. Tell the TCP dissector where the data for this
|
|
* message starts in the data it handed us, and how many
|
|
* more bytes we need, and return.
|
|
*/
|
|
pinfo->desegment_offset = offset;
|
|
pinfo->desegment_len = 5 - available_bytes;
|
|
*need_desegmentation = TRUE;
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get the record layer fields of interest
|
|
*/
|
|
content_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 1);
|
|
record_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 3);
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_is_valid_content_type(content_type)) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Can we do reassembly?
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ssl_desegment && pinfo->can_desegment) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Yes - is the record split across segment boundaries?
|
|
*/
|
|
if (available_bytes < record_length + 5) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Yes. Tell the TCP dissector where the data for this
|
|
* message starts in the data it handed us, and how many
|
|
* more bytes we need, and return.
|
|
*/
|
|
pinfo->desegment_offset = offset;
|
|
pinfo->desegment_len = (record_length + 5) - available_bytes;
|
|
*need_desegmentation = TRUE;
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* if we don't have a valid content_type, there's no sense
|
|
* continuing any further
|
|
*/
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
|
|
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Continuation Data");
|
|
|
|
/* Set the protocol column */
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL))
|
|
{
|
|
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL,
|
|
ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version]);
|
|
}
|
|
return offset + 5 + record_length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If GUI, fill in record layer part of tree
|
|
*/
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* add the record layer subtree header */
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, 5 + record_length);
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_record, tvb,
|
|
offset, 5 + record_length, 0);
|
|
ssl_record_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_record);
|
|
}
|
|
if (ssl_record_tree)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* show the one-byte content type */
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_record_tree, hf_ssl_record_content_type,
|
|
tvb, offset, 1, 0);
|
|
offset++;
|
|
|
|
/* add the version */
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_record_tree, hf_ssl_record_version, tvb,
|
|
offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
/* add the length */
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_record_tree, hf_ssl_record_length, tvb,
|
|
offset, 2, record_length);
|
|
offset += 2; /* move past length field itself */
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* if no GUI tree, then just skip over those fields */
|
|
offset += 5;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* if we don't already have a version set for this conversation,
|
|
* but this message's version is authoritative (i.e., it's
|
|
* not client_hello, then save the version to to conversation
|
|
* structure and print the column version
|
|
*/
|
|
next_byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
if (*conv_version == SSL_VER_UNKNOWN
|
|
&& ssl_is_authoritative_version_message(content_type, next_byte))
|
|
{
|
|
if (version == SSLV3_VERSION)
|
|
{
|
|
*conv_version = SSL_VER_SSLv3;
|
|
if (ssl) {
|
|
ssl->version_netorder = version;
|
|
ssl->state |= SSL_VERSION;
|
|
}
|
|
/*ssl_set_conv_version(pinfo, ssl->version);*/
|
|
}
|
|
else if (version == TLSV1_VERSION)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
*conv_version = SSL_VER_TLS;
|
|
if (ssl) {
|
|
ssl->version_netorder = version;
|
|
ssl->state |= SSL_VERSION;
|
|
}
|
|
/*ssl_set_conv_version(pinfo, ssl->version);*/
|
|
}
|
|
else if (version == TLSV1DOT1_VERSION)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
*conv_version = SSL_VER_TLSv1DOT1;
|
|
if (ssl) {
|
|
ssl->version_netorder = version;
|
|
ssl->state |= SSL_VERSION;
|
|
}
|
|
/*ssl_set_conv_version(pinfo, ssl->version);*/
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL))
|
|
{
|
|
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL,
|
|
ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* now dissect the next layer
|
|
*/
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_record: content_type %d\n",content_type);
|
|
|
|
/* PAOLO try to decrypt each record (we must keep ciphers "in sync")
|
|
* store plain text only for app data */
|
|
|
|
switch (content_type) {
|
|
case SSL_ID_CHG_CIPHER_SPEC:
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
|
|
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Change Cipher Spec");
|
|
dissect_ssl3_change_cipher_spec(tvb, ssl_record_tree,
|
|
offset, conv_version, content_type);
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_change_cipher_spec\n");
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_ID_ALERT:
|
|
{
|
|
tvbuff_t* decrypted;
|
|
decrypted=0;
|
|
if (ssl&&decrypt_ssl3_record(tvb, pinfo, offset,
|
|
record_length, content_type, ssl, FALSE))
|
|
ssl_add_record_info(proto_ssl, pinfo, ssl_decrypted_data.data,
|
|
ssl_decrypted_data_avail, offset);
|
|
|
|
/* try to retrive and use decrypted alert record, if any. */
|
|
decrypted = ssl_get_record_info(proto_ssl, pinfo, offset);
|
|
if (decrypted)
|
|
dissect_ssl3_alert(decrypted, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, 0,
|
|
conv_version);
|
|
else
|
|
dissect_ssl3_alert(tvb, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, offset,
|
|
conv_version);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
case SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE:
|
|
{
|
|
tvbuff_t* decrypted;
|
|
decrypted=0;
|
|
/* try to decrypt handshake record, if possible. Store decrypted
|
|
* record for later usage. The offset is used as 'key' to itentify
|
|
* this record into the packet (we can have multiple handshake records
|
|
* in the same frame) */
|
|
if (ssl && decrypt_ssl3_record(tvb, pinfo, offset,
|
|
record_length, content_type, ssl, FALSE))
|
|
ssl_add_record_info(proto_ssl, pinfo, ssl_decrypted_data.data,
|
|
ssl_decrypted_data_avail, offset);
|
|
|
|
/* try to retrive and use decrypted handshake record, if any. */
|
|
decrypted = ssl_get_record_info(proto_ssl, pinfo, offset);
|
|
if (decrypted) {
|
|
/* add desegmented data to the data source list */
|
|
add_new_data_source(pinfo, decrypted, "Decrypted SSL record");
|
|
dissect_ssl3_handshake(decrypted, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, 0,
|
|
decrypted->length, conv_version, ssl, content_type);
|
|
} else {
|
|
dissect_ssl3_handshake(tvb, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, offset,
|
|
record_length, conv_version, ssl, content_type);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
case SSL_ID_APP_DATA:
|
|
if (ssl){
|
|
decrypt_ssl3_record(tvb, pinfo, offset,
|
|
record_length, content_type, ssl, TRUE);
|
|
/* if application data desegmentation is allowed */
|
|
if(ssl_desegment_app_data)
|
|
ssl_desegment_ssl_app_data(ssl,pinfo);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* show on info colum what we are decoding */
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
|
|
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Application Data");
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_record_tree)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
/* we need dissector information when the selected packet is shown.
|
|
* ssl session pointer is NULL at that time, so we can't access
|
|
* info cached there*/
|
|
association = ssl_association_find(ssl_associations, pinfo->srcport, pinfo->ptype == PT_TCP);
|
|
association = association ? association: ssl_association_find(ssl_associations, pinfo->destport, pinfo->ptype == PT_TCP);
|
|
|
|
proto_item_set_text(ssl_record_tree,
|
|
"%s Record Layer: %s Protocol: %s",
|
|
ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version],
|
|
val_to_str(content_type, ssl_31_content_type, "unknown"),
|
|
association?association->info:"Application Data");
|
|
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_record_tree, hf_ssl_record_appdata, tvb,
|
|
offset, record_length, 0);
|
|
|
|
/* show decrypted data info, if available */
|
|
pi = p_get_proto_data(pinfo->fd, proto_ssl);
|
|
if (pi && pi->app_data.data)
|
|
{
|
|
tvbuff_t* new_tvb;
|
|
|
|
/* try to dissect decrypted data*/
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_record decrypted len %d\n",
|
|
pi->app_data.data_len);
|
|
|
|
/* create new tvbuff for the decrypted data */
|
|
new_tvb = tvb_new_real_data(pi->app_data.data,
|
|
pi->app_data.data_len, pi->app_data.data_len);
|
|
|
|
/* add this tvb as a child to the original one */
|
|
tvb_set_child_real_data_tvbuff(tvb, new_tvb);
|
|
|
|
/* add desegmented data to the data source list */
|
|
add_new_data_source(pinfo, new_tvb, "Decrypted SSL data");
|
|
|
|
/* find out a dissector using server port*/
|
|
if (association && association->handle) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_record found association %p\n", association);
|
|
ssl_print_text_data("decrypted app data",pi->app_data.data,
|
|
pi->app_data.data_len);
|
|
|
|
call_dissector(association->handle, new_tvb, pinfo, proto_tree_get_root(tree));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
/* shouldn't get here since we check above for valid types */
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
|
|
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Bad SSLv3 Content Type");
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
offset += record_length; /* skip to end of record */
|
|
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* dissects the change cipher spec procotol, filling in the tree */
|
|
static void
|
|
dissect_ssl3_change_cipher_spec(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
|
|
guint* conv_version, guint8 content_type)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* enum { change_cipher_spec(1), (255) } type;
|
|
* } ChangeCipherSpec;
|
|
*
|
|
*/
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
{
|
|
proto_item_set_text(tree,
|
|
"%s Record Layer: %s Protocol: Change Cipher Spec",
|
|
ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version],
|
|
val_to_str(content_type, ssl_31_content_type, "unknown"));
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_change_cipher_spec, tvb,
|
|
offset++, 1, FALSE);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* dissects the alert message, filling in the tree */
|
|
static void
|
|
dissect_ssl3_alert(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
|
|
guint* conv_version)
|
|
{
|
|
/* struct {
|
|
* AlertLevel level;
|
|
* AlertDescription description;
|
|
* } Alert;
|
|
*/
|
|
proto_tree *ti;
|
|
proto_tree *ssl_alert_tree;
|
|
const gchar *level;
|
|
const gchar *desc;
|
|
guint8 byte;
|
|
ssl_alert_tree = NULL;
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
{
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_alert_message, tvb,
|
|
offset, 2, 0);
|
|
ssl_alert_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_alert);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* set the record layer label
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* first lookup the names for the alert level and description */
|
|
byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); /* grab the level byte */
|
|
level = match_strval(byte, ssl_31_alert_level);
|
|
|
|
byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset+1); /* grab the desc byte */
|
|
desc = match_strval(byte, ssl_31_alert_description);
|
|
|
|
/* now set the text in the record layer line */
|
|
if (level && desc)
|
|
{
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
|
|
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO,
|
|
"Alert (Level: %s, Description: %s)",
|
|
level, desc);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
|
|
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Encrypted Alert");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
{
|
|
if (level && desc)
|
|
{
|
|
proto_item_set_text(tree, "%s Record Layer: Alert "
|
|
"(Level: %s, Description: %s)",
|
|
ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version],
|
|
level, desc);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_alert_tree, hf_ssl_alert_message_level,
|
|
tvb, offset++, 1, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_alert_tree, hf_ssl_alert_message_description,
|
|
tvb, offset++, 1, FALSE);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
