8494 lines
332 KiB
C
8494 lines
332 KiB
C
/* packet-ssl-utils.c
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* ssl manipulation functions
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* By Paolo Abeni <paolo.abeni@email.com>
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*
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* Copyright (c) 2013, Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
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* Copyright (c) 2014, Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
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*
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* Wireshark - Network traffic analyzer
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* By Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
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* Copyright 1998 Gerald Combs
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
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* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
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* of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
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* Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
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*/
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#include "config.h"
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#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB
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#define ZLIB_CONST
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#include <zlib.h>
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#endif
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <epan/packet.h>
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#include <epan/strutil.h>
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#include <epan/addr_resolv.h>
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#include <epan/ipv6.h>
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#include <epan/expert.h>
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#include <epan/asn1.h>
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#include <epan/proto_data.h>
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#include <epan/oids.h>
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#include <wsutil/filesystem.h>
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#include <wsutil/file_util.h>
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#include <wsutil/str_util.h>
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#include <wsutil/report_message.h>
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#include <wsutil/pint.h>
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#include <wsutil/strtoi.h>
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#include <ws_version_info.h>
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#include "packet-ber.h"
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#include "packet-x509af.h"
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#include "packet-x509if.h"
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#include "packet-ssl-utils.h"
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#include "packet-ssl.h"
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#include "packet-dtls.h"
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#if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS)
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#include <gnutls/abstract.h>
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#endif
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#if GCRYPT_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010600 /* 1.6.0 */
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/* Whether to provide support for authentication in addition to decryption. */
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#define HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD
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#endif
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/* Lookup tables {{{ */
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const value_string ssl_version_short_names[] = {
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{ SSL_VER_UNKNOWN, "SSL" },
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{ SSLV2_VERSION, "SSLv2" },
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{ SSLV3_VERSION, "SSLv3" },
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{ TLSV1_VERSION, "TLSv1" },
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{ TLSV1DOT1_VERSION, "TLSv1.1" },
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{ TLSV1DOT2_VERSION, "TLSv1.2" },
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{ TLSV1DOT3_VERSION, "TLSv1.3" },
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{ DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION, "DTLSv1.0" },
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{ DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION, "DTLSv1.2" },
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{ DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION, "DTLS 1.0 (OpenSSL pre 0.9.8f)" },
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{ PCT_VERSION, "PCT" },
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{ 0x00, NULL }
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};
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const value_string ssl_versions[] = {
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{ SSLV2_VERSION, "SSL 2.0" },
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{ SSLV3_VERSION, "SSL 3.0" },
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{ TLSV1_VERSION, "TLS 1.0" },
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{ TLSV1DOT1_VERSION, "TLS 1.1" },
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{ TLSV1DOT2_VERSION, "TLS 1.2" },
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{ TLSV1DOT3_VERSION, "TLS 1.3" },
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{ 0x7F0E, "TLS 1.3 (draft 14)" },
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{ 0x7F0F, "TLS 1.3 (draft 15)" },
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{ 0x7F10, "TLS 1.3 (draft 16)" },
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{ 0x7F11, "TLS 1.3 (draft 17)" },
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{ 0x7F12, "TLS 1.3 (draft 18)" },
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{ 0x7F13, "TLS 1.3 (draft 19)" },
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{ DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION, "DTLS 1.0 (OpenSSL pre 0.9.8f)" },
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{ DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION, "DTLS 1.0" },
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{ DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION, "DTLS 1.2" },
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{ 0x00, NULL }
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};
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const value_string ssl_20_msg_types[] = {
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{ SSL2_HND_ERROR, "Error" },
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{ SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO, "Client Hello" },
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{ SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, "Client Master Key" },
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{ SSL2_HND_CLIENT_FINISHED, "Client Finished" },
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{ SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO, "Server Hello" },
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{ SSL2_HND_SERVER_VERIFY, "Server Verify" },
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{ SSL2_HND_SERVER_FINISHED, "Server Finished" },
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{ SSL2_HND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, "Request Certificate" },
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{ SSL2_HND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, "Client Certificate" },
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{ 0x00, NULL }
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};
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/* http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml */
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/* Note: sorted by ascending value so value_string-ext can do a binary search */
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static const value_string ssl_20_cipher_suites[] = {
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{ 0x000000, "TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL" },
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{ 0x000001, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5" },
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{ 0x000002, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
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{ 0x000003, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" },
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{ 0x000004, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" },
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{ 0x000005, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
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{ 0x000006, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5" },
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{ 0x000007, "TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000008, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000009, "TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x00000a, "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x00000b, "TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x00000c, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x00000d, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x00000e, "TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x00000f, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000010, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000011, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000012, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000013, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000014, "TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000015, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000016, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000017, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" },
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{ 0x000018, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" },
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{ 0x000019, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x00001a, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x00001b, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x00001c, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
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{ 0x00001d, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA" },
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#if 0
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{ 0x00001e, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
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#endif
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/* RFC 2712 */
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{ 0x00001E, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x00001F, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000020, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
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{ 0x000021, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000022, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_MD5" },
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{ 0x000023, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_MD5" },
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{ 0x000024, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" },
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{ 0x000025, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_MD5" },
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{ 0x000026, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_SHA" },
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{ 0x000027, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_SHA" },
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{ 0x000028, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_SHA" },
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{ 0x000029, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_MD5" },
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{ 0x00002A, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5" },
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{ 0x00002B, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" },
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/* RFC 4785 */
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{ 0x00002C, "TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
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{ 0x00002D, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
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{ 0x00002E, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
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/* RFC 5246 */
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{ 0x00002f, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000030, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000031, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000032, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000033, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000034, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000035, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000036, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000037, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000038, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000039, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x00003A, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x00003B, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256" },
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{ 0x00003C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
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{ 0x00003D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
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{ 0x00003E, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
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{ 0x00003F, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
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{ 0x000040, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
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{ 0x000041, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000042, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000043, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000044, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000045, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000046, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000047, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
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{ 0x000048, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
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{ 0x000049, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x00004A, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x00004B, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x00004C, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000060, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5" },
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{ 0x000061, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5" },
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{ 0x000062, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000063, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000064, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" },
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{ 0x000065, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" },
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{ 0x000066, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
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{ 0x000067, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
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{ 0x000068, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
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{ 0x000069, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
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{ 0x00006A, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
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{ 0x00006B, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
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{ 0x00006C, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
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{ 0x00006D, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
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/* 0x00,0x6E-83 Unassigned */
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{ 0x000084, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000085, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000086, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000087, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000088, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000089, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
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/* RFC 4279 */
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{ 0x00008A, "TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
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{ 0x00008B, "TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x00008C, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x00008D, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x00008E, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
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{ 0x00008F, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000090, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000091, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000092, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
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{ 0x000093, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000094, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000095, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
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/* RFC 4162 */
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{ 0x000096, "TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000097, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000098, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x000099, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x00009A, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x00009B, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
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/* RFC 5288 */
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{ 0x00009C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
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{ 0x00009D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
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{ 0x00009E, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
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{ 0x00009F, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
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{ 0x0000A0, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
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{ 0x0000A1, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
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{ 0x0000A2, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
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{ 0x0000A3, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
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{ 0x0000A4, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
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{ 0x0000A5, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
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{ 0x0000A6, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
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{ 0x0000A7, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
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/* RFC 5487 */
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{ 0x0000A8, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
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{ 0x0000A9, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
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{ 0x0000AA, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
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{ 0x0000AB, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
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{ 0x0000AC, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
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{ 0x0000AD, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
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{ 0x0000AE, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
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{ 0x0000AF, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
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{ 0x0000B0, "TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256" },
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{ 0x0000B1, "TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384" },
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{ 0x0000B2, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
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{ 0x0000B3, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
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{ 0x0000B4, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256" },
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{ 0x0000B5, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384" },
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{ 0x0000B6, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
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{ 0x0000B7, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
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{ 0x0000B8, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256" },
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{ 0x0000B9, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384" },
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/* From RFC 5932 */
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{ 0x0000BA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
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{ 0x0000BB, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
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{ 0x0000BC, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
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{ 0x0000BD, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
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{ 0x0000BE, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
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{ 0x0000BF, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
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{ 0x0000C0, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
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{ 0x0000C1, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
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{ 0x0000C2, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
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{ 0x0000C3, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
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{ 0x0000C4, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
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{ 0x0000C5, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
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/* 0x00,0xC6-FE Unassigned */
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{ 0x0000FF, "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV" },
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/* 0x01-BF,* Unassigned */
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/* From RFC 4492 */
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{ 0x00c001, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
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{ 0x00c002, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
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{ 0x00c003, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x00c004, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x00c005, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x00c006, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
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{ 0x00c007, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
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{ 0x00c008, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x00c009, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
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{ 0x00c00a, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
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|
{ 0x00c00b, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x00c00c, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x00c00d, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x00c00e, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x00c00f, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x00c010, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x00c011, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x00c012, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x00c013, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x00c014, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x00c015, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x00c016, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x00c017, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x00c018, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x00c019, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
/* RFC 5054 */
|
|
{ 0x00C01A, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x00C01B, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x00C01C, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x00C01D, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x00C01E, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x00C01F, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x00C020, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x00C021, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x00C022, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
/* RFC 5589 */
|
|
{ 0x00C023, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00C024, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0x00C025, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00C026, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0x00C027, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00C028, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0x00C029, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00C02A, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0x00C02B, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00C02C, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0x00C02D, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00C02E, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0x00C02F, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00C030, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0x00C031, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00C032, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
/* RFC 5489 */
|
|
{ 0x00C033, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x00C034, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x00C035, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x00C036, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x00C037, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00C038, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0x00C039, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x00C03A, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00C03B, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384" },
|
|
/* 0xC0,0x3C-FF Unassigned
|
|
0xC1-FD,* Unassigned
|
|
0xFE,0x00-FD Unassigned
|
|
0xFE,0xFE-FF Reserved to avoid conflicts with widely deployed implementations [Pasi_Eronen]
|
|
0xFF,0x00-FF Reserved for Private Use [RFC5246]
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* old numbers used in the beginning
|
|
* http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305 */
|
|
{ 0x00CC13, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00CC14, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00CC15, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
|
|
|
|
/* http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305 */
|
|
{ 0x00CCA8, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00CCA9, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00CCAA, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00CCAB, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00CCAC, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00CCAD, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00CCAE, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
|
|
|
|
/* http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-josefsson-salsa20-tls */
|
|
{ 0x00E410, "TLS_RSA_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
|
|
{ 0x00E411, "TLS_RSA_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
|
|
{ 0x00E412, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
|
|
{ 0x00E413, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
|
|
{ 0x00E414, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
|
|
{ 0x00E415, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
|
|
{ 0x00E416, "TLS_PSK_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
|
|
{ 0x00E417, "TLS_PSK_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
|
|
{ 0x00E418, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
|
|
{ 0x00E419, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
|
|
{ 0x00E41A, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
|
|
{ 0x00E41B, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
|
|
{ 0x00E41C, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
|
|
{ 0x00E41D, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
|
|
{ 0x00E41E, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
|
|
{ 0x00E41F, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
|
|
|
|
/* these from http://www.mozilla.org/projects/
|
|
security/pki/nss/ssl/fips-ssl-ciphersuites.html */
|
|
{ 0x00fefe, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"},
|
|
{ 0x00feff, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x00ffe0, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x00ffe1, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"},
|
|
/* note that ciphersuites of {0x00????} are TLS cipher suites in
|
|
* a sslv2 client hello message; the ???? above is the two-byte
|
|
* tls cipher suite id
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
{ 0x010080, "SSL2_RC4_128_WITH_MD5" },
|
|
{ 0x020080, "SSL2_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5" },
|
|
{ 0x030080, "SSL2_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5" },
|
|
{ 0x040080, "SSL2_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5" },
|
|
{ 0x050080, "SSL2_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5" },
|
|
{ 0x060040, "SSL2_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5" },
|
|
{ 0x0700c0, "SSL2_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5" },
|
|
{ 0x080080, "SSL2_RC4_64_WITH_MD5" },
|
|
|
|
/* Microsoft's old PCT protocol. These are from Eric Rescorla's
|
|
book "SSL and TLS" */
|
|
{ 0x800001, "PCT_SSL_CERT_TYPE | PCT1_CERT_X509" },
|
|
{ 0x800003, "PCT_SSL_CERT_TYPE | PCT1_CERT_X509_CHAIN" },
|
|
{ 0x810001, "PCT_SSL_HASH_TYPE | PCT1_HASH_MD5" },
|
|
{ 0x810003, "PCT_SSL_HASH_TYPE | PCT1_HASH_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x820001, "PCT_SSL_EXCH_TYPE | PCT1_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1" },
|
|
{ 0x830004, "PCT_SSL_CIPHER_TYPE_1ST_HALF | PCT1_CIPHER_RC4" },
|
|
{ 0x842840, "PCT_SSL_CIPHER_TYPE_2ND_HALF | PCT1_ENC_BITS_40 | PCT1_MAC_BITS_128" },
|
|
{ 0x848040, "PCT_SSL_CIPHER_TYPE_2ND_HALF | PCT1_ENC_BITS_128 | PCT1_MAC_BITS_128" },
|
|
{ 0x8f8001, "PCT_SSL_COMPAT | PCT_VERSION_1" },
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
value_string_ext ssl_20_cipher_suites_ext = VALUE_STRING_EXT_INIT(ssl_20_cipher_suites);
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Supported Groups (formerly named "EC Named Curve").
|
|
* https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-8
|
|
*/
|
|
const value_string ssl_extension_curves[] = {
|
|
{ 1, "sect163k1" },
|
|
{ 2, "sect163r1" },
|
|
{ 3, "sect163r2" },
|
|
{ 4, "sect193r1" },
|
|
{ 5, "sect193r2" },
|
|
{ 6, "sect233k1" },
|
|
{ 7, "sect233r1" },
|
|
{ 8, "sect239k1" },
|
|
{ 9, "sect283k1" },
|
|
{ 10, "sect283r1" },
|
|
{ 11, "sect409k1" },
|
|
{ 12, "sect409r1" },
|
|
{ 13, "sect571k1" },
|
|
{ 14, "sect571r1" },
|
|
{ 15, "secp160k1" },
|
|
{ 16, "secp160r1" },
|
|
{ 17, "secp160r2" },
|
|
{ 18, "secp192k1" },
|
|
{ 19, "secp192r1" },
|
|
{ 20, "secp224k1" },
|
|
{ 21, "secp224r1" },
|
|
{ 22, "secp256k1" },
|
|
{ 23, "secp256r1" },
|
|
{ 24, "secp384r1" },
|
|
{ 25, "secp521r1" },
|
|
{ 26, "brainpoolP256r1" }, /* RFC 7027 */
|
|
{ 27, "brainpoolP384r1" }, /* RFC 7027 */
|
|
{ 28, "brainpoolP512r1" }, /* RFC 7027 */
|
|
{ 29, "ecdh_x25519" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis */
|
|
{ 30, "ecdh_x448" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis */
|
|
{ 256, "ffdhe2048" }, /* RFC 7919 */
|
|
{ 257, "ffdhe3072" }, /* RFC 7919 */
|
|
{ 258, "ffdhe4096" }, /* RFC 7919 */
|
|
{ 259, "ffdhe6144" }, /* RFC 7919 */
|
|
{ 260, "ffdhe8192" }, /* RFC 7919 */
|
|
{ 0xFF01, "arbitrary_explicit_prime_curves" },
|
|
{ 0xFF02, "arbitrary_explicit_char2_curves" },
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const value_string ssl_curve_types[] = {
|
|
{ 1, "explicit_prime" },
|
|
{ 2, "explicit_char2" },
|
|
{ 3, "named_curve" },
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const value_string ssl_extension_ec_point_formats[] = {
|
|
{ 0, "uncompressed" },
|
|
{ 1, "ansiX962_compressed_prime" },
|
|
{ 2, "ansiX962_compressed_char2" },
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const value_string ssl_20_certificate_type[] = {
|
|
{ 0x00, "N/A" },
|
|
{ 0x01, "X.509 Certificate" },
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const value_string ssl_31_content_type[] = {
|
|
{ 20, "Change Cipher Spec" },
|
|
{ 21, "Alert" },
|
|
{ 22, "Handshake" },
|
|
{ 23, "Application Data" },
|
|
{ 24, "Heartbeat" },
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
/* XXX - would be used if we dissected the body of a Change Cipher Spec
|
|
message. */
|
|
const value_string ssl_31_change_cipher_spec[] = {
|
|
{ 1, "Change Cipher Spec" },
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
const value_string ssl_31_alert_level[] = {
|
|
{ 1, "Warning" },
|
|
{ 2, "Fatal" },
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const value_string ssl_31_alert_description[] = {
|
|
{ 0, "Close Notify" },
|
|
{ 1, "End of Early Data" },
|
|
{ 10, "Unexpected Message" },
|
|
{ 20, "Bad Record MAC" },
|
|
{ 21, "Decryption Failed" },
|
|
{ 22, "Record Overflow" },
|
|
{ 30, "Decompression Failure" },
|
|
{ 40, "Handshake Failure" },
|
|
{ 41, "No Certificate" },
|
|
{ 42, "Bad Certificate" },
|
|
{ 43, "Unsupported Certificate" },
|
|
{ 44, "Certificate Revoked" },
|
|
{ 45, "Certificate Expired" },
|
|
{ 46, "Certificate Unknown" },
|
|
{ 47, "Illegal Parameter" },
|
|
{ 48, "Unknown CA" },
|
|
{ 49, "Access Denied" },
|
|
{ 50, "Decode Error" },
|
|
{ 51, "Decrypt Error" },
|
|
{ 60, "Export Restriction" },
|
|
{ 70, "Protocol Version" },
|
|
{ 71, "Insufficient Security" },
|
|
{ 80, "Internal Error" },
|
|
{ 86, "Inappropriate Fallback" },
|
|
{ 90, "User Canceled" },
|
|
{ 100, "No Renegotiation" },
|
|
{ 109, "Missing Extension" },
|
|
{ 110, "Unsupported Extension" },
|
|
{ 111, "Certificate Unobtainable" },
|
|
{ 112, "Unrecognized Name" },
|
|
{ 113, "Bad Certificate Status Response" },
|
|
{ 114, "Bad Certificate Hash Value" },
|
|
{ 115, "Unknown PSK Identity" },
|
|
{ 116, "Certificate Required" },
|
|
{ 120, "No application Protocol" },
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const value_string ssl_31_handshake_type[] = {
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_REQUEST, "Hello Request" },
|
|
{ SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO, "Client Hello" },
|
|
{ SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO, "Server Hello" },
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, "Hello Verify Request"},
|
|
{ SSL_HND_NEWSESSION_TICKET, "New Session Ticket" },
|
|
{ SSL_HND_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, "End of Early Data" },
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, "Hello Retry Request" },
|
|
{ SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, "Encrypted Extensions" },
|
|
{ SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE, "Certificate" },
|
|
{ SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG, "Server Key Exchange" },
|
|
{ SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST, "Certificate Request" },
|
|
{ SSL_HND_SVR_HELLO_DONE, "Server Hello Done" },
|
|
{ SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY, "Certificate Verify" },
|
|
{ SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG, "Client Key Exchange" },
|
|
{ SSL_HND_FINISHED, "Finished" },
|
|
{ SSL_HND_CERT_URL, "Client Certificate URL" },
|
|
{ SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS, "Certificate Status" },
|
|
{ SSL_HND_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA, "Supplemental Data" },
|
|
{ SSL_HND_KEY_UPDATE, "Key Update" },
|
|
{ SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTS, "Encrypted Extensions" },
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const value_string tls_heartbeat_type[] = {
|
|
{ 1, "Request" },
|
|
{ 2, "Response" },
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const value_string tls_heartbeat_mode[] = {
|
|
{ 1, "Peer allowed to send requests" },
|
|
{ 2, "Peer not allowed to send requests" },
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const value_string ssl_31_compression_method[] = {
|
|
{ 0, "null" },
|
|
{ 1, "DEFLATE" },
|
|
{ 64, "LZS" },
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
/* XXX - would be used if we dissected a Signature, as would be
|
|
seen in a server key exchange or certificate verify message. */
|
|
const value_string ssl_31_key_exchange_algorithm[] = {
|
|
{ 0, "RSA" },
|
|
{ 1, "Diffie Hellman" },
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const value_string ssl_31_signature_algorithm[] = {
|
|
{ 0, "Anonymous" },
|
|
{ 1, "RSA" },
|
|
{ 2, "DSA" },
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
const value_string ssl_31_client_certificate_type[] = {
|
|
{ 1, "RSA Sign" },
|
|
{ 2, "DSS Sign" },
|
|
{ 3, "RSA Fixed DH" },
|
|
{ 4, "DSS Fixed DH" },
|
|
/* GOST certificate types */
|
|
/* Section 3.5 of draft-chudov-cryptopro-cptls-04 */
|
|
{ 21, "GOST R 34.10-94" },
|
|
{ 22, "GOST R 34.10-2001" },
|
|
/* END GOST certificate types */
|
|
{ 64, "ECDSA Sign" },
|
|
{ 65, "RSA Fixed ECDH" },
|
|
{ 66, "ECDSA Fixed ECDH" },
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
/* XXX - would be used if we dissected exchange keys, as would be
|
|
seen in a client key exchange message. */
|
|
const value_string ssl_31_public_value_encoding[] = {
|
|
{ 0, "Implicit" },
|
|
{ 1, "Explicit" },
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml */
|
|
/* Note: sorted by ascending value so value_string_ext fcns can do a binary search */
|
|
static const value_string ssl_31_ciphersuite[] = {
|
|
/* RFC 2246, RFC 4346, RFC 5246 */
|
|
{ 0x0000, "TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL" },
|
|
{ 0x0001, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5" },
|
|
{ 0x0002, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0003, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" },
|
|
{ 0x0004, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" },
|
|
{ 0x0005, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0006, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5" },
|
|
{ 0x0007, "TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0008, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0009, "TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x000a, "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x000b, "TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x000c, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x000d, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x000e, "TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x000f, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0010, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0011, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0012, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0013, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0014, "TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0015, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0016, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0017, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" },
|
|
{ 0x0018, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" },
|
|
{ 0x0019, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x001a, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x001b, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x001c, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x001d, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
#if 0 /* Because it clashes with KRB5, is never used any more, and is safe
|
|
to remove according to David Hopwood <david.hopwood@zetnet.co.uk>
|
|
of the ietf-tls list */
|
|
{ 0x001e, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 2712 */
|
|
{ 0x001E, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x001F, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0020, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0021, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0022, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_MD5" },
|
|
{ 0x0023, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_MD5" },
|
|
{ 0x0024, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" },
|
|
{ 0x0025, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_MD5" },
|
|
{ 0x0026, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0027, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0028, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0029, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_MD5" },
|
|
{ 0x002A, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5" },
|
|
{ 0x002B, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" },
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 4785 */
|
|
{ 0x002C, "TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x002D, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x002E, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 5246 */
|
|
{ 0x002F, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0030, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0031, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0032, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0033, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0034, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0035, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0036, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0037, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0038, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0039, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x003A, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x003B, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x003C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x003D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x003E, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x003F, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x0040, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 4132 */
|
|
{ 0x0041, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0042, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0043, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0044, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0045, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0046, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
/* 0x00,0x60-66 Reserved to avoid conflicts with widely deployed implementations */
|
|
/* --- ??? --- */
|
|
{ 0x0060, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5" },
|
|
{ 0x0061, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5" },
|
|
/* draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt */
|
|
{ 0x0062, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0063, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0064, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0065, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0066, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
|
|
/* --- ??? ---*/
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0067, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x0068, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x0069, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x006A, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x006B, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x006C, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x006D, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
|
|
/* draft-chudov-cryptopro-cptls-04.txt */
|
|
{ 0x0080, "TLS_GOSTR341094_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT" },
|
|
{ 0x0081, "TLS_GOSTR341001_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT" },
|
|
{ 0x0082, "TLS_GOSTR341094_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411" },
|
|
{ 0x0083, "TLS_GOSTR341001_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411" },
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 4132 */
|
|
{ 0x0084, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0085, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0086, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0087, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0088, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0089, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 4279 */
|
|
{ 0x008A, "TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x008B, "TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x008C, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x008D, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x008E, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x008F, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0090, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0091, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0092, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0093, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0094, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0095, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 4162 */
|
|
{ 0x0096, "TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0097, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0098, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x0099, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x009A, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x009B, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 5288 */
|
|
{ 0x009C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x009D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0x009E, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x009F, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0x00A0, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00A1, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0x00A2, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00A3, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0x00A4, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00A5, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0x00A6, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00A7, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 5487 */
|
|
{ 0x00A8, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00A9, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0x00AA, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00AB, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0x00AC, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00AD, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0x00AE, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00AF, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0x00B0, "TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00B1, "TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0x00B2, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00B3, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0x00B4, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00B5, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0x00B6, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00B7, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0x00B8, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00B9, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384" },
|
|
|
|
/* From RFC 5932 */
|
|
{ 0x00BA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00BB, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00BC, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00BD, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00BE, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00BF, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00C0, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00C1, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00C2, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00C3, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00C4, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x00C5, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
/* 0x00,0xC6-FE Unassigned */
|
|
/* From RFC 5746 */
|
|
{ 0x00FF, "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV" },
|
|
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13 */
|
|
{ 0x1301, "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x1302, "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0x1303, "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x1304, "TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0x1305, "TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256" },
|
|
/* From RFC 7507 */
|
|
{ 0x5600, "TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV" },
|
|
/* From RFC 4492 */
|
|
{ 0xc001, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xc002, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xc003, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xc004, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xc005, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xc006, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xc007, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xc008, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xc009, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xc00a, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xc00b, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xc00c, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xc00d, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xc00e, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xc00f, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xc010, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xc011, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xc012, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xc013, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xc014, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xc015, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xc016, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xc017, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xc018, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xc019, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 5054 */
|
|
{ 0xC01A, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xC01B, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xC01C, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xC01D, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xC01E, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xC01F, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xC020, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xC021, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xC022, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 5589 */
|
|
{ 0xC023, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC024, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC025, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC026, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC027, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC028, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC029, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC02A, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC02B, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC02C, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC02D, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC02E, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC02F, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC030, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC031, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC032, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 5489 */
|
|
{ 0xC033, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xC034, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xC035, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xC036, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xC037, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC038, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC039, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xC03A, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC03B, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384" },
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 6209 */
|
|
{ 0xC03C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC03D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC03E, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC03F, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC040, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC041, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC042, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC043, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC044, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC045, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC046, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC047, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC048, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC049, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC04A, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC04B, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC04C, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC04D, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC04E, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC04F, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC050, "TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC051, "TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC052, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC053, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC054, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC055, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC056, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC057, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC058, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC059, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC05A, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC05B, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC05C, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC05D, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC05E, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC05F, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC060, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC061, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC062, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC063, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC064, "TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC065, "TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC066, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC067, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC068, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC069, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC06A, "TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC06B, "TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC06C, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC06D, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC06E, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC06F, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC070, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC071, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 6367 */
|
|
{ 0xC072, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC073, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC074, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC075, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC076, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC077, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC078, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC079, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC07A, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC07B, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC07C, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC07D, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC07E, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC07F, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC080, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC081, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC082, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC083, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC084, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC085, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC086, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC087, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC088, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC089, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC08A, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC08B, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC08C, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC08D, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC08E, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC08F, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC090, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC091, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC092, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC093, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC094, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC095, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC096, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC097, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC098, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC099, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
