wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ssl-utils.h

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/* packet-ssl-utils.h
* ssl manipulation functions
* By Paolo Abeni <paolo.abeni@email.com>
*
* Wireshark - Network traffic analyzer
* By Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
* Copyright 1998 Gerald Combs
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
*/
#ifndef __SSL_UTILS_H_
#define __SSL_UTILS_H_
#include <stdio.h> /* some APIs we declare take a stdio stream as an argument */
#include <glib.h>
#include <epan/packet.h>
#include <epan/prefs.h>
#include <epan/wmem/wmem.h>
#include <epan/expert.h>
ssl,dtls,ssl-utils: Prepare for STARTTLS handling All STARTTLS-like dissectors (protocols which can switch to SSL/TLS after a protocol command) currently fail to get called after decryption. The reason for this is that the port is not registered for SSL dissection via ssl_dissector_add. Besides this, the MySQL dissector breaks in the event of multiple segments because it does not properly set desegmentation. The call path TCP | App | SSL | App is a bad, error-prone pattern which requires duplication of required functionality in dissectors. This patch enables to bypass the App (TCP | SSL | App) by registering a SSL as conversation dissector after a STARTTLS switch. Logical overview of changes: - Move srv_addr, srv_ptype and srv_port to SslSession and adjust the users. This allows passing SslSession around which will never be null unlike SslDecryptSession. This is needed for looking up the packet direction (server or client) before calling a subdissector. - Add app_handle to store the dissector and last_nontls_frame the frame that initiated STARTTLS. - The same app_handle is now used to store the dissector handle from a ssl association. - Moved conversation data (SslDecryptSession) to ssl-utils to avoid code duplication. Merge ssl_session_init into it. The new ssl_session_get() is needed for STARTTLS frame/handle storage. - Introduce new "ssl_starttls_ack" function to signal the last non-TLS packet. - Ensure that match_uint is set before calling the conversation dissector. This ensures that dissectors using match_uint to check the direction of a packet (client vs. server) see the TCP port instead of the IP proto. At least the MySQL and SMTP dissectors require such special treatment. - Move epan/conversation.h outside HAVE_LIBGNUTLS, remove from dtls (as it is already included by ssl-utils). - Various comment/debug string updates. Remove outdated comment before SSL association lookup. Besides setting match_uint and caching the app_handle, existing dissectors should not be affected by this patch. Follow-up patches will update existing dissectors to use the new ssl_starttls_ack interface. Bug: 9515 Change-Id: I795d16b6a901e672a5d89e922adc7e5bbcda0333 Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/6872 Reviewed-by: Alexis La Goutte <alexis.lagoutte@gmail.com> Petri-Dish: Alexis La Goutte <alexis.lagoutte@gmail.com> Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org> Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
2015-02-05 18:54:52 +00:00
#include <epan/conversation.h>
#include <epan/unit_strings.h>
#include <wsutil/wsgcrypt.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS
#include <gnutls/x509.h>
#include <gnutls/pkcs12.h>
#endif /* HAVE_LIBGNUTLS */
/* TODO inline this now that Libgcrypt is mandatory? */
#define SSL_CIPHER_CTX gcry_cipher_hd_t
ssl-utils: allow gcrypt without GnuTLS, improve structure Fix distinction between HAVE_LIBGNUTLS and HAVE_LIBGCRYPT. If GnuTLS is unavailable, then the only missing feature is decryption using an RSA private key file. Regardless of GnuTLS, allow SSL decryption (e.g. using a SSL key log file or a PSK configured via preferences). This change has no functional effect when GnuTLS and gcrypt are both available (or not). Additionally, decryption is possible if only libgcrypt is available. Further changes to make ssl-utils more maintainable and documented: - Group related functions, add markers and documentation. The following functions are moved (with no further modifications): - ssl_data_realloc, ssl_data_copy: related to StringInfo. - ssl_change_cipher, ssl_create_flow: related to the decryption of a session. - ssl_decompress_record: related to Record Decompression. - ssl_lib_init: moved to an arbitrary place. - ssl_set_server: moved closer to ssl_packet_from_server. - ssl_is_valid_content_type, ssl_is_valid_handshake_type: move closer to dissection code. - ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request, ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request_v2, ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_elliptic_curves, ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_ec_point_formats: move to TLS extensions. - Remove unused forward declaration of _gcry_rsa_decrypt. - ssl-packet-utils.h: - Remove ssl_equal, ssl_hash. These are only used in packet-ssl-utils.c. - ssl_private_key_equal, ssl_private_key_hash, ssl_common_register_options: inline when decryption is not possible. - Remove ws_symbol_export.h, enable SSL debug log when libgcrypt is compiled in (instead of depending on GnuTLS). - Move/merge stub code when GnuTLS or libgcrypt are not available: - ssl_find_cipher: move. - ssl_cipher_setiv: move. - ssl_generate_pre_master_secret, ssl_generate_keyring_material: move. Compile-tested all combinations: - no GnuTLS, no libgcrypt: CentOS 6. - no GnuTLS, has libgcrypt: CentOS 6. Passes all decryption tests except for the ones that need a RSA private key file. - has GnuTLS, no libgcrypt: Arch Linux. - has GnuTLS, has libgcrypt: Arch Linux. The decryption tests pass. (GnuTLS support is useless without gcrypt, but included for completeness.) Change-Id: I727248937331f8788de8ed78248bb33296206096 Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/11052 Petri-Dish: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl> Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org> Reviewed-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
2015-10-15 00:00:47 +00:00
#define SSL_DECRYPT_DEBUG
/* other defines */
typedef enum {
SSL_ID_CHG_CIPHER_SPEC = 0x14,
SSL_ID_ALERT = 0x15,
SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE = 0x16,
SSL_ID_APP_DATA = 0x17,
SSL_ID_HEARTBEAT = 0x18
} ContentType;
typedef enum {
SSL_HND_HELLO_REQUEST = 0,
SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO = 1,
SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO = 2,
SSL_HND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST = 3,
SSL_HND_NEWSESSION_TICKET = 4,
SSL_HND_END_OF_EARLY_DATA = 5,
SSL_HND_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST = 6,
SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS = 8,
SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE = 11,
SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG = 12,
SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST = 13,
SSL_HND_SVR_HELLO_DONE = 14,
SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY = 15,
SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG = 16,
SSL_HND_FINISHED = 20,
SSL_HND_CERT_URL = 21,
SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS = 22,
SSL_HND_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA = 23,
SSL_HND_KEY_UPDATE = 24,
/* Encrypted Extensions was NextProtocol in draft-agl-tls-nextprotoneg-03
* and changed in draft 04. Not to be confused with TLS 1.3 EE. */
SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTS = 67
} HandshakeType;
#define SSL2_HND_ERROR 0x00
#define SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO 0x01
#define SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY 0x02
#define SSL2_HND_CLIENT_FINISHED 0x03
#define SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO 0x04
#define SSL2_HND_SERVER_VERIFY 0x05
#define SSL2_HND_SERVER_FINISHED 0x06
#define SSL2_HND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE 0x07
#define SSL2_HND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 0x08
#define PCT_VERSION_1 0x8001
#define PCT_MSG_CLIENT_HELLO 0x01
#define PCT_MSG_SERVER_HELLO 0x02
#define PCT_MSG_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY 0x03
#define PCT_MSG_SERVER_VERIFY 0x04
#define PCT_MSG_ERROR 0x05
#define PCT_CH_OFFSET_V1 0xa
#define PCT_CIPHER_DES 0x01
#define PCT_CIPHER_IDEA 0x02
#define PCT_CIPHER_RC2 0x03
#define PCT_CIPHER_RC4 0x04
#define PCT_CIPHER_DES_112 0x05
#define PCT_CIPHER_DES_168 0x06
#define PCT_HASH_MD5 0x0001
#define PCT_HASH_MD5_TRUNC_64 0x0002
#define PCT_HASH_SHA 0x0003
#define PCT_HASH_SHA_TRUNC_80 0x0004
#define PCT_HASH_DES_DM 0x0005
#define PCT_CERT_NONE 0x00
#define PCT_CERT_X509 0x01
#define PCT_CERT_PKCS7 0x02
#define PCT_SIG_NONE 0x0000
#define PCT_SIG_RSA_MD5 0x0001
#define PCT_SIG_RSA_SHA 0x0002
#define PCT_SIG_DSA_SHA 0x0003
#define PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1 0x01
#define PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_DES 0x02
#define PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_DES3 0x03
#define PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_RC2 0x04
#define PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_RC4 0x05
#define PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3 0x06
#define PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3_TOKEN_DES 0x07
#define PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3_TOKEN_DES3 0x08
#define PCT_EXCH_FORTEZZA_TOKEN 0x09
#define PCT_ERR_BAD_CERTIFICATE 0x01
#define PCT_ERR_CLIENT_AUTH_FAILED 0x02
#define PCT_ERR_ILLEGAL_MESSAGE 0x03
#define PCT_ERR_INTEGRITY_CHECK_FAILED 0x04
#define PCT_ERR_SERVER_AUTH_FAILED 0x05
#define PCT_ERR_SPECS_MISMATCH 0x06
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SERVER_NAME 0
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH 1
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_URL 2
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_TRUSTED_CA_KEYS 3
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC 4
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST 5
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_USER_MAPPING 6
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CLIENT_AUTHZ 7
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SERVER_AUTHZ 8
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CERT_TYPE 9
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS 10 /* renamed from "elliptic_curves" (RFC 7919 / TLS 1.3) */
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_EC_POINT_FORMATS 11
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SRP 12
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS 13
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_USE_SRTP 14
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_HEARTBEAT 15
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_ALPN 16
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST_V2 17
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SIGNED_CERTIFICATE_TIMESTAMP 18
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CLIENT_CERT_TYPE 19
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SERVER_CERT_TYPE 20
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_PADDING 21
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC 22
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET 23
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_TOKEN_BINDING 24
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CACHED_INFO 25
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_QUIC_TRANSPORT_PARAMETERS 26 /* Not yet assigned by IANA (QUIC-TLS Draft04) */
/* 26-34 Unassigned*/
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SESSION_TICKET_TLS 35
/* TLS 1.3 draft */
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_KEY_SHARE_OLD 40
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY 41
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_EARLY_DATA 42
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS 43
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_COOKIE 44
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES 45
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_TICKET_EARLY_DATA_INFO 46 /* draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18 (removed in -19) */
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITIES 47
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_OID_FILTERS 48
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH 49
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_CERT 50
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_KEY_SHARE 51
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_0A0A 2570
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_1A1A 6682
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_2A2A 10794
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_NPN 13172 /* 0x3374 */
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_3A3A 14906
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_4A4A 19018
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_5A5A 23130
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_6A6A 27242
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CHANNEL_ID_OLD 30031 /* 0x754f */
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CHANNEL_ID 30032 /* 0x7550 */
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_7A7A 31354
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_8A8A 35466