proto_item_set_text(tree,
|
|
"%s Record Layer: Encrypted Alert",
|
|
ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version]);
|
|
proto_item_set_text(ssl_alert_tree,
|
|
"Alert Message: Encrypted Alert");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* dissects the handshake protocol, filling the tree */
|
|
static void
|
|
dissect_ssl3_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
|
|
guint32 record_length, guint *conv_version,
|
|
SslDecryptSession* ssl, guint8 content_type)
|
|
{
|
|
/* struct {
|
|
* HandshakeType msg_type;
|
|
* uint24 length;
|
|
* select (HandshakeType) {
|
|
* case hello_request: HelloRequest;
|
|
* case client_hello: ClientHello;
|
|
* case server_hello: ServerHello;
|
|
* case certificate: Certificate;
|
|
* case server_key_exchange: ServerKeyExchange;
|
|
* case certificate_request: CertificateRequest;
|
|
* case server_hello_done: ServerHelloDone;
|
|
* case certificate_verify: CertificateVerify;
|
|
* case client_key_exchange: ClientKeyExchange;
|
|
* case finished: Finished;
|
|
* } body;
|
|
* } Handshake;
|
|
*/
|
|
proto_tree *ti;
|
|
proto_tree *ssl_hand_tree;
|
|
const gchar *msg_type_str;
|
|
guint8 msg_type;
|
|
guint32 length;
|
|
gboolean first_iteration;
|
|
ti = NULL;
|
|
ssl_hand_tree = NULL;
|
|
msg_type_str = NULL;
|
|
first_iteration = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
/* just as there can be multiple records per packet, there
|
|
* can be multiple messages per record as long as they have
|
|
* the same content type
|
|
*
|
|
* we really only care about this for handshake messages
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* set record_length to the max offset */
|
|
record_length += offset;
|
|
while (offset < record_length)
|
|
{
|
|
msg_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
msg_type_str = match_strval(msg_type, ssl_31_handshake_type);
|
|
length = tvb_get_ntoh24(tvb, offset + 1);
|
|
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_handshake iteration %d type %d offset %d lenght %d "
|
|
"bytes, remaning %d \n", first_iteration, msg_type, offset, length, record_length);
|
|
if (!msg_type_str && !first_iteration)
|
|
{
|
|
/* only dissect / report messages if they're
|
|
* either the first message in this record
|
|
* or they're a valid message type
|
|
*/
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* on second and later iterations, add comma to info col */
|
|
if (!first_iteration)
|
|
{
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
|
|
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", ");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Update our info string
|
|
*/
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
|
|
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "%s", (msg_type_str != NULL)
|
|
? msg_type_str : "Encrypted Handshake Message");
|
|
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
{
|
|
/* set the label text on the record layer expanding node */
|
|
if (first_iteration)
|
|
{
|
|
proto_item_set_text(tree, "%s Record Layer: %s Protocol: %s",
|
|
ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version],
|
|
val_to_str(content_type, ssl_31_content_type, "unknown"),
|
|
(msg_type_str!=NULL) ? msg_type_str :
|
|
"Encrypted Handshake Message");
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
proto_item_set_text(tree, "%s Record Layer: %s Protocol: %s",
|
|
ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version],
|
|
val_to_str(content_type, ssl_31_content_type, "unknown"),
|
|
"Multiple Handshake Messages");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* add a subtree for the handshake protocol */
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_protocol, tvb,
|
|
offset, length + 4, 0);
|
|
ssl_hand_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_handshake);
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_hand_tree)
|
|
{
|
|
/* set the text label on the subtree node */
|
|
proto_item_set_text(ssl_hand_tree, "Handshake Protocol: %s",
|
|
(msg_type_str != NULL) ? msg_type_str :
|
|
"Encrypted Handshake Message");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* if we don't have a valid handshake type, just quit dissecting */
|
|
if (!msg_type_str)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/* PAOLO: if we are doing ssl decryption we must dissect some requests type */
|
|
if (ssl_hand_tree || ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
/* add nodes for the message type and message length */
|
|
if (ssl_hand_tree)
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_hand_tree, hf_ssl_handshake_type,
|
|
tvb, offset, 1, msg_type);
|
|
offset++;
|
|
if (ssl_hand_tree)
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_hand_tree, hf_ssl_handshake_length,
|
|
tvb, offset, 3, length);
|
|
offset += 3;
|
|
|
|
/* now dissect the handshake message, if necessary */
|
|
switch (msg_type) {
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_REQUEST:
|
|
/* hello_request has no fields, so nothing to do! */
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_hello(tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset, length, ssl);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_hello(tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset, length, ssl);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE:
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert(tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset, pinfo);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG:
|
|
/* unimplemented */
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST:
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert_req(tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_HND_SVR_HELLO_DONE:
|
|
/* server_hello_done has no fields, so nothing to do! */
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY:
|
|
/* unimplemented */
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG:
|
|
{
|
|
/* PAOLO: here we can have all the data to build session key*/
|
|
StringInfo encrypted_pre_master;
|
|
gint ret;
|
|
guint encrlen, skip;
|
|
encrlen = length;
|
|
skip = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
/* check for required session data */
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_handshake found SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG state %X\n",
|
|
ssl->state);
|
|
if ((ssl->state & (SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION)) !=
|
|
(SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION)) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_handshake not enough data to generate key (required %X)\n",
|
|
(SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION));
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* get encrypted data, on tls1 we have to skip two bytes
|
|
* (it's the encrypted len and should be equal to record len - 2)
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ssl->version == SSL_VER_TLS||ssl->version == SSL_VER_TLSv1DOT1)
|
|
{
|
|
encrlen = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
skip = 2;
|
|
if (encrlen > length - 2)
|
|
{
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_handshake wrong encrypted length (%d max %d)\n",
|
|
encrlen, length);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
encrypted_pre_master.data = se_alloc(encrlen);
|
|
encrypted_pre_master.data_len = encrlen;
|
|
tvb_memcpy(tvb, encrypted_pre_master.data, offset+skip, encrlen);
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl->private_key) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_handshake can't find private key\n");
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* go with ssl key processessing; encrypted_pre_master
|
|
* will be used for master secret store*/
|
|
ret = ssl_decrypt_pre_master_secret(ssl, &encrypted_pre_master, ssl->private_key);
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_handshake can't decrypt pre master secret\n");
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ssl_generate_keyring_material(ssl)<0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_handshake can't generate keyring material\n");
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
ssl->state |= SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY;
|
|
ssl_save_session(ssl, ssl_session_hash);
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_handshake session keys succesfully generated\n");
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_HND_FINISHED:
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_finished(tvb, ssl_hand_tree,
|
|
offset, conv_version);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
offset += 4; /* skip the handshake header when handshake is not processed*/
|
|
|
|
offset += length;
|
|
first_iteration = FALSE; /* set up for next pass, if any */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gint
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_hello_common(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree,
|
|
guint32 offset, SslDecryptSession* ssl, gint from_server)
|
|
{
|
|
/* show the client's random challenge */
|
|
nstime_t gmt_unix_time;
|
|
guint8 session_id_length;
|
|
proto_item *ti_rnd;
|
|
proto_tree *ssl_rnd_tree;
|
|
|
|
session_id_length = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
/* PAOLO: get proper peer information*/
|
|
StringInfo* rnd;
|
|
if (from_server)
|
|
rnd = &ssl->server_random;
|
|
else
|
|
rnd = &ssl->client_random;
|
|
|
|
/* get provided random for keyring generation*/
|
|
tvb_memcpy(tvb, rnd->data, offset, 32);
|
|
rnd->data_len = 32;
|
|
if (from_server)
|
|
ssl->state |= SSL_SERVER_RANDOM;
|
|
else
|
|
ssl->state |= SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM;
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_hnd_hello_common found random state %X\n",
|
|
ssl->state);
|
|
|
|
session_id_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 32);
|
|
/* check stored session id info */
|
|
if (from_server && (session_id_length == ssl->session_id.data_len) &&
|
|
(tvb_memeql(tvb, offset+33, ssl->session_id.data, session_id_length) == 0))
|
|
{
|
|
/* clinet/server id match: try to restore a previous cached session*/
|
|
ssl_restore_session(ssl, ssl_session_hash);
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
tvb_memcpy(tvb,ssl->session_id.data, offset+33, session_id_length);
|
|
ssl->session_id.data_len = session_id_length;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
{
|
|
ti_rnd = proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 32, "Random");
|
|
ssl_rnd_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti_rnd, ett_ssl_random);
|
|
|
|
/* show the time */
|
|
gmt_unix_time.secs = tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset);
|
|
gmt_unix_time.nsecs = 0;
|
|
proto_tree_add_time(ssl_rnd_tree, hf_ssl_handshake_random_time,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, &gmt_unix_time);
|
|
offset += 4;
|
|
|
|
/* show the random bytes */
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_rnd_tree, hf_ssl_handshake_random_bytes,
|
|
tvb, offset, 28, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 28;
|
|
|
|
/* show the session id */
|
|
session_id_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_session_id_len,
|
|
tvb, offset++, 1, 0);
|
|
if (session_id_length > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, session_id_length);
|
|
proto_tree_add_bytes_format(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_session_id,
|
|
tvb, offset, session_id_length,
|
|
tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, session_id_length),
|
|
"Session ID (%u byte%s)",
|
|
session_id_length,
|
|
plurality(session_id_length, "", "s"));
|
|
offset += session_id_length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* XXXX */
|
|
return session_id_length+33;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gint
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_hello_ext(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 left)
|
|
{
|
|
guint16 extension_length;
|
|
guint16 ext_type;
|
|
guint16 ext_len;
|
|
proto_item *pi;
|
|
proto_tree *ext_tree;
|
|
|
|
if (left < 2)
|
|
return offset;
|
|
|
|
extension_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_extensions_len,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, extension_length);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
left -= 2;
|
|
|
|
while (left >= 4)
|
|
{
|
|
ext_type = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
ext_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 2);
|
|
|
|
pi = proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 4 + ext_len,
|
|
"Extension: %s",
|
|
val_to_str(ext_type,
|
|
tls_hello_extension_types,
