bus: Extend and reorder arguments of ike_derived_keys() hook

This now includes all key material derived for IKE_SAs in the order
defined in the RFC:

  {SK_d | SK_ai | SK_ar | SK_ei | SK_er | SK_pi | SK_pr}
               = prf+ (SKEYSEED, Ni | Nr | SPIi | SPIr)

Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer <thomas.egerer@secunet.com>

src/libcharon/bus/bus.c

@@ -604,8 +604,8 @@ METHOD(bus_t, ike_keys, void,
 }
 
 METHOD(bus_t, ike_derived_keys, void,
-	private_bus_t *this, chunk_t sk_ei, chunk_t sk_er, chunk_t sk_ai,
+	private_bus_t *this, chunk_t sk_d, chunk_t sk_ai, chunk_t sk_ar,
-	chunk_t sk_ar)
+	chunk_t sk_ei, chunk_t sk_er, chunk_t sk_pi, chunk_t sk_pr)
 {
 	enumerator_t *enumerator;
 	ike_sa_t *ike_sa;
@@ -623,8 +623,9 @@ METHOD(bus_t, ike_derived_keys, void,
 			continue;
 		}
 		entry->calling++;
-		keep = entry->listener->ike_derived_keys(entry->listener, ike_sa, sk_ei,
+		keep = entry->listener->ike_derived_keys(entry->listener, ike_sa, sk_d,
-												 sk_er, sk_ai, sk_ar);
+												 sk_ai, sk_ar, sk_ei, sk_er,
+												 sk_pi, sk_pr);
 		entry->calling--;
 		if (!keep)
 		{

src/libcharon/bus/bus.h

@@ -363,13 +363,17 @@ struct bus_t {
 	/**
 	 * IKE_SA derived keys hook.
 	 *
-	 * @param sk_ei		SK_ei, or Ka for IKEv1
+	 * @param sk_d		SK_d, or SKEYID_d for IKEv1
-	 * @param sk_er		SK_er
 	 * @param sk_ai		SK_ai, or SKEYID_a for IKEv1
 	 * @param sk_ar		SK_ar
+	 * @param sk_ei		SK_ei, or Ka for IKEv1
+	 * @param sk_er		SK_er
+	 * @param sk_pi		SK_pi
+	 * @param sk_pr		SK_pr
 	 */
-	void (*ike_derived_keys)(bus_t *this, chunk_t sk_ei, chunk_t sk_er,
+	void (*ike_derived_keys)(bus_t *this, chunk_t sk_d, chunk_t sk_ai,
-							 chunk_t sk_ai, chunk_t sk_ar);
+							 chunk_t sk_ar, chunk_t sk_ei, chunk_t sk_er,
+							 chunk_t sk_pi, chunk_t sk_pr);
 
 	/**
 	 * CHILD_SA keymat hook.

src/libcharon/bus/listeners/listener.h

@@ -100,13 +100,17 @@ struct listener_t {
 	 * Hook called with derived IKE_SA keys.
 	 *
 	 * @param ike_sa	IKE_SA these keys belong to
-	 * @param sk_ei		SK_ei, or Ka for IKEv1
+	 * @param sk_d		SK_d, or SKEYID_d for IKEv1
-	 * @param sk_er		SK_er
 	 * @param sk_ai		SK_ai, or SKEYID_a for IKEv1
 	 * @param sk_ar		SK_ar
+	 * @param sk_ei		SK_ei, or Ka for IKEv1
+	 * @param sk_er		SK_er
+	 * @param sk_pi		SK_pi
+	 * @param sk_pr		SK_pr
 	 */
-	bool (*ike_derived_keys)(listener_t *this, ike_sa_t *ike_sa, chunk_t sk_ei,
+	bool (*ike_derived_keys)(listener_t *this, ike_sa_t *ike_sa, chunk_t sk_d,
-							 chunk_t sk_er, chunk_t sk_ai, chunk_t sk_ar);
+							 chunk_t sk_ai, chunk_t sk_ar, chunk_t sk_ei,
+							 chunk_t sk_er, chunk_t sk_pi, chunk_t sk_pr);
 
 	/**
 	 * Hook called with CHILD_SA key material.

src/libcharon/plugins/save_keys/save_keys_listener.c

@@ -276,8 +276,9 @@ static inline void esp_names(proposal_t *proposal, const char **enc,
 }
 