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_9A9A 39578
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_AAAA 43690
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_BABA 47802
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_CACA 51914
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_DADA 56026
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_EAEA 60138
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_FAFA 64250
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO 65281 /* 0xFF01 */
#define SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_DRAFT_VERSION_TLS13 65282 /* 0xFF02 */
#define SSL_HND_CERT_URL_TYPE_INDIVIDUAL_CERT 1
#define SSL_HND_CERT_URL_TYPE_PKIPATH 2
#define SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS_TYPE_OCSP 1
#define SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS_TYPE_OCSP_MULTI 2
#define SSL_HND_CERT_TYPE_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY 2
#define SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_STREAM_DATA 0
#define SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_DATA 1
#define SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_BIDI_STREAMS 2
#define SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_IDLE_TIMEOUT 3
#define SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_OMIT_CONNECTION_ID 4 /* removed in draft -11 */
#define SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE 5
#define SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_STATELESS_RESET_TOKEN 6
#define SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_ACK_DELAY_EXPONENT 7
#define SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_UNI_STREAMS 8
/*
* Lookup tables
*/
extern const value_string ssl_version_short_names[];
extern const value_string ssl_20_msg_types[];
extern value_string_ext ssl_20_cipher_suites_ext;
extern const value_string ssl_20_certificate_type[];
extern const value_string ssl_31_content_type[];
extern const value_string ssl_versions[];
extern const value_string ssl_31_change_cipher_spec[];
extern const value_string ssl_31_alert_level[];
extern const value_string ssl_31_alert_description[];
extern const value_string ssl_31_handshake_type[];
extern const value_string tls_heartbeat_type[];
extern const value_string tls_heartbeat_mode[];
extern const value_string ssl_31_compression_method[];
extern const value_string ssl_31_key_exchange_algorithm[];
extern const value_string ssl_31_signature_algorithm[];
extern const value_string ssl_31_client_certificate_type[];
extern const value_string ssl_31_public_value_encoding[];
extern value_string_ext ssl_31_ciphersuite_ext;
extern const value_string pct_msg_types[];
extern const value_string pct_cipher_type[];
extern const value_string pct_hash_type[];
extern const value_string pct_cert_type[];
extern const value_string pct_sig_type[];
extern const value_string pct_exch_type[];
extern const value_string pct_error_code[];
extern const value_string tls_hello_extension_types[];
extern const value_string tls_hash_algorithm[];
extern const value_string tls_signature_algorithm[];
extern const value_string tls13_signature_algorithm[];
extern const value_string tls_certificate_type[];
extern const value_string tls_cert_chain_type[];
extern const value_string tls_cert_status_type[];
extern const value_string ssl_extension_curves[];
extern const value_string ssl_extension_ec_point_formats[];
extern const value_string ssl_curve_types[];
extern const value_string tls_hello_ext_server_name_type_vs[];
extern const value_string tls_hello_ext_psk_ke_mode[];
extern const value_string tls13_key_update_request[];
extern const value_string quic_transport_parameter_id[];
extern const value_string quic_version_vals[];
/* XXX Should we use GByteArray instead? */
typedef struct _StringInfo {
guchar *data; /* Backing storage which may be larger than data_len */
guint data_len; /* Length of the meaningful part of data */
} StringInfo;
#define SSL_WRITE_KEY 1
#define SSL_VER_UNKNOWN 0
#define PCT_VERSION 0x8001 /* PCT_VERSION_1 from http://graphcomp.com/info/specs/ms/pct.htm */
#define SSLV2_VERSION 0x0002 /* not in record layer, SSL_CLIENT_SERVER from
http://www-archive.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/ssl/draft02.html */
#define SSLV3_VERSION 0x300
#define TLSV1_VERSION 0x301
#define TLSV1DOT1_VERSION 0x302
#define TLSV1DOT2_VERSION 0x303
#define TLSV1DOT3_VERSION 0x304
#define DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION 0xfeff
#define DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION 0x100
#define DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION 0xfefd
/* Returns the TLS 1.3 draft version or 0 if not applicable. */
static inline guint8 tls13_draft_version(guint32 version) {
if ((version & 0xff00) == 0x7f00) {
return (guint8) version;
}
return 0;
}
#define SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM (1<<0)
#define SSL_SERVER_RANDOM (1<<1)
#define SSL_CIPHER (1<<2)
#define SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY (1<<3)
#define SSL_VERSION (1<<4)
#define SSL_MASTER_SECRET (1<<5)
#define SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET (1<<6)
#define SSL_CLIENT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET (1<<7)
#define SSL_SERVER_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET (1<<8)
#define SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET (1<<10)
#define SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC (1<<11)
#define SSL_SEEN_0RTT_APPDATA (1<<12)
#define SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_MASK (SSL_CLIENT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET|SSL_SERVER_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
/* SSL Cipher Suite modes */
typedef enum {
MODE_STREAM, /* GenericStreamCipher */
MODE_CBC, /* GenericBlockCipher */
MODE_GCM, /* GenericAEADCipher */
MODE_CCM, /* AEAD_AES_{128,256}_CCM with 16 byte auth tag */
MODE_CCM_8, /* AEAD_AES_{128,256}_CCM with 8 byte auth tag */
MODE_POLY1305, /* AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 with 16 byte auth tag (RFC 7905) */
} ssl_cipher_mode_t;
/* Explicit and implicit nonce length (RFC 5116 - Section 3.2.1) */
#define IMPLICIT_NONCE_LEN 4
#define EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN 8
#define TLS13_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH 12
/* TLS 1.3 Record type for selecting the appropriate secret. */
typedef enum {
TLS_SECRET_0RTT_APP,
TLS_SECRET_HANDSHAKE,
TLS_SECRET_APP,
} TLSRecordType;
#define SSL_DEBUG_USE_STDERR "-"
#define SSLV2_MAX_SESSION_ID_LENGTH_IN_BYTES 16
/* Record fragment lengths MUST NOT exceed 2^14 (= 0x4000) */
#define TLS_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH 0x4000
typedef struct _SslCipherSuite {
gint number;
gint kex;
gint enc;
gint dig;
ssl_cipher_mode_t mode;
} SslCipherSuite;
typedef struct _SslFlow {
guint32 byte_seq;
guint16 flags;
wmem_tree_t *multisegment_pdus;
} SslFlow;
typedef struct _SslDecompress SslDecompress;
typedef struct _SslDecoder {
const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite;
gint compression;
guchar _mac_key_or_write_iv[48];
StringInfo mac_key; /* for block and stream ciphers */
StringInfo write_iv; /* for AEAD ciphers (at least GCM, CCM) */
SSL_CIPHER_CTX evp;
SslDecompress *decomp;
guint64 seq; /**< Implicit (TLS) or explicit (DTLS) record sequence number. */
guint16 epoch;
SslFlow *flow;
StringInfo app_traffic_secret; /**< TLS 1.3 application traffic secret (if applicable), wmem file scope. */
} SslDecoder;
/*
* TLS 1.3 Cipher context. Simpler than SslDecoder since no compression is
* required and all keys are calculated internally.
*/
typedef struct {
gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;
guint8 iv[TLS13_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH];
} tls13_cipher;
#define KEX_DHE_DSS 0x10
#define KEX_DHE_PSK 0x11
#define KEX_DHE_RSA 0x12
#define KEX_DH_ANON 0x13
#define KEX_DH_DSS 0x14
#define KEX_DH_RSA 0x15
#define KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA 0x16
#define KEX_ECDHE_PSK 0x17
#define KEX_ECDHE_RSA 0x18
#define KEX_ECDH_ANON 0x19
#define KEX_ECDH_ECDSA 0x1a
#define KEX_ECDH_RSA 0x1b
#define KEX_KRB5 0x1c
#define KEX_PSK 0x1d
#define KEX_RSA 0x1e
#define KEX_RSA_PSK 0x1f
#define KEX_SRP_SHA 0x20
#define KEX_SRP_SHA_DSS 0x21
#define KEX_SRP_SHA_RSA 0x22
#define KEX_IS_DH(n) ((n) >= KEX_DHE_DSS && (n) <= KEX_ECDH_RSA)
#define KEX_TLS13 0x23
/* Order is significant, must match "ciphers" array in packet-ssl-utils.c */
#define ENC_DES 0x30
#define ENC_3DES 0x31
#define ENC_RC4 0x32
#define ENC_RC2 0x33
#define ENC_IDEA 0x34
#define ENC_AES 0x35
#define ENC_AES256 0x36
#define ENC_CAMELLIA128 0x37
#define ENC_CAMELLIA256 0x38
#define ENC_SEED 0x39
#define ENC_CHACHA20 0x3A
#define ENC_NULL 0x3B
#define DIG_MD5 0x40
#define DIG_SHA 0x41
#define DIG_SHA256 0x42
#define DIG_SHA384 0x43
#define DIG_NA 0x44 /* Not Applicable */
typedef struct {
const gchar *name;
guint len;
} SslDigestAlgo;
typedef struct _SslRecordInfo {
guchar *plain_data; /**< Decrypted data. */
guint data_len; /**< Length of decrypted data. */
gint id; /**< Identifies the exact record within a frame
(there can be multiple records in a frame). */
ContentType type; /**< Content type of the decrypted record data. */
SslFlow *flow; /**< Flow where this record fragment is a part of.
Can be NULL if this record type may not be fragmented. */
guint32 seq; /**< Data offset within the flow. */
struct _SslRecordInfo* next;
} SslRecordInfo;
typedef struct {
SslRecordInfo *records; /**< Decrypted records within this frame. */
guint32 srcport; /**< Used for Decode As */
guint32 destport;
} SslPacketInfo;
typedef struct _SslSession {
gint cipher;
gint compression;
guint16 version;
guchar tls13_draft_version;
gint8 client_cert_type;
gint8 server_cert_type;
guint32 client_ccs_frame;
guint32 server_ccs_frame;
ssl,dtls,ssl-utils: Prepare for STARTTLS handling All STARTTLS-like dissectors (protocols which can switch to SSL/TLS after a protocol command) currently fail to get called after decryption. The reason for this is that the port is not registered for SSL dissection via ssl_dissector_add. Besides this, the MySQL dissector breaks in the event of multiple segments because it does not properly set desegmentation. The call path TCP | App | SSL | App is a bad, error-prone pattern which requires duplication of required functionality in dissectors. This patch enables to bypass the App (TCP | SSL | App) by registering a SSL as conversation dissector after a STARTTLS switch. Logical overview of changes: - Move srv_addr, srv_ptype and srv_port to SslSession and adjust the users. This allows passing SslSession around which will never be null unlike SslDecryptSession. This is needed for looking up the packet direction (server or client) before calling a subdissector. - Add app_handle to store the dissector and last_nontls_frame the frame that initiated STARTTLS. - The same app_handle is now used to store the dissector handle from a ssl association. - Moved conversation data (SslDecryptSession) to ssl-utils to avoid code duplication. Merge ssl_session_init into it. The new ssl_session_get() is needed for STARTTLS frame/handle storage. - Introduce new "ssl_starttls_ack" function to signal the last non-TLS packet. - Ensure that match_uint is set before calling the conversation dissector. This ensures that dissectors using match_uint to check the direction of a packet (client vs. server) see the TCP port instead of the IP proto. At least the MySQL and SMTP dissectors require such special treatment. - Move epan/conversation.h outside HAVE_LIBGNUTLS, remove from dtls (as it is already included by ssl-utils). - Various comment/debug string updates. Remove outdated comment before SSL association lookup. Besides setting match_uint and caching the app_handle, existing dissectors should not be affected by this patch. Follow-up patches will update existing dissectors to use the new ssl_starttls_ack interface. Bug: 9515 Change-Id: I795d16b6a901e672a5d89e922adc7e5bbcda0333 Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/6872 Reviewed-by: Alexis La Goutte <alexis.lagoutte@gmail.com> Petri-Dish: Alexis La Goutte <alexis.lagoutte@gmail.com> Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org> Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
2015-02-05 18:54:52 +00:00
/* The address/proto/port of the server as determined from heuristics
* (e.g. ClientHello) or set externally (via ssl_set_master_secret()). */
address srv_addr;
port_type srv_ptype;
guint srv_port;
/* The Application layer protocol if known (for STARTTLS support) */
dissector_handle_t app_handle;
guint32 last_nontls_frame;
gboolean is_session_resumed;
} SslSession;