{ 0xC09A, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xC09B, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 6655 */
|
|
{ 0xC09C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM" },
|
|
{ 0xC09D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM" },
|
|
{ 0xC09E, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM" },
|
|
{ 0xC09F, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM" },
|
|
{ 0xC0A0, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8" },
|
|
{ 0xC0A1, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8" },
|
|
{ 0xC0A2, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8" },
|
|
{ 0xC0A3, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8" },
|
|
{ 0xC0A4, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM" },
|
|
{ 0xC0A5, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM" },
|
|
{ 0xC0A6, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM" },
|
|
{ 0xC0A7, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM" },
|
|
{ 0xC0A8, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8" },
|
|
{ 0xC0A9, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8" },
|
|
{ 0xC0AA, "TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8" },
|
|
{ 0xC0AB, "TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8" },
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 7251 */
|
|
{ 0xC0AC, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM" },
|
|
{ 0xC0AD, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM" },
|
|
{ 0xC0AE, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8" },
|
|
{ 0xC0AF, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8" },
|
|
/*
|
|
0xC0,0xAB-FF Unassigned
|
|
0xC1-FD,* Unassigned
|
|
0xFE,0x00-FD Unassigned
|
|
0xFE,0xFE-FF Reserved to avoid conflicts with widely deployed implementations [Pasi_Eronen]
|
|
0xFF,0x00-FF Reserved for Private Use [RFC5246]
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* old numbers used in the beginning
|
|
* http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305 */
|
|
{ 0xCC13, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xCC14, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xCC15, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
|
|
|
|
/* http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305 */
|
|
{ 0xCCA8, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xCCA9, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xCCAA, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xCCAB, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xCCAC, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xCCAD, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
|
|
{ 0xCCAE, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
|
|
|
|
/* http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-josefsson-salsa20-tls */
|
|
{ 0xE410, "TLS_RSA_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
|
|
{ 0xE411, "TLS_RSA_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
|
|
{ 0xE412, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
|
|
{ 0xE413, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
|
|
{ 0xE414, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
|
|
{ 0xE415, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
|
|
{ 0xE416, "TLS_PSK_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
|
|
{ 0xE417, "TLS_PSK_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
|
|
{ 0xE418, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
|
|
{ 0xE419, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
|
|
{ 0xE41A, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
|
|
{ 0xE41B, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
|
|
{ 0xE41C, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
|
|
{ 0xE41D, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
|
|
{ 0xE41E, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
|
|
{ 0xE41F, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
|
|
|
|
/* these from http://www.mozilla.org/projects/
|
|
security/pki/nss/ssl/fips-ssl-ciphersuites.html */
|
|
{ 0xfefe, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"},
|
|
{ 0xfeff, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xffe0, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
{ 0xffe1, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"},
|
|
/* note that ciphersuites 0xff00 - 0xffff are private */
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
value_string_ext ssl_31_ciphersuite_ext = VALUE_STRING_EXT_INIT(ssl_31_ciphersuite);
|
|
|
|
|
|
const value_string pct_msg_types[] = {
|
|
{ PCT_MSG_CLIENT_HELLO, "Client Hello" },
|
|
{ PCT_MSG_SERVER_HELLO, "Server Hello" },
|
|
{ PCT_MSG_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, "Client Master Key" },
|
|
{ PCT_MSG_SERVER_VERIFY, "Server Verify" },
|
|
{ PCT_MSG_ERROR, "Error" },
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const value_string pct_cipher_type[] = {
|
|
{ PCT_CIPHER_DES, "DES" },
|
|
{ PCT_CIPHER_IDEA, "IDEA" },
|
|
{ PCT_CIPHER_RC2, "RC2" },
|
|
{ PCT_CIPHER_RC4, "RC4" },
|
|
{ PCT_CIPHER_DES_112, "DES 112 bit" },
|
|
{ PCT_CIPHER_DES_168, "DES 168 bit" },
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const value_string pct_hash_type[] = {
|
|
{ PCT_HASH_MD5, "MD5" },
|
|
{ PCT_HASH_MD5_TRUNC_64, "MD5_TRUNC_64"},
|
|
{ PCT_HASH_SHA, "SHA"},
|
|
{ PCT_HASH_SHA_TRUNC_80, "SHA_TRUNC_80"},
|
|
{ PCT_HASH_DES_DM, "DES_DM"},
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const value_string pct_cert_type[] = {
|
|
{ PCT_CERT_NONE, "None" },
|
|
{ PCT_CERT_X509, "X.509" },
|
|
{ PCT_CERT_PKCS7, "PKCS #7" },
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
const value_string pct_sig_type[] = {
|
|
{ PCT_SIG_NONE, "None" },
|
|
{ PCT_SIG_RSA_MD5, "MD5" },
|
|
{ PCT_SIG_RSA_SHA, "RSA SHA" },
|
|
{ PCT_SIG_DSA_SHA, "DSA SHA" },
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const value_string pct_exch_type[] = {
|
|
{ PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1, "RSA PKCS#1" },
|
|
{ PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_DES, "RSA PKCS#1 Token DES" },
|
|
{ PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_DES3, "RSA PKCS#1 Token 3DES" },
|
|
{ PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_RC2, "RSA PKCS#1 Token RC-2" },
|
|
{ PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_RC4, "RSA PKCS#1 Token RC-4" },
|
|
{ PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3, "DH PKCS#3" },
|
|
{ PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3_TOKEN_DES, "DH PKCS#3 Token DES" },
|
|
{ PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3_TOKEN_DES3, "DH PKCS#3 Token 3DES" },
|
|
{ PCT_EXCH_FORTEZZA_TOKEN, "Fortezza" },
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const value_string pct_error_code[] = {
|
|
{ PCT_ERR_BAD_CERTIFICATE, "PCT_ERR_BAD_CERTIFICATE" },
|
|
{ PCT_ERR_CLIENT_AUTH_FAILED, "PCT_ERR_CLIENT_AUTH_FAILE" },
|
|
{ PCT_ERR_ILLEGAL_MESSAGE, "PCT_ERR_ILLEGAL_MESSAGE" },
|
|
{ PCT_ERR_INTEGRITY_CHECK_FAILED, "PCT_ERR_INTEGRITY_CHECK_FAILED" },
|
|
{ PCT_ERR_SERVER_AUTH_FAILED, "PCT_ERR_SERVER_AUTH_FAILED" },
|
|
{ PCT_ERR_SPECS_MISMATCH, "PCT_ERR_SPECS_MISMATCH" },
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/* http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml#tls-extensiontype-values-1 */
|
|
const value_string tls_hello_extension_types[] = {
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SERVER_NAME, "server_name" }, /* RFC 6066 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, "max_fragment_length" },/* RFC 6066 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_URL, "client_certificate_url" }, /* RFC 6066 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_TRUSTED_CA_KEYS, "trusted_ca_keys" }, /* RFC 6066 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC, "truncated_hmac" }, /* RFC 6066 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST, "status_request" }, /* RFC 6066 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_USER_MAPPING, "user_mapping" }, /* RFC 4681 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CLIENT_AUTHZ, "client_authz" }, /* RFC 5878 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SERVER_AUTHZ, "server_authz" }, /* RFC 5878 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CERT_TYPE, "cert_type" }, /* RFC 6091 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, "supported_groups" }, /* RFC 4492, RFC 7919 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_EC_POINT_FORMATS, "ec_point_formats" }, /* RFC 4492 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SRP, "srp" }, /* RFC 5054 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS, "signature_algorithms" }, /* RFC 5246 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_USE_SRTP, "use_srtp" }, /* RFC 5764 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_HEARTBEAT, "heartbeat" }, /* RFC 6520 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_ALPN, "application_layer_protocol_negotiation" }, /* RFC 7301 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST_V2, "status_request_v2" }, /* RFC 6961 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SIGNED_CERTIFICATE_TIMESTAMP, "signed_certificate_timestamp" }, /* RFC 6962 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CLIENT_CERT_TYPE, "client_certificate_type" }, /* RFC 7250 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SERVER_CERT_TYPE, "server_certificate_type" }, /* RFC 7250 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_PADDING, "padding" }, /* RFC 7685 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC, "encrypt_then_mac" }, /* RFC 7366 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET, "extended_master_secret" }, /* RFC 7627 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_TOKEN_BINDING, "token_binding" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tokbind-negotiation */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CACHED_INFO, "cached_info" }, /* RFC 7924 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SESSION_TICKET_TLS, "SessionTicket TLS" }, /* RFC 4507 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_KEY_SHARE, "key_share" }, /* TLS 1.3 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY, "pre_shared_key" }, /* TLS 1.3 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_EARLY_DATA, "early_data" }, /* TLS 1.3 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, "supported_versions" }, /* TLS 1.3 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_COOKIE, "cookie" }, /* TLS 1.3 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES, "psk_key_exchange_modes" }, /* TLS 1.3 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITIES, "certificate_authorities" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-19#section-4.2.3.1 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_OID_FILTERS, "oid_filters" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-19#section-4.3.2.1 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_NPN, "next_protocol_negotiation"}, /* https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-agl-tls-nextprotoneg-03.html */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CHANNEL_ID_OLD, "channel_id_old" }, /* http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-balfanz-tls-channelid-00
|
|
https://twitter.com/ericlaw/status/274237352531083264 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CHANNEL_ID, "channel_id" }, /* http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-balfanz-tls-channelid-01
|
|
https://code.google.com/p/chromium/codesearch#chromium/src/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslt.h&l=209 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, "renegotiation_info" }, /* RFC 5746 */
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_DRAFT_VERSION_TLS13, "Draft version of TLS 1.3" }, /* for experimentation only https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg20853.html */
|
|
{ 0, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const value_string tls_hello_ext_server_name_type_vs[] = {
|
|
{ 0, "host_name" },
|
|
{ 0, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/* draft-ietf-tls-tls13-19 4.2.6 */
|
|
const value_string tls_hello_ext_psk_ke_mode[] = {
|
|
{ 0, "PSK-only key establishment (psk_ke)" },
|
|
{ 1, "PSK with (EC)DHE key establishment (psk_dhe_ke)" },
|
|
{ 0, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const value_string tls13_key_update_request[] = {
|
|
{ 0, "update_not_requested" },
|
|
{ 1, "update_requested" },
|
|
{ 0, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 5246 7.4.1.4.1 */
|
|
const value_string tls_hash_algorithm[] = {
|
|
{ 0, "None" },
|
|
{ 1, "MD5" },
|
|
{ 2, "SHA1" },
|
|
{ 3, "SHA224" },
|
|
{ 4, "SHA256" },
|
|
{ 5, "SHA384" },
|
|
{ 6, "SHA512" },
|
|
{ 0, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const value_string tls_signature_algorithm[] = {
|
|
{ 0, "Anonymous" },
|
|
{ 1, "RSA" },
|
|
{ 2, "DSA" },
|
|
{ 3, "ECDSA" },
|
|
{ 0, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 6091 3.1 */
|
|
const value_string tls_certificate_type[] = {
|
|
{ 0, "X.509" },
|
|
{ 1, "OpenPGP" },
|
|
{ SSL_HND_CERT_TYPE_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY, "Raw Public Key" }, /* RFC 7250 */
|
|
{ 0, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const value_string tls_cert_chain_type[] = {
|
|
{ SSL_HND_CERT_URL_TYPE_INDIVIDUAL_CERT, "Individual Certificates" },
|
|
{ SSL_HND_CERT_URL_TYPE_PKIPATH, "PKI Path" },
|
|
{ 0, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const value_string tls_cert_status_type[] = {
|
|
{ SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS_TYPE_OCSP, "OCSP" },
|
|
{ SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS_TYPE_OCSP_MULTI, "OCSP Multi" },
|
|
{ 0, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/* Generated by tools/make-tls-ct-logids.py
|
|
* Last-Modified Mon, 06 Mar 2017 15:27:22 GMT, 24 entries. */
|
|
static const bytes_string ct_logids[] = {
|
|
{ "\xa4\xb9\x09\x90\xb4\x18\x58\x14\x87\xbb\x13\xa2\xcc\x67\x70\x0a"
|
|
"\x3c\x35\x98\x04\xf9\x1b\xdf\xb8\xe3\x77\xcd\x0e\xc8\x0d\xdc\x10", 32,
|
|
"Google 'Pilot' log" },
|
|
{ "\x68\xf6\x98\xf8\x1f\x64\x82\xbe\x3a\x8c\xee\xb9\x28\x1d\x4c\xfc"
|
|
"\x71\x51\x5d\x67\x93\xd4\x44\xd1\x0a\x67\xac\xbb\x4f\x4f\xfb\xc4", 32,
|
|
"Google 'Aviator' log" },
|
|
{ "\x56\x14\x06\x9a\x2f\xd7\xc2\xec\xd3\xf5\xe1\xbd\x44\xb2\x3e\xc7"
|
|
"\x46\x76\xb9\xbc\x99\x11\x5c\xc0\xef\x94\x98\x55\xd6\x89\xd0\xdd", 32,
|
|
"DigiCert Log Server" },
|
|
{ "\xee\x4b\xbd\xb7\x75\xce\x60\xba\xe1\x42\x69\x1f\xab\xe1\x9e\x66"
|
|
"\xa3\x0f\x7e\x5f\xb0\x72\xd8\x83\x00\xc4\x7b\x89\x7a\xa8\xfd\xcb", 32,
|
|
"Google 'Rocketeer' log" },
|
|
{ "\xcd\xb5\x17\x9b\x7f\xc1\xc0\x46\xfe\xea\x31\x13\x6a\x3f\x8f\x00"
|
|
"\x2e\x61\x82\xfa\xf8\x89\x6f\xec\xc8\xb2\xf5\xb5\xab\x60\x49\x00", 32,
|
|
"Certly.IO log" },
|
|
{ "\x74\x61\xb4\xa0\x9c\xfb\x3d\x41\xd7\x51\x59\x57\x5b\x2e\x76\x49"
|
|
"\xa4\x45\xa8\xd2\x77\x09\xb0\xcc\x56\x4a\x64\x82\xb7\xeb\x41\xa3", 32,
|
|
"Izenpe log" },
|
|
{ "\xdd\xeb\x1d\x2b\x7a\x0d\x4f\xa6\x20\x8b\x81\xad\x81\x68\x70\x7e"
|
|
"\x2e\x8e\x9d\x01\xd5\x5c\x88\x8d\x3d\x11\xc4\xcd\xb6\xec\xbe\xcc", 32,
|
|
"Symantec log" },
|
|
{ "\xac\x3b\x9a\xed\x7f\xa9\x67\x47\x57\x15\x9e\x6d\x7d\x57\x56\x72"
|
|
"\xf9\xd9\x81\x00\x94\x1e\x9b\xde\xff\xec\xa1\x31\x3b\x75\x78\x2d", 32,
|
|
"Venafi log" },
|
|
{ "\x9e\x4f\xf7\x3d\xc3\xce\x22\x0b\x69\x21\x7c\x89\x9e\x46\x80\x76"
|
|
"\xab\xf8\xd7\x86\x36\xd5\xcc\xfc\x85\xa3\x1a\x75\x62\x8b\xa8\x8b", 32,
|
|
"WoSign log" },
|
|
{ "\x41\xb2\xdc\x2e\x89\xe6\x3c\xe4\xaf\x1b\xa7\xbb\x29\xbf\x68\xc6"
|
|
"\xde\xe6\xf9\xf1\xcc\x04\x7e\x30\xdf\xfa\xe3\xb3\xba\x25\x92\x63", 32,
|
|
"WoSign ctlog" },
|
|
{ "\xbc\x78\xe1\xdf\xc5\xf6\x3c\x68\x46\x49\x33\x4d\xa1\x0f\xa1\x5f"
|
|
"\x09\x79\x69\x20\x09\xc0\x81\xb4\xf3\xf6\x91\x7f\x3e\xd9\xb8\xa5", 32,
|
|
"Symantec VEGA log" },
|
|
{ "\xa5\x77\xac\x9c\xed\x75\x48\xdd\x8f\x02\x5b\x67\xa2\x41\x08\x9d"
|
|
"\xf8\x6e\x0f\x47\x6e\xc2\x03\xc2\xec\xbe\xdb\x18\x5f\x28\x26\x38", 32,
|
|
"CNNIC CT log" },
|
|
{ "\xc9\xcf\x89\x0a\x21\x10\x9c\x66\x6c\xc1\x7a\x3e\xd0\x65\xc9\x30"
|
|
"\xd0\xe0\x13\x5a\x9f\xeb\xa8\x5a\xf1\x42\x10\xb8\x07\x24\x21\xaa", 32,
|
|
"Wang Shengnan GDCA log" },
|
|
{ "\xa8\x99\xd8\x78\x0c\x92\x90\xaa\xf4\x62\xf3\x18\x80\xcc\xfb\xd5"
|
|
"\x24\x51\xe9\x70\xd0\xfb\xf5\x91\xef\x75\xb0\xd9\x9b\x64\x56\x81", 32,
|
|
"Google 'Submariner' log" },
|
|
{ "\x89\x41\x44\x9c\x70\x74\x2e\x06\xb9\xfc\x9c\xe7\xb1\x16\xba\x00"
|
|
"\x24\xaa\x36\xd5\x9a\xf4\x4f\x02\x04\x40\x4f\x00\xf7\xea\x85\x66", 32,
|
|
"Izenpe 2nd log" },
|
|
{ "\x34\xbb\x6a\xd6\xc3\xdf\x9c\x03\xee\xa8\xa4\x99\xff\x78\x91\x48"
|
|
"\x6c\x9d\x5e\x5c\xac\x92\xd0\x1f\x7b\xfd\x1b\xce\x19\xdb\x48\xef", 32,
|
|
"StartCom CT log" },
|
|
{ "\xbb\xd9\xdf\xbc\x1f\x8a\x71\xb5\x93\x94\x23\x97\xaa\x92\x7b\x47"
|
|
"\x38\x57\x95\x0a\xab\x52\xe8\x1a\x90\x96\x64\x36\x8e\x1e\xd1\x85", 32,
|
|
"Google 'Skydiver' log" },
|
|
{ "\x29\x3c\x51\x96\x54\xc8\x39\x65\xba\xaa\x50\xfc\x58\x07\xd4\xb7"
|
|
"\x6f\xbf\x58\x7a\x29\x72\xdc\xa4\xc3\x0c\xf4\xe5\x45\x47\xf4\x78", 32,
|
|
"Google 'Icarus' log" },
|
|
{ "\x92\x4a\x30\xf9\x09\x33\x6f\xf4\x35\xd6\x99\x3a\x10\xac\x75\xa2"
|
|
"\xc6\x41\x72\x8e\x7f\xc2\xd6\x59\xae\x61\x88\xff\xad\x40\xce\x01", 32,
|
|
"GDCA log" },
|
|
{ "\x1d\x02\x4b\x8e\xb1\x49\x8b\x34\x4d\xfd\x87\xea\x3e\xfc\x09\x96"
|
|
"\xf7\x50\x6f\x23\x5d\x1d\x49\x70\x61\xa4\x77\x3c\x43\x9c\x25\xfb", 32,
|
|
"Google 'Daedalus' log" },
|
|
{ "\xe0\x12\x76\x29\xe9\x04\x96\x56\x4e\x3d\x01\x47\x98\x44\x98\xaa"
|
|
"\x48\xf8\xad\xb1\x66\x00\xeb\x79\x02\xa1\xef\x99\x09\x90\x62\x73", 32,
|
|
"PuChuangSiDa log" },
|
|
{ "\x03\x01\x9d\xf3\xfd\x85\xa6\x9a\x8e\xbd\x1f\xac\xc6\xda\x9b\xa7"
|
|
"\x3e\x46\x97\x74\xfe\x77\xf5\x79\xfc\x5a\x08\xb8\x32\x8c\x1d\x6b", 32,
|
|
"Venafi Gen2 CT log" },
|
|
{ "\x15\x97\x04\x88\xd7\xb9\x97\xa0\x5b\xeb\x52\x51\x2a\xde\xe8\xd2"
|
|
"\xe8\xb4\xa3\x16\x52\x64\x12\x1a\x9f\xab\xfb\xd5\xf8\x5a\xd9\x3f", 32,
|
|
"Symantec SIRIUS log" },
|
|
{ "\x87\x75\xbf\xe7\x59\x7c\xf8\x8c\x43\x99\x5f\xbd\xf3\x6e\xff\x56"
|
|
"\x8d\x47\x56\x36\xff\x4a\xb5\x60\xc1\xb4\xea\xff\x5e\xa0\x83\x0f", 32,
|
|
"DigiCert CT2 log" },
|
|
{ NULL, 0, NULL }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/* string_string is inappropriate as it compares strings while
|
|
* "byte strings MUST NOT be truncated" (RFC 7301) */
|
|
typedef struct ssl_alpn_protocol {
|
|
const char *proto_name;
|
|
gboolean match_exact;
|
|
const char *dissector_name;
|
|
} ssl_alpn_protocol_t;
|
|
/* http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml#alpn-protocol-ids */
|
|
static const ssl_alpn_protocol_t ssl_alpn_protocols[] = {
|
|
{ "http/1.1", TRUE, "http" },
|
|
/* SPDY moves so fast, just 1, 2 and 3 are registered with IANA but there
|
|
* already exists 3.1 as of this writing... match the prefix. */
|
|
{ "spdy/", FALSE, "spdy" },
|
|
{ "stun.turn", TRUE, "turnchannel" },
|
|
{ "stun.nat-discovery", TRUE, "stun" },
|
|
/* draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-16 */
|
|
{ "h2-", FALSE, "http2" }, /* draft versions */
|
|
{ "h2", TRUE, "http2" }, /* final version */
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/* Lookup tables }}} */
|
|
|
|
/* we keep this internal to packet-ssl-utils, as there should be
|
|
no need to access it any other way.
|
|
|
|
This also allows us to hide the dependency on zlib.
|
|
*/
|
|
struct _SslDecompress {
|
|
gint compression;
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB
|
|
z_stream istream;
|
|
#endif
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/* To assist in parsing client/server key exchange messages
|
|
0 indicates unknown */
|
|
gint ssl_get_keyex_alg(gint cipher)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Map Cipher suite number to Key Exchange algorithm {{{ */
|
|
switch(cipher) {
|
|
case 0x0017:
|
|
case 0x0018:
|
|
case 0x0019:
|
|
case 0x001a:
|
|
case 0x001b:
|
|
case 0x0034:
|
|
case 0x003a:
|
|
case 0x0046:
|
|
case 0x006c:
|
|
case 0x006d:
|
|
case 0x0089:
|
|
case 0x009b:
|
|
case 0x00a6:
|
|
case 0x00a7:
|
|
case 0x00bf:
|
|
case 0x00c5:
|
|
case 0xc084:
|
|
case 0xc085:
|
|
return KEX_DH_ANON;
|
|
case 0x000b:
|
|
case 0x000c:
|
|
case 0x000d:
|
|
case 0x0030:
|
|
case 0x0036:
|
|
case 0x003e:
|
|
case 0x0042:
|
|
case 0x0068:
|
|
case 0x0085:
|
|
case 0x0097:
|
|
case 0x00a4:
|
|
case 0x00a5:
|
|
case 0x00bb:
|
|
case 0x00c1:
|
|
case 0xc082:
|
|
case 0xc083:
|
|
return KEX_DH_DSS;
|
|
case 0x000e:
|
|
case 0x000f:
|
|
case 0x0010:
|
|
case 0x0031:
|
|
case 0x0037:
|
|
case 0x003f:
|
|
case 0x0043:
|
|
case 0x0069:
|
|
case 0x0086:
|
|
case 0x0098:
|
|
case 0x00a0:
|
|
case 0x00a1:
|
|
case 0x00bc:
|
|
case 0x00c2:
|
|
case 0xc07e:
|
|
case 0xc07f:
|
|
return KEX_DH_RSA;
|
|
case 0x0011:
|
|
case 0x0012:
|
|
case 0x0013:
|
|
case 0x0032:
|
|
case 0x0038:
|
|
case 0x0040:
|
|
case 0x0044:
|
|
case 0x0063:
|
|
case 0x0065:
|
|
case 0x0066:
|
|
case 0x006a:
|
|
case 0x0087:
|
|
case 0x0099:
|
|
case 0x00a2:
|
|
case 0x00a3:
|
|
case 0x00bd:
|
|
case 0x00c3:
|
|
case 0xc080:
|
|
case 0xc081:
|
|
return KEX_DHE_DSS;
|
|
case 0x002d:
|
|
case 0x008e:
|
|
case 0x008f:
|
|
case 0x0090:
|
|
case 0x0091:
|
|
case 0x00aa:
|
|
case 0x00ab:
|
|
case 0x00b2:
|
|
case 0x00b3:
|
|
case 0x00b4:
|
|
case 0x00b5:
|
|
case 0xc090:
|
|
case 0xc091:
|
|
case 0xc096:
|
|
case 0xc097:
|
|
case 0xc0a6:
|
|
case 0xc0a7:
|
|
case 0xc0aa:
|
|
case 0xc0ab:
|
|
case 0xe41c:
|
|
case 0xe41d:
|
|
return KEX_DHE_PSK;
|
|
case 0x0014:
|
|
case 0x0015:
|
|
case 0x0016:
|
|
case 0x0033:
|
|
case 0x0039:
|
|
case 0x0045:
|
|
case 0x0067:
|
|
case 0x006b:
|
|
case 0x0088:
|
|
case 0x009a:
|
|
case 0x009e:
|
|
case 0x009f:
|
|
case 0x00be:
|
|
case 0x00c4:
|
|
case 0xc07c:
|
|
case 0xc07d:
|
|
case 0xc09e:
|
|
case 0xc09f:
|
|
case 0xc0a2:
|
|
case 0xc0a3:
|
|
case 0xe41e:
|
|
case 0xe41f:
|
|
return KEX_DHE_RSA;
|
|
case 0xc015:
|
|
case 0xc016:
|
|
case 0xc017:
|
|
case 0xc018:
|
|
case 0xc019:
|
|
return KEX_ECDH_ANON;
|
|
case 0xc001:
|
|
case 0xc002:
|
|
case 0xc003:
|
|
case 0xc004:
|
|
case 0xc005:
|
|
case 0xc025:
|
|
case 0xc026:
|
|
case 0xc02d:
|
|
case 0xc02e:
|
|
case 0xc074:
|
|
case 0xc075:
|
|
case 0xc088:
|
|
case 0xc089:
|
|
return KEX_ECDH_ECDSA;
|
|
case 0xc00b:
|
|
case 0xc00c:
|
|
case 0xc00d:
|
|
case 0xc00e:
|
|
case 0xc00f:
|
|
case 0xc029:
|
|
case 0xc02a:
|
|
case 0xc031:
|
|
case 0xc032:
|
|
case 0xc078:
|
|
case 0xc079:
|
|
case 0xc08c:
|
|
case 0xc08d:
|
|
return KEX_ECDH_RSA;
|
|
case 0xc006:
|
|
case 0xc007:
|
|
case 0xc008:
|
|
case 0xc009:
|
|
case 0xc00a:
|
|
case 0xc023:
|
|
case 0xc024:
|
|
case 0xc02b:
|
|
case 0xc02c:
|
|
case 0xc072:
|
|
case 0xc073:
|
|
case 0xc086:
|
|
case 0xc087:
|
|
case 0xc0ac:
|
|
case 0xc0ad:
|
|
case 0xc0ae:
|
|
case 0xc0af:
|
|
case 0xe414:
|
|
case 0xe415:
|
|
return KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA;
|
|
case 0xc033:
|
|
case 0xc034:
|
|
case 0xc035:
|
|
case 0xc036:
|
|
case 0xc037:
|
|
case 0xc038:
|
|
case 0xc039:
|
|
case 0xc03a:
|
|
case 0xc03b:
|
|
case 0xc09a:
|
|
case 0xc09b:
|
|
case 0xe418:
|
|
case 0xe419:
|
|
return KEX_ECDHE_PSK;
|
|
case 0xc010:
|
|
case 0xc011:
|
|
case 0xc012:
|
|
case 0xc013:
|
|
case 0xc014:
|
|
case 0xc027:
|
|
case 0xc028:
|
|
case 0xc02f:
|
|
case 0xc030:
|
|
case 0xc076:
|
|
case 0xc077:
|
|
case 0xc08a:
|
|
case 0xc08b:
|
|
case 0xe412:
|
|
case 0xe413:
|
|
return KEX_ECDHE_RSA;
|
|
case 0x001e:
|
|
case 0x001f:
|
|
case 0x0020:
|
|
case 0x0021:
|
|
case 0x0022:
|
|
case 0x0023:
|
|
case 0x0024:
|
|
case 0x0025:
|
|
case 0x0026:
|
|
case 0x0027:
|
|
case 0x0028:
|
|
case 0x0029:
|
|
case 0x002a:
|
|
case 0x002b:
|
|
return KEX_KRB5;
|
|
case 0x002c:
|
|
case 0x008a:
|
|
case 0x008b:
|
|
case 0x008c:
|
|
case 0x008d:
|
|
case 0x00a8:
|
|
case 0x00a9:
|
|
case 0x00ae:
|
|
case 0x00af:
|
|
case 0x00b0:
|
|
case 0x00b1:
|
|
case 0xc064:
|
|
case 0xc065:
|
|
case 0xc08e:
|
|
case 0xc08f:
|
|
case 0xc094:
|
|
case 0xc095:
|
|
case 0xc0a4:
|
|
case 0xc0a5:
|
|
case 0xc0a8:
|
|
case 0xc0a9:
|
|
case 0xe416:
|
|
case 0xe417:
|
|
return KEX_PSK;
|
|
case 0x0001:
|
|
case 0x0002:
|
|
case 0x0003:
|
|
case 0x0004:
|
|
case 0x0005:
|
|
case 0x0006:
|
|
case 0x0007:
|
|
case 0x0008:
|
|
case 0x0009:
|
|
case 0x000a:
|
|
case 0x002f:
|
|
case 0x0035:
|
|
case 0x003b:
|
|
case 0x003c:
|
|
case 0x003d:
|
|
case 0x0041:
|
|
case 0x0060:
|
|
case 0x0061:
|
|
case 0x0062:
|
|
case 0x0064:
|
|
case 0x0084:
|
|
case 0x0096:
|
|
case 0x009c:
|
|
case 0x009d:
|
|
case 0x00ba:
|
|
case 0x00c0:
|
|
case 0xc07a:
|
|
case 0xc07b:
|
|
case 0xc09c:
|
|
case 0xc09d:
|
|
case 0xc0a0:
|
|
case 0xc0a1:
|
|
case 0xe410:
|
|
case 0xe411:
|
|
case 0xfefe:
|
|
case 0xfeff:
|
|
case 0xffe0:
|
|
case 0xffe1:
|
|
return KEX_RSA;
|
|
case 0x002e:
|
|
case 0x0092:
|
|
case 0x0093:
|
|
case 0x0094:
|
|
case 0x0095:
|
|
case 0x00ac:
|
|
case 0x00ad:
|
|
case 0x00b6:
|
|
case 0x00b7:
|
|
case 0x00b8:
|
|
case 0x00b9:
|
|
case 0xc092:
|
|
case 0xc093:
|
|
case 0xc098:
|
|
case 0xc099:
|
|
case 0xe41a:
|
|
case 0xe41b:
|
|
return KEX_RSA_PSK;
|
|
case 0xc01a:
|
|
case 0xc01d:
|
|
case 0xc020:
|
|
return KEX_SRP_SHA;
|
|
case 0xc01c:
|
|
case 0xc01f:
|
|
case 0xc022:
|
|
return KEX_SRP_SHA_DSS;
|
|
case 0xc01b:
|
|
case 0xc01e:
|
|
case 0xc021:
|
|
return KEX_SRP_SHA_RSA;
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* }}} */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* StringInfo structure (len + data) functions {{{ */
|
|
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_data_alloc(StringInfo* str, size_t len)
|
|
{
|
|
str->data = (guchar *)g_malloc(len);
|
|
/* the allocator can return a null pointer for a size equal to 0,
|
|
* and that must be allowed */
|
|
if (len > 0 && !str->data)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
str->data_len = (guint) len;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_data_set(StringInfo* str, const guchar* data, guint len)
|
|
{
|
|
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(data);
|
|
memcpy(str->data, data, len);
|
|
str->data_len = len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_data_realloc(StringInfo* str, guint len)
|
|
{
|
|
str->data = (guchar *)g_realloc(str->data, len);
|
|
if (!str->data)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
str->data_len = len;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static StringInfo *
|
|
ssl_data_clone(StringInfo *str)
|
|
{
|
|
StringInfo *cloned_str;
|
|
cloned_str = (StringInfo *) wmem_alloc0(wmem_file_scope(),
|
|
sizeof(StringInfo) + str->data_len);
|
|
cloned_str->data = (guchar *) (cloned_str + 1);
|
|
ssl_data_set(cloned_str, str->data, str->data_len);
|
|
return cloned_str;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_data_copy(StringInfo* dst, StringInfo* src)
|
|
{
|
|
if (dst->data_len < src->data_len) {
|
|
if (ssl_data_realloc(dst, src->data_len))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
memcpy(dst->data, src->data, src->data_len);
|
|
dst->data_len = src->data_len;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* from_hex converts |hex_len| bytes of hex data from |in| and sets |*out| to
|
|
* the result. |out->data| will be allocated using wmem_file_scope. Returns TRUE on
|
|
* success. */
|
|
static gboolean from_hex(StringInfo* out, const char* in, gsize hex_len) {
|
|
gsize i;
|
|
|
|
if (hex_len & 1)
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
|
|
out->data = (guchar *)wmem_alloc(wmem_file_scope(), hex_len / 2);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < hex_len / 2; i++) {
|
|
int a = ws_xton(in[i*2]);
|
|
int b = ws_xton(in[i*2 + 1]);
|
|
if (a == -1 || b == -1)
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
out->data[i] = a << 4 | b;
|
|
}
|
|
out->data_len = (guint)hex_len / 2;
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
/* StringInfo structure (len + data) functions }}} */
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* libgcrypt wrappers for HMAC/message digest operations {{{ */
|
|
/* hmac abstraction layer */
|
|
#define SSL_HMAC gcry_md_hd_t
|
|
|
|
static inline gint
|
|
ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC* md, const void * key, gint len, gint algo)
|
|
{
|
|
gcry_error_t err;
|
|
const char *err_str, *err_src;
|
|
|
|
err = gcry_md_open(md,algo, GCRY_MD_FLAG_HMAC);
|
|
if (err != 0) {
|
|
err_str = gcry_strerror(err);
|
|
err_src = gcry_strsource(err);
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_hmac_init(): gcry_md_open failed %s/%s", err_str, err_src);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
gcry_md_setkey (*(md), key, len);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
static inline void
|
|
ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC* md, const void* data, gint len)
|
|
{
|
|
gcry_md_write(*(md), data, len);
|
|
}
|
|
static inline void
|
|
ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC* md, guchar* data, guint* datalen)
|
|
{
|
|
gint algo;
|
|
guint len;
|
|
|
|
algo = gcry_md_get_algo (*(md));
|
|
len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(algo);
|
|
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(len <= *datalen);
|
|
memcpy(data, gcry_md_read(*(md), algo), len);
|
|
*datalen = len;
|
|
}
|
|
static inline void
|
|
ssl_hmac_cleanup(SSL_HMAC* md)
|
|
{
|
|
gcry_md_close(*(md));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* message digest abstraction layer*/
|
|
#define SSL_MD gcry_md_hd_t
|
|
|
|
static inline gint
|
|
ssl_md_init(SSL_MD* md, gint algo)
|
|
{
|
|
gcry_error_t err;
|
|
const char *err_str, *err_src;
|
|
err = gcry_md_open(md,algo, 0);
|
|
if (err != 0) {
|
|
err_str = gcry_strerror(err);
|
|
err_src = gcry_strsource(err);
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_md_init(): gcry_md_open failed %s/%s", err_str, err_src);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
static inline void
|
|
ssl_md_update(SSL_MD* md, guchar* data, gint len)
|
|
{
|
|
gcry_md_write(*(md), data, len);
|
|
}
|
|
static inline void
|
|
ssl_md_final(SSL_MD* md, guchar* data, guint* datalen)
|
|
{
|
|
gint algo;
|
|
gint len;
|
|
algo = gcry_md_get_algo (*(md));
|
|
len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo);
|
|
memcpy(data, gcry_md_read(*(md), algo), len);
|
|
*datalen = len;
|
|
}
|
|
static inline void
|
|
ssl_md_cleanup(SSL_MD* md)
|
|
{
|
|
gcry_md_close(*(md));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* md5 /sha abstraction layer */
|
|
#define SSL_SHA_CTX gcry_md_hd_t
|
|
#define SSL_MD5_CTX gcry_md_hd_t
|
|
|
|
static inline void
|
|
ssl_sha_init(SSL_SHA_CTX* md)
|
|
{
|
|
gcry_md_open(md,GCRY_MD_SHA1, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
static inline void
|
|
ssl_sha_update(SSL_SHA_CTX* md, guchar* data, gint len)
|
|
{
|
|
gcry_md_write(*(md), data, len);
|
|
}
|
|
static inline void
|
|
ssl_sha_final(guchar* buf, SSL_SHA_CTX* md)
|
|
{
|
|
memcpy(buf, gcry_md_read(*(md), GCRY_MD_SHA1),
|
|
gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(GCRY_MD_SHA1));
|
|
}
|
|
static inline void
|
|
ssl_sha_cleanup(SSL_SHA_CTX* md)
|
|
{
|
|
gcry_md_close(*(md));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline gint
|
|
ssl_md5_init(SSL_MD5_CTX* md)
|
|
{
|
|
return gcry_md_open(md,GCRY_MD_MD5, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
static inline void
|
|
ssl_md5_update(SSL_MD5_CTX* md, guchar* data, gint len)
|
|
{
|
|
gcry_md_write(*(md), data, len);
|
|
}
|
|
static inline void
|
|
ssl_md5_final(guchar* buf, SSL_MD5_CTX* md)
|
|
{
|
|
memcpy(buf, gcry_md_read(*(md), GCRY_MD_MD5),
|
|
gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(GCRY_MD_MD5));
|
|
}
|
|
static inline void
|
|
ssl_md5_cleanup(SSL_MD5_CTX* md)
|
|
{
|
|
gcry_md_close(*(md));
|
|
}
|
|
/* libgcrypt wrappers for HMAC/message digest operations }}} */
|
|
|
|
/* libgcrypt wrappers for Cipher state manipulation {{{ */
|
|
gint
|
|
ssl_cipher_setiv(SSL_CIPHER_CTX *cipher, guchar* iv, gint iv_len)
|
|
{
|
|
gint ret;
|
|
#if 0
|
|
guchar *ivp;
|
|
gint i;
|
|
gcry_cipher_hd_t c;
|
|
c=(gcry_cipher_hd_t)*cipher;
|
|
#endif
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("--------------------------------------------------------------------");
|
|
#if 0
|
|
for(ivp=c->iv,i=0; i < iv_len; i++ )
|
|
{
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%d ",ivp[i]);
|
|
i++;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("--------------------------------------------------------------------");
|
|
ret = gcry_cipher_setiv(*(cipher), iv, iv_len);
|
|
#if 0
|
|
for(ivp=c->iv,i=0; i < iv_len; i++ )
|
|
{
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%d ",ivp[i]);
|
|
i++;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("--------------------------------------------------------------------");
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
/* stream cipher abstraction layer*/
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_cipher_init(gcry_cipher_hd_t *cipher, gint algo, guchar* sk,
|
|
guchar* iv, gint mode)
|
|
{
|
|
gint gcry_modes[] = {
|
|
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM,
|
|
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CBC,
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD
|
|
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_GCM,
|
|
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CCM,
|
|
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CCM
|
|
#else
|
|
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CTR,
|
|
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CTR,
|
|
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CTR,
|
|
#endif
|
|
};
|
|
gint err;
|
|
if (algo == -1) {
|
|
/* NULL mode */
|
|
*(cipher) = (gcry_cipher_hd_t)-1;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
err = gcry_cipher_open(cipher, algo, gcry_modes[mode], 0);
|
|
if (err !=0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
err = gcry_cipher_setkey(*(cipher), sk, gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen (algo));
|
|
if (err != 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
/* AEAD cipher suites will set the nonce later. */
|
|
if (mode == MODE_CBC) {
|
|
err = gcry_cipher_setiv(*(cipher), iv, gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen(algo));
|
|
if (err != 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
static inline gint
|
|
ssl_cipher_decrypt(gcry_cipher_hd_t *cipher, guchar * out, gint outl,
|
|
const guchar * in, gint inl)
|
|
{
|
|
if ((*cipher) == (gcry_cipher_hd_t)-1)
|
|
{
|
|
if (in && inl)
|
|
memcpy(out, in, outl < inl ? outl : inl);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return gcry_cipher_decrypt ( *(cipher), out, outl, in, inl);
|
|
}
|
|
static inline gint
|
|
ssl_get_digest_by_name(const gchar*name)
|
|
{
|
|
return gcry_md_map_name(name);
|
|
}
|
|
static inline gint
|
|
ssl_get_cipher_by_name(const gchar* name)
|
|
{
|
|
return gcry_cipher_map_name(name);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline void
|
|
ssl_cipher_cleanup(gcry_cipher_hd_t *cipher)
|
|
{
|
|
if ((*cipher) != (gcry_cipher_hd_t)-1)
|
|
gcry_cipher_close(*cipher);
|
|
*cipher = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
/* libgcrypt wrappers for Cipher state manipulation }}} */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS
|
|
/* libgcrypt wrapper to decrypt using a RSA private key {{{ */
|
|
/* decrypt data with private key. Store decrypted data directly into input
|
|
* buffer */
|
|
static int
|
|
ssl_private_decrypt(const guint len, guchar* data, gcry_sexp_t pk)
|
|
{
|
|
gint rc = 0;
|
|
size_t decr_len = 0, i = 0;
|
|
gcry_sexp_t s_data = NULL, s_plain = NULL;
|
|
gcry_mpi_t encr_mpi = NULL, text = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* create mpi representation of encrypted data */
|
|
rc = gcry_mpi_scan(&encr_mpi, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, data, len, NULL);
|
|
if (rc != 0 ) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("pcry_private_decrypt: can't convert data to mpi (size %d):%s\n",
|
|
len, gcry_strerror(rc));
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* put the data into a simple list */
|
|
rc = gcry_sexp_build(&s_data, NULL, "(enc-val(rsa(a%m)))", encr_mpi);
|
|
if (rc != 0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("pcry_private_decrypt: can't build encr_sexp:%s\n",
|
|
gcry_strerror(rc));
|
|
decr_len = 0;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* pass it to libgcrypt */
|
|
rc = gcry_pk_decrypt(&s_plain, s_data, pk);
|
|
if (rc != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("pcry_private_decrypt: can't decrypt key:%s\n",
|
|
gcry_strerror(rc));
|
|
decr_len = 0;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* convert plain text sexp to mpi format */
|
|
text = gcry_sexp_nth_mpi(s_plain, 0, 0);
|
|
if (! text) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("pcry_private_decrypt: can't convert sexp to mpi\n");
|
|
decr_len = 0;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* compute size requested for plaintext buffer */
|
|
rc = gcry_mpi_print(GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, NULL, 0, &decr_len, text);
|
|
if (rc != 0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("pcry_private_decrypt: can't compute decr size:%s\n",
|
|
gcry_strerror(rc));
|
|
decr_len = 0;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* sanity check on out buffer */
|
|
if (decr_len > len) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("pcry_private_decrypt: decrypted data is too long ?!? (%" G_GSIZE_MODIFIER "u max %d)\n", decr_len, len);
|
|
decr_len = 0;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* write plain text to newly allocated buffer */
|
|
rc = gcry_mpi_print(GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, data, len, &decr_len, text);
|
|
if (rc != 0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("pcry_private_decrypt: can't print decr data to mpi (size %" G_GSIZE_MODIFIER "u):%s\n", decr_len, gcry_strerror(rc));
|
|
decr_len = 0;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl_print_data("decrypted_unstrip_pre_master", data, decr_len);
|
|
|
|
/* strip the padding*/
|
|
rc = 0;
|
|
for (i = 1; i < decr_len; i++) {
|
|
if (data[i] == 0) {
|
|
rc = (gint) i+1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("pcry_private_decrypt: stripping %d bytes, decr_len %" G_GSIZE_MODIFIER "u\n", rc, decr_len);
|
|
decr_len -= rc;
|
|
memmove(data, data+rc, decr_len);
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
gcry_sexp_release(s_data);
|
|
gcry_sexp_release(s_plain);
|
|
gcry_mpi_release(encr_mpi);
|
|
gcry_mpi_release(text);
|
|
return (int) decr_len;
|
|
} /* }}} */
|
|
#endif /* HAVE_LIBGNUTLS */
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Digests, Ciphers and Cipher Suites registry {{{ */
|
|
static const SslDigestAlgo digests[]={
|
|
{"MD5", 16},
|
|
{"SHA1", 20},
|
|
{"SHA256", 32},
|
|
{"SHA384", 48},
|
|
{"Not Applicable", 0},
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#define DIGEST_MAX_SIZE 48
|
|
|
|
/* get index digest index */
|
|
static const SslDigestAlgo *
|
|
ssl_cipher_suite_dig(const SslCipherSuite *cs) {
|
|
return &digests[cs->dig - DIG_MD5];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const gchar *ciphers[]={
|
|
"DES",
|
|
"3DES",
|
|
"ARCFOUR", /* libgcrypt does not support rc4, but this should be 100% compatible*/
|
|
"RFC2268_128", /* libgcrypt name for RC2 with a 128-bit key */
|
|
"IDEA",
|
|
"AES",
|
|
"AES256",
|
|
"CAMELLIA128",
|
|
"CAMELLIA256",
|
|
"SEED",
|
|
"*UNKNOWN*"
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const SslCipherSuite cipher_suites[]={
|
|
{0x0001,KEX_RSA, ENC_NULL, DIG_MD5, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 */
|
|
{0x0002,KEX_RSA, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA */
|
|
{0x0003,KEX_RSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_MD5, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 */
|
|
{0x0004,KEX_RSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_MD5, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 */
|
|
{0x0005,KEX_RSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
|
|
{0x0006,KEX_RSA, ENC_RC2, DIG_MD5, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 */
|
|
{0x0007,KEX_RSA, ENC_IDEA, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0008,KEX_RSA, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0009,KEX_RSA, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x000A,KEX_RSA, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x000B,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x000C,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x000D,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x000E,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x000F,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0010,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0011,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0012,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0013,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0014,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0015,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0016,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0017,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_RC4, DIG_MD5, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 */
|
|
{0x0018,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_RC4, DIG_MD5, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 */
|
|
{0x0019,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x001A,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x001B,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x002C,KEX_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA */
|
|
{0x002D,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA */
|
|
{0x002E,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA */
|
|
{0x002F,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0030,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0031,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0032,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0033,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0034,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0035,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0036,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0037,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0038,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0039,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x003A,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x003B,KEX_RSA, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA256, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x003C,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x003D,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x003E,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x003F,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x0040,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x0041,KEX_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0042,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0043,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0044,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0045,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0046,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0060,KEX_RSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_MD5, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5 */
|
|
{0x0061,KEX_RSA, ENC_RC2, DIG_MD5, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5 */
|
|
{0x0062,KEX_RSA, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0063,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0064,KEX_RSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA */
|
|
{0x0065,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA */
|
|
{0x0066,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
|
|
{0x0067,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x0068,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x0069,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x006A,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x006B,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x006C,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x006D,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x0084,KEX_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0085,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0086,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0087,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0088,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0089,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x008A,KEX_PSK, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
|
|
{0x008B,KEX_PSK, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x008C,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x008D,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x008E,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
|
|
{0x008F,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0090,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0091,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0092,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
|
|
{0x0093,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0094,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0095,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0096,KEX_RSA, ENC_SEED, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0097,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_SEED, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0098,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_SEED, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x0099,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_SEED, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x009A,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_SEED, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x009B,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_SEED, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0x009C,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x009D,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
|
|
{0x009E,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x009F,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
|
|
{0x00A0,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x00A1,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
|
|
{0x00A2,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x00A3,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
|
|
{0x00A4,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x00A5,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
|
|
{0x00A6,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x00A7,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
|
|
{0x00A8,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x00A9,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
|
|
{0x00AA,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x00AB,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
|
|
{0x00AC,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x00AD,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
|
|
{0x00AE,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x00AF,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 */
|
|
{0x00B0,KEX_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA256, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x00B1,KEX_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA384, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 */
|
|
{0x00B2,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x00B3,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 */
|
|
{0x00B4,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA256, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x00B5,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA384, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 */
|
|
{0x00B6,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x00B7,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 */
|
|
{0x00B8,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA256, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x00B9,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA384, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 */
|
|
{0x00BA,KEX_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x00BB,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x00BC,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x00BD,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x00BE,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x00BF,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x00C0,KEX_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x00C1,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x00C2,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x00C3,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x00C4,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x00C5,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
|
|
/* NOTE: TLS 1.3 cipher suites are incompatible with TLS 1.2. */
|
|
{0x1301,KEX_TLS13, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x1302,KEX_TLS13, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
|
|
/* TODO TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x1304,KEX_TLS13, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 */
|
|
{0x1305,KEX_TLS13, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 */
|
|
|
|
{0xC001,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA */
|
|
{0xC002,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
|
|
{0xC003,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0xC004,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0xC005,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0xC006,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA */
|
|
{0xC007,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
|
|
{0xC008,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0xC009,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0xC00A,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0xC00B,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA */
|
|
{0xC00C,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
|
|
{0xC00D,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0xC00E,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0xC00F,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0xC010,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA */
|
|
{0xC011,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
|
|
{0xC012,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0xC013,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0xC014,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0xC015,KEX_ECDH_ANON, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA */
|
|
{0xC016,KEX_ECDH_ANON, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
|
|
{0xC017,KEX_ECDH_ANON, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0xC018,KEX_ECDH_ANON, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0xC019,KEX_ECDH_ANON, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0xC023,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0xC024,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 */
|
|
{0xC025,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0xC026,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 */
|
|
{0xC027,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0xC028,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 */
|
|
{0xC029,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0xC02A,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 */
|
|
{0xC02B,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
|
|
{0xC02C,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
|
|
{0xC02D,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
|
|
{0xC02E,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
|
|
{0xC02F,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
|
|
{0xC030,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
|
|
{0xC031,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
|
|
{0xC032,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
|
|
{0xC033,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
|
|
{0xC034,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0xC035,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0xC036,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
|
|
{0xC037,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0xC038,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 */
|
|
{0xC039,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA */
|
|
{0xC03A,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA256, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 */
|
|
{0xC03B,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA384, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 */
|
|
{0xC072,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0xC073,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */
|
|
{0xC074,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0xC075,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */
|
|
{0xC076,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0xC077,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */
|
|
{0xC078,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0xC079,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */
|
|
{0xC07A,KEX_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
|
|
{0xC07B,KEX_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
|
|
{0xC07C,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
|
|
{0xC07D,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
|
|
{0xC07E,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
|
|
{0xC07F,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
|
|
{0xC080,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
|
|
{0xC081,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
|
|
{0xC082,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
|
|
{0xC083,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
|
|
{0xC084,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
|
|
{0xC085,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
|
|
{0xC086,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
|
|
{0xC087,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
|
|
{0xC088,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
|
|
{0xC089,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
|
|
{0xC08A,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
|
|
{0xC08B,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
|
|
{0xC08C,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
|
|
{0xC08D,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
|
|
{0xC08E,KEX_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
|
|
{0xC08F,KEX_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
|
|
{0xC090,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
|
|
{0xC091,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
|
|
{0xC092,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
|
|
{0xC093,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
|
|
{0xC094,KEX_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0xC095,KEX_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */
|
|
{0xC096,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0xC097,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */
|
|
{0xC098,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0xC099,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */
|
|
{0xC09A,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
|
|
{0xC09B,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */
|
|
{0xC09C,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM */
|
|
{0xC09D,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM */
|
|
{0xC09E,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM */
|
|
{0xC09F,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM */
|
|
{0xC0A0,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 */
|
|
{0xC0A1,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 */
|
|
{0xC0A2,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 */
|
|
{0xC0A3,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 */
|
|
{0xC0A4,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM */
|
|
{0xC0A5,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM */
|
|
{0xC0A6,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM */
|
|
{0xC0A7,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM */
|
|
{0xC0A8,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 */
|
|
{0xC0A9,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 */
|
|
{0xC0AA,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 */
|
|
{0xC0AB,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 */
|
|
{0xC0AC,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM */
|
|
{0xC0AD,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM */
|
|
{0xC0AE,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 */
|
|
{0xC0AF,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 */
|
|
{-1, 0, 0, 0, MODE_STREAM}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#define MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 16
|
|
#define MAX_KEY_SIZE 32
|
|
|
|
const SslCipherSuite *
|
|
ssl_find_cipher(int num)
|
|
{
|
|
const SslCipherSuite *c;
|
|
for(c=cipher_suites;c->number!=-1;c++){
|
|
if(c->number==num){
|
|
return c;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
guint
|
|
ssl_get_cipher_blocksize(const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite)
|
|
{
|
|
gint cipher_algo;
|
|
if (cipher_suite->mode != MODE_CBC) return 0;
|
|
cipher_algo = ssl_get_cipher_by_name(ciphers[cipher_suite->enc - 0x30]);
|
|
return (guint)gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen(cipher_algo);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static guint
|
|
ssl_get_cipher_export_keymat_size(int cipher_suite_num)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (cipher_suite_num) {
|
|
/* See RFC 6101 (SSL 3.0), Table 2, column Key Material. */
|
|
case 0x0003: /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 */
|
|
case 0x0006: /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 */
|
|
case 0x0008: /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
|
|
case 0x000B: /* TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
|
|
case 0x000E: /* TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
|
|
case 0x0011: /* TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
|
|
case 0x0014: /* TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
|
|
case 0x0017: /* TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 */
|
|
case 0x0019: /* TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
|
|
return 5;
|
|
|
|
/* not defined in below draft, but "implemented by several vendors",
|
|
* https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00036.html */
|
|
case 0x0060: /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5 */
|
|
case 0x0061: /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5 */
|
|
return 7;
|
|
|
|
/* Note: the draft states that DES_CBC needs 8 bytes, but Wireshark always
|
|
* used 7. Until a pcap proves 8, let's use the old value. Link:
|
|
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01 */
|
|
case 0x0062: /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */
|
|
case 0x0063: /* TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */
|
|
case 0x0064: /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA */
|
|
case 0x0065: /* TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA */
|
|
return 7;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Digests, Ciphers and Cipher Suites registry }}} */
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* HMAC and the Pseudorandom function {{{ */
|
|
static void
|
|
tls_hash(StringInfo *secret, StringInfo *seed, gint md,
|
|
StringInfo *out, guint out_len)
|
|
{
|
|
/* RFC 2246 5. HMAC and the pseudorandom function
|
|
* '+' denotes concatenation.
