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wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-tls-utils.c

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/* packet-tls-utils.c
* ssl manipulation functions
* By Paolo Abeni <paolo.abeni@email.com>
*
* Copyright (c) 2013, Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
* Copyright (c) 2014, Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
*
* Wireshark - Network traffic analyzer
* By Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
* Copyright 1998 Gerald Combs
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
*/
#include "config.h"
#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB
#define ZLIB_CONST
#include <zlib.h>
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <epan/packet.h>
#include <epan/strutil.h>
#include <epan/addr_resolv.h>
#include <epan/ipv6.h>
#include <epan/expert.h>
#include <epan/asn1.h>
#include <epan/proto_data.h>
#include <epan/oids.h>
#include <epan/secrets.h>
#include <wsutil/filesystem.h>
#include <wsutil/file_util.h>
#include <wsutil/str_util.h>
#include <wsutil/report_message.h>
#include <wsutil/pint.h>
#include <wsutil/strtoi.h>
#include <wsutil/wsgcrypt.h>
#include <wsutil/rsa.h>
#include <version_info.h>
#include "packet-ber.h"
#include "packet-x509af.h"
#include "packet-x509if.h"
#include "packet-tls-utils.h"
#include "packet-ocsp.h"
#include "packet-tls.h"
#include "packet-dtls.h"
#include "packet-quic.h"
#if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS)
#include <gnutls/abstract.h>
#endif
/* Lookup tables {{{ */
const value_string ssl_version_short_names[] = {
{ SSLV2_VERSION, "SSLv2" },
{ SSLV3_VERSION, "SSLv3" },
{ TLSV1_VERSION, "TLSv1" },
{ TLSV1DOT1_VERSION, "TLSv1.1" },
{ TLSV1DOT2_VERSION, "TLSv1.2" },
{ TLSV1DOT3_VERSION, "TLSv1.3" },
{ DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION, "DTLSv1.0" },
{ DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION, "DTLSv1.2" },
{ DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION, "DTLS 1.0 (OpenSSL pre 0.9.8f)" },
{ 0x00, NULL }
};
const value_string ssl_versions[] = {
{ SSLV2_VERSION, "SSL 2.0" },
{ SSLV3_VERSION, "SSL 3.0" },
{ TLSV1_VERSION, "TLS 1.0" },
{ TLSV1DOT1_VERSION, "TLS 1.1" },
{ TLSV1DOT2_VERSION, "TLS 1.2" },
{ TLSV1DOT3_VERSION, "TLS 1.3" },
{ 0x7F0E, "TLS 1.3 (draft 14)" },
{ 0x7F0F, "TLS 1.3 (draft 15)" },
{ 0x7F10, "TLS 1.3 (draft 16)" },
{ 0x7F11, "TLS 1.3 (draft 17)" },
{ 0x7F12, "TLS 1.3 (draft 18)" },
{ 0x7F13, "TLS 1.3 (draft 19)" },
{ 0x7F14, "TLS 1.3 (draft 20)" },
{ 0x7F15, "TLS 1.3 (draft 21)" },
{ 0x7F16, "TLS 1.3 (draft 22)" },
{ 0x7F17, "TLS 1.3 (draft 23)" },
{ 0x7F18, "TLS 1.3 (draft 24)" },
{ 0x7F19, "TLS 1.3 (draft 25)" },
{ 0x7F1A, "TLS 1.3 (draft 26)" },
{ 0x7F1B, "TLS 1.3 (draft 27)" },
{ 0x7F1C, "TLS 1.3 (draft 28)" },
{ 0xFB17, "TLS 1.3 (Facebook draft 23)" },
{ 0xFB1A, "TLS 1.3 (Facebook draft 26)" },
{ DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION, "DTLS 1.0 (OpenSSL pre 0.9.8f)" },
{ DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION, "DTLS 1.0" },
{ DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION, "DTLS 1.2" },
{ 0x00, NULL }
};
const value_string ssl_20_msg_types[] = {
{ SSL2_HND_ERROR, "Error" },
{ SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO, "Client Hello" },
{ SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, "Client Master Key" },
{ SSL2_HND_CLIENT_FINISHED, "Client Finished" },
{ SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO, "Server Hello" },
{ SSL2_HND_SERVER_VERIFY, "Server Verify" },
{ SSL2_HND_SERVER_FINISHED, "Server Finished" },
{ SSL2_HND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, "Request Certificate" },
{ SSL2_HND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, "Client Certificate" },
{ 0x00, NULL }
};
/* http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml */
/* Note: sorted by ascending value so value_string-ext can do a binary search */
static const value_string ssl_20_cipher_suites[] = {
{ 0x000000, "TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL" },
{ 0x000001, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5" },
{ 0x000002, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
{ 0x000003, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" },
{ 0x000004, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" },
{ 0x000005, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
{ 0x000006, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5" },
{ 0x000007, "TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000008, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000009, "TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00000a, "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00000b, "TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00000c, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00000d, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00000e, "TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00000f, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000010, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000011, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000012, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000013, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000014, "TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000015, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000016, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000017, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" },
{ 0x000018, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" },
{ 0x000019, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00001a, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00001b, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00001c, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
{ 0x00001d, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA" },
#if 0
{ 0x00001e, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
#endif
/* RFC 2712 */
{ 0x00001E, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00001F, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000020, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
{ 0x000021, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000022, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_MD5" },
{ 0x000023, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_MD5" },
{ 0x000024, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" },
{ 0x000025, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_MD5" },
{ 0x000026, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_SHA" },
{ 0x000027, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_SHA" },
{ 0x000028, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_SHA" },
{ 0x000029, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_MD5" },
{ 0x00002A, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5" },
{ 0x00002B, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" },
/* RFC 4785 */
{ 0x00002C, "TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
{ 0x00002D, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
{ 0x00002E, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
/* RFC 5246 */
{ 0x00002f, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000030, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000031, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000032, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000033, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000034, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000035, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000036, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000037, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000038, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000039, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00003A, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00003B, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256" },
{ 0x00003C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x00003D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x00003E, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x00003F, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x000040, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x000041, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000042, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000043, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000044, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000045, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000046, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000047, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
{ 0x000048, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
{ 0x000049, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00004A, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00004B, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00004C, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000060, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5" },
{ 0x000061, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5" },
{ 0x000062, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000063, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000064, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" },
{ 0x000065, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" },
{ 0x000066, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
{ 0x000067, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x000068, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x000069, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x00006A, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x00006B, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x00006C, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x00006D, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
/* 0x00,0x6E-83 Unassigned */
{ 0x000084, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000085, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000086, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000087, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000088, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000089, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
/* RFC 4279 */
{ 0x00008A, "TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
{ 0x00008B, "TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00008C, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00008D, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00008E, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
{ 0x00008F, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000090, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000091, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000092, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
{ 0x000093, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000094, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000095, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
/* RFC 4162 */
{ 0x000096, "TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000097, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000098, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000099, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00009A, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00009B, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
/* RFC 5288 */
{ 0x00009C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0x00009D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0x00009E, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0x00009F, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0x0000A0, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0x0000A1, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0x0000A2, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0x0000A3, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0x0000A4, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0x0000A5, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0x0000A6, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0x0000A7, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
/* RFC 5487 */
{ 0x0000A8, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0x0000A9, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0x0000AA, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0x0000AB, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0x0000AC, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0x0000AD, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0x0000AE, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x0000AF, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0x0000B0, "TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256" },
{ 0x0000B1, "TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384" },
{ 0x0000B2, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x0000B3, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0x0000B4, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256" },
{ 0x0000B5, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384" },
{ 0x0000B6, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x0000B7, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0x0000B8, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256" },
{ 0x0000B9, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384" },
/* From RFC 5932 */
{ 0x0000BA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x0000BB, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x0000BC, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x0000BD, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x0000BE, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x0000BF, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x0000C0, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x0000C1, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x0000C2, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x0000C3, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x0000C4, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x0000C5, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
/* 0x00,0xC6-FE Unassigned */
{ 0x0000FF, "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV" },
/* 0x01-BF,* Unassigned */
/* From RFC 4492 */
{ 0x00c001, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
{ 0x00c002, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
{ 0x00c003, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00c004, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00c005, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00c006, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
{ 0x00c007, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
{ 0x00c008, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00c009, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00c00a, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00c00b, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
{ 0x00c00c, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
{ 0x00c00d, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00c00e, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00c00f, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00c010, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
{ 0x00c011, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
{ 0x00c012, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00c013, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00c014, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00c015, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
{ 0x00c016, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
{ 0x00c017, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00c018, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00c019, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
/* RFC 5054 */
{ 0x00C01A, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00C01B, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00C01C, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00C01D, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00C01E, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00C01F, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00C020, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00C021, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00C022, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
/* RFC 5589 */
{ 0x00C023, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x00C024, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0x00C025, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x00C026, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0x00C027, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x00C028, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0x00C029, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x00C02A, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0x00C02B, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0x00C02C, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0x00C02D, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0x00C02E, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0x00C02F, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0x00C030, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0x00C031, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0x00C032, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
/* RFC 5489 */
{ 0x00C033, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
{ 0x00C034, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00C035, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00C036, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00C037, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x00C038, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0x00C039, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
{ 0x00C03A, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256" },
{ 0x00C03B, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384" },
/* 0xC0,0x3C-FF Unassigned
0xC1-FD,* Unassigned
0xFE,0x00-FD Unassigned
0xFE,0xFE-FF Reserved to avoid conflicts with widely deployed implementations [Pasi_Eronen]
0xFF,0x00-FF Reserved for Private Use [RFC5246]
*/
/* old numbers used in the beginning
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305 */
{ 0x00CC13, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
{ 0x00CC14, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
{ 0x00CC15, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7905 */
{ 0x00CCA8, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
{ 0x00CCA9, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
{ 0x00CCAA, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
{ 0x00CCAB, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
{ 0x00CCAC, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
{ 0x00CCAD, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
{ 0x00CCAE, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-josefsson-salsa20-tls */
{ 0x00E410, "TLS_RSA_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
{ 0x00E411, "TLS_RSA_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
{ 0x00E412, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
{ 0x00E413, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
{ 0x00E414, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
{ 0x00E415, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
{ 0x00E416, "TLS_PSK_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
{ 0x00E417, "TLS_PSK_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
{ 0x00E418, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
{ 0x00E419, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
{ 0x00E41A, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
{ 0x00E41B, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
{ 0x00E41C, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
{ 0x00E41D, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
{ 0x00E41E, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
{ 0x00E41F, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
/* these from http://www.mozilla.org/projects/
security/pki/nss/ssl/fips-ssl-ciphersuites.html */
{ 0x00fefe, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"},
{ 0x00feff, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00ffe0, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x00ffe1, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"},
/* note that ciphersuites of {0x00????} are TLS cipher suites in
* a sslv2 client hello message; the ???? above is the two-byte
* tls cipher suite id
*/
{ 0x010080, "SSL2_RC4_128_WITH_MD5" },
{ 0x020080, "SSL2_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5" },
{ 0x030080, "SSL2_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5" },
{ 0x040080, "SSL2_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5" },
{ 0x050080, "SSL2_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5" },
{ 0x060040, "SSL2_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5" },
{ 0x0700c0, "SSL2_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5" },
{ 0x080080, "SSL2_RC4_64_WITH_MD5" },
{ 0x00, NULL }
};
value_string_ext ssl_20_cipher_suites_ext = VALUE_STRING_EXT_INIT(ssl_20_cipher_suites);
/*
* Supported Groups (formerly named "EC Named Curve").
* https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-8
*/
const value_string ssl_extension_curves[] = {
{ 1, "sect163k1" },
{ 2, "sect163r1" },
{ 3, "sect163r2" },
{ 4, "sect193r1" },
{ 5, "sect193r2" },
{ 6, "sect233k1" },
{ 7, "sect233r1" },
{ 8, "sect239k1" },
{ 9, "sect283k1" },
{ 10, "sect283r1" },
{ 11, "sect409k1" },
{ 12, "sect409r1" },
{ 13, "sect571k1" },
{ 14, "sect571r1" },
{ 15, "secp160k1" },
{ 16, "secp160r1" },
{ 17, "secp160r2" },
{ 18, "secp192k1" },
{ 19, "secp192r1" },
{ 20, "secp224k1" },
{ 21, "secp224r1" },
{ 22, "secp256k1" },
{ 23, "secp256r1" },
{ 24, "secp384r1" },
{ 25, "secp521r1" },
{ 26, "brainpoolP256r1" }, /* RFC 7027 */
{ 27, "brainpoolP384r1" }, /* RFC 7027 */
{ 28, "brainpoolP512r1" }, /* RFC 7027 */
{ 29, "x25519" }, /* RFC 8446 / RFC 8422 */
{ 30, "x448" }, /* RFC 8446 / RFC 8422 */
{ 256, "ffdhe2048" }, /* RFC 7919 */
{ 257, "ffdhe3072" }, /* RFC 7919 */
{ 258, "ffdhe4096" }, /* RFC 7919 */
{ 259, "ffdhe6144" }, /* RFC 7919 */
{ 260, "ffdhe8192" }, /* RFC 7919 */
{ 2570, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* RFC 8701 */