|
|
"Unknown %u"));
|
|
ext_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(pi, ett_ssl_extension);
|
|
if (!ext_tree)
|
|
ext_tree = tree;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(ext_tree, hf_ssl_handshake_extension_type,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, ext_type);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(ext_tree, hf_ssl_handshake_extension_len,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, ext_len);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_bytes_format(ext_tree, hf_ssl_handshake_extension_data,
|
|
tvb, offset, ext_len,
|
|
tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, ext_len),
|
|
"Data (%u byte%s)",
|
|
ext_len, plurality(ext_len, "", "s"));
|
|
offset += ext_len;
|
|
left -= 2 + 2 + ext_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 length,
|
|
SslDecryptSession*ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
/* struct {
|
|
* ProtocolVersion client_version;
|
|
* Random random;
|
|
* SessionID session_id;
|
|
* CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-1>;
|
|
* CompressionMethod compression_methods<1..2^8-1>;
|
|
* Extension client_hello_extension_list<0..2^16-1>;
|
|
* } ClientHello;
|
|
*
|
|
*/
|
|
proto_tree *ti;
|
|
proto_tree *cs_tree;
|
|
guint16 cipher_suite_length;
|
|
guint8 compression_methods_length;
|
|
guint8 compression_method;
|
|
guint16 start_offset;
|
|
cipher_suite_length = 0;
|
|
compression_methods_length = 0;
|
|
start_offset = offset;
|
|
|
|
if (tree || ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
/* show the client version */
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_client_version, tvb,
|
|
offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
/* show the fields in common with server hello */
|
|
offset += dissect_ssl3_hnd_hello_common(tvb, tree, offset, ssl, 0);
|
|
|
|
/* tell the user how many cipher suites there are */
|
|
cipher_suite_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
if (!tree)
|
|
return;
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites_len,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, cipher_suite_length);
|
|
offset += 2; /* skip opaque length */
|
|
|
|
if (cipher_suite_length > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, cipher_suite_length);
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
|
|
hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites,
|
|
tvb, offset, cipher_suite_length,
|
|
"Cipher Suites (%u suite%s)",
|
|
cipher_suite_length / 2,
|
|
plurality(cipher_suite_length/2, "", "s"));
|
|
|
|
/* make this a subtree */
|
|
cs_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_cipher_suites);
|
|
if (!cs_tree)
|
|
{
|
|
cs_tree = tree; /* failsafe */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (cipher_suite_length > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(cs_tree, hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suite,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
cipher_suite_length -= 2;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* tell the user how man compression methods there are */
|
|
compression_methods_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_comp_methods_len,
|
|
tvb, offset, 1, compression_methods_length);
|
|
offset++;
|
|
|
|
if (compression_methods_length > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, compression_methods_length);
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
|
|
hf_ssl_handshake_comp_methods,
|
|
tvb, offset, compression_methods_length,
|
|
"Compression Methods (%u method%s)",
|
|
compression_methods_length,
|
|
plurality(compression_methods_length,
|
|
"", "s"));
|
|
|
|
/* make this a subtree */
|
|
cs_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_comp_methods);
|
|
if (!cs_tree)
|
|
{
|
|
cs_tree = tree; /* failsafe */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (compression_methods_length > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
compression_method = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
if (compression_method < 64)
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(cs_tree, hf_ssl_handshake_comp_method,
|
|
tvb, offset, 1, compression_method);
|
|
else if (compression_method > 63 && compression_method < 193)
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(cs_tree, tvb, offset, 1,
|
|
"Compression Method: Reserved - to be assigned by IANA (%u)",
|
|
compression_method);
|
|
else
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(cs_tree, tvb, offset, 1,
|
|
"Compression Method: Private use range (%u)",
|
|
compression_method);
|
|
offset++;
|
|
compression_methods_length--;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (length > offset - start_offset)
|
|
{
|
|
offset = dissect_ssl3_hnd_hello_ext(tvb, tree, offset,
|
|
length -
|
|
(offset - start_offset));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 length, SslDecryptSession* ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
/* struct {
|
|
* ProtocolVersion server_version;
|
|
* Random random;
|
|
* SessionID session_id;
|
|
* CipherSuite cipher_suite;
|
|
* CompressionMethod compression_method;
|
|
* Extension server_hello_extension_list<0..2^16-1>;
|
|
* } ServerHello;
|
|
*/
|
|
guint16 start_offset;
|
|
start_offset = offset;
|
|
|
|
if (tree || ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
/* show the server version */
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_server_version, tvb,
|
|
offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
/* first display the elements conveniently in
|
|
* common with client hello
|
|
*/
|
|
offset += dissect_ssl3_hnd_hello_common(tvb, tree, offset, ssl, 1);
|
|
|
|
/* PAOLO: handle session cipher suite */
|
|
if (ssl) {
|
|
/* store selected cipher suite for decryption */
|
|
ssl->cipher = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
if (ssl_find_cipher(ssl->cipher,&ssl->cipher_suite) < 0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_hello can't find cipher suite %X\n", ssl->cipher);
|
|
goto no_cipher;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->state |= SSL_CIPHER;
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_hello found cipher %X, state %X\n",
|
|
ssl->cipher, ssl->state);
|
|
|
|
/* if we have restored a session now we can have enought material
|
|
* to build session key, check it out*/
|
|
if ((ssl->state &
|
|
(SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION|SSL_MASTER_SECRET)) !=
|
|
(SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION|SSL_MASTER_SECRET)) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_hello not enough data to generate key (required %X)\n",
|
|
(SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION|SSL_MASTER_SECRET));
|
|
goto no_cipher;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_hello trying to generate keys\n");
|
|
if (ssl_generate_keyring_material(ssl)<0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_hello can't generate keyring material\n");
|
|
goto no_cipher;
|
|
}
|
|
ssl->state |= SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY;
|
|
}
|
|
no_cipher:
|
|
if (!tree)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/* now the server-selected cipher suite */
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suite,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
/* and the server-selected compression method */
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_comp_method,
|
|
tvb, offset, 1, FALSE);
|
|
offset++;
|
|
|
|
if (length > offset - start_offset)
|
|
{
|
|
offset = dissect_ssl3_hnd_hello_ext(tvb, tree, offset,
|
|
length -
|
|
(offset - start_offset));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* opaque ASN.1Cert<2^24-1>;
|
|
*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* ASN.1Cert certificate_list<1..2^24-1>;
|
|
* } Certificate;
|
|
*/
|
|
guint32 certificate_list_length;
|
|
proto_tree *ti;
|
|
proto_tree *subtree;
|
|
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
{
|
|
certificate_list_length = tvb_get_ntoh24(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_certificates_len,
|
|
tvb, offset, 3, certificate_list_length);
|
|
offset += 3; /* 24-bit length value */
|
|
|
|
if (certificate_list_length > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, certificate_list_length);
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
|
|
hf_ssl_handshake_certificates,
|
|
tvb, offset, certificate_list_length,
|
|
"Certificates (%u byte%s)",
|
|
certificate_list_length,
|
|
plurality(certificate_list_length,
|
|
"", "s"));
|
|
|
|
/* make it a subtree */
|
|
subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_certs);
|
|
if (!subtree)
|
|
{
|
|
subtree = tree; /* failsafe */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* iterate through each certificate */
|
|
while (certificate_list_length > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
/* get the length of the current certificate */
|
|
guint32 cert_length;
|
|
cert_length = tvb_get_ntoh24(tvb, offset);
|
|
certificate_list_length -= 3 + cert_length;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf_ssl_handshake_certificate_len,
|
|
tvb, offset, 3, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 3;
|
|
|
|
dissect_x509af_Certificate(FALSE, tvb, offset, pinfo, subtree, hf_ssl_handshake_certificate);
|
|
offset += cert_length;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert_req(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* enum {
|
|
* rsa_sign(1), dss_sign(2), rsa_fixed_dh(3), dss_fixed_dh(4),
|
|
* (255)
|
|
* } ClientCertificateType;
|
|
*
|
|
* opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>;
|
|
*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
|
|
* DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<3..2^16-1>;
|
|
* } CertificateRequest;
|
|
*
|
|
*/
|
|
proto_tree *ti;
|
|
proto_tree *subtree;
|
|
guint8 cert_types_count;
|
|
gint dnames_length;
|
|
cert_types_count = 0;
|
|
dnames_length = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
{
|
|
cert_types_count = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_cert_types_count,
|
|
tvb, offset, 1, cert_types_count);
|
|
offset++;
|
|
|
|
if (cert_types_count > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
|
|
hf_ssl_handshake_cert_types,
|
|
tvb, offset, cert_types_count,
|
|
"Certificate types (%u type%s)",
|
|
cert_types_count,
|
|
plurality(cert_types_count, "", "s"));
|
|
subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_cert_types);
|
|
if (!subtree)
|
|
{
|
|
subtree = tree;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (cert_types_count > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf_ssl_handshake_cert_type,
|
|
tvb, offset, 1, FALSE);
|
|
offset++;
|
|
cert_types_count--;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dnames_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_dnames_len,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, dnames_length);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
if (dnames_length > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, dnames_length);
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
|
|
hf_ssl_handshake_dnames,
|
|
tvb, offset, dnames_length,
|
|
"Distinguished Names (%d byte%s)",
|
|
dnames_length,
|
|
plurality(dnames_length, "", "s"));
|
|
subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_dnames);
|
|
if (!subtree)
|
|
{
|
|
subtree = tree;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (dnames_length > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
/* get the length of the current certificate */
|
|
guint16 name_length;
|
|
name_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
dnames_length -= 2 + name_length;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf_ssl_handshake_dname_len,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, name_length);
|
|
proto_tree_add_bytes_format(subtree,
|
|
hf_ssl_handshake_dname,
|
|
tvb, offset, name_length,
|
|
tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, name_length),
|
|
"Distinguished Name (%u byte%s)",
|
|
name_length,
|
|
plurality(name_length, "", "s"));
|
|
offset += name_length;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_finished(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
|
|
guint* conv_version)
|
|
{
|
|
/* For TLS:
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* opaque verify_data[12];
|
|
* } Finished;
|
|
*
|
|
* For SSLv3:
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* opaque md5_hash[16];
|
|
* opaque sha_hash[20];
|
|
* } Finished;
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* this all needs a tree, so bail if we don't have one */
|
|
if (!tree)
|
|
{