 METHOD(listener_t, ike_derived_keys, bool,
-	private_save_keys_listener_t *this, ike_sa_t *ike_sa, chunk_t sk_ei,
+	private_save_keys_listener_t *this, ike_sa_t *ike_sa, chunk_t sk_d,
-	chunk_t sk_er, chunk_t sk_ai, chunk_t sk_ar)
+	chunk_t sk_ai, chunk_t sk_ar, chunk_t sk_ei, chunk_t sk_er, chunk_t sk_pi,
+	chunk_t sk_pr)
 {
 	ike_version_t version;
 	ike_sa_id_t *id;

src/libcharon/sa/ikev1/keymat_v1.c

@@ -484,7 +484,8 @@ METHOD(keymat_v1_t, derive_ike_keys, bool,
 	{
 		return FALSE;
 	}
-	charon->bus->ike_derived_keys(charon->bus, ka, chunk_empty, this->skeyid_a,
+	charon->bus->ike_derived_keys(charon->bus, this->skeyid_d, this->skeyid_a,
+								  chunk_empty, ka, chunk_empty, chunk_empty,
 								  chunk_empty);
 	chunk_clear(&ka);
 	if (!this->hasher && !this->public.create_hasher(&this->public, proposal))

src/libcharon/sa/ikev2/keymat_v2.c

@@ -100,10 +100,10 @@ METHOD(keymat_t, create_nonce_gen, nonce_gen_t*,
  * Derive IKE keys for a combined AEAD algorithm
  */
 static bool derive_ike_aead(private_keymat_v2_t *this, uint16_t alg,
-							uint16_t key_size, prf_plus_t *prf_plus)
+							uint16_t key_size, prf_plus_t *prf_plus,
+							chunk_t *sk_ei, chunk_t *sk_er)
 {
 	aead_t *aead_i, *aead_r;
-	chunk_t sk_ei = chunk_empty, sk_er = chunk_empty;
 	u_int salt_size;
 
 	switch (alg)
@@ -146,22 +146,22 @@ static bool derive_ike_aead(private_keymat_v2_t *this, uint16_t alg,
 	{
 		goto failure;
 	}
-	if (!prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &sk_ei))
+	if (!prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, sk_ei))
 	{
 		goto failure;
 	}
-	DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_ei secret %B", &sk_ei);
+	DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_ei secret %B", sk_ei);
-	if (!aead_i->set_key(aead_i, sk_ei))
+	if (!aead_i->set_key(aead_i, *sk_ei))
 	{
 		goto failure;
 	}
 
-	if (!prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &sk_er))
+	if (!prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, sk_er))
 	{
 		goto failure;
 	}
-	DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_er secret %B", &sk_er);
+	DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_er secret %B", sk_er);
-	if (!aead_r->set_key(aead_r, sk_er))
+	if (!aead_r->set_key(aead_r, *sk_er))
 	{
 		goto failure;
 	}
@@ -177,14 +177,10 @@ static bool derive_ike_aead(private_keymat_v2_t *this, uint16_t alg,
 		this->aead_out = aead_r;
 	}
 	aead_i = aead_r = NULL;
-	charon->bus->ike_derived_keys(charon->bus, sk_ei, sk_er, chunk_empty,
-								  chunk_empty);
 
 failure:
 	DESTROY_IF(aead_i);
 	DESTROY_IF(aead_r);
-	chunk_clear(&sk_ei);
-	chunk_clear(&sk_er);
 	return this->aead_in && this->aead_out;
 }
 
@@ -192,14 +188,14 @@ failure:
  * Derive IKE keys for traditional encryption and MAC algorithms
  */
 static bool derive_ike_traditional(private_keymat_v2_t *this, uint16_t enc_alg,
-					uint16_t enc_size, uint16_t int_alg, prf_plus_t *prf_plus)
+					uint16_t enc_size, uint16_t int_alg, prf_plus_t *prf_plus,
+					chunk_t *sk_ai, chunk_t *sk_ar, chunk_t *sk_ei,
+					chunk_t *sk_er)
 {
 	crypter_t *crypter_i = NULL, *crypter_r = NULL;
 	signer_t *signer_i, *signer_r;
 	iv_gen_t *ivg_i, *ivg_r;
 	size_t key_size;
-	chunk_t sk_ei = chunk_empty, sk_er = chunk_empty,
-			sk_ai = chunk_empty, sk_ar = chunk_empty;
 
 	signer_i = lib->crypto->create_signer(lib->crypto, int_alg);
 	signer_r = lib->crypto->create_signer(lib->crypto, int_alg);
@@ -223,22 +219,22 @@ static bool derive_ike_traditional(private_keymat_v2_t *this, uint16_t enc_alg,
 	/* SK_ai/SK_ar used for integrity protection */
 	key_size = signer_i->get_key_size(signer_i);
 
-	if (!prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &sk_ai))
+	if (!prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, sk_ai))
 	{
 		goto failure;
 	}
-	DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_ai secret %B", &sk_ai);
+	DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_ai secret %B", sk_ai);
-	if (!signer_i->set_key(signer_i, sk_ai))
+	if (!signer_i->set_key(signer_i, *sk_ai))
 	{
 		goto failure;
 	}
 
-	if (!prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &sk_ar))
+	if (!prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, sk_ar))
 	{
 		goto failure;
 	}
-	DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_ar secret %B", &sk_ar);
+	DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_ar secret %B", sk_ar);
-	if (!signer_r->set_key(signer_r, sk_ar))
+	if (!signer_r->set_key(signer_r, *sk_ar))
 	{
 		goto failure;
 	}
@@ -246,22 +242,22 @@ static bool derive_ike_traditional(private_keymat_v2_t *this, uint16_t enc_alg,
 	/* SK_ei/SK_er used for encryption */
 	key_size = crypter_i->get_key_size(crypter_i);
 