{ 6682, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* RFC 8701 */
{ 10794, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* RFC 8701 */
{ 14906, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* RFC 8701 */
{ 19018, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* RFC 8701 */
{ 23130, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* RFC 8701 */
{ 27242, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* RFC 8701 */
{ 31354, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* RFC 8701 */
{ 35466, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* RFC 8701 */
{ 39578, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* RFC 8701 */
{ 43690, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* RFC 8701 */
{ 47802, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* RFC 8701 */
{ 51914, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* RFC 8701 */
{ 56026, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* RFC 8701 */
{ 60138, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* RFC 8701 */
{ 64250, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* RFC 8701 */
{ 0xFF01, "arbitrary_explicit_prime_curves" },
{ 0xFF02, "arbitrary_explicit_char2_curves" },
{ 0x00, NULL }
};
const value_string ssl_curve_types[] = {
{ 1, "explicit_prime" },
{ 2, "explicit_char2" },
{ 3, "named_curve" },
{ 0x00, NULL }
};
const value_string ssl_extension_ec_point_formats[] = {
{ 0, "uncompressed" },
{ 1, "ansiX962_compressed_prime" },
{ 2, "ansiX962_compressed_char2" },
{ 0x00, NULL }
};
const value_string ssl_20_certificate_type[] = {
{ 0x00, "N/A" },
{ 0x01, "X.509 Certificate" },
{ 0x00, NULL }
};
const value_string ssl_31_content_type[] = {
{ 20, "Change Cipher Spec" },
{ 21, "Alert" },
{ 22, "Handshake" },
{ 23, "Application Data" },
{ 24, "Heartbeat" },
{ 25, "Connection ID" },
{ 0x00, NULL }
};
#if 0
/* XXX - would be used if we dissected the body of a Change Cipher Spec
message. */
const value_string ssl_31_change_cipher_spec[] = {
{ 1, "Change Cipher Spec" },
{ 0x00, NULL }
};
#endif
const value_string ssl_31_alert_level[] = {
{ 1, "Warning" },
{ 2, "Fatal" },
{ 0x00, NULL }
};
const value_string ssl_31_alert_description[] = {
{ 0, "Close Notify" },
{ 1, "End of Early Data" },
{ 10, "Unexpected Message" },
{ 20, "Bad Record MAC" },
{ 21, "Decryption Failed" },
{ 22, "Record Overflow" },
{ 30, "Decompression Failure" },
{ 40, "Handshake Failure" },
{ 41, "No Certificate" },
{ 42, "Bad Certificate" },
{ 43, "Unsupported Certificate" },
{ 44, "Certificate Revoked" },
{ 45, "Certificate Expired" },
{ 46, "Certificate Unknown" },
{ 47, "Illegal Parameter" },
{ 48, "Unknown CA" },
{ 49, "Access Denied" },
{ 50, "Decode Error" },
{ 51, "Decrypt Error" },
{ 60, "Export Restriction" },
{ 70, "Protocol Version" },
{ 71, "Insufficient Security" },
{ 80, "Internal Error" },
{ 86, "Inappropriate Fallback" },
{ 90, "User Canceled" },
{ 100, "No Renegotiation" },
{ 109, "Missing Extension" },
{ 110, "Unsupported Extension" },
{ 111, "Certificate Unobtainable" },
{ 112, "Unrecognized Name" },
{ 113, "Bad Certificate Status Response" },
{ 114, "Bad Certificate Hash Value" },
{ 115, "Unknown PSK Identity" },
{ 116, "Certificate Required" },
{ 120, "No application Protocol" },
{ 0x00, NULL }
};
const value_string ssl_31_handshake_type[] = {
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_REQUEST, "Hello Request" },
{ SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO, "Client Hello" },
{ SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO, "Server Hello" },
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, "Hello Verify Request"},
{ SSL_HND_NEWSESSION_TICKET, "New Session Ticket" },
{ SSL_HND_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, "End of Early Data" },
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, "Hello Retry Request" },
{ SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, "Encrypted Extensions" },
{ SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE, "Certificate" },
{ SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG, "Server Key Exchange" },
{ SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST, "Certificate Request" },
{ SSL_HND_SVR_HELLO_DONE, "Server Hello Done" },
{ SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY, "Certificate Verify" },
{ SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG, "Client Key Exchange" },
{ SSL_HND_FINISHED, "Finished" },
{ SSL_HND_CERT_URL, "Client Certificate URL" },
{ SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS, "Certificate Status" },
{ SSL_HND_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA, "Supplemental Data" },
{ SSL_HND_KEY_UPDATE, "Key Update" },
{ SSL_HND_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE, "Compressed Certificate" },
{ SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTS, "Encrypted Extensions" },
{ 0x00, NULL }
};
const value_string tls_heartbeat_type[] = {
{ 1, "Request" },
{ 2, "Response" },
{ 0x00, NULL }
};
const value_string tls_heartbeat_mode[] = {
{ 1, "Peer allowed to send requests" },
{ 2, "Peer not allowed to send requests" },
{ 0x00, NULL }
};
const value_string ssl_31_compression_method[] = {
{ 0, "null" },
{ 1, "DEFLATE" },
{ 64, "LZS" },
{ 0x00, NULL }
};
#if 0
/* XXX - would be used if we dissected a Signature, as would be
seen in a server key exchange or certificate verify message. */
const value_string ssl_31_key_exchange_algorithm[] = {
{ 0, "RSA" },
{ 1, "Diffie Hellman" },
{ 0x00, NULL }
};
const value_string ssl_31_signature_algorithm[] = {
{ 0, "Anonymous" },
{ 1, "RSA" },
{ 2, "DSA" },
{ 0x00, NULL }
};
#endif
const value_string ssl_31_client_certificate_type[] = {
{ 1, "RSA Sign" },
{ 2, "DSS Sign" },
{ 3, "RSA Fixed DH" },
{ 4, "DSS Fixed DH" },
/* GOST certificate types */
/* Section 3.5 of draft-chudov-cryptopro-cptls-04 */
{ 21, "GOST R 34.10-94" },
{ 22, "GOST R 34.10-2001" },
/* END GOST certificate types */
{ 64, "ECDSA Sign" },
{ 65, "RSA Fixed ECDH" },
{ 66, "ECDSA Fixed ECDH" },
{ 0x00, NULL }
};
#if 0
/* XXX - would be used if we dissected exchange keys, as would be
seen in a client key exchange message. */
const value_string ssl_31_public_value_encoding[] = {
{ 0, "Implicit" },
{ 1, "Explicit" },
{ 0x00, NULL }
};
#endif
/* http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml */
/* Note: sorted by ascending value so value_string_ext fcns can do a binary search */
static const value_string ssl_31_ciphersuite[] = {
/* RFC 2246, RFC 4346, RFC 5246 */
{ 0x0000, "TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL" },
{ 0x0001, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5" },
{ 0x0002, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
{ 0x0003, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" },
{ 0x0004, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" },
{ 0x0005, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
{ 0x0006, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5" },
{ 0x0007, "TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0008, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0009, "TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000a, "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000b, "TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000c, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000d, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000e, "TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x000f, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0010, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0011, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0012, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0013, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0014, "TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0015, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0016, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0017, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" },
{ 0x0018, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" },
{ 0x0019, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x001a, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x001b, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x001c, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
{ 0x001d, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA" },
#if 0 /* Because it clashes with KRB5, is never used any more, and is safe
to remove according to David Hopwood <david.hopwood@zetnet.co.uk>
of the ietf-tls list */
{ 0x001e, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
#endif
/* RFC 2712 */
{ 0x001E, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x001F, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0020, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
{ 0x0021, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0022, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_MD5" },
{ 0x0023, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_MD5" },
{ 0x0024, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" },
{ 0x0025, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_MD5" },
{ 0x0026, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_SHA" },
{ 0x0027, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_SHA" },
{ 0x0028, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_SHA" },
{ 0x0029, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_MD5" },
{ 0x002A, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5" },
{ 0x002B, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" },
/* RFC 4785 */
{ 0x002C, "TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
{ 0x002D, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
{ 0x002E, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
/* RFC 5246 */
{ 0x002F, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0030, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0031, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0032, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0033, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0034, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0035, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0036, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0037, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0038, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0039, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x003A, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x003B, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256" },
{ 0x003C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x003D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x003E, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x003F, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x0040, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
/* RFC 4132 */
{ 0x0041, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0042, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0043, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0044, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0045, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0046, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
/* 0x00,0x60-66 Reserved to avoid conflicts with widely deployed implementations */
/* --- ??? --- */
{ 0x0060, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5" },
{ 0x0061, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5" },
/* draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt */
{ 0x0062, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0063, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0064, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" },
{ 0x0065, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" },
{ 0x0066, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
/* --- ??? ---*/
{ 0x0067, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x0068, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x0069, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x006A, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x006B, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x006C, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x006D, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
/* draft-chudov-cryptopro-cptls-04.txt */
{ 0x0080, "TLS_GOSTR341094_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT" },
{ 0x0081, "TLS_GOSTR341001_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT" },
{ 0x0082, "TLS_GOSTR341094_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411" },
{ 0x0083, "TLS_GOSTR341001_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411" },
/* RFC 4132 */
{ 0x0084, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0085, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0086, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0087, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0088, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0089, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
/* RFC 4279 */
{ 0x008A, "TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
{ 0x008B, "TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x008C, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x008D, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x008E, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
{ 0x008F, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0090, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0091, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0092, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
{ 0x0093, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0094, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0095, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
/* RFC 4162 */
{ 0x0096, "TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0097, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0098, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x0099, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x009A, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0x009B, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
/* RFC 5288 */
{ 0x009C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0x009D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0x009E, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0x009F, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0x00A0, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0x00A1, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0x00A2, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0x00A3, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0x00A4, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0x00A5, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0x00A6, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0x00A7, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
/* RFC 5487 */
{ 0x00A8, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0x00A9, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0x00AA, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0x00AB, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0x00AC, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0x00AD, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0x00AE, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x00AF, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0x00B0, "TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256" },
{ 0x00B1, "TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384" },
{ 0x00B2, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x00B3, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0x00B4, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256" },
{ 0x00B5, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384" },
{ 0x00B6, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x00B7, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0x00B8, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256" },
{ 0x00B9, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384" },
/* From RFC 5932 */
{ 0x00BA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x00BB, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x00BC, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x00BD, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x00BE, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x00BF, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x00C0, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x00C1, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x00C2, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x00C3, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x00C4, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0x00C5, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
/* draft-yang-tls-tls13-sm-suites */
{ 0x00C6, "TLS_SM4_GCM_SM3" },
{ 0x00C7, "TLS_SM4_CCM_SM3" },
/* 0x00,0xC8-FE Unassigned */
/* From RFC 5746 */
{ 0x00FF, "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV" },
/* RFC 8701 */
{ 0x0A0A, "Reserved (GREASE)" },
/* RFC 8446 */
{ 0x1301, "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0x1302, "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0x1303, "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
{ 0x1304, "TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256" },
{ 0x1305, "TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256" },
/* RFC 8701 */
{ 0x1A1A, "Reserved (GREASE)" },
{ 0x2A2A, "Reserved (GREASE)" },
{ 0x3A3A, "Reserved (GREASE)" },
{ 0x4A4A, "Reserved (GREASE)" },
/* From RFC 7507 */
{ 0x5600, "TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV" },
/* RFC 8701 */
{ 0x5A5A, "Reserved (GREASE)" },
{ 0x6A6A, "Reserved (GREASE)" },
{ 0x7A7A, "Reserved (GREASE)" },
{ 0x8A8A, "Reserved (GREASE)" },
{ 0x9A9A, "Reserved (GREASE)" },
{ 0xAAAA, "Reserved (GREASE)" },
{ 0xBABA, "Reserved (GREASE)" },
/* From RFC 4492 */
{ 0xc001, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
{ 0xc002, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
{ 0xc003, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0xc004, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0xc005, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0xc006, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
{ 0xc007, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
{ 0xc008, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0xc009, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0xc00a, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0xc00b, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
{ 0xc00c, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
{ 0xc00d, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0xc00e, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0xc00f, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0xc010, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
{ 0xc011, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
{ 0xc012, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0xc013, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0xc014, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0xc015, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
{ 0xc016, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
{ 0xc017, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0xc018, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0xc019, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
/* RFC 5054 */
{ 0xC01A, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0xC01B, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0xC01C, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0xC01D, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0xC01E, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0xC01F, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0xC020, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0xC021, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0xC022, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
/* RFC 5589 */
{ 0xC023, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0xC024, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0xC025, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0xC026, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0xC027, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0xC028, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0xC029, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0xC02A, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0xC02B, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xC02C, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0xC02D, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xC02E, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0xC02F, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xC030, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0xC031, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xC032, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
/* RFC 5489 */
{ 0xC033, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
{ 0xC034, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0xC035, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0xC036, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0xC037, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0xC038, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0xC039, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
{ 0xC03A, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256" },
{ 0xC03B, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384" },
/* RFC 6209 */