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch(*conv_version) {
|
|
case SSL_VER_TLS:
|
|
case SSL_VER_TLSv1DOT1:
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_finished,
|
|
tvb, offset, 12, FALSE);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_VER_SSLv3:
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_md5_hash,
|
|
tvb, offset, 16, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 16;
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_sha_hash,
|
|
tvb, offset, 20, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 20;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*********************************************************************
|
|
*
|
|
* SSL version 2 Dissectors
|
|
*
|
|
*********************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* record layer dissector */
|
|
static gint
|
|
dissect_ssl2_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
|
|
guint32 offset, guint* conv_version,
|
|
gboolean *need_desegmentation,
|
|
SslDecryptSession* ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
guint32 initial_offset;
|
|
guint8 byte;
|
|
guint8 record_length_length;
|
|
guint32 record_length;
|
|
gint is_escape;
|
|
gint16 padding_length;
|
|
guint8 msg_type;
|
|
const gchar *msg_type_str;
|
|
guint32 available_bytes;
|
|
proto_tree *ti;
|
|
proto_tree *ssl_record_tree;
|
|
|
|
initial_offset = offset;
|
|
byte = 0;
|
|
record_length_length = 0;
|
|
record_length = 0;
|
|
is_escape = -1;
|
|
padding_length = -1;
|
|
msg_type = 0;
|
|
msg_type_str = NULL;
|
|
available_bytes = 0;
|
|
ssl_record_tree = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* pull first byte; if high bit is set, then record
|
|
* length is three bytes due to padding; otherwise
|
|
* record length is two bytes
|
|
*/
|
|
byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
record_length_length = (byte & 0x80) ? 2 : 3;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Can we do reassembly?
|
|
*/
|
|
available_bytes = tvb_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_desegment && pinfo->can_desegment) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Yes - is the record header split across segment boundaries?
|
|
*/
|
|
if (available_bytes < record_length_length) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Yes. Tell the TCP dissector where the data for this
|
|
* message starts in the data it handed us, and how many
|
|
* more bytes we need, and return.
|
|
*/
|
|
pinfo->desegment_offset = offset;
|
|
pinfo->desegment_len = record_length_length - available_bytes;
|
|
*need_desegmentation = TRUE;
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* parse out the record length */
|
|
switch(record_length_length) {
|
|
case 2: /* two-byte record length */
|
|
record_length = (byte & 0x7f) << 8;
|
|
byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 1);
|
|
record_length += byte;
|
|
break;
|
|
case 3: /* three-byte record length */
|
|
is_escape = (byte & 0x40) ? TRUE : FALSE;
|
|
record_length = (byte & 0x3f) << 8;
|
|
byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 1);
|
|
record_length += byte;
|
|
byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 2);
|
|
padding_length = byte;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Can we do reassembly?
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ssl_desegment && pinfo->can_desegment) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Yes - is the record split across segment boundaries?
|
|
*/
|
|
if (available_bytes < (record_length_length + record_length)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Yes. Tell the TCP dissector where the data for this
|
|
* message starts in the data it handed us, and how many
|
|
* more bytes we need, and return.
|
|
*/
|
|
pinfo->desegment_offset = offset;
|
|
pinfo->desegment_len = (record_length_length + record_length)
|
|
- available_bytes;
|
|
*need_desegmentation = TRUE;
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
offset += record_length_length;
|
|
|
|
/* add the record layer subtree header */
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_record, tvb, initial_offset,
|
|
record_length_length + record_length, 0);
|
|
ssl_record_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_record);
|
|
|
|
/* pull the msg_type so we can bail if it's unknown */
|
|
msg_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, initial_offset + record_length_length);
|
|
|
|
/* if we get a server_hello or later handshake in v2, then set
|
|
* this to sslv2
|
|
*/
|
|
if (*conv_version == SSL_VER_UNKNOWN)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ssl_looks_like_valid_pct_handshake(tvb,
|
|
(initial_offset +
|
|
record_length_length),
|
|
record_length)) {
|
|
*conv_version = SSL_VER_PCT;
|
|
/*ssl_set_conv_version(pinfo, ssl->version);*/
|
|
}
|
|
else if (msg_type >= 2 && msg_type <= 8)
|
|
{
|
|
*conv_version = SSL_VER_SSLv2;
|
|
/*ssl_set_conv_version(pinfo, ssl->version);*/
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* if we get here, but don't have a version set for the
|
|
* conversation, then set a version for just this frame
|
|
* (e.g., on a client hello)
|
|
*/
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL))
|
|
{
|
|
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL,
|
|
(*conv_version == SSL_VER_PCT) ? "PCT" : "SSLv2");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* see if the msg_type is valid; if not the payload is
|
|
* probably encrypted, so note that fact and bail
|
|
*/
|
|
msg_type_str = match_strval(msg_type,
|
|
(*conv_version == SSL_VER_PCT)
|
|
? pct_msg_types : ssl_20_msg_types);
|
|
if (!msg_type_str
|
|
|| ((*conv_version != SSL_VER_PCT) &&
|
|
!ssl_looks_like_valid_v2_handshake(tvb, initial_offset
|
|
+ record_length_length,
|
|
record_length))
|
|
|| ((*conv_version == SSL_VER_PCT) &&
|
|
!ssl_looks_like_valid_pct_handshake(tvb, initial_offset
|
|
+ record_length_length,
|
|
record_length)))
|
|
{
|
|
if (ssl_record_tree)
|
|
{
|
|
proto_item_set_text(ssl_record_tree, "%s Record Layer: %s",
|
|
(*conv_version == SSL_VER_PCT)
|
|
? "PCT" : "SSLv2",
|
|
"Encrypted Data");
|
|
}
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
|
|
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Encrypted Data");
|
|
return initial_offset + record_length_length + record_length;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
|
|
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, msg_type_str);
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_record_tree)
|
|
{
|
|
proto_item_set_text(ssl_record_tree, "%s Record Layer: %s",
|
|
(*conv_version == SSL_VER_PCT)
|
|
? "PCT" : "SSLv2",
|
|
msg_type_str);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We have a valid message type, so move foward, filling in the
|
|
* tree by adding the length, is_escape boolean and padding_length,
|
|
* if present in the original packet
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ssl_record_tree)
|
|
{
|
|
/* add the record length */
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, record_length_length);
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_uint (ssl_record_tree,
|
|
hf_ssl_record_length, tvb,
|
|
initial_offset, record_length_length,
|
|
record_length);
|
|
}
|
|
if (ssl_record_tree && is_escape != -1)
|
|
{
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean(ssl_record_tree,
|
|
hf_ssl2_record_is_escape, tvb,
|
|
initial_offset, 1, is_escape);
|
|
}
|
|
if (ssl_record_tree && padding_length != -1)
|
|
{
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_record_tree,
|
|
hf_ssl2_record_padding_length, tvb,
|
|
initial_offset + 2, 1, padding_length);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* dissect the record data
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* jump forward to the start of the record data */
|
|
offset = initial_offset + record_length_length;
|
|
|
|
/* add the message type */
|
|
if (ssl_record_tree)
|
|
{
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_record_tree,
|
|
(*conv_version == SSL_VER_PCT)
|
|
? hf_pct_msg_type : hf_ssl2_msg_type,
|
|
tvb, offset, 1, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
offset++; /* move past msg_type byte */
|
|
|
|
if (*conv_version != SSL_VER_PCT)
|
|
{
|
|
/* dissect the message (only handle client hello right now) */
|
|
switch (msg_type) {
|
|
case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
|
|
dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_hello(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset, ssl);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY:
|
|
dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_master_key(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
|
|
dissect_ssl2_hnd_server_hello(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset, pinfo);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_HND_ERROR:
|
|
case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_FINISHED:
|
|
case SSL2_HND_SERVER_VERIFY:
|
|
case SSL2_HND_SERVER_FINISHED:
|
|
case SSL2_HND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE:
|
|
case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:
|
|
/* unimplemented */
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default: /* unknown */
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* dissect the message */
|
|
switch (msg_type) {
|
|
case PCT_MSG_CLIENT_HELLO:
|
|
dissect_pct_msg_client_hello(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset);
|
|
break;
|
|
case PCT_MSG_SERVER_HELLO:
|
|
dissect_pct_msg_server_hello(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset, pinfo);
|
|
break;
|
|
case PCT_MSG_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY:
|
|
dissect_pct_msg_client_master_key(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset);
|
|
break;
|
|
case PCT_MSG_SERVER_VERIFY:
|
|
dissect_pct_msg_server_verify(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset);
|
|
break;
|
|
case PCT_MSG_ERROR:
|
|
dissect_pct_msg_error(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default: /* unknown */
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return (initial_offset + record_length_length + record_length);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
|
|
SslDecryptSession* ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
/* struct {
|
|
* uint8 msg_type;
|
|
* Version version;
|
|
* uint16 cipher_spec_length;
|
|
* uint16 session_id_length;
|
|
* uint16 challenge_length;
|
|
* V2CipherSpec cipher_specs[V2ClientHello.cipher_spec_length];
|
|
* opaque session_id[V2ClientHello.session_id_length];
|
|
* Random challenge;
|
|
* } V2ClientHello;
|
|
*
|
|
* Note: when we get here, offset's already pointing at Version
|
|
*
|
|
*/
|
|
guint16 version;
|
|
guint16 cipher_spec_length;
|
|
guint16 session_id_length;
|
|
guint16 challenge_length;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *ti;
|
|
proto_tree *cs_tree;
|
|
cs_tree=0;
|
|
|
|
version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
if (!ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(version))
|
|
{
|
|
/* invalid version; probably encrypted data */
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (tree || ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
/* show the version */
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_record_version, tvb,
|
|
offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
cipher_spec_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec_len,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
session_id_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_len,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
challenge_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge_len,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
{
|
|
/* tell the user how many cipher specs they've won */
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, cipher_spec_length);
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites,
|
|
tvb, offset, cipher_spec_length,
|
|
"Cipher Specs (%u specs)",
|
|
cipher_spec_length/3);
|
|
|
|
/* make this a subtree and expand the actual specs below */
|
|
cs_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_cipher_suites);
|
|
if (!cs_tree)
|
|
{
|
|
cs_tree = tree; /* failsafe */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* iterate through the cipher specs, showing them */
|
|
while (cipher_spec_length > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
if (cs_tree)
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(cs_tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec,
|
|
tvb, offset, 3, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 3; /* length of one cipher spec */
|
|