ssl: clarify meaning of StringInfo, cleanup PRFs, master_secret It was not clear whether the data_len member of StringInfo refers to the allocated memory (as was done for session_ticket) or the length of the actual data. This is clarified in a comment. To keep the invariant "data_len refers to the length of meaningful data", some code has been moved just in case some intermediate code fails: - Setting session_ticket.data_len vs tvb_memcpy to session_ticket.data. - PRF functions would expect the data length as input to a paramter named "out". This is highly confusing, so another parameter has been added to signify the requested length, "out_len". This also helps holding up the invariant. - For prf() calls, out.data_len does not need to be initialized but passed as parameter. Other PRF-related changes: - Change the PRF functions to return a boolean instead of an int. - tls_hash: return void as it cannot fail and remove related error handling from callers. Fix a memleak of label_seed if tls_hash was successful. - tls_hash: add comments to clarify its functionality, whitespace. - ssl3_generate_export_iv could not fail, so make it void. Also added an out_len param to pass the target length. - In prf(), replaced if-conditions for SSL version by a switch. - In ssl_generate_keyring_material, the scope of some variable has been tightened. - ssl_session_init: explicitly set data_len to 0. This is strictly not necessary as the callers have already zeroed out the memory, but that has not been documented. Other changes related to master_secret (ssl_save_session[_ticket]): - Initialize master_secret.data_len to 0 in ssl_session_init as the master_secret is unusable at that point. - Remove the hack that tests whether master_secret.data is non-empty. - Replace hardcoded master_secret length (48) from wmem_alloc0(). - Introduce macro for master secret length, use this in SslDecryptSession, for parsing from keyfile and converting pre-master secret to master secret (prf). - Use (master_secret + 1) to refer to the part after the struct rather than adding the size manually to a gchar-casted master_secret. Change-Id: Ie1ea448db54e828b904568224486147a3d962522 Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/3030 Reviewed-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl> Reviewed-by: Alexis La Goutte <alexis.lagoutte@gmail.com>
2014-07-13 21:12:03 +00:00
/* RFC 5246, section 8.1 says that the master secret is always 48 bytes */
#define SSL_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH 48
/* This holds state information for a SSL conversation */
typedef struct _SslDecryptSession {
ssl: clarify meaning of StringInfo, cleanup PRFs, master_secret It was not clear whether the data_len member of StringInfo refers to the allocated memory (as was done for session_ticket) or the length of the actual data. This is clarified in a comment. To keep the invariant "data_len refers to the length of meaningful data", some code has been moved just in case some intermediate code fails: - Setting session_ticket.data_len vs tvb_memcpy to session_ticket.data. - PRF functions would expect the data length as input to a paramter named "out". This is highly confusing, so another parameter has been added to signify the requested length, "out_len". This also helps holding up the invariant. - For prf() calls, out.data_len does not need to be initialized but passed as parameter. Other PRF-related changes: - Change the PRF functions to return a boolean instead of an int. - tls_hash: return void as it cannot fail and remove related error handling from callers. Fix a memleak of label_seed if tls_hash was successful. - tls_hash: add comments to clarify its functionality, whitespace. - ssl3_generate_export_iv could not fail, so make it void. Also added an out_len param to pass the target length. - In prf(), replaced if-conditions for SSL version by a switch. - In ssl_generate_keyring_material, the scope of some variable has been tightened. - ssl_session_init: explicitly set data_len to 0. This is strictly not necessary as the callers have already zeroed out the memory, but that has not been documented. Other changes related to master_secret (ssl_save_session[_ticket]): - Initialize master_secret.data_len to 0 in ssl_session_init as the master_secret is unusable at that point. - Remove the hack that tests whether master_secret.data is non-empty. - Replace hardcoded master_secret length (48) from wmem_alloc0(). - Introduce macro for master secret length, use this in SslDecryptSession, for parsing from keyfile and converting pre-master secret to master secret (prf). - Use (master_secret + 1) to refer to the part after the struct rather than adding the size manually to a gchar-casted master_secret. Change-Id: Ie1ea448db54e828b904568224486147a3d962522 Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/3030 Reviewed-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl> Reviewed-by: Alexis La Goutte <alexis.lagoutte@gmail.com>
2014-07-13 21:12:03 +00:00
guchar _master_secret[SSL_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH];
guchar _session_id[256];
guchar _client_random[32];
guchar _server_random[32];
StringInfo session_id;
StringInfo session_ticket;
StringInfo server_random;
StringInfo client_random;
StringInfo master_secret;
StringInfo handshake_data;
/* the data store for this StringInfo must be allocated explicitly with a capture lifetime scope */
StringInfo pre_master_secret;
guchar _server_data_for_iv[24];
StringInfo server_data_for_iv;
guchar _client_data_for_iv[24];
StringInfo client_data_for_iv;
gint state;
const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite;
SslDecoder *server;
SslDecoder *client;
SslDecoder *server_new;
SslDecoder *client_new;
#if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS)
gcry_sexp_t private_key;
#endif
StringInfo psk;
StringInfo app_data_segment;
SslSession session;
gboolean has_early_data;
} SslDecryptSession;
/* User Access Table */
typedef struct _ssldecrypt_assoc_t {
char* ipaddr;
char* port;
char* protocol;
char* keyfile;
char* password;
} ssldecrypt_assoc_t;
ssl,dtls: simplify keyfile handling Previously, the keylog file would be fully parsed when an encrypted pre-master secret is encountered or in the ChangeCipherSpec stage. There was also a lot of duplication in the key logfile parsing. This patch simplifies the key logfile parsing by using regular expressions. Rather than scanning the key logfile for a specific key, do this scan once at ssl init and save the results to a hashtable. The map for session ID/tickets to master keys already existed, another one for client random to master key and encrypted pre-master to pre-master was added. This could later also be wired to the "Export SSL Keys" menu item for improved reliability (when no session ID or tickets are available, the client random could be used). The ssl_{save,restore}_session{,_ticket} functions have been converted to a single function that looks up a key (sid / client random / encr. pre-master) to a (pre-)master secret. Other minor changes: return booleans for some functions that can only fail/pass. Remove some functions from the ssl-utils header that have become private a few commits ago. Remove some outstanding issues from the comments in packet-ssl as they are already done, add myself to the ssl-utils header. These changes pass the test suite and the sample Session Ticket-enabled capture from https://bugs.wireshark.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=5963 On-the-fly decryption are broken with this patch since keylog files are read once at the start of a capture. This will be solved in a future patch. Change-Id: Idb343abe161950b5f3ff61bee093d0f4ef9655bd Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/3057 Reviewed-by: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com> Petri-Dish: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com> Petri-Dish: Alexis La Goutte <alexis.lagoutte@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
2014-07-19 09:06:25 +00:00
typedef struct ssl_common_options {
const gchar *psk;
const gchar *keylog_filename;
} ssl_common_options_t;
/** Map from something to a (pre-)master secret */
typedef struct {
GHashTable *session; /* Session ID (1-32 bytes) to master secret. */
GHashTable *tickets; /* Session Ticket to master secret. */
GHashTable *crandom; /* Client Random to master secret */
GHashTable *pre_master; /* First 8 bytes of encrypted pre-master secret to
pre-master secret */
GHashTable *pms; /* Client Random to unencrypted pre-master secret */
/* For TLS 1.3: maps Client Random to derived secret. */
GHashTable *tls13_client_early;
GHashTable *tls13_client_handshake;
GHashTable *tls13_server_handshake;
GHashTable *tls13_client_appdata;
GHashTable *tls13_server_appdata;
GHashTable *tls13_early_exporter;
GHashTable *tls13_exporter;
ssl,dtls: simplify keyfile handling Previously, the keylog file would be fully parsed when an encrypted pre-master secret is encountered or in the ChangeCipherSpec stage. There was also a lot of duplication in the key logfile parsing. This patch simplifies the key logfile parsing by using regular expressions. Rather than scanning the key logfile for a specific key, do this scan once at ssl init and save the results to a hashtable. The map for session ID/tickets to master keys already existed, another one for client random to master key and encrypted pre-master to pre-master was added. This could later also be wired to the "Export SSL Keys" menu item for improved reliability (when no session ID or tickets are available, the client random could be used). The ssl_{save,restore}_session{,_ticket} functions have been converted to a single function that looks up a key (sid / client random / encr. pre-master) to a (pre-)master secret. Other minor changes: return booleans for some functions that can only fail/pass. Remove some functions from the ssl-utils header that have become private a few commits ago. Remove some outstanding issues from the comments in packet-ssl as they are already done, add myself to the ssl-utils header. These changes pass the test suite and the sample Session Ticket-enabled capture from https://bugs.wireshark.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=5963 On-the-fly decryption are broken with this patch since keylog files are read once at the start of a capture. This will be solved in a future patch. Change-Id: Idb343abe161950b5f3ff61bee093d0f4ef9655bd Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/3057 Reviewed-by: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com> Petri-Dish: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com> Petri-Dish: Alexis La Goutte <alexis.lagoutte@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
2014-07-19 09:06:25 +00:00
} ssl_master_key_map_t;
gint ssl_get_keyex_alg(gint cipher);
gboolean ssldecrypt_uat_fld_ip_chk_cb(void*, const char*, unsigned, const void*, const void*, char** err);
gboolean ssldecrypt_uat_fld_port_chk_cb(void*, const char*, unsigned, const void*, const void*, char** err);
gboolean ssldecrypt_uat_fld_fileopen_chk_cb(void*, const char*, unsigned, const void*, const void*, char** err);
gboolean ssldecrypt_uat_fld_password_chk_cb(void*, const char*, unsigned, const void*, const void*, char** err);
gchar* ssl_association_info(const char* dissector_table_name, const char* table_protocol);
ssl,dtls,ssl-utils: Prepare for STARTTLS handling All STARTTLS-like dissectors (protocols which can switch to SSL/TLS after a protocol command) currently fail to get called after decryption. The reason for this is that the port is not registered for SSL dissection via ssl_dissector_add. Besides this, the MySQL dissector breaks in the event of multiple segments because it does not properly set desegmentation. The call path TCP | App | SSL | App is a bad, error-prone pattern which requires duplication of required functionality in dissectors. This patch enables to bypass the App (TCP | SSL | App) by registering a SSL as conversation dissector after a STARTTLS switch. Logical overview of changes: - Move srv_addr, srv_ptype and srv_port to SslSession and adjust the users. This allows passing SslSession around which will never be null unlike SslDecryptSession. This is needed for looking up the packet direction (server or client) before calling a subdissector. - Add app_handle to store the dissector and last_nontls_frame the frame that initiated STARTTLS. - The same app_handle is now used to store the dissector handle from a ssl association. - Moved conversation data (SslDecryptSession) to ssl-utils to avoid code duplication. Merge ssl_session_init into it. The new ssl_session_get() is needed for STARTTLS frame/handle storage. - Introduce new "ssl_starttls_ack" function to signal the last non-TLS packet. - Ensure that match_uint is set before calling the conversation dissector. This ensures that dissectors using match_uint to check the direction of a packet (client vs. server) see the TCP port instead of the IP proto. At least the MySQL and SMTP dissectors require such special treatment. - Move epan/conversation.h outside HAVE_LIBGNUTLS, remove from dtls (as it is already included by ssl-utils). - Various comment/debug string updates. Remove outdated comment before SSL association lookup. Besides setting match_uint and caching the app_handle, existing dissectors should not be affected by this patch. Follow-up patches will update existing dissectors to use the new ssl_starttls_ack interface. Bug: 9515 Change-Id: I795d16b6a901e672a5d89e922adc7e5bbcda0333 Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/6872 Reviewed-by: Alexis La Goutte <alexis.lagoutte@gmail.com> Petri-Dish: Alexis La Goutte <alexis.lagoutte@gmail.com> Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org> Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
2015-02-05 18:54:52 +00:00
/** Retrieve a SslSession, creating it if it did not already exist.
* @param conversation The SSL conversation.
* @param ssl_handle The dissector handle for SSL or DTLS.