{ 0xC03C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0xC03D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0xC03E, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0xC03F, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0xC040, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0xC041, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0xC042, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0xC043, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0xC044, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0xC045, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0xC046, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0xC047, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0xC048, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0xC049, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0xC04A, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0xC04B, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0xC04C, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0xC04D, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0xC04E, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0xC04F, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0xC050, "TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xC051, "TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0xC052, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xC053, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0xC054, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xC055, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0xC056, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xC057, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0xC058, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xC059, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0xC05A, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xC05B, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0xC05C, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xC05D, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0xC05E, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xC05F, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0xC060, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xC061, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0xC062, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xC063, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0xC064, "TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0xC065, "TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0xC066, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0xC067, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0xC068, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0xC069, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0xC06A, "TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xC06B, "TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0xC06C, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xC06D, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0xC06E, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xC06F, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0xC070, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0xC071, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
/* RFC 6367 */
{ 0xC072, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0xC073, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0xC074, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0xC075, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0xC076, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0xC077, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0xC078, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0xC079, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0xC07A, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xC07B, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0xC07C, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xC07D, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0xC07E, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xC07F, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0xC080, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xC081, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0xC082, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xC083, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0xC084, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xC085, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0xC086, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xC087, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0xC088, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xC089, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0xC08A, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xC08B, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0xC08C, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xC08D, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0xC08E, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xC08F, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0xC090, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xC091, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0xC092, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xC093, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0xC094, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0xC095, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0xC096, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0xC097, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0xC098, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0xC099, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
{ 0xC09A, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
{ 0xC09B, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
/* RFC 6655 */
{ 0xC09C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM" },
{ 0xC09D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM" },
{ 0xC09E, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM" },
{ 0xC09F, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM" },
{ 0xC0A0, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8" },
{ 0xC0A1, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8" },
{ 0xC0A2, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8" },
{ 0xC0A3, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8" },
{ 0xC0A4, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM" },
{ 0xC0A5, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM" },
{ 0xC0A6, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM" },
{ 0xC0A7, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM" },
{ 0xC0A8, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8" },
{ 0xC0A9, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8" },
{ 0xC0AA, "TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8" },
{ 0xC0AB, "TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8" },
/* RFC 7251 */
{ 0xC0AC, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM" },
{ 0xC0AD, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM" },
{ 0xC0AE, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8" },
{ 0xC0AF, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8" },
/* RFC 8492 */
{ 0xC0B0, "TLS_ECCPWD_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xC0B1, "TLS_ECCPWD_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0xC0B2, "TLS_ECCPWD_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xC0B3, "TLS_ECCPWD_WITH_AES_256_CCM_SHA384" },
/* draft-camwinget-tls-ts13-macciphersuites */
{ 0xC0B4, "TLS_SHA256_SHA256" },
{ 0xC0B5, "TLS_SHA384_SHA384" },
/* https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake-01.txt */
{ 0xC0FF, "TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8" },
/* draft-smyshlyaev-tls12-gost-suites */
{ 0xC100, "TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_CTR_OMAC" },
{ 0xC101, "TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_CTR_OMAC" },
{ 0xC102, "TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT" },
/* draft-smyshlyaev-tls13-gost-suites */
{ 0xC103, "TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_L" },
{ 0xC104, "TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_L" },
{ 0xC105, "TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_S" },
{ 0xC106, "TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_S" },
/* RFC 8701 */
{ 0xCACA, "Reserved (GREASE)" },
/*
0xC0,0xAB-FF Unassigned
0xC1,0x03-FD,* Unassigned
0xFE,0x00-FD Unassigned
0xFE,0xFE-FF Reserved to avoid conflicts with widely deployed implementations [Pasi_Eronen]
0xFF,0x00-FF Reserved for Private Use [RFC5246]
*/
/* old numbers used in the beginning
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305 */
{ 0xCC13, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
{ 0xCC14, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
{ 0xCC15, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
/* RFC 7905 */
{ 0xCCA8, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
{ 0xCCA9, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
{ 0xCCAA, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
{ 0xCCAB, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
{ 0xCCAC, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
{ 0xCCAD, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
{ 0xCCAE, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead */
{ 0xD001, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
{ 0xD002, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
{ 0xD003, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256" },
{ 0xD005, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256" },
/* RFC 8701 */
{ 0xDADA, "Reserved (GREASE)" },
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-josefsson-salsa20-tls */
{ 0xE410, "TLS_RSA_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
{ 0xE411, "TLS_RSA_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
{ 0xE412, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
{ 0xE413, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
{ 0xE414, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
{ 0xE415, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
{ 0xE416, "TLS_PSK_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
{ 0xE417, "TLS_PSK_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
{ 0xE418, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
{ 0xE419, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
{ 0xE41A, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
{ 0xE41B, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
{ 0xE41C, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
{ 0xE41D, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
{ 0xE41E, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
{ 0xE41F, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
/* RFC 8701 */
{ 0xEAEA, "Reserved (GREASE)" },
{ 0xFAFA, "Reserved (GREASE)" },
/* these from http://www.mozilla.org/projects/
security/pki/nss/ssl/fips-ssl-ciphersuites.html */
{ 0xfefe, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"},
{ 0xfeff, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0xffe0, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
{ 0xffe1, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
/* note that ciphersuites 0xff00 - 0xffff are private */
{ 0x00, NULL }
};
value_string_ext ssl_31_ciphersuite_ext = VALUE_STRING_EXT_INIT(ssl_31_ciphersuite);
/* http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml#tls-extensiontype-values-1 */
const value_string tls_hello_extension_types[] = {
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SERVER_NAME, "server_name" }, /* RFC 6066 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, "max_fragment_length" },/* RFC 6066 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_URL, "client_certificate_url" }, /* RFC 6066 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_TRUSTED_CA_KEYS, "trusted_ca_keys" }, /* RFC 6066 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC, "truncated_hmac" }, /* RFC 6066 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST, "status_request" }, /* RFC 6066 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_USER_MAPPING, "user_mapping" }, /* RFC 4681 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CLIENT_AUTHZ, "client_authz" }, /* RFC 5878 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SERVER_AUTHZ, "server_authz" }, /* RFC 5878 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CERT_TYPE, "cert_type" }, /* RFC 6091 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, "supported_groups" }, /* RFC 4492, RFC 7919 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_EC_POINT_FORMATS, "ec_point_formats" }, /* RFC 4492 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SRP, "srp" }, /* RFC 5054 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS, "signature_algorithms" }, /* RFC 5246 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_USE_SRTP, "use_srtp" }, /* RFC 5764 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_HEARTBEAT, "heartbeat" }, /* RFC 6520 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_ALPN, "application_layer_protocol_negotiation" }, /* RFC 7301 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST_V2, "status_request_v2" }, /* RFC 6961 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SIGNED_CERTIFICATE_TIMESTAMP, "signed_certificate_timestamp" }, /* RFC 6962 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CLIENT_CERT_TYPE, "client_certificate_type" }, /* RFC 7250 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SERVER_CERT_TYPE, "server_certificate_type" }, /* RFC 7250 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_PADDING, "padding" }, /* RFC 7685 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC, "encrypt_then_mac" }, /* RFC 7366 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET, "extended_master_secret" }, /* RFC 7627 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_TOKEN_BINDING, "token_binding" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tokbind-negotiation */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CACHED_INFO, "cached_info" }, /* RFC 7924 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_COMPRESS_CERTIFICATE, "compress_certificate" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-certificate-compression-03 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT, "record_size_limit" }, /* RFC 8449 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SESSION_TICKET_TLS, "session_ticket" }, /* RFC 5077 / RFC 8447 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_KEY_SHARE_OLD, "Reserved (key_share)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-22 (removed in -23) */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY, "pre_shared_key" }, /* RFC 8446 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_EARLY_DATA, "early_data" }, /* RFC 8446 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, "supported_versions" }, /* RFC 8446 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_COOKIE, "cookie" }, /* RFC 8446 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES, "psk_key_exchange_modes" }, /* RFC 8446 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_TICKET_EARLY_DATA_INFO, "Reserved (ticket_early_data_info)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18 (removed in -19) */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITIES, "certificate_authorities" }, /* RFC 8446 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_OID_FILTERS, "oid_filters" }, /* RFC 8446 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH, "post_handshake_auth" }, /* RFC 8446 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_CERT, "signature_algorithms_cert" }, /* RFC 8446 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_KEY_SHARE, "key_share" }, /* RFC 8446 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CONNECTION_ID, "connection_id" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_0A0A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* RFC 8701 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_1A1A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* RFC 8701 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_2A2A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* RFC 8701 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_NPN, "next_protocol_negotiation"}, /* https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-agl-tls-nextprotoneg-03.html */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_3A3A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* RFC 8701 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_4A4A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* RFC 8701 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_5A5A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* RFC 8701 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_6A6A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* RFC 8701 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CHANNEL_ID_OLD, "channel_id_old" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-balfanz-tls-channelid-00
https://twitter.com/ericlaw/status/274237352531083264 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CHANNEL_ID, "channel_id" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-balfanz-tls-channelid-01
https://code.google.com/p/chromium/codesearch#chromium/src/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslt.h&l=209 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, "renegotiation_info" }, /* RFC 5746 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_7A7A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* RFC 8701 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_8A8A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* RFC 8701 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_9A9A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* RFC 8701 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_AAAA, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* RFC 8701 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_BABA, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* RFC 8701 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_CACA, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* RFC 8701 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_DADA, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* RFC 8701 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_EAEA, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* RFC 8701 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_FAFA, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* RFC 8701 */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_QUIC_TRANSPORT_PARAMETERS, "quic_transports_parameters" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-tls */
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_ENCRYPTED_SERVER_NAME, "encrypted_server_name" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-esni-01 */
{ 0, NULL }
};
const value_string tls_hello_ext_server_name_type_vs[] = {
{ 0, "host_name" },
{ 0, NULL }
};
/* RFC 6066 Section 4 */
const value_string tls_hello_ext_max_fragment_length[] = {
{ 1, "512" }, // 2^9
{ 2, "1024" }, // 2^10
{ 3, "2048" }, // 2^11
{ 4, "4096" }, // 2^12
{ 0, NULL }
};
/* RFC 8446 Section 4.2.9 */
const value_string tls_hello_ext_psk_ke_mode[] = {
{ 0, "PSK-only key establishment (psk_ke)" },
{ 1, "PSK with (EC)DHE key establishment (psk_dhe_ke)" },
{ 0, NULL }
};
const value_string tls13_key_update_request[] = {
{ 0, "update_not_requested" },
{ 1, "update_requested" },
{ 0, NULL }
};
/* RFC 5246 7.4.1.4.1 */
const value_string tls_hash_algorithm[] = {
{ 0, "None" },
{ 1, "MD5" },
{ 2, "SHA1" },
{ 3, "SHA224" },
{ 4, "SHA256" },
{ 5, "SHA384" },
{ 6, "SHA512" },
{ 0, NULL }
};
const value_string tls_signature_algorithm[] = {
{ 0, "Anonymous" },
{ 1, "RSA" },
{ 2, "DSA" },
{ 3, "ECDSA" },
{ 0, NULL }
};
/* RFC 8446 Section 4.2.3 */
const value_string tls13_signature_algorithm[] = {
{ 0x0201, "rsa_pkcs1_sha1" },
{ 0x0203, "ecdsa_sha1" },
{ 0x0401, "rsa_pkcs1_sha256" },
{ 0x0403, "ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" },
{ 0x0501, "rsa_pkcs1_sha384" },
{ 0x0503, "ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384" },
{ 0x0601, "rsa_pkcs1_sha512" },
{ 0x0603, "ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512" },
{ 0x0804, "rsa_pss_rsae_sha256" },
{ 0x0805, "rsa_pss_rsae_sha384" },
{ 0x0806, "rsa_pss_rsae_sha512" },
{ 0x0807, "ed25519" },
{ 0x0808, "ed448" },
{ 0x0809, "rsa_pss_pss_sha256" },
{ 0x080a, "rsa_pss_pss_sha384" },
{ 0x080b, "rsa_pss_pss_sha512" },
{ 0, NULL }
};
/* RFC 6091 3.1 */
const value_string tls_certificate_type[] = {
{ 0, "X.509" },
{ 1, "OpenPGP" },
{ SSL_HND_CERT_TYPE_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY, "Raw Public Key" }, /* RFC 7250 */
{ 0, NULL }
};
const value_string tls_cert_chain_type[] = {
{ SSL_HND_CERT_URL_TYPE_INDIVIDUAL_CERT, "Individual Certificates" },
{ SSL_HND_CERT_URL_TYPE_PKIPATH, "PKI Path" },
{ 0, NULL }
};
const value_string tls_cert_status_type[] = {
{ SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS_TYPE_OCSP, "OCSP" },
{ SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS_TYPE_OCSP_MULTI, "OCSP Multi" },
{ 0, NULL }
};
/* Generated by tools/make-tls-ct-logids.py
* Last-Modified Fri, 29 May 2020 22:15:00 GMT, 102 entries. */
static const bytes_string ct_logids[] = {
{ (const guint8[]){
0xfa, 0xd4, 0xc9, 0x7c, 0xc4, 0x9e, 0xe2, 0xf8, 0xac, 0x85, 0xc5,
0xea, 0x5c, 0xea, 0x09, 0xd0, 0x22, 0x0d, 0xbb, 0xf4, 0xe4, 0x9c,
0x6b, 0x50, 0x66, 0x2f, 0xf8, 0x68, 0xf8, 0x6b, 0x8c, 0x28,
},
32, "Google 'Argon2017' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xa4, 0x50, 0x12, 0x69, 0x05, 0x5a, 0x15, 0x54, 0x5e, 0x62, 0x11,
0xab, 0x37, 0xbc, 0x10, 0x3f, 0x62, 0xae, 0x55, 0x76, 0xa4, 0x5e,
0x4b, 0x17, 0x14, 0x45, 0x3e, 0x1b, 0x22, 0x10, 0x6a, 0x25,
},
32, "Google 'Argon2018' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x63, 0xf2, 0xdb, 0xcd, 0xe8, 0x3b, 0xcc, 0x2c, 0xcf, 0x0b, 0x72,
0x84, 0x27, 0x57, 0x6b, 0x33, 0xa4, 0x8d, 0x61, 0x77, 0x8f, 0xbd,
0x75, 0xa6, 0x38, 0xb1, 0xc7, 0x68, 0x54, 0x4b, 0xd8, 0x8d,
},
32, "Google 'Argon2019' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xb2, 0x1e, 0x05, 0xcc, 0x8b, 0xa2, 0xcd, 0x8a, 0x20, 0x4e, 0x87,
0x66, 0xf9, 0x2b, 0xb9, 0x8a, 0x25, 0x20, 0x67, 0x6b, 0xda, 0xfa,
0x70, 0xe7, 0xb2, 0x49, 0x53, 0x2d, 0xef, 0x8b, 0x90, 0x5e,
},
32, "Google 'Argon2020' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xf6, 0x5c, 0x94, 0x2f, 0xd1, 0x77, 0x30, 0x22, 0x14, 0x54, 0x18,
0x08, 0x30, 0x94, 0x56, 0x8e, 0xe3, 0x4d, 0x13, 0x19, 0x33, 0xbf,
0xdf, 0x0c, 0x2f, 0x20, 0x0b, 0xcc, 0x4e, 0xf1, 0x64, 0xe3,
},
32, "Google 'Argon2021' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x29, 0x79, 0xbe, 0xf0, 0x9e, 0x39, 0x39, 0x21, 0xf0, 0x56, 0x73,
0x9f, 0x63, 0xa5, 0x77, 0xe5, 0xbe, 0x57, 0x7d, 0x9c, 0x60, 0x0a,
0xf8, 0xf9, 0x4d, 0x5d, 0x26, 0x5c, 0x25, 0x5d, 0xc7, 0x84,
},
32, "Google 'Argon2022' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xe8, 0x3e, 0xd0, 0xda, 0x3e, 0xf5, 0x06, 0x35, 0x32, 0xe7, 0x57,
0x28, 0xbc, 0x89, 0x6b, 0xc9, 0x03, 0xd3, 0xcb, 0xd1, 0x11, 0x6b,
0xec, 0xeb, 0x69, 0xe1, 0x77, 0x7d, 0x6d, 0x06, 0xbd, 0x6e,
},
32, "Google 'Argon2023' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xb1, 0x0c, 0xd5, 0x59, 0xa6, 0xd6, 0x78, 0x46, 0x81, 0x1f, 0x7d,