|
|
* P_hash(secret, seed) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(1) + seed) +
|
|
* HMAC_hash(secret, A(2) + seed) + ...
|
|
* A(0) = seed
|
|
* A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i - 1))
|
|
*/
|
|
guint8 *ptr;
|
|
guint left, tocpy;
|
|
guint8 *A;
|
|
guint8 _A[DIGEST_MAX_SIZE], tmp[DIGEST_MAX_SIZE];
|
|
guint A_l, tmp_l;
|
|
SSL_HMAC hm;
|
|
|
|
ptr = out->data;
|
|
left = out_len;
|
|
|
|
ssl_print_string("tls_hash: hash secret", secret);
|
|
ssl_print_string("tls_hash: hash seed", seed);
|
|
/* A(0) = seed */
|
|
A = seed->data;
|
|
A_l = seed->data_len;
|
|
|
|
while (left) {
|
|
/* A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i-1)) */
|
|
ssl_hmac_init(&hm, secret->data, secret->data_len, md);
|
|
ssl_hmac_update(&hm, A, A_l);
|
|
A_l = sizeof(_A); /* upper bound len for hash output */
|
|
ssl_hmac_final(&hm, _A, &A_l);
|
|
ssl_hmac_cleanup(&hm);
|
|
A = _A;
|
|
|
|
/* HMAC_hash(secret, A(i) + seed) */
|
|
ssl_hmac_init(&hm, secret->data, secret->data_len, md);
|
|
ssl_hmac_update(&hm, A, A_l);
|
|
ssl_hmac_update(&hm, seed->data, seed->data_len);
|
|
tmp_l = sizeof(tmp); /* upper bound len for hash output */
|
|
ssl_hmac_final(&hm, tmp, &tmp_l);
|
|
ssl_hmac_cleanup(&hm);
|
|
|
|
/* ssl_hmac_final puts the actual digest output size in tmp_l */
|
|
tocpy = MIN(left, tmp_l);
|
|
memcpy(ptr, tmp, tocpy);
|
|
ptr += tocpy;
|
|
left -= tocpy;
|
|
}
|
|
out->data_len = out_len;
|
|
|
|
ssl_print_string("hash out", out);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gboolean
|
|
tls_prf(StringInfo* secret, const gchar *usage,
|
|
StringInfo* rnd1, StringInfo* rnd2, StringInfo* out, guint out_len)
|
|
{
|
|
StringInfo seed, sha_out, md5_out;
|
|
guint8 *ptr;
|
|
StringInfo s1, s2;
|
|
guint i,s_l;
|
|
size_t usage_len, rnd2_len;
|
|
gboolean success = FALSE;
|
|
usage_len = strlen(usage);
|
|
rnd2_len = rnd2 ? rnd2->data_len : 0;
|
|
|
|
/* initalize buffer for sha, md5 random seed*/
|
|
if (ssl_data_alloc(&sha_out, MAX(out_len, 20)) < 0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("tls_prf: can't allocate sha out\n");
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ssl_data_alloc(&md5_out, MAX(out_len, 16)) < 0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("tls_prf: can't allocate md5 out\n");
|
|
goto free_sha;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ssl_data_alloc(&seed, usage_len+rnd1->data_len+rnd2_len) < 0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("tls_prf: can't allocate rnd %d\n",
|
|
(int) (usage_len+rnd1->data_len+rnd2_len));
|
|
goto free_md5;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ptr=seed.data;
|
|
memcpy(ptr,usage,usage_len);
|
|
ptr+=usage_len;
|
|
memcpy(ptr,rnd1->data,rnd1->data_len);
|
|
if (rnd2_len > 0) {
|
|
ptr+=rnd1->data_len;
|
|
memcpy(ptr,rnd2->data,rnd2->data_len);
|
|
/*ptr+=rnd2->data_len;*/
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* initalize buffer for client/server seeds*/
|
|
s_l=secret->data_len/2 + secret->data_len%2;
|
|
if (ssl_data_alloc(&s1, s_l) < 0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("tls_prf: can't allocate secret %d\n", s_l);
|
|
goto free_seed;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ssl_data_alloc(&s2, s_l) < 0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("tls_prf: can't allocate secret(2) %d\n", s_l);
|
|
goto free_s1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(s1.data,secret->data,s_l);
|
|
memcpy(s2.data,secret->data + (secret->data_len - s_l),s_l);
|
|
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("tls_prf: tls_hash(md5 secret_len %d seed_len %d )\n", s1.data_len, seed.data_len);
|
|
tls_hash(&s1, &seed, ssl_get_digest_by_name("MD5"), &md5_out, out_len);
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("tls_prf: tls_hash(sha)\n");
|
|
tls_hash(&s2, &seed, ssl_get_digest_by_name("SHA1"), &sha_out, out_len);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < out_len; i++)
|
|
out->data[i] = md5_out.data[i] ^ sha_out.data[i];
|
|
/* success, now store the new meaningful data length */
|
|
out->data_len = out_len;
|
|
success = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
ssl_print_string("PRF out",out);
|
|
g_free(s2.data);
|
|
free_s1:
|
|
g_free(s1.data);
|
|
free_seed:
|
|
g_free(seed.data);
|
|
free_md5:
|
|
g_free(md5_out.data);
|
|
free_sha:
|
|
g_free(sha_out.data);
|
|
return success;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gboolean
|
|
tls12_prf(gint md, StringInfo* secret, const gchar* usage,
|
|
StringInfo* rnd1, StringInfo* rnd2, StringInfo* out, guint out_len)
|
|
{
|
|
StringInfo label_seed;
|
|
size_t usage_len, rnd2_len;
|
|
rnd2_len = rnd2 ? rnd2->data_len : 0;
|
|
|
|
usage_len = strlen(usage);
|
|
if (ssl_data_alloc(&label_seed, usage_len+rnd1->data_len+rnd2_len) < 0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("tls12_prf: can't allocate label_seed\n");
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
memcpy(label_seed.data, usage, usage_len);
|
|
memcpy(label_seed.data+usage_len, rnd1->data, rnd1->data_len);
|
|
if (rnd2_len > 0)
|
|
memcpy(label_seed.data+usage_len+rnd1->data_len, rnd2->data, rnd2->data_len);
|
|
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("tls12_prf: tls_hash(hash_alg %s secret_len %d seed_len %d )\n", gcry_md_algo_name(md), secret->data_len, label_seed.data_len);
|
|
tls_hash(secret, &label_seed, md, out, out_len);
|
|
g_free(label_seed.data);
|
|
ssl_print_string("PRF out", out);
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
ssl3_generate_export_iv(StringInfo *r1, StringInfo *r2,
|
|
StringInfo *out, guint out_len)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL_MD5_CTX md5;
|
|
guint8 tmp[16];
|
|
|
|
ssl_md5_init(&md5);
|
|
ssl_md5_update(&md5,r1->data,r1->data_len);
|
|
ssl_md5_update(&md5,r2->data,r2->data_len);
|
|
ssl_md5_final(tmp,&md5);
|
|
ssl_md5_cleanup(&md5);
|
|
|
|
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(out_len <= sizeof(tmp));
|
|
ssl_data_set(out, tmp, out_len);
|
|
ssl_print_string("export iv", out);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gboolean
|
|
ssl3_prf(StringInfo* secret, const gchar* usage,
|
|
StringInfo* rnd1, StringInfo* rnd2, StringInfo* out, guint out_len)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL_MD5_CTX md5;
|
|
SSL_SHA_CTX sha;
|
|
guint off;
|
|
gint i = 0,j;
|
|
guint8 buf[20];
|
|
|
|
for (off = 0; off < out_len; off += 16) {
|
|
guchar outbuf[16];
|
|
i++;
|
|
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl3_prf: sha1_hash(%d)\n",i);
|
|
/* A, BB, CCC, ... */
|
|
for(j=0;j<i;j++){
|
|
buf[j]=64+i;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl_sha_init(&sha);
|
|
ssl_sha_update(&sha,buf,i);
|
|
ssl_sha_update(&sha,secret->data,secret->data_len);
|
|
|
|
if(!strcmp(usage,"client write key") || !strcmp(usage,"server write key")){
|
|
if (rnd2)
|
|
ssl_sha_update(&sha,rnd2->data,rnd2->data_len);
|
|
ssl_sha_update(&sha,rnd1->data,rnd1->data_len);
|
|
}
|
|
else{
|
|
ssl_sha_update(&sha,rnd1->data,rnd1->data_len);
|
|
if (rnd2)
|
|
ssl_sha_update(&sha,rnd2->data,rnd2->data_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl_sha_final(buf,&sha);
|
|
ssl_sha_cleanup(&sha);
|
|
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl3_prf: md5_hash(%d) datalen %d\n",i,
|
|
secret->data_len);
|
|
ssl_md5_init(&md5);
|
|
ssl_md5_update(&md5,secret->data,secret->data_len);
|
|
ssl_md5_update(&md5,buf,20);
|
|
ssl_md5_final(outbuf,&md5);
|
|
ssl_md5_cleanup(&md5);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(out->data + off, outbuf, MIN(out_len - off, 16));
|
|
}
|
|
out->data_len = out_len;
|
|
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* out_len is the wanted output length for the pseudorandom function.
|
|
* Ensure that ssl->cipher_suite is set. */
|
|
static gboolean
|
|
prf(SslDecryptSession *ssl, StringInfo *secret, const gchar *usage,
|
|
StringInfo *rnd1, StringInfo *rnd2, StringInfo *out, guint out_len)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (ssl->session.version) {
|
|
case SSLV3_VERSION:
|
|
return ssl3_prf(secret, usage, rnd1, rnd2, out, out_len);
|
|
|
|
case TLSV1_VERSION:
|
|
case TLSV1DOT1_VERSION:
|
|
case DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION:
|
|
case DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION:
|
|
return tls_prf(secret, usage, rnd1, rnd2, out, out_len);
|
|
|
|
default: /* TLSv1.2 */
|
|
switch (ssl->cipher_suite->dig) {
|
|
case DIG_SHA384:
|
|
return tls12_prf(GCRY_MD_SHA384, secret, usage, rnd1, rnd2,
|
|
out, out_len);
|
|
default:
|
|
return tls12_prf(GCRY_MD_SHA256, secret, usage, rnd1, rnd2,
|
|
out, out_len);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gint tls_handshake_hash(SslDecryptSession* ssl, StringInfo* out)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL_MD5_CTX md5;
|
|
SSL_SHA_CTX sha;
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_data_alloc(out, 36) < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
ssl_md5_init(&md5);
|
|
ssl_md5_update(&md5,ssl->handshake_data.data,ssl->handshake_data.data_len);
|
|
ssl_md5_final(out->data,&md5);
|
|
ssl_md5_cleanup(&md5);
|
|
|
|
ssl_sha_init(&sha);
|
|
ssl_sha_update(&sha,ssl->handshake_data.data,ssl->handshake_data.data_len);
|
|
ssl_sha_final(out->data+16,&sha);
|
|
ssl_sha_cleanup(&sha);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gint tls12_handshake_hash(SslDecryptSession* ssl, gint md, StringInfo* out)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL_MD mc;
|
|
guint8 tmp[48];
|
|
guint len;
|
|
|
|
ssl_md_init(&mc, md);
|
|
ssl_md_update(&mc,ssl->handshake_data.data,ssl->handshake_data.data_len);
|
|
ssl_md_final(&mc, tmp, &len);
|
|
ssl_md_cleanup(&mc);
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_data_alloc(out, len) < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
memcpy(out->data, tmp, len);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gboolean
|
|
tls13_hkdf_expand_label(int md, const StringInfo *secret, const char *label, const char *hash_value,
|
|
guint16 out_len, guchar **out)
|
|
{
|
|
/* draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18:
|
|
* HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label, HashValue, Length) =
|
|
* HKDF-Expand(Secret, HkdfLabel, Length)
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* uint16 length = Length;
|
|
* opaque label<9..255> = "TLS 1.3, " + Label;
|
|
* opaque hash_value<0..255> = HashValue;
|
|
* } HkdfLabel;
|
|
*
|
|
* RFC 5869 HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF):
|
|
* HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L) -> OKM
|
|
*/
|
|
guchar lastoutput[DIGEST_MAX_SIZE];
|
|
gcry_md_hd_t h;
|
|
gcry_error_t err;
|
|
const guint label_length = (guint) strlen(label);
|
|
const guint hash_value_length = (guint) strlen(hash_value);
|
|
const guint hash_len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(md);
|
|
|
|
/* Some sanity checks */
|
|
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(out_len > 0 && out_len <= 255 * hash_len);
|
|
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(label_length <= 255 - 9);
|
|
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(hash_value_length <= 255);
|
|
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(hash_len > 0 && hash_len <= DIGEST_MAX_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
err = gcry_md_open(&h, md, GCRY_MD_FLAG_HMAC);
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s failed to invoke hash func %d: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, md, gcry_strerror(err));
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*out = (guchar *)wmem_alloc(NULL, out_len);
|
|
|
|
for (guint offset = 0; offset < out_len; offset += hash_len) {
|
|
gcry_md_reset(h);
|
|
gcry_md_setkey(h, secret->data, secret->data_len); /* Set PRK */
|
|
|
|
if (offset > 0) {
|
|
gcry_md_write(h, lastoutput, hash_len); /* T(1..N) */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* info = HkdfLabel { length, label, hash_value } */
|
|
gcry_md_putc(h, out_len >> 8); /* length */
|
|
gcry_md_putc(h, (guint8) out_len);
|
|
gcry_md_putc(h, 9 + label_length); /* label */
|
|
gcry_md_write(h, "TLS 1.3, ", 9);
|
|
gcry_md_write(h, label, label_length);
|
|
gcry_md_putc(h, hash_value_length); /* hash_value */
|
|
gcry_md_write(h, hash_value, hash_value_length);
|
|
|
|
gcry_md_putc(h, (guint8) (offset / hash_len + 1)); /* constant 0x01..N */
|
|
|
|
memcpy(lastoutput, gcry_md_read(h, md), hash_len);
|
|
memcpy(*out + offset, lastoutput, MIN(hash_len, out_len - offset));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
gcry_md_close(h);
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
/* HMAC and the Pseudorandom function }}} */
|
|
|
|
/* Record Decompression (after decryption) {{{ */
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB
|
|
/* memory allocation functions for zlib initialization */
|
|
static void* ssl_zalloc(void* opaque _U_, unsigned int no, unsigned int size)
|
|
{
|
|
return g_malloc0(no*size);
|
|
}
|
|
static void ssl_zfree(void* opaque _U_, void* addr)
|
|
{
|
|
g_free(addr);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static SslDecompress*
|
|
ssl_create_decompressor(gint compression)
|
|
{
|
|
SslDecompress *decomp;
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB
|
|
int err;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (compression == 0) return NULL;
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_create_decompressor: compression method %d\n", compression);
|
|
decomp = (SslDecompress *)wmem_alloc(wmem_file_scope(), sizeof(SslDecompress));
|
|
decomp->compression = compression;
|
|
switch (decomp->compression) {
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB
|
|
case 1: /* DEFLATE */
|
|
decomp->istream.zalloc = ssl_zalloc;
|
|
decomp->istream.zfree = ssl_zfree;
|
|
decomp->istream.opaque = Z_NULL;
|
|
decomp->istream.next_in = Z_NULL;
|
|
decomp->istream.next_out = Z_NULL;
|
|
decomp->istream.avail_in = 0;
|
|
decomp->istream.avail_out = 0;
|
|
err = inflateInit(&decomp->istream);
|
|
if (err != Z_OK) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_create_decompressor: inflateInit_() failed - %d\n", err);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
default:
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_create_decompressor: unsupported compression method %d\n", decomp->compression);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
return decomp;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB
|
|
static int
|
|
ssl_decompress_record(SslDecompress* decomp, const guchar* in, guint inl, StringInfo* out_str, guint* outl)
|
|
{
|
|
gint err;
|
|
|
|
switch (decomp->compression) {
|
|
case 1: /* DEFLATE */
|
|
err = Z_OK;
|
|
if (out_str->data_len < 16384) { /* maximal plain length */
|
|
ssl_data_realloc(out_str, 16384);
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef z_const
|
|
decomp->istream.next_in = in;
|
|
#else
|
|
DIAG_OFF(cast-qual)
|
|
decomp->istream.next_in = (Bytef *)in;
|
|
DIAG_ON(cast-qual)
|
|
#endif
|
|
decomp->istream.avail_in = inl;
|
|
decomp->istream.next_out = out_str->data;
|
|
decomp->istream.avail_out = out_str->data_len;
|
|
if (inl > 0)
|
|
err = inflate(&decomp->istream, Z_SYNC_FLUSH);
|
|
if (err != Z_OK) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decompress_record: inflate() failed - %d\n", err);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
*outl = out_str->data_len - decomp->istream.avail_out;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decompress_record: unsupported compression method %d\n", decomp->compression);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
int
|
|
ssl_decompress_record(SslDecompress* decomp _U_, const guchar* in _U_, guint inl _U_, StringInfo* out_str _U_, guint* outl _U_)
|
|
{
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decompress_record: unsupported compression method %d\n", decomp->compression);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
/* Record Decompression (after decryption) }}} */
|
|
|
|
/* Create a new structure to store decrypted chunks. {{{ */
|
|
static SslFlow*
|
|
ssl_create_flow(void)
|
|
{
|
|
SslFlow *flow;
|
|
|
|
flow = (SslFlow *)wmem_alloc(wmem_file_scope(), sizeof(SslFlow));
|
|
flow->byte_seq = 0;
|
|
flow->flags = 0;
|
|
flow->multisegment_pdus = wmem_tree_new(wmem_file_scope());
|
|
return flow;
|
|
}
|
|
/* }}} */
|
|
|
|
/* Use the negotiated security parameters for decryption. {{{ */
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_change_cipher(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, gboolean server)
|
|
{
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_change_cipher %s\n", (server)?"SERVER":"CLIENT");
|
|
if (server) {
|
|
ssl_session->server = ssl_session->server_new;
|
|
ssl_session->server_new = NULL;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ssl_session->client = ssl_session->client_new;
|
|
ssl_session->client_new = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* }}} */
|
|
|
|
/* Init cipher state given some security parameters. {{{ */
|
|
static gboolean
|
|
ssl_decoder_destroy_cb(wmem_allocator_t *, wmem_cb_event_t, void *);
|
|
|
|
static SslDecoder*
|
|
ssl_create_decoder(const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite, gint cipher_algo,
|
|
gint compression, guint8 *mk, guint8 *sk, guint8 *iv, guint iv_length)
|
|
{
|
|
SslDecoder *dec;
|
|
ssl_cipher_mode_t mode = cipher_suite->mode;
|
|
|
|
dec = (SslDecoder *)wmem_alloc0(wmem_file_scope(), sizeof(SslDecoder));
|
|
/* init mac buffer: mac storage is embedded into decoder struct to save a
|
|
memory allocation and waste samo more memory*/
|
|
dec->cipher_suite=cipher_suite;
|
|
dec->compression = compression;
|
|
if ((mode == MODE_STREAM && mk != NULL) || mode == MODE_CBC) {
|
|
// AEAD ciphers use no MAC key, but stream and block ciphers do. Note
|
|
// the special case for NULL ciphers, even if there is insufficieny
|
|
// keying material (including MAC key), we will can still create
|
|
// decoders since "decryption" is easy for such ciphers.
|
|
dec->mac_key.data = dec->_mac_key_or_write_iv;
|
|
ssl_data_set(&dec->mac_key, mk, ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->len);
|
|
} else if (mode == MODE_GCM || mode == MODE_CCM || mode == MODE_CCM_8) {
|
|
// Input for the nonce, to be used with AEAD ciphers.
|
|
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(iv_length <= sizeof(dec->_mac_key_or_write_iv));
|
|
dec->write_iv.data = dec->_mac_key_or_write_iv;
|
|
ssl_data_set(&dec->write_iv, iv, iv_length);
|
|
}
|
|
dec->seq = 0;
|
|
dec->decomp = ssl_create_decompressor(compression);
|
|
wmem_register_callback(wmem_file_scope(), ssl_decoder_destroy_cb, dec);
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_cipher_init(&dec->evp,cipher_algo,sk,iv,cipher_suite->mode) < 0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s: can't create cipher id:%d mode:%d\n", G_STRFUNC,
|
|
cipher_algo, cipher_suite->mode);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("decoder initialized (digest len %d)\n", ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->len);
|
|
return dec;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gboolean
|
|
ssl_decoder_destroy_cb(wmem_allocator_t *allocator _U_, wmem_cb_event_t event _U_, void *user_data)
|
|
{
|
|
SslDecoder *dec = (SslDecoder *) user_data;
|
|
|
|
if (dec->evp)
|
|
ssl_cipher_cleanup(&dec->evp);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB
|
|
if (dec->decomp != NULL && dec->decomp->compression == 1 /* DEFLATE */)
|
|
inflateEnd(&dec->decomp->istream);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
/* }}} */
|
|
|
|
/* (Pre-)master secrets calculations {{{ */
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS
|
|
static int
|
|
ssl_decrypt_pre_master_secret(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session,
|
|
StringInfo *encrypted_pre_master,
|
|
gcry_sexp_t pk);
|
|
#endif /* HAVE_LIBGNUTLS */
|
|
|
|
static gboolean
|
|
ssl_restore_master_key(SslDecryptSession *ssl, const char *label,
|
|
gboolean is_pre_master, GHashTable *ht, StringInfo *key);
|
|
|
|
gboolean
|
|
ssl_generate_pre_master_secret(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session,
|
|
guint32 length, tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset,
|
|
const gchar *ssl_psk,
|
|
const ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map)
|
|
{
|
|
/* check for required session data */
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s: found SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG, state %X\n",
|
|
G_STRFUNC, ssl_session->state);
|
|
if ((ssl_session->state & (SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION)) !=
|
|
(SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION)) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s: not enough data to generate key (required state %X)\n", G_STRFUNC,
|
|
(SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION));
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_session->session.version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s: detected TLS 1.3 which has no pre-master secrets\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* check to see if the PMS was provided to us*/
|
|
if (ssl_restore_master_key(ssl_session, "Unencrypted pre-master secret", TRUE,
|
|
mk_map->pms, &ssl_session->client_random)) {
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_session->cipher_suite->kex == KEX_PSK)
|
|
{
|
|
/* calculate pre master secret*/
|
|
StringInfo pre_master_secret;
|
|
guint psk_len, pre_master_len;
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_psk || (ssl_psk[0] == 0)) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s: can't find pre-shared-key\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* convert hex string into char*/
|
|
if (!from_hex(&ssl_session->psk, ssl_psk, strlen(ssl_psk))) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s: ssl.psk/dtls.psk contains invalid hex\n",
|
|
G_STRFUNC);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
psk_len = ssl_session->psk.data_len;
|
|
if (psk_len >= (2 << 15)) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s: ssl.psk/dtls.psk must not be larger than 2^15 - 1\n",
|
|
G_STRFUNC);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
pre_master_len = psk_len * 2 + 4;
|
|
|
|
pre_master_secret.data = (guchar *)wmem_alloc(wmem_file_scope(), pre_master_len);
|
|
pre_master_secret.data_len = pre_master_len;
|
|
/* 2 bytes psk_len*/
|
|
pre_master_secret.data[0] = psk_len >> 8;
|
|
pre_master_secret.data[1] = psk_len & 0xFF;
|
|
/* psk_len bytes times 0*/
|
|
memset(&pre_master_secret.data[2], 0, psk_len);
|
|
/* 2 bytes psk_len*/
|
|
pre_master_secret.data[psk_len + 2] = psk_len >> 8;
|
|
pre_master_secret.data[psk_len + 3] = psk_len & 0xFF;
|
|
/* psk*/
|
|
memcpy(&pre_master_secret.data[psk_len + 4], ssl_session->psk.data, psk_len);
|
|
|
|
ssl_session->pre_master_secret.data = pre_master_secret.data;
|
|
ssl_session->pre_master_secret.data_len = pre_master_len;
|
|
/*ssl_debug_printf("pre master secret",&ssl->pre_master_secret);*/
|
|
|
|
/* Remove the master secret if it was there.