cipher_spec_length -= 3;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* if there's a session id, show it */
|
|
if (session_id_length > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
{
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, session_id_length);
|
|
proto_tree_add_bytes_format(tree,
|
|
hf_ssl_handshake_session_id,
|
|
tvb, offset, session_id_length,
|
|
tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, session_id_length),
|
|
"Session ID (%u byte%s)",
|
|
session_id_length,
|
|
plurality(session_id_length, "", "s"));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* PAOLO: get session id and reset session state for key [re]negotiation */
|
|
if (ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
tvb_memcpy(tvb,ssl->session_id.data, offset, session_id_length);
|
|
ssl->session_id.data_len = session_id_length;
|
|
ssl->state &= ~(SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY|SSL_MASTER_SECRET|
|
|
SSL_CIPHER|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM);
|
|
}
|
|
offset += session_id_length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* if there's a challenge, show it */
|
|
if (challenge_length > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, challenge_length);
|
|
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge,
|
|
tvb, offset, challenge_length, 0);
|
|
if (ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
/* PAOLO: get client random data; we get at most 32 bytes from
|
|
challenge */
|
|
gint max;
|
|
max = challenge_length > 32? 32: challenge_length;
|
|
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("client random len: %d padded to 32\n",
|
|
challenge_length);
|
|
|
|
/* client random is padded with zero and 'right' aligned */
|
|
memset(ssl->client_random.data, 0, 32 - max);
|
|
tvb_memcpy(tvb, &ssl->client_random.data[32 - max], offset, max);
|
|
ssl->client_random.data_len = 32;
|
|
ssl->state |= SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
offset += challenge_length;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
dissect_pct_msg_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
|
|
{
|
|
guint16 CH_CLIENT_VERSION, CH_OFFSET, CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH, CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH, CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH, CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH, CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH;
|
|
proto_item *CH_CIPHER_SPECS_ti, *CH_HASH_SPECS_ti, *CH_CERT_SPECS_ti, *CH_EXCH_SPECS_ti;
|
|
proto_tree *CH_CIPHER_SPECS_tree, *CH_HASH_SPECS_tree, *CH_CERT_SPECS_tree, *CH_EXCH_SPECS_tree;
|
|
gint i;
|
|
|
|
CH_CLIENT_VERSION = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
if(CH_CLIENT_VERSION != PCT_VERSION_1)
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Client Version, should be %x in PCT version 1", PCT_VERSION_1);
|
|
else
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Client Version (%x)", PCT_VERSION_1);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "PAD");
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 32, "Client Session ID Data (32 bytes)");
|
|
offset += 32;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 32, "Challange Data(32 bytes)");
|
|
offset += 32;
|
|
|
|
CH_OFFSET = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
if(CH_OFFSET != PCT_CH_OFFSET_V1)
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "CH_OFFSET: %d, should be %d in PCT version 1", CH_OFFSET, PCT_CH_OFFSET_V1);
|
|
else
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "CH_OFFSET: %d", CH_OFFSET);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "CIPHER_SPECS Length: %d", CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "HASH_SPECS Length: %d", CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "CERT_SPECS Length: %d", CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "EXCH_SPECS Length: %d", CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "IV Length: %d", CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
if(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH) {
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH);
|
|
CH_CIPHER_SPECS_ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_cipher_spec, tvb, offset, CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH, FALSE);
|
|
CH_CIPHER_SPECS_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_ti, ett_pct_cipher_suites);
|
|
|
|
for(i=0; i<(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH/4); i++) {
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_tree, hf_pct_handshake_cipher, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_tree, tvb, offset, 1, "Encryption key length: %d", tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset));
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_tree, tvb, offset, 1, "MAC key length in bits: %d", tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) + 64);
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH) {
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH);
|
|
CH_HASH_SPECS_ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_hash_spec, tvb, offset, CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH, FALSE);
|
|
CH_HASH_SPECS_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(CH_HASH_SPECS_ti, ett_pct_hash_suites);
|
|
|
|
for(i=0; i<(CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH/2); i++) {
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(CH_HASH_SPECS_tree, hf_pct_handshake_hash, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH) {
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH);
|
|
CH_CERT_SPECS_ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_cert_spec, tvb, offset, CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH, FALSE);
|
|
CH_CERT_SPECS_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(CH_CERT_SPECS_ti, ett_pct_cert_suites);
|
|
|
|
for(i=0; i< (CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH/2); i++) {
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(CH_CERT_SPECS_tree, hf_pct_handshake_cert, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH) {
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH);
|
|
CH_EXCH_SPECS_ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_exch_spec, tvb, offset, CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH, FALSE);
|
|
CH_EXCH_SPECS_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(CH_EXCH_SPECS_ti, ett_pct_exch_suites);
|
|
|
|
for(i=0; i<(CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH/2); i++) {
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(CH_EXCH_SPECS_tree, hf_pct_handshake_exch, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH) {
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH);
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH, "IV data (%d bytes)", CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH);
|
|
offset += CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
dissect_pct_msg_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo)
|
|
{
|
|
/* structure:
|
|
char SH_MSG_SERVER_HELLO
|
|
char SH_PAD
|
|
char SH_SERVER_VERSION_MSB
|
|
char SH_SERVER_VERSION_LSB
|
|
char SH_RESTART_SESSION_OK
|
|
char SH_CLIENT_AUTH_REQ
|
|
char SH_CIPHER_SPECS_DATA[4]
|
|
char SH_HASH_SPECS_DATA[2]
|
|
char SH_CERT_SPECS_DATA[2]
|
|
char SH_EXCH_SPECS_DATA[2]
|
|
char SH_CONNECTION_ID_DATA[32]
|
|
char SH_CERTIFICATE_LENGTH_MSB
|
|
char SH_CERTIFICATE_LENGTH_LSB
|
|
char SH_CLIENT_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH_MSB
|
|
char SH_CLIENT_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH_LSB
|
|
char SH_CLIENT_SIG_SPECS_LENGTH_MSB
|
|
char SH_CLIENT_SIG_SPECS_LENGTH_LSB
|
|
char SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH_MSB
|
|
char SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH_LSB
|
|
char SH_CERTIFICATE_DATA[MSB<<8|LSB]
|
|
char SH_CLIENT_CERT_SPECS_DATA[MSB<<8|LSB]
|
|
char SH_CLIENT_SIG_SPECS_DATA[MSB<<8|LSB]
|
|
char SH_RESPONSE_DATA[MSB<<8|LSB]
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
guint16 SH_SERVER_VERSION, SH_CERT_LENGTH, SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH, SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH, SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "PAD");
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
|
|
SH_SERVER_VERSION = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
if(SH_SERVER_VERSION != PCT_VERSION_1)
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Server Version, should be %x in PCT version 1", PCT_VERSION_1);
|
|
else
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Server Version (%x)", PCT_VERSION_1);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SH_RESTART_SESSION_OK flag");
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SH_CLIENT_AUTH_REQ flag");
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_cipher, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "Encryption key length: %d", tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset));
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "MAC key length in bits: %d", tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) + 64);
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_hash, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_cert, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_exch, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 32, "Connection ID Data (32 bytes)");
|
|
offset += 32;
|
|
|
|
SH_CERT_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Server Certificate Length: %d", SH_CERT_LENGTH);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Client CERT_SPECS Length: %d", SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Client SIG_SPECS Length: %d", SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Response Length: %d", SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
if(SH_CERT_LENGTH) {
|
|
dissect_x509af_Certificate(FALSE, tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, hf_pct_handshake_server_cert);
|
|
offset += SH_CERT_LENGTH;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH) {
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH);
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH, "Client CERT_SPECS (%d bytes)", SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH);
|
|
offset += SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH) {
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH);
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH, "Client Signature (%d bytes)", SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH);
|
|
offset += SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH) {
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH, "Server Response (%d bytes)", SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
|
|
offset += SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
dissect_pct_msg_client_master_key(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
|
|
{
|
|
guint16 CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH, CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH, CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH, CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE, CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH, CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "PAD");
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_cert, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_sig, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Clear Key Length: %d",CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Encrypted Key Length: %d",CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH= tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "IV Length: %d",CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Verify Prelude Length: %d",CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Client Cert Length: %d",CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Response Length: %d",CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
if(CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH) {
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH);
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH, "Clear Key data (%d bytes)", CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH);
|
|
offset += CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH;
|
|
}
|
|
if(CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH) {
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH);
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH, "Encrypted Key data (%d bytes)", CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH);
|
|
offset += CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH;
|
|
}
|
|
if(CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH) {