0xf9, 0xa5, 0x15, 0x32, 0x73, 0x9a, 0xc4, 0x8d, 0x70, 0x3b, 0xea,
0x03, 0x23, 0xda, 0x5d, 0x38, 0x75, 0x5b, 0xc0, 0xad, 0x4e,
},
32, "Google 'Xenon2018' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x08, 0x41, 0x14, 0x98, 0x00, 0x71, 0x53, 0x2c, 0x16, 0x19, 0x04,
0x60, 0xbc, 0xfc, 0x47, 0xfd, 0xc2, 0x65, 0x3a, 0xfa, 0x29, 0x2c,
0x72, 0xb3, 0x7f, 0xf8, 0x63, 0xae, 0x29, 0xcc, 0xc9, 0xf0,
},
32, "Google 'Xenon2019' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x07, 0xb7, 0x5c, 0x1b, 0xe5, 0x7d, 0x68, 0xff, 0xf1, 0xb0, 0xc6,
0x1d, 0x23, 0x15, 0xc7, 0xba, 0xe6, 0x57, 0x7c, 0x57, 0x94, 0xb7,
0x6a, 0xee, 0xbc, 0x61, 0x3a, 0x1a, 0x69, 0xd3, 0xa2, 0x1c,
},
32, "Google 'Xenon2020' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x7d, 0x3e, 0xf2, 0xf8, 0x8f, 0xff, 0x88, 0x55, 0x68, 0x24, 0xc2,
0xc0, 0xca, 0x9e, 0x52, 0x89, 0x79, 0x2b, 0xc5, 0x0e, 0x78, 0x09,
0x7f, 0x2e, 0x6a, 0x97, 0x68, 0x99, 0x7e, 0x22, 0xf0, 0xd7,
},
32, "Google 'Xenon2021' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x46, 0xa5, 0x55, 0xeb, 0x75, 0xfa, 0x91, 0x20, 0x30, 0xb5, 0xa2,
0x89, 0x69, 0xf4, 0xf3, 0x7d, 0x11, 0x2c, 0x41, 0x74, 0xbe, 0xfd,
0x49, 0xb8, 0x85, 0xab, 0xf2, 0xfc, 0x70, 0xfe, 0x6d, 0x47,
},
32, "Google 'Xenon2022' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xad, 0xf7, 0xbe, 0xfa, 0x7c, 0xff, 0x10, 0xc8, 0x8b, 0x9d, 0x3d,
0x9c, 0x1e, 0x3e, 0x18, 0x6a, 0xb4, 0x67, 0x29, 0x5d, 0xcf, 0xb1,
0x0c, 0x24, 0xca, 0x85, 0x86, 0x34, 0xeb, 0xdc, 0x82, 0x8a,
},
32, "Google 'Xenon2023' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x68, 0xf6, 0x98, 0xf8, 0x1f, 0x64, 0x82, 0xbe, 0x3a, 0x8c, 0xee,
0xb9, 0x28, 0x1d, 0x4c, 0xfc, 0x71, 0x51, 0x5d, 0x67, 0x93, 0xd4,
0x44, 0xd1, 0x0a, 0x67, 0xac, 0xbb, 0x4f, 0x4f, 0xfb, 0xc4,
},
32, "Google 'Aviator' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x29, 0x3c, 0x51, 0x96, 0x54, 0xc8, 0x39, 0x65, 0xba, 0xaa, 0x50,
0xfc, 0x58, 0x07, 0xd4, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0xbf, 0x58, 0x7a, 0x29, 0x72,
0xdc, 0xa4, 0xc3, 0x0c, 0xf4, 0xe5, 0x45, 0x47, 0xf4, 0x78,
},
32, "Google 'Icarus' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xa4, 0xb9, 0x09, 0x90, 0xb4, 0x18, 0x58, 0x14, 0x87, 0xbb, 0x13,
0xa2, 0xcc, 0x67, 0x70, 0x0a, 0x3c, 0x35, 0x98, 0x04, 0xf9, 0x1b,
0xdf, 0xb8, 0xe3, 0x77, 0xcd, 0x0e, 0xc8, 0x0d, 0xdc, 0x10,
},
32, "Google 'Pilot' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xee, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0xb7, 0x75, 0xce, 0x60, 0xba, 0xe1, 0x42, 0x69,
0x1f, 0xab, 0xe1, 0x9e, 0x66, 0xa3, 0x0f, 0x7e, 0x5f, 0xb0, 0x72,
0xd8, 0x83, 0x00, 0xc4, 0x7b, 0x89, 0x7a, 0xa8, 0xfd, 0xcb,
},
32, "Google 'Rocketeer' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xbb, 0xd9, 0xdf, 0xbc, 0x1f, 0x8a, 0x71, 0xb5, 0x93, 0x94, 0x23,
0x97, 0xaa, 0x92, 0x7b, 0x47, 0x38, 0x57, 0x95, 0x0a, 0xab, 0x52,
0xe8, 0x1a, 0x90, 0x96, 0x64, 0x36, 0x8e, 0x1e, 0xd1, 0x85,
},
32, "Google 'Skydiver' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xa8, 0x99, 0xd8, 0x78, 0x0c, 0x92, 0x90, 0xaa, 0xf4, 0x62, 0xf3,
0x18, 0x80, 0xcc, 0xfb, 0xd5, 0x24, 0x51, 0xe9, 0x70, 0xd0, 0xfb,
0xf5, 0x91, 0xef, 0x75, 0xb0, 0xd9, 0x9b, 0x64, 0x56, 0x81,
},
32, "Google 'Submariner' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x1d, 0x02, 0x4b, 0x8e, 0xb1, 0x49, 0x8b, 0x34, 0x4d, 0xfd, 0x87,
0xea, 0x3e, 0xfc, 0x09, 0x96, 0xf7, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x23, 0x5d, 0x1d,
0x49, 0x70, 0x61, 0xa4, 0x77, 0x3c, 0x43, 0x9c, 0x25, 0xfb,
},
32, "Google 'Daedalus' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xb0, 0xcc, 0x83, 0xe5, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0x7d, 0x6b, 0xaf, 0x7c, 0x09,
0xcc, 0x28, 0x49, 0x04, 0x87, 0x2a, 0xc7, 0xe8, 0x8b, 0x13, 0x2c,
0x63, 0x50, 0xb7, 0xc6, 0xfd, 0x26, 0xe1, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x77,
},
32, "Google 'Testtube' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xc3, 0xbf, 0x03, 0xa7, 0xe1, 0xca, 0x88, 0x41, 0xc6, 0x07, 0xba,
0xe3, 0xff, 0x42, 0x70, 0xfc, 0xa5, 0xec, 0x45, 0xb1, 0x86, 0xeb,
0xbe, 0x4e, 0x2c, 0xf3, 0xfc, 0x77, 0x86, 0x30, 0xf5, 0xf6,
},
32, "Google 'Crucible' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x52, 0xeb, 0x4b, 0x22, 0x5e, 0xc8, 0x96, 0x97, 0x48, 0x50, 0x67,
0x5f, 0x23, 0xe4, 0x3b, 0xc1, 0xd0, 0x21, 0xe3, 0x21, 0x4c, 0xe5,
0x2e, 0xcd, 0x5f, 0xa8, 0x7c, 0x20, 0x3c, 0xdf, 0xca, 0x03,
},
32, "Google 'Solera2018' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x0b, 0x76, 0x0e, 0x9a, 0x8b, 0x9a, 0x68, 0x2f, 0x88, 0x98, 0x5b,
0x15, 0xe9, 0x47, 0x50, 0x1a, 0x56, 0x44, 0x6b, 0xba, 0x88, 0x30,
0x78, 0x5c, 0x38, 0x42, 0x99, 0x43, 0x86, 0x45, 0x0c, 0x00,
},
32, "Google 'Solera2019' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x1f, 0xc7, 0x2c, 0xe5, 0xa1, 0xb7, 0x99, 0xf4, 0x00, 0xc3, 0x59,
0xbf, 0xf9, 0x6c, 0xa3, 0x91, 0x35, 0x48, 0xe8, 0x64, 0x42, 0x20,
0x61, 0x09, 0x52, 0xe9, 0xba, 0x17, 0x74, 0xf7, 0xba, 0xc7,
},
32, "Google 'Solera2020' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xa3, 0xc9, 0x98, 0x45, 0xe8, 0x0a, 0xb7, 0xce, 0x00, 0x15, 0x7b,
0x37, 0x42, 0xdf, 0x02, 0x07, 0xdd, 0x27, 0x2b, 0x2b, 0x60, 0x2e,
0xcf, 0x98, 0xee, 0x2c, 0x12, 0xdb, 0x9c, 0x5a, 0xe7, 0xe7,
},
32, "Google 'Solera2021' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x69, 0x7a, 0xaf, 0xca, 0x1a, 0x6b, 0x53, 0x6f, 0xae, 0x21, 0x20,
0x50, 0x46, 0xde, 0xba, 0xd7, 0xe0, 0xea, 0xea, 0x13, 0xd2, 0x43,
0x2e, 0x6e, 0x9d, 0x8f, 0xb3, 0x79, 0xf2, 0xb9, 0xaa, 0xf3,
},
32, "Google 'Solera2022' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xf9, 0x7e, 0x97, 0xb8, 0xd3, 0x3e, 0xf7, 0xa1, 0x59, 0x02, 0xa5,
0x3a, 0x19, 0xe1, 0x79, 0x90, 0xe5, 0xdc, 0x40, 0x6a, 0x03, 0x18,
0x25, 0xba, 0xad, 0x93, 0xe9, 0x8f, 0x9b, 0x9c, 0x69, 0xcb,
},
32, "Google 'Solera2023' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x1f, 0xbc, 0x36, 0xe0, 0x02, 0xed, 0xe9, 0x7f, 0x40, 0x19, 0x9e,
0x86, 0xb3, 0x57, 0x3b, 0x8a, 0x42, 0x17, 0xd8, 0x01, 0x87, 0x74,
0x6a, 0xd0, 0xda, 0x03, 0xa0, 0x60, 0x54, 0xd2, 0x0d, 0xf4,
},
32, "Cloudflare 'Nimbus2017' Log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xdb, 0x74, 0xaf, 0xee, 0xcb, 0x29, 0xec, 0xb1, 0xfe, 0xca, 0x3e,
0x71, 0x6d, 0x2c, 0xe5, 0xb9, 0xaa, 0xbb, 0x36, 0xf7, 0x84, 0x71,
0x83, 0xc7, 0x5d, 0x9d, 0x4f, 0x37, 0xb6, 0x1f, 0xbf, 0x64,
},
32, "Cloudflare 'Nimbus2018' Log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x74, 0x7e, 0xda, 0x83, 0x31, 0xad, 0x33, 0x10, 0x91, 0x21, 0x9c,
0xce, 0x25, 0x4f, 0x42, 0x70, 0xc2, 0xbf, 0xfd, 0x5e, 0x42, 0x20,
0x08, 0xc6, 0x37, 0x35, 0x79, 0xe6, 0x10, 0x7b, 0xcc, 0x56,
},
32, "Cloudflare 'Nimbus2019' Log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x5e, 0xa7, 0x73, 0xf9, 0xdf, 0x56, 0xc0, 0xe7, 0xb5, 0x36, 0x48,
0x7d, 0xd0, 0x49, 0xe0, 0x32, 0x7a, 0x91, 0x9a, 0x0c, 0x84, 0xa1,
0x12, 0x12, 0x84, 0x18, 0x75, 0x96, 0x81, 0x71, 0x45, 0x58,
},
32, "Cloudflare 'Nimbus2020' Log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x44, 0x94, 0x65, 0x2e, 0xb0, 0xee, 0xce, 0xaf, 0xc4, 0x40, 0x07,
0xd8, 0xa8, 0xfe, 0x28, 0xc0, 0xda, 0xe6, 0x82, 0xbe, 0xd8, 0xcb,
0x31, 0xb5, 0x3f, 0xd3, 0x33, 0x96, 0xb5, 0xb6, 0x81, 0xa8,
},
32, "Cloudflare 'Nimbus2021' Log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x41, 0xc8, 0xca, 0xb1, 0xdf, 0x22, 0x46, 0x4a, 0x10, 0xc6, 0xa1,
0x3a, 0x09, 0x42, 0x87, 0x5e, 0x4e, 0x31, 0x8b, 0x1b, 0x03, 0xeb,
0xeb, 0x4b, 0xc7, 0x68, 0xf0, 0x90, 0x62, 0x96, 0x06, 0xf6,
},
32, "Cloudflare 'Nimbus2022' Log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x7a, 0x32, 0x8c, 0x54, 0xd8, 0xb7, 0x2d, 0xb6, 0x20, 0xea, 0x38,
0xe0, 0x52, 0x1e, 0xe9, 0x84, 0x16, 0x70, 0x32, 0x13, 0x85, 0x4d,
0x3b, 0xd2, 0x2b, 0xc1, 0x3a, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x52, 0xeb, 0x52,
},
32, "Cloudflare 'Nimbus2023' Log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x56, 0x14, 0x06, 0x9a, 0x2f, 0xd7, 0xc2, 0xec, 0xd3, 0xf5, 0xe1,
0xbd, 0x44, 0xb2, 0x3e, 0xc7, 0x46, 0x76, 0xb9, 0xbc, 0x99, 0x11,
0x5c, 0xc0, 0xef, 0x94, 0x98, 0x55, 0xd6, 0x89, 0xd0, 0xdd,
},
32, "DigiCert Log Server" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x87, 0x75, 0xbf, 0xe7, 0x59, 0x7c, 0xf8, 0x8c, 0x43, 0x99, 0x5f,
0xbd, 0xf3, 0x6e, 0xff, 0x56, 0x8d, 0x47, 0x56, 0x36, 0xff, 0x4a,
0xb5, 0x60, 0xc1, 0xb4, 0xea, 0xff, 0x5e, 0xa0, 0x83, 0x0f,
},
32, "DigiCert Log Server 2" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xc1, 0x16, 0x4a, 0xe0, 0xa7, 0x72, 0xd2, 0xd4, 0x39, 0x2d, 0xc8,
0x0a, 0xc1, 0x07, 0x70, 0xd4, 0xf0, 0xc4, 0x9b, 0xde, 0x99, 0x1a,
0x48, 0x40, 0xc1, 0xfa, 0x07, 0x51, 0x64, 0xf6, 0x33, 0x60,
},
32, "DigiCert Yeti2018 Log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xe2, 0x69, 0x4b, 0xae, 0x26, 0xe8, 0xe9, 0x40, 0x09, 0xe8, 0x86,
0x1b, 0xb6, 0x3b, 0x83, 0xd4, 0x3e, 0xe7, 0xfe, 0x74, 0x88, 0xfb,
0xa4, 0x8f, 0x28, 0x93, 0x01, 0x9d, 0xdd, 0xf1, 0xdb, 0xfe,
},
32, "DigiCert Yeti2019 Log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xf0, 0x95, 0xa4, 0x59, 0xf2, 0x00, 0xd1, 0x82, 0x40, 0x10, 0x2d,
0x2f, 0x93, 0x88, 0x8e, 0xad, 0x4b, 0xfe, 0x1d, 0x47, 0xe3, 0x99,
0xe1, 0xd0, 0x34, 0xa6, 0xb0, 0xa8, 0xaa, 0x8e, 0xb2, 0x73,
},
32, "DigiCert Yeti2020 Log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x5c, 0xdc, 0x43, 0x92, 0xfe, 0xe6, 0xab, 0x45, 0x44, 0xb1, 0x5e,
0x9a, 0xd4, 0x56, 0xe6, 0x10, 0x37, 0xfb, 0xd5, 0xfa, 0x47, 0xdc,
0xa1, 0x73, 0x94, 0xb2, 0x5e, 0xe6, 0xf6, 0xc7, 0x0e, 0xca,
},
32, "DigiCert Yeti2021 Log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x22, 0x45, 0x45, 0x07, 0x59, 0x55, 0x24, 0x56, 0x96, 0x3f, 0xa1,
0x2f, 0xf1, 0xf7, 0x6d, 0x86, 0xe0, 0x23, 0x26, 0x63, 0xad, 0xc0,
0x4b, 0x7f, 0x5d, 0xc6, 0x83, 0x5c, 0x6e, 0xe2, 0x0f, 0x02,
},
32, "DigiCert Yeti2022 Log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x35, 0xcf, 0x19, 0x1b, 0xbf, 0xb1, 0x6c, 0x57, 0xbf, 0x0f, 0xad,
0x4c, 0x6d, 0x42, 0xcb, 0xbb, 0xb6, 0x27, 0x20, 0x26, 0x51, 0xea,
0x3f, 0xe1, 0x2a, 0xef, 0xa8, 0x03, 0xc3, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0x4c,
},
32, "DigiCert Yeti2023 Log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x6f, 0xf1, 0x41, 0xb5, 0x64, 0x7e, 0x42, 0x22, 0xf7, 0xef, 0x05,
0x2c, 0xef, 0xae, 0x7c, 0x21, 0xfd, 0x60, 0x8e, 0x27, 0xd2, 0xaf,
0x5a, 0x6e, 0x9f, 0x4b, 0x8a, 0x37, 0xd6, 0x63, 0x3e, 0xe5,
},
32, "DigiCert Nessie2018 Log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xfe, 0x44, 0x61, 0x08, 0xb1, 0xd0, 0x1a, 0xb7, 0x8a, 0x62, 0xcc,
0xfe, 0xab, 0x6a, 0xb2, 0xb2, 0xba, 0xbf, 0xf3, 0xab, 0xda, 0xd8,
0x0a, 0x4d, 0x8b, 0x30, 0xdf, 0x2d, 0x00, 0x08, 0x83, 0x0c,
},
32, "DigiCert Nessie2019 Log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xc6, 0x52, 0xa0, 0xec, 0x48, 0xce, 0xb3, 0xfc, 0xab, 0x17, 0x09,
0x92, 0xc4, 0x3a, 0x87, 0x41, 0x33, 0x09, 0xe8, 0x00, 0x65, 0xa2,
0x62, 0x52, 0x40, 0x1b, 0xa3, 0x36, 0x2a, 0x17, 0xc5, 0x65,
},
32, "DigiCert Nessie2020 Log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xee, 0xc0, 0x95, 0xee, 0x8d, 0x72, 0x64, 0x0f, 0x92, 0xe3, 0xc3,
0xb9, 0x1b, 0xc7, 0x12, 0xa3, 0x69, 0x6a, 0x09, 0x7b, 0x4b, 0x6a,
0x1a, 0x14, 0x38, 0xe6, 0x47, 0xb2, 0xcb, 0xed, 0xc5, 0xf9,
},
32, "DigiCert Nessie2021 Log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x51, 0xa3, 0xb0, 0xf5, 0xfd, 0x01, 0x79, 0x9c, 0x56, 0x6d, 0xb8,
0x37, 0x78, 0x8f, 0x0c, 0xa4, 0x7a, 0xcc, 0x1b, 0x27, 0xcb, 0xf7,
0x9e, 0x88, 0x42, 0x9a, 0x0d, 0xfe, 0xd4, 0x8b, 0x05, 0xe5,
},
32, "DigiCert Nessie2022 Log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xb3, 0x73, 0x77, 0x07, 0xe1, 0x84, 0x50, 0xf8, 0x63, 0x86, 0xd6,
0x05, 0xa9, 0xdc, 0x11, 0x09, 0x4a, 0x79, 0x2d, 0xb1, 0x67, 0x0c,
0x0b, 0x87, 0xdc, 0xf0, 0x03, 0x0e, 0x79, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x9a,
},
32, "DigiCert Nessie2023 Log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xdd, 0xeb, 0x1d, 0x2b, 0x7a, 0x0d, 0x4f, 0xa6, 0x20, 0x8b, 0x81,
0xad, 0x81, 0x68, 0x70, 0x7e, 0x2e, 0x8e, 0x9d, 0x01, 0xd5, 0x5c,
0x88, 0x8d, 0x3d, 0x11, 0xc4, 0xcd, 0xb6, 0xec, 0xbe, 0xcc,
},
32, "Symantec log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xbc, 0x78, 0xe1, 0xdf, 0xc5, 0xf6, 0x3c, 0x68, 0x46, 0x49, 0x33,
0x4d, 0xa1, 0x0f, 0xa1, 0x5f, 0x09, 0x79, 0x69, 0x20, 0x09, 0xc0,
0x81, 0xb4, 0xf3, 0xf6, 0x91, 0x7f, 0x3e, 0xd9, 0xb8, 0xa5,
},
32, "Symantec 'Vega' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xa7, 0xce, 0x4a, 0x4e, 0x62, 0x07, 0xe0, 0xad, 0xde, 0xe5, 0xfd,
0xaa, 0x4b, 0x1f, 0x86, 0x76, 0x87, 0x67, 0xb5, 0xd0, 0x02, 0xa5,
0x5d, 0x47, 0x31, 0x0e, 0x7e, 0x67, 0x0a, 0x95, 0xea, 0xb2,
},
32, "Symantec Deneb" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x15, 0x97, 0x04, 0x88, 0xd7, 0xb9, 0x97, 0xa0, 0x5b, 0xeb, 0x52,
0x51, 0x2a, 0xde, 0xe8, 0xd2, 0xe8, 0xb4, 0xa3, 0x16, 0x52, 0x64,
0x12, 0x1a, 0x9f, 0xab, 0xfb, 0xd5, 0xf8, 0x5a, 0xd9, 0x3f,
},
32, "Symantec 'Sirius' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xcd, 0xb5, 0x17, 0x9b, 0x7f, 0xc1, 0xc0, 0x46, 0xfe, 0xea, 0x31,
0x13, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0x8f, 0x00, 0x2e, 0x61, 0x82, 0xfa, 0xf8, 0x89,
0x6f, 0xec, 0xc8, 0xb2, 0xf5, 0xb5, 0xab, 0x60, 0x49, 0x00,
},
32, "Certly.IO log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x74, 0x61, 0xb4, 0xa0, 0x9c, 0xfb, 0x3d, 0x41, 0xd7, 0x51, 0x59,
0x57, 0x5b, 0x2e, 0x76, 0x49, 0xa4, 0x45, 0xa8, 0xd2, 0x77, 0x09,
0xb0, 0xcc, 0x56, 0x4a, 0x64, 0x82, 0xb7, 0xeb, 0x41, 0xa3,
},
32, "Izenpe log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x89, 0x41, 0x44, 0x9c, 0x70, 0x74, 0x2e, 0x06, 0xb9, 0xfc, 0x9c,
0xe7, 0xb1, 0x16, 0xba, 0x00, 0x24, 0xaa, 0x36, 0xd5, 0x9a, 0xf4,
0x4f, 0x02, 0x04, 0x40, 0x4f, 0x00, 0xf7, 0xea, 0x85, 0x66,
},
32, "Izenpe 'Argi' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x9e, 0x4f, 0xf7, 0x3d, 0xc3, 0xce, 0x22, 0x0b, 0x69, 0x21, 0x7c,
0x89, 0x9e, 0x46, 0x80, 0x76, 0xab, 0xf8, 0xd7, 0x86, 0x36, 0xd5,
0xcc, 0xfc, 0x85, 0xa3, 0x1a, 0x75, 0x62, 0x8b, 0xa8, 0x8b,
},
32, "WoSign CT log #1" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x41, 0xb2, 0xdc, 0x2e, 0x89, 0xe6, 0x3c, 0xe4, 0xaf, 0x1b, 0xa7,
0xbb, 0x29, 0xbf, 0x68, 0xc6, 0xde, 0xe6, 0xf9, 0xf1, 0xcc, 0x04,
0x7e, 0x30, 0xdf, 0xfa, 0xe3, 0xb3, 0xba, 0x25, 0x92, 0x63,
},
32, "WoSign log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x63, 0xd0, 0x00, 0x60, 0x26, 0xdd, 0xe1, 0x0b, 0xb0, 0x60, 0x1f,
0x45, 0x24, 0x46, 0x96, 0x5e, 0xe2, 0xb6, 0xea, 0x2c, 0xd4, 0xfb,
0xc9, 0x5a, 0xc8, 0x66, 0xa5, 0x50, 0xaf, 0x90, 0x75, 0xb7,
},
32, "WoSign log 2" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xc9, 0xcf, 0x89, 0x0a, 0x21, 0x10, 0x9c, 0x66, 0x6c, 0xc1, 0x7a,
0x3e, 0xd0, 0x65, 0xc9, 0x30, 0xd0, 0xe0, 0x13, 0x5a, 0x9f, 0xeb,
0xa8, 0x5a, 0xf1, 0x42, 0x10, 0xb8, 0x07, 0x24, 0x21, 0xaa,
},
32, "GDCA CT log #1" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x92, 0x4a, 0x30, 0xf9, 0x09, 0x33, 0x6f, 0xf4, 0x35, 0xd6, 0x99,
0x3a, 0x10, 0xac, 0x75, 0xa2, 0xc6, 0x41, 0x72, 0x8e, 0x7f, 0xc2,
0xd6, 0x59, 0xae, 0x61, 0x88, 0xff, 0xad, 0x40, 0xce, 0x01,
},
32, "GDCA CT log #2" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x71, 0x7e, 0xa7, 0x42, 0x09, 0x75, 0xbe, 0x84, 0xa2, 0x72, 0x35,
0x53, 0xf1, 0x77, 0x7c, 0x26, 0xdd, 0x51, 0xaf, 0x4e, 0x10, 0x21,
0x44, 0x09, 0x4d, 0x90, 0x19, 0xb4, 0x62, 0xfb, 0x66, 0x68,
},
32, "GDCA Log 1" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x14, 0x30, 0x8d, 0x90, 0xcc, 0xd0, 0x30, 0x13, 0x50, 0x05, 0xc0,
0x1c, 0xa5, 0x26, 0xd8, 0x1e, 0x84, 0xe8, 0x76, 0x24, 0xe3, 0x9b,
0x62, 0x48, 0xe0, 0x8f, 0x72, 0x4a, 0xea, 0x3b, 0xb4, 0x2a,
},
32, "GDCA Log 2" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xdb, 0x76, 0xfd, 0xad, 0xac, 0x65, 0xe7, 0xd0, 0x95, 0x08, 0x88,
0x6e, 0x21, 0x59, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x90, 0x35, 0x2f, 0x5f, 0xea, 0xd3,
0xe3, 0xdc, 0x5e, 0x22, 0xeb, 0x35, 0x0a, 0xcc, 0x7b, 0x98,
},
32, "Sectigo 'Dodo' CT log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x55, 0x81, 0xd4, 0xc2, 0x16, 0x90, 0x36, 0x01, 0x4a, 0xea, 0x0b,
0x9b, 0x57, 0x3c, 0x53, 0xf0, 0xc0, 0xe4, 0x38, 0x78, 0x70, 0x25,
0x08, 0x17, 0x2f, 0xa3, 0xaa, 0x1d, 0x07, 0x13, 0xd3, 0x0c,
},
32, "Sectigo 'Sabre' CT log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x6f, 0x53, 0x76, 0xac, 0x31, 0xf0, 0x31, 0x19, 0xd8, 0x99, 0x00,
0xa4, 0x51, 0x15, 0xff, 0x77, 0x15, 0x1c, 0x11, 0xd9, 0x02, 0xc1,
0x00, 0x29, 0x06, 0x8d, 0xb2, 0x08, 0x9a, 0x37, 0xd9, 0x13,
},
32, "Sectigo 'Mammoth' CT log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xac, 0x3b, 0x9a, 0xed, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x67, 0x47, 0x57, 0x15, 0x9e,
0x6d, 0x7d, 0x57, 0x56, 0x72, 0xf9, 0xd9, 0x81, 0x00, 0x94, 0x1e,
0x9b, 0xde, 0xff, 0xec, 0xa1, 0x31, 0x3b, 0x75, 0x78, 0x2d,
},
32, "Venafi log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x03, 0x01, 0x9d, 0xf3, 0xfd, 0x85, 0xa6, 0x9a, 0x8e, 0xbd, 0x1f,
0xac, 0xc6, 0xda, 0x9b, 0xa7, 0x3e, 0x46, 0x97, 0x74, 0xfe, 0x77,
0xf5, 0x79, 0xfc, 0x5a, 0x08, 0xb8, 0x32, 0x8c, 0x1d, 0x6b,
},
32, "Venafi Gen2 CT log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xa5, 0x77, 0xac, 0x9c, 0xed, 0x75, 0x48, 0xdd, 0x8f, 0x02, 0x5b,
0x67, 0xa2, 0x41, 0x08, 0x9d, 0xf8, 0x6e, 0x0f, 0x47, 0x6e, 0xc2,
0x03, 0xc2, 0xec, 0xbe, 0xdb, 0x18, 0x5f, 0x28, 0x26, 0x38,
},
32, "CNNIC CT log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x34, 0xbb, 0x6a, 0xd6, 0xc3, 0xdf, 0x9c, 0x03, 0xee, 0xa8, 0xa4,
0x99, 0xff, 0x78, 0x91, 0x48, 0x6c, 0x9d, 0x5e, 0x5c, 0xac, 0x92,
0xd0, 0x1f, 0x7b, 0xfd, 0x1b, 0xce, 0x19, 0xdb, 0x48, 0xef,
},
32, "StartCom log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xe0, 0x12, 0x76, 0x29, 0xe9, 0x04, 0x96, 0x56, 0x4e, 0x3d, 0x01,
0x47, 0x98, 0x44, 0x98, 0xaa, 0x48, 0xf8, 0xad, 0xb1, 0x66, 0x00,
0xeb, 0x79, 0x02, 0xa1, 0xef, 0x99, 0x09, 0x90, 0x62, 0x73,
},
32, "PuChuangSiDa CT log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x53, 0x7b, 0x69, 0xa3, 0x56, 0x43, 0x35, 0xa9, 0xc0, 0x49, 0x04,
0xe3, 0x95, 0x93, 0xb2, 0xc2, 0x98, 0xeb, 0x8d, 0x7a, 0x6e, 0x83,
0x02, 0x36, 0x35, 0xc6, 0x27, 0x24, 0x8c, 0xd6, 0xb4, 0x40,
},
32, "Nordu 'flimsy' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xaa, 0xe7, 0x0b, 0x7f, 0x3c, 0xb8, 0xd5, 0x66, 0xc8, 0x6c, 0x2f,
0x16, 0x97, 0x9c, 0x9f, 0x44, 0x5f, 0x69, 0xab, 0x0e, 0xb4, 0x53,
0x55, 0x89, 0xb2, 0xf7, 0x7a, 0x03, 0x01, 0x04, 0xf3, 0xcd,
},
32, "Nordu 'plausible' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xcf, 0x55, 0xe2, 0x89, 0x23, 0x49, 0x7c, 0x34, 0x0d, 0x52, 0x06,
0xd0, 0x53, 0x53, 0xae, 0xb2, 0x58, 0x34, 0xb5, 0x2f, 0x1f, 0x8d,
0xc9, 0x52, 0x68, 0x09, 0xf2, 0x12, 0xef, 0xdd, 0x7c, 0xa6,
},
32, "SHECA CT log 1" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x32, 0xdc, 0x59, 0xc2, 0xd4, 0xc4, 0x19, 0x68, 0xd5, 0x6e, 0x14,
0xbc, 0x61, 0xac, 0x8f, 0x0e, 0x45, 0xdb, 0x39, 0xfa, 0xf3, 0xc1,
0x55, 0xaa, 0x42, 0x52, 0xf5, 0x00, 0x1f, 0xa0, 0xc6, 0x23,
},
32, "SHECA CT log 2" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x96, 0x06, 0xc0, 0x2c, 0x69, 0x00, 0x33, 0xaa, 0x1d, 0x14, 0x5f,
0x59, 0xc6, 0xe2, 0x64, 0x8d, 0x05, 0x49, 0xf0, 0xdf, 0x96, 0xaa,
0xb8, 0xdb, 0x91, 0x5a, 0x70, 0xd8, 0xec, 0xf3, 0x90, 0xa5,
},
32, "Akamai CT Log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x39, 0x37, 0x6f, 0x54, 0x5f, 0x7b, 0x46, 0x07, 0xf5, 0x97, 0x42,
0xd7, 0x68, 0xcd, 0x5d, 0x24, 0x37, 0xbf, 0x34, 0x73, 0xb6, 0x53,
0x4a, 0x48, 0x34, 0xbc, 0xf7, 0x2e, 0x68, 0x1c, 0x83, 0xc9,
},
32, "Alpha CT Log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x65, 0x9b, 0x33, 0x50, 0xf4, 0x3b, 0x12, 0xcc, 0x5e, 0xa5, 0xab,
0x4e, 0xc7, 0x65, 0xd3, 0xfd, 0xe6, 0xc8, 0x82, 0x43, 0x77, 0x77,
0x78, 0xe7, 0x20, 0x03, 0xf9, 0xeb, 0x2b, 0x8c, 0x31, 0x29,
},
32, "Let's Encrypt 'Oak2019' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xe7, 0x12, 0xf2, 0xb0, 0x37, 0x7e, 0x1a, 0x62, 0xfb, 0x8e, 0xc9,
0x0c, 0x61, 0x84, 0xf1, 0xea, 0x7b, 0x37, 0xcb, 0x56, 0x1d, 0x11,
0x26, 0x5b, 0xf3, 0xe0, 0xf3, 0x4b, 0xf2, 0x41, 0x54, 0x6e,
},
32, "Let's Encrypt 'Oak2020' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x94, 0x20, 0xbc, 0x1e, 0x8e, 0xd5, 0x8d, 0x6c, 0x88, 0x73, 0x1f,
0x82, 0x8b, 0x22, 0x2c, 0x0d, 0xd1, 0xda, 0x4d, 0x5e, 0x6c, 0x4f,
0x94, 0x3d, 0x61, 0xdb, 0x4e, 0x2f, 0x58, 0x4d, 0xa2, 0xc2,
},
32, "Let's Encrypt 'Oak2021' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xdf, 0xa5, 0x5e, 0xab, 0x68, 0x82, 0x4f, 0x1f, 0x6c, 0xad, 0xee,
0xb8, 0x5f, 0x4e, 0x3e, 0x5a, 0xea, 0xcd, 0xa2, 0x12, 0xa4, 0x6a,
0x5e, 0x8e, 0x3b, 0x12, 0xc0, 0x20, 0x44, 0x5c, 0x2a, 0x73,
},
32, "Let's Encrypt 'Oak2022' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xb7, 0x3e, 0xfb, 0x24, 0xdf, 0x9c, 0x4d, 0xba, 0x75, 0xf2, 0x39,
0xc5, 0xba, 0x58, 0xf4, 0x6c, 0x5d, 0xfc, 0x42, 0xcf, 0x7a, 0x9f,
0x35, 0xc4, 0x9e, 0x1d, 0x09, 0x81, 0x25, 0xed, 0xb4, 0x99,
},
32, "Let's Encrypt 'Oak2023' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x84, 0x9f, 0x5f, 0x7f, 0x58, 0xd2, 0xbf, 0x7b, 0x54, 0xec, 0xbd,
0x74, 0x61, 0x1c, 0xea, 0x45, 0xc4, 0x9c, 0x98, 0xf1, 0xd6, 0x48,
0x1b, 0xc6, 0xf6, 0x9e, 0x8c, 0x17, 0x4f, 0x24, 0xf3, 0xcf,
},
32, "Let's Encrypt 'Testflume2019' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xc6, 0x3f, 0x22, 0x18, 0xc3, 0x7d, 0x56, 0xa6, 0xaa, 0x06, 0xb5,
0x96, 0xda, 0x8e, 0x53, 0xd4, 0xd7, 0x15, 0x6d, 0x1e, 0x9b, 0xac,
0x8e, 0x44, 0xd2, 0x20, 0x2d, 0xe6, 0x4d, 0x69, 0xd9, 0xdc,
},
32, "Let's Encrypt 'Testflume2020' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x03, 0xed, 0xf1, 0xda, 0x97, 0x76, 0xb6, 0xf3, 0x8c, 0x34, 0x1e,
0x39, 0xed, 0x9d, 0x70, 0x7a, 0x75, 0x70, 0x36, 0x9c, 0xf9, 0x84,
0x4f, 0x32, 0x7f, 0xe9, 0xe1, 0x41, 0x38, 0x36, 0x1b, 0x60,
},
32, "Let's Encrypt 'Testflume2021' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x23, 0x27, 0xef, 0xda, 0x35, 0x25, 0x10, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0x19, 0xef,
0x49, 0x1a, 0xe3, 0xff, 0x1c, 0xc5, 0xa4, 0x79, 0xbc, 0xe3, 0x78,
0x78, 0x36, 0x0e, 0xe3, 0x18, 0xcf, 0xfb, 0x64, 0xf8, 0xc8,
},
32, "Let's Encrypt 'Testflume2022' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x55, 0x34, 0xb7, 0xab, 0x5a, 0x6a, 0xc3, 0xa7, 0xcb, 0xeb, 0xa6,
0x54, 0x87, 0xb2, 0xa2, 0xd7, 0x1b, 0x48, 0xf6, 0x50, 0xfa, 0x17,
0xc5, 0x19, 0x7c, 0x97, 0xa0, 0xcb, 0x20, 0x76, 0xf3, 0xc6,
},
32, "Let's Encrypt 'Testflume2023' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x29, 0x6a, 0xfa, 0x2d, 0x56, 0x8b, 0xca, 0x0d, 0x2e, 0xa8, 0x44,
0x95, 0x6a, 0xe9, 0x72, 0x1f, 0xc3, 0x5f, 0xa3, 0x55, 0xec, 0xda,
0x99, 0x69, 0x3a, 0xaf, 0xd4, 0x58, 0xa7, 0x1a, 0xef, 0xdd,
},
32, "Let's Encrypt 'Clicky' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xb0, 0xb7, 0x84, 0xbc, 0x81, 0xc0, 0xdd, 0xc4, 0x75, 0x44, 0xe8,