*/
extern SslDecryptSession *
ssl_get_session(conversation_t *conversation, dissector_handle_t ssl_handle);
/** Set server address and port */
extern void
ssl,dtls,ssl-utils: Prepare for STARTTLS handling All STARTTLS-like dissectors (protocols which can switch to SSL/TLS after a protocol command) currently fail to get called after decryption. The reason for this is that the port is not registered for SSL dissection via ssl_dissector_add. Besides this, the MySQL dissector breaks in the event of multiple segments because it does not properly set desegmentation. The call path TCP | App | SSL | App is a bad, error-prone pattern which requires duplication of required functionality in dissectors. This patch enables to bypass the App (TCP | SSL | App) by registering a SSL as conversation dissector after a STARTTLS switch. Logical overview of changes: - Move srv_addr, srv_ptype and srv_port to SslSession and adjust the users. This allows passing SslSession around which will never be null unlike SslDecryptSession. This is needed for looking up the packet direction (server or client) before calling a subdissector. - Add app_handle to store the dissector and last_nontls_frame the frame that initiated STARTTLS. - The same app_handle is now used to store the dissector handle from a ssl association. - Moved conversation data (SslDecryptSession) to ssl-utils to avoid code duplication. Merge ssl_session_init into it. The new ssl_session_get() is needed for STARTTLS frame/handle storage. - Introduce new "ssl_starttls_ack" function to signal the last non-TLS packet. - Ensure that match_uint is set before calling the conversation dissector. This ensures that dissectors using match_uint to check the direction of a packet (client vs. server) see the TCP port instead of the IP proto. At least the MySQL and SMTP dissectors require such special treatment. - Move epan/conversation.h outside HAVE_LIBGNUTLS, remove from dtls (as it is already included by ssl-utils). - Various comment/debug string updates. Remove outdated comment before SSL association lookup. Besides setting match_uint and caching the app_handle, existing dissectors should not be affected by this patch. Follow-up patches will update existing dissectors to use the new ssl_starttls_ack interface. Bug: 9515 Change-Id: I795d16b6a901e672a5d89e922adc7e5bbcda0333 Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/6872 Reviewed-by: Alexis La Goutte <alexis.lagoutte@gmail.com> Petri-Dish: Alexis La Goutte <alexis.lagoutte@gmail.com> Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org> Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
2015-02-05 18:54:52 +00:00
ssl_set_server(SslSession *session, address *addr, port_type ptype, guint32 port);
/** Marks this packet as the last one before switching to SSL that is supposed
* to encapsulate this protocol.
* @param ssl_handle The dissector handle for SSL or DTLS.
* @param pinfo Packet Info.
* @param app_handle Dissector handle for the protocol inside the decrypted
* Application Data record.
* @return 0 for the first STARTTLS acknowledgement (success) or if ssl_handle
* is NULL. >0 if STARTTLS was started before.
*/
WS_DLL_PUBLIC guint32
ssl,dtls,ssl-utils: Prepare for STARTTLS handling All STARTTLS-like dissectors (protocols which can switch to SSL/TLS after a protocol command) currently fail to get called after decryption. The reason for this is that the port is not registered for SSL dissection via ssl_dissector_add. Besides this, the MySQL dissector breaks in the event of multiple segments because it does not properly set desegmentation. The call path TCP | App | SSL | App is a bad, error-prone pattern which requires duplication of required functionality in dissectors. This patch enables to bypass the App (TCP | SSL | App) by registering a SSL as conversation dissector after a STARTTLS switch. Logical overview of changes: - Move srv_addr, srv_ptype and srv_port to SslSession and adjust the users. This allows passing SslSession around which will never be null unlike SslDecryptSession. This is needed for looking up the packet direction (server or client) before calling a subdissector. - Add app_handle to store the dissector and last_nontls_frame the frame that initiated STARTTLS. - The same app_handle is now used to store the dissector handle from a ssl association. - Moved conversation data (SslDecryptSession) to ssl-utils to avoid code duplication. Merge ssl_session_init into it. The new ssl_session_get() is needed for STARTTLS frame/handle storage. - Introduce new "ssl_starttls_ack" function to signal the last non-TLS packet. - Ensure that match_uint is set before calling the conversation dissector. This ensures that dissectors using match_uint to check the direction of a packet (client vs. server) see the TCP port instead of the IP proto. At least the MySQL and SMTP dissectors require such special treatment. - Move epan/conversation.h outside HAVE_LIBGNUTLS, remove from dtls (as it is already included by ssl-utils). - Various comment/debug string updates. Remove outdated comment before SSL association lookup. Besides setting match_uint and caching the app_handle, existing dissectors should not be affected by this patch. Follow-up patches will update existing dissectors to use the new ssl_starttls_ack interface. Bug: 9515 Change-Id: I795d16b6a901e672a5d89e922adc7e5bbcda0333 Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/6872 Reviewed-by: Alexis La Goutte <alexis.lagoutte@gmail.com> Petri-Dish: Alexis La Goutte <alexis.lagoutte@gmail.com> Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org> Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
2015-02-05 18:54:52 +00:00
ssl_starttls_ack(dissector_handle_t ssl_handle, packet_info *pinfo,
dissector_handle_t app_handle);
/** Marks this packet as belonging to an SSL conversation started with STARTTLS.
* @param ssl_handle The dissector handle for SSL or DTLS.
* @param pinfo Packet Info.
* @param app_handle Dissector handle for the protocol inside the decrypted
* Application Data record.
* @return 0 for the first STARTTLS acknowledgement (success) or if ssl_handle
* is NULL. >0 if STARTTLS was started before.
*/
WS_DLL_PUBLIC guint32
ssl_starttls_post_ack(dissector_handle_t ssl_handle, packet_info *pinfo,
dissector_handle_t app_handle);
extern dissector_handle_t
ssl_find_appdata_dissector(const char *name);
/** set the data and len for the stringInfo buffer. buf should be big enough to
* contain the provided data
@param buf the buffer to update
@param src the data source
@param len the source data len */
extern void
ssl_data_set(StringInfo* buf, const guchar* src, guint len);
/** alloc the data with the specified len for the stringInfo buffer.
@param str the data source
@param len the source data len */
extern gint
ssl_data_alloc(StringInfo* str, size_t len);
extern gint
ssl_cipher_setiv(SSL_CIPHER_CTX *cipher, guchar* iv, gint iv_len);
/** Search for the specified cipher suite id
@param num the id of the cipher suite to be searched
@return pointer to the cipher suite struct (or NULL if not found). */
extern const SslCipherSuite *
ssl_find_cipher(int num);
/** Returns the Libgcrypt cipher identifier or 0 if unavailable. */
int
ssl_get_cipher_algo(const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite);
/** Obtains the block size for a CBC block cipher.
* @param cipher_suite a cipher suite as returned by ssl_find_cipher().
* @return the block size of a cipher or 0 if unavailable.
*/
guint
ssl_get_cipher_blocksize(const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite);
ssl,dtls: simplify keyfile handling Previously, the keylog file would be fully parsed when an encrypted pre-master secret is encountered or in the ChangeCipherSpec stage. There was also a lot of duplication in the key logfile parsing. This patch simplifies the key logfile parsing by using regular expressions. Rather than scanning the key logfile for a specific key, do this scan once at ssl init and save the results to a hashtable. The map for session ID/tickets to master keys already existed, another one for client random to master key and encrypted pre-master to pre-master was added. This could later also be wired to the "Export SSL Keys" menu item for improved reliability (when no session ID or tickets are available, the client random could be used). The ssl_{save,restore}_session{,_ticket} functions have been converted to a single function that looks up a key (sid / client random / encr. pre-master) to a (pre-)master secret. Other minor changes: return booleans for some functions that can only fail/pass. Remove some functions from the ssl-utils header that have become private a few commits ago. Remove some outstanding issues from the comments in packet-ssl as they are already done, add myself to the ssl-utils header. These changes pass the test suite and the sample Session Ticket-enabled capture from https://bugs.wireshark.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=5963 On-the-fly decryption are broken with this patch since keylog files are read once at the start of a capture. This will be solved in a future patch. Change-Id: Idb343abe161950b5f3ff61bee093d0f4ef9655bd Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/3057 Reviewed-by: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com> Petri-Dish: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com> Petri-Dish: Alexis La Goutte <alexis.lagoutte@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
2014-07-19 09:06:25 +00:00
gboolean
ssl_generate_pre_master_secret(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session,
guint32 length, tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset,
ssl,dtls: simplify keyfile handling Previously, the keylog file would be fully parsed when an encrypted pre-master secret is encountered or in the ChangeCipherSpec stage. There was also a lot of duplication in the key logfile parsing. This patch simplifies the key logfile parsing by using regular expressions. Rather than scanning the key logfile for a specific key, do this scan once at ssl init and save the results to a hashtable. The map for session ID/tickets to master keys already existed, another one for client random to master key and encrypted pre-master to pre-master was added. This could later also be wired to the "Export SSL Keys" menu item for improved reliability (when no session ID or tickets are available, the client random could be used). The ssl_{save,restore}_session{,_ticket} functions have been converted to a single function that looks up a key (sid / client random / encr. pre-master) to a (pre-)master secret. Other minor changes: return booleans for some functions that can only fail/pass. Remove some functions from the ssl-utils header that have become private a few commits ago. Remove some outstanding issues from the comments in packet-ssl as they are already done, add myself to the ssl-utils header. These changes pass the test suite and the sample Session Ticket-enabled capture from https://bugs.wireshark.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=5963 On-the-fly decryption are broken with this patch since keylog files are read once at the start of a capture. This will be solved in a future patch. Change-Id: Idb343abe161950b5f3ff61bee093d0f4ef9655bd Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/3057 Reviewed-by: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com> Petri-Dish: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com> Petri-Dish: Alexis La Goutte <alexis.lagoutte@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
2014-07-19 09:06:25 +00:00
const gchar *ssl_psk,
const ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map);
/** Expand the pre_master_secret to generate all the session information
* (master secret, session keys, ivs)
@param ssl_session the store for all the session data
@return 0 on success */
extern gint
ssl_generate_keyring_material(SslDecryptSession*ssl_session);
extern void
ssl_change_cipher(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, gboolean server);
/** Try to decrypt an ssl record
@param ssl ssl_session the store all the session data
@param decoder the stream decoder to be used
@param ct the content type of this ssl record
@param record_version the version as contained in the record
@param ignore_mac_failed whether to ignore MAC or authenticity failures
@param in a pointer to the ssl record to be decrypted
@param inl the record length
@param comp_str a pointer to the store the compression data
@param out_str a pointer to the store for the decrypted data
@param outl the decrypted data len
@return 0 on success */
extern gint
ssl_decrypt_record(SslDecryptSession *ssl, SslDecoder *decoder, guint8 ct, guint16 record_version,
gboolean ignore_mac_failed,
const guchar *in, guint16 inl, StringInfo *comp_str, StringInfo *out_str, guint *outl);
/**
* Given a cipher algorithm and its mode, a hash algorithm and the secret (with
* the same length as the hash algorithm), try to build a cipher. The algorithms
* and mode are Libgcrypt identifiers.