|
|
This forces keying material regeneration in
|
|
case we're renegotiating */
|
|
ssl_session->state &= ~(SSL_MASTER_SECRET|SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY);
|
|
ssl_session->state |= SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET;
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
StringInfo encrypted_pre_master;
|
|
guint encrlen, skip;
|
|
encrlen = length;
|
|
skip = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* get encrypted data, on tls1 we have to skip two bytes
|
|
* (it's the encrypted len and should be equal to record len - 2)
|
|
* in case of rsa1024 that would be 128 + 2 = 130; for psk not necessary
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ssl_session->cipher_suite->kex == KEX_RSA &&
|
|
(ssl_session->session.version == TLSV1_VERSION ||
|
|
ssl_session->session.version == TLSV1DOT1_VERSION ||
|
|
ssl_session->session.version == TLSV1DOT2_VERSION ||
|
|
ssl_session->session.version == DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION ||
|
|
ssl_session->session.version == DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION))
|
|
{
|
|
encrlen = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
skip = 2;
|
|
if (encrlen > length - 2)
|
|
{
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s: wrong encrypted length (%d max %d)\n",
|
|
G_STRFUNC, encrlen, length);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* the valid lower bound is higher than 8, but it is sufficient for the
|
|
* ssl keylog file below */
|
|
if (encrlen < 8) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s: invalid encrypted pre-master key length %d\n",
|
|
G_STRFUNC, encrlen);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
encrypted_pre_master.data = (guchar *)wmem_alloc(wmem_file_scope(), encrlen);
|
|
encrypted_pre_master.data_len = encrlen;
|
|
tvb_memcpy(tvb, encrypted_pre_master.data, offset+skip, encrlen);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS
|
|
if (ssl_session->private_key) {
|
|
/* try to decrypt encrypted pre-master with RSA key */
|
|
if (ssl_decrypt_pre_master_secret(ssl_session,
|
|
&encrypted_pre_master, ssl_session->private_key))
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s: can't decrypt pre-master secret\n",
|
|
G_STRFUNC);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* HAVE_LIBGNUTLS */
|
|
|
|
/* try to find the pre-master secret from the encrypted one. The
|
|
* ssl key logfile stores only the first 8 bytes, so truncate it */
|
|
encrypted_pre_master.data_len = 8;
|
|
if (ssl_restore_master_key(ssl_session, "Encrypted pre-master secret",
|
|
TRUE, mk_map->pre_master, &encrypted_pre_master))
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Used for (D)TLS 1.2 and earlier versions (not with TLS 1.3). */
|
|
int
|
|
ssl_generate_keyring_material(SslDecryptSession*ssl_session)
|
|
{
|
|
StringInfo key_block = { NULL, 0 };
|
|
guint8 _iv_c[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE],_iv_s[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
|
|
guint8 _key_c[MAX_KEY_SIZE],_key_s[MAX_KEY_SIZE];
|
|
gint needed;
|
|
gint cipher_algo = -1; /* special value (-1) for NULL encryption */
|
|
guint encr_key_len, write_iv_len = 0;
|
|
gboolean is_export_cipher;
|
|
guint8 *ptr, *c_iv = NULL, *s_iv = NULL;
|
|
guint8 *c_wk = NULL, *s_wk = NULL, *c_mk = NULL, *s_mk = NULL;
|
|
const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite = ssl_session->cipher_suite;
|
|
|
|
/* TLS 1.3 is handled directly in tls13_change_key. */
|
|
if (ssl_session->session.version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s: detected TLS 1.3. Should not have been called!\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* check for enough info to proced */
|
|
guint need_all = SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION;
|
|
guint need_any = SSL_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET;
|
|
if (((ssl_session->state & need_all) != need_all) || ((ssl_session->state & need_any) == 0)) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_generate_keyring_material not enough data to generate key "
|
|
"(0x%02X required 0x%02X or 0x%02X)\n", ssl_session->state,
|
|
need_all|SSL_MASTER_SECRET, need_all|SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET);
|
|
/* Special case: for NULL encryption, allow dissection of data even if
|
|
* the Client Hello is missing (MAC keys are now skipped though). */
|
|
need_all = SSL_CIPHER|SSL_VERSION;
|
|
if ((ssl_session->state & need_all) == need_all &&
|
|
cipher_suite->enc == ENC_NULL) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s NULL cipher found, will create a decoder but "
|
|
"skip MAC validation as keys are missing.\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
goto create_decoders;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* if master key is not available, generate is from the pre-master secret */
|
|
if (!(ssl_session->state & SSL_MASTER_SECRET)) {
|
|
if ((ssl_session->state & SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_MASK) == SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_MASK) {
|
|
StringInfo handshake_hashed_data;
|
|
gint ret;
|
|
|
|
handshake_hashed_data.data = NULL;
|
|
handshake_hashed_data.data_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s:PRF(pre_master_secret_extended)\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
ssl_print_string("pre master secret",&ssl_session->pre_master_secret);
|
|
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(ssl_session->handshake_data.data_len > 0);
|
|
|
|
switch(ssl_session->session.version) {
|
|
case TLSV1_VERSION:
|
|
case TLSV1DOT1_VERSION:
|
|
case DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION:
|
|
case DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION:
|
|
ret = tls_handshake_hash(ssl_session, &handshake_hashed_data);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
switch (cipher_suite->dig) {
|
|
case DIG_SHA384:
|
|
ret = tls12_handshake_hash(ssl_session, GCRY_MD_SHA384, &handshake_hashed_data);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
ret = tls12_handshake_hash(ssl_session, GCRY_MD_SHA256, &handshake_hashed_data);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't generate handshake hash\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wmem_free(wmem_file_scope(), ssl_session->handshake_data.data);
|
|
ssl_session->handshake_data.data = NULL;
|
|
ssl_session->handshake_data.data_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!prf(ssl_session, &ssl_session->pre_master_secret, "extended master secret",
|
|
&handshake_hashed_data,
|
|
NULL, &ssl_session->master_secret,
|
|
SSL_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH)) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't generate master_secret\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
g_free(handshake_hashed_data.data);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
g_free(handshake_hashed_data.data);
|
|
} else {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s:PRF(pre_master_secret)\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
ssl_print_string("pre master secret",&ssl_session->pre_master_secret);
|
|
ssl_print_string("client random",&ssl_session->client_random);
|
|
ssl_print_string("server random",&ssl_session->server_random);
|
|
if (!prf(ssl_session, &ssl_session->pre_master_secret, "master secret",
|
|
&ssl_session->client_random,
|
|
&ssl_session->server_random, &ssl_session->master_secret,
|
|
SSL_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH)) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't generate master_secret\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
ssl_print_string("master secret",&ssl_session->master_secret);
|
|
|
|
/* the pre-master secret has been 'consumend' so we must clear it now */
|
|
ssl_session->state &= ~SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET;
|
|
ssl_session->state |= SSL_MASTER_SECRET;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Find the Libgcrypt cipher algorithm for the given SSL cipher suite ID */
|
|
if (cipher_suite->enc != ENC_NULL) {
|
|
const char *cipher_name = ciphers[cipher_suite->enc-0x30];
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s CIPHER: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, cipher_name);
|
|
cipher_algo = ssl_get_cipher_by_name(cipher_name);
|
|
if (cipher_algo == 0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't find cipher %s\n", G_STRFUNC, cipher_name);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Export ciphers consume less material from the key block. */
|
|
encr_key_len = ssl_get_cipher_export_keymat_size(cipher_suite->number);
|
|
is_export_cipher = encr_key_len > 0;
|
|
if (!is_export_cipher && cipher_suite->enc != ENC_NULL) {
|
|
encr_key_len = (guint)gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen(cipher_algo);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CBC) {
|
|
write_iv_len = (guint)gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen(cipher_algo);
|
|
} else if (cipher_suite->mode == MODE_GCM || cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CCM || cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CCM_8) {
|
|
/* account for a four-byte salt for client and server side (from
|
|
* client_write_IV and server_write_IV), see GCMNonce (RFC 5288) */
|
|
write_iv_len = 4;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Compute the key block. First figure out how much data we need */
|
|
needed = ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->len*2; /* MAC key */
|
|
needed += 2 * encr_key_len; /* encryption key */
|
|
needed += 2 * write_iv_len; /* write IV */
|
|
|
|
key_block.data = (guchar *)g_malloc(needed);
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s sess key generation\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
if (!prf(ssl_session, &ssl_session->master_secret, "key expansion",
|
|
&ssl_session->server_random,&ssl_session->client_random,
|
|
&key_block, needed)) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't generate key_block\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
ssl_print_string("key expansion", &key_block);
|
|
|
|
ptr=key_block.data;
|
|
/* client/server write MAC key (for non-AEAD ciphers) */
|
|
if (cipher_suite->mode == MODE_STREAM || cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CBC) {
|
|
c_mk=ptr; ptr+=ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->len;
|
|
s_mk=ptr; ptr+=ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->len;
|
|
}
|
|
/* client/server write encryption key */
|
|
c_wk=ptr; ptr += encr_key_len;
|
|
s_wk=ptr; ptr += encr_key_len;
|
|
/* client/server write IV (used as IV (for CBC) or salt (for AEAD)) */
|
|
if (write_iv_len > 0) {
|
|
c_iv=ptr; ptr += write_iv_len;
|
|
s_iv=ptr; /* ptr += write_iv_len; */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* export ciphers work with a smaller key length */
|
|
if (is_export_cipher) {
|
|
if (cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CBC) {
|
|
|
|
/* We only have room for MAX_BLOCK_SIZE bytes IVs, but that's
|
|
all we should need. This is a sanity check */
|
|
if (write_iv_len > MAX_BLOCK_SIZE) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s cipher suite block must be at most %d nut is %d\n",
|
|
G_STRFUNC, MAX_BLOCK_SIZE, write_iv_len);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(ssl_session->session.version==SSLV3_VERSION){
|
|
/* The length of these fields are ignored by this caller */
|
|
StringInfo iv_c, iv_s;
|
|
iv_c.data = _iv_c;
|
|
iv_s.data = _iv_s;
|
|
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s ssl3_generate_export_iv\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
ssl3_generate_export_iv(&ssl_session->client_random,
|
|
&ssl_session->server_random, &iv_c, write_iv_len);
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s ssl3_generate_export_iv(2)\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
ssl3_generate_export_iv(&ssl_session->server_random,
|
|
&ssl_session->client_random, &iv_s, write_iv_len);
|
|
}
|
|
else{
|
|
guint8 _iv_block[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE * 2];
|
|
StringInfo iv_block;
|
|
StringInfo key_null;
|
|
guint8 _key_null;
|
|
|
|
key_null.data = &_key_null;
|
|
key_null.data_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
iv_block.data = _iv_block;
|
|
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s prf(iv_block)\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
if (!prf(ssl_session, &key_null, "IV block",
|
|
&ssl_session->client_random,
|
|
&ssl_session->server_random, &iv_block,
|
|
write_iv_len * 2)) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't generate tls31 iv block\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(_iv_c, iv_block.data, write_iv_len);
|
|
memcpy(_iv_s, iv_block.data + write_iv_len, write_iv_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c_iv=_iv_c;
|
|
s_iv=_iv_s;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_session->session.version==SSLV3_VERSION){
|
|
|
|
SSL_MD5_CTX md5;
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s MD5(client_random)\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
|
|
ssl_md5_init(&md5);
|
|
ssl_md5_update(&md5,c_wk,encr_key_len);
|
|
ssl_md5_update(&md5,ssl_session->client_random.data,
|
|
ssl_session->client_random.data_len);
|
|
ssl_md5_update(&md5,ssl_session->server_random.data,
|
|
ssl_session->server_random.data_len);
|
|
ssl_md5_final(_key_c,&md5);
|
|
ssl_md5_cleanup(&md5);
|
|
c_wk=_key_c;
|
|
|
|
ssl_md5_init(&md5);
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s MD5(server_random)\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
ssl_md5_update(&md5,s_wk,encr_key_len);
|
|
ssl_md5_update(&md5,ssl_session->server_random.data,
|
|
ssl_session->server_random.data_len);
|
|
ssl_md5_update(&md5,ssl_session->client_random.data,
|
|
ssl_session->client_random.data_len);
|
|
ssl_md5_final(_key_s,&md5);
|
|
ssl_md5_cleanup(&md5);
|
|
s_wk=_key_s;
|
|
}
|
|
else{
|
|
StringInfo key_c, key_s, k;
|
|
key_c.data = _key_c;
|
|
key_s.data = _key_s;
|
|
|
|
k.data = c_wk;
|
|
k.data_len = encr_key_len;
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s PRF(key_c)\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
if (!prf(ssl_session, &k, "client write key",
|
|
&ssl_session->client_random,
|
|
&ssl_session->server_random, &key_c, sizeof(_key_c))) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't generate tll31 server key \n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
c_wk=_key_c;
|
|
|
|
k.data = s_wk;
|
|
k.data_len = encr_key_len;
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s PRF(key_s)\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
if (!prf(ssl_session, &k, "server write key",
|
|
&ssl_session->client_random,
|
|
&ssl_session->server_random, &key_s, sizeof(_key_s))) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't generate tll31 client key \n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
s_wk=_key_s;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* show key material info */
|
|
if (c_mk != NULL) {
|
|
ssl_print_data("Client MAC key",c_mk,ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->len);
|
|
ssl_print_data("Server MAC key",s_mk,ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->len);
|
|
}
|
|
ssl_print_data("Client Write key", c_wk, encr_key_len);
|
|
ssl_print_data("Server Write key", s_wk, encr_key_len);
|
|
/* used as IV for CBC mode and the AEAD implicit nonce (salt) */
|
|
if (write_iv_len > 0) {
|
|
ssl_print_data("Client Write IV", c_iv, write_iv_len);
|
|
ssl_print_data("Server Write IV", s_iv, write_iv_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
create_decoders:
|
|
/* create both client and server ciphers*/
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s ssl_create_decoder(client)\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
ssl_session->client_new = ssl_create_decoder(cipher_suite, cipher_algo, ssl_session->session.compression, c_mk, c_wk, c_iv, write_iv_len);
|
|
if (!ssl_session->client_new) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't init client decoder\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s ssl_create_decoder(server)\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
ssl_session->server_new = ssl_create_decoder(cipher_suite, cipher_algo, ssl_session->session.compression, s_mk, s_wk, s_iv, write_iv_len);
|
|
if (!ssl_session->server_new) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't init client decoder\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Continue the SSL stream after renegotiation with new keys. */
|
|
ssl_session->client_new->flow = ssl_session->client ? ssl_session->client->flow : ssl_create_flow();
|
|
ssl_session->server_new->flow = ssl_session->server ? ssl_session->server->flow : ssl_create_flow();
|
|
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s: client seq %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT ", server seq %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT "\n",
|
|
G_STRFUNC, ssl_session->client_new->seq, ssl_session->server_new->seq);
|
|
g_free(key_block.data);
|
|
ssl_session->state |= SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
fail:
|
|
g_free(key_block.data);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Generated the key material based on the given secret. */
|
|
static gboolean
|
|
tls13_generate_keys(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, const StringInfo *secret, gboolean is_from_server)
|
|
{
|
|
gboolean success = FALSE;
|
|
guchar *write_key = NULL, *write_iv = NULL;
|
|
SslDecoder *decoder;
|
|
guint key_length, iv_length;
|
|
int hash_algo;
|
|
const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite = ssl_session->cipher_suite;
|
|
int cipher_algo;
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_session->session.version != TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s only usable for TLS 1.3, not %#x!\n", G_STRFUNC,
|
|
ssl_session->session.version);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cipher_suite == NULL) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s Unknown cipher\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cipher_suite->kex != KEX_TLS13) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s Invalid cipher suite 0x%04x spotted!\n", G_STRFUNC, cipher_suite->number);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Find the Libgcrypt cipher algorithm for the given SSL cipher suite ID */
|
|
const char *cipher_name = ciphers[cipher_suite->enc-0x30];
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s CIPHER: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, cipher_name);
|
|
cipher_algo = ssl_get_cipher_by_name(cipher_name);
|
|
if (cipher_algo == 0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't find cipher %s\n", G_STRFUNC, cipher_name);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const char *hash_name = ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->name;
|
|
hash_algo = ssl_get_digest_by_name(hash_name);
|
|
if (!hash_algo) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't find hash function %s\n", G_STRFUNC, hash_name);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key_length = (guint) gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen(cipher_algo);
|
|
/* AES-GCM/AES-CCM/Poly1305-ChaCha20 all have N_MIN=N_MAX = 12. */
|
|
iv_length = 12;
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s key_length %u iv_length %u\n", G_STRFUNC, key_length, iv_length);
|
|
|
|
if (!tls13_hkdf_expand_label(hash_algo, secret, "key", "", key_length, &write_key)) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s write_key expansion failed\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!tls13_hkdf_expand_label(hash_algo, secret, "iv", "", iv_length, &write_iv)) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s write_iv expansion failed\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl_print_data(is_from_server ? "Server Write Key" : "Client Write Key", write_key, key_length);
|
|
ssl_print_data(is_from_server ? "Server Write IV" : "Client Write IV", write_iv, iv_length);
|
|
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s ssl_create_decoder(%s)\n", G_STRFUNC, is_from_server ? "server" : "client");
|
|
decoder = ssl_create_decoder(cipher_suite, cipher_algo, 0, NULL, write_key, write_iv, iv_length);
|
|
if (!decoder) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't init %s decoder\n", G_STRFUNC, is_from_server ? "server" : "client");
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Continue the TLS session with new keys, but reuse old flow to keep things
|
|
* like "Follow SSL" working (by linking application data records). */
|
|
if (is_from_server) {
|
|
decoder->flow = ssl_session->server ? ssl_session->server->flow : ssl_create_flow();
|
|
ssl_session->server = decoder;
|
|
} else {
|
|
decoder->flow = ssl_session->client ? ssl_session->client->flow : ssl_create_flow();
|
|
ssl_session->client = decoder;
|
|
}
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s %s ready using cipher suite 0x%04x (cipher %s hash %s)\n", G_STRFUNC,
|
|
is_from_server ? "Server" : "Client", cipher_suite->number, cipher_name, hash_name);
|
|
success = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
wmem_free(NULL, write_key);
|
|
wmem_free(NULL, write_iv);
|
|
return success;
|
|
}
|
|
/* (Pre-)master secrets calculations }}} */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS
|
|
/* Decrypt RSA pre-master secret using RSA private key. {{{ */
|
|
static gboolean
|
|
ssl_decrypt_pre_master_secret(SslDecryptSession*ssl_session,
|
|
StringInfo* encrypted_pre_master, gcry_sexp_t pk)
|
|
{
|
|
gint i;
|
|
|
|
if (!encrypted_pre_master)
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
|
|
if (KEX_IS_DH(ssl_session->cipher_suite->kex)) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s: session uses Diffie-Hellman key exchange "
|
|
"(cipher suite 0x%04X %s) and cannot be decrypted "
|
|
"using a RSA private key file.\n",
|
|
G_STRFUNC, ssl_session->session.cipher,
|
|
val_to_str_ext_const(ssl_session->session.cipher,
|
|
&ssl_31_ciphersuite_ext, "unknown"));
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
} else if(ssl_session->cipher_suite->kex != KEX_RSA) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s key exchange %d different from KEX_RSA (%d)\n",
|
|
G_STRFUNC, ssl_session->cipher_suite->kex, KEX_RSA);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* with tls key loading will fail if not rsa type, so no need to check*/
|
|
ssl_print_string("pre master encrypted",encrypted_pre_master);
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s: RSA_private_decrypt\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
i=ssl_private_decrypt(encrypted_pre_master->data_len,
|
|
encrypted_pre_master->data, pk);
|
|
|
|
if (i!=48) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s wrong pre_master_secret length (%d, expected "
|
|
"%d)\n", G_STRFUNC, i, 48);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* the decrypted data has been written into the pre_master key buffer */
|
|
ssl_session->pre_master_secret.data = encrypted_pre_master->data;
|
|
ssl_session->pre_master_secret.data_len=48;
|
|
ssl_print_string("pre master secret",&ssl_session->pre_master_secret);
|
|
|
|
/* Remove the master secret if it was there.
|
|
This forces keying material regeneration in
|
|
case we're renegotiating */
|
|
ssl_session->state &= ~(SSL_MASTER_SECRET|SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY);
|
|
ssl_session->state |= SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET;
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
} /* }}} */
|
|
#endif /* HAVE_LIBGNUTLS */
|
|
|
|
/* Decryption integrity check {{{ */
|
|
|
|
static gint
|
|
tls_check_mac(SslDecoder*decoder, gint ct, gint ver, guint8* data,
|
|
guint32 datalen, guint8* mac)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL_HMAC hm;
|
|
gint md;
|
|
guint32 len;
|
|
guint8 buf[DIGEST_MAX_SIZE];
|
|
gint16 temp;
|
|
|
|
md=ssl_get_digest_by_name(ssl_cipher_suite_dig(decoder->cipher_suite)->name);
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("tls_check_mac mac type:%s md %d\n",
|
|
ssl_cipher_suite_dig(decoder->cipher_suite)->name, md);
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_hmac_init(&hm,decoder->mac_key.data,decoder->mac_key.data_len,md) != 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
/* hash sequence number */
|
|
phton64(buf, decoder->seq);
|
|
|
|
decoder->seq++;
|
|
|
|
ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,8);
|
|
|
|
/* hash content type */
|
|
buf[0]=ct;
|
|
ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,1);
|
|
|
|
/* hash version,data length and data*/
|
|
/* *((gint16*)buf) = g_htons(ver); */
|
|
temp = g_htons(ver);
|
|
memcpy(buf, &temp, 2);
|
|
ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,2);
|
|
|
|
/* *((gint16*)buf) = g_htons(datalen); */
|
|
temp = g_htons(datalen);
|
|
memcpy(buf, &temp, 2);
|
|
ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,2);
|
|
ssl_hmac_update(&hm,data,datalen);
|
|
|
|
/* get digest and digest len*/
|
|
len = sizeof(buf);
|
|
ssl_hmac_final(&hm,buf,&len);
|
|
ssl_hmac_cleanup(&hm);
|
|
ssl_print_data("Mac", buf, len);
|
|
if(memcmp(mac,buf,len))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
ssl3_check_mac(SslDecoder*decoder,int ct,guint8* data,
|
|
guint32 datalen, guint8* mac)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL_MD mc;
|
|
gint md;
|
|
guint32 len;
|
|
guint8 buf[64],dgst[20];
|
|
gint pad_ct;
|
|
gint16 temp;
|
|
|
|
pad_ct=(decoder->cipher_suite->dig==DIG_SHA)?40:48;
|
|
|
|
/* get cipher used for digest comptuation */
|
|
md=ssl_get_digest_by_name(ssl_cipher_suite_dig(decoder->cipher_suite)->name);
|
|
if (ssl_md_init(&mc,md) !=0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
/* do hash computation on data && padding */
|
|
ssl_md_update(&mc,decoder->mac_key.data,decoder->mac_key.data_len);
|
|
|
|
/* hash padding*/
|
|
memset(buf,0x36,pad_ct);
|
|
ssl_md_update(&mc,buf,pad_ct);
|
|
|
|
/* hash sequence number */
|
|
phton64(buf, decoder->seq);
|
|
decoder->seq++;
|
|
ssl_md_update(&mc,buf,8);
|
|
|
|
/* hash content type */
|
|
buf[0]=ct;
|
|
ssl_md_update(&mc,buf,1);
|
|
|
|
/* hash data length in network byte order and data*/
|
|
/* *((gint16* )buf) = g_htons(datalen); */
|
|
temp = g_htons(datalen);
|
|
memcpy(buf, &temp, 2);
|
|
ssl_md_update(&mc,buf,2);
|
|
ssl_md_update(&mc,data,datalen);
|
|
|
|
/* get partial digest */
|
|
ssl_md_final(&mc,dgst,&len);
|
|
ssl_md_cleanup(&mc);
|
|
|
|
ssl_md_init(&mc,md);
|
|
|
|
/* hash mac key */
|
|
ssl_md_update(&mc,decoder->mac_key.data,decoder->mac_key.data_len);
|
|
|
|
/* hash padding and partial digest*/
|
|
memset(buf,0x5c,pad_ct);
|
|
ssl_md_update(&mc,buf,pad_ct);
|
|
ssl_md_update(&mc,dgst,len);
|
|
|
|
ssl_md_final(&mc,dgst,&len);
|
|
ssl_md_cleanup(&mc);
|
|
|
|
if(memcmp(mac,dgst,len))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gint
|
|
dtls_check_mac(SslDecoder*decoder, gint ct,int ver, guint8* data,
|
|
guint32 datalen, guint8* mac)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL_HMAC hm;
|
|
gint md;
|
|
guint32 len;
|
|
guint8 buf[DIGEST_MAX_SIZE];
|
|
gint16 temp;
|
|
|
|
md=ssl_get_digest_by_name(ssl_cipher_suite_dig(decoder->cipher_suite)->name);
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("dtls_check_mac mac type:%s md %d\n",
|
|
ssl_cipher_suite_dig(decoder->cipher_suite)->name, md);
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_hmac_init(&hm,decoder->mac_key.data,decoder->mac_key.data_len,md) != 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("dtls_check_mac seq: %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT " epoch: %d\n",decoder->seq,decoder->epoch);
|
|
/* hash sequence number */
|
|
phton64(buf, decoder->seq);
|
|
buf[0]=decoder->epoch>>8;
|
|
buf[1]=(guint8)decoder->epoch;
|
|
|
|
ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,8);
|
|
|
|
/* hash content type */
|
|
buf[0]=ct;
|
|
ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,1);
|
|
|
|
/* hash version,data length and data */
|
|
temp = g_htons(ver);
|
|
memcpy(buf, &temp, 2);
|
|
ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,2);
|
|
|
|
temp = g_htons(datalen);
|
|
memcpy(buf, &temp, 2);
|
|
ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,2);
|
|
ssl_hmac_update(&hm,data,datalen);
|
|
/* get digest and digest len */
|
|
len = sizeof(buf);
|
|
ssl_hmac_final(&hm,buf,&len);
|
|
ssl_hmac_cleanup(&hm);
|
|
ssl_print_data("Mac", buf, len);
|
|
if(memcmp(mac,buf,len))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
/* Decryption integrity check }}} */
|
|
|
|
|
|
static gboolean
|
|
tls_decrypt_aead_record(SslDecryptSession *ssl, SslDecoder *decoder,
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD
|
|
guint8 ct, guint16 record_version,
|
|
#else
|
|
guint8 ct _U_, guint16 record_version _U_,
|
|
#endif
|
|
const guchar *in, guint16 inl, StringInfo *out_str, guint *outl)
|
|
{
|
|
/* RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2) 6.2.3.3 defines the TLSCipherText.fragment as:
|
|
* GenericAEADCipher: { nonce_explicit, [content] }
|
|
* In TLS 1.3 this explicit nonce is gone.
|
|
* With AES GCM/CCM, "[content]" is actually the concatenation of the
|
|
* ciphertext and authentication tag.
|
|
*/
|
|
const guint16 version = ssl->session.version;
|
|
const gboolean is_v12 = version == TLSV1DOT2_VERSION || version == DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION;
|
|
gcry_error_t err;
|
|
const guchar *explicit_nonce = NULL, *ciphertext;
|
|
guint ciphertext_len, auth_tag_len;
|
|
guchar nonce[12];
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD
|
|
const guchar *auth_tag_wire;
|
|
guchar auth_tag_calc[16];
|
|
#else
|
|
guchar nonce_with_counter[16] = { 0 };
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
switch (decoder->cipher_suite->mode) {
|
|
case MODE_GCM:
|
|
case MODE_CCM:
|
|
auth_tag_len = 16;
|
|
break;
|
|
case MODE_CCM_8:
|
|
auth_tag_len = 8;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s unsupported cipher!\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Parse input into explicit nonce (TLS 1.2 only), ciphertext and tag. */
|
|
if (is_v12) {
|
|
if (inl < EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN + auth_tag_len) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s input %d is too small for explicit nonce %d and auth tag %d\n",
|
|
G_STRFUNC, inl, EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN, auth_tag_len);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
explicit_nonce = in;
|
|
ciphertext = explicit_nonce + EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN;
|
|
ciphertext_len = inl - EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN - auth_tag_len;
|
|
} else if (version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
|
|
if (inl < auth_tag_len) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s input %d has no space for auth tag %d\n", G_STRFUNC, inl, auth_tag_len);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
ciphertext = in;
|
|
ciphertext_len = inl - auth_tag_len;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s Unexpected TLS version %#x\n", G_STRFUNC, version);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD
|
|
auth_tag_wire = ciphertext + ciphertext_len;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Nonce construction is version-specific. */
|
|
if (is_v12) {
|
|
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(decoder->write_iv.data_len == IMPLICIT_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
/* Implicit (4) and explicit (8) part of nonce. */
|
|
memcpy(nonce, decoder->write_iv.data, IMPLICIT_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
memcpy(nonce + IMPLICIT_NONCE_LEN, explicit_nonce, EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
|
|
#ifndef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD
|
|
if (decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_GCM) {
|
|
/* NIST SP 800-38D, sect. 7.2 says that the 32-bit counter part starts
|
|
* at 1, and gets incremented before passing to the block cipher. */
|
|
memcpy(nonce_with_counter, nonce, IMPLICIT_NONCE_LEN + EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
nonce_with_counter[IMPLICIT_NONCE_LEN + EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN + 3] = 2;
|
|
} else { /* MODE_CCM and MODE_CCM_8 */
|
|
/* The nonce for CCM and GCM are the same, but the nonce is used as input
|
|
* in the CCM algorithm described in RFC 3610. The nonce generated here is
|
|
* the one from RFC 3610 sect 2.3. Encryption. */
|
|
/* Flags: (L-1) ; L = 16 - 1 - nonceSize */
|
|
nonce_with_counter[0] = 3 - 1;
|
|
memcpy(nonce_with_counter + 1, nonce, IMPLICIT_NONCE_LEN + EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN);
|
|
/* struct { opaque salt[4]; opaque nonce_explicit[8] } CCMNonce (RFC 6655) */
|
|
nonce_with_counter[IMPLICIT_NONCE_LEN + EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN + 3] = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
} else if (version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Technically the nonce length must be at least 8 bytes, but for
|
|
* AES-GCM, AES-CCM and Poly1305-ChaCha20 the nonce length is exact 12.
|
|
*/
|
|
const guint nonce_len = 12;
|
|
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(decoder->write_iv.data_len == nonce_len);
|
|
memcpy(nonce, decoder->write_iv.data, decoder->write_iv.data_len);
|
|
/* Sequence number is left-padded with zeroes and XORed with write_iv */
|
|
phton64(nonce + nonce_len - 8, pntoh64(nonce + nonce_len - 8) ^ decoder->seq);
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s seq %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT "\n", G_STRFUNC, decoder->seq);
|
|
decoder->seq++; /* Implicit sequence number for TLS 1.3. */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Set nonce and additional authentication data */
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD
|
|
gcry_cipher_reset(decoder->evp);
|
|
ssl_print_data("nonce", nonce, 12);
|
|
err = gcry_cipher_setiv(decoder->evp, nonce, 12);
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s failed to set nonce: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, gcry_strerror(err));
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CCM || decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CCM_8) {
|
|
/* size of plaintext, additional authenticated data and auth tag. */
|
|
guint64 lengths[3] = { ciphertext_len, is_v12 ? 13 : 0, auth_tag_len };
|
|
gcry_cipher_ctl(decoder->evp, GCRYCTL_SET_CCM_LENGTHS, lengths, sizeof(lengths));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* (D)TLS 1.2 needs specific AAD, TLS 1.3 uses empty AAD. */
|
|
if (is_v12) {
|
|
guchar aad[13];
|
|
phton64(aad, decoder->seq); /* record sequence number */
|
|
if (version == TLSV1DOT2_VERSION) {
|
|
decoder->seq++; /* Implicit sequence number for TLS 1.2. */
|
|
} else {
|
|
phton16(aad, decoder->epoch); /* DTLS 1.2 includes epoch. */
|
|
}
|
|
aad[8] = ct; /* TLSCompressed.type */
|
|
phton16(aad + 9, record_version); /* TLSCompressed.version */
|
|
phton16(aad + 11, ciphertext_len); /* TLSCompressed.length */
|
|
ssl_print_data("AAD", aad, sizeof(aad));
|
|
err = gcry_cipher_authenticate(decoder->evp, aad, sizeof(aad));
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s failed to set AAD: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, gcry_strerror(err));
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
err = gcry_cipher_setctr(decoder->evp, nonce_with_counter, 16);
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s failed: failed to set CTR: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, gcry_strerror(err));
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Decrypt now that nonce and AAD are set. */
|
|
err = gcry_cipher_decrypt(decoder->evp, out_str->data, out_str->data_len, ciphertext, ciphertext_len);
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s decrypt failed: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, gcry_strerror(err));
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check authentication tag for authenticity (replaces MAC) */
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD
|
|
err = gcry_cipher_gettag(decoder->evp, auth_tag_calc, auth_tag_len);
|
|
if (err == 0 && !memcmp(auth_tag_calc, auth_tag_wire, auth_tag_len)) {
|
|
ssl_print_data("auth_tag(OK)", auth_tag_calc, auth_tag_len);
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s cannot obtain tag: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, gcry_strerror(err));
|
|
} else {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s auth tag mismatch\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
ssl_print_data("auth_tag(expect)", auth_tag_calc, auth_tag_len);
|
|
ssl_print_data("auth_tag(actual)", auth_tag_wire, auth_tag_len);
|
|
}
|
|
if (ssl_ignore_mac_failed) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s: auth check failed, but ignored for troubleshooting ;-)\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
} else {
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("Libgcrypt is older than 1.6, unable to verify auth tag!\n");
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
ssl_print_data("Plaintext", out_str->data, ciphertext_len);
|
|
*outl = ciphertext_len;
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Record decryption glue based on security parameters {{{ */
|
|
/* Assume that we are called only for a non-NULL decoder which also means that
|
|
* we have a non-NULL decoder->cipher_suite. */
|
|
int
|
|
ssl_decrypt_record(SslDecryptSession *ssl, SslDecoder *decoder, guint8 ct, guint16 record_version,
|
|
const guchar *in, guint16 inl, StringInfo *comp_str, StringInfo *out_str, guint *outl)
|
|
{
|
|
guint pad, worklen, uncomplen, maclen, mac_fraglen = 0;
|
|
guint8 *mac = NULL, *mac_frag = NULL;
|
|
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record ciphertext len %d\n", inl);
|
|
ssl_print_data("Ciphertext",in, inl);
|
|
|
|
if ((ssl->session.version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) != (decoder->cipher_suite->kex == KEX_TLS13)) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s Invalid cipher suite for the protocol version!\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ensure we have enough storage space for decrypted data */
|
|
if (inl > out_str->data_len)
|
|
{
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: allocating %d bytes for decrypt data (old len %d)\n",
|
|
inl + 32, out_str->data_len);
|
|
ssl_data_realloc(out_str, inl + 32);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* AEAD ciphers (GenericAEADCipher in TLS 1.2; TLS 1.3) have no padding nor
|
|
* a separate MAC, so use a different routine for simplicity. */
|
|
if (decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_GCM ||
|
|
decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CCM ||
|
|
decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CCM_8 ||
|
|
ssl->session.version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
|
|
|
|
if (!tls_decrypt_aead_record(ssl, decoder, ct, record_version, in, inl, out_str, &worklen)) {
|
|
/* decryption failed */
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
goto skip_mac;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 6101/2246: SSLCipherText/TLSCipherText has two structures for types:
|
|
* (notation: { unencrypted, [ encrypted ] })
|
|
* GenericStreamCipher: { [content, mac] }
|
|
* GenericBlockCipher: { IV (TLS 1.1+), [content, mac, padding, padding_len] }
|
|
* RFC 5426 (TLS 1.2): TLSCipherText has additionally:
|
|
* GenericAEADCipher: { nonce_explicit, [content] }
|
|
* RFC 4347 (DTLS): based on TLS 1.1, only GenericBlockCipher is supported.
|
|
* RFC 6347 (DTLS 1.2): based on TLS 1.2, includes GenericAEADCipher too.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
maclen = ssl_cipher_suite_dig(decoder->cipher_suite)->len;
|
|
|
|
/* (TLS 1.1 and later, DTLS) Extract explicit IV for GenericBlockCipher */
|
|
if (decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CBC) {
|
|
guint blocksize = 0;
|
|
|
|
switch (ssl->session.version) {
|
|
case TLSV1DOT1_VERSION:
|
|
case TLSV1DOT2_VERSION:
|
|
case DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION:
|
|
case DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION:
|
|
case DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION:
|
|
blocksize = ssl_get_cipher_blocksize(decoder->cipher_suite);
|
|
if (inl < blocksize) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record failed: input %d has no space for IV %d\n",
|
|
inl, blocksize);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
pad = gcry_cipher_setiv(decoder->evp, in, blocksize);
|
|
if (pad != 0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record failed: failed to set IV: %s %s\n",
|
|
gcry_strsource (pad), gcry_strerror (pad));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
inl -= blocksize;
|
|
in += blocksize;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Encrypt-then-MAC for (D)TLS (RFC 7366) */
|
|
if (ssl->state & SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* MAC is calculated over (IV + ) ENCRYPTED contents:
|
|
*
|
|
* MAC(MAC_write_key, ... +
|
|
* IV + // for TLS 1.1 or greater
|
|
* TLSCiphertext.enc_content);
|
|
*/
|
|
if (inl < maclen) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s failed: input %d has no space for MAC %d\n",
|
|
G_STRFUNC, inl, maclen);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
inl -= maclen;
|
|
mac = (guint8 *)in + inl;
|
|
mac_frag = (guint8 *)in - blocksize;
|
|
mac_fraglen = blocksize + inl;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* First decrypt*/
|
|
if ((pad = ssl_cipher_decrypt(&decoder->evp, out_str->data, out_str->data_len, in, inl)) != 0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record failed: ssl_cipher_decrypt: %s %s\n", gcry_strsource (pad),
|
|
gcry_strerror (pad));
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl_print_data("Plaintext", out_str->data, inl);
|
|
worklen=inl;
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* strip padding for GenericBlockCipher */
|
|
if (decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CBC) {
|
|
if (inl < 1) { /* Should this check happen earlier? */
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record failed: input length %d too small\n", inl);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
pad=out_str->data[inl-1];
|
|
if (worklen <= pad) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record failed: padding %d too large for work %d\n",
|
|
pad, worklen);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
worklen-=(pad+1);
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record found padding %d final len %d\n",
|
|
pad, worklen);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* MAC for GenericStreamCipher and GenericBlockCipher.