0x83, 0xf0, 0x59, 0x85, 0xbb, 0x90, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x34, 0xd8, 0xab,
0x88, 0xb2, 0xb2, 0xe5, 0x33, 0x98, 0x0b, 0x8e, 0x50, 0x8b,
},
32, "Up In The Air 'Behind the Sofa' log" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x47, 0x44, 0x47, 0x7c, 0x75, 0xde, 0x42, 0x6d, 0x5c, 0x44, 0xef,
0xd4, 0xa9, 0x2c, 0x96, 0x77, 0x59, 0x7f, 0x65, 0x7a, 0x8f, 0xe0,
0xca, 0xdb, 0xc6, 0xd6, 0x16, 0xed, 0xa4, 0x97, 0xc4, 0x25,
},
32, "Qihoo 360 2020" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xc6, 0xd7, 0xed, 0x9e, 0xdb, 0x8e, 0x74, 0xf0, 0xa7, 0x1b, 0x4d,
0x4a, 0x98, 0x4b, 0xcb, 0xeb, 0xab, 0xbd, 0x28, 0xcc, 0x1f, 0xd7,
0x63, 0x29, 0xe8, 0x87, 0x26, 0xcd, 0x4c, 0x25, 0x46, 0x63,
},
32, "Qihoo 360 2021" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x66, 0x3c, 0xb0, 0x9c, 0x1f, 0xcd, 0x9b, 0xaa, 0x62, 0x76, 0x3c,
0xcb, 0x53, 0x4e, 0xec, 0x80, 0x58, 0x12, 0x28, 0x05, 0x07, 0xac,
0x69, 0xa4, 0x5f, 0xcd, 0x38, 0xcf, 0x4c, 0xc7, 0x4c, 0xf1,
},
32, "Qihoo 360 2022" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xe2, 0x64, 0x7f, 0x6e, 0xda, 0x34, 0x05, 0x03, 0xc6, 0x4d, 0x4e,
0x10, 0xa8, 0x69, 0x68, 0x1f, 0xde, 0x9c, 0x5a, 0x2c, 0xf3, 0xb3,
0x2d, 0x5f, 0x20, 0x0b, 0x96, 0x36, 0x05, 0x90, 0x88, 0x23,
},
32, "Qihoo 360 2023" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xc5, 0xcf, 0xe5, 0x4b, 0x61, 0x51, 0xb4, 0x9b, 0x14, 0x2e, 0xd2,
0x63, 0xbd, 0xe7, 0x32, 0x93, 0x36, 0x37, 0x99, 0x79, 0x95, 0x50,
0xae, 0x44, 0x35, 0xcd, 0x1a, 0x69, 0x97, 0xc9, 0xc3, 0xc3,
},
32, "Qihoo 360 v1 2020" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x48, 0x14, 0x58, 0x7c, 0xf2, 0x8b, 0x08, 0xfe, 0x68, 0x3f, 0xd2,
0xbc, 0xd9, 0x45, 0x99, 0x4c, 0x2e, 0xb7, 0x4c, 0x8a, 0xe8, 0xc8,
0x7f, 0xce, 0x42, 0x9b, 0x7c, 0xd3, 0x1d, 0x51, 0xbd, 0xc4,
},
32, "Qihoo 360 v1 2021" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x49, 0x11, 0xb8, 0xd6, 0x14, 0xcf, 0xd3, 0xd9, 0x9f, 0x16, 0xd3,
0x76, 0x54, 0x5e, 0xe1, 0xb8, 0xcc, 0xfc, 0x51, 0x1f, 0x50, 0x9f,
0x08, 0x0b, 0xa0, 0xa0, 0x87, 0xd9, 0x1d, 0xfa, 0xee, 0xa9,
},
32, "Qihoo 360 v1 2022" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xb6, 0x74, 0x0b, 0x12, 0x00, 0x2e, 0x03, 0x3f, 0xd0, 0xe7, 0xe9,
0x41, 0xf4, 0xba, 0x3e, 0xe1, 0xbf, 0xc1, 0x49, 0xb5, 0x24, 0xb4,
0xcf, 0x62, 0x8d, 0x53, 0xef, 0xea, 0x1f, 0x40, 0x3a, 0x8d,
},
32, "Qihoo 360 v1 2023" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x45, 0x35, 0x94, 0x98, 0xd9, 0x3a, 0x89, 0xe0, 0x28, 0x03, 0x08,
0xd3, 0x7d, 0x62, 0x6d, 0xc4, 0x23, 0x75, 0x47, 0x58, 0xdc, 0xe0,
0x37, 0x00, 0x36, 0xfb, 0xab, 0x0e, 0xdf, 0x8a, 0x6b, 0xcf,
},
32, "Trust Asia Log1" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xa5, 0x95, 0x94, 0x3b, 0x53, 0x70, 0xbe, 0xe9, 0x06, 0xe0, 0x05,
0x0d, 0x1f, 0xb5, 0xbb, 0xc6, 0xa4, 0x0e, 0x65, 0xf2, 0x65, 0xae,
0x85, 0x2c, 0x76, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xad, 0xb2, 0x33, 0x36, 0xed,
},
32, "Trust Asia Log2020" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0x67, 0x8d, 0xb6, 0x5b, 0x3e, 0x74, 0x43, 0xb6, 0xf3, 0xa3, 0x70,
0xd5, 0xe1, 0x3a, 0xb1, 0xb4, 0x3b, 0xe0, 0xa0, 0xd3, 0x51, 0xf7,
0xca, 0x74, 0x22, 0x50, 0xc7, 0xc6, 0xfa, 0x51, 0xa8, 0x8a,
},
32, "Trust Asia Log2021" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xc3, 0x65, 0xf9, 0xb3, 0x65, 0x4f, 0x32, 0x83, 0xc7, 0x9d, 0xa9,
0x8e, 0x93, 0xd7, 0x41, 0x8f, 0x5b, 0xab, 0x7b, 0xe3, 0x25, 0x2c,
0x98, 0xe1, 0xd2, 0xf0, 0x4b, 0xb9, 0xeb, 0x42, 0x7d, 0x23,
},
32, "Trust Asia Log2022" },
{ (const guint8[]){
0xe8, 0x7e, 0xa7, 0x66, 0x0b, 0xc2, 0x6c, 0xf6, 0x00, 0x2e, 0xf5,
0x72, 0x5d, 0x3f, 0xe0, 0xe3, 0x31, 0xb9, 0x39, 0x3b, 0xb9, 0x2f,
0xbf, 0x58, 0xeb, 0x3b, 0x90, 0x49, 0xda, 0xf5, 0x43, 0x5a,
},
32, "Trust Asia Log2023" },
{ NULL, 0, NULL }
};
/*
* Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) dissector tables.
*/
static dissector_table_t ssl_alpn_dissector_table;
static dissector_table_t dtls_alpn_dissector_table;
/*
* Special cases for prefix matching of the ALPN, if the ALPN includes
* a version number for a draft or protocol revision.
*/
typedef struct ssl_alpn_prefix_match_protocol {
const char *proto_prefix;
const char *dissector_name;
} ssl_alpn_prefix_match_protocol_t;
static const ssl_alpn_prefix_match_protocol_t ssl_alpn_prefix_match_protocols[] = {
/* SPDY moves so fast, just 1, 2 and 3 are registered with IANA but there
* already exists 3.1 as of this writing... match the prefix. */
{ "spdy/", "spdy" },
/* draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-16 */
{ "h2-", "http2" }, /* draft versions */
};
const value_string compress_certificate_algorithm_vals[] = {
{ 1, "zlib" },
{ 2, "brotli" },
{ 3, "zstd" },
{ 0, NULL }
};
const value_string quic_transport_parameter_id[] = {
{ SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_ORIGINAL_DESTINATION_CONNECTION_ID, "original_destination_connection_id" },
{ SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_MAX_IDLE_TIMEOUT, "max_idle_timeout" },
{ SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_STATELESS_RESET_TOKEN, "stateless_reset_token" },
{ SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_MAX_UDP_PAYLOAD_SIZE, "max_udp_payload_size" },
{ SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_DATA, "initial_max_data" },
{ SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_STREAM_DATA_BIDI_LOCAL, "initial_max_stream_data_bidi_local" },
{ SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_STREAM_DATA_BIDI_REMOTE, "initial_max_stream_data_bidi_remote" },
{ SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_STREAM_DATA_UNI, "initial_max_stream_data_uni" },
{ SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_STREAMS_UNI, "initial_max_streams_uni" },
{ SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_STREAMS_BIDI, "initial_max_streams_bidi" },
{ SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_ACK_DELAY_EXPONENT, "ack_delay_exponent" },
{ SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_MAX_ACK_DELAY, "max_ack_delay" },
{ SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_DISABLE_ACTIVE_MIGRATION, "disable_active_migration" },
{ SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_PREFERRED_ADDRESS, "preferred_address" },
{ SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_ACTIVE_CONNECTION_ID_LIMIT, "active_connection_id_limit" },
{ SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_SOURCE_CONNECTION_ID, "initial_source_connection_id" },
{ SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_RETRY_SOURCE_CONNECTION_ID, "retry_source_connection_id" },
{ SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_MAX_DATAGRAM_FRAME_SIZE, "max_datagram_frame_size" },
{ SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_LOSS_BITS, "loss_bits" },
{ SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_GREASE_QUIC_BIT, "grease_quic_bit" },
{ SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_ENABLE_TIME_STAMP, "enable_time_stamp" },
{ SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_ENABLE_TIME_STAMP_V2, "enable_time_stamp_v2" },
{ SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_MIN_ACK_DELAY, "min_ack_delay" },
{ SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_GOOGLE_USER_AGENT, "google_user_agent" },
{ SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_GOOGLE_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_YET_SUPPORTED, "google_key_update_not_yet_supported" },
{ SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_GOOGLE_QUIC_VERSION, "google_quic_version" },
{ SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_GOOGLE_INITIAL_RTT, "google_initial_rtt" },
{ SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_GOOGLE_SUPPORT_HANDSHAKE_DONE, "google_support_handshake_done" },
{ SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_GOOGLE_QUIC_PARAMS, "google_quic_params" },
{ SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_GOOGLE_CONNECTION_OPTIONS, "google_connection_options" },
{ SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_FACEBOOK_PARTIAL_RELIABILITY, "facebook_partial_reliability" },
{ 0, NULL }
};
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-huitema-quic-ts-03 */
const val64_string quic_enable_time_stamp_v2_vals[] = {
{ 1, "I would like to receive TIME_STAMP frames" },
{ 2, "I am able to generate TIME_STAMP frames" },
{ 3, "I am able to generate TIME_STAMP frames and I would like to receive them" },
{ 0, NULL }
};
/* Lookup tables }}} */
void
quic_transport_parameter_id_base_custom(gchar *result, guint64 parameter_id)
{
const char *label;
/* GREASE? https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-transport-27#section-18.1 */
if (((parameter_id - 27) % 31) == 0) {
label = "GREASE";
} else if (parameter_id > 0xffffffff) {
// There are no 64-bit Parameter IDs at the moment.
label = "Unknown";
} else {
label = val_to_str_const((guint32)parameter_id, quic_transport_parameter_id, "Unknown");
}
g_snprintf(result, ITEM_LABEL_LENGTH, "%s (0x%02" G_GINT64_MODIFIER "x)", label, parameter_id);
}
/* we keep this internal to packet-tls-utils, as there should be
no need to access it any other way.
This also allows us to hide the dependency on zlib.
*/
struct _SslDecompress {
gint compression;
#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB
z_stream istream;
#endif
};
/* To assist in parsing client/server key exchange messages
0 indicates unknown */
gint ssl_get_keyex_alg(gint cipher)
{
/* Map Cipher suite number to Key Exchange algorithm {{{ */
switch(cipher) {
case 0x0017:
case 0x0018:
case 0x0019:
case 0x001a:
case 0x001b:
case 0x0034:
case 0x003a:
case 0x0046:
case 0x006c:
case 0x006d:
case 0x0089:
case 0x009b:
case 0x00a6:
case 0x00a7:
case 0x00bf:
case 0x00c5:
case 0xc084:
case 0xc085:
return KEX_DH_ANON;
case 0x000b:
case 0x000c:
case 0x000d:
case 0x0030:
case 0x0036:
case 0x003e:
case 0x0042:
case 0x0068:
case 0x0085:
case 0x0097:
case 0x00a4:
case 0x00a5:
case 0x00bb:
case 0x00c1:
case 0xc082:
case 0xc083:
return KEX_DH_DSS;
case 0x000e:
case 0x000f:
case 0x0010:
case 0x0031:
case 0x0037:
case 0x003f:
case 0x0043:
case 0x0069:
case 0x0086:
case 0x0098:
case 0x00a0:
case 0x00a1:
case 0x00bc:
case 0x00c2:
case 0xc07e:
case 0xc07f:
return KEX_DH_RSA;
case 0x0011:
case 0x0012:
case 0x0013:
case 0x0032:
case 0x0038:
case 0x0040:
case 0x0044:
case 0x0063:
case 0x0065:
case 0x0066:
case 0x006a:
case 0x0087:
case 0x0099:
case 0x00a2:
case 0x00a3:
case 0x00bd:
case 0x00c3:
case 0xc080:
case 0xc081:
return KEX_DHE_DSS;
case 0x002d:
case 0x008e:
case 0x008f:
case 0x0090:
case 0x0091:
case 0x00aa:
case 0x00ab:
case 0x00b2:
case 0x00b3:
case 0x00b4:
case 0x00b5:
case 0xc090:
case 0xc091:
case 0xc096:
case 0xc097:
case 0xc0a6:
case 0xc0a7:
case 0xc0aa:
case 0xc0ab:
case 0xccad:
case 0xe41c:
case 0xe41d:
return KEX_DHE_PSK;
case 0x0014:
case 0x0015:
case 0x0016:
case 0x0033:
case 0x0039:
case 0x0045:
case 0x0067:
case 0x006b:
case 0x0088:
case 0x009a:
case 0x009e:
case 0x009f:
case 0x00be:
case 0x00c4:
case 0xc07c:
case 0xc07d:
case 0xc09e:
case 0xc09f:
case 0xc0a2:
case 0xc0a3:
case 0xccaa:
case 0xe41e:
case 0xe41f:
return KEX_DHE_RSA;
case 0xc015:
case 0xc016:
case 0xc017:
case 0xc018:
case 0xc019:
return KEX_ECDH_ANON;
case 0xc001:
case 0xc002:
case 0xc003:
case 0xc004:
case 0xc005:
case 0xc025:
case 0xc026:
case 0xc02d:
case 0xc02e:
case 0xc074:
case 0xc075:
case 0xc088:
case 0xc089:
return KEX_ECDH_ECDSA;
case 0xc00b:
case 0xc00c:
case 0xc00d:
case 0xc00e:
case 0xc00f:
case 0xc029:
case 0xc02a:
case 0xc031:
case 0xc032:
case 0xc078:
case 0xc079:
case 0xc08c:
case 0xc08d:
return KEX_ECDH_RSA;
case 0xc006:
case 0xc007:
case 0xc008:
case 0xc009:
case 0xc00a:
case 0xc023:
case 0xc024:
case 0xc02b:
case 0xc02c:
case 0xc072:
case 0xc073:
case 0xc086:
case 0xc087:
case 0xc0ac:
case 0xc0ad:
case 0xc0ae:
case 0xc0af:
case 0xcca9:
case 0xe414:
case 0xe415:
return KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA;
case 0xc033:
case 0xc034:
case 0xc035:
case 0xc036:
case 0xc037:
case 0xc038:
case 0xc039:
case 0xc03a:
case 0xc03b:
case 0xc09a:
case 0xc09b:
case 0xccac:
case 0xe418:
case 0xe419:
return KEX_ECDHE_PSK;
case 0xc010:
case 0xc011:
case 0xc012:
case 0xc013:
case 0xc014:
case 0xc027:
case 0xc028:
case 0xc02f:
case 0xc030:
case 0xc076:
case 0xc077:
case 0xc08a:
case 0xc08b:
case 0xcca8:
case 0xe412:
case 0xe413:
return KEX_ECDHE_RSA;
case 0x001e:
case 0x001f:
case 0x0020:
case 0x0021:
case 0x0022:
case 0x0023:
case 0x0024:
case 0x0025:
case 0x0026:
case 0x0027:
case 0x0028:
case 0x0029:
case 0x002a:
case 0x002b:
return KEX_KRB5;
case 0x002c:
case 0x008a:
case 0x008b:
case 0x008c:
case 0x008d:
case 0x00a8:
case 0x00a9:
case 0x00ae:
case 0x00af:
case 0x00b0:
case 0x00b1:
case 0xc064:
case 0xc065:
case 0xc08e:
case 0xc08f:
case 0xc094:
case 0xc095:
case 0xc0a4:
case 0xc0a5:
case 0xc0a8:
case 0xc0a9:
case 0xccab:
case 0xe416:
case 0xe417:
return KEX_PSK;
case 0x0001:
case 0x0002:
case 0x0003:
case 0x0004:
case 0x0005:
case 0x0006:
case 0x0007:
case 0x0008:
case 0x0009:
case 0x000a:
case 0x002f:
case 0x0035:
case 0x003b:
case 0x003c:
case 0x003d:
case 0x0041:
case 0x0060:
case 0x0061:
case 0x0062:
case 0x0064:
case 0x0084:
case 0x0096:
case 0x009c:
case 0x009d:
case 0x00ba:
case 0x00c0:
case 0xc07a:
case 0xc07b:
case 0xc09c:
case 0xc09d:
case 0xc0a0:
case 0xc0a1:
case 0xe410:
case 0xe411:
case 0xfefe:
case 0xfeff:
case 0xffe0:
case 0xffe1:
return KEX_RSA;
case 0x002e:
case 0x0092:
case 0x0093:
case 0x0094:
case 0x0095:
case 0x00ac:
case 0x00ad:
case 0x00b6:
case 0x00b7:
case 0x00b8:
case 0x00b9:
case 0xc092:
case 0xc093:
case 0xc098:
case 0xc099:
case 0xccae:
case 0xe41a:
case 0xe41b:
return KEX_RSA_PSK;
case 0xc01a:
case 0xc01d:
case 0xc020:
return KEX_SRP_SHA;
case 0xc01c:
case 0xc01f:
case 0xc022:
return KEX_SRP_SHA_DSS;
case 0xc01b:
case 0xc01e:
case 0xc021:
return KEX_SRP_SHA_RSA;
case 0xc0ff:
return KEX_ECJPAKE;
default:
break;
}
return 0;
/* }}} */
}
static wmem_list_t *connection_id_session_list = NULL;
void
ssl_init_cid_list(void) {
connection_id_session_list = wmem_list_new(wmem_file_scope());
}
void
ssl_cleanup_cid_list(void) {
wmem_destroy_list(connection_id_session_list);
}
void
ssl_add_session_by_cid(SslDecryptSession *session)
{
wmem_list_append(connection_id_session_list, session);
}
SslDecryptSession *
ssl_get_session_by_cid(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset)
{
SslDecryptSession * ssl_cid = NULL;
wmem_list_frame_t *it = wmem_list_head(connection_id_session_list);
while (it != NULL && ssl_cid == NULL) {
SslDecryptSession * ssl = (SslDecryptSession *)wmem_list_frame_data(it);
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(ssl != NULL);
SslSession *session = &ssl->session;
if (session->client_cid_len > 0 && tvb_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, session->client_cid_len)) {
if (tvb_memeql(tvb, offset, session->client_cid, session->client_cid_len) == 0) {
ssl_cid = ssl;
}
}
if (session->server_cid_len > 0) {
if (tvb_memeql(tvb, offset, session->server_cid, session->server_cid_len) == 0) {
ssl_cid = ssl;
}
}
it = wmem_list_frame_next(it);
}
return ssl_cid;
}
/* StringInfo structure (len + data) functions {{{ */
gint
ssl_data_alloc(StringInfo* str, size_t len)
{
str->data = (guchar *)g_malloc(len);
/* the allocator can return a null pointer for a size equal to 0,
* and that must be allowed */
if (len > 0 && !str->data)
return -1;
str->data_len = (guint) len;
return 0;
}
void
ssl_data_set(StringInfo* str, const guchar* data, guint len)
{
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(data);
memcpy(str->data, data, len);
str->data_len = len;
}
static gint
ssl_data_realloc(StringInfo* str, guint len)
{
str->data = (guchar *)g_realloc(str->data, len);
if (!str->data)
return -1;
str->data_len = len;
return 0;
}
static StringInfo *
ssl_data_clone(StringInfo *str)
{
StringInfo *cloned_str;
cloned_str = (StringInfo *) wmem_alloc0(wmem_file_scope(),
sizeof(StringInfo) + str->data_len);
cloned_str->data = (guchar *) (cloned_str + 1);
ssl_data_set(cloned_str, str->data, str->data_len);
return cloned_str;
}
static gint
ssl_data_copy(StringInfo* dst, StringInfo* src)
{
if (dst->data_len < src->data_len) {
if (ssl_data_realloc(dst, src->data_len))
return -1;
}
memcpy(dst->data, src->data, src->data_len);
dst->data_len = src->data_len;
return 0;
}
/* from_hex converts |hex_len| bytes of hex data from |in| and sets |*out| to
* the result. |out->data| will be allocated using wmem_file_scope. Returns TRUE on
* success. */
static gboolean from_hex(StringInfo* out, const char* in, gsize hex_len) {
gsize i;
if (hex_len & 1)
return FALSE;
out->data = (guchar *)wmem_alloc(wmem_file_scope(), hex_len / 2);
for (i = 0; i < hex_len / 2; i++) {
int a = ws_xton(in[i*2]);
int b = ws_xton(in[i*2 + 1]);
if (a == -1 || b == -1)
return FALSE;
out->data[i] = a << 4 | b;
}
out->data_len = (guint)hex_len / 2;
return TRUE;
}
/* StringInfo structure (len + data) functions }}} */
/* libgcrypt wrappers for HMAC/message digest operations {{{ */
/* hmac abstraction layer */
#define SSL_HMAC gcry_md_hd_t
static inline gint
ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC* md, const void * key, gint len, gint algo)
{
gcry_error_t err;
const char *err_str, *err_src;
err = gcry_md_open(md,algo, GCRY_MD_FLAG_HMAC);
if (err != 0) {
err_str = gcry_strerror(err);
err_src = gcry_strsource(err);
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_hmac_init(): gcry_md_open failed %s/%s", err_str, err_src);
return -1;
}
gcry_md_setkey (*(md), key, len);
return 0;
}
static inline void
ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC* md, const void* data, gint len)
{
gcry_md_write(*(md), data, len);
}
static inline void
ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC* md, guchar* data, guint* datalen)
{
gint algo;
guint len;
algo = gcry_md_get_algo (*(md));
len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(algo);
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(len <= *datalen);
memcpy(data, gcry_md_read(*(md), algo), len);
*datalen = len;
}
static inline void
ssl_hmac_cleanup(SSL_HMAC* md)
{
gcry_md_close(*(md));
}
/* message digest abstraction layer*/
#define SSL_MD gcry_md_hd_t
static inline gint
ssl_md_init(SSL_MD* md, gint algo)
{
gcry_error_t err;
const char *err_str, *err_src;
err = gcry_md_open(md,algo, 0);
if (err != 0) {
err_str = gcry_strerror(err);
err_src = gcry_strsource(err);
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_md_init(): gcry_md_open failed %s/%s", err_str, err_src);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static inline void
ssl_md_update(SSL_MD* md, guchar* data, gint len)
{
gcry_md_write(*(md), data, len);
}
static inline void
ssl_md_final(SSL_MD* md, guchar* data, guint* datalen)
{
gint algo;
gint len;
algo = gcry_md_get_algo (*(md));
len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo);
memcpy(data, gcry_md_read(*(md), algo), len);
*datalen = len;
}
static inline void
ssl_md_cleanup(SSL_MD* md)
{
gcry_md_close(*(md));
}
/* md5 /sha abstraction layer */
#define SSL_SHA_CTX gcry_md_hd_t
#define SSL_MD5_CTX gcry_md_hd_t
static inline void
ssl_sha_init(SSL_SHA_CTX* md)
{
gcry_md_open(md,GCRY_MD_SHA1, 0);
}
static inline void
ssl_sha_update(SSL_SHA_CTX* md, guchar* data, gint len)
{
gcry_md_write(*(md), data, len);
}
static inline void
ssl_sha_final(guchar* buf, SSL_SHA_CTX* md)
{
memcpy(buf, gcry_md_read(*(md), GCRY_MD_SHA1),
gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(GCRY_MD_SHA1));
}
static inline void
ssl_sha_cleanup(SSL_SHA_CTX* md)
{
gcry_md_close(*(md));
}
static inline gint
ssl_md5_init(SSL_MD5_CTX* md)
{
return gcry_md_open(md,GCRY_MD_MD5, 0);
}
static inline void
ssl_md5_update(SSL_MD5_CTX* md, guchar* data, gint len)
{
gcry_md_write(*(md), data, len);
}
static inline void
ssl_md5_final(guchar* buf, SSL_MD5_CTX* md)
{
memcpy(buf, gcry_md_read(*(md), GCRY_MD_MD5),
gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(GCRY_MD_MD5));
}
static inline void
ssl_md5_cleanup(SSL_MD5_CTX* md)
{
gcry_md_close(*(md));
}
/* libgcrypt wrappers for HMAC/message digest operations }}} */
/* libgcrypt wrappers for Cipher state manipulation {{{ */
gint
ssl_cipher_setiv(SSL_CIPHER_CTX *cipher, guchar* iv, gint iv_len)
{
gint ret;
#if 0
guchar *ivp;
gint i;
gcry_cipher_hd_t c;
c=(gcry_cipher_hd_t)*cipher;
#endif
ssl_debug_printf("--------------------------------------------------------------------");
#if 0
for(ivp=c->iv,i=0; i < iv_len; i++ )
{
ssl_debug_printf("%d ",ivp[i]);
i++;
}
#endif
ssl_debug_printf("--------------------------------------------------------------------");
ret = gcry_cipher_setiv(*(cipher), iv, iv_len);
#if 0
for(ivp=c->iv,i=0; i < iv_len; i++ )
{
ssl_debug_printf("%d ",ivp[i]);
i++;
}
#endif
ssl_debug_printf("--------------------------------------------------------------------");
return ret;
}
/* stream cipher abstraction layer*/
static gint
ssl_cipher_init(gcry_cipher_hd_t *cipher, gint algo, guchar* sk,
guchar* iv, gint mode)
{
gint gcry_modes[] = {
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM,
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CBC,
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_GCM,
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CCM,
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CCM,
#else
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CTR,
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CTR,
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CTR,
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_CHACHA20_POLY1305
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_POLY1305,
#else
-1, /* AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 is unsupported. */
#endif
};
gint err;
if (algo == -1) {
/* NULL mode */
*(cipher) = (gcry_cipher_hd_t)-1;
return 0;
}
err = gcry_cipher_open(cipher, algo, gcry_modes[mode], 0);
if (err !=0)
return -1;
err = gcry_cipher_setkey(*(cipher), sk, gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen (algo));
if (err != 0)
return -1;
/* AEAD cipher suites will set the nonce later. */
if (mode == MODE_CBC) {
err = gcry_cipher_setiv(*(cipher), iv, gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen(algo));
if (err != 0)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static inline gint
ssl_cipher_decrypt(gcry_cipher_hd_t *cipher, guchar * out, gint outl,
const guchar * in, gint inl)
{
if ((*cipher) == (gcry_cipher_hd_t)-1)
{
if (in && inl)
memcpy(out, in, outl < inl ? outl : inl);
return 0;
}