*/
tls13_cipher *
tls13_cipher_create(const char *label_prefix, int cipher_algo, int cipher_mode, int hash_algo, const StringInfo *secret, const gchar **error);
/* Common part bitween SSL and DTLS dissectors */
ssl-utils: allow gcrypt without GnuTLS, improve structure Fix distinction between HAVE_LIBGNUTLS and HAVE_LIBGCRYPT. If GnuTLS is unavailable, then the only missing feature is decryption using an RSA private key file. Regardless of GnuTLS, allow SSL decryption (e.g. using a SSL key log file or a PSK configured via preferences). This change has no functional effect when GnuTLS and gcrypt are both available (or not). Additionally, decryption is possible if only libgcrypt is available. Further changes to make ssl-utils more maintainable and documented: - Group related functions, add markers and documentation. The following functions are moved (with no further modifications): - ssl_data_realloc, ssl_data_copy: related to StringInfo. - ssl_change_cipher, ssl_create_flow: related to the decryption of a session. - ssl_decompress_record: related to Record Decompression. - ssl_lib_init: moved to an arbitrary place. - ssl_set_server: moved closer to ssl_packet_from_server. - ssl_is_valid_content_type, ssl_is_valid_handshake_type: move closer to dissection code. - ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request, ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request_v2, ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_elliptic_curves, ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_ec_point_formats: move to TLS extensions. - Remove unused forward declaration of _gcry_rsa_decrypt. - ssl-packet-utils.h: - Remove ssl_equal, ssl_hash. These are only used in packet-ssl-utils.c. - ssl_private_key_equal, ssl_private_key_hash, ssl_common_register_options: inline when decryption is not possible. - Remove ws_symbol_export.h, enable SSL debug log when libgcrypt is compiled in (instead of depending on GnuTLS). - Move/merge stub code when GnuTLS or libgcrypt are not available: - ssl_find_cipher: move. - ssl_cipher_setiv: move. - ssl_generate_pre_master_secret, ssl_generate_keyring_material: move. Compile-tested all combinations: - no GnuTLS, no libgcrypt: CentOS 6. - no GnuTLS, has libgcrypt: CentOS 6. Passes all decryption tests except for the ones that need a RSA private key file. - has GnuTLS, no libgcrypt: Arch Linux. - has GnuTLS, has libgcrypt: Arch Linux. The decryption tests pass. (GnuTLS support is useless without gcrypt, but included for completeness.) Change-Id: I727248937331f8788de8ed78248bb33296206096 Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/11052 Petri-Dish: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl> Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org> Reviewed-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
2015-10-15 00:00:47 +00:00
/* Hash Functions for RSA private keys table */
extern gboolean
ssl_private_key_equal (gconstpointer v, gconstpointer v2);
extern guint
ssl_private_key_hash (gconstpointer v);
/* private key table entries have a scope 'larger' then packet capture,
* so we can't rely on wmem_file_scope function */
extern void
ssl_private_key_free(gpointer key);
ssl-utils: allow gcrypt without GnuTLS, improve structure Fix distinction between HAVE_LIBGNUTLS and HAVE_LIBGCRYPT. If GnuTLS is unavailable, then the only missing feature is decryption using an RSA private key file. Regardless of GnuTLS, allow SSL decryption (e.g. using a SSL key log file or a PSK configured via preferences). This change has no functional effect when GnuTLS and gcrypt are both available (or not). Additionally, decryption is possible if only libgcrypt is available. Further changes to make ssl-utils more maintainable and documented: - Group related functions, add markers and documentation. The following functions are moved (with no further modifications): - ssl_data_realloc, ssl_data_copy: related to StringInfo. - ssl_change_cipher, ssl_create_flow: related to the decryption of a session. - ssl_decompress_record: related to Record Decompression. - ssl_lib_init: moved to an arbitrary place. - ssl_set_server: moved closer to ssl_packet_from_server. - ssl_is_valid_content_type, ssl_is_valid_handshake_type: move closer to dissection code. - ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request, ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request_v2, ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_elliptic_curves, ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_ec_point_formats: move to TLS extensions. - Remove unused forward declaration of _gcry_rsa_decrypt. - ssl-packet-utils.h: - Remove ssl_equal, ssl_hash. These are only used in packet-ssl-utils.c. - ssl_private_key_equal, ssl_private_key_hash, ssl_common_register_options: inline when decryption is not possible. - Remove ws_symbol_export.h, enable SSL debug log when libgcrypt is compiled in (instead of depending on GnuTLS). - Move/merge stub code when GnuTLS or libgcrypt are not available: - ssl_find_cipher: move. - ssl_cipher_setiv: move. - ssl_generate_pre_master_secret, ssl_generate_keyring_material: move. Compile-tested all combinations: - no GnuTLS, no libgcrypt: CentOS 6. - no GnuTLS, has libgcrypt: CentOS 6. Passes all decryption tests except for the ones that need a RSA private key file. - has GnuTLS, no libgcrypt: Arch Linux. - has GnuTLS, has libgcrypt: Arch Linux. The decryption tests pass. (GnuTLS support is useless without gcrypt, but included for completeness.) Change-Id: I727248937331f8788de8ed78248bb33296206096 Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/11052 Petri-Dish: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl> Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org> Reviewed-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
2015-10-15 00:00:47 +00:00
/* handling of association between tls/dtls ports and clear text protocol */
extern void
ssl_association_add(const char* dissector_table_name, dissector_handle_t main_handle, dissector_handle_t subdissector_handle, guint port, gboolean tcp);
extern void
ssl_association_remove(const char* dissector_table_name, dissector_handle_t main_handle, dissector_handle_t subdissector_handle, guint port, gboolean tcp);
extern gint
ssl_packet_from_server(SslSession *session, dissector_table_t table, packet_info *pinfo);
/* add to packet data a copy of the specified real data */
extern void
ssl_add_record_info(gint proto, packet_info *pinfo, const guchar *data, gint data_len, gint record_id, SslFlow *flow, ContentType type, guint8 curr_layer_num_ssl);
/* search in packet data for the specified id; return a newly created tvb for the associated data */
extern tvbuff_t*
ssl_get_record_info(tvbuff_t *parent_tvb, gint proto, packet_info *pinfo, gint record_id, guint8 curr_layer_num_ssl, SslRecordInfo **matched_record);
/* initialize/reset per capture state data (ssl sessions cache) */
extern void
ssl_common_init(ssl_master_key_map_t *master_key_map,
StringInfo *decrypted_data, StringInfo *compressed_data);
extern void
ssl_common_cleanup(ssl_master_key_map_t *master_key_map, FILE **ssl_keylog_file,
StringInfo *decrypted_data, StringInfo *compressed_data);
/* tries to update the secrets cache from the given filename */
extern void
ssl_load_keyfile(const gchar *ssl_keylog_filename, FILE **keylog_file,
const ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map);
/* parse ssl related preferences (private keys and ports association strings) */
extern void
ssl_parse_key_list(const ssldecrypt_assoc_t * uats, GHashTable *key_hash, const char* dissector_table_name, dissector_handle_t main_handle, gboolean tcp);
/* store master secret into session data cache */
extern void
ssl_save_session(SslDecryptSession* ssl, GHashTable *session_hash);
extern void
ssl,dtls: simplify keyfile handling Previously, the keylog file would be fully parsed when an encrypted pre-master secret is encountered or in the ChangeCipherSpec stage. There was also a lot of duplication in the key logfile parsing. This patch simplifies the key logfile parsing by using regular expressions. Rather than scanning the key logfile for a specific key, do this scan once at ssl init and save the results to a hashtable. The map for session ID/tickets to master keys already existed, another one for client random to master key and encrypted pre-master to pre-master was added. This could later also be wired to the "Export SSL Keys" menu item for improved reliability (when no session ID or tickets are available, the client random could be used). The ssl_{save,restore}_session{,_ticket} functions have been converted to a single function that looks up a key (sid / client random / encr. pre-master) to a (pre-)master secret. Other minor changes: return booleans for some functions that can only fail/pass. Remove some functions from the ssl-utils header that have become private a few commits ago. Remove some outstanding issues from the comments in packet-ssl as they are already done, add myself to the ssl-utils header. These changes pass the test suite and the sample Session Ticket-enabled capture from https://bugs.wireshark.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=5963 On-the-fly decryption are broken with this patch since keylog files are read once at the start of a capture. This will be solved in a future patch. Change-Id: Idb343abe161950b5f3ff61bee093d0f4ef9655bd Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/3057 Reviewed-by: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com> Petri-Dish: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com> Petri-Dish: Alexis La Goutte <alexis.lagoutte@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
2014-07-19 09:06:25 +00:00
ssl_finalize_decryption(SslDecryptSession *ssl, ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map);
extern gboolean
tls13_generate_keys(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, const StringInfo *secret, gboolean is_from_server);
extern StringInfo *
tls13_load_secret(SslDecryptSession *ssl, ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map,
gboolean is_from_server, TLSRecordType type);
extern void
tls13_change_key(SslDecryptSession *ssl, ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map,
gboolean is_from_server, TLSRecordType type);
extern void
tls13_key_update(SslDecryptSession *ssl, gboolean is_from_server);
extern gboolean
ssl_is_valid_content_type(guint8 type);
extern gboolean
ssl_is_valid_handshake_type(guint8 hs_type, gboolean is_dtls);
extern void
tls_scan_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
guint16 *server_version, gboolean *is_hrr);
extern void
ssl_try_set_version(SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl,
guint8 content_type, guint8 handshake_type,
gboolean is_dtls, guint16 version);
extern void
ssl_calculate_handshake_hash(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset, guint32 length);
/* common header fields, subtrees and expert info for SSL and DTLS dissectors */
typedef struct ssl_common_dissect {
struct {
gint change_cipher_spec;
gint hs_exts_len;
gint hs_ext_alpn_len;
gint hs_ext_alpn_list;
gint hs_ext_alpn_str;
gint hs_ext_alpn_str_len;
gint hs_ext_cert_url_item;
gint hs_ext_cert_url_padding;
gint hs_ext_cert_url_sha1;
gint hs_ext_cert_url_type;
gint hs_ext_cert_url_url;
gint hs_ext_cert_url_url_hash_list_len;
gint hs_ext_cert_url_url_len;
gint hs_ext_cert_status_type;
gint hs_ext_cert_status_request_len;
gint hs_ext_cert_status_responder_id_list_len;
gint hs_ext_cert_status_request_extensions_len;
gint hs_ext_cert_status_request_list_len;
gint hs_ocsp_response_list_len;
gint hs_ocsp_response_len;
gint hs_ext_cert_type;
gint hs_ext_cert_types;
gint hs_ext_cert_types_len;
gint hs_ext_data;
gint hs_ext_ec_point_format;
gint hs_ext_ec_point_formats;
gint hs_ext_ec_point_formats_len;
gint hs_ext_supported_group;
gint hs_ext_supported_groups;
gint hs_ext_supported_groups_len;
gint hs_ext_heartbeat_mode;
gint hs_ext_len;
gint hs_ext_npn_str;
gint hs_ext_npn_str_len;
gint hs_ext_reneg_info_len;
gint hs_ext_reneg_info;
gint hs_ext_key_share_client_length;
gint hs_ext_key_share_group;
gint hs_ext_key_share_key_exchange_length;
gint hs_ext_key_share_key_exchange;
gint hs_ext_key_share_selected_group;
gint hs_ext_psk_identities_length;
gint hs_ext_psk_identity_identity_length;
gint hs_ext_psk_identity_identity;
gint hs_ext_psk_identity_obfuscated_ticket_age;
gint hs_ext_psk_binders_length;
gint hs_ext_psk_binders;
gint hs_ext_psk_identity_selected;
gint hs_ext_supported_versions_len;
gint hs_ext_supported_version;
gint hs_ext_cookie_len;
gint hs_ext_cookie;
gint hs_ext_server_name;
gint hs_ext_server_name_len;
gint hs_ext_server_name_list_len;
gint hs_ext_server_name_type;
gint hs_ext_padding_data;
gint hs_ext_type;
gint hs_sig_hash_alg;
gint hs_sig_hash_alg_len;
gint hs_sig_hash_algs;
gint hs_sig_hash_hash;
gint hs_sig_hash_sig;
gint hs_client_keyex_epms_len;
gint hs_client_keyex_epms;
gint hs_server_keyex_modulus_len;
gint hs_server_keyex_exponent_len;
gint hs_server_keyex_sig_len;
gint hs_server_keyex_p_len;
gint hs_server_keyex_g_len;
gint hs_server_keyex_ys_len;
gint hs_client_keyex_yc_len;
gint hs_client_keyex_point_len;
gint hs_server_keyex_point_len;
gint hs_server_keyex_p;
gint hs_server_keyex_g;
gint hs_server_keyex_curve_type;
gint hs_server_keyex_named_curve;
gint hs_server_keyex_ys;
gint hs_client_keyex_yc;
gint hs_server_keyex_point;
gint hs_client_keyex_point;
gint hs_server_keyex_modulus;
gint hs_server_keyex_exponent;
gint hs_server_keyex_sig;
gint hs_server_keyex_hint_len;
gint hs_server_keyex_hint;
gint hs_client_keyex_identity_len;
gint hs_client_keyex_identity;
gint hs_certificates_len;
gint hs_certificates;
gint hs_certificate_len;
gint hs_certificate;
gint hs_cert_types_count;
gint hs_cert_types;
gint hs_cert_type;
gint hs_dnames_len;
gint hs_dnames;
gint hs_dname_len;
gint hs_dname;
gint hs_random;
gint hs_random_time;
gint hs_random_bytes;
gint hs_session_id;
gint hs_session_id_len;
gint hs_client_version;
gint hs_server_version;
gint hs_cipher_suites_len;
gint hs_cipher_suites;
gint hs_cipher_suite;
gint hs_comp_methods_len;
gint hs_comp_methods;
gint hs_comp_method;
gint hs_session_ticket_lifetime_hint;
gint hs_session_ticket_age_add;
gint hs_session_ticket_nonce_len;
gint hs_session_ticket_nonce;
gint hs_session_ticket_len;
gint hs_session_ticket;
gint hs_finished;
gint hs_client_cert_vrfy_sig_len;
gint hs_client_cert_vrfy_sig;
/* TLS 1.3 */
gint hs_ext_draft_version_tls13;
gint hs_ext_psk_ke_modes_length;
gint hs_ext_psk_ke_mode;
gint hs_certificate_request_context_length;
gint hs_certificate_request_context;
gint hs_key_update_request_update;
gint sct_scts_length;
gint sct_sct_length;
gint sct_sct_version;
gint sct_sct_logid;
gint sct_sct_timestamp;
gint sct_sct_extensions_length;
gint sct_sct_extensions;
gint sct_sct_signature;
gint sct_sct_signature_length;
gint hs_ext_max_early_data_size;
gint hs_ext_oid_filters_length;
gint hs_ext_oid_filters_oid_length;
gint hs_ext_oid_filters_oid;
gint hs_ext_oid_filters_values_length;
/* QUIC Transport Parameters */
gint hs_ext_quictp_negotiated_version;
gint hs_ext_quictp_initial_version;
gint hs_ext_quictp_supported_versions_len;
gint hs_ext_quictp_supported_versions;
gint hs_ext_quictp_len;
gint hs_ext_quictp_parameter;
gint hs_ext_quictp_parameter_type;
gint hs_ext_quictp_parameter_len;
gint hs_ext_quictp_parameter_value;
gint hs_ext_quictp_parameter_initial_max_stream_data;
gint hs_ext_quictp_parameter_initial_max_data;
gint hs_ext_quictp_parameter_initial_max_bidi_streams;
gint hs_ext_quictp_parameter_idle_timeout;
gint hs_ext_quictp_parameter_max_packet_size;