|
|
* (normal case without Encrypt-then-MAC (RFC 7366) extension. */
|
|
if (!mac) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* MAC is calculated over the DECRYPTED contents:
|
|
*
|
|
* MAC(MAC_write_key, ... + TLSCompressed.fragment);
|
|
*/
|
|
if (worklen < maclen) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s wrong record len/padding outlen %d\n work %d\n", G_STRFUNC, *outl, worklen);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
worklen -= maclen;
|
|
mac = out_str->data + worklen;
|
|
mac_frag = out_str->data;
|
|
mac_fraglen = worklen;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If NULL encryption active and no keys are available, do not bother
|
|
* checking the MAC. We do not have keys for that. */
|
|
if (decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_STREAM &&
|
|
decoder->cipher_suite->enc == ENC_NULL &&
|
|
!(ssl->state & SSL_MASTER_SECRET)) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("MAC check skipped due to missing keys\n");
|
|
goto skip_mac;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Now check the MAC */
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("checking mac (len %d, version %X, ct %d seq %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT ")\n",
|
|
worklen, ssl->session.version, ct, decoder->seq);
|
|
if(ssl->session.version==SSLV3_VERSION){
|
|
if(ssl3_check_mac(decoder,ct,mac_frag,mac_fraglen,mac) < 0) {
|
|
if(ssl_ignore_mac_failed) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac failed, but ignored for troubleshooting ;-)\n");
|
|
}
|
|
else{
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac failed\n");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else{
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac ok\n");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if(ssl->session.version==TLSV1_VERSION || ssl->session.version==TLSV1DOT1_VERSION || ssl->session.version==TLSV1DOT2_VERSION){
|
|
if(tls_check_mac(decoder,ct,ssl->session.version,mac_frag,mac_fraglen,mac)< 0) {
|
|
if(ssl_ignore_mac_failed) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac failed, but ignored for troubleshooting ;-)\n");
|
|
}
|
|
else{
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac failed\n");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else{
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac ok\n");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if(ssl->session.version==DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION ||
|
|
ssl->session.version==DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION ||
|
|
ssl->session.version==DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION){
|
|
/* Try rfc-compliant mac first, and if failed, try old openssl's non-rfc-compliant mac */
|
|
if(dtls_check_mac(decoder,ct,ssl->session.version,mac_frag,mac_fraglen,mac)>= 0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac ok\n");
|
|
}
|
|
else if(tls_check_mac(decoder,ct,TLSV1_VERSION,mac_frag,mac_fraglen,mac)>= 0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: dtls rfc-compliant mac failed, but old openssl's non-rfc-compliant mac ok\n");
|
|
}
|
|
else if(ssl_ignore_mac_failed) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac failed, but ignored for troubleshooting ;-)\n");
|
|
}
|
|
else{
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac failed\n");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
skip_mac:
|
|
|
|
*outl = worklen;
|
|
|
|
if (decoder->compression > 0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: compression method %d\n", decoder->compression);
|
|
ssl_data_copy(comp_str, out_str);
|
|
ssl_print_data("Plaintext compressed", comp_str->data, worklen);
|
|
if (!decoder->decomp) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: no decoder available\n");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ssl_decompress_record(decoder->decomp, comp_str->data, worklen, out_str, &uncomplen) < 0) return -1;
|
|
ssl_print_data("Plaintext uncompressed", out_str->data, uncomplen);
|
|
*outl = uncomplen;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Record decryption glue based on security parameters }}} */
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS)
|
|
/* RSA private key file processing {{{ */
|
|
#define RSA_PARS 6
|
|
static gcry_sexp_t
|
|
ssl_privkey_to_sexp(gnutls_x509_privkey_t priv_key)
|
|
{
|
|
gnutls_datum_t rsa_datum[RSA_PARS]; /* m, e, d, p, q, u */
|
|
size_t tmp_size;
|
|
gcry_error_t gret;
|
|
gcry_sexp_t rsa_priv_key = NULL;
|
|
gint i;
|
|
gcry_mpi_t rsa_params[RSA_PARS];
|
|
|
|
/* RSA get parameter */
|
|
if (gnutls_x509_privkey_export_rsa_raw(priv_key,
|
|
&rsa_datum[0],
|
|
&rsa_datum[1],
|
|
&rsa_datum[2],
|
|
&rsa_datum[3],
|
|
&rsa_datum[4],
|
|
&rsa_datum[5]) != 0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_load_key: can't export rsa param (is a rsa private key file ?!?)\n");
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* convert each rsa parameter to mpi format*/
|
|
for(i=0; i<RSA_PARS; i++) {
|
|
gret = gcry_mpi_scan(&rsa_params[i], GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, rsa_datum[i].data, rsa_datum[i].size,&tmp_size);
|
|
/* these buffers were allocated by gnutls_x509_privkey_export_rsa_raw() */
|
|
g_free(rsa_datum[i].data);
|
|
if (gret != 0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_load_key: can't convert m rsa param to int (size %d)\n", rsa_datum[i].size);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* libgcrypt expects p < q, and gnutls might not return it as such, depending on gnutls version and its crypto backend */
|
|
if (gcry_mpi_cmp(rsa_params[3], rsa_params[4]) > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_load_key: swapping p and q parameters and recomputing u\n");
|
|
/* p, q = q, p */
|
|
gcry_mpi_swap(rsa_params[3], rsa_params[4]);
|
|
/* due to swapping p and q, u = p^-1 mod p which happens to be needed. */
|
|
}
|
|
/* libgcrypt expects u = p^-1 mod q (for OpenPGP), but the u parameter
|
|
* says u = q^-1 mod p. Recompute u = p^-1 mod q. Do this unconditionally as
|
|
* at least GnuTLS 2.12.23 computes an invalid value. */
|
|
gcry_mpi_invm(rsa_params[5], rsa_params[3], rsa_params[4]);
|
|
|
|
if (gcry_sexp_build( &rsa_priv_key, NULL,
|
|
"(private-key(rsa((n%m)(e%m)(d%m)(p%m)(q%m)(u%m))))", rsa_params[0],
|
|
rsa_params[1], rsa_params[2], rsa_params[3], rsa_params[4],
|
|
rsa_params[5]) != 0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_load_key: can't build rsa private key s-exp\n");
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i< 6; i++)
|
|
gcry_mpi_release(rsa_params[i]);
|
|
return rsa_priv_key;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Load an RSA private key from specified file
|
|
@param fp the file that contain the key data
|
|
@return a pointer to the loaded key on success, or NULL */
|
|
static gnutls_x509_privkey_t
|
|
ssl_load_key(FILE* fp)
|
|
{
|
|
/* gnutls makes our work much harder, since we have to work internally with
|
|
* s-exp formatted data, but PEM loader exports only in "gnutls_datum_t"
|
|
* format, and a datum -> s-exp convertion function does not exist.
|
|
*/
|
|
gnutls_x509_privkey_t priv_key;
|
|
gnutls_datum_t key;
|
|
ws_statb64 statbuf;
|
|
gint ret;
|
|
guint bytes;
|
|
|
|
if (ws_fstat64(ws_fileno(fp), &statbuf) == -1) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_load_key: can't ws_fstat64 file\n");
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode)) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_load_key: file is a directory\n");
|
|
errno = EISDIR;
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (S_ISFIFO(statbuf.st_mode)) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_load_key: file is a named pipe\n");
|
|
errno = EINVAL;
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode)) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_load_key: file is not a regular file\n");
|
|
errno = EINVAL;
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
/* XXX - check for a too-big size */
|
|
/* load all file contents into a datum buffer*/
|
|
key.data = (unsigned char *)g_malloc((size_t)statbuf.st_size);
|
|
key.size = (int)statbuf.st_size;
|
|
bytes = (guint) fread(key.data, 1, key.size, fp);
|
|
if (bytes < key.size) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_load_key: can't read from file %d bytes, got %d\n",
|
|
key.size, bytes);
|
|
g_free(key.data);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* init private key data*/
|
|
gnutls_x509_privkey_init(&priv_key);
|
|
|
|
/* import PEM data*/
|
|
if ((ret = gnutls_x509_privkey_import(priv_key, &key, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM)) != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_load_key: can't import pem data: %s\n", gnutls_strerror(ret));
|
|
g_free(key.data);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (gnutls_x509_privkey_get_pk_algorithm(priv_key) != GNUTLS_PK_RSA) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_load_key: private key public key algorithm isn't RSA\n");
|
|
g_free(key.data);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
g_free(key.data);
|
|
|
|
return priv_key;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const char *
|
|
BAGTYPE(gnutls_pkcs12_bag_type_t x) {
|
|
switch (x) {
|
|
case GNUTLS_BAG_EMPTY: return "Empty";
|
|
case GNUTLS_BAG_PKCS8_ENCRYPTED_KEY: return "PKCS#8 Encrypted key";
|
|
case GNUTLS_BAG_PKCS8_KEY: return "PKCS#8 Key";
|
|
case GNUTLS_BAG_CERTIFICATE: return "Certificate";
|
|
case GNUTLS_BAG_CRL: return "CRL";
|
|
case GNUTLS_BAG_ENCRYPTED: return "Encrypted";
|
|
case GNUTLS_BAG_UNKNOWN: return "Unknown";
|
|
default: return "<undefined>";
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Load a RSA private key from a PKCS#12 file.
|
|
* @param fp the file that contains the key data.
|
|
* @param cert_passwd password to decrypt the PKCS#12 file.
|
|
* @param[out] err error message upon failure; NULL upon success.
|
|
* @return a pointer to the loaded key on success; NULL upon failure.
|
|
*/
|
|
static gnutls_x509_privkey_t
|
|
ssl_load_pkcs12(FILE* fp, const gchar *cert_passwd, char** err) {
|
|
|
|
int i, j, ret;
|
|
int rest;
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
gnutls_datum_t data;
|
|
gnutls_pkcs12_bag_t bag = NULL;
|
|
gnutls_pkcs12_bag_type_t bag_type;
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
|
|
gnutls_pkcs12_t ssl_p12 = NULL;
|
|
gnutls_x509_privkey_t ssl_pkey = NULL;
|
|
|
|
gnutls_x509_privkey_t priv_key = NULL;
|
|
*err = NULL;
|
|
|
|
rest = 4096;
|
|
data.data = (unsigned char *)g_malloc(rest);
|
|
data.size = rest;
|
|
p = data.data;
|
|
while ((len = fread(p, 1, rest, fp)) > 0) {
|
|
p += len;
|
|
rest -= (int) len;
|
|
if (!rest) {
|
|
rest = 1024;
|
|
data.data = (unsigned char *)g_realloc(data.data, data.size + rest);
|
|
p = data.data + data.size;
|
|
data.size += rest;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
data.size -= rest;
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%d bytes read\n", data.size);
|
|
if (!feof(fp)) {
|
|
*err = g_strdup("Error during certificate reading.");
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s\n", *err);
|
|
g_free(data.data);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = gnutls_pkcs12_init(&ssl_p12);
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
*err = g_strdup_printf("gnutls_pkcs12_init(&st_p12) - %s", gnutls_strerror(ret));
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s\n", *err);
|
|
g_free(data.data);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* load PKCS#12 in DER or PEM format */
|
|
ret = gnutls_pkcs12_import(ssl_p12, &data, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER, 0);
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
*err = g_strdup_printf("could not load PKCS#12 in DER format: %s", gnutls_strerror(ret));
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s\n", *err);
|
|
g_free(*err);
|
|
|
|
ret = gnutls_pkcs12_import(ssl_p12, &data, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM, 0);
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
*err = g_strdup_printf("could not load PKCS#12 in PEM format: %s", gnutls_strerror(ret));
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s\n", *err);
|
|
} else {
|
|
*err = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
g_free(data.data);
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl_debug_printf( "PKCS#12 imported\n");
|
|
|
|
/* TODO: Use gnutls_pkcs12_simple_parse, since 3.1.0 (August 2012) */
|
|
for (i=0; ; i++) {
|
|
|
|
ret = gnutls_pkcs12_bag_init(&bag);
|
|
if (ret < 0) break;
|
|
|
|
ret = gnutls_pkcs12_get_bag(ssl_p12, i, bag);
|
|
if (ret < 0) break;
|
|
|
|
for (j=0; j<gnutls_pkcs12_bag_get_count(bag); j++) {
|
|
|
|
ret = gnutls_pkcs12_bag_get_type(bag, j);
|
|
if (ret < 0) goto done;
|
|
bag_type = (gnutls_pkcs12_bag_type_t)ret;
|
|
if (bag_type >= GNUTLS_BAG_UNKNOWN) goto done;
|
|
ssl_debug_printf( "Bag %d/%d: %s\n", i, j, BAGTYPE(bag_type));
|
|
if (bag_type == GNUTLS_BAG_ENCRYPTED) {
|
|
ret = gnutls_pkcs12_bag_decrypt(bag, cert_passwd);
|
|
if (ret == 0) {
|
|
ret = gnutls_pkcs12_bag_get_type(bag, j);
|
|
if (ret < 0) goto done;
|
|
bag_type = (gnutls_pkcs12_bag_type_t)ret;
|
|
if (bag_type >= GNUTLS_BAG_UNKNOWN) goto done;
|
|
ssl_debug_printf( "Bag %d/%d decrypted: %s\n", i, j, BAGTYPE(bag_type));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = gnutls_pkcs12_bag_get_data(bag, j, &data);
|
|
if (ret < 0) goto done;
|
|
|
|
switch (bag_type) {
|
|
|
|
case GNUTLS_BAG_PKCS8_KEY:
|
|
case GNUTLS_BAG_PKCS8_ENCRYPTED_KEY:
|
|
|
|
ret = gnutls_x509_privkey_init(&ssl_pkey);
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
*err = g_strdup_printf("gnutls_x509_privkey_init(&ssl_pkey) - %s", gnutls_strerror(ret));
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s\n", *err);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = gnutls_x509_privkey_import_pkcs8(ssl_pkey, &data, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER, cert_passwd,
|
|
(bag_type==GNUTLS_BAG_PKCS8_KEY) ? GNUTLS_PKCS_PLAIN : 0);
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
*err = g_strdup_printf("Can not decrypt private key - %s", gnutls_strerror(ret));
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s\n", *err);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (gnutls_x509_privkey_get_pk_algorithm(ssl_pkey) != GNUTLS_PK_RSA) {
|
|
*err = g_strdup("ssl_load_pkcs12: private key public key algorithm isn't RSA");
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s\n", *err);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Private key found, return it. */
|
|
priv_key = ssl_pkey;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
default: ;
|
|
}
|
|
} /* j */
|
|
if (bag) { gnutls_pkcs12_bag_deinit(bag); bag = NULL; }
|
|
} /* i */
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
if (!priv_key && ssl_pkey)
|
|
gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit(ssl_pkey);
|
|
if (bag)
|
|
gnutls_pkcs12_bag_deinit(bag);
|
|
|
|
return priv_key;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_private_key_free(gpointer key)
|
|
{
|
|
gcry_sexp_release((gcry_sexp_t) key);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
ssl_find_private_key_by_pubkey(SslDecryptSession *ssl, GHashTable *key_hash,
|
|
gnutls_datum_t *subjectPublicKeyInfo)
|
|
{
|
|
gnutls_pubkey_t pubkey = NULL;
|
|
guchar key_id[20];
|
|
size_t key_id_len = sizeof(key_id);
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
if (!subjectPublicKeyInfo->size) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s: could not find SubjectPublicKeyInfo\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r = gnutls_pubkey_init(&pubkey);
|
|
if (r < 0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s: failed to init pubkey: %s\n",
|
|
G_STRFUNC, gnutls_strerror(r));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r = gnutls_pubkey_import(pubkey, subjectPublicKeyInfo, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
|
|
if (r < 0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s: failed to import pubkey from handshake: %s\n",
|
|
G_STRFUNC, gnutls_strerror(r));
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Generate a 20-byte SHA-1 hash. */
|
|
r = gnutls_pubkey_get_key_id(pubkey, 0, key_id, &key_id_len);
|
|
if (r < 0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s: failed to extract key id from pubkey: %s\n",
|
|
G_STRFUNC, gnutls_strerror(r));
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl_print_data("lookup(KeyID)", key_id, key_id_len);
|
|
ssl->private_key = (gcry_sexp_t)g_hash_table_lookup(key_hash, key_id);
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s: lookup result: %p\n", G_STRFUNC, (void *) ssl->private_key);
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
gnutls_pubkey_deinit(pubkey);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* RSA private key file processing }}} */
|
|
|
|
#else /* ! defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS) */
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_private_key_free(gpointer key _U_)
|
|
{
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* ! defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS) */
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*--- Start of dissector-related code below ---*/
|
|
|
|
/* get ssl data for this session. if no ssl data is found allocate a new one*/
|
|
SslDecryptSession *
|
|
ssl_get_session(conversation_t *conversation, dissector_handle_t ssl_handle)
|
|
{
|
|
void *conv_data;
|
|
SslDecryptSession *ssl_session;
|
|
int proto_ssl;
|
|
|
|
proto_ssl = dissector_handle_get_protocol_index(ssl_handle);
|
|
conv_data = conversation_get_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl);
|
|
if (conv_data != NULL)
|
|
return (SslDecryptSession *)conv_data;
|
|
|
|
/* no previous SSL conversation info, initialize it. */
|
|
ssl_session = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), SslDecryptSession);
|
|
|
|
/* data_len is the part that is meaningful, not the allocated length */
|
|
ssl_session->master_secret.data_len = 0;
|
|
ssl_session->master_secret.data = ssl_session->_master_secret;
|
|
ssl_session->session_id.data_len = 0;
|
|
ssl_session->session_id.data = ssl_session->_session_id;
|
|
ssl_session->client_random.data_len = 0;
|
|
ssl_session->client_random.data = ssl_session->_client_random;
|
|
ssl_session->server_random.data_len = 0;
|
|
ssl_session->server_random.data = ssl_session->_server_random;
|
|
ssl_session->session_ticket.data_len = 0;
|
|
ssl_session->session_ticket.data = NULL; /* will be re-alloced as needed */
|
|
ssl_session->server_data_for_iv.data_len = 0;
|
|
ssl_session->server_data_for_iv.data = ssl_session->_server_data_for_iv;
|
|
ssl_session->client_data_for_iv.data_len = 0;
|
|
ssl_session->client_data_for_iv.data = ssl_session->_client_data_for_iv;
|
|
ssl_session->app_data_segment.data = NULL;
|
|
ssl_session->app_data_segment.data_len = 0;
|
|
ssl_session->handshake_data.data=NULL;
|
|
ssl_session->handshake_data.data_len=0;
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize parameters which are not necessary specific to decryption. */
|
|
ssl_session->session.version = SSL_VER_UNKNOWN;
|
|
clear_address(&ssl_session->session.srv_addr);
|
|
ssl_session->session.srv_ptype = PT_NONE;
|
|
ssl_session->session.srv_port = 0;
|
|
|
|
conversation_add_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl, ssl_session);
|
|
return ssl_session;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Resets the decryption parameters for the next decoder. */
|
|
static void ssl_reset_session(SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl, gboolean is_client)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ssl) {
|
|
/* Ensure that secrets are not restored using stale identifiers. Split
|
|
* between client and server in case the packets somehow got out of order. */
|
|
gint clear_flags = SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY | SSL_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET;
|
|
|
|
if (is_client) {
|
|
clear_flags |= SSL_CLIENT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET;
|
|
ssl->session_id.data_len = 0;
|
|
ssl->session_ticket.data_len = 0;
|
|
ssl->master_secret.data_len = 0;
|
|
ssl->client_random.data_len = 0;
|
|
ssl->has_early_data = FALSE;
|
|
} else {
|
|
clear_flags |= SSL_SERVER_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET;
|
|
ssl->server_random.data_len = 0;
|
|
ssl->pre_master_secret.data_len = 0;
|
|
#if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS)
|
|
ssl->private_key = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
ssl->psk.data_len = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->state & clear_flags) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s detected renegotiation, clearing 0x%02x (%s side)\n",
|
|
G_STRFUNC, ssl->state & clear_flags, is_client ? "client" : "server");
|
|
ssl->state &= ~clear_flags;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* These flags might be used for non-decryption purposes and may affect the
|
|
* dissection, so reset them as well. */
|
|
if (is_client) {
|
|
session->client_cert_type = 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
session->compression = 0;
|
|
session->server_cert_type = 0;
|
|
/* session->is_session_resumed is already handled in the ServerHello dissection. */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static guint32
|
|
ssl_starttls(dissector_handle_t ssl_handle, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
dissector_handle_t app_handle, guint32 last_nontls_frame)
|
|
{
|
|
conversation_t *conversation;
|
|
SslSession *session;
|
|
|
|
/* Ignore if the SSL dissector is disabled. */
|
|
if (!ssl_handle)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* The caller should always pass a valid handle to its own dissector. */
|
|
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(app_handle);
|
|
|
|
conversation = find_or_create_conversation(pinfo);
|
|
session = &ssl_get_session(conversation, ssl_handle)->session;
|
|
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s: old frame %d, app_handle=%p (%s)\n", G_STRFUNC,
|
|
session->last_nontls_frame,
|
|
(void *)session->app_handle,
|
|
dissector_handle_get_dissector_name(session->app_handle));
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s: current frame %d, app_handle=%p (%s)\n", G_STRFUNC,
|
|
pinfo->num, (void *)app_handle,
|
|
dissector_handle_get_dissector_name(app_handle));
|
|
|
|
/* Do not switch again if a dissector did it before. */
|
|
if (session->last_nontls_frame) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s: not overriding previous app handle!\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
return session->last_nontls_frame;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
session->app_handle = app_handle;
|
|
/* The SSL dissector should be called first for this conversation. */
|
|
conversation_set_dissector(conversation, ssl_handle);
|
|
/* SSL starts after this frame. */
|
|
session->last_nontls_frame = last_nontls_frame;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
} /* }}} */
|
|
|
|
/* ssl_starttls_ack: mark future frames as encrypted. {{{ */
|
|
guint32
|
|
ssl_starttls_ack(dissector_handle_t ssl_handle, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
dissector_handle_t app_handle)
|
|
{
|
|
return ssl_starttls(ssl_handle, pinfo, app_handle, pinfo->num);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
guint32
|
|
ssl_starttls_post_ack(dissector_handle_t ssl_handle, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
dissector_handle_t app_handle)
|
|
{
|
|
return ssl_starttls(ssl_handle, pinfo, app_handle, pinfo->num - 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dissector_handle_t
|
|
ssl_find_appdata_dissector(const char *name)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Accept 'http' for backwards compatibility and sanity. */
|
|
if (!strcmp(name, "http"))
|
|
name = "http-over-tls";
|
|
return find_dissector(name);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Functions for TLS/DTLS sessions and RSA private keys hashtables. {{{ */
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_equal (gconstpointer v, gconstpointer v2)
|
|
{
|
|
const StringInfo *val1;
|
|
const StringInfo *val2;
|
|
val1 = (const StringInfo *)v;
|
|
val2 = (const StringInfo *)v2;
|
|
|
|
if (val1->data_len == val2->data_len &&
|
|
!memcmp(val1->data, val2->data, val2->data_len)) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static guint
|
|
ssl_hash (gconstpointer v)
|
|
{
|
|
guint l,hash;
|
|
const StringInfo* id;
|
|
const guint* cur;
|
|
hash = 0;
|
|
id = (const StringInfo*) v;
|
|
|
|
/* id and id->data are mallocated in ssl_save_master_key(). As such 'data'
|
|
* should be aligned for any kind of access (for example as a guint as
|
|
* is done below). The intermediate void* cast is to prevent "cast
|
|
* increases required alignment of target type" warnings on CPUs (such
|
|
* as SPARCs) that do not allow misaligned memory accesses.
|
|
*/
|
|
cur = (const guint*)(void*) id->data;
|
|
|
|
for (l=4; (l < id->data_len); l+=4, cur++)
|
|
hash = hash ^ (*cur);
|
|
|
|
return hash;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
gboolean
|
|
ssl_private_key_equal (gconstpointer v, gconstpointer v2)
|
|
{
|
|
/* key ID length (SHA-1 hash, per GNUTLS_KEYID_USE_SHA1) */
|
|
return !memcmp(v, v2, 20);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
guint
|
|
ssl_private_key_hash (gconstpointer v)
|
|
{
|
|
guint l, hash = 0;
|
|
const guint8 *cur = (const guint8 *)v;
|
|
|
|
/* The public key' SHA-1 hash (which maps to a private key) has a uniform
|
|
* distribution, hence simply xor'ing them should be sufficient. */
|
|
for (l = 0; l < 20; l += 4, cur += 4)
|
|
hash ^= pntoh32(cur);
|
|
|
|
return hash;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Functions for TLS/DTLS sessions and RSA private keys hashtables. }}} */
|
|
|
|
/* Handling of association between tls/dtls ports and clear text protocol. {{{ */
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_association_add(const char* dissector_table_name, dissector_handle_t main_handle, dissector_handle_t subdissector_handle, guint port, gboolean tcp)
|
|
{
|
|
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(main_handle);
|
|
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(subdissector_handle);
|
|
/* Registration is required for Export PDU feature to work properly. */
|
|
DISSECTOR_ASSERT_HINT(dissector_handle_get_dissector_name(subdissector_handle),
|
|
"SSL appdata dissectors must register with register_dissector()!");
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("association_add %s port %d handle %p\n", dissector_table_name, port, (void *)subdissector_handle);
|
|
|
|
if (port) {
|
|
dissector_add_uint(dissector_table_name, port, subdissector_handle);
|
|
if (tcp)
|
|
dissector_add_uint("tcp.port", port, main_handle);
|
|
else
|
|
dissector_add_uint("udp.port", port, main_handle);
|
|
dissector_add_uint("sctp.port", port, main_handle);
|
|
} else {
|
|
dissector_add_for_decode_as(dissector_table_name, subdissector_handle);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_association_remove(const char* dissector_table_name, dissector_handle_t main_handle, dissector_handle_t subdissector_handle, guint port, gboolean tcp)
|
|
{
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_association_remove removing %s %u - handle %p\n",
|
|
tcp?"TCP":"UDP", port, (void *)subdissector_handle);
|
|
if (main_handle) {
|
|
dissector_delete_uint(tcp?"tcp.port":"udp.port", port, main_handle);
|
|
dissector_delete_uint("sctp.port", port, main_handle);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (port) {
|
|
dissector_delete_uint(dissector_table_name, port, subdissector_handle);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_set_server(SslSession *session, address *addr, port_type ptype, guint32 port)
|
|
{
|
|
copy_address_wmem(wmem_file_scope(), &session->srv_addr, addr);
|
|
session->srv_ptype = ptype;
|
|
session->srv_port = port;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
ssl_packet_from_server(SslSession *session, dissector_table_t table, packet_info *pinfo)
|
|
{
|
|
gint ret;
|
|
if (session->srv_addr.type != AT_NONE) {
|
|
ret = (session->srv_ptype == pinfo->ptype) &&
|
|
(session->srv_port == pinfo->srcport) &&
|
|
addresses_equal(&session->srv_addr, &pinfo->src);
|
|
} else {
|
|
ret = (dissector_get_uint_handle(table, pinfo->srcport) != 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("packet_from_server: is from server - %s\n", (ret)?"TRUE":"FALSE");
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Handling of association between tls/dtls ports and clear text protocol. }}} */
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Links SSL records with the real packet data. {{{ */
|
|
/**
|
|
* Remembers the decrypted TLS record fragment (TLSInnerPlaintext in TLS 1.3) to
|
|
* avoid the need for a decoder in the second pass. Additionally, it remembers
|
|
* sequence numbers (for reassembly and Follow SSL Stream).
|
|
*
|
|
* @param proto The protocol identifier (proto_ssl or proto_dtls).
|
|
* @param pinfo The packet where the record originates from.
|
|
* @param data Decrypted data to store in the record.
|
|
* @param data_len Length of decrypted record data.
|
|
* @param record_id The identifier for this record within the current packet.
|
|
* @param flow Information about sequence numbers, etc.
|
|
* @param type TLS Content Type (such as handshake or application_data).