return gcry_cipher_decrypt ( *(cipher), out, outl, in, inl);
}
static inline gint
ssl_get_digest_by_name(const gchar*name)
{
return gcry_md_map_name(name);
}
static inline gint
ssl_get_cipher_by_name(const gchar* name)
{
return gcry_cipher_map_name(name);
}
static inline void
ssl_cipher_cleanup(gcry_cipher_hd_t *cipher)
{
if ((*cipher) != (gcry_cipher_hd_t)-1)
gcry_cipher_close(*cipher);
*cipher = NULL;
}
/* }}} */
/* Digests, Ciphers and Cipher Suites registry {{{ */
static const SslDigestAlgo digests[]={
{"MD5", 16},
{"SHA1", 20},
{"SHA256", 32},
{"SHA384", 48},
{"Not Applicable", 0},
};
#define DIGEST_MAX_SIZE 48
/* get index digest index */
static const SslDigestAlgo *
ssl_cipher_suite_dig(const SslCipherSuite *cs) {
return &digests[cs->dig - DIG_MD5];
}
static const gchar *ciphers[]={
"DES",
"3DES",
"ARCFOUR", /* libgcrypt does not support rc4, but this should be 100% compatible*/
"RFC2268_128", /* libgcrypt name for RC2 with a 128-bit key */
"IDEA",
"AES",
"AES256",
"CAMELLIA128",
"CAMELLIA256",
"SEED",
"CHACHA20", /* since Libgcrypt 1.7.0 */
"*UNKNOWN*"
};
static const SslCipherSuite cipher_suites[]={
{0x0001,KEX_RSA, ENC_NULL, DIG_MD5, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 */
{0x0002,KEX_RSA, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA */
{0x0003,KEX_RSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_MD5, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 */
{0x0004,KEX_RSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_MD5, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 */
{0x0005,KEX_RSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
{0x0006,KEX_RSA, ENC_RC2, DIG_MD5, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 */
{0x0007,KEX_RSA, ENC_IDEA, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA */
{0x0008,KEX_RSA, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
{0x0009,KEX_RSA, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */
{0x000A,KEX_RSA, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
{0x000B,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
{0x000C,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */
{0x000D,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
{0x000E,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
{0x000F,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */
{0x0010,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
{0x0011,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
{0x0012,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */
{0x0013,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
{0x0014,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
{0x0015,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */
{0x0016,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
{0x0017,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_RC4, DIG_MD5, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 */
{0x0018,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_RC4, DIG_MD5, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 */
{0x0019,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
{0x001A,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */
{0x001B,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
{0x002C,KEX_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA */
{0x002D,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA */
{0x002E,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA */
{0x002F,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
{0x0030,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
{0x0031,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
{0x0032,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
{0x0033,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
{0x0034,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
{0x0035,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
{0x0036,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
{0x0037,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
{0x0038,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
{0x0039,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
{0x003A,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
{0x003B,KEX_RSA, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA256, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 */
{0x003C,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
{0x003D,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 */
{0x003E,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
{0x003F,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
{0x0040,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
{0x0041,KEX_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA */
{0x0042,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA */
{0x0043,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA */
{0x0044,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA */
{0x0045,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA */
{0x0046,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA */
{0x0060,KEX_RSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_MD5, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5 */
{0x0061,KEX_RSA, ENC_RC2, DIG_MD5, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5 */
{0x0062,KEX_RSA, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */
{0x0063,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */
{0x0064,KEX_RSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA */
{0x0065,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA */
{0x0066,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
{0x0067,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
{0x0068,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 */
{0x0069,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 */
{0x006A,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 */
{0x006B,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 */
{0x006C,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
{0x006D,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 */
{0x0084,KEX_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA */
{0x0085,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA */
{0x0086,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA */
{0x0087,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA */
{0x0088,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA */
{0x0089,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA */
{0x008A,KEX_PSK, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
{0x008B,KEX_PSK, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
{0x008C,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
{0x008D,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
{0x008E,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
{0x008F,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
{0x0090,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
{0x0091,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
{0x0092,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
{0x0093,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
{0x0094,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
{0x0095,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
{0x0096,KEX_RSA, ENC_SEED, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA */
{0x0097,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_SEED, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA */
{0x0098,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_SEED, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA */
{0x0099,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_SEED, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA */
{0x009A,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_SEED, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA */
{0x009B,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_SEED, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA */
{0x009C,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
{0x009D,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
{0x009E,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
{0x009F,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
{0x00A0,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
{0x00A1,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
{0x00A2,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
{0x00A3,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
{0x00A4,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
{0x00A5,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
{0x00A6,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
{0x00A7,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
{0x00A8,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
{0x00A9,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
{0x00AA,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
{0x00AB,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
{0x00AC,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
{0x00AD,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
{0x00AE,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
{0x00AF,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 */
{0x00B0,KEX_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA256, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 */
{0x00B1,KEX_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA384, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 */
{0x00B2,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
{0x00B3,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 */
{0x00B4,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA256, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 */
{0x00B5,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA384, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 */
{0x00B6,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
{0x00B7,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 */
{0x00B8,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA256, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 */
{0x00B9,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA384, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 */
{0x00BA,KEX_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
{0x00BB,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
{0x00BC,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
{0x00BD,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
{0x00BE,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
{0x00BF,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
{0x00C0,KEX_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 */
{0x00C1,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 */
{0x00C2,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 */
{0x00C3,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 */
{0x00C4,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 */
{0x00C5,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 */
/* NOTE: TLS 1.3 cipher suites are incompatible with TLS 1.2. */
{0x1301,KEX_TLS13, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
{0x1302,KEX_TLS13, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
{0x1303,KEX_TLS13, ENC_CHACHA20, DIG_SHA256, MODE_POLY1305 }, /* TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 */
{0x1304,KEX_TLS13, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 */
{0x1305,KEX_TLS13, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 */
{0xC001,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA */
{0xC002,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
{0xC003,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
{0xC004,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
{0xC005,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
{0xC006,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA */
{0xC007,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
{0xC008,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
{0xC009,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
{0xC00A,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
{0xC00B,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA */
{0xC00C,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
{0xC00D,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
{0xC00E,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
{0xC00F,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
{0xC0FF,KEX_ECJPAKE, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 */
{0xC010,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA */
{0xC011,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
{0xC012,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
{0xC013,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
{0xC014,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
{0xC015,KEX_ECDH_ANON, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA */
{0xC016,KEX_ECDH_ANON, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
{0xC017,KEX_ECDH_ANON, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
{0xC018,KEX_ECDH_ANON, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
{0xC019,KEX_ECDH_ANON, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
{0xC023,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
{0xC024,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 */
{0xC025,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
{0xC026,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 */
{0xC027,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
{0xC028,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 */
{0xC029,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
{0xC02A,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 */
{0xC02B,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
{0xC02C,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
{0xC02D,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
{0xC02E,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
{0xC02F,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
{0xC030,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
{0xC031,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
{0xC032,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
{0xC033,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
{0xC034,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
{0xC035,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
{0xC036,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
{0xC037,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
{0xC038,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 */
{0xC039,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA */
{0xC03A,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA256, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 */
{0xC03B,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA384, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 */
{0xC072,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
{0xC073,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */
{0xC074,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
{0xC075,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */
{0xC076,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
{0xC077,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */
{0xC078,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
{0xC079,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */
{0xC07A,KEX_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
{0xC07B,KEX_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
{0xC07C,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
{0xC07D,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
{0xC07E,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
{0xC07F,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
{0xC080,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
{0xC081,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
{0xC082,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
{0xC083,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
{0xC084,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
{0xC085,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
{0xC086,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
{0xC087,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
{0xC088,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
{0xC089,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
{0xC08A,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
{0xC08B,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
{0xC08C,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
{0xC08D,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
{0xC08E,KEX_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
{0xC08F,KEX_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
{0xC090,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
{0xC091,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
{0xC092,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
{0xC093,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
{0xC094,KEX_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
{0xC095,KEX_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */
{0xC096,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
{0xC097,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */
{0xC098,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
{0xC099,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */
{0xC09A,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
{0xC09B,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */
{0xC09C,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM */
{0xC09D,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM */
{0xC09E,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM */
{0xC09F,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM */
{0xC0A0,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 */
{0xC0A1,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 */
{0xC0A2,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 */
{0xC0A3,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 */
{0xC0A4,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM */
{0xC0A5,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM */
{0xC0A6,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM */
{0xC0A7,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM */
{0xC0A8,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 */
{0xC0A9,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 */
{0xC0AA,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 */
{0xC0AB,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 */
{0xC0AC,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM */
{0xC0AD,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM */
{0xC0AE,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 */
{0xC0AF,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 */
{0xCCA8,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_CHACHA20, DIG_SHA256, MODE_POLY1305 }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 */
{0xCCA9,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_CHACHA20, DIG_SHA256, MODE_POLY1305 }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 */
{0xCCAA,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_CHACHA20, DIG_SHA256, MODE_POLY1305 }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 */
{0xCCAB,KEX_PSK, ENC_CHACHA20, DIG_SHA256, MODE_POLY1305 }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 */
{0xCCAC,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_CHACHA20, DIG_SHA256, MODE_POLY1305 }, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 */
{0xCCAD,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_CHACHA20, DIG_SHA256, MODE_POLY1305 }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 */
{0xCCAE,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_CHACHA20, DIG_SHA256, MODE_POLY1305 }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 */
{-1, 0, 0, 0, MODE_STREAM}
};
#define MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 16
#define MAX_KEY_SIZE 32
const SslCipherSuite *
ssl_find_cipher(int num)
{
const SslCipherSuite *c;
for(c=cipher_suites;c->number!=-1;c++){
if(c->number==num){
return c;
}
}
return NULL;
}
int
ssl_get_cipher_algo(const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite)
{
return gcry_cipher_map_name(ciphers[cipher_suite->enc - 0x30]);
}
guint
ssl_get_cipher_blocksize(const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite)
{
gint cipher_algo;
if (cipher_suite->mode != MODE_CBC) return 0;
cipher_algo = ssl_get_cipher_by_name(ciphers[cipher_suite->enc - 0x30]);
return (guint)gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen(cipher_algo);
}
static guint
ssl_get_cipher_export_keymat_size(int cipher_suite_num)
{
switch (cipher_suite_num) {
/* See RFC 6101 (SSL 3.0), Table 2, column Key Material. */
case 0x0003: /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 */
case 0x0006: /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 */
case 0x0008: /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
case 0x000B: /* TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
case 0x000E: /* TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
case 0x0011: /* TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
case 0x0014: /* TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
case 0x0017: /* TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 */
case 0x0019: /* TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
return 5;
/* not defined in below draft, but "implemented by several vendors",
* https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00036.html */
case 0x0060: /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5 */
case 0x0061: /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5 */
return 7;
/* Note: the draft states that DES_CBC needs 8 bytes, but Wireshark always
* used 7. Until a pcap proves 8, let's use the old value. Link:
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01 */
case 0x0062: /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */
case 0x0063: /* TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */
case 0x0064: /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA */
case 0x0065: /* TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA */
return 7;
default:
return 0;
}
}
/* Digests, Ciphers and Cipher Suites registry }}} */
/* HMAC and the Pseudorandom function {{{ */
static void
tls_hash(StringInfo *secret, StringInfo *seed, gint md,
StringInfo *out, guint out_len)
{
/* RFC 2246 5. HMAC and the pseudorandom function
* '+' denotes concatenation.