gint hs_ext_quictp_parameter_stateless_reset_token;
gint hs_ext_quictp_parameter_ack_delay_exponent;
gint hs_ext_quictp_parameter_initial_max_uni_streams;
/* do not forget to update SSL_COMMON_LIST_T and SSL_COMMON_HF_LIST! */
} hf;
struct {
gint hs_ext;
gint hs_ext_alpn;
gint hs_ext_cert_types;
gint hs_ext_groups;
gint hs_ext_curves_point_formats;
gint hs_ext_npn;
gint hs_ext_reneg_info;
gint hs_ext_key_share;
gint hs_ext_key_share_ks;
gint hs_ext_pre_shared_key;
gint hs_ext_psk_identity;
gint hs_ext_server_name;
gint hs_ext_oid_filter;
gint hs_ext_quictp_parameter;
gint hs_sig_hash_alg;
gint hs_sig_hash_algs;
gint urlhash;
gint keyex_params;
gint certificates;
gint cert_types;
gint dnames;
gint hs_random;
gint cipher_suites;
gint comp_methods;
gint session_ticket;
gint sct;
gint cert_status;
gint ocsp_response;
/* do not forget to update SSL_COMMON_LIST_T and SSL_COMMON_ETT_LIST! */
} ett;
struct {
/* Generic expert info for malformed packets. */
expert_field malformed_vector_length;
expert_field malformed_buffer_too_small;
expert_field malformed_trailing_data;
expert_field hs_ext_cert_status_undecoded;
expert_field resumed;
expert_field record_length_invalid;
/* do not forget to update SSL_COMMON_LIST_T and SSL_COMMON_EI_LIST! */
} ei;
} ssl_common_dissect_t;
/* Header fields specific to DTLS. See packet-dtls.c */
typedef struct {
gint hf_dtls_handshake_cookie_len;
gint hf_dtls_handshake_cookie;
/* Do not forget to initialize dtls_hfs to -1 in packet-dtls.c! */
} dtls_hfs_t;
/* Header fields specific to SSL. See packet-ssl.c */
typedef struct {
gint hs_md5_hash;
gint hs_sha_hash;
/* Do not forget to initialize ssl_hfs to -1 in packet-ssl.c! */
} ssl_hfs_t;
/* Helpers for dissecting Variable-Length Vectors. {{{ */
/* Largest value that fits in a 24-bit number (2^24-1). */
#define G_MAXUINT24 ((1U << 24) - 1)
/**
* Helper for dissection of variable-length vectors (RFC 5246, section 4.3). It
* adds a length field to the tree and writes the validated length value into
* "ret_length" (which is truncated if it exceeds "offset_end").
*
* The size of the field is derived from "max_value" (for example, 8 and 255
* require one byte while 400 needs two bytes). Expert info is added if the
* length field from the tvb is outside the (min_value, max_value) range.
*
* Returns TRUE if there is enough space for the length field and data elements
* and FALSE otherwise.
*/
extern gboolean
ssl_add_vector(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
guint offset, guint offset_end, guint32 *ret_length,
int hf_length, guint32 min_value, guint32 max_value);
/**
* Helper to check whether the data in a vector with multiple elements is
* correctly dissected. If the current "offset" (normally the value after
* adding all kinds of fields) does not match "offset_end" (the end of the
* vector), expert info is added.
*
* Returns TRUE if the offset matches the end of the vector and FALSE otherwise.
*/
extern gboolean
ssl_end_vector(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
guint offset, guint offset_end);
/* }}} */
extern void
ssl_check_record_length(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, packet_info *pinfo,
guint record_length, proto_item *length_pi,
guint16 version, tvbuff_t *decrypted_tvb);
void
ssl_dissect_change_cipher_spec(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
guint32 offset, SslSession *session,
gboolean is_from_server,
const SslDecryptSession *ssl);
extern void
ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_hello(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
guint32 offset_end, SslSession *session,
SslDecryptSession *ssl,
dtls_hfs_t *dtls_hfs);
extern void
ssl_dissect_hnd_srv_hello(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info* pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl,
gboolean is_dtls, gboolean is_hrr);
extern void
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_retry_request(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info* pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl,
gboolean is_dtls);
extern void
ssl_dissect_hnd_encrypted_extensions(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info* pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl,
gboolean is_dtls);
extern void
ssl_dissect_hnd_new_ses_ticket(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl,
gboolean is_dtls, GHashTable *session_hash);
extern void
ssl_dissect_hnd_cert(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree,
guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, packet_info *pinfo,
SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl,
GHashTable *key_hash, gboolean is_from_server, gboolean is_dtls);
extern void
ssl_dissect_hnd_cert_req(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
SslSession *session, gboolean is_dtls);
extern void
ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_cert_verify(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint16 version);
extern void
ssl_dissect_hnd_finished(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
const SslSession *session, ssl_hfs_t *ssl_hfs);
extern void
ssl_dissect_hnd_cert_url(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset);
extern guint32
tls_dissect_hnd_certificate_status(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end);
extern void
ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_keyex(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 length,
const SslSession *session);
extern void
ssl_dissect_hnd_srv_keyex(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
const SslSession *session);
extern void
tls13_dissect_hnd_key_update(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset);
extern guint32
tls_dissect_sct_list(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint16 version);
extern gboolean
tls13_hkdf_expand_label_context(int md, const StringInfo *secret,
const char *label_prefix, const char *label,
const guint8 *context, guint8 context_length,
guint16 out_len, guchar **out);
extern gboolean
tls13_hkdf_expand_label(int md, const StringInfo *secret,
const char *label_prefix, const char *label,
guint16 out_len, guchar **out);
/* {{{ */
#define SSL_COMMON_LIST_T(name) \
ssl_common_dissect_t name = { \
/* hf */ { \
-1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, \
-1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, \
-1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, \
-1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, \
-1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, \
-1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, \
-1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, \
-1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, \
-1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, \
-1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, \
}, \
/* ett */ { \
-1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, \
-1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, \
}, \
/* ei */ { \
EI_INIT, EI_INIT, EI_INIT, EI_INIT, EI_INIT, EI_INIT, \
}, \
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ */
#define SSL_COMMON_HF_LIST(name, prefix) \
{ & name .hf.change_cipher_spec, \
{ "Change Cipher Spec Message", prefix ".change_cipher_spec", \
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"Signals a change in cipher specifications", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_exts_len, \
{ "Extensions Length", prefix ".handshake.extensions_length", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"Length of hello extensions", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_type, \
{ "Type", prefix ".handshake.extension.type", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, VALS(tls_hello_extension_types), 0x0, \
"Hello extension type", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_len, \
{ "Length", prefix ".handshake.extension.len", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"Length of a hello extension", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_data, \
{ "Data", prefix ".handshake.extension.data", \
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"Hello Extension data", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_supported_groups_len, \
{ "Supported Groups List Length", prefix ".handshake.extensions_supported_groups_length", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_supported_groups, \
{ "Supported Groups List", prefix ".handshake.extensions_supported_groups", \
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"List of supported groups (formerly Supported Elliptic Curves)", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_supported_group, \
{ "Supported Group", prefix ".handshake.extensions_supported_group", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(ssl_extension_curves), 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_ec_point_formats_len, \
{ "EC point formats Length", prefix ".handshake.extensions_ec_point_formats_length", \
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"Length of elliptic curves point formats field", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_ec_point_formats, \
{ "EC point formats", prefix ".handshake.extensions_ec_point_formats", \
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"List of elliptic curves point format", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_ec_point_format, \
{ "EC point format", prefix ".handshake.extensions_ec_point_format", \
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_extension_ec_point_formats), 0x0, \
"Elliptic curves point format", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_alpn_len, \
{ "ALPN Extension Length", prefix ".handshake.extensions_alpn_len", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"Length of the ALPN Extension", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_alpn_list, \
{ "ALPN Protocol", prefix ".handshake.extensions_alpn_list", \
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_alpn_str_len, \
{ "ALPN string length", prefix ".handshake.extensions_alpn_str_len", \
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"Length of ALPN string", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_alpn_str, \
{ "ALPN Next Protocol", prefix ".handshake.extensions_alpn_str", \
FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_npn_str_len, \
{ "Protocol string length", prefix ".handshake.extensions_npn_str_len", \
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"Length of next protocol string", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_npn_str, \
{ "Next Protocol", prefix ".handshake.extensions_npn", \
FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_reneg_info_len, \
{ "Renegotiation info extension length", prefix ".handshake.extensions_reneg_info_len", \
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_reneg_info, \
{ "Renegotiation info", prefix ".handshake.extensions_reneg_info",\
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_key_share_client_length, \
{ "Client Key Share Length", prefix ".handshake.extensions_key_share_client_length", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_key_share_group, \
{ "Group", prefix ".handshake.extensions_key_share_group", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_extension_curves), 0x00, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_key_share_key_exchange_length, \
{ "Key Exchange Length", prefix ".handshake.extensions_key_share_key_exchange_length", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_key_share_key_exchange, \
{ "Key Exchange", prefix ".handshake.extensions_key_share_key_exchange", \
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_key_share_selected_group, \
{ "Selected Group", prefix ".handshake.extensions_key_share_selected_group", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_extension_curves), 0x00, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_psk_identities_length, \
{ "Identities Length", prefix ".handshake.extensions.psk.identities.length", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_psk_identity_identity_length, \
{ "Identity Length", prefix ".handshake.extensions.psk.identity.identity_length", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_psk_identity_identity, \
{ "Identity", prefix ".handshake.extensions.psk.identity.identity", \
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_psk_identity_obfuscated_ticket_age, \
{ "Obfuscated Ticket Age", prefix ".handshake.extensions.psk.identity.obfuscated_ticket_age", \
FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_psk_binders_length, \
{ "PSK Binders length", prefix ".handshake.extensions.psk.binders_len", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_psk_binders, \
{ "PSK Binders", prefix ".handshake.extensions.psk.binders", \
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_psk_identity_selected, \
{ "Selected Identity", prefix ".handshake.extensions.psk.identity.selected", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_supported_versions_len, \
{ "Supported Versions length", prefix ".handshake.extensions.supported_versions_len", \
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_supported_version, \
{ "Supported Version", prefix ".handshake.extensions.supported_version", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(ssl_versions), 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_cookie_len, \
{ "Cookie length", prefix ".handshake.extensions.cookie_len", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_cookie, \
{ "Cookie", prefix ".handshake.extensions.cookie", \
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_server_name_list_len, \
{ "Server Name list length", prefix ".handshake.extensions_server_name_list_len", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"Length of server name list", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_server_name_len, \
{ "Server Name length", prefix ".handshake.extensions_server_name_len", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"Length of server name string", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_server_name_type, \
{ "Server Name Type", prefix ".handshake.extensions_server_name_type", \
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(tls_hello_ext_server_name_type_vs), 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_server_name, \
{ "Server Name", prefix ".handshake.extensions_server_name", \
FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_padding_data, \
{ "Padding Data", prefix ".handshake.extensions_padding_data", \
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"Must be zero", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_cert_url_type, \
{ "Certificate Chain Type", prefix ".handshake.cert_url_type", \
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(tls_cert_chain_type), 0x0, \
"Certificate Chain Type for Client Certificate URL", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_cert_url_url_hash_list_len, \
{ "URL and Hash list Length", prefix ".handshake.cert_url.url_hash_len", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_cert_url_item, \
{ "URL and Hash", prefix ".handshake.cert_url.url_hash", \
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_cert_url_url_len, \
{ "URL Length", prefix ".handshake.cert_url.url_len", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_cert_type, \
{ "Certificate Type", prefix ".handshake.cert_type.type", \
FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX, VALS(tls_certificate_type), 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_cert_types, \
{ "Certificate Type List", prefix ".handshake.cert_type.types", \