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_add_record_info(gint proto, packet_info *pinfo, const guchar *data, gint data_len, gint record_id, SslFlow *flow, ContentType type)
|
|
{
|
|
SslRecordInfo* rec, **prec;
|
|
SslPacketInfo* pi;
|
|
|
|
pi = (SslPacketInfo *)p_get_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto, 0);
|
|
if (!pi)
|
|
{
|
|
pi = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), SslPacketInfo);
|
|
p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto, 0, pi);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rec = wmem_new(wmem_file_scope(), SslRecordInfo);
|
|
rec->plain_data = (guchar *)wmem_memdup(wmem_file_scope(), data, data_len);
|
|
rec->data_len = data_len;
|
|
rec->id = record_id;
|
|
rec->type = type;
|
|
rec->next = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* TODO allow Handshake records also to be reassembled. There needs to be
|
|
* one "flow" for each record type (appdata, handshake). "seq" for the
|
|
* record should then be relative within this flow. */
|
|
if (flow && type == SSL_ID_APP_DATA) {
|
|
rec->seq = flow->byte_seq;
|
|
rec->flow = flow;
|
|
flow->byte_seq += data_len;
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s stored decrypted record seq=%d nxtseq=%d flow=%p\n",
|
|
G_STRFUNC, rec->seq, rec->seq + data_len, (void*)flow);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Remember decrypted records. */
|
|
prec = &pi->records;
|
|
while (*prec) prec = &(*prec)->next;
|
|
*prec = rec;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* search in packet data for the specified id; return a newly created tvb for the associated data */
|
|
tvbuff_t*
|
|
ssl_get_record_info(tvbuff_t *parent_tvb, int proto, packet_info *pinfo, gint record_id, SslRecordInfo **matched_record)
|
|
{
|
|
SslRecordInfo* rec;
|
|
SslPacketInfo* pi;
|
|
pi = (SslPacketInfo *)p_get_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (!pi)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
for (rec = pi->records; rec; rec = rec->next)
|
|
if (rec->id == record_id) {
|
|
*matched_record = rec;
|
|
/* link new real_data_tvb with a parent tvb so it is freed when frame dissection is complete */
|
|
return tvb_new_child_real_data(parent_tvb, rec->plain_data, rec->data_len, rec->data_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Links SSL records with the real packet data. }}} */
|
|
|
|
/* initialize/reset per capture state data (ssl sessions cache). {{{ */
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_common_init(ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map,
|
|
StringInfo *decrypted_data, StringInfo *compressed_data)
|
|
{
|
|
mk_map->session = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
|
|
mk_map->tickets = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
|
|
mk_map->crandom = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
|
|
mk_map->pre_master = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
|
|
mk_map->pms = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
|
|
mk_map->tls13_client_early = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
|
|
mk_map->tls13_client_handshake = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
|
|
mk_map->tls13_server_handshake = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
|
|
mk_map->tls13_client_appdata = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
|
|
mk_map->tls13_server_appdata = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
|
|
ssl_data_alloc(decrypted_data, 32);
|
|
ssl_data_alloc(compressed_data, 32);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_common_cleanup(ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map, FILE **ssl_keylog_file,
|
|
StringInfo *decrypted_data, StringInfo *compressed_data)
|
|
{
|
|
g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->session);
|
|
g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->tickets);
|
|
g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->crandom);
|
|
g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->pre_master);
|
|
g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->pms);
|
|
g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->tls13_client_early);
|
|
g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->tls13_client_handshake);
|
|
g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->tls13_server_handshake);
|
|
g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->tls13_client_appdata);
|
|
g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->tls13_server_appdata);
|
|
|
|
g_free(decrypted_data->data);
|
|
g_free(compressed_data->data);
|
|
|
|
/* close the previous keylog file now that the cache are cleared, this
|
|
* allows the cache to be filled with the full keylog file contents. */
|
|
if (*ssl_keylog_file) {
|
|
fclose(*ssl_keylog_file);
|
|
*ssl_keylog_file = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* }}} */
|
|
|
|
/* parse ssl related preferences (private keys and ports association strings) */
|
|
#if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS)
|
|
/* Load a single RSA key file item from preferences. {{{ */
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_parse_key_list(const ssldecrypt_assoc_t *uats, GHashTable *key_hash, const char* dissector_table_name, dissector_handle_t main_handle, gboolean tcp)
|
|
{
|
|
gnutls_x509_privkey_t priv_key;
|
|
gcry_sexp_t private_key;
|
|
FILE* fp = NULL;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
size_t key_id_len = 20;
|
|
guchar *key_id = NULL;
|
|
dissector_handle_t handle;
|
|
/* try to load keys file first */
|
|
fp = ws_fopen(uats->keyfile, "rb");
|
|
if (!fp) {
|
|
report_open_failure(uats->keyfile, errno, FALSE);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((gint)strlen(uats->password) == 0) {
|
|
priv_key = ssl_load_key(fp);
|
|
} else {
|
|
char *err = NULL;
|
|
priv_key = ssl_load_pkcs12(fp, uats->password, &err);
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
report_failure("%s\n", err);
|
|
g_free(err);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
fclose(fp);
|
|
|
|
if (!priv_key) {
|
|
report_failure("Can't load private key from %s\n", uats->keyfile);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key_id = (guchar *) g_malloc0(key_id_len);
|
|
ret = gnutls_x509_privkey_get_key_id(priv_key, 0, key_id, &key_id_len);
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
report_failure("Can't calculate public key ID for %s: %s",
|
|
uats->keyfile, gnutls_strerror(ret));
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
ssl_print_data("KeyID", key_id, key_id_len);
|
|
|
|
private_key = ssl_privkey_to_sexp(priv_key);
|
|
if (!private_key) {
|
|
report_failure("Can't extract private key parameters for %s", uats->keyfile);
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
g_hash_table_replace(key_hash, key_id, private_key);
|
|
key_id = NULL; /* used in key_hash, do not free. */
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_init private key file %s successfully loaded.\n", uats->keyfile);
|
|
|
|
handle = ssl_find_appdata_dissector(uats->protocol);
|
|
if (handle) {
|
|
/* Port to subprotocol mapping */
|
|
guint16 port = 0;
|
|
if (ws_strtou16(uats->port, NULL, &port)) {
|
|
if (port > 0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_init port '%d' filename '%s' password(only for p12 file) '%s'\n",
|
|
port, uats->keyfile, uats->password);
|
|
|
|
ssl_association_add(dissector_table_name, main_handle, handle, port, tcp);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (strcmp(uats->port, "start_tls"))
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("invalid ssl_init_port: %s\n", uats->port);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit(priv_key);
|
|
g_free(key_id);
|
|
}
|
|
/* }}} */
|
|
#else
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_parse_key_list(const ssldecrypt_assoc_t *uats _U_, GHashTable *key_hash _U_, const char* dissector_table_name _U_, dissector_handle_t main_handle _U_, gboolean tcp _U_)
|
|
{
|
|
report_failure("Can't load private key files, support is not compiled in.");
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Store/load a known (pre-)master secret from/for this SSL session. {{{ */
|
|
/** store a known (pre-)master secret into cache */
|
|
static void
|
|
ssl_save_master_key(const char *label, GHashTable *ht, StringInfo *key,
|
|
StringInfo *mk)
|
|
{
|
|
StringInfo *ht_key, *master_secret;
|
|
|
|
if (key->data_len == 0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s: not saving empty %s!\n", G_STRFUNC, label);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (mk->data_len == 0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s not saving empty (pre-)master secret for %s!\n",
|
|
G_STRFUNC, label);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ssl_hash() depends on session_ticket->data being aligned for guint access
|
|
* so be careful in changing how it is allocated. */
|
|
ht_key = ssl_data_clone(key);
|
|
master_secret = ssl_data_clone(mk);
|
|
g_hash_table_insert(ht, ht_key, master_secret);
|
|
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s inserted (pre-)master secret for %s\n", G_STRFUNC, label);
|
|
ssl_print_string("stored key", ht_key);
|
|
ssl_print_string("stored (pre-)master secret", master_secret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** restore a (pre-)master secret given some key in the cache */
|
|
static gboolean
|
|
ssl_restore_master_key(SslDecryptSession *ssl, const char *label,
|
|
gboolean is_pre_master, GHashTable *ht, StringInfo *key)
|
|
{
|
|
StringInfo *ms;
|
|
|
|
if (key->data_len == 0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't restore %smaster secret using an empty %s\n",
|
|
G_STRFUNC, is_pre_master ? "pre-" : "", label);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ms = (StringInfo *)g_hash_table_lookup(ht, key);
|
|
if (!ms) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't find %smaster secret by %s\n", G_STRFUNC,
|
|
is_pre_master ? "pre-" : "", label);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* (pre)master secret found, clear knowledge of other keys and set it in the
|
|
* current conversation */
|
|
ssl->state &= ~(SSL_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET |
|
|
SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY);
|
|
if (is_pre_master) {
|
|
/* unlike master secret, pre-master secret has a variable size (48 for
|
|
* RSA, varying for PSK) and is therefore not statically allocated */
|
|
ssl->pre_master_secret.data = (guchar *) wmem_alloc(wmem_file_scope(),
|
|
ms->data_len);
|
|
ssl_data_set(&ssl->pre_master_secret, ms->data, ms->data_len);
|
|
ssl->state |= SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ssl_data_set(&ssl->master_secret, ms->data, ms->data_len);
|
|
ssl->state |= SSL_MASTER_SECRET;
|
|
}
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s %smaster secret retrieved using %s\n", G_STRFUNC,
|
|
is_pre_master ? "pre-" : "", label);
|
|
ssl_print_string(label, key);
|
|
ssl_print_string("(pre-)master secret", ms);
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Store/load a known (pre-)master secret from/for this SSL session. }}} */
|
|
|
|
/* Should be called when all parameters are ready (after ChangeCipherSpec), and
|
|
* the decoder should be attempted to be initialized. {{{*/
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_finalize_decryption(SslDecryptSession *ssl, ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ssl->session.version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
|
|
/* TLS 1.3 implementations only provide secrets derived from the master
|
|
* secret which are loaded in tls13_change_key. No master secrets can be
|
|
* loaded here, so just return. */
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s state = 0x%02X\n", G_STRFUNC, ssl->state);
|
|
if (ssl->state & SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf(" session key already available, nothing to do.\n");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!(ssl->state & SSL_CIPHER)) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf(" Cipher suite (Server Hello) is missing!\n");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* for decryption, there needs to be a master secret (which can be derived
|
|
* from pre-master secret). If missing, try to pick a master key from cache
|
|
* (an earlier packet in the capture or key logfile). */
|
|
if (!(ssl->state & (SSL_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET)) &&
|
|
!ssl_restore_master_key(ssl, "Session ID", FALSE,
|
|
mk_map->session, &ssl->session_id) &&
|
|
(!ssl->session.is_session_resumed ||
|
|
!ssl_restore_master_key(ssl, "Session Ticket", FALSE,
|
|
mk_map->tickets, &ssl->session_ticket)) &&
|
|
!ssl_restore_master_key(ssl, "Client Random", FALSE,
|
|
mk_map->crandom, &ssl->client_random)) {
|
|
if (ssl->cipher_suite->enc != ENC_NULL) {
|
|
/* how unfortunate, the master secret could not be found */
|
|
ssl_debug_printf(" Cannot find master secret\n");
|
|
return;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf(" Cannot find master secret, continuing anyway "
|
|
"because of a NULL cipher\n");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_generate_keyring_material(ssl) < 0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't generate keyring material\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Save Client Random/ Session ID for "SSL Export Session keys" */
|
|
ssl_save_master_key("Client Random", mk_map->crandom,
|
|
&ssl->client_random, &ssl->master_secret);
|
|
ssl_save_master_key("Session ID", mk_map->session,
|
|
&ssl->session_id, &ssl->master_secret);
|
|
/* Only save the new secrets if the server sent the ticket. The client
|
|
* ticket might have become stale. */
|
|
if (ssl->state & SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
|
|
ssl_save_master_key("Session Ticket", mk_map->tickets,
|
|
&ssl->session_ticket, &ssl->master_secret);
|
|
}
|
|
} /* }}} */
|
|
|
|
/* Load the new key. */
|
|
void
|
|
tls13_change_key(SslDecryptSession *ssl, ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map,
|
|
gboolean is_from_server, TLSRecordType type)
|
|
{
|
|
GHashTable *key_map;
|
|
const char *label;
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->session.version != TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s TLS version %#x is not 1.3\n", G_STRFUNC, ssl->session.version);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->client_random.data_len == 0) {
|
|
/* May happen if Hello message is missing and Finished is found. */
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s missing Client Random\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (type) {
|
|
case TLS_SECRET_0RTT_APP:
|
|
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(!is_from_server);
|
|
label = "CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET";
|
|
key_map = mk_map->tls13_client_early;
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_SECRET_HANDSHAKE:
|
|
if (is_from_server) {
|
|
label = "SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET";
|
|
key_map = mk_map->tls13_server_handshake;
|
|
} else {
|
|
label = "CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET";
|
|
key_map = mk_map->tls13_client_handshake;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLS_SECRET_APP:
|
|
if (is_from_server) {
|
|
label = "SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0";
|
|
key_map = mk_map->tls13_server_appdata;
|
|
} else {
|
|
label = "CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0";
|
|
key_map = mk_map->tls13_client_appdata;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
g_assert_not_reached();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Transitioning to new keys, mark old ones as unusable. */
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s transitioning to new key, old state 0x%02x\n", G_STRFUNC, ssl->state);
|
|
ssl->state &= ~(SSL_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY);
|
|
|
|
StringInfo *secret = (StringInfo *)g_hash_table_lookup(key_map, &ssl->client_random);
|
|
if (!secret) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s Cannot find %s, decryption impossible\n", G_STRFUNC, label);
|
|
/* Disable decryption, the keys are invalid. */
|
|
if (is_from_server) {
|
|
ssl->server = NULL;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ssl->client = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* TLS 1.3 secret found, set new keys. */
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s Retrieved TLS 1.3 traffic secret.\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
ssl_print_string("Client Random", &ssl->client_random);
|
|
ssl_print_string(label, secret);
|
|
if (tls13_generate_keys(ssl, secret, is_from_server)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Remember the application traffic secret to support Key Update. The
|
|
* other secrets cannot be used for this purpose, so free them.
|
|
*/
|
|
SslDecoder *decoder = is_from_server ? ssl->server : ssl->client;
|
|
StringInfo *app_secret = &decoder->app_traffic_secret;
|
|
if (type == TLS_SECRET_APP) {
|
|
app_secret->data = (guchar *) wmem_realloc(wmem_file_scope(),
|
|
app_secret->data,
|
|
secret->data_len);
|
|
ssl_data_set(app_secret, secret->data, secret->data_len);
|
|
} else {
|
|
wmem_free(wmem_file_scope(), app_secret->data);
|
|
app_secret->data = NULL;
|
|
app_secret->data_len = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Update to next application data traffic secret for TLS 1.3. The previous
|
|
* secret should have been set by tls13_change_key.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
tls13_key_update(SslDecryptSession *ssl, gboolean is_from_server)
|
|
{
|
|
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-7.2
|
|
* traffic_secret_N+1 = HKDF-Expand-Label(
|
|
* traffic_secret_N,
|
|
* "application traffic secret", "", Hash.length)
|
|
*
|
|
* Note that traffic_secret_N is of the same length (Hash.length).
|
|
*/
|
|
const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite = ssl->cipher_suite;
|
|
SslDecoder *decoder = is_from_server ? ssl->server : ssl->client;
|
|
StringInfo *app_secret = decoder ? &decoder->app_traffic_secret : NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!cipher_suite || !app_secret || app_secret->data_len == 0) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s Cannot perform Key Update due to missing info\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Previous traffic secret is available, so find the hash function,
|
|
* expand the new traffic secret and generate new keys.
|
|
*/
|
|
const char *hash_name = ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->name;
|
|
int hash_algo = ssl_get_digest_by_name(hash_name);
|
|
const guint hash_len = app_secret->data_len;
|
|
guchar *new_secret;
|
|
if (!tls13_hkdf_expand_label(hash_algo, app_secret, "application traffic secret", "",
|
|
hash_len, &new_secret)) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s traffic_secret_N+1 expansion failed\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
ssl_data_set(app_secret, new_secret, hash_len);
|
|
wmem_free(NULL, new_secret);
|
|
tls13_generate_keys(ssl, app_secret, is_from_server);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** SSL keylog file handling. {{{ */
|
|
|
|
static GRegex *
|
|
ssl_compile_keyfile_regex(void)
|
|
{
|
|
#define OCTET "(?:[[:xdigit:]]{2})"
|
|
const gchar *pattern =
|
|
"(?:"
|
|
/* Matches Client Hellos having this Client Random */
|
|
"PMS_CLIENT_RANDOM (?<client_random_pms>" OCTET "{32}) "
|
|
/* Matches first part of encrypted RSA pre-master secret */
|
|
"|RSA (?<encrypted_pmk>" OCTET "{8}) "
|
|
/* Pre-Master-Secret is given, it is 48 bytes for RSA,
|
|
but it can be of any length for DHE */
|
|
")(?<pms>" OCTET "+)"
|
|
"|(?:"
|
|
/* Matches Server Hellos having a Session ID */
|
|
"RSA Session-ID:(?<session_id>" OCTET "+) Master-Key:"
|
|
/* Matches Client Hellos having this Client Random */
|
|
"|CLIENT_RANDOM (?<client_random>" OCTET "{32}) "
|
|
/* Master-Secret is given, its length is fixed */
|
|
")(?<master_secret>" OCTET "{" G_STRINGIFY(SSL_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH) "})"
|
|
"|(?"
|
|
/* TLS 1.3 Client Random to Derived Secrets mapping. */
|
|
":CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET (?<client_early>" OCTET "{32})"
|
|
"|CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET (?<client_handshake>" OCTET "{32})"
|
|
"|SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET (?<server_handshake>" OCTET "{32})"
|
|
"|CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 (?<client_appdata>" OCTET "{32})"
|
|
"|SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 (?<server_appdata>" OCTET "{32})"
|
|
") (?<derived_secret>" OCTET "+)";
|
|
#undef OCTET
|
|
static GRegex *regex = NULL;
|
|
GError *gerr = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!regex) {
|
|
regex = g_regex_new(pattern,
|
|
(GRegexCompileFlags)(G_REGEX_OPTIMIZE | G_REGEX_ANCHORED),
|
|
G_REGEX_MATCH_ANCHORED, &gerr);
|
|
if (gerr) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s failed to compile regex: %s\n", G_STRFUNC,
|
|
gerr->message);
|
|
g_error_free(gerr);
|
|
regex = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return regex;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gboolean
|
|
file_needs_reopen(FILE *fp, const char *filename)
|
|
{
|
|
ws_statb64 open_stat, current_stat;
|
|
|
|
/* consider a file deleted when stat fails for either file,
|
|
* or when the residing device / inode has changed. */
|
|
if (0 != ws_fstat64(ws_fileno(fp), &open_stat))
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
if (0 != ws_stat64(filename, ¤t_stat))
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
|
|
/* Note: on Windows, ino may be 0. Existing files cannot be deleted on
|
|
* Windows, but hopefully the size is a good indicator when a file got
|
|
* removed and recreated */
|
|
return open_stat.st_dev != current_stat.st_dev ||
|
|
open_stat.st_ino != current_stat.st_ino ||
|
|
open_stat.st_size > current_stat.st_size;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
typedef struct ssl_master_key_match_group {
|
|
const char *re_group_name;
|
|
GHashTable *master_key_ht;
|
|
} ssl_master_key_match_group_t;
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_load_keyfile(const gchar *ssl_keylog_filename, FILE **keylog_file,
|
|
const ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned i;
|
|
GRegex *regex;
|
|
ssl_master_key_match_group_t mk_groups[] = {
|
|
{ "encrypted_pmk", mk_map->pre_master },
|
|
{ "session_id", mk_map->session },
|
|
{ "client_random", mk_map->crandom },
|
|
{ "client_random_pms", mk_map->pms },
|
|
/* TLS 1.3 map from Client Random to derived secret. */
|
|
{ "client_early", mk_map->tls13_client_early },
|
|
{ "client_handshake", mk_map->tls13_client_handshake },
|
|
{ "server_handshake", mk_map->tls13_server_handshake },
|
|
{ "client_appdata", mk_map->tls13_client_appdata },
|
|
{ "server_appdata", mk_map->tls13_server_appdata },
|
|
};
|
|
/* no need to try if no key log file is configured. */
|
|
if (!ssl_keylog_filename || !*ssl_keylog_filename) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s dtls/ssl.keylog_file is not configured!\n",
|
|
G_STRFUNC);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* The format of the file is a series of records with one of the following formats:
|
|
* - "RSA xxxx yyyy"
|
|
* Where xxxx are the first 8 bytes of the encrypted pre-master secret (hex-encoded)
|
|
* Where yyyy is the cleartext pre-master secret (hex-encoded)
|
|
* (this is the original format introduced with bug 4349)
|
|
*
|
|
* - "RSA Session-ID:xxxx Master-Key:yyyy"
|
|
* Where xxxx is the SSL session ID (hex-encoded)
|
|
* Where yyyy is the cleartext master secret (hex-encoded)
|
|
* (added to support openssl s_client Master-Key output)
|
|
* This is somewhat is a misnomer because there's nothing RSA specific
|
|
* about this.
|
|
*
|
|
* - "PMS_CLIENT_RANDOM xxxx yyyy"
|
|
* Where xxxx is the client_random from the ClientHello (hex-encoded)
|
|
* Where yyyy is the cleartext pre-master secret (hex-encoded)
|
|
* (This format allows SSL connections to be decrypted, if a user can
|
|
* capture the PMS but could not recover the MS for a specific session
|
|
* with a SSL Server.)
|
|
*
|
|
* - "CLIENT_RANDOM xxxx yyyy"
|
|
* Where xxxx is the client_random from the ClientHello (hex-encoded)
|
|
* Where yyyy is the cleartext master secret (hex-encoded)
|
|
* (This format allows non-RSA SSL connections to be decrypted, i.e.
|
|
* ECDHE-RSA.)
|
|
*
|
|
* - "CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET xxxx yyyy"
|
|
* - "CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET xxxx yyyy"
|
|
* - "SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET xxxx yyyy"
|
|
* - "CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 xxxx yyyy"
|
|
* - "SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 xxxx yyyy"
|
|
* Where xxxx is the client_random from the ClientHello (hex-encoded)
|
|
* Where yyyy is the secret (hex-encoded) derived from the early,
|
|
* handshake or master secrets. (This format is introduced with TLS 1.3
|
|
* and supported by BoringSSL, OpenSSL, etc. See bug 12779.)
|
|
*/
|
|
regex = ssl_compile_keyfile_regex();
|
|
if (!regex)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("trying to use SSL keylog in %s\n", ssl_keylog_filename);
|
|
|
|
/* if the keylog file was deleted, re-open it */
|
|
if (*keylog_file && file_needs_reopen(*keylog_file, ssl_keylog_filename)) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s file got deleted, trying to re-open\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
fclose(*keylog_file);
|
|
*keylog_file = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (*keylog_file == NULL) {
|
|
*keylog_file = ws_fopen(ssl_keylog_filename, "r");
|
|
if (!*keylog_file) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s failed to open SSL keylog\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
char buf[512], *line;
|
|
gsize bytes_read;
|
|
GMatchInfo *mi;
|
|
|
|
line = fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), *keylog_file);
|
|
if (!line)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
bytes_read = strlen(line);
|
|
/* fgets includes the \n at the end of the line. */
|
|
if (bytes_read > 0 && line[bytes_read - 1] == '\n') {
|
|
line[bytes_read - 1] = 0;
|
|
bytes_read--;
|
|
}
|
|
if (bytes_read > 0 && line[bytes_read - 1] == '\r') {
|
|
line[bytes_read - 1] = 0;
|
|
bytes_read--;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl_debug_printf(" checking keylog line: %s\n", line);
|
|
if (g_regex_match(regex, line, G_REGEX_MATCH_ANCHORED, &mi)) {
|
|
gchar *hex_key, *hex_pre_ms_or_ms;
|
|
StringInfo *key = wmem_new(wmem_file_scope(), StringInfo);
|
|
StringInfo *pre_ms_or_ms = NULL;
|
|
GHashTable *ht = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Is the PMS being supplied with the PMS_CLIENT_RANDOM
|
|
* otherwise we will use the Master Secret
|
|
*/
|
|
hex_pre_ms_or_ms = g_match_info_fetch_named(mi, "master_secret");
|
|
if (hex_pre_ms_or_ms == NULL || !*hex_pre_ms_or_ms) {
|
|
g_free(hex_pre_ms_or_ms);
|
|
hex_pre_ms_or_ms = g_match_info_fetch_named(mi, "pms");
|
|
}
|
|
if (hex_pre_ms_or_ms == NULL || !*hex_pre_ms_or_ms) {
|
|
g_free(hex_pre_ms_or_ms);
|
|
hex_pre_ms_or_ms = g_match_info_fetch_named(mi, "derived_secret");
|
|
}
|
|
/* There is always a match, otherwise the regex is wrong. */
|
|
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(hex_pre_ms_or_ms && strlen(hex_pre_ms_or_ms));
|
|
|
|
/* convert from hex to bytes and save to hashtable */
|
|
pre_ms_or_ms = wmem_new(wmem_file_scope(), StringInfo);
|
|
from_hex(pre_ms_or_ms, hex_pre_ms_or_ms, strlen(hex_pre_ms_or_ms));
|
|
g_free(hex_pre_ms_or_ms);
|
|
|
|
/* Find a master key from any format (CLIENT_RANDOM, SID, ...) */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < G_N_ELEMENTS(mk_groups); i++) {
|
|
ssl_master_key_match_group_t *g = &mk_groups[i];
|
|
hex_key = g_match_info_fetch_named(mi, g->re_group_name);
|
|
if (hex_key && *hex_key) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf(" matched %s\n", g->re_group_name);
|
|
ht = g->master_key_ht;
|
|
from_hex(key, hex_key, strlen(hex_key));
|
|
g_free(hex_key);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
g_free(hex_key);
|
|
}
|
|
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(ht); /* Cannot be reached, or regex is wrong. */
|
|
|
|
g_hash_table_insert(ht, key, pre_ms_or_ms);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf(" unrecognized line\n");
|
|
}
|
|
/* always free match info even if there is no match. */
|
|
g_match_info_free(mi);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/** SSL keylog file handling. }}} */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef SSL_DECRYPT_DEBUG /* {{{ */
|
|
|
|
static FILE* ssl_debug_file=NULL;
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_set_debug(const gchar* name)
|
|
{
|
|
static gint debug_file_must_be_closed;
|
|
gint use_stderr;
|
|
|
|
use_stderr = name?(strcmp(name, SSL_DEBUG_USE_STDERR) == 0):0;
|
|
|
|
if (debug_file_must_be_closed)
|
|
fclose(ssl_debug_file);
|
|
|
|
if (use_stderr)
|
|
ssl_debug_file = stderr;
|
|
else if (!name || (strcmp(name, "") ==0))
|
|
ssl_debug_file = NULL;
|
|
else
|
|
ssl_debug_file = ws_fopen(name, "w");
|
|
|
|
if (!use_stderr && ssl_debug_file)
|
|
debug_file_must_be_closed = 1;
|
|
else
|
|
debug_file_must_be_closed = 0;
|
|
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("Wireshark SSL debug log \n\n");
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("Wireshark version: %s\n", get_ws_vcs_version_info());
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("GnuTLS version: %s\n", gnutls_check_version(NULL));
|
|
#endif
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("Libgcrypt version: %s\n", gcry_check_version(NULL));
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("\n");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_debug_flush(void)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ssl_debug_file)
|
|
fflush(ssl_debug_file);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_debug_printf(const gchar* fmt, ...)
|
|
{
|
|
va_list ap;
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_debug_file)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
va_start(ap, fmt);
|
|
vfprintf(ssl_debug_file, fmt, ap);
|
|
va_end(ap);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_print_data(const gchar* name, const guchar* data, size_t len)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t i, j, k;
|
|
if (!ssl_debug_file)
|
|
return;
|
|
fprintf(ssl_debug_file,"%s[%d]:\n",name, (int) len);
|
|
for (i=0; i<len; i+=16) {
|
|
fprintf(ssl_debug_file,"| ");
|
|
for (j=i, k=0; k<16 && j<len; ++j, ++k)
|
|
fprintf(ssl_debug_file,"%.2x ",data[j]);
|
|
for (; k<16; ++k)
|
|
fprintf(ssl_debug_file," ");
|
|
fputc('|', ssl_debug_file);
|
|
for (j=i, k=0; k<16 && j<len; ++j, ++k) {
|
|
guchar c = data[j];
|
|
if (!g_ascii_isprint(c) || (c=='\t')) c = '.';
|
|
fputc(c, ssl_debug_file);
|
|
}
|
|
for (; k<16; ++k)
|
|
fputc(' ', ssl_debug_file);
|
|
fprintf(ssl_debug_file,"|\n");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_print_string(const gchar* name, const StringInfo* data)
|
|
{
|
|
ssl_print_data(name, data->data, data->data_len);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* SSL_DECRYPT_DEBUG }}} */
|
|
|
|
/* UAT preferences callbacks. {{{ */
|
|
/* checks for SSL and DTLS UAT key list fields */
|
|
|
|
gboolean
|
|
ssldecrypt_uat_fld_ip_chk_cb(void* r _U_, const char* p, guint len _U_, const void* u1 _U_, const void* u2 _U_, char** err)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!p || strlen(p) == 0u) {
|
|
*err = g_strdup("No IP address given.");
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*err = NULL;
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
gboolean
|
|
ssldecrypt_uat_fld_port_chk_cb(void* r _U_, const char* p, guint len _U_, const void* u1 _U_, const void* u2 _U_, char** err)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!p || strlen(p) == 0u) {
|
|
*err = g_strdup("No Port given.");
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(p, "start_tls") != 0){
|
|
guint16 port;
|
|
if (!ws_strtou16(p, NULL, &port)) {
|
|
*err = g_strdup("Invalid port given.");
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*err = NULL;
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
gboolean
|
|
ssldecrypt_uat_fld_fileopen_chk_cb(void* r _U_, const char* p, guint len _U_, const void* u1 _U_, const void* u2 _U_, char** err)
|
|
{
|
|
ws_statb64 st;
|
|
|
|
if (!p || strlen(p) == 0u) {
|
|
*err = g_strdup("No filename given.");
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (ws_stat64(p, &st) != 0) {
|
|
*err = g_strdup_printf("File '%s' does not exist or access is denied.", p);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*err = NULL;
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
gboolean
|
|
ssldecrypt_uat_fld_password_chk_cb(void *r _U_, const char *p _U_, guint len _U_, const void *u1 _U_, const void *u2 _U_, char **err)
|
|
{
|
|
#if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS)
|
|
ssldecrypt_assoc_t* f = (ssldecrypt_assoc_t *)r;
|
|
FILE *fp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (p && (strlen(p) > 0u)) {
|
|
fp = ws_fopen(f->keyfile, "rb");
|
|
if (fp) {
|
|
char *msg = NULL;
|
|
gnutls_x509_privkey_t priv_key = ssl_load_pkcs12(fp, p, &msg);
|
|
if (!priv_key) {
|
|
fclose(fp);
|
|
*err = g_strdup_printf("Could not load PKCS#12 key file: %s", msg);
|
|
g_free(msg);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
g_free(msg);
|
|
gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit(priv_key);
|
|
fclose(fp);
|
|
} else {
|
|
*err = g_strdup_printf("Leave this field blank if the keyfile is not PKCS#12.");
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*err = NULL;
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
#else
|
|
*err = g_strdup("Cannot load key files, support is not compiled in.");
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
/* UAT preferences callbacks. }}} */
|
|
|
|
/** maximum size of ssl_association_info() string */
|
|
#define SSL_ASSOC_MAX_LEN 8192
|
|
|
|
typedef struct ssl_association_info_callback_data
|
|
{
|
|
gchar *str;
|
|
const char *table_protocol;
|
|
} ssl_association_info_callback_data_t;
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* callback function used by ssl_association_info() to traverse the SSL associations.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
ssl_association_info_(const gchar *table _U_, gpointer handle, gpointer user_data)
|
|
{
|
|
ssl_association_info_callback_data_t* data = (ssl_association_info_callback_data_t*)user_data;
|
|
const int l = (const int)strlen(data->str);
|
|
g_snprintf(data->str+l, SSL_ASSOC_MAX_LEN-l, "'%s' %s\n", dissector_handle_get_short_name((dissector_handle_t)handle), data->table_protocol);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* @return an information string on the SSL protocol associations. The string has ephemeral lifetime/scope.
|
|
*/
|
|
gchar*
|
|
ssl_association_info(const char* dissector_table_name, const char* table_protocol)
|
|
{
|
|
ssl_association_info_callback_data_t data;
|
|
|
|
data.str = (gchar *)g_malloc0(SSL_ASSOC_MAX_LEN);
|
|
data.table_protocol = table_protocol;
|
|
dissector_table_foreach_handle(dissector_table_name, ssl_association_info_, &data);
|
|
return data.str;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Begin of code related to dissection of wire data. */
|
|
|
|
/* Helpers for dissecting Variable-Length Vectors. {{{ */
|
|
gboolean
|
|
ssl_add_vector(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
|
|
guint offset, guint offset_end, guint32 *ret_length,
|
|
int hf_length, guint32 min_value, guint32 max_value)
|
|
{
|
|
guint veclen_size;
|
|
guint32 veclen_value;
|
|
proto_item *pi;
|
|
|
|
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(offset <= offset_end);
|
|
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(min_value <= max_value);
|
|
|
|
if (max_value > 0xffffff) {
|
|
veclen_size = 4;
|
|
} else if (max_value > 0xffff) {
|
|
veclen_size = 3;
|
|
} else if (max_value > 0xff) {
|
|
veclen_size = 2;
|
|
} else {
|
|
veclen_size = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (offset_end - offset < veclen_size) {
|
|
proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, pinfo, &hf->ei.malformed_buffer_too_small,
|
|
tvb, offset, offset_end - offset,
|
|
"No more room for vector of length %u",
|
|
veclen_size);
|
|
*ret_length = 0;
|
|
return FALSE; /* Cannot read length. */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pi = proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(tree, hf_length, tvb, offset, veclen_size, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &veclen_value);
|
|
offset += veclen_size;
|
|
|
|
if (veclen_value < min_value) {
|
|
expert_add_info_format(pinfo, pi, &hf->ei.malformed_vector_length,
|
|
"Vector length %u is smaller than minimum %u",
|
|
veclen_value, min_value);
|
|
} else if (veclen_value > max_value) {
|
|
expert_add_info_format(pinfo, pi, &hf->ei.malformed_vector_length,
|
|
"Vector length %u is larger than maximum %u",
|
|
veclen_value, max_value);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (offset_end - offset < veclen_value) {
|
|
expert_add_info_format(pinfo, pi, &hf->ei.malformed_buffer_too_small,
|
|
"Vector length %u is too large, truncating it to %u",
|
|
veclen_value, offset_end - offset);
|
|
*ret_length = offset_end - offset;
|
|
return FALSE; /* Length is truncated to avoid overflow. */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*ret_length = veclen_value;
|
|
return TRUE; /* Length is OK. */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
gboolean
|
|
ssl_end_vector(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
|
|
guint offset, guint offset_end)
|
|
{
|
|
if (offset < offset_end) {
|
|
guint trailing = offset_end - offset;
|
|
proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, pinfo, &hf->ei.malformed_trailing_data,
|
|
tvb, offset, trailing,
|
|
"%u trailing byte%s unprocessed",
|
|
trailing, plurality(trailing, " was", "s were"));
|
|
return FALSE; /* unprocessed data warning */
|
|
} else if (offset > offset_end) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Returned offset runs past the end. This should not happen and is
|
|
* possibly a dissector bug.
|
|
*/
|
|
guint excess = offset - offset_end;
|
|
proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, pinfo, &hf->ei.malformed_buffer_too_small,
|
|
tvb, offset_end, excess,
|
|
"Dissector processed too much data (%u byte%s)",
|
|
excess, plurality(excess, "", "s"));
|
|
return FALSE; /* overflow error */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return TRUE; /* OK, offset matches. */
|
|
}
|
|
/** }}} */
|
|
|
|
|
|
static guint32
|
|
ssl_dissect_digitally_signed(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
|
|
guint16 version, gint hf_sig_len, gint hf_sig);
|
|
|
|
/* change_cipher_spec(20) dissection */
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_dissect_change_cipher_spec(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
|
|
guint32 offset, SslSession *session,
|
|
gboolean is_from_server,
|
|
const SslDecryptSession *ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* enum { change_cipher_spec(1), (255) } type;
|
|
* } ChangeCipherSpec;
|
|
*/
|
|
proto_item *ti;
|
|
proto_item_set_text(tree,
|
|
"%s Record Layer: %s Protocol: Change Cipher Spec",
|
|
val_to_str_const(session->version, ssl_version_short_names, "SSL"),
|
|
val_to_str_const(SSL_ID_CHG_CIPHER_SPEC, ssl_31_content_type, "unknown"));
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.change_cipher_spec, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA);
|
|
|
|
/* Use heuristics to detect an abbreviated handshake, assume that missing
|
|
* ServerHelloDone implies reusing previously negotiating keys. Then when
|
|
* a Session ID or ticket is present, it must be a resumed session.
|
|
* Normally this should be done at the Finished message, but that may be
|
|
* encrypted so we do it here, at the last cleartext message. */
|
|
if (is_from_server && ssl) {
|
|
if (session->is_session_resumed) {
|
|
const char *resumed = NULL;
|
|
if (ssl->session_ticket.data_len) {
|
|
resumed = "Session Ticket";
|
|
} else if (ssl->session_id.data_len) {
|
|
resumed = "Session ID";
|
|
}
|
|
if (resumed) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s Session resumption using %s\n", G_STRFUNC, resumed);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Can happen if the capture somehow starts in the middle */
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s No Session resumption, missing packets?\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s Not using Session resumption\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (is_from_server && session->is_session_resumed)
|
|
expert_add_info(pinfo, ti, &hf->ei.resumed);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Begin of handshake(22) record dissections */
|
|
/* dissect a list of hash algorithms, return the number of bytes dissected
|
|
this is used for the signature algorithms extension and for the
|
|
TLS1.2 certificate request. {{{ */
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_dissect_hash_alg_list(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree,
|
|
packet_info* pinfo, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
|
|
{
|
|
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* HashAlgorithm hash;
|
|
* SignatureAlgorithm signature;
|
|
* } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm;
|
|
* SignatureAndHashAlgorithm supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
|
|
*/
|
|
proto_tree *subtree, *alg_tree;
|
|
proto_item *ti;
|
|
guint sh_alg_length;
|
|
guint32 next_offset;
|
|
|
|
/* SignatureAndHashAlgorithm supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2> */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &sh_alg_length,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_sig_hash_alg_len, 2, G_MAXUINT16 - 1)) {
|
|
return offset_end;
|
|
}
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
next_offset = offset + sh_alg_length;
|
|
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree, hf->hf.hs_sig_hash_algs, tvb, offset, sh_alg_length,
|
|
"Signature Hash Algorithms (%u algorithm%s)",
|
|
sh_alg_length / 2, plurality(sh_alg_length / 2, "", "s"));
|
|
subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.hs_sig_hash_algs);
|
|
|
|
while (offset + 2 <= next_offset) {
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf->hf.hs_sig_hash_alg,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
alg_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.hs_sig_hash_alg);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(alg_tree, hf->hf.hs_sig_hash_hash,
|
|
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(alg_tree, hf->hf.hs_sig_hash_sig,
|
|
tvb, offset+1, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, next_offset)) {
|
|
offset = next_offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return offset;
|
|
} /* }}} */
|
|
|
|
/* Dissection of DistinguishedName (for CertificateRequest and
|
|
* certificate_authorities extension). {{{ */
|
|
static guint32
|
|
tls_dissect_certificate_authorities(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
|
|
{
|
|
proto_item *ti;
|
|
proto_tree *subtree;
|
|
guint32 dnames_length, next_offset;
|
|
asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx;
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Note: minimum length is 0 for TLS 1.1/1.2 and 3 for earlier/later */
|
|
/* DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1> */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &dnames_length,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_dnames_len, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
|
|
return offset_end;
|
|
}
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
next_offset = offset + dnames_length;
|
|
|
|
if (dnames_length > 0) {
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_dnames,
|
|
tvb, offset, dnames_length,
|
|
"Distinguished Names (%d byte%s)",
|
|
dnames_length,
|
|
plurality(dnames_length, "", "s"));
|
|
subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.dnames);
|
|
|
|
asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo);
|
|
|
|
while (offset < next_offset) {
|
|
/* get the length of the current certificate */
|
|
guint32 name_length;
|
|
/* opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1> */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, next_offset, &name_length,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_dname_len, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) {
|
|
return next_offset;
|
|
}
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
dissect_x509if_DistinguishedName(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx,
|
|
subtree, hf->hf.hs_dname);
|
|
offset += name_length;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return offset;
|
|
} /* }}} */
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** TLS Extensions (in Client Hello and Server Hello). {{{ */
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_sig_hash_algs(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, packet_info* pinfo, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
|
|
{
|
|
return ssl_dissect_hash_alg_list(hf, tvb, tree, pinfo, offset, offset_end);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_alpn(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
|
|
guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
|
|
guint8 hnd_type, SslSession *session)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7301#section-3.1
|
|
* opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>;
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1>
|
|
* } ProtocolNameList;
|
|
*/
|
|
proto_tree *alpn_tree;
|
|
proto_item *ti;
|
|
guint32 next_offset, alpn_length, name_length;
|
|
guint8 *proto_name = NULL;
|
|
guint32 proto_name_length = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &alpn_length,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_ext_alpn_len, 2, G_MAXUINT16)) {
|
|
return offset_end;
|
|
}
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
next_offset = offset + alpn_length;
|
|
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_alpn_list,
|
|
tvb, offset, alpn_length, ENC_NA);
|
|
alpn_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.hs_ext_alpn);
|
|
|
|
/* Parse list (note missing check for end of vector, ssl_add_vector below
|
|
* ensures that data is always available.) */
|
|
while (offset < next_offset) {
|
|
/* opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1> */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, alpn_tree, offset, next_offset, &name_length,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_ext_alpn_str_len, 1, G_MAXUINT8)) {
|
|
return next_offset;
|
|
}
|
|
offset++;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(alpn_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_alpn_str,
|
|
tvb, offset, name_length, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA);
|
|
/* Remember first ALPN ProtocolName entry for server. */
|
|
if (hnd_type == SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO || hnd_type == SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
|
|
proto_name_length = name_length;
|
|
proto_name = tvb_get_string_enc(wmem_packet_scope(), tvb, offset,
|
|
proto_name_length, ENC_ASCII);
|
|
}
|
|
offset += name_length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If ALPN is given in ServerHello, then ProtocolNameList MUST contain
|
|
* exactly one "ProtocolName". */
|
|
if (proto_name) {
|
|
/* '\0'-terminated string for prefix/full string comparison purposes. */
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < G_N_ELEMENTS(ssl_alpn_protocols); i++) {
|
|
const ssl_alpn_protocol_t *alpn_proto = &ssl_alpn_protocols[i];
|
|
|
|
if ((alpn_proto->match_exact &&
|
|
proto_name_length == strlen(alpn_proto->proto_name) &&
|
|
!strcmp(proto_name, alpn_proto->proto_name)) ||
|
|
(!alpn_proto->match_exact && g_str_has_prefix(proto_name, alpn_proto->proto_name))) {
|
|
|
|
dissector_handle_t handle;
|
|
/* ProtocolName match, so set the App data dissector handle.