* P_hash(secret, seed) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(1) + seed) +
* HMAC_hash(secret, A(2) + seed) + ...
* A(0) = seed
* A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i - 1))
*/
guint8 *ptr;
guint left, tocpy;
guint8 *A;
guint8 _A[DIGEST_MAX_SIZE], tmp[DIGEST_MAX_SIZE];
guint A_l, tmp_l;
SSL_HMAC hm;
ptr = out->data;
left = out_len;
ssl_print_string("tls_hash: hash secret", secret);
ssl_print_string("tls_hash: hash seed", seed);
/* A(0) = seed */
A = seed->data;
A_l = seed->data_len;
while (left) {
/* A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i-1)) */
ssl_hmac_init(&hm, secret->data, secret->data_len, md);
ssl_hmac_update(&hm, A, A_l);
A_l = sizeof(_A); /* upper bound len for hash output */
ssl_hmac_final(&hm, _A, &A_l);
ssl_hmac_cleanup(&hm);
A = _A;
/* HMAC_hash(secret, A(i) + seed) */
ssl_hmac_init(&hm, secret->data, secret->data_len, md);
ssl_hmac_update(&hm, A, A_l);
ssl_hmac_update(&hm, seed->data, seed->data_len);
tmp_l = sizeof(tmp); /* upper bound len for hash output */
ssl_hmac_final(&hm, tmp, &tmp_l);
ssl_hmac_cleanup(&hm);
/* ssl_hmac_final puts the actual digest output size in tmp_l */
tocpy = MIN(left, tmp_l);
memcpy(ptr, tmp, tocpy);
ptr += tocpy;
left -= tocpy;
}
out->data_len = out_len;
ssl_print_string("hash out", out);
}
static gboolean
tls_prf(StringInfo* secret, const gchar *usage,
StringInfo* rnd1, StringInfo* rnd2, StringInfo* out, guint out_len)
{
StringInfo seed, sha_out, md5_out;
guint8 *ptr;
StringInfo s1, s2;
guint i,s_l;
size_t usage_len, rnd2_len;
gboolean success = FALSE;
usage_len = strlen(usage);
rnd2_len = rnd2 ? rnd2->data_len : 0;
/* initalize buffer for sha, md5 random seed*/
if (ssl_data_alloc(&sha_out, MAX(out_len, 20)) < 0) {
ssl_debug_printf("tls_prf: can't allocate sha out\n");
return FALSE;
}
if (ssl_data_alloc(&md5_out, MAX(out_len, 16)) < 0) {
ssl_debug_printf("tls_prf: can't allocate md5 out\n");
goto free_sha;
}
if (ssl_data_alloc(&seed, usage_len+rnd1->data_len+rnd2_len) < 0) {
ssl_debug_printf("tls_prf: can't allocate rnd %d\n",
(int) (usage_len+rnd1->data_len+rnd2_len));
goto free_md5;
}
ptr=seed.data;
memcpy(ptr,usage,usage_len);
ptr+=usage_len;
memcpy(ptr,rnd1->data,rnd1->data_len);
if (rnd2_len > 0) {
ptr+=rnd1->data_len;
memcpy(ptr,rnd2->data,rnd2->data_len);
/*ptr+=rnd2->data_len;*/
}
/* initalize buffer for client/server seeds*/
s_l=secret->data_len/2 + secret->data_len%2;
if (ssl_data_alloc(&s1, s_l) < 0) {
ssl_debug_printf("tls_prf: can't allocate secret %d\n", s_l);
goto free_seed;
}
if (ssl_data_alloc(&s2, s_l) < 0) {
ssl_debug_printf("tls_prf: can't allocate secret(2) %d\n", s_l);
goto free_s1;
}
memcpy(s1.data,secret->data,s_l);
memcpy(s2.data,secret->data + (secret->data_len - s_l),s_l);
ssl_debug_printf("tls_prf: tls_hash(md5 secret_len %d seed_len %d )\n", s1.data_len, seed.data_len);
tls_hash(&s1, &seed, ssl_get_digest_by_name("MD5"), &md5_out, out_len);
ssl_debug_printf("tls_prf: tls_hash(sha)\n");
tls_hash(&s2, &seed, ssl_get_digest_by_name("SHA1"), &sha_out, out_len);
for (i = 0; i < out_len; i++)
out->data[i] = md5_out.data[i] ^ sha_out.data[i];
/* success, now store the new meaningful data length */
out->data_len = out_len;
success = TRUE;
ssl_print_string("PRF out",out);
g_free(s2.data);
free_s1:
g_free(s1.data);
free_seed:
g_free(seed.data);
free_md5:
g_free(md5_out.data);
free_sha:
g_free(sha_out.data);
return success;
}
static gboolean
tls12_prf(gint md, StringInfo* secret, const gchar* usage,
StringInfo* rnd1, StringInfo* rnd2, StringInfo* out, guint out_len)
{
StringInfo label_seed;
size_t usage_len, rnd2_len;
rnd2_len = rnd2 ? rnd2->data_len : 0;
usage_len = strlen(usage);
if (ssl_data_alloc(&label_seed, usage_len+rnd1->data_len+rnd2_len) < 0) {
ssl_debug_printf("tls12_prf: can't allocate label_seed\n");
return FALSE;
}
memcpy(label_seed.data, usage, usage_len);
memcpy(label_seed.data+usage_len, rnd1->data, rnd1->data_len);
if (rnd2_len > 0)
memcpy(label_seed.data+usage_len+rnd1->data_len, rnd2->data, rnd2->data_len);
ssl_debug_printf("tls12_prf: tls_hash(hash_alg %s secret_len %d seed_len %d )\n", gcry_md_algo_name(md), secret->data_len, label_seed.data_len);
tls_hash(secret, &label_seed, md, out, out_len);
g_free(label_seed.data);
ssl_print_string("PRF out", out);
return TRUE;
}
static void
ssl3_generate_export_iv(StringInfo *r1, StringInfo *r2,
StringInfo *out, guint out_len)
{
SSL_MD5_CTX md5;
guint8 tmp[16];
ssl_md5_init(&md5);
ssl_md5_update(&md5,r1->data,r1->data_len);
ssl_md5_update(&md5,r2->data,r2->data_len);
ssl_md5_final(tmp,&md5);
ssl_md5_cleanup(&md5);
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(out_len <= sizeof(tmp));
ssl_data_set(out, tmp, out_len);
ssl_print_string("export iv", out);
}
static gboolean
ssl3_prf(StringInfo* secret, const gchar* usage,
StringInfo* rnd1, StringInfo* rnd2, StringInfo* out, guint out_len)
{
SSL_MD5_CTX md5;
SSL_SHA_CTX sha;
guint off;
gint i = 0,j;
guint8 buf[20];
for (off = 0; off < out_len; off += 16) {
guchar outbuf[16];
i++;
ssl_debug_printf("ssl3_prf: sha1_hash(%d)\n",i);
/* A, BB, CCC, ... */
for(j=0;j<i;j++){
buf[j]=64+i;
}
ssl_sha_init(&sha);
ssl_sha_update(&sha,buf,i);
ssl_sha_update(&sha,secret->data,secret->data_len);
if(!strcmp(usage,"client write key") || !strcmp(usage,"server write key")){
if (rnd2)
ssl_sha_update(&sha,rnd2->data,rnd2->data_len);
ssl_sha_update(&sha,rnd1->data,rnd1->data_len);
}
else{
ssl_sha_update(&sha,rnd1->data,rnd1->data_len);
if (rnd2)
ssl_sha_update(&sha,rnd2->data,rnd2->data_len);
}
ssl_sha_final(buf,&sha);
ssl_sha_cleanup(&sha);
ssl_debug_printf("ssl3_prf: md5_hash(%d) datalen %d\n",i,
secret->data_len);
ssl_md5_init(&md5);
ssl_md5_update(&md5,secret->data,secret->data_len);
ssl_md5_update(&md5,buf,20);
ssl_md5_final(outbuf,&md5);
ssl_md5_cleanup(&md5);
memcpy(out->data + off, outbuf, MIN(out_len - off, 16));
}
out->data_len = out_len;
return TRUE;
}
/* out_len is the wanted output length for the pseudorandom function.
* Ensure that ssl->cipher_suite is set. */
static gboolean
prf(SslDecryptSession *ssl, StringInfo *secret, const gchar *usage,
StringInfo *rnd1, StringInfo *rnd2, StringInfo *out, guint out_len)
{
switch (ssl->session.version) {
case SSLV3_VERSION:
return ssl3_prf(secret, usage, rnd1, rnd2, out, out_len);
case TLSV1_VERSION:
case TLSV1DOT1_VERSION:
case DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION:
case DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION:
return tls_prf(secret, usage, rnd1, rnd2, out, out_len);
default: /* TLSv1.2 */
switch (ssl->cipher_suite->dig) {
case DIG_SHA384:
return tls12_prf(GCRY_MD_SHA384, secret, usage, rnd1, rnd2,
out, out_len);
default:
return tls12_prf(GCRY_MD_SHA256, secret, usage, rnd1, rnd2,
out, out_len);
}
}
}
static gint tls_handshake_hash(SslDecryptSession* ssl, StringInfo* out)
{
SSL_MD5_CTX md5;
SSL_SHA_CTX sha;
if (ssl_data_alloc(out, 36) < 0)
return -1;
ssl_md5_init(&md5);
ssl_md5_update(&md5,ssl->handshake_data.data,ssl->handshake_data.data_len);
ssl_md5_final(out->data,&md5);
ssl_md5_cleanup(&md5);
ssl_sha_init(&sha);
ssl_sha_update(&sha,ssl->handshake_data.data,ssl->handshake_data.data_len);
ssl_sha_final(out->data+16,&sha);
ssl_sha_cleanup(&sha);
return 0;
}
static gint tls12_handshake_hash(SslDecryptSession* ssl, gint md, StringInfo* out)
{
SSL_MD mc;
guint8 tmp[48];
guint len;
ssl_md_init(&mc, md);
ssl_md_update(&mc,ssl->handshake_data.data,ssl->handshake_data.data_len);
ssl_md_final(&mc, tmp, &len);
ssl_md_cleanup(&mc);
if (ssl_data_alloc(out, len) < 0)
return -1;
memcpy(out->data, tmp, len);
return 0;
}
/**
* Obtains the label prefix used in HKDF-Expand-Label. This function can be
* inlined and removed once support for draft 19 and before is dropped.
*/
static inline const char *
tls13_hkdf_label_prefix(guint8 tls13_draft_version)
{
if (tls13_draft_version && tls13_draft_version < 20) {
return "TLS 1.3, ";
} else {
return "tls13 ";
}
}
/*
* Computes HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label, Hash(context_value), Length) with a
* custom label prefix. If "context_hash" is NULL, then an empty context is
* used. Otherwise it must have the same length as the hash algorithm output.
*/
gboolean
tls13_hkdf_expand_label_context(int md, const StringInfo *secret,
const char *label_prefix, const char *label,
const guint8 *context_hash, guint8 context_length,
guint16 out_len, guchar **out)
{
/* RFC 8446 Section 7.1:
* HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label, Context, Length) =
* HKDF-Expand(Secret, HkdfLabel, Length)
* struct {
* uint16 length = Length;
* opaque label<7..255> = "tls13 " + Label; // "tls13 " is label prefix.
* opaque context<0..255> = Context;
* } HkdfLabel;
*
* RFC 5869 HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF):
* HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L) -> OKM
*/
gcry_error_t err;
const guint label_prefix_length = (guint) strlen(label_prefix);
const guint label_length = (guint) strlen(label);
/* Some sanity checks */
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(label_length > 0 && label_prefix_length + label_length <= 255);
/* info = HkdfLabel { length, label, context } */
GByteArray *info = g_byte_array_new();
const guint16 length = g_htons(out_len);
g_byte_array_append(info, (const guint8 *)&length, sizeof(length));
const guint8 label_vector_length = label_prefix_length + label_length;
g_byte_array_append(info, &label_vector_length, 1);
g_byte_array_append(info, (const guint8 *)label_prefix, label_prefix_length);
g_byte_array_append(info, (const guint8*)label, label_length);
g_byte_array_append(info, &context_length, 1);
if (context_length) {
g_byte_array_append(info, context_hash, context_length);
}
*out = (guchar *)wmem_alloc(NULL, out_len);
err = hkdf_expand(md, secret->data, secret->data_len, info->data, info->len, *out, out_len);
g_byte_array_free(info, TRUE);
if (err) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s failed %d: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, md, gcry_strerror(err));
wmem_free(NULL, *out);
*out = NULL;
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
gboolean
tls13_hkdf_expand_label(int md, const StringInfo *secret,
const char *label_prefix, const char *label,
guint16 out_len, guchar **out)
{
return tls13_hkdf_expand_label_context(md, secret, label_prefix, label, NULL, 0, out_len, out);
}
/* HMAC and the Pseudorandom function }}} */
/* Record Decompression (after decryption) {{{ */
#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB
/* memory allocation functions for zlib initialization */
static void* ssl_zalloc(void* opaque _U_, unsigned int no, unsigned int size)
{
return g_malloc0(no*size);
}
static void ssl_zfree(void* opaque _U_, void* addr)
{
g_free(addr);
}
#endif
static SslDecompress*
ssl_create_decompressor(gint compression)
{
SslDecompress *decomp;
#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB
int err;
#endif
if (compression == 0) return NULL;
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_create_decompressor: compression method %d\n", compression);
decomp = wmem_new(wmem_file_scope(), SslDecompress);
decomp->compression = compression;
switch (decomp->compression) {
#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB
case 1: /* DEFLATE */
decomp->istream.zalloc = ssl_zalloc;
decomp->istream.zfree = ssl_zfree;
decomp->istream.opaque = Z_NULL;
decomp->istream.next_in = Z_NULL;
decomp->istream.next_out = Z_NULL;
decomp->istream.avail_in = 0;
decomp->istream.avail_out = 0;
err = inflateInit(&decomp->istream);
if (err != Z_OK) {
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_create_decompressor: inflateInit_() failed - %d\n", err);
return NULL;
}
break;
#endif
default:
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_create_decompressor: unsupported compression method %d\n", decomp->compression);
return NULL;
}
return decomp;
}
#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB
static int
ssl_decompress_record(SslDecompress* decomp, const guchar* in, guint inl, StringInfo* out_str, guint* outl)
{
gint err;
switch (decomp->compression) {
case 1: /* DEFLATE */
err = Z_OK;
if (out_str->data_len < 16384) { /* maximal plain length */
ssl_data_realloc(out_str, 16384);
}
#ifdef z_const
decomp->istream.next_in = in;
#else
DIAG_OFF(cast-qual)
decomp->istream.next_in = (Bytef *)in;
DIAG_ON(cast-qual)
#endif
decomp->istream.avail_in = inl;
decomp->istream.next_out = out_str->data;
decomp->istream.avail_out = out_str->data_len;
if (inl > 0)
err = inflate(&decomp->istream, Z_SYNC_FLUSH);
if (err != Z_OK) {
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decompress_record: inflate() failed - %d\n", err);
return -1;
}
*outl = out_str->data_len - decomp->istream.avail_out;
break;
default:
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decompress_record: unsupported compression method %d\n", decomp->compression);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
#else
int
ssl_decompress_record(SslDecompress* decomp _U_, const guchar* in _U_, guint inl _U_, StringInfo* out_str _U_, guint* outl _U_)
{
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decompress_record: unsupported compression method %d\n", decomp->compression);
return -1;
}
#endif
/* Record Decompression (after decryption) }}} */
/* Create a new structure to store decrypted chunks. {{{ */
static SslFlow*
ssl_create_flow(void)
{
SslFlow *flow;
flow = wmem_new(wmem_file_scope(), SslFlow);
flow->byte_seq = 0;
flow->flags = 0;
flow->multisegment_pdus = wmem_tree_new(wmem_file_scope());
return flow;
}
/* }}} */
/* Use the negotiated security parameters for decryption. {{{ */
void
ssl_change_cipher(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, gboolean server)
{
SslDecoder **new_decoder = server ? &ssl_session->server_new : &ssl_session->client_new;
SslDecoder **dest = server ? &ssl_session->server : &ssl_session->client;
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_change_cipher %s%s\n", server ? "SERVER" : "CLIENT",
*new_decoder ? "" : " (No decoder found - retransmission?)");
if (*new_decoder) {
*dest = *new_decoder;
*new_decoder = NULL;
}
}
/* }}} */
/* Init cipher state given some security parameters. {{{ */
static gboolean
ssl_decoder_destroy_cb(wmem_allocator_t *, wmem_cb_event_t, void *);
static SslDecoder*
ssl_create_decoder(const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite, gint cipher_algo,
gint compression, guint8 *mk, guint8 *sk, guint8 *iv, guint iv_length)
{
SslDecoder *dec;
ssl_cipher_mode_t mode = cipher_suite->mode;
dec = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), SslDecoder);
/* init mac buffer: mac storage is embedded into decoder struct to save a
memory allocation and waste samo more memory*/
dec->cipher_suite=cipher_suite;
dec->compression = compression;
if ((mode == MODE_STREAM && mk != NULL) || mode == MODE_CBC) {
// AEAD ciphers use no MAC key, but stream and block ciphers do. Note
// the special case for NULL ciphers, even if there is insufficieny
// keying material (including MAC key), we will can still create
// decoders since "decryption" is easy for such ciphers.
dec->mac_key.data = dec->_mac_key_or_write_iv;
ssl_data_set(&dec->mac_key, mk, ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->len);
} else if (mode == MODE_GCM || mode == MODE_CCM || mode == MODE_CCM_8 || mode == MODE_POLY1305) {
// Input for the nonce, to be used with AEAD ciphers.
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(iv_length <= sizeof(dec->_mac_key_or_write_iv));
dec->write_iv.data = dec->_mac_key_or_write_iv;
ssl_data_set(&dec->write_iv, iv, iv_length);
}
dec->seq = 0;
dec->decomp = ssl_create_decompressor(compression);
wmem_register_callback(wmem_file_scope(), ssl_decoder_destroy_cb, dec);
if (ssl_cipher_init(&dec->evp,cipher_algo,sk,iv,cipher_suite->mode) < 0) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s: can't create cipher id:%d mode:%d\n", G_STRFUNC,
cipher_algo, cipher_suite->mode);
return NULL;
}
ssl_debug_printf("decoder initialized (digest len %d)\n", ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->len);
return dec;
}
static gboolean
ssl_decoder_destroy_cb(wmem_allocator_t *allocator _U_, wmem_cb_event_t event _U_, void *user_data)
{
SslDecoder *dec = (SslDecoder *) user_data;
if (dec->evp)
ssl_cipher_cleanup(&dec->evp);
#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB
if (dec->decomp != NULL && dec->decomp->compression == 1 /* DEFLATE */)
inflateEnd(&dec->decomp->istream);
#endif
return FALSE;
}
static gboolean
tls13_cipher_destroy_cb(wmem_allocator_t *allocator _U_, wmem_cb_event_t event _U_, void *user_data)
{
tls13_cipher *cipher = (tls13_cipher *) user_data;
gcry_cipher_close(cipher->hd);
return FALSE;
}
tls13_cipher *
tls13_cipher_create(const char *label_prefix, int cipher_algo, int cipher_mode, int hash_algo, const StringInfo *secret, const gchar **error)
{
tls13_cipher *cipher = NULL;
guchar *write_key = NULL, *write_iv = NULL;
guint key_length, iv_length;
gcry_cipher_hd_t hd = NULL;
gcry_error_t err;
/*
* Calculate traffic keys based on RFC 8446 Section 7.