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH);
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH, "IV data (%d bytes)", CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH);
|
|
offset += CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH;
|
|
}
|
|
if(CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE) {
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE);
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE, "Verify Prelude data (%d bytes)", CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE);
|
|
offset += CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE;
|
|
}
|
|
if(CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH) {
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH);
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH, "Client Certificate data (%d bytes)", CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH);
|
|
offset += CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH;
|
|
}
|
|
if(CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH) {
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH, "Response data (%d bytes)", CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
|
|
offset += CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
dissect_pct_msg_server_verify(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
|
|
{
|
|
guint16 SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "PAD");
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 32, "Server Session ID data (32 bytes)");
|
|
offset += 32;
|
|
|
|
SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Server Response Length: %d", SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
if(SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH) {
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH, "Server Response (%d bytes)", SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
|
|
offset += SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
dissect_pct_msg_error(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
|
|
{
|
|
guint16 ERROR_CODE, INFO_LEN;
|
|
|
|
ERROR_CODE = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_msg_error_type, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
INFO_LEN = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Eror Information Length: %d", INFO_LEN);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
if (ERROR_CODE == PCT_ERR_SPECS_MISMATCH && INFO_LEN == 6)
|
|
{
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SPECS_MISMATCH_CIPHER");
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SPECS_MISMATCH_HASH");
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SPECS_MISMATCH_CERT");
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SPECS_MISMATCH_EXCH");
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SPECS_MISMATCH_CLIENT_CERT");
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SPECS_MISMATCH_CLIENT_SIG");
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
}
|
|
else if(INFO_LEN) {
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, INFO_LEN, "Error Information dta (%d bytes)", INFO_LEN);
|
|
offset += INFO_LEN;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_master_key(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
|
|
{
|
|
/* struct {
|
|
* uint8 msg_type;
|
|
* V2Cipherspec cipher;
|
|
* uint16 clear_key_length;
|
|
* uint16 encrypted_key_length;
|
|
* uint16 key_arg_length;
|
|
* opaque clear_key_data[V2ClientMasterKey.clear_key_length];
|
|
* opaque encrypted_key_data[V2ClientMasterKey.encrypted_key_length];
|
|
* opaque key_arg_data[V2ClientMasterKey.key_arg_length];
|
|
* } V2ClientMasterKey;
|
|
*
|
|
* Note: when we get here, offset's already pointing at cipher
|
|
*/
|
|
guint16 clear_key_length;
|
|
guint16 encrypted_key_length;
|
|
guint16 key_arg_length;
|
|
|
|
/* at this point, everything we do involves the tree,
|
|
* so quit now if we don't have one ;-)
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!tree)
|
|
{
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* show the selected cipher */
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec,
|
|
tvb, offset, 3, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 3;
|
|
|
|
/* get the fixed fields */
|
|
clear_key_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key_len,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
encrypted_key_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key_len,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
key_arg_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg_len,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
/* show the variable length fields */
|
|
if (clear_key_length > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, clear_key_length);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key,
|
|
tvb, offset, clear_key_length, FALSE);
|
|
offset += clear_key_length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (encrypted_key_length > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, encrypted_key_length);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key,
|
|
tvb, offset, encrypted_key_length, FALSE);
|
|
offset += encrypted_key_length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (key_arg_length > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, key_arg_length);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg,
|
|
tvb, offset, key_arg_length, FALSE);
|
|
offset += key_arg_length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
dissect_ssl2_hnd_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo)
|
|
{
|
|
/* struct {
|
|
* uint8 msg_type;
|
|
* uint8 session_id_hit;
|
|
* uint8 certificate_type;
|
|
* uint16 server_version;
|
|
* uint16 certificate_length;
|
|
* uint16 cipher_specs_length;
|
|
* uint16 connection_id_length;
|
|
* opaque certificate_data[V2ServerHello.certificate_length];
|
|
* opaque cipher_specs_data[V2ServerHello.cipher_specs_length];
|
|
* opaque connection_id_data[V2ServerHello.connection_id_length];
|
|
* } V2ServerHello;
|
|
*
|
|
* Note: when we get here, offset's already pointing at session_id_hit
|
|
*/
|
|
guint16 certificate_length;
|
|
guint16 cipher_spec_length;
|
|
guint16 connection_id_length;
|
|
guint16 version;
|
|
proto_tree *ti;
|
|
proto_tree *subtree;
|
|
|
|
/* everything we do only makes sense with a tree, so
|
|
* quit now if we don't have one
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!tree)
|
|
{
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 2);
|
|
if (!ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(version))
|
|
{
|
|
/* invalid version; probably encrypted data */
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* is there a hit? */
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_hit,
|
|
tvb, offset, 1, FALSE);
|
|
offset++;
|
|
|
|
/* what type of certificate is this? */
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cert_type,
|
|
tvb, offset, 1, FALSE);
|
|
offset++;
|
|
|
|
/* now the server version */
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_server_version,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
/* get the fixed fields */
|
|
certificate_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_certificate_len,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, certificate_length);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
cipher_spec_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec_len,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, cipher_spec_length);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
connection_id_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id_len,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, connection_id_length);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
/* now the variable length fields */
|
|
if (certificate_length > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
dissect_x509af_Certificate(FALSE, tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, hf_ssl_handshake_certificate);
|
|
offset += certificate_length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cipher_spec_length > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
/* provide a collapsing node for the cipher specs */
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, cipher_spec_length);
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
|
|
hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites,
|
|
tvb, offset, cipher_spec_length,
|
|
"Cipher Specs (%u spec%s)",
|
|
cipher_spec_length/3,
|
|
plurality(cipher_spec_length/3, "", "s"));
|
|
subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_cipher_suites);
|
|
if (!subtree)
|
|
{
|
|
subtree = tree;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* iterate through the cipher specs */
|
|
while (cipher_spec_length > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec,
|
|
tvb, offset, 3, FALSE);
|
|
offset += 3;
|
|
cipher_spec_length -= 3;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (connection_id_length > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, connection_id_length);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id,
|
|
tvb, offset, connection_id_length, FALSE);
|
|
offset += connection_id_length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*********************************************************************
|
|
*
|
|
* Support Functions
|
|
*
|
|
*********************************************************************/
|
|
#if 0
|
|
static void
|
|
ssl_set_conv_version(packet_info *pinfo, guint version)
|
|
{
|
|
conversation_t *conversation;
|
|
|
|
if (pinfo->fd->flags.visited)
|
|
{
|
|
/* We've already processed this frame; no need to do any more
|
|
* work on it.
|
|
*/
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
conversation = find_conversation(pinfo->fd->num, &pinfo->src, &pinfo->dst, pinfo->ptype,
|
|
pinfo->srcport, pinfo->destport, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (conversation == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
/* create a new conversation */
|
|
conversation = conversation_new(pinfo->fd->num, &pinfo->src, &pinfo->dst, pinfo->ptype,
|
|
pinfo->srcport, pinfo->destport, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (conversation_get_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl) != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
/* get rid of the current data */
|
|
conversation_delete_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl);
|
|
}
|
|
conversation_add_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl, GINT_TO_POINTER(version));
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_is_valid_handshake_type(guint8 type)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (type) {
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_REQUEST:
|
|
case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
|
|
case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
|
|
case SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE:
|
|
case SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG:
|
|
case SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST:
|
|
case SSL_HND_SVR_HELLO_DONE:
|
|
case SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY:
|
|
case SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG:
|
|
case SSL_HND_FINISHED:
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(guint16 version)
|
|
{
|
|
const gchar *version_str;
|
|
version_str = match_strval(version, ssl_versions);
|
|
return version_str != NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_is_authoritative_version_message(guint8 content_type,
|
|
guint8 next_byte)
|
|
{
|
|
if (content_type == SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE
|
|
&& ssl_is_valid_handshake_type(next_byte))
|
|
{
|
|
return (next_byte != SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO);
|
|
}
|
|
else if (ssl_is_valid_content_type(content_type)
|
|
&& content_type != SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE)
|
|
{
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_is_v2_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset)
|
|
{
|
|
guint8 byte;
|
|
|
|
byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
if (byte != 0x80) /* v2 client hello should start this way */
|
|
{
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset+2);
|
|
if (byte != 0x01) /* v2 client hello msg type */
|
|
{
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* 1 in 2^16 of being right; improve later if necessary */
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* this applies a heuristic to determine whether
|
|
* or not the data beginning at offset looks like a
|
|
* valid sslv2 record. this isn't really possible,
|
|
* but we'll try to do a reasonable job anyway.