|
|
* This may override protocols given via the UAT dialog, but
|
|
* since the ALPN hint is precise, do it anyway. */
|
|
handle = ssl_find_appdata_dissector(alpn_proto->dissector_name);
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s: changing handle %p to %p (%s)", G_STRFUNC,
|
|
(void *)session->app_handle,
|
|
(void *)handle, alpn_proto->dissector_name);
|
|
/* if dissector is disabled, do not overwrite previous one */
|
|
if (handle)
|
|
session->app_handle = handle;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_npn(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
|
|
guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
|
|
{
|
|
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-nextprotoneg-04#page-3
|
|
* The "extension_data" field of a "next_protocol_negotiation" extension
|
|
* in a "ServerHello" contains an optional list of protocols advertised
|
|
* by the server. Protocols are named by opaque, non-empty byte strings
|
|
* and the list of protocols is serialized as a concatenation of 8-bit,
|
|
* length prefixed byte strings. Implementations MUST ensure that the
|
|
* empty string is not included and that no byte strings are truncated.
|
|
*/
|
|
guint32 npn_length;
|
|
proto_tree *npn_tree;
|
|
|
|
/* List is optional, do not add tree if there are no entries. */
|
|
if (offset == offset_end) {
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
npn_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, hf->ett.hs_ext_npn, NULL, "Next Protocol Negotiation");
|
|
|
|
while (offset < offset_end) {
|
|
/* non-empty, 8-bit length prefixed strings means range 1..255 */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, npn_tree, offset, offset_end, &npn_length,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_ext_npn_str_len, 1, G_MAXUINT8)) {
|
|
return offset_end;
|
|
}
|
|
offset++;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(npn_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_npn_str,
|
|
tvb, offset, npn_length, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA);
|
|
offset += npn_length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_reneg_info(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
|
|
guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
|
|
{
|
|
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5746#section-3.2
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* opaque renegotiated_connection<0..255>;
|
|
* } RenegotiationInfo;
|
|
*
|
|
*/
|
|
proto_tree *reneg_info_tree;
|
|
guint32 reneg_info_length;
|
|
|
|
reneg_info_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, hf->ett.hs_ext_reneg_info, NULL, "Renegotiation Info extension");
|
|
|
|
/* opaque renegotiated_connection<0..255> */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, reneg_info_tree, offset, offset_end, &reneg_info_length,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_ext_reneg_info_len, 0, 255)) {
|
|
return offset_end;
|
|
}
|
|
offset++;
|
|
|
|
if (reneg_info_length > 0) {
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(reneg_info_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_reneg_info, tvb, offset, reneg_info_length, ENC_NA);
|
|
offset += reneg_info_length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_key_share_entry(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
|
|
{
|
|
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.2.5
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* NamedGroup group;
|
|
* opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>;
|
|
* } KeyShareEntry;
|
|
*/
|
|
guint32 key_exchange_length, group;
|
|
proto_tree *ks_tree;
|
|
|
|
ks_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, 4, hf->ett.hs_ext_key_share_ks, NULL, "Key Share Entry");
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(ks_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_key_share_group, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &group);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
proto_item_append_text(ks_tree, ": Group: %s", val_to_str(group, ssl_extension_curves, "Unknown (%u)"));
|
|
|
|
/* opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1> */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, ks_tree, offset, offset_end, &key_exchange_length,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_ext_key_share_key_exchange_length, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) {
|
|
return offset_end; /* Bad (possible truncated) length, skip to end of KeyShare extension. */
|
|
}
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
proto_item_set_len(ks_tree, 2 + 2 + key_exchange_length);
|
|
proto_item_append_text(ks_tree, ", Key Exchange length: %u", key_exchange_length);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ks_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_key_share_key_exchange, tvb, offset, key_exchange_length, ENC_NA);
|
|
offset += key_exchange_length;
|
|
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_key_share(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
|
|
guint8 hnd_type)
|
|
{
|
|
proto_tree *key_share_tree;
|
|
guint32 next_offset;
|
|
guint32 client_shares_length;
|
|
|
|
if (offset_end <= offset) { /* Check if ext_len == 0 and "overflow" (offset + ext_len) > guint32) */
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key_share_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, hf->ett.hs_ext_key_share, NULL, "Key Share extension");
|
|
|
|
switch(hnd_type){
|
|
case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
|
|
/* KeyShareEntry client_shares<0..2^16-1> */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, key_share_tree, offset, offset_end, &client_shares_length,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_ext_key_share_client_length, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
|
|
return offset_end;
|
|
}
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
next_offset = offset + client_shares_length;
|
|
while (offset + 4 <= next_offset) { /* (NamedGroup (2 bytes), key_exchange (1 byte for length, 1 byte minimum data) */
|
|
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_key_share_entry(hf, tvb, pinfo, key_share_tree, offset, next_offset);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, key_share_tree, offset, next_offset)) {
|
|
return next_offset;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
|
|
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_key_share_entry(hf, tvb, pinfo, key_share_tree, offset, offset_end);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(key_share_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_key_share_selected_group, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN );
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
break;
|
|
default: /* no default */
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_pre_shared_key(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
|
|
guint8 hnd_type)
|
|
{
|
|
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-19#section-4.2.8
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* opaque identity<1..2^16-1>;
|
|
* uint32 obfuscated_ticket_age;
|
|
* } PskIdentity;
|
|
* opaque PskBinderEntry<32..255>;
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* select (Handshake.msg_type) {
|
|
* case client_hello:
|
|
* PskIdentity identities<7..2^16-1>;
|
|
* PskBinderEntry binders<33..2^16-1>;
|
|
* case server_hello:
|
|
* uint16 selected_identity;
|
|
* };
|
|
* } PreSharedKeyExtension;
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *psk_tree;
|
|
|
|
psk_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, hf->ett.hs_ext_pre_shared_key, NULL, "Pre-Shared Key extension");
|
|
|
|
switch (hnd_type){
|
|
case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO: {
|
|
guint32 identities_length, identities_end, binders_length;
|
|
|
|
/* PskIdentity identities<7..2^16-1> */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, psk_tree, offset, offset_end, &identities_length,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_identities_length, 7, G_MAXUINT16)) {
|
|
return offset_end;
|
|
}
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
identities_end = offset + identities_length;
|
|
|
|
while (offset < identities_end) {
|
|
guint32 identity_length;
|
|
proto_tree *identity_tree;
|
|
|
|
identity_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(psk_tree, tvb, offset, 4, hf->ett.hs_ext_psk_identity, NULL, "PSK Identity (");
|
|
|
|
/* opaque identity<1..2^16-1> */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, identity_tree, offset, identities_end, &identity_length,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_identity_identity_length, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) {
|
|
return identities_end;
|
|
}
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
proto_item_append_text(identity_tree, "length: %u)", identity_length);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(identity_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_identity_identity, tvb, offset, identity_length, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset += identity_length;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(identity_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_identity_obfuscated_ticket_age, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset += 4;
|
|
|
|
proto_item_set_len(identity_tree, 2 + identity_length + 4);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, psk_tree, offset, identities_end)) {
|
|
offset = identities_end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* PskBinderEntry binders<33..2^16-1> */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, psk_tree, offset, offset_end, &binders_length,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_binders_length, 33, G_MAXUINT16)) {
|
|
return offset_end;
|
|
}
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_binders, tvb, offset, binders_length, ENC_NA);
|
|
offset += binders_length;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO: {
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_identity_selected, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static guint32
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_early_data(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo _U_,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end _U_,
|
|
guint8 hnd_type, SslDecryptSession *ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-19#section-4.2.7
|
|
* struct {} Empty;
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* select (Handshake.msg_type) {
|
|
* case new_session_ticket: uint32 max_early_data_size;
|
|
* case client_hello: Empty;
|
|
* case encrypted_extensions: Empty;
|
|
* };
|
|
* } EarlyDataIndication;
|
|
*/
|
|
switch (hnd_type) {
|
|
case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
|
|
/* Remember that early_data will follow the handshake. */
|
|
if (ssl) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s found early_data extension\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
ssl->has_early_data = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_HND_NEWSESSION_TICKET:
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_max_early_data_size, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset += 4;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_supported_versions(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.2.1
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* ProtocolVersion versions<2..254>;
|
|
* } SupportedVersions;
|
|
*/
|
|
guint32 versions_length, next_offset;
|
|
/* ProtocolVersion versions<2..254> */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &versions_length,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_ext_supported_versions_len, 2, 254)) {
|
|
return offset_end;
|
|
}
|
|
offset++;
|
|
next_offset = offset + versions_length;
|
|
|
|
while (offset + 2 <= next_offset) {
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_supported_versions, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, next_offset)) {
|
|
offset = next_offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_cookie(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
|
|
guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
|
|
{
|
|
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.2.2
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* opaque cookie<1..2^16-1>;
|
|
* } Cookie;
|
|
*/
|
|
guint32 cookie_length;
|
|
/* opaque cookie<1..2^16-1> */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &cookie_length,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_ext_cookie_len, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) {
|
|
return offset_end;
|
|
}
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cookie, tvb, offset, cookie_length, ENC_NA);
|
|
offset += cookie_length;
|
|
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_psk_key_exchange_modes(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
|
|
{
|
|
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-19#section-4.2.6
|
|
* enum { psk_ke(0), psk_dhe_ke(1), (255) } PskKeyExchangeMode;
|
|
*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* PskKeyExchangeMode ke_modes<1..255>;
|
|
* } PskKeyExchangeModes;
|
|
*/
|
|
guint32 ke_modes_length, next_offset;
|
|
|
|
/* PskKeyExchangeMode ke_modes<1..255> */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &ke_modes_length,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_ke_modes_length, 1, 255)) {
|
|
return offset_end;
|
|
}
|
|
offset++;
|
|
next_offset = offset + ke_modes_length;
|
|
|
|
while (offset < next_offset) {
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_ke_mode, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA);
|
|
offset++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static guint32
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_certificate_authorities(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
|
|
{
|
|
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-19#section-4.2.3.1
|
|
* opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>;
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* DistinguishedName authorities<3..2^16-1>;
|
|
* } CertificateAuthoritiesExtension;
|
|
*/
|
|
return tls_dissect_certificate_authorities(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_oid_filters(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
|
|
{
|
|
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-19#section-4.3.2.1
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* opaque certificate_extension_oid<1..2^8-1>;
|
|
* opaque certificate_extension_values<0..2^16-1>;
|
|
* } OIDFilter;
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* OIDFilter filters<0..2^16-1>;
|
|
* } OIDFilterExtension;
|
|
*/
|
|
proto_tree *subtree;
|
|
guint32 filters_length, oid_length, values_length, value_offset;
|
|
asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx;
|
|
const char *oid, *name;
|
|
|
|
/* OIDFilter filters<0..2^16-1> */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &filters_length,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_ke_modes_length, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
|
|
return offset_end;
|
|
}
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
offset_end = offset + filters_length;
|
|
|
|
asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo);
|
|
|
|
while (offset < offset_end) {
|
|
subtree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset,
|
|
hf->ett.hs_ext_oid_filter, NULL, "OID Filter");
|
|
|
|
/* opaque certificate_extension_oid<1..2^8-1> */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, offset_end, &oid_length,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_ext_oid_filters_oid_length, 1, G_MAXUINT8)) {
|
|
return offset_end;
|
|
}
|
|
offset++;
|
|
dissect_ber_object_identifier_str(FALSE, &asn1_ctx, subtree, tvb, offset,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_ext_oid_filters_oid, &oid);
|
|
offset += oid_length;
|
|
|
|
/* Append OID to tree label */
|
|
name = oid_resolved_from_string(wmem_packet_scope(), oid);
|
|
proto_item_append_text(subtree, " (%s)", name ? name : oid);
|
|
|
|
/* opaque certificate_extension_values<0..2^16-1> */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, offset_end, &values_length,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_ext_oid_filters_values_length, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
|
|
return offset_end;
|
|
}
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
proto_item_set_len(subtree, 1 + oid_length + 2 + values_length);
|
|
if (values_length > 0) {
|
|
value_offset = offset;
|
|
value_offset = dissect_ber_identifier(pinfo, subtree, tvb, value_offset, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
|
value_offset = dissect_ber_length(pinfo, subtree, tvb, value_offset, NULL, NULL);
|
|
call_ber_oid_callback(oid, tvb, value_offset, pinfo, subtree, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
offset += values_length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_server_name(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
|
|
guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
|
|
{
|
|
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066#section-3
|
|
*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* NameType name_type;
|
|
* select (name_type) {
|
|
* case host_name: HostName;
|
|
* } name;
|
|
* } ServerName;
|
|
*
|
|
* enum {
|
|
* host_name(0), (255)
|
|
* } NameType;
|
|
*
|
|
* opaque HostName<1..2^16-1>;
|
|
*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* ServerName server_name_list<1..2^16-1>
|
|
* } ServerNameList;
|
|
*/
|
|
proto_tree *server_name_tree;
|
|
guint32 list_length, server_name_length, next_offset;
|
|
|
|
/* The server SHALL include "server_name" extension with empty data. */
|
|
if (offset == offset_end) {
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
server_name_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, hf->ett.hs_ext_server_name, NULL, "Server Name Indication extension");
|
|
|
|
/* ServerName server_name_list<1..2^16-1> */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, server_name_tree, offset, offset_end, &list_length,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_ext_server_name_list_len, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) {
|
|
return offset_end;
|
|
}
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
next_offset = offset + list_length;
|
|
|
|
while (offset < next_offset) {
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(server_name_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_server_name_type,
|
|
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA);
|
|
offset++;
|
|
|
|
/* opaque HostName<1..2^16-1> */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, server_name_tree, offset, next_offset, &server_name_length,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_ext_server_name_len, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) {
|
|
return next_offset;
|
|
}
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(server_name_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_server_name,
|
|
tvb, offset, server_name_length, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA);
|
|
offset += server_name_length;
|
|
}
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_session_ticket(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint8 hnd_type, SslDecryptSession *ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
guint ext_len = offset_end - offset;
|
|
if (hnd_type == SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO && ssl && ext_len != 0) {
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, ext_len);
|
|
/* Save the Session Ticket such that it can be used as identifier for
|
|
* restoring a previous Master Secret (in ChangeCipherSpec) */
|
|
ssl->session_ticket.data = (guchar*)wmem_realloc(wmem_file_scope(),
|
|
ssl->session_ticket.data, ext_len);
|
|
ssl->session_ticket.data_len = ext_len;
|
|
tvb_memcpy(tvb,ssl->session_ticket.data, offset, ext_len);
|
|
}
|
|
proto_tree_add_bytes_format(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_data,
|
|
tvb, offset, ext_len, NULL,
|
|
"Data (%u byte%s)",
|
|
ext_len, plurality(ext_len, "", "s"));
|
|
return offset + ext_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_cert_type(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
|
|
guint8 hnd_type, guint16 ext_type, SslSession *session)
|
|
{
|
|
guint8 cert_list_length;
|
|
guint8 cert_type;
|
|
proto_tree *cert_list_tree;
|
|
proto_item *ti;
|
|
|
|
switch(hnd_type){
|
|
case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
|
|
cert_list_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_types_len,
|
|
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
if (offset_end - offset != (guint32)cert_list_length)
|
|
return offset;
|
|
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_types, tvb, offset,
|
|
cert_list_length, cert_list_length);
|
|
proto_item_append_text(ti, " (%d)", cert_list_length);
|
|
|
|
/* make this a subtree */
|
|
cert_list_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.hs_ext_cert_types);
|
|
|
|
/* loop over all point formats */
|
|
while (cert_list_length > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(cert_list_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset++;
|
|
cert_list_length--;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
|
|
case SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
|
|
case SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE:
|
|
cert_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
if (ext_type == SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CERT_TYPE || ext_type == SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CLIENT_CERT_TYPE) {
|
|
session->client_cert_type = cert_type;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ext_type == SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CERT_TYPE || ext_type == SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SERVER_CERT_TYPE) {
|
|
session->server_cert_type = cert_type;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
default: /* no default */
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_common(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
|
|
SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl,
|
|
gboolean from_server)
|
|
{
|
|
nstime_t gmt_unix_time;
|
|
guint8 sessid_length;
|
|
proto_tree *rnd_tree;
|
|
proto_tree *ti_rnd;
|
|
|
|
/* Prepare for renegotiation by resetting the state. */
|
|
ssl_reset_session(session, ssl, !from_server);
|
|
|
|
if (ssl) {
|
|
StringInfo *rnd;
|
|
if (from_server)
|
|
rnd = &ssl->server_random;
|
|
else
|
|
rnd = &ssl->client_random;
|
|
|
|
/* save provided random for later keyring generation */
|
|
tvb_memcpy(tvb, rnd->data, offset, 32);
|
|
rnd->data_len = 32;
|
|
if (from_server)
|
|
ssl->state |= SSL_SERVER_RANDOM;
|
|
else
|
|
ssl->state |= SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM;
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s found %s RANDOM -> state 0x%02X\n", G_STRFUNC,
|
|
from_server ? "SERVER" : "CLIENT", ssl->state);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ti_rnd = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_random, tvb, offset, 32, ENC_NA);
|
|
|
|
if (session->version != TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { /* No time on first bytes random with TLS 1.3 */
|
|
|
|
rnd_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti_rnd, hf->ett.hs_random);
|
|
/* show the time */
|
|
gmt_unix_time.secs = tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset);
|
|
gmt_unix_time.nsecs = 0;
|
|
proto_tree_add_time(rnd_tree, hf->hf.hs_random_time,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, &gmt_unix_time);
|
|
offset += 4;
|
|
|
|
/* show the random bytes */
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(rnd_tree, hf->hf.hs_random_bytes,
|
|
tvb, offset, 28, ENC_NA);
|
|
offset += 28;
|
|
} else {
|
|
offset += 32;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (from_server == 0 || session->version != TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { /* No Session ID with TLS 1.3 on Server Hello */
|
|
/* show the session id (length followed by actual Session ID) */
|
|
sessid_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_session_id_len,
|
|
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset++;
|
|
|
|
if (ssl) {
|
|
/* save the authorative SID for later use in ChangeCipherSpec.
|
|
* (D)TLS restricts the SID to 32 chars, it does not make sense to
|
|
* save more, so ignore larger ones. */
|
|
if (from_server && sessid_length <= 32) {
|
|
tvb_memcpy(tvb, ssl->session_id.data, offset, sessid_length);
|
|
ssl->session_id.data_len = sessid_length;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (sessid_length > 0) {
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_session_id,
|
|
tvb, offset, sessid_length, ENC_NA);
|
|
offset += sessid_length;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree,
|
|
guint32 offset, gboolean has_length)
|
|
{
|
|
guint cert_status_type;
|
|
|
|
cert_status_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_status_type,
|
|
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA);
|
|
offset++;
|
|
|
|
if (has_length) {
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_status_request_len,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (cert_status_type) {
|
|
case SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS_TYPE_OCSP:
|
|
case SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS_TYPE_OCSP_MULTI:
|
|
{
|
|
guint16 responder_id_list_len;
|
|
guint16 request_extensions_len;
|
|
proto_item *responder_id;
|
|
proto_item *request_extensions;
|
|
|
|
responder_id_list_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
responder_id =
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_status_responder_id_list_len,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
if (responder_id_list_len != 0) {
|
|
expert_add_info_format(NULL, responder_id,
|
|
&hf->ei.hs_ext_cert_status_undecoded,
|
|
"Responder ID list is not implemented, contact Wireshark"
|
|
" developers if you want this to be supported");
|
|
/* Non-empty responder ID list would mess with extensions. */
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
request_extensions_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
request_extensions =
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_status_request_extensions_len, tvb, offset,
|
|
2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
if (request_extensions_len != 0)
|
|
expert_add_info_format(NULL, request_extensions,
|
|
&hf->ei.hs_ext_cert_status_undecoded,
|
|
"Request Extensions are not implemented, contact"
|
|
" Wireshark developers if you want this to be supported");
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request_v2(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree,
|
|
guint32 offset)
|
|
{
|
|
gint32 list_len;
|
|
|
|
list_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
while (list_len > 0) {
|
|
guint32 prev_offset = offset;
|
|
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request(hf, tvb, tree, offset, TRUE);
|
|
list_len -= (offset - prev_offset);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static guint
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_supported_groups(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
|
|
{
|
|
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.2.4
|
|
* enum { ..., (0xFFFF) } NamedGroup;
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* NamedGroup named_group_list<2..2^16-1>
|
|
* } NamedGroupList;
|
|
*
|
|
* NOTE: "NamedCurve" (RFC 4492) is renamed to "NamedGroup" (RFC 7919) and
|
|
* the extension itself from "elliptic_curves" to "supported_groups".
|
|
*/
|
|
guint32 groups_length, next_offset;
|
|
proto_tree *groups_tree;
|
|
proto_item *ti;
|
|
|
|
/* NamedGroup named_group_list<2..2^16-1> */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &groups_length,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_ext_supported_groups_len, 2, G_MAXUINT16)) {
|
|
return offset_end;
|
|
}
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
next_offset = offset + groups_length;
|
|
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_ext_supported_groups,
|
|
tvb, offset, groups_length,
|
|
"Supported Groups (%d group%s)",
|
|
groups_length / 2,
|
|
plurality(groups_length/2, "", "s"));
|
|
|
|
/* make this a subtree */
|
|
groups_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.hs_ext_groups);
|
|
|
|
/* loop over all groups */
|
|
while (offset + 2 <= offset_end) {
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(groups_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_supported_group, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, groups_tree, offset, next_offset)) {
|
|
offset = next_offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_ec_point_formats(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
|
|
{
|
|
guint8 ecpf_length;
|
|
proto_tree *ecpf_tree;
|
|
proto_item *ti;
|
|
|
|
ecpf_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_ec_point_formats_len,
|
|
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_ext_ec_point_formats,
|
|
tvb, offset, ecpf_length,
|
|
"Elliptic curves point formats (%d)",
|
|
ecpf_length);
|
|
|
|
/* make this a subtree */
|
|
ecpf_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.hs_ext_curves_point_formats);
|
|
|
|
/* loop over all point formats */
|
|
while (ecpf_length > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ecpf_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_ec_point_format, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset++;
|
|
ecpf_length--;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static guint32
|
|
tls_dissect_sct(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
|
|
guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint16 version)
|
|
{
|
|
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-3.2
|
|
* enum { v1(0), (255) } Version;
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* opaque key_id[32];
|
|
* } LogID;
|
|
* opaque CtExtensions<0..2^16-1>;
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* Version sct_version;
|
|
* LogID id;
|
|
* uint64 timestamp;
|
|
* CtExtensions extensions;
|
|
* digitally-signed struct { ... };
|
|
* } SignedCertificateTimestamp;
|
|
*/
|
|
guint64 sct_timestamp_ms;
|
|
nstime_t sct_timestamp;
|
|
guint32 exts_len;
|
|
const gchar *log_name;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.sct_sct_version, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA);
|
|
offset++;
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.sct_sct_logid, tvb, offset, 32, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
log_name = bytesval_to_str(tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, 32), 32, ct_logids, "Unknown Log");
|
|
proto_item_append_text(tree, " (%s)", log_name);
|
|
offset += 32;
|
|
sct_timestamp_ms = tvb_get_ntoh64(tvb, offset);
|
|
sct_timestamp.secs = (time_t)(sct_timestamp_ms / 1000);
|
|
sct_timestamp.nsecs = (int)((sct_timestamp_ms % 1000) * 1000000);
|
|
proto_tree_add_time(tree, hf->hf.sct_sct_timestamp, tvb, offset, 8, &sct_timestamp);
|
|
offset += 8;
|
|
/* opaque CtExtensions<0..2^16-1> */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &exts_len,
|
|
hf->hf.sct_sct_extensions_length, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
|
|
return offset_end;
|
|
}
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
if (exts_len > 0) {
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.sct_sct_extensions, tvb, offset, exts_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset += exts_len;
|
|
}
|
|
offset = ssl_dissect_digitally_signed(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, version,
|
|
hf->hf.sct_sct_signature_length,
|
|
hf->hf.sct_sct_signature);
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
guint32
|
|
tls_dissect_sct_list(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
|
|
guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint16 version)
|
|
{
|
|
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-3.3
|
|
* opaque SerializedSCT<1..2^16-1>;
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* SerializedSCT sct_list <1..2^16-1>;
|
|
* } SignedCertificateTimestampList;
|
|
*/
|
|
guint32 list_length, sct_length, next_offset;
|
|
proto_tree *subtree;
|
|
|
|
/* SerializedSCT sct_list <1..2^16-1> */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &list_length,
|
|
hf->hf.sct_scts_length, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) {
|
|
return offset_end;
|
|
}
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
while (offset < offset_end) {
|
|
subtree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, 2, hf->ett.sct, NULL, "Signed Certificate Timestamp");
|
|
|
|
/* opaque SerializedSCT<1..2^16-1> */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, offset_end, &sct_length,
|
|
hf->hf.sct_sct_length, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) {
|
|
return offset_end;
|
|
}
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
next_offset = offset + sct_length;
|
|
proto_item_set_len(subtree, 2 + sct_length);
|
|
offset = tls_dissect_sct(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, next_offset, version);
|
|
if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, next_offset)) {
|
|
offset = next_offset;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return offset;
|
|
}
|
|
/** TLS Extensions (in Client Hello and Server Hello). }}} */
|
|
|
|
/* Whether the Content and Handshake Types are valid; handle Protocol Version. {{{ */
|
|
gboolean
|
|
ssl_is_valid_content_type(guint8 type)
|
|
{
|
|
switch ((ContentType) type) {
|
|
case SSL_ID_CHG_CIPHER_SPEC:
|
|
case SSL_ID_ALERT:
|
|
case SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE:
|
|
case SSL_ID_APP_DATA:
|
|
case SSL_ID_HEARTBEAT:
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
gboolean
|
|
ssl_is_valid_handshake_type(guint8 hs_type, gboolean is_dtls)
|
|
{
|
|
switch ((HandshakeType) hs_type) {
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
|
|
/* hello_verify_request is DTLS-only */
|
|
return is_dtls;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_REQUEST:
|
|
case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
|
|
case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
|
|
case SSL_HND_NEWSESSION_TICKET:
|
|
case SSL_HND_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
|
|
case SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
|
|
case SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE:
|
|
case SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG:
|
|
case SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST:
|
|
case SSL_HND_SVR_HELLO_DONE:
|
|
case SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY:
|
|
case SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG:
|
|
case SSL_HND_FINISHED:
|
|
case SSL_HND_CERT_URL:
|
|
case SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS:
|
|
case SSL_HND_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA:
|
|
case SSL_HND_KEY_UPDATE:
|
|
case SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTS:
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static gboolean
|
|
ssl_is_authoritative_version_message(guint8 content_type, guint8 handshake_type,
|
|
gboolean is_dtls)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Consider all valid Handshake messages (except for Client Hello) and
|
|
* all other valid record types (other than Handshake) */
|
|
return (content_type == SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE &&
|
|
ssl_is_valid_handshake_type(handshake_type, is_dtls) &&
|
|
handshake_type != SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO) ||
|
|
(content_type != SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE &&
|
|
ssl_is_valid_content_type(content_type));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_try_set_version(SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl,
|
|
guint8 content_type, guint8 handshake_type,
|
|
gboolean is_dtls, guint16 version)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!ssl_is_authoritative_version_message(content_type, handshake_type,
|
|
is_dtls))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
switch (version) {
|
|
case SSLV3_VERSION:
|
|
case TLSV1_VERSION:
|
|
case TLSV1DOT1_VERSION:
|
|
case TLSV1DOT2_VERSION:
|
|
case TLSV1DOT3_VERSION:
|
|
if (is_dtls)
|
|
return;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION:
|
|
case DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION:
|
|
case DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION:
|
|
if (!is_dtls)
|
|
return;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default: /* invalid version number */
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
session->version = version;
|
|
if (ssl) {
|
|
ssl->state |= SSL_VERSION;
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s found version 0x%04X -> state 0x%02X\n", G_STRFUNC, version, ssl->state);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_check_record_length(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
guint record_length, proto_item *length_pi,
|
|
guint16 version, tvbuff_t *decrypted_tvb)
|
|
{
|
|
guint max_expansion;
|
|
if (version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
|
|
/* TLS 1.3: Max length is 2^14 + 256 */
|
|
max_expansion = 256;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* RFC 5246, Section 6.2.3: TLSCiphertext.fragment length MUST NOT exceed 2^14 + 2048 */
|
|
max_expansion = 2048;
|
|
}
|
|
if (record_length > TLS_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH + max_expansion) {
|
|
expert_add_info_format(pinfo, length_pi, &hf->ei.record_length_invalid,
|
|
"TLSCiphertext length MUST NOT exceed 2^14 + %u", max_expansion);
|
|
}
|
|
if (decrypted_tvb && tvb_captured_length(decrypted_tvb) > TLS_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH) {
|
|
expert_add_info_format(pinfo, length_pi, &hf->ei.record_length_invalid,
|
|
"TLSPlaintext length MUST NOT exceed 2^14");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
ssl_set_cipher(SslDecryptSession *ssl, guint16 cipher)
|
|
{
|
|
/* store selected cipher suite for decryption */
|
|
ssl->session.cipher = cipher;
|
|
|
|
if (!(ssl->cipher_suite = ssl_find_cipher(cipher))) {
|
|
ssl->state &= ~SSL_CIPHER;
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't find cipher suite 0x%04X\n", G_STRFUNC, cipher);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Cipher found, save this for the delayed decoder init */
|
|
ssl->state |= SSL_CIPHER;
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s found CIPHER 0x%04X %s -> state 0x%02X\n", G_STRFUNC, cipher,
|
|
val_to_str_ext_const(cipher, &ssl_31_ciphersuite_ext, "unknown"),
|
|
ssl->state);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* }}} */
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Client Hello and Server Hello dissections. {{{ */
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree,
|
|
packet_info* pinfo, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint8 hnd_type,
|
|
SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl,
|
|
gboolean is_dtls);
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_hello(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
|
|
guint32 offset_end, SslSession *session,
|
|
SslDecryptSession *ssl, dtls_hfs_t *dtls_hfs)
|
|
{
|
|
/* struct {
|
|
* ProtocolVersion client_version;
|
|
* Random random;
|
|
* SessionID session_id;
|
|
* opaque cookie<0..32>; //new field for DTLS
|
|
* CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-1>;
|
|
* CompressionMethod compression_methods<1..2^8-1>;
|
|
* Extension client_hello_extension_list<0..2^16-1>;
|
|
* } ClientHello;
|
|
*/
|
|
proto_item *ti;
|
|
proto_tree *cs_tree;
|
|
guint32 cipher_suite_length;
|
|
guint32 compression_methods_length;
|
|
guint8 compression_method;
|
|
guint32 next_offset;
|
|
|
|
/* show the client version */
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_client_version, tvb,
|
|
offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
/* dissect fields that are also present in ClientHello */
|
|
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_common(hf, tvb, tree, offset, session, ssl, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
/* fields specific for DTLS (cookie_len, cookie) */
|
|
if (dtls_hfs != NULL) {
|
|
guint32 cookie_length;
|
|
/* opaque cookie<0..32> (for DTLS only) */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &cookie_length,
|
|
dtls_hfs->hf_dtls_handshake_cookie_len, 0, 32)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
offset++;
|
|
if (cookie_length > 0) {
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, dtls_hfs->hf_dtls_handshake_cookie,
|
|
tvb, offset, cookie_length, ENC_NA);
|
|
offset += cookie_length;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-1> */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &cipher_suite_length,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_cipher_suites_len, 2, G_MAXUINT16)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
next_offset = offset + cipher_suite_length;
|
|
if (ssl && cipher_suite_length == 2) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If there is only a single cipher, assume that this will be used
|
|
* (needed for 0-RTT decryption support in TLS 1.3).
|
|
*/
|
|
ssl_set_cipher(ssl, tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset));
|
|
}
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_cipher_suites,
|
|
tvb, offset, cipher_suite_length,
|
|
"Cipher Suites (%d suite%s)",
|
|
cipher_suite_length / 2,
|
|
plurality(cipher_suite_length/2, "", "s"));
|
|
cs_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.cipher_suites);
|
|
while (offset + 2 <= next_offset) {
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(cs_tree, hf->hf.hs_cipher_suite, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, cs_tree, offset, next_offset)) {
|
|
offset = next_offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* CompressionMethod compression_methods<1..2^8-1> */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &compression_methods_length,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_comp_methods_len, 1, G_MAXUINT8)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
offset++;
|
|
next_offset = offset + compression_methods_length;
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_comp_methods,
|
|
tvb, offset, compression_methods_length,
|
|
"Compression Methods (%u method%s)",
|
|
compression_methods_length,
|
|
plurality(compression_methods_length,
|
|
"", "s"));
|
|
cs_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.comp_methods);
|
|
while (offset < next_offset) {
|
|
compression_method = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
/* TODO: make reserved/private comp meth. fields selectable */
|
|
if (compression_method < 64)
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(cs_tree, hf->hf.hs_comp_method,
|
|
tvb, offset, 1, compression_method);
|
|
else if (compression_method > 63 && compression_method < 193)
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint_format_value(cs_tree, hf->hf.hs_comp_method, tvb, offset, 1,
|
|
compression_method, "Reserved - to be assigned by IANA (%u)",
|
|
compression_method);
|
|
else
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint_format_value(cs_tree, hf->hf.hs_comp_method, tvb, offset, 1,
|
|
compression_method, "Private use range (%u)",
|
|
compression_method);
|
|
offset++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL v3.0 has no extensions, so length field can indeed be missing. */
|
|
if (offset < offset_end) {
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(hf, tvb, tree, pinfo, offset,
|
|
offset_end, SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
|
session, ssl, dtls_hfs != NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_srv_hello(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
packet_info* pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
|
|
SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl,
|
|
gboolean is_dtls)
|
|
{
|
|
/* struct {
|
|
* ProtocolVersion server_version;
|
|
* Random random;
|
|
* SessionID session_id; // TLS 1.2 and before
|
|
* CipherSuite cipher_suite;
|
|
* CompressionMethod compression_method; // TLS 1.2 and before
|
|
* Extension server_hello_extension_list<0..2^16-1>;
|
|
* } ServerHello;
|
|
*/
|
|
guint16 server_version;
|
|
|
|
/* This version is always better than the guess at the Record Layer */
|
|
server_version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
if((server_version & 0xFF00) == 0x7f00) { /* if server_version start with 0x7f, it is (and force) TLS 1.3 */
|
|
server_version = TLSV1DOT3_VERSION;
|
|
}
|
|
ssl_try_set_version(session, ssl, SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE, SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO,
|
|
is_dtls, server_version);
|
|
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL,
|
|
val_to_str_const(server_version, ssl_version_short_names, "SSL"));
|
|
|
|
/* Initially assume that the session is resumed. If this is not the case, a
|
|
* ServerHelloDone will be observed before the ChangeCipherSpec message
|
|
* which will reset this flag. */
|
|
session->is_session_resumed = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
/* show the server version */
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_server_version, tvb,
|
|
offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
/* dissect fields that are also present in ClientHello */
|
|
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_common(hf, tvb, tree, offset, session, ssl, TRUE);
|
|
|
|
if (ssl) {
|
|
/* store selected cipher suite for decryption */
|
|
ssl_set_cipher(ssl, tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* now the server-selected cipher suite */
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_cipher_suite,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
if (session->version != TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { /* No compression with TLS 1.3 */
|
|
if (ssl) {
|
|
/* store selected compression method for decryption */
|
|
ssl->session.compression = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
}
|
|
/* and the server-selected compression method */
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_comp_method,
|
|
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL v3.0 has no extensions, so length field can indeed be missing. */
|
|
if (offset < offset_end) {
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(hf, tvb, tree, pinfo, offset,
|
|
offset_end, SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO,
|
|
session, ssl, is_dtls);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Client Hello and Server Hello dissections. }}} */
|
|
|
|
/* New Session Ticket dissection. {{{ */
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_new_ses_ticket(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
|
|
SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl,
|
|
gboolean is_dtls, GHashTable *session_hash)
|
|
{
|
|
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5077#section-3.3 (TLS >= 1.0):
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* uint32 ticket_lifetime_hint;
|
|
* opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>;
|
|
* } NewSessionTicket;
|
|
*
|
|
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.5.1
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* uint32 ticket_lifetime;
|
|
* uint32 ticket_age_add;
|
|
* opaque ticket<1..2^16-1>;
|
|
* Extension extensions<0..2^16-2>;
|
|
* } NewSessionTicket;
|
|
*/
|
|
proto_tree *subtree;
|
|
guint32 ticket_len;
|
|
gboolean is_tls13 = session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION;
|
|
|
|
subtree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset,
|
|
hf->ett.session_ticket, NULL,
|
|
"TLS Session Ticket");
|
|
|
|
/* ticket lifetime hint */
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf->hf.hs_session_ticket_lifetime_hint,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset += 4;
|
|
|
|
if (is_tls13) {
|
|
/* for TLS 1.3: ticket_age_add */
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf->hf.hs_session_ticket_age_add,
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset += 4;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* opaque ticket<0..2^16-1> (with TLS 1.3 the minimum is 1) */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, offset_end, &ticket_len,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_session_ticket_len, is_tls13 ? 1 : 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
/* Content depends on implementation, so just show data! */
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf->hf.hs_session_ticket,
|
|
tvb, offset, ticket_len, ENC_NA);
|
|
/* save the session ticket to cache for ssl_finalize_decryption */
|
|
if (ssl && !is_tls13) {
|
|
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, ticket_len);
|
|
ssl->session_ticket.data = (guchar*)wmem_realloc(wmem_file_scope(),
|
|
ssl->session_ticket.data, ticket_len);
|
|
ssl->session_ticket.data_len = ticket_len;
|
|
tvb_memcpy(tvb, ssl->session_ticket.data, offset, ticket_len);
|
|
/* NewSessionTicket is received after the first (client)
|
|
* ChangeCipherSpec, and before the second (server) ChangeCipherSpec.