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_cert_types_len, \
{ "Certificate Type List Length", prefix ".handshake.cert_type.types_len", \
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_cert_url_url, \
Fix some hf_ field datatype conflicts. 'ieee17221.clock_source_id' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_UINT16 and FT_UINT64 'ieee17221.stream_format' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_NONE and FT_UINT64 'afp.unknown' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_UINT16 and FT_BYTES 'afp.toc_offset' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_NONE and FT_UINT64 'bootp.client_id.iaid' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_UINT32 and FT_STRING 'bthfp.chld.mode' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_STRING and FT_UINT8 'canopen.pdo.data' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_STRINGZ and FT_BYTES 'canopen.sdo.data' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_UINT32 and FT_BYTES 'ceph.msg.' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_UINT32 and FT_UINT64 'ceph.version' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_UINT16 and FT_UINT64 'cip.linkaddress' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_STRING and FT_UINT8 'dnp3.al.ana' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_FLOAT and FT_INT32 'dnp3.al.anaout' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_FLOAT and FT_INT32 'dtls.handshake.cert_url.url_hash_len' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_STRING and FT_UINT16 'ssl.handshake.cert_url.url_hash_len' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_STRING and FT_UINT16 'dvb-s2_gse.label' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_UINT24 and FT_ETHER 'fcdns.rply.fc4type' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_NONE and FT_UINT8 'fcdns.req.fc4type' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_NONE and FT_UINT8 'icmp.int_info.name' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_STRING and FT_BOOLEAN 'icmpv6.ilnp.nb_locs' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_UINT64 and FT_UINT8 'icmpv6.ilnp.nb_locs' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_UINT32 and FT_UINT64 'mausb.clear_transfers.status' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_BOOLEAN and FT_NONE 'mikey.v' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_BOOLEAN and FT_NONE 'mswsp.rangeboundry.ultype' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_STRING and FT_UINT32 'mswsp.arrayvector.address64' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_UINT32 and FT_UINT64 'nlm.lock.l_offset' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_UINT32 and FT_UINT64 'nlm.lock.l_len' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_UINT32 and FT_UINT64 'pflog.saddr' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_IPv6 and FT_IPv4 'pflog.daddr' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_IPv6 and FT_IPv4 'pflog.saddr' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_BYTES and FT_IPv6 'pflog.daddr' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_BYTES and FT_IPv6 'pgm.spm.path' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_IPv6 and FT_IPv4 'pgm.nak.src' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_IPv6 and FT_IPv4 'pgm.nak.grp' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_IPv6 and FT_IPv4 'pgm.poll.path' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_IPv6 and FT_IPv4 'pgm.opts.ccdata.acker' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_IPv6 and FT_IPv4 'pgm.opts.ccdata.acker' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_IPv4 and FT_IPv6 'pgm.opts.ccdata.acker' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_IPv6 and FT_IPv4 'pgm.opts.redirect.dlr' exists multiple times with NOT compatible types: FT_IPv6 and FT_IPv4 Change-Id: Iaf694699d108a12db172da8dd9fbab211adb329d Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14070 Petri-Dish: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net> Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org> Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
2016-02-22 01:19:02 +00:00
{ "URL", prefix ".handshake.cert_url.url", \
FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"URL used to fetch the certificate(s)", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_cert_url_padding, \
{ "Padding", prefix ".handshake.cert_url.padding", \
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"Padding that MUST be 0x01 for backwards compatibility", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_cert_url_sha1, \
{ "SHA1 Hash", prefix ".handshake.cert_url.sha1", \
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"SHA1 Hash of the certificate", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_cert_status_type, \
{ "Certificate Status Type", prefix ".handshake.extensions_status_request_type", \
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(tls_cert_status_type), 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_cert_status_request_len, \
{ "Certificate Status Length", prefix ".handshake.extensions_status_request_len", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_cert_status_responder_id_list_len, \
{ "Responder ID list Length", prefix ".handshake.extensions_status_request_responder_ids_len", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_cert_status_request_extensions_len, \
{ "Request Extensions Length", prefix ".handshake.extensions_status_request_exts_len", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_cert_status_request_list_len, \
{ "Certificate Status List Length", prefix ".handshake.extensions_status_request_list_len", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"CertificateStatusRequestItemV2 list length", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ocsp_response_list_len, \
{ "OCSP Response List Length", prefix ".handshake.ocsp_response_list_len", \
FT_UINT24, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"OCSPResponseList length", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ocsp_response_len, \
{ "OCSP Response Length", prefix ".handshake.ocsp_response_len", \
FT_UINT24, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_sig_hash_alg_len, \
{ "Signature Hash Algorithms Length", prefix ".handshake.sig_hash_alg_len", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"Length of Signature Hash Algorithms", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_sig_hash_algs, \
{ "Signature Algorithms", prefix ".handshake.sig_hash_algs", \
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"List of supported Signature Algorithms", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_sig_hash_alg, \
{ "Signature Algorithm", prefix ".handshake.sig_hash_alg", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(tls13_signature_algorithm), 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_sig_hash_hash, \
{ "Signature Hash Algorithm Hash", prefix ".handshake.sig_hash_hash", \
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(tls_hash_algorithm), 0x0, \
"Hash algorithm (TLS 1.2)", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_sig_hash_sig, \
{ "Signature Hash Algorithm Signature", prefix ".handshake.sig_hash_sig", \
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(tls_signature_algorithm), 0x0, \
"Signature algorithm (TLS 1.2)", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_client_keyex_epms_len, \
{ "Encrypted PreMaster length", prefix ".handshake.epms_len", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"Length of encrypted PreMaster secret", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_client_keyex_epms, \
{ "Encrypted PreMaster", prefix ".handshake.epms", \
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"Encrypted PreMaster secret", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_server_keyex_modulus_len, \
{ "Modulus Length", prefix ".handshake.modulus_len", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"Length of RSA-EXPORT modulus", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_server_keyex_exponent_len, \
{ "Exponent Length", prefix ".handshake.exponent_len", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"Length of RSA-EXPORT exponent", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_server_keyex_sig_len, \
{ "Signature Length", prefix ".handshake.sig_len", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"Length of Signature", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_server_keyex_p_len, \
{ "p Length", prefix ".handshake.p_len", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"Length of p", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_server_keyex_g_len, \
{ "g Length", prefix ".handshake.g_len", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"Length of g", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_server_keyex_ys_len, \
{ "Pubkey Length", prefix ".handshake.ys_len", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"Length of server's Diffie-Hellman public key", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_client_keyex_yc_len, \
{ "Pubkey Length", prefix ".handshake.yc_len", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"Length of client's Diffie-Hellman public key", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_client_keyex_point_len, \
{ "Pubkey Length", prefix ".handshake.client_point_len", \
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"Length of client's EC Diffie-Hellman public key", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_server_keyex_point_len, \
{ "Pubkey Length", prefix ".handshake.server_point_len", \
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"Length of server's EC Diffie-Hellman public key", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_server_keyex_p, \
{ "p", prefix ".handshake.p", \
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"Diffie-Hellman p", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_server_keyex_g, \
{ "g", prefix ".handshake.g", \
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"Diffie-Hellman g", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_server_keyex_curve_type, \
{ "Curve Type", prefix ".handshake.server_curve_type", \
FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX, VALS(ssl_curve_types), 0x0, \
"Server curve_type", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_server_keyex_named_curve, \
{ "Named Curve", prefix ".handshake.server_named_curve", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(ssl_extension_curves), 0x0, \
"Server named_curve", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_server_keyex_ys, \
{ "Pubkey", prefix ".handshake.ys", \
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"Diffie-Hellman server pubkey", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_client_keyex_yc, \
{ "Pubkey", prefix ".handshake.yc", \
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"Diffie-Hellman client pubkey", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_server_keyex_point, \
{ "Pubkey", prefix ".handshake.server_point", \
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"EC Diffie-Hellman server pubkey", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_client_keyex_point, \
{ "Pubkey", prefix ".handshake.client_point", \
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"EC Diffie-Hellman client pubkey", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_server_keyex_modulus, \
{ "Modulus", prefix ".handshake.modulus", \
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"RSA-EXPORT modulus", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_server_keyex_exponent, \
{ "Exponent", prefix ".handshake.exponent", \
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"RSA-EXPORT exponent", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_server_keyex_sig, \
{ "Signature", prefix ".handshake.sig", \
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"Diffie-Hellman server signature", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_server_keyex_hint_len, \
{ "Hint Length", prefix ".handshake.hint_len", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"Length of PSK Hint", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_server_keyex_hint, \
{ "Hint", prefix ".handshake.hint", \
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"PSK Hint", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_client_keyex_identity_len, \
{ "Identity Length", prefix ".handshake.identity_len", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"Length of PSK Identity", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_client_keyex_identity, \
{ "Identity", prefix ".handshake.identity", \
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"PSK Identity", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_heartbeat_mode, \
{ "Mode", prefix ".handshake.extension.heartbeat.mode", \
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(tls_heartbeat_mode), 0x0, \
"Heartbeat extension mode", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_certificates_len, \
{ "Certificates Length", prefix ".handshake.certificates_length", \
FT_UINT24, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"Length of certificates field", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_certificates, \
{ "Certificates", prefix ".handshake.certificates", \
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"List of certificates", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_certificate, \
{ "Certificate", prefix ".handshake.certificate", \
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_certificate_len, \
{ "Certificate Length", prefix ".handshake.certificate_length", \
FT_UINT24, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"Length of certificate", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_cert_types_count, \
{ "Certificate types count", prefix ".handshake.cert_types_count",\
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"Count of certificate types", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_cert_types, \
{ "Certificate types", prefix ".handshake.cert_types", \
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"List of certificate types", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_cert_type, \
{ "Certificate type", prefix ".handshake.cert_type", \
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_client_certificate_type), 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_dnames_len, \
{ "Distinguished Names Length", prefix ".handshake.dnames_len", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"Length of list of CAs that server trusts", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_dnames, \
{ "Distinguished Names", prefix ".handshake.dnames", \
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"List of CAs that server trusts", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_dname_len, \
{ "Distinguished Name Length", prefix ".handshake.dname_len", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"Length of distinguished name", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_dname, \
{ "Distinguished Name", prefix ".handshake.dname", \
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"Distinguished name of a CA that server trusts", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_random, \
{ "Random", prefix ".handshake.random", \
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"Random values used for deriving keys", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_random_time, \
{ "GMT Unix Time", prefix ".handshake.random_time", \
FT_ABSOLUTE_TIME, ABSOLUTE_TIME_LOCAL, NULL, 0x0, \