|
|
*/
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_looks_like_sslv2(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset)
|
|
{
|
|
/* here's the current approach:
|
|
*
|
|
* we only try to catch unencrypted handshake messages, so we can
|
|
* assume that there is not padding. This means that the
|
|
* first byte must be >= 0x80 and there must be a valid sslv2
|
|
* msg_type in the third byte
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* get the first byte; must have high bit set */
|
|
guint8 byte;
|
|
byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
if (byte < 0x80)
|
|
{
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* get the supposed msg_type byte; since we only care about
|
|
* unencrypted handshake messages (we can't tell the type for
|
|
* encrypted messages), we just check against that list
|
|
*/
|
|
byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 2);
|
|
switch(byte) {
|
|
case SSL2_HND_ERROR:
|
|
case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
|
|
case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY:
|
|
case SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
|
|
case PCT_MSG_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY:
|
|
case PCT_MSG_ERROR:
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* this applies a heuristic to determine whether
|
|
* or not the data beginning at offset looks like a
|
|
* valid sslv3 record. this is somewhat more reliable
|
|
* than sslv2 due to the structure of the v3 protocol
|
|
*/
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_looks_like_sslv3(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset)
|
|
{
|
|
/* have to have a valid content type followed by a valid
|
|
* protocol version
|
|
*/
|
|
guint8 byte;
|
|
guint16 version;
|
|
|
|
/* see if the first byte is a valid content type */
|
|
byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
if (!ssl_is_valid_content_type(byte))
|
|
{
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* now check to see if the version byte appears valid */
|
|
version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 1);
|
|
if (version != SSLV3_VERSION && version != TLSV1_VERSION && version != TLSV1DOT1_VERSION)
|
|
{
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* applies a heuristic to determine whether
|
|
* or not the data beginning at offset looks
|
|
* like a valid, unencrypted v2 handshake message.
|
|
* since it isn't possible to completely tell random
|
|
* data apart from a valid message without state,
|
|
* we try to help the odds.
|
|
*/
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_looks_like_valid_v2_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset,
|
|
guint32 record_length)
|
|
{
|
|
/* first byte should be a msg_type.
|
|
*
|
|
* - we know we only see client_hello, client_master_key,
|
|
* and server_hello in the clear, so check to see if
|
|
* msg_type is one of those (this gives us a 3 in 2^8
|
|
* chance of saying yes with random payload)
|
|
*
|
|
* - for those three types that we know about, do some
|
|
* further validation to reduce the chance of an error
|
|
*/
|
|
guint8 msg_type;
|
|
guint16 version;
|
|
guint32 sum;
|
|
|
|
/* fetch the msg_type */
|
|
msg_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
switch (msg_type) {
|
|
case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
|
|
/* version follows msg byte, so verify that this is valid */
|
|
version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset+1);
|
|
return ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(version);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
|
|
/* version is three bytes after msg_type */
|
|
version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset+3);
|
|
return ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(version);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY:
|
|
/* sum of clear_key_length, encrypted_key_length, and key_arg_length
|
|
* must be less than record length
|
|
*/
|
|
sum = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 4); /* clear_key_length */
|
|
sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 6); /* encrypted_key_length */
|
|
sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 8); /* key_arg_length */
|
|
if (sum > record_length)
|
|
{
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* applies a heuristic to determine whether
|
|
* or not the data beginning at offset looks
|
|
* like a valid, unencrypted v2 handshake message.
|
|
* since it isn't possible to completely tell random
|
|
* data apart from a valid message without state,
|
|
* we try to help the odds.
|
|
*/
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_looks_like_valid_pct_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset,
|
|
guint32 record_length)
|
|
{
|
|
/* first byte should be a msg_type.
|
|
*
|
|
* - we know we only see client_hello, client_master_key,
|
|
* and server_hello in the clear, so check to see if
|
|
* msg_type is one of those (this gives us a 3 in 2^8
|
|
* chance of saying yes with random payload)
|
|
*
|
|
* - for those three types that we know about, do some
|
|
* further validation to reduce the chance of an error
|
|
*/
|
|
guint8 msg_type;
|
|
guint16 version;
|
|
guint32 sum;
|
|
|
|
/* fetch the msg_type */
|
|
msg_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
switch (msg_type) {
|
|
case PCT_MSG_CLIENT_HELLO:
|
|
/* version follows msg byte, so verify that this is valid */
|
|
version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset+1);
|
|
return version == PCT_VERSION_1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PCT_MSG_SERVER_HELLO:
|
|
/* version is one byte after msg_type */
|
|
version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset+2);
|
|
return version == PCT_VERSION_1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PCT_MSG_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY:
|
|
/* sum of various length fields must be less than record length */
|
|
sum = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 6); /* clear_key_length */
|
|
sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 8); /* encrypted_key_length */
|
|
sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 10); /* key_arg_length */
|
|
sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 12); /* verify_prelude_length */
|
|
sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 14); /* client_cert_length */
|
|
sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 16); /* response_length */
|
|
if (sum > record_length)
|
|
{
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PCT_MSG_SERVER_VERIFY:
|
|
/* record is 36 bytes longer than response_length */
|
|
sum = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 34); /* response_length */
|
|
if ((sum + 36) == record_length)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
else
|
|
return 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*********************************************************************
|
|
*
|
|
* Standard Ethereal Protocol Registration and housekeeping
|
|
*
|
|
*********************************************************************/
|
|
void
|
|
proto_register_ssl(void)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Setup list of header fields See Section 1.6.1 for details*/
|
|
static hf_register_info hf[] = {
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_record,
|
|
{ "Record Layer", "ssl.record",
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Record layer", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_record_content_type,
|
|
{ "Content Type", "ssl.record.content_type",
|
|
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_content_type), 0x0,
|
|
"Content type", HFILL}
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_msg_type,
|
|
{ "Handshake Message Type", "ssl.handshake.type",
|
|
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_20_msg_types), 0x0,
|
|
"SSLv2 handshake message type", HFILL}
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_pct_msg_type,
|
|
{ "Handshake Message Type", "ssl.pct_handshake.type",
|
|
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(pct_msg_types), 0x0,
|
|
"PCT handshake message type", HFILL}
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_record_version,
|
|
{ "Version", "ssl.record.version",
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(ssl_versions), 0x0,
|
|
"Record layer version.", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_record_length,
|
|
{ "Length", "ssl.record.length",
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Length of SSL record data", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_record_appdata,
|
|
{ "Encrypted Application Data", "ssl.app_data",
|
|
FT_BYTES, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Payload is encrypted application data", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ & hf_ssl2_record,
|
|
{ "SSLv2/PCT Record Header", "ssl.record",
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"SSLv2/PCT record data", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_record_is_escape,
|
|
{ "Is Escape", "ssl.record.is_escape",
|
|
FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Indicates a security escape", HFILL}
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_record_padding_length,
|
|
{ "Padding Length", "ssl.record.padding_length",
|
|
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Length of padding at end of record", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_change_cipher_spec,
|
|
{ "Change Cipher Spec Message", "ssl.change_cipher_spec",
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Signals a change in cipher specifications", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ & hf_ssl_alert_message,
|
|
{ "Alert Message", "ssl.alert_message",
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Alert message", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ & hf_ssl_alert_message_level,
|
|
{ "Level", "ssl.alert_message.level",
|
|
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_alert_level), 0x0,
|
|
"Alert message level", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_alert_message_description,
|
|
{ "Description", "ssl.alert_message.desc",
|
|
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_alert_description), 0x0,
|
|
"Alert message description", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_protocol,
|
|
{ "Handshake Protocol", "ssl.handshake",
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Handshake protocol message", HFILL}
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_type,
|
|
{ "Handshake Type", "ssl.handshake.type",
|
|
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_handshake_type), 0x0,
|
|
"Type of handshake message", HFILL}
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_length,
|
|
{ "Length", "ssl.handshake.length",
|
|
FT_UINT24, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Length of handshake message", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_client_version,
|
|
{ "Version", "ssl.handshake.version",
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(ssl_versions), 0x0,
|
|
"Maximum version supported by client", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_server_version,
|
|
{ "Version", "ssl.handshake.version",
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(ssl_versions), 0x0,
|
|
"Version selected by server", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_random_time,
|
|
{ "gmt_unix_time", "ssl.handshake.random_time",
|
|
FT_ABSOLUTE_TIME, 0, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Unix time field of random structure", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_random_bytes,
|
|
{ "random_bytes", "ssl.handshake.random_bytes",
|
|
FT_BYTES, 0, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Random challenge used to authenticate server", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites_len,
|
|
{ "Cipher Suites Length", "ssl.handshake.cipher_suites_length",
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Length of cipher suites field", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites,
|
|
{ "Cipher Suites", "ssl.handshake.ciphersuites",
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"List of cipher suites supported by client", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suite,
|
|
{ "Cipher Suite", "ssl.handshake.ciphersuite",
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(ssl_31_ciphersuite), 0x0,
|
|
"Cipher suite", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec,
|
|
{ "Cipher Spec", "ssl.handshake.cipherspec",
|
|
FT_UINT24, BASE_HEX, VALS(ssl_20_cipher_suites), 0x0,
|
|
"Cipher specification", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_session_id,
|
|
{ "Session ID", "ssl.handshake.session_id",
|
|
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Identifies the SSL session, allowing later resumption", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_comp_methods_len,
|
|
{ "Compression Methods Length", "ssl.handshake.comp_methods_length",
|
|
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Length of compression methods field", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_comp_methods,
|
|
{ "Compression Methods", "ssl.handshake.comp_methods",
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"List of compression methods supported by client", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_comp_method,
|
|
{ "Compression Method", "ssl.handshake.comp_method",
|
|