|
|
* Since the second CCS has already the session key available it will
|
|
* just return. To ensure that the session ticket is mapped to a
|
|
* master key (from the first CCS), save the ticket here too. */
|
|
ssl_save_master_key("Session Ticket", session_hash,
|
|
&ssl->session_ticket, &ssl->master_secret);
|
|
ssl->state |= SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET;
|
|
}
|
|
offset += ticket_len;
|
|
|
|
if (is_tls13) {
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(hf, tvb, subtree, pinfo, offset,
|
|
offset_end, SSL_HND_NEWSESSION_TICKET,
|
|
session, ssl, is_dtls);
|
|
}
|
|
} /* }}} */
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_retry_request(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
packet_info* pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
|
|
SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl,
|
|
gboolean is_dtls)
|
|
{
|
|
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-19#section-4.1.4
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* ProtocolVersion server_version;
|
|
* CipherSuite cipher_suite;
|
|
* Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>;
|
|
* } HelloRetryRequest;
|
|
*/
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_server_version, tvb,
|
|
offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_cipher_suite,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(hf, tvb, tree, pinfo, offset,
|
|
offset_end, SSL_HND_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
|
|
session, ssl, is_dtls);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_encrypted_extensions(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
packet_info* pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
|
|
SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl,
|
|
gboolean is_dtls)
|
|
{
|
|
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.3.1
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
|
|
* } EncryptedExtensions;
|
|
*/
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(hf, tvb, tree, pinfo, offset,
|
|
offset_end, SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
|
|
session, ssl, is_dtls);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Certificate and Certificate Request dissections. {{{ */
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_cert(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree,
|
|
guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl _U_,
|
|
GHashTable *key_hash _U_, gboolean is_from_server, gboolean is_dtls)
|
|
{
|
|
/* opaque ASN.1Cert<1..2^24-1>;
|
|
*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* select(certificate_type) {
|
|
*
|
|
* // certificate type defined in RFC 7250
|
|
* case RawPublicKey:
|
|
* opaque ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>;
|
|
*
|
|
* // X.509 certificate defined in RFC 5246
|
|
* case X.509:
|
|
* ASN.1Cert certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
|
|
* };
|
|
* } Certificate;
|
|
*
|
|
* draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18:
|
|
* opaque ASN1Cert<1..2^24-1>;
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* ASN1Cert cert_data;
|
|
* Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
|
|
* } CertificateEntry;
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
|
|
* CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
|
|
* } Certificate;
|
|
*/
|
|
enum { CERT_X509, CERT_RPK } cert_type;
|
|
asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx;
|
|
#if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS)
|
|
gnutls_datum_t subjectPublicKeyInfo = { NULL, 0 };
|
|
#endif
|
|
guint32 next_offset;
|
|
|
|
asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo);
|
|
|
|
if ((is_from_server && session->server_cert_type == SSL_HND_CERT_TYPE_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY) ||
|
|
(!is_from_server && session->client_cert_type == SSL_HND_CERT_TYPE_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY)) {
|
|
cert_type = CERT_RPK;
|
|
} else {
|
|
cert_type = CERT_X509;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS)
|
|
/* Ask the pkcs1 dissector to return the public key details */
|
|
if (ssl)
|
|
asn1_ctx.private_data = &subjectPublicKeyInfo;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
switch (cert_type) {
|
|
case CERT_RPK:
|
|
{
|
|
guint32 cert_length;
|
|
/* opaque ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1> */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &cert_length,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_certificate_len, 1, G_MAXUINT24)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
offset += 3;
|
|
|
|
dissect_x509af_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, tree, hf->hf.hs_certificate);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
case CERT_X509:
|
|
{
|
|
guint32 certificate_list_length;
|
|
proto_item *ti;
|
|
proto_tree *subtree;
|
|
|
|
/* TLS 1.3: opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1> */
|
|
if (session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
|
|
guint32 context_length;
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &context_length,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_certificate_request_context_length, 0, G_MAXUINT8)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
offset++;
|
|
if (context_length > 0) {
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_certificate_request_context,
|
|
tvb, offset, context_length, ENC_NA);
|
|
offset += context_length;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1> */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &certificate_list_length,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_certificates_len, 0, G_MAXUINT24)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
offset += 3; /* 24-bit length value */
|
|
next_offset = offset + certificate_list_length;
|
|
|
|
if (certificate_list_length > 0) {
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_certificates,
|
|
tvb, offset, certificate_list_length,
|
|
"Certificates (%u bytes)",
|
|
certificate_list_length);
|
|
|
|
/* make it a subtree */
|
|
subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.certificates);
|
|
|
|
/* iterate through each certificate */
|
|
while (offset < next_offset) {
|
|
guint32 cert_length;
|
|
/* opaque ASN1Cert<1..2^24-1> */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, next_offset, &cert_length,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_certificate_len, 1, G_MAXUINT24)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
offset += 3;
|
|
|
|
dissect_x509af_Certificate(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, subtree, hf->hf.hs_certificate);
|
|
#if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS)
|
|
/* Only attempt to get the RSA modulus for the first cert. */
|
|
asn1_ctx.private_data = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
offset += cert_length;
|
|
|
|
/* TLS 1.3: Extension extensions<0..2^16-1> */
|
|
if (session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
|
|
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(hf, tvb, subtree, pinfo, offset,
|
|
next_offset, SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
session, ssl, is_dtls);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS)
|
|
if (is_from_server && ssl)
|
|
ssl_find_private_key_by_pubkey(ssl, key_hash, &subjectPublicKeyInfo);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_cert_req(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
|
|
SslSession *session, gboolean is_dtls)
|
|
{
|
|
/* From SSL 3.0 and up (note that since TLS 1.1 certificate_authorities can be empty):
|
|
* enum {
|
|
* rsa_sign(1), dss_sign(2), rsa_fixed_dh(3), dss_fixed_dh(4),
|
|
* (255)
|
|
* } ClientCertificateType;
|
|
*
|
|
* opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>;
|
|
*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
|
|
* DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<3..2^16-1>;
|
|
* } CertificateRequest;
|
|
*
|
|
*
|
|
* As per TLSv1.2 (RFC 5246) the format has changed to:
|
|
*
|
|
* enum {
|
|
* rsa_sign(1), dss_sign(2), rsa_fixed_dh(3), dss_fixed_dh(4),
|
|
* rsa_ephemeral_dh_RESERVED(5), dss_ephemeral_dh_RESERVED(6),
|
|
* fortezza_dms_RESERVED(20), (255)
|
|
* } ClientCertificateType;
|
|
*
|
|
* enum {
|
|
* none(0), md5(1), sha1(2), sha224(3), sha256(4), sha384(5),
|
|
* sha512(6), (255)
|
|
* } HashAlgorithm;
|
|
*
|
|
* enum { anonymous(0), rsa(1), dsa(2), ecdsa(3), (255) }
|
|
* SignatureAlgorithm;
|
|
*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* HashAlgorithm hash;
|
|
* SignatureAlgorithm signature;
|
|
* } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm;
|
|
*
|
|
* SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
|
|
* supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
|
|
*
|
|
* opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>;
|
|
*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
|
|
* SignatureAndHashAlgorithm supported_signature_algorithms<2^16-1>;
|
|
* DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
|
|
* } CertificateRequest;
|
|
*
|
|
* draft-ietf-tls-tls13-19:
|
|
*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
|
|
* Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>;
|
|
* } CertificateRequest;
|
|
*/
|
|
proto_item *ti;
|
|
proto_tree *subtree;
|
|
guint32 next_offset;
|
|
asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx;
|
|
|
|
if (!tree)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo);
|
|
|
|
if (session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
|
|
guint32 context_length;
|
|
/* opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1> */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &context_length,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_certificate_request_context_length, 0, G_MAXUINT8)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
offset++;
|
|
if (context_length > 0) {
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_certificate_request_context,
|
|
tvb, offset, context_length, ENC_NA);
|
|
offset += context_length;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
guint32 cert_types_count;
|
|
/* ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1> */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &cert_types_count,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_cert_types_count, 1, G_MAXUINT8)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
offset++;
|
|
next_offset = offset + cert_types_count;
|
|
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_cert_types,
|
|
tvb, offset, cert_types_count,
|
|
"Certificate types (%u type%s)",
|
|
cert_types_count,
|
|
plurality(cert_types_count, "", "s"));
|
|
subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.cert_types);
|
|
|
|
while (offset < next_offset) {
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf->hf.hs_cert_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset++;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (session->version) {
|
|
case TLSV1DOT2_VERSION:
|
|
case DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION:
|
|
offset = ssl_dissect_hash_alg_list(hf, tvb, tree, pinfo, offset, offset_end);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* SslDecryptSession pointer is NULL because Certificate Extensions
|
|
* should not influence decryption state.
|
|
*/
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(hf, tvb, tree, pinfo, offset,
|
|
offset_end, SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST,
|
|
session, NULL, is_dtls);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* for TLS 1.2 and older, the certificate_authorities field. */
|
|
tls_dissect_certificate_authorities(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Certificate and Certificate Request dissections. }}} */
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_cert_verify(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint16 version)
|
|
{
|
|
ssl_dissect_digitally_signed(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, version,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_client_cert_vrfy_sig_len,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_client_cert_vrfy_sig);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Finished dissection. {{{ */
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_finished(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
|
|
const SslSession *session, ssl_hfs_t *ssl_hfs)
|
|
{
|
|
/* For SSLv3:
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* opaque md5_hash[16];
|
|
* opaque sha_hash[20];
|
|
* } Finished;
|
|
*
|
|
* For (D)TLS:
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* opaque verify_data[12];
|
|
* } Finished;
|
|
*
|
|
* For TLS 1.3:
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* opaque verify_data[Hash.length];
|
|
* }
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!tree)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (session->version == SSLV3_VERSION) {
|
|
if (ssl_hfs != NULL) {
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, ssl_hfs->hs_md5_hash,
|
|
tvb, offset, 16, ENC_NA);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, ssl_hfs->hs_sha_hash,
|
|
tvb, offset + 16, 20, ENC_NA);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Length should be 12 for TLS before 1.3, assume this is the case. */
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_finished,
|
|
tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, ENC_NA);
|
|
}
|
|
} /* }}} */
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 6066 Certificate URL handshake message dissection. {{{ */
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_cert_url(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
|
|
{
|
|
guint16 url_hash_len;
|
|
|
|
/* enum {
|
|
* individual_certs(0), pkipath(1), (255)
|
|
* } CertChainType;
|
|
*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* CertChainType type;
|
|
* URLAndHash url_and_hash_list<1..2^16-1>;
|
|
* } CertificateURL;
|
|
*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* opaque url<1..2^16-1>;
|
|
* unint8 padding;
|
|
* opaque SHA1Hash[20];
|
|
* } URLAndHash;
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_url_type,
|
|
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA);
|
|
offset++;
|
|
|
|
url_hash_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_url_url_hash_list_len,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
while (url_hash_len-- > 0) {
|
|
proto_item *urlhash_item;
|
|
proto_tree *urlhash_tree;
|
|
guint16 url_len;
|
|
|
|
urlhash_item = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_url_item,
|
|
tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
|
|
urlhash_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(urlhash_item, hf->ett.urlhash);
|
|
|
|
url_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(urlhash_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_url_url_len,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(urlhash_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_url_url,
|
|
tvb, offset, url_len, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA);
|
|
offset += url_len;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(urlhash_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_url_padding,
|
|
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA);
|
|
offset++;
|
|
/* Note: RFC 6066 says that padding must be 0x01 */
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(urlhash_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_url_sha1,
|
|
tvb, offset, 20, ENC_NA);
|
|
offset += 20;
|
|
}
|
|
} /* }}} */
|
|
|
|
/* Dissection of TLS Extensions in Client Hello, Server Hello, etc. {{{ */
|
|
static gint
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree,
|
|
packet_info* pinfo, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint8 hnd_type,
|
|
SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl,
|
|
gboolean is_dtls)
|
|
{
|
|
guint32 exts_len;
|
|
guint16 ext_type;
|
|
guint32 ext_len;
|
|
guint32 next_offset;
|
|
proto_tree *ext_tree;
|
|
|
|
/* Extension extensions<0..2^16-2> (for TLS 1.3 HRR/CR min-length is 2) */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &exts_len,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_exts_len, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
|
|
return offset_end;
|
|
}
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
offset_end = offset + exts_len;
|
|
|
|
while (offset_end - offset >= 4)
|
|
{
|
|
ext_type = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
ext_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 2);
|
|
|
|
ext_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree_format(tree, tvb, offset, 4 + ext_len, hf->ett.hs_ext, NULL,
|
|
"Extension: %s (len=%u)", val_to_str(ext_type,
|
|
tls_hello_extension_types,
|
|
"Unknown type %u"), ext_len);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(ext_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_type,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, ext_type);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
/* opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1> */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, offset_end, &ext_len,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_ext_len, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
|
|
return offset_end;
|
|
}
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
next_offset = offset + ext_len;
|
|
|
|
switch (ext_type) {
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SERVER_NAME:
|
|
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_server_name(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST:
|
|
if (hnd_type == SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO)
|
|
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request(hf, tvb, ext_tree, offset, FALSE);
|
|
// TODO dissect CertificateStatus for SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE (TLS 1.3)
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CERT_TYPE:
|
|
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_cert_type(hf, tvb, ext_tree,
|
|
offset, next_offset,
|
|
hnd_type, ext_type,
|
|
session);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS:
|
|
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_supported_groups(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_EC_POINT_FORMATS:
|
|
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_ec_point_formats(hf, tvb, ext_tree, offset);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS:
|
|
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_sig_hash_algs(hf, tvb, ext_tree, pinfo, offset, next_offset);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_USE_SRTP:
|
|
if (is_dtls) {
|
|
offset = dtls_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_use_srtp(tvb, ext_tree, offset, next_offset);
|
|
} else {
|
|
// XXX expert info: This extension MUST only be used with DTLS, and not with TLS.
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_HEARTBEAT:
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ext_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_heartbeat_mode,
|
|
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset++;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_ALPN:
|
|
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_alpn(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, hnd_type, session);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST_V2:
|
|
if (hnd_type == SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO)
|
|
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request_v2(hf, tvb, ext_tree, offset);
|
|
// TODO dissect CertificateStatus for SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE (TLS 1.3)
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SIGNED_CERTIFICATE_TIMESTAMP:
|
|
if (hnd_type == SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO || hnd_type == SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS)
|
|
offset = tls_dissect_sct_list(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, session->version);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CLIENT_CERT_TYPE:
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SERVER_CERT_TYPE:
|
|
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_cert_type(hf, tvb, ext_tree,
|
|
offset, next_offset,
|
|
hnd_type, ext_type,
|
|
session);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_PADDING:
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ext_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_padding_data, tvb, offset, ext_len, ENC_NA);
|
|
offset += ext_len;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC:
|
|
if (ssl && hnd_type == SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO) {
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("%s enabling Encrypt-then-MAC\n", G_STRFUNC);
|
|
ssl->state |= SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET:
|
|
if (ssl) {
|
|
switch (hnd_type) {
|
|
case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
|
|
ssl->state |= SSL_CLIENT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
|
|
ssl->state |= SSL_SERVER_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET;
|
|
break;
|
|
default: /* no default */
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SESSION_TICKET_TLS:
|
|
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_session_ticket(hf, tvb, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, hnd_type, ssl);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_KEY_SHARE:
|
|
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_key_share(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, hnd_type);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY:
|
|
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_pre_shared_key(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, hnd_type);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_EARLY_DATA:
|
|
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_early_data(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, hnd_type, ssl);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS:
|
|
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_supported_versions(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_COOKIE:
|
|
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_cookie(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES:
|
|
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_psk_key_exchange_modes(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITIES:
|
|
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_certificate_authorities(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_OID_FILTERS:
|
|
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_oid_filters(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_NPN:
|
|
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_npn(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO:
|
|
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_reneg_info(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_DRAFT_VERSION_TLS13:
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ext_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_draft_version_tls13,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ext_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_data,
|
|
tvb, offset, ext_len, ENC_NA);
|
|
offset += ext_len;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset)) {
|
|
/* Dissection did not end at expected location, fix it. */
|
|
offset = next_offset;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check if Extensions vector is correctly terminated. */
|
|
if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end)) {
|
|
offset = offset_end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return offset;
|
|
} /* }}} */
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* ClientKeyExchange algo-specific dissectors. {{{ */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_ecdh(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
|
|
guint32 length)
|
|
{
|
|
gint point_len;
|
|
proto_tree *ssl_ecdh_tree;
|
|
|
|
ssl_ecdh_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length,
|
|
hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "EC Diffie-Hellman Client Params");
|
|
|
|
/* point */
|
|
point_len = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecdh_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_point_len, tvb,
|
|
offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecdh_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_point, tvb,
|
|
offset + 1, point_len, ENC_NA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_dh(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 length)
|
|
{
|
|
gint yc_len;
|
|
proto_tree *ssl_dh_tree;
|
|
|
|
ssl_dh_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length,
|
|
hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "Diffie-Hellman Client Params");
|
|
|
|
/* ClientDiffieHellmanPublic.dh_public (explicit) */
|
|
yc_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_dh_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_yc_len, tvb,
|
|
offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_dh_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_yc, tvb,
|
|
offset + 2, yc_len, ENC_NA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_rsa(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
|
|
guint32 length, const SslSession *session)
|
|
{
|
|
gint epms_len;
|
|
proto_tree *ssl_rsa_tree;
|
|
|
|
ssl_rsa_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length,
|
|
hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "RSA Encrypted PreMaster Secret");
|
|
|
|
/* EncryptedPreMasterSecret.pre_master_secret */
|
|
switch (session->version) {
|
|
case SSLV2_VERSION:
|
|
case SSLV3_VERSION:
|
|
case DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION:
|
|
/* OpenSSL pre-0.9.8f DTLS and pre-TLS quirk: 2-octet length vector is
|
|
* not present. The handshake contents represents the EPMS, see:
|
|
* https://bugs.wireshark.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=10222 */
|
|
epms_len = length;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
/* TLS and DTLS include vector length before EPMS */
|
|
epms_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_rsa_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_epms_len, tvb,
|
|
offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_rsa_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_epms, tvb,
|
|
offset, epms_len, ENC_NA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Used in PSK cipher suites */
|
|
static void
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_psk(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 length)
|
|
{
|
|
guint identity_len;
|
|
proto_tree *ssl_psk_tree;
|
|
|
|
ssl_psk_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length,
|
|
hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "PSK Client Params");
|
|
/* identity */
|
|
identity_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_identity_len, tvb,
|
|
offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_identity, tvb,
|
|
offset + 2, identity_len, ENC_NA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Used in RSA PSK cipher suites */
|
|
static void
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_rsa_psk(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
|
|
guint32 length)
|
|
{
|
|
gint identity_len, epms_len;
|
|
proto_tree *ssl_psk_tree;
|
|
|
|
ssl_psk_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length,
|
|
hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "RSA PSK Client Params");
|
|
|
|
/* identity */
|
|
identity_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_identity_len,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_identity,
|
|
tvb, offset + 2, identity_len, ENC_NA);
|
|
offset += 2 + identity_len;
|
|
|
|
/* Yc */
|
|
epms_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_epms_len, tvb,
|
|
offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_epms, tvb,
|
|
offset + 2, epms_len, ENC_NA);
|
|
}
|
|
/* ClientKeyExchange algo-specific dissectors. }}} */
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Dissects DigitallySigned (see RFC 5246 4.7 Cryptographic Attributes). {{{ */
|
|
static guint32
|
|
ssl_dissect_digitally_signed(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
|
|
guint16 version, gint hf_sig_len, gint hf_sig)
|
|
{
|
|
guint32 sig_len;
|
|
proto_item *ti_algo;
|
|
proto_tree *ssl_algo_tree;
|
|
|
|
switch (version) {
|
|
case TLSV1DOT2_VERSION:
|
|
case DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION:
|
|
case TLSV1DOT3_VERSION: /* XXX merge both fields into one SignatureScheme? */
|
|
ti_algo = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_sig_hash_alg, tvb,
|
|
offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
ssl_algo_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti_algo, hf->ett.hs_sig_hash_alg);
|
|
|
|
/* SignatureAndHashAlgorithm { hash, signature } */
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_algo_tree, hf->hf.hs_sig_hash_hash, tvb,
|
|
offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_algo_tree, hf->hf.hs_sig_hash_sig, tvb,
|
|
offset + 1, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Sig */
|
|
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &sig_len,
|
|
hf_sig_len, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
|
|
return offset_end;
|
|
}
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_sig, tvb, offset, sig_len, ENC_NA);
|
|
offset += sig_len;
|
|
return offset;
|
|
} /* }}} */
|
|
|
|
/* ServerKeyExchange algo-specific dissectors. {{{ */
|
|
|
|
/* dissects signed_params inside a ServerKeyExchange for some keyex algos */
|
|
static void
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_sig(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
|
|
guint16 version)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* TLSv1.2 (RFC 5246 sec 7.4.8)
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* digitally-signed struct {
|
|
* opaque handshake_messages[handshake_messages_length];
|
|
* }
|
|
* } CertificateVerify;
|
|
*
|
|
* TLSv1.0/TLSv1.1 (RFC 5436 sec 7.4.8 and 7.4.3) works essentially the same
|
|
* as TLSv1.2, but the hash algorithms are not explicit in digitally-signed.
|
|
*
|
|
* SSLv3 (RFC 6101 sec 5.6.8) essentially works the same as TLSv1.0 but it
|
|
* does more hashing including the master secret and padding.
|
|
*/
|
|
ssl_dissect_digitally_signed(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, version,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_sig_len,
|
|
hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_sig);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecdh(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
|
|
guint16 version, gboolean anon)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 4492 ECC cipher suites for TLS
|
|
*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* ECCurveType curve_type;
|
|
* select (curve_type) {
|
|
* case explicit_prime:
|
|
* ...
|
|
* case explicit_char2:
|
|
* ...
|
|
* case named_curve:
|
|
* NamedCurve namedcurve;
|
|
* };
|
|
* } ECParameters;
|
|
*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* opaque point <1..2^8-1>;
|
|
* } ECPoint;
|
|
*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* ECParameters curve_params;
|
|
* ECPoint public;
|
|
* } ServerECDHParams;
|
|
*
|
|
* select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
|
|
* case ec_diffie_hellman:
|
|
* ServerECDHParams params;
|
|
* Signature signed_params;
|
|
* } ServerKeyExchange;
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
gint curve_type;
|
|
gint point_len;
|
|
proto_tree *ssl_ecdh_tree;
|
|
|
|
ssl_ecdh_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset,
|
|
hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "EC Diffie-Hellman Server Params");
|
|
|
|
/* ECParameters.curve_type */
|
|
curve_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecdh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_curve_type, tvb,
|
|
offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset++;
|
|
if (curve_type != 3)
|
|
return; /* only named_curves are supported */
|
|
|
|
/* case curve_type == named_curve; ECParameters.namedcurve */
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecdh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_named_curve, tvb,
|
|
offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
/* ECPoint.point */
|
|
point_len = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecdh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_point_len, tvb,
|
|
offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecdh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_point, tvb,
|
|
offset + 1, point_len, ENC_NA);
|
|
offset += 1 + point_len;
|
|
|
|
/* Signature (if non-anonymous KEX) */
|
|
if (!anon) {
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_sig(hf, tvb, pinfo, ssl_ecdh_tree, offset, offset_end, version);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_dhe(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
|
|
guint16 version, gboolean anon)
|
|
{
|
|
gint p_len, g_len, ys_len;
|
|
proto_tree *ssl_dh_tree;
|
|
|
|
ssl_dh_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset,
|
|
hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "Diffie-Hellman Server Params");
|
|
|
|
/* p */
|
|
p_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_dh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_p_len, tvb,
|
|
offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_dh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_p, tvb,
|
|
offset + 2, p_len, ENC_NA);
|
|
offset += 2 + p_len;
|
|
|
|
/* g */
|
|
g_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_dh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_g_len, tvb,
|
|
offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_dh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_g, tvb,
|
|
offset + 2, g_len, ENC_NA);
|
|
offset += 2 + g_len;
|
|
|
|
/* Ys */
|
|
ys_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_dh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_ys_len, tvb,
|
|
offset, 2, ys_len);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_dh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_ys, tvb,
|
|
offset + 2, ys_len, ENC_NA);
|
|
offset += 2 + ys_len;
|
|
|
|
/* Signature (if non-anonymous KEX) */
|
|
if (!anon) {
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_sig(hf, tvb, pinfo, ssl_dh_tree, offset, offset_end, version);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Only used in RSA-EXPORT cipher suites */
|
|
static void
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_rsa(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
|
|
guint16 version)
|
|
{
|
|
gint modulus_len, exponent_len;
|
|
proto_tree *ssl_rsa_tree;
|
|
|
|
ssl_rsa_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset,
|
|
hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "RSA-EXPORT Server Params");
|
|
|
|
/* modulus */
|
|
modulus_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_rsa_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_modulus_len, tvb,
|
|
offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_rsa_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_modulus, tvb,
|
|
offset + 2, modulus_len, ENC_NA);
|
|
offset += 2 + modulus_len;
|
|
|
|
/* exponent */
|
|
exponent_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_rsa_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_exponent_len,
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_rsa_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_exponent,
|
|
tvb, offset + 2, exponent_len, ENC_NA);
|
|
offset += 2 + exponent_len;
|
|
|
|
/* Signature */
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_sig(hf, tvb, pinfo, ssl_rsa_tree, offset, offset_end, version);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Used in RSA PSK and PSK cipher suites */
|
|
static void
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_psk(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 length)
|
|
{
|
|
guint hint_len;
|
|
proto_tree *ssl_psk_tree;
|
|
|
|
hint_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
if ((2 + hint_len) != length) {
|
|
/* Lengths don't line up (wasn't what we expected?) */
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl_psk_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length,
|
|
hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "PSK Server Params");
|
|
|
|
/* hint */
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_hint_len, tvb,
|
|
offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_hint, tvb,
|
|
offset + 2, hint_len, ENC_NA);
|
|
}
|
|
/* ServerKeyExchange algo-specific dissectors. }}} */
|
|
|
|
/* Client Key Exchange and Server Key Exchange handshake dissections. {{{ */
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_keyex(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 length,
|
|
const SslSession *session)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (ssl_get_keyex_alg(session->cipher)) {
|
|
case KEX_DH_ANON: /* RFC 5246; DHE_DSS, DHE_RSA, DH_DSS, DH_RSA, DH_ANON: ClientDiffieHellmanPublic */
|
|
case KEX_DH_DSS:
|
|
case KEX_DH_RSA:
|
|
case KEX_DHE_DSS:
|
|
case KEX_DHE_RSA:
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_dh(hf, tvb, tree, offset, length);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KEX_DHE_PSK: /* RFC 4279; diffie_hellman_psk: psk_identity, ClientDiffieHellmanPublic */
|
|
/* XXX: implement support for DHE_PSK */
|
|
break;
|
|
case KEX_ECDH_ANON: /* RFC 4492; ec_diffie_hellman: ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic */
|
|
case KEX_ECDH_ECDSA:
|
|
case KEX_ECDH_RSA:
|
|
case KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA:
|
|
case KEX_ECDHE_RSA:
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_ecdh(hf, tvb, tree, offset, length);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KEX_ECDHE_PSK: /* RFC 5489; ec_diffie_hellman_psk: psk_identity, ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic */
|
|
/* XXX: implement support for ECDHE_PSK */
|
|
break;
|
|
case KEX_KRB5: /* RFC 2712; krb5: KerberosWrapper */
|
|
/* XXX: implement support for KRB5 */
|
|
break;
|
|
case KEX_PSK: /* RFC 4279; psk: psk_identity */
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_psk(hf, tvb, tree, offset, length);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KEX_RSA: /* RFC 5246; rsa: EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_rsa(hf, tvb, tree, offset, length, session);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KEX_RSA_PSK: /* RFC 4279; rsa_psk: psk_identity, EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_rsa_psk(hf, tvb, tree, offset, length);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KEX_SRP_SHA: /* RFC 5054; srp: ClientSRPPublic */
|
|
case KEX_SRP_SHA_DSS:
|
|
case KEX_SRP_SHA_RSA:
|
|
/* XXX: implement support for SRP_SHA* */
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
/* XXX: add info message for not supported KEX algo */
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_dissect_hnd_srv_keyex(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
|
|
const SslSession *session)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (ssl_get_keyex_alg(session->cipher)) {
|
|
case KEX_DH_ANON: /* RFC 5246; ServerDHParams */
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_dhe(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, session->version, TRUE);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KEX_DH_DSS: /* RFC 5246; not allowed */
|
|
case KEX_DH_RSA:
|
|
/* XXX: add error on not allowed KEX */
|
|
break;
|
|
case KEX_DHE_DSS: /* RFC 5246; dhe_dss, dhe_rsa: ServerDHParams, Signature */
|
|
case KEX_DHE_RSA:
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_dhe(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, session->version, FALSE);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KEX_DHE_PSK: /* RFC 4279; diffie_hellman_psk: psk_identity_hint, ServerDHParams */
|
|
/* XXX: implement support for DHE_PSK */
|
|
break;
|
|
case KEX_ECDH_ANON: /* RFC 4492; ec_diffie_hellman: ServerECDHParams (without signature for anon) */
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecdh(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, session->version, TRUE);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KEX_ECDHE_PSK: /* RFC 5489; psk_identity_hint, ServerECDHParams */
|
|
/* XXX: implement support for ECDHE_PSK */
|
|
break;
|
|
case KEX_ECDH_ECDSA: /* RFC 4492; ec_diffie_hellman: ServerECDHParams, Signature */
|
|
case KEX_ECDH_RSA:
|
|
case KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA:
|
|
case KEX_ECDHE_RSA:
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecdh(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, session->version, FALSE);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KEX_KRB5: /* RFC 2712; not allowed */
|
|
/* XXX: add error on not allowed KEX */
|
|
break;
|
|
case KEX_PSK: /* RFC 4279; psk, rsa: psk_identity*/
|
|
case KEX_RSA_PSK:
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_psk(hf, tvb, tree, offset, offset_end - offset);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KEX_RSA: /* only allowed if the public key in the server certificate is longer than 512 bits*/
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_rsa(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, session->version);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KEX_SRP_SHA: /* RFC 5054; srp: ServerSRPParams, Signature */
|
|
case KEX_SRP_SHA_DSS:
|
|
case KEX_SRP_SHA_RSA:
|
|
/* XXX: implement support for SRP_SHA* */
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
/* XXX: add info message for not supported KEX algo */
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Client Key Exchange and Server Key Exchange handshake dissections. }}} */
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
tls13_dissect_hnd_key_update(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
|
|
{
|
|
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.5.3
|
|
* enum {
|
|
* update_not_requested(0), update_requested(1), (255)
|
|
* } KeyUpdateRequest;
|
|
*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* KeyUpdateRequest request_update;
|
|
* } KeyUpdate;
|
|
*/
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_key_update_request_update, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_common_register_options(module_t *module, ssl_common_options_t *options)
|
|
{
|
|
prefs_register_string_preference(module, "psk", "Pre-Shared-Key",
|
|
"Pre-Shared-Key as HEX string. Should be 0 to 16 bytes.",
|
|
&(options->psk));
|
|
|
|
prefs_register_filename_preference(module, "keylog_file", "(Pre)-Master-Secret log filename",
|
|
"The name of a file which contains a list of \n"
|
|
"(pre-)master secrets in one of the following formats:\n"
|
|
"\n"
|
|
"RSA <EPMS> <PMS>\n"
|
|
"RSA Session-ID:<SSLID> Master-Key:<MS>\n"
|
|
"CLIENT_RANDOM <CRAND> <MS>\n"
|
|
"PMS_CLIENT_RANDOM <CRAND> <PMS>\n"
|
|
"\n"
|
|
"Where:\n"
|
|
"<EPMS> = First 8 bytes of the Encrypted PMS\n"
|
|
"<PMS> = The Pre-Master-Secret (PMS) used to derive the MS\n"
|
|
"<SSLID> = The SSL Session ID\n"
|
|
"<MS> = The Master-Secret (MS)\n"
|
|
"<CRAND> = The Client's random number from the ClientHello message\n"
|
|
"\n"
|
|
"(All fields are in hex notation)",
|
|
&(options->keylog_filename));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
ssl_calculate_handshake_hash(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset, guint32 length)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ssl_session && ssl_session->session.version != TLSV1DOT3_VERSION && !(ssl_session->state & SSL_MASTER_SECRET)) {
|
|
guint32 old_length = ssl_session->handshake_data.data_len;
|
|
ssl_debug_printf("Calculating hash with offset %d %d\n", offset, length);
|
|
ssl_session->handshake_data.data = (guchar *)wmem_realloc(wmem_file_scope(), ssl_session->handshake_data.data, old_length + length);
|
|
tvb_memcpy(tvb, ssl_session->handshake_data.data + old_length, offset, length);
|
|
ssl_session->handshake_data.data_len += length;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Editor modelines - http://www.wireshark.org/tools/modelines.html
|
|
*
|
|
* Local variables:
|
|
* c-basic-offset: 4
|
|
* tab-width: 8
|
|
* indent-tabs-mode: nil
|
|
* End:
|
|
*
|
|
* vi: set shiftwidth=4 tabstop=8 expandtab:
|
|
* :indentSize=4:tabSize=8:noTabs=true:
|
|
*/
|