-	if (!prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &sk_ei))
+	if (!prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, sk_ei))
 	{
 		goto failure;
 	}
-	DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_ei secret %B", &sk_ei);
+	DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_ei secret %B", sk_ei);
-	if (!crypter_i->set_key(crypter_i, sk_ei))
+	if (!crypter_i->set_key(crypter_i, *sk_ei))
 	{
 		goto failure;
 	}
 
-	if (!prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &sk_er))
+	if (!prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, sk_er))
 	{
 		goto failure;
 	}
-	DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_er secret %B", &sk_er);
+	DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_er secret %B", sk_er);
-	if (!crypter_r->set_key(crypter_r, sk_er))
+	if (!crypter_r->set_key(crypter_r, *sk_er))
 	{
 		goto failure;
 	}
@@ -284,13 +280,8 @@ static bool derive_ike_traditional(private_keymat_v2_t *this, uint16_t enc_alg,
 	}
 	signer_i = signer_r = NULL;
 	crypter_i = crypter_r = NULL;
-	charon->bus->ike_derived_keys(charon->bus, sk_ei, sk_er, sk_ai, sk_ar);
 
 failure:
-	chunk_clear(&sk_ai);
-	chunk_clear(&sk_ar);
-	chunk_clear(&sk_ei);
-	chunk_clear(&sk_er);
 	DESTROY_IF(signer_i);
 	DESTROY_IF(signer_r);
 	DESTROY_IF(crypter_i);
@@ -303,8 +294,10 @@ METHOD(keymat_v2_t, derive_ike_keys, bool,
 	chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r, ike_sa_id_t *id,
 	pseudo_random_function_t rekey_function, chunk_t rekey_skd)
 {
-	chunk_t skeyseed = chunk_empty, key, secret, full_nonce, fixed_nonce;
+	chunk_t skeyseed = chunk_empty, secret, full_nonce, fixed_nonce;
 	chunk_t prf_plus_seed, spi_i, spi_r;
+	chunk_t sk_ei = chunk_empty, sk_er = chunk_empty;
+	chunk_t sk_ai = chunk_empty, sk_ar = chunk_empty, sk_pi, sk_pr;
 	prf_plus_t *prf_plus = NULL;
 	uint16_t alg, key_size, int_alg;
 	prf_t *rekey_prf = NULL;
@@ -434,7 +427,7 @@ METHOD(keymat_v2_t, derive_ike_keys, bool,
 
 	if (encryption_algorithm_is_aead(alg))
 	{
-		if (!derive_ike_aead(this, alg, key_size, prf_plus))
+		if (!derive_ike_aead(this, alg, key_size, prf_plus, &sk_ei, &sk_er))
 		{
 			goto failure;
 		}
@@ -448,7 +441,8 @@ METHOD(keymat_v2_t, derive_ike_keys, bool,
 				 transform_type_names, INTEGRITY_ALGORITHM);
 			goto failure;
 		}
-		if (!derive_ike_traditional(this, alg, key_size, int_alg, prf_plus))
+		if (!derive_ike_traditional(this, alg, key_size, int_alg, prf_plus,
+									&sk_ai, &sk_ar, &sk_ei, &sk_er))
 		{
 			goto failure;
 		}
@@ -456,35 +450,40 @@ METHOD(keymat_v2_t, derive_ike_keys, bool,
 
 	/* SK_pi/SK_pr used for authentication => stored for later */
 	key_size = this->prf->get_key_size(this->prf);
-	if (!prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &key))
+	if (!prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &sk_pi))
 	{
 		goto failure;
 	}
-	DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_pi secret %B", &key);
+	DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_pi secret %B", &sk_pi);
 	if (this->initiator)
 	{
-		this->skp_build = key;
+		this->skp_build = sk_pi;
 	}
 	else
 	{
-		this->skp_verify = key;
+		this->skp_verify = sk_pi;
 	}
-	if (!prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &key))
+	if (!prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &sk_pr))
 	{
 		goto failure;
 	}
-	DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_pr secret %B", &key);
+	DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_pr secret %B", &sk_pr);
 	if (this->initiator)
 	{
-		this->skp_verify = key;
+		this->skp_verify = sk_pr;
 	}
 	else
 	{
-		this->skp_build = key;
+		this->skp_build = sk_pr;
 	}
+	charon->bus->ike_derived_keys(charon->bus,this->skd, sk_ai, sk_ar, sk_ei,
+								  sk_er, sk_pi, sk_pr);
 
-	/* all done, prf_plus not needed anymore */
 failure:
+	chunk_clear(&sk_ai);
+	chunk_clear(&sk_ar);
+	chunk_clear(&sk_ei);
+	chunk_clear(&sk_er);
 	DESTROY_IF(prf_plus);
 	DESTROY_IF(rekey_prf);