"Unix time field of random structure", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_random_bytes, \
{ "Random Bytes", prefix ".handshake.random_bytes", \
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"Random values used for deriving keys", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_session_id, \
{ "Session ID", prefix ".handshake.session_id", \
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"Identifies the SSL session, allowing later resumption", HFILL }\
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_session_id_len, \
{ "Session ID Length", prefix ".handshake.session_id_length", \
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"Length of Session ID field", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_client_version, \
{ "Version", prefix ".handshake.version", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(ssl_versions), 0x0, \
"Maximum version supported by client", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_server_version, \
{ "Version", prefix ".handshake.version", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(ssl_versions), 0x0, \
"Version selected by server", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_cipher_suites_len, \
{ "Cipher Suites Length", prefix ".handshake.cipher_suites_length", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"Length of cipher suites field", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_cipher_suites, \
{ "Cipher Suites", prefix ".handshake.ciphersuites", \
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"List of cipher suites supported by client", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_cipher_suite, \
{ "Cipher Suite", prefix ".handshake.ciphersuite", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX|BASE_EXT_STRING, &ssl_31_ciphersuite_ext, 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_comp_methods_len, \
{ "Compression Methods Length", prefix ".handshake.comp_methods_length", \
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"Length of compression methods field", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_comp_methods, \
{ "Compression Methods", prefix ".handshake.comp_methods", \
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"List of compression methods supported by client", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_comp_method, \
{ "Compression Method", prefix ".handshake.comp_method", \
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_compression_method), 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_session_ticket_lifetime_hint, \
{ "Session Ticket Lifetime Hint", \
prefix ".handshake.session_ticket_lifetime_hint", \
FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC|BASE_UNIT_STRING, &units_second_seconds, 0x0, \
"New Session Ticket Lifetime Hint", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_session_ticket_age_add, \
{ "Session Ticket Age Add", \
prefix ".handshake.session_ticket_age_add", \
FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"Random 32-bit value to obscure age of ticket", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_session_ticket_nonce_len, \
{ "Session Ticket Nonce Length", prefix ".handshake.session_ticket_nonce_length", \
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_session_ticket_nonce, \
{ "Session Ticket Nonce", prefix ".handshake.session_ticket_nonce", \
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"A unique per-ticket value", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_session_ticket_len, \
{ "Session Ticket Length", prefix ".handshake.session_ticket_length", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"New Session Ticket Length", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_session_ticket, \
{ "Session Ticket", prefix ".handshake.session_ticket", \
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"New Session Ticket", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_finished, \
{ "Verify Data", prefix ".handshake.verify_data", \
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"Opaque verification data", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_client_cert_vrfy_sig_len, \
{ "Signature length", prefix ".handshake.client_cert_vrfy.sig_len", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"Length of CertificateVerify's signature", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_client_cert_vrfy_sig, \
{ "Signature", prefix ".handshake.client_cert_vrfy.sig", \
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"CertificateVerify's signature", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_draft_version_tls13, \
{ "Draft version of TLS 1.3", prefix ".extension.draft_version_tls13", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
"Indicate the version of draft supported by client", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_psk_ke_modes_length, \
{ "PSK Key Exchange Modes Length", prefix ".extension.psk_ke_modes_length", \
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_psk_ke_mode, \
{ "PSK Key Exchange Mode", prefix ".extension.psk_ke_mode", \
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(tls_hello_ext_psk_ke_mode), 0x0, \
"Key exchange modes where the client supports use of PSKs", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_certificate_request_context_length, \
{ "Certificate Request Context Length", prefix ".handshake.certificate_request_context_length", \
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_certificate_request_context, \
{ "Certificate Request Context", prefix ".handshake.certificate_request_context", \
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, \
"Value from CertificateRequest or empty for server auth", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_key_update_request_update, \
{ "Key Update Request", prefix ".handshake.key_update.request_update", \
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(tls13_key_update_request), 0x00, \
"Whether the receiver should also update its keys", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.sct_scts_length, \
{ "Serialized SCT List Length", prefix ".sct.scts_length", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.sct_sct_length, \
{ "Serialized SCT Length", prefix ".sct.sct_length", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.sct_sct_version, \
{ "SCT Version", prefix ".sct.sct_version", \
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, \
"SCT Protocol version (v1 (0) is defined in RFC 6962)", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.sct_sct_logid, \
{ "Log ID", prefix ".sct.sct_logid", \
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, \
"SHA-256 hash of log's public key", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.sct_sct_timestamp, \
{ "Timestamp", prefix ".sct.sct_timestamp", \
FT_ABSOLUTE_TIME, ABSOLUTE_TIME_UTC, NULL, 0x00, \
"Timestamp of issuance", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.sct_sct_extensions_length, \
{ "Extensions length", prefix ".sct.sct_extensions_length", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, \
"Length of future extensions to this protocol (currently none)", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.sct_sct_extensions, \
{ "Extensions", prefix ".sct.sct_extensions", \
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, \
"Future extensions to this protocol (currently none)", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.sct_sct_signature_length, \
{ "Signature Length", prefix ".sct.sct_signature_length", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.sct_sct_signature, \
{ "Signature", prefix ".sct.sct_signature", \
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_max_early_data_size, \
{ "Maximum Early Data Size", prefix ".early_data.max_early_data_size", \
FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, \
"Maximum amount of 0-RTT data that the client may send", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_oid_filters_length, \
{ "OID Filters Length", prefix ".extension.oid_filters_length", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_oid_filters_oid_length, \
{ "Certificate Extension OID Length", prefix ".extension.oid_filters.oid_length", \
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_oid_filters_oid, \
{ "Certificate Extension OID", prefix ".extension.oid_filters.oid", \
FT_OID, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_oid_filters_values_length, \
{ "Certificate Extension Values Length", prefix ".extension.oid_filters.values_length", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_quictp_negotiated_version, \
{ "Negotiated Version", prefix ".quic.negotiated_version", \
FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX, VALS(quic_version_vals), 0x00, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_quictp_initial_version, \
{ "Initial Version", prefix ".quic.initial_version", \
FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX, VALS(quic_version_vals), 0x00, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_quictp_supported_versions_len, \
{ "Supported Versions Length", prefix ".quic.supported_versions.len", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_quictp_supported_versions, \
{ "Supported Versions", prefix ".quic.supported_versions", \
FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX, VALS(quic_version_vals), 0x00, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_quictp_len, \
{ "Parameters Length", prefix ".quic.len", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter, \
{ "Parameter", prefix ".quic.parameter", \
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_type, \
{ "Type", prefix ".quic.parameter.type", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(quic_transport_parameter_id), 0x00, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_len, \
{ "Length", prefix ".quic.parameter.length", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_value, \
{ "Value", prefix ".quic.parameter.value", \
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, \
NULL, HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_initial_max_stream_data, \
{ "initial_max_stream_data", prefix ".quic.parameter.initial_max_stream_data", \
FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, \
"Contains the initial value for the maximum data that can be sent on any newly created stream", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_initial_max_data, \
{ "initial_max_data", prefix ".quic.parameter.initial_max_data", \
FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, \
"Contains the initial value for the maximum amount of data that can be sent on the connection", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_initial_max_bidi_streams, \
{ "initial_max_bidi_streams", prefix ".quic.parameter.initial_max_bidi_streams", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, \
"Initial maximum number of application-owned bidirectional streams", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_idle_timeout, \
{ "idle_timeout", prefix ".quic.parameter.idle_timeout", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, \
"In seconds", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_max_packet_size, \
{ "max_packet_size", prefix ".quic.parameter.max_packet_size", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, \
"Indicates that packets larger than this limit will be dropped", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_stateless_reset_token, \
{ "stateless_reset_token", prefix ".quic.parameter.stateless_reset_token", \
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, \
"Used in verifying a stateless reset", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_ack_delay_exponent, \
{ "ack_delay_exponent", prefix ".quic.parameter.ack_delay_exponent", \
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, \
"Indicating an exponent used to decode the ACK Delay field in the ACK frame,", HFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_initial_max_uni_streams, \
{ "initial_max_uni_streams", prefix ".quic.parameter.initial_max_uni_streams", \
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, \
"Initial maximum number of application-owned unidirectional streams", HFILL } \
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ */
#define SSL_COMMON_ETT_LIST(name) \
& name .ett.hs_ext, \
& name .ett.hs_ext_alpn, \
& name .ett.hs_ext_cert_types, \
& name .ett.hs_ext_groups, \
& name .ett.hs_ext_curves_point_formats, \
& name .ett.hs_ext_npn, \
& name .ett.hs_ext_reneg_info, \
& name .ett.hs_ext_key_share, \
& name .ett.hs_ext_key_share_ks, \
& name .ett.hs_ext_pre_shared_key, \
& name .ett.hs_ext_psk_identity, \
& name .ett.hs_ext_server_name, \
& name .ett.hs_ext_oid_filter, \
& name .ett.hs_ext_quictp_parameter, \
& name .ett.hs_sig_hash_alg, \
& name .ett.hs_sig_hash_algs, \
& name .ett.urlhash, \
& name .ett.keyex_params, \
& name .ett.certificates, \
& name .ett.cert_types, \
& name .ett.dnames, \
& name .ett.hs_random, \
& name .ett.cipher_suites, \
& name .ett.comp_methods, \
& name .ett.session_ticket, \
& name .ett.sct, \
& name .ett.cert_status, \
& name .ett.ocsp_response, \
/* }}} */
/* {{{ */
#define SSL_COMMON_EI_LIST(name, prefix) \
{ & name .ei.malformed_vector_length, \
{ prefix ".malformed.vector_length", PI_PROTOCOL, PI_WARN, \
"Variable vector length is outside the permitted range", EXPFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .ei.malformed_buffer_too_small, \
{ prefix ".malformed.buffer_too_small", PI_MALFORMED, PI_ERROR, \
"Malformed message, not enough data is available", EXPFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .ei.malformed_trailing_data, \
{ prefix ".malformed.trailing_data", PI_PROTOCOL, PI_WARN, \
"Undecoded trailing data is present", EXPFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .ei.hs_ext_cert_status_undecoded, \
{ prefix ".handshake.status_request.undecoded", PI_UNDECODED, PI_NOTE, \
"Responder ID list or Request Extensions are not implemented, contact Wireshark developers if you want this to be supported", EXPFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .ei.resumed, \
{ prefix ".resumed", PI_SEQUENCE, PI_NOTE, \
"This session reuses previously negotiated keys (Session resumption)", EXPFILL } \
}, \
{ & name .ei.record_length_invalid, \
{ prefix ".record.length.invalid", PI_PROTOCOL, PI_ERROR, \
"Record fragment length is too large", EXPFILL } \
}
/* }}} */
extern void
ssl_common_register_ssl_alpn_dissector_table(const char *name,
const char *ui_name, const int proto);
extern void
ssl_common_register_dtls_alpn_dissector_table(const char *name,
const char *ui_name, const int proto);
extern void
ssl_common_register_options(module_t *module, ssl_common_options_t *options);
#ifdef SSL_DECRYPT_DEBUG
extern void
ssl_debug_printf(const gchar* fmt,...) G_GNUC_PRINTF(1,2);
extern void
ssl_print_data(const gchar* name, const guchar* data, size_t len);
extern void
ssl_print_string(const gchar* name, const StringInfo* data);
extern void
ssl_set_debug(const gchar* name);
extern void
ssl_debug_flush(void);
#else
/* No debug: nullify debug operation*/
static inline void G_GNUC_PRINTF(1,2)
ssl_debug_printf(const gchar* fmt _U_,...)
{
}
#define ssl_print_data(a, b, c)
#define ssl_print_string(a, b)
#define ssl_set_debug(name)
#define ssl_debug_flush()
#endif /* SSL_DECRYPT_DEBUG */
#endif /* SSL_UTILS_H */
/*
* Editor modelines - http://www.wireshark.org/tools/modelines.html
*
* Local variables:
* c-basic-offset: 4
* tab-width: 8
* indent-tabs-mode: nil
* End:
*
* vi: set shiftwidth=4 tabstop=8 expandtab:
* :indentSize=4:tabSize=8:noTabs=true:
*/