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_compression_method), 0x0,
|
|
"Compression Method", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_extensions_len,
|
|
{ "Extensions Length", "ssl.handshake.extensions_length",
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Length of hello extensions", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_extension_type,
|
|
{ "Type", "ssl.handshake.extension.type",
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(tls_hello_extension_types), 0x0,
|
|
"Hello extension type", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_extension_len,
|
|
{ "Length", "ssl.handshake.extension.len",
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Length of a hello extension", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_extension_data,
|
|
{ "Data", "ssl.handshake.extension.data",
|
|
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Hello Extension data", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_certificates_len,
|
|
{ "Certificates Length", "ssl.handshake.certificates_length",
|
|
FT_UINT24, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Length of certificates field", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_certificates,
|
|
{ "Certificates", "ssl.handshake.certificates",
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"List of certificates", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_certificate,
|
|
{ "Certificate", "ssl.handshake.certificate",
|
|
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Certificate", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_certificate_len,
|
|
{ "Certificate Length", "ssl.handshake.certificate_length",
|
|
FT_UINT24, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Length of certificate", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_cert_types_count,
|
|
{ "Certificate types count", "ssl.handshake.cert_types_count",
|
|
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Count of certificate types", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_cert_types,
|
|
{ "Certificate types", "ssl.handshake.cert_types",
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"List of certificate types", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_cert_type,
|
|
{ "Certificate type", "ssl.handshake.cert_type",
|
|
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_client_certificate_type), 0x0,
|
|
"Certificate type", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_finished,
|
|
{ "Verify Data", "ssl.handshake.verify_data",
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Opaque verification data", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_md5_hash,
|
|
{ "MD5 Hash", "ssl.handshake.md5_hash",
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Hash of messages, master_secret, etc.", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_sha_hash,
|
|
{ "SHA-1 Hash", "ssl.handshake.sha_hash",
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Hash of messages, master_secret, etc.", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_session_id_len,
|
|
{ "Session ID Length", "ssl.handshake.session_id_length",
|
|
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Length of session ID field", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_dnames_len,
|
|
{ "Distinguished Names Length", "ssl.handshake.dnames_len",
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Length of list of CAs that server trusts", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_dnames,
|
|
{ "Distinguished Names", "ssl.handshake.dnames",
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"List of CAs that server trusts", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_dname_len,
|
|
{ "Distinguished Name Length", "ssl.handshake.dname_len",
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Length of distinguished name", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_dname,
|
|
{ "Distinguished Name", "ssl.handshake.dname",
|
|
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Distinguished name of a CA that server trusts", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge,
|
|
{ "Challenge", "ssl.handshake.challenge",
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Challenge data used to authenticate server", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec_len,
|
|
{ "Cipher Spec Length", "ssl.handshake.cipher_spec_len",
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Length of cipher specs field", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_len,
|
|
{ "Session ID Length", "ssl.handshake.session_id_length",
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Length of session ID field", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge_len,
|
|
{ "Challenge Length", "ssl.handshake.challenge_length",
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Length of challenge field", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key_len,
|
|
{ "Clear Key Data Length", "ssl.handshake.clear_key_length",
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Length of clear key data", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key_len,
|
|
{ "Encrypted Key Data Length", "ssl.handshake.encrypted_key_length",
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Length of encrypted key data", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg_len,
|
|
{ "Key Argument Length", "ssl.handshake.key_arg_length",
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Length of key argument", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key,
|
|
{ "Clear Key Data", "ssl.handshake.clear_key_data",
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Clear portion of MASTER-KEY", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key,
|
|
{ "Encrypted Key", "ssl.handshake.encrypted_key",
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Secret portion of MASTER-KEY encrypted to server", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg,
|
|
{ "Key Argument", "ssl.handshake.key_arg",
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Key Argument (e.g., Initialization Vector)", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_hit,
|
|
{ "Session ID Hit", "ssl.handshake.session_id_hit",
|
|
FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Did the server find the client's Session ID?", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_cert_type,
|
|
{ "Certificate Type", "ssl.handshake.cert_type",
|
|
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_20_certificate_type), 0x0,
|
|
"Certificate Type", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id_len,
|
|
{ "Connection ID Length", "ssl.handshake.connection_id_length",
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Length of connection ID", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id,
|
|
{ "Connection ID", "ssl.handshake.connection_id",
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"Server's challenge to client", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_pct_handshake_cipher_spec,
|
|
{ "Cipher Spec", "pct.handshake.cipherspec",
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"PCT Cipher specification", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_pct_handshake_cipher,
|
|
{ "Cipher", "pct.handshake.cipher",
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(pct_cipher_type), 0x0,
|
|
"PCT Ciper", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_pct_handshake_hash_spec,
|
|
{ "Hash Spec", "pct.handshake.hashspec",
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"PCT Hash specification", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_pct_handshake_hash,
|
|
{ "Hash", "pct.handshake.hash",
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(pct_hash_type), 0x0,
|
|
"PCT Hash", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_pct_handshake_cert_spec,
|
|
{ "Cert Spec", "pct.handshake.certspec",
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"PCT Certificate specification", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_pct_handshake_cert,
|
|
{ "Cert", "pct.handshake.cert",
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(pct_cert_type), 0x0,
|
|
"PCT Certificate", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_pct_handshake_exch_spec,
|
|
{ "Exchange Spec", "pct.handshake.exchspec",
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
"PCT Exchange specification", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_pct_handshake_exch,
|
|
{ "Exchange", "pct.handshake.exch",
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(pct_exch_type), 0x0,
|
|
"PCT Exchange", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_pct_handshake_sig,
|
|
{ "Sig Spec", "pct.handshake.sig",
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(pct_sig_type), 0x0,
|
|
"PCT Signature", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_pct_msg_error_type,
|
|
{ "PCT Error Code", "pct.msg_error_code",
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(pct_error_code), 0x0,
|
|
"PCT Error Code", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
{ &hf_pct_handshake_server_cert,
|
|
{ "Server Cert", "pct.handshake.server_cert",
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL , 0x0,
|
|
"PCT Server Certificate", HFILL }
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/* Setup protocol subtree array */
|
|
static gint *ett[] = {
|
|
&ett_ssl,
|
|
&ett_ssl_record,
|
|
&ett_ssl_alert,
|
|
&ett_ssl_handshake,
|
|
&ett_ssl_cipher_suites,
|
|
&ett_ssl_comp_methods,
|
|
&ett_ssl_extension,
|
|
&ett_ssl_certs,
|
|
&ett_ssl_cert_types,
|
|
&ett_ssl_dnames,
|
|
&ett_ssl_random,
|
|
&ett_pct_cipher_suites,
|
|
&ett_pct_hash_suites,
|
|
&ett_pct_cert_suites,
|
|
&ett_pct_exch_suites,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/* Register the protocol name and description */
|
|
proto_ssl = proto_register_protocol("Secure Socket Layer",
|
|
"SSL", "ssl");
|
|
|
|
/* Required function calls to register the header fields and
|
|
* subtrees used */
|
|
proto_register_field_array(proto_ssl, hf, array_length(hf));
|
|
proto_register_subtree_array(ett, array_length(ett));
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
module_t *ssl_module = prefs_register_protocol(proto_ssl, proto_reg_handoff_ssl);
|
|
prefs_register_bool_preference(ssl_module,
|
|
"desegment_ssl_records",
|
|
"Reassemble SSL records spanning multiple TCP segments",
|
|
"Whether the SSL dissector should reassemble SSL records spanning multiple TCP segments. "
|
|
"To use this option, you must also enable \"Allow subdissectors to reassemble TCP streams\" in the TCP protocol settings.",
|
|
&ssl_desegment);
|
|
prefs_register_bool_preference(ssl_module,
|
|
"desegment_ssl_application_data",
|
|
"Reassemble SSL Application Data spanning multiple SSL records",
|
|
"Whether the SSL dissector should reassemble SSL Application Data spanning multiple SSL records. ",
|
|
&ssl_desegment_app_data);
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS
|
|
prefs_register_string_preference(ssl_module, "keys_list", "RSA keys list",
|
|
"semicolon separated list of private RSA keys used for SSL decryption; "
|
|
"each list entry must be in the form of <ip>,<port>,<protocol>,<key_file_name>"
|
|
"<key_file_name> is the local file name of the RSA private key used by the specified server\n",
|
|
(const gchar **)&ssl_keys_list);
|
|
prefs_register_string_preference(ssl_module, "debug_file", "SSL debug file",
|
|
"redirect ssl debug to file name; leave empty to disable debug, "
|
|
"use \"" SSL_DEBUG_USE_STDERR "\" to redirect output to stderr\n",
|
|
(const gchar **)&ssl_debug_file_name);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
register_dissector("ssl", dissect_ssl, proto_ssl);
|
|
ssl_handle = find_dissector("ssl");
|
|
|
|
ssl_associations = g_tree_new(ssl_association_cmp);
|
|
|
|
register_init_routine(ssl_init);
|
|
ssl_lib_init();
|
|
ssl_tap = register_tap("ssl");
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("proto_register_ssl: registered tap %s:%d\n",
|
|
"ssl", ssl_tap);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If this dissector uses sub-dissector registration add a registration
|
|
* routine. This format is required because a script is used to find
|
|
* these routines and create the code that calls these routines.
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|
*/
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|
void
|
|
proto_reg_handoff_ssl(void)
|
|
{
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|
|
|
/* parse key list */
|
|
ssl_parse();
|
|
|
|
/* add ssl dissection to defaults ports */
|
|
ssl_dissector_add(443, "http", TRUE);
|
|
ssl_dissector_add(636, "ldap", TRUE);
|
|
ssl_dissector_add(993, "imap", TRUE);
|
|
ssl_dissector_add(995, "pop", TRUE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_dissector_add(guint port, const gchar *protocol, gboolean tcp)
|
|
{
|
|
SslAssociation *assoc;
|
|
|
|
assoc = ssl_association_find(ssl_associations, port, tcp);
|
|
if (assoc) {
|
|
ssl_association_remove(ssl_associations, assoc);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl_association_add(ssl_associations, ssl_handle, port, protocol, tcp, FALSE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_dissector_delete(guint port, const gchar *protocol, gboolean tcp)
|
|
{
|
|
SslAssociation *assoc;
|
|
|
|
assoc = ssl_association_find(ssl_associations, port, tcp);
|
|
if (assoc && (assoc->handle == find_dissector(protocol))) {
|
|
ssl_association_remove(ssl_associations, assoc);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|