Usually, changing this won't be necessary (actually, some plugins
specifically use different DRGBs for RNG_WEAK in order to separate
the public nonces from random data used for e.g. DH).
But for experts with special plugin configurations this might be
more flexible and avoids code changes.
Updates the command wrappers in all the bindings and simplifies calling
new commands (i.e. not yet wrapped) with the Python and Ruby bindings.
Fixes#3028.
Also expose a method to call arbitrary commands, which allows calling not
yet wrapped commands. Exceptions are raised for all commands if the response
includes a negative "success" key (similar to how it's done in the Python
bindings).
Adds support for childless initiation of IKE_SAs (RFC 6023) e.g. to
force a separate DH exchange for all CHILD_SAs including the first one.
Also allows the initiation of only the IKE_SA via swanctl --initiate if
the peer supports this extension.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#99.
Luckily, the type is only used once when generating payloads and there it
doesn't matter because the encoding rules are the same.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#135.
While the alias is available after enabling the unit, we don't
actually do that in our testing environment (adding a symlink manually
would work too, then again, why not just use the proper name?).
Use strongswan-starter for the legacy unit and simply strongswan for the
modern one (strongswan-swanctl is configured as alias, which should
cause the installation of symlinks when the service is enabled via
systemctl).
Check for wolfssl/options.h because if it isn't included, checking other
headers will trigger a warning about hardening the wolfSSL build, which
will cause the check to fail with -Werror.
If the file doesn't exist because user_settings.h is used, the check may
be skipped by configuring with `ac_cv_header_wolfssl_options_h=yes`.
The main fixes are
* the generation of fingerprints for RSA, ECDSA, and EdDSA
* the encoding of ECDSA private keys
* calculating p and q for RSA private keys
* deriving the public key for raw Ed25519 private keys
Also, instead of numeric literals for buffer lengths ASN.1 related
constants are used.
Instead of assuming passwords are simply ASCII-encoded we now assume they are
provided UTF-8-encoded, which is quite likely nowadays. The UTF-8 byte
sequences are not validated, however, only valid code points are encoded
as UTF-16LE.
Fixes#3014.
Previously, the initiator would install the SA in transport mode if the
peer sent back the USE_TRANSPORT_MODE notify, even if that was not
requested originally.
The only messages that are generally sent encrypted but could be sent
unencrypted are INFORMATIONALs (currently only used for IKEv1 and ME
connectivity checks). This should prevent issues if the keymat_t behaves
incorrectly and does not return an aead_t when it actually should.
Might be useful for users of other daemons too. Note that compared to the
previous implementation in charon-tkm, the mask/label are applied in
network order.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#134.
Previously, attributes in an incorrectly sent CFG_REPLY would still be passed
to attribute handlers. This does not prevent handlers from receiving
unrequested attributes if they requested at least one other.
Tobias Brunner