*/
key_length = (guint) gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen(cipher_algo);
iv_length = TLS13_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH;
if (!tls13_hkdf_expand_label(hash_algo, secret, label_prefix, "key", key_length, &write_key)) {
*error = "Key expansion (key) failed";
return NULL;
}
if (!tls13_hkdf_expand_label(hash_algo, secret, label_prefix, "iv", iv_length, &write_iv)) {
*error = "Key expansion (IV) failed";
goto end;
}
err = gcry_cipher_open(&hd, cipher_algo, cipher_mode, 0);
if (err) {
*error = wmem_strdup_printf(wmem_packet_scope(), "Decryption (initialization) failed: %s", gcry_strerror(err));
goto end;
}
err = gcry_cipher_setkey(hd, write_key, key_length);
if (err) {
*error = wmem_strdup_printf(wmem_packet_scope(), "Decryption (setkey) failed: %s", gcry_strerror(err));
gcry_cipher_close(hd);
goto end;
}
cipher = wmem_new(wmem_file_scope(), tls13_cipher);
wmem_register_callback(wmem_file_scope(), tls13_cipher_destroy_cb, cipher);
cipher->hd = hd;
memcpy(cipher->iv, write_iv, iv_length);
*error = NULL;
end:
wmem_free(NULL, write_key);
wmem_free(NULL, write_iv);
return cipher;
}
/* }}} */
/* (Pre-)master secrets calculations {{{ */
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS
static int
ssl_decrypt_pre_master_secret(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session,
StringInfo *encrypted_pre_master,
GHashTable *key_hash);
#endif /* HAVE_LIBGNUTLS */
static gboolean
ssl_restore_master_key(SslDecryptSession *ssl, const char *label,
gboolean is_pre_master, GHashTable *ht, StringInfo *key);
gboolean
ssl_generate_pre_master_secret(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session,
guint32 length, tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset,
const gchar *ssl_psk,
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS
GHashTable *key_hash,
#endif
const ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map)
{
/* check for required session data */
ssl_debug_printf("%s: found SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG, state %X\n",
G_STRFUNC, ssl_session->state);
if ((ssl_session->state & (SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION)) !=
(SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION)) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s: not enough data to generate key (required state %X)\n", G_STRFUNC,
(SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION));
return FALSE;
}
if (ssl_session->session.version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s: detected TLS 1.3 which has no pre-master secrets\n", G_STRFUNC);
return FALSE;
}
/* check to see if the PMS was provided to us*/
if (ssl_restore_master_key(ssl_session, "Unencrypted pre-master secret", TRUE,
mk_map->pms, &ssl_session->client_random)) {
return TRUE;
}
if (ssl_session->cipher_suite->kex == KEX_PSK)
{
/* calculate pre master secret*/
StringInfo pre_master_secret;
guint psk_len, pre_master_len;
if (!ssl_psk || (ssl_psk[0] == 0)) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s: can't find pre-shared key\n", G_STRFUNC);
return FALSE;
}
/* convert hex string into char*/
if (!from_hex(&ssl_session->psk, ssl_psk, strlen(ssl_psk))) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s: ssl.psk/dtls.psk contains invalid hex\n",
G_STRFUNC);
return FALSE;
}
psk_len = ssl_session->psk.data_len;
if (psk_len >= (2 << 15)) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s: ssl.psk/dtls.psk must not be larger than 2^15 - 1\n",
G_STRFUNC);
return FALSE;
}
pre_master_len = psk_len * 2 + 4;
pre_master_secret.data = (guchar *)wmem_alloc(wmem_file_scope(), pre_master_len);
pre_master_secret.data_len = pre_master_len;
/* 2 bytes psk_len*/
pre_master_secret.data[0] = psk_len >> 8;
pre_master_secret.data[1] = psk_len & 0xFF;
/* psk_len bytes times 0*/
memset(&pre_master_secret.data[2], 0, psk_len);
/* 2 bytes psk_len*/
pre_master_secret.data[psk_len + 2] = psk_len >> 8;
pre_master_secret.data[psk_len + 3] = psk_len & 0xFF;
/* psk*/
memcpy(&pre_master_secret.data[psk_len + 4], ssl_session->psk.data, psk_len);
ssl_session->pre_master_secret.data = pre_master_secret.data;
ssl_session->pre_master_secret.data_len = pre_master_len;
/*ssl_debug_printf("pre master secret",&ssl->pre_master_secret);*/
/* Remove the master secret if it was there.
This forces keying material regeneration in
case we're renegotiating */
ssl_session->state &= ~(SSL_MASTER_SECRET|SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY);
ssl_session->state |= SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET;
return TRUE;
}
else
{
guint encrlen, skip;
encrlen = length;
skip = 0;
/* get encrypted data, on tls1 we have to skip two bytes
* (it's the encrypted len and should be equal to record len - 2)
* in case of rsa1024 that would be 128 + 2 = 130; for psk not necessary
*/
if (ssl_session->cipher_suite->kex == KEX_RSA &&
(ssl_session->session.version == TLSV1_VERSION ||
ssl_session->session.version == TLSV1DOT1_VERSION ||
ssl_session->session.version == TLSV1DOT2_VERSION ||
ssl_session->session.version == DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION ||
ssl_session->session.version == DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION))
{
encrlen = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
skip = 2;
if (encrlen > length - 2)
{
ssl_debug_printf("%s: wrong encrypted length (%d max %d)\n",
G_STRFUNC, encrlen, length);
return FALSE;
}
}
/* the valid lower bound is higher than 8, but it is sufficient for the
* ssl keylog file below */
if (encrlen < 8) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s: invalid encrypted pre-master key length %d\n",
G_STRFUNC, encrlen);
return FALSE;
}
StringInfo encrypted_pre_master = {
.data = (guchar *)tvb_memdup(wmem_packet_scope(), tvb, offset + skip, encrlen),
.data_len = encrlen,
};
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS
/* Try to lookup an appropriate RSA private key to decrypt the Encrypted Pre-Master Secret. */
if (ssl_session->cert_key_id) {
if (ssl_decrypt_pre_master_secret(ssl_session, &encrypted_pre_master, key_hash))
return TRUE;
ssl_debug_printf("%s: can't decrypt pre-master secret\n",
G_STRFUNC);
}
#endif /* HAVE_LIBGNUTLS */
/* try to find the pre-master secret from the encrypted one. The
* ssl key logfile stores only the first 8 bytes, so truncate it */
encrypted_pre_master.data_len = 8;
if (ssl_restore_master_key(ssl_session, "Encrypted pre-master secret",
TRUE, mk_map->pre_master, &encrypted_pre_master))
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
/* Used for (D)TLS 1.2 and earlier versions (not with TLS 1.3). */
int
ssl_generate_keyring_material(SslDecryptSession*ssl_session)
{
StringInfo key_block = { NULL, 0 };
guint8 _iv_c[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE],_iv_s[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
guint8 _key_c[MAX_KEY_SIZE],_key_s[MAX_KEY_SIZE];
gint needed;
gint cipher_algo = -1; /* special value (-1) for NULL encryption */
guint encr_key_len, write_iv_len = 0;
gboolean is_export_cipher;
guint8 *ptr, *c_iv = NULL, *s_iv = NULL;
guint8 *c_wk = NULL, *s_wk = NULL, *c_mk = NULL, *s_mk = NULL;
const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite = ssl_session->cipher_suite;
/* TLS 1.3 is handled directly in tls13_change_key. */
if (ssl_session->session.version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s: detected TLS 1.3. Should not have been called!\n", G_STRFUNC);
return -1;
}
/* check for enough info to proced */
guint need_all = SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION;
guint need_any = SSL_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET;
if (((ssl_session->state & need_all) != need_all) || ((ssl_session->state & need_any) == 0)) {
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_generate_keyring_material not enough data to generate key "
"(0x%02X required 0x%02X or 0x%02X)\n", ssl_session->state,
need_all|SSL_MASTER_SECRET, need_all|SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET);
/* Special case: for NULL encryption, allow dissection of data even if
* the Client Hello is missing (MAC keys are now skipped though). */
need_all = SSL_CIPHER|SSL_VERSION;
if ((ssl_session->state & need_all) == need_all &&
cipher_suite->enc == ENC_NULL) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s NULL cipher found, will create a decoder but "
"skip MAC validation as keys are missing.\n", G_STRFUNC);
goto create_decoders;
}
return -1;
}
/* if master key is not available, generate is from the pre-master secret */
if (!(ssl_session->state & SSL_MASTER_SECRET)) {
if ((ssl_session->state & SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_MASK) == SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_MASK) {
StringInfo handshake_hashed_data;
gint ret;
handshake_hashed_data.data = NULL;
handshake_hashed_data.data_len = 0;
ssl_debug_printf("%s:PRF(pre_master_secret_extended)\n", G_STRFUNC);
ssl_print_string("pre master secret",&ssl_session->pre_master_secret);
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(ssl_session->handshake_data.data_len > 0);
switch(ssl_session->session.version) {
case TLSV1_VERSION:
case TLSV1DOT1_VERSION:
case DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION:
case DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION:
ret = tls_handshake_hash(ssl_session, &handshake_hashed_data);
break;
default:
switch (cipher_suite->dig) {
case DIG_SHA384:
ret = tls12_handshake_hash(ssl_session, GCRY_MD_SHA384, &handshake_hashed_data);
break;
default:
ret = tls12_handshake_hash(ssl_session, GCRY_MD_SHA256, &handshake_hashed_data);
break;
}
break;
}
if (ret) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't generate handshake hash\n", G_STRFUNC);
return -1;
}
wmem_free(wmem_file_scope(), ssl_session->handshake_data.data);
ssl_session->handshake_data.data = NULL;
ssl_session->handshake_data.data_len = 0;
if (!prf(ssl_session, &ssl_session->pre_master_secret, "extended master secret",
&handshake_hashed_data,
NULL, &ssl_session->master_secret,
SSL_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH)) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't generate master_secret\n", G_STRFUNC);
g_free(handshake_hashed_data.data);
return -1;
}
g_free(handshake_hashed_data.data);
} else {
ssl_debug_printf("%s:PRF(pre_master_secret)\n", G_STRFUNC);
ssl_print_string("pre master secret",&ssl_session->pre_master_secret);
ssl_print_string("client random",&ssl_session->client_random);
ssl_print_string("server random",&ssl_session->server_random);
if (!prf(ssl_session, &ssl_session->pre_master_secret, "master secret",
&ssl_session->client_random,
&ssl_session->server_random, &ssl_session->master_secret,
SSL_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH)) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't generate master_secret\n", G_STRFUNC);
return -1;
}
}
ssl_print_string("master secret",&ssl_session->master_secret);
/* the pre-master secret has been 'consumend' so we must clear it now */
ssl_session->state &= ~SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET;
ssl_session->state |= SSL_MASTER_SECRET;
}
/* Find the Libgcrypt cipher algorithm for the given SSL cipher suite ID */
if (cipher_suite->enc != ENC_NULL) {
const char *cipher_name = ciphers[cipher_suite->enc-0x30];
ssl_debug_printf("%s CIPHER: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, cipher_name);
cipher_algo = ssl_get_cipher_by_name(cipher_name);
if (cipher_algo == 0) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't find cipher %s\n", G_STRFUNC, cipher_name);
return -1;
}
}
/* Export ciphers consume less material from the key block. */
encr_key_len = ssl_get_cipher_export_keymat_size(cipher_suite->number);
is_export_cipher = encr_key_len > 0;
if (!is_export_cipher && cipher_suite->enc != ENC_NULL) {
encr_key_len = (guint)gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen(cipher_algo);
}
if (cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CBC) {
write_iv_len = (guint)gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen(cipher_algo);
} else if (cipher_suite->mode == MODE_GCM || cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CCM || cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CCM_8) {
/* account for a four-byte salt for client and server side (from
* client_write_IV and server_write_IV), see GCMNonce (RFC 5288) */
write_iv_len = 4;
} else if (cipher_suite->mode == MODE_POLY1305) {
/* RFC 7905: SecurityParameters.fixed_iv_length is twelve bytes */
write_iv_len = 12;
}
/* Compute the key block. First figure out how much data we need */
needed = ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->len*2; /* MAC key */
needed += 2 * encr_key_len; /* encryption key */
needed += 2 * write_iv_len; /* write IV */
key_block.data = (guchar *)g_malloc(needed);
ssl_debug_printf("%s sess key generation\n", G_STRFUNC);
if (!prf(ssl_session, &ssl_session->master_secret, "key expansion",
&ssl_session->server_random,&ssl_session->client_random,
&key_block, needed)) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't generate key_block\n", G_STRFUNC);
goto fail;
}
ssl_print_string("key expansion", &key_block);
ptr=key_block.data;
/* client/server write MAC key (for non-AEAD ciphers) */
if (cipher_suite->mode == MODE_STREAM || cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CBC) {
c_mk=ptr; ptr+=ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->len;
s_mk=ptr; ptr+=ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->len;
}
/* client/server write encryption key */
c_wk=ptr; ptr += encr_key_len;
s_wk=ptr; ptr += encr_key_len;
/* client/server write IV (used as IV (for CBC) or salt (for AEAD)) */
if (write_iv_len > 0) {
c_iv=ptr; ptr += write_iv_len;
s_iv=ptr; /* ptr += write_iv_len; */
}
/* export ciphers work with a smaller key length */
if (is_export_cipher) {
if (cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CBC) {
/* We only have room for MAX_BLOCK_SIZE bytes IVs, but that's
all we should need. This is a sanity check */
if (write_iv_len > MAX_BLOCK_SIZE) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s cipher suite block must be at most %d nut is %d\n",
G_STRFUNC, MAX_BLOCK_SIZE, write_iv_len);
goto fail;
}
if(ssl_session->session.version==SSLV3_VERSION){
/* The length of these fields are ignored by this caller */
StringInfo iv_c, iv_s;
iv_c.data = _iv_c;
iv_s.data = _iv_s;
ssl_debug_printf("%s ssl3_generate_export_iv\n", G_STRFUNC);
ssl3_generate_export_iv(&ssl_session->client_random,
&ssl_session->server_random, &iv_c, write_iv_len);
ssl_debug_printf("%s ssl3_generate_export_iv(2)\n", G_STRFUNC);
ssl3_generate_export_iv(&ssl_session->server_random,
&ssl_session->client_random, &iv_s, write_iv_len);
}
else{
guint8 _iv_block[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE * 2];
StringInfo iv_block;
StringInfo key_null;
guint8 _key_null;
key_null.data = &_key_null;
key_null.data_len = 0;
iv_block.data = _iv_block;
ssl_debug_printf("%s prf(iv_block)\n", G_STRFUNC);
if (!prf(ssl_session, &key_null, "IV block",
&ssl_session->client_random,
&ssl_session->server_random, &iv_block,
write_iv_len * 2)) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't generate tls31 iv block\n", G_STRFUNC);
goto fail;
}
memcpy(_iv_c, iv_block.data, write_iv_len);
memcpy(_iv_s, iv_block.data + write_iv_len, write_iv_len);
}
c_iv=_iv_c;
s_iv=_iv_s;
}
if (ssl_session->session.version==SSLV3_VERSION){
SSL_MD5_CTX md5;
ssl_debug_printf("%s MD5(client_random)\n", G_STRFUNC);
ssl_md5_init(&md5);
ssl_md5_update(&md5,c_wk,encr_key_len);
ssl_md5_update(&md5,ssl_session->client_random.data,
ssl_session->client_random.data_len);
ssl_md5_update(&md5,ssl_session->server_random.data,
ssl_session->server_random.data_len);
ssl_md5_final(_key_c,&md5);
ssl_md5_cleanup(&md5);
c_wk=_key_c;
ssl_md5_init(&md5);
ssl_debug_printf("%s MD5(server_random)\n", G_STRFUNC);
ssl_md5_update(&md5,s_wk,encr_key_len);
ssl_md5_update(&md5,ssl_session->server_random.data,
ssl_session->server_random.data_len);
ssl_md5_update(&md5,ssl_session->client_random.data,
ssl_session->client_random.data_len);
ssl_md5_final(_key_s,&md5);
ssl_md5_cleanup(&md5);
s_wk=_key_s;
}
else{
StringInfo key_c, key_s, k;
key_c.data = _key_c;
key_s.data = _key_s;
k.data = c_wk;
k.data_len = encr_key_len;
ssl_debug_printf("%s PRF(key_c)\n", G_STRFUNC);
if (!prf(ssl_session, &k, "client write key",
&ssl_session->client_random,
&ssl_session->server_random, &key_c, sizeof(_key_c))) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't generate tll31 server key \n", G_STRFUNC);
goto fail;
}
c_wk=_key_c;
k.data = s_wk;
k.data_len = encr_key_len;
ssl_debug_printf("%s PRF(key_s)\n", G_STRFUNC);
if (!prf(ssl_session, &k, "server write key",
&ssl_session->client_random,
&ssl_session->server_random, &key_s, sizeof(_key_s))) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't generate tll31 client key \n", G_STRFUNC);
goto fail;
}
s_wk=_key_s;
}
}
/* show key material info */
if (c_mk != NULL) {
ssl_print_data("Client MAC key",c_mk,ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->len);
ssl_print_data("Server MAC key",s_mk,ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->len);
}
ssl_print_data("Client Write key", c_wk, encr_key_len);
ssl_print_data("Server Write key", s_wk, encr_key_len);
/* used as IV for CBC mode and the AEAD implicit nonce (salt) */
if (write_iv_len > 0) {
ssl_print_data("Client Write IV", c_iv, write_iv_len);
ssl_print_data("Server Write IV", s_iv, write_iv_len);
}
create_decoders:
/* create both client and server ciphers*/
ssl_debug_printf("%s ssl_create_decoder(client)\n", G_STRFUNC);
ssl_session->client_new = ssl_create_decoder(cipher_suite, cipher_algo, ssl_session->session.compression, c_mk, c_wk, c_iv, write_iv_len);
if (!ssl_session->client_new) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't init client decoder\n", G_STRFUNC);
goto fail;
}
ssl_debug_printf("%s ssl_create_decoder(server)\n", G_STRFUNC);
ssl_session->server_new = ssl_create_decoder(cipher_suite, cipher_algo, ssl_session->session.compression, s_mk, s_wk, s_iv, write_iv_len);
if (!ssl_session->server_new) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't init client decoder\n", G_STRFUNC);
goto fail;
}
/* Continue the SSL stream after renegotiation with new keys. */
ssl_session->client_new->flow = ssl_session->client ? ssl_session->client->flow : ssl_create_flow();
ssl_session->server_new->flow = ssl_session->server ? ssl_session->server->flow : ssl_create_flow();
ssl_debug_printf("%s: client seq %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT ", server seq %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT "\n",
G_STRFUNC, ssl_session->client_new->seq, ssl_session->server_new->seq);
g_free(key_block.data);
ssl_session->state |= SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY;
return 0;
fail:
g_free(key_block.data);
return -1;
}
/* Generated the key material based on the given secret. */
gboolean
tls13_generate_keys(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, const StringInfo *secret, gboolean is_from_server)
{
gboolean success = FALSE;
guchar *write_key = NULL, *write_iv = NULL;
SslDecoder *decoder;
guint key_length, iv_length;
int hash_algo;
const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite = ssl_session->cipher_suite;
int cipher_algo;
if (ssl_session->session.version != TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s only usable for TLS 1.3, not %#x!\n", G_STRFUNC,
ssl_session->session.version);
return FALSE;
}
if (cipher_suite == NULL) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s Unknown cipher\n", G_STRFUNC);
return FALSE;
}
if (cipher_suite->kex != KEX_TLS13) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s Invalid cipher suite 0x%04x spotted!\n", G_STRFUNC, cipher_suite->number);
return FALSE;
}
/* Find the Libgcrypt cipher algorithm for the given SSL cipher suite ID */
const char *cipher_name = ciphers[cipher_suite->enc-0x30];
ssl_debug_printf("%s CIPHER: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, cipher_name);
cipher_algo = ssl_get_cipher_by_name(cipher_name);
if (cipher_algo == 0) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't find cipher %s\n", G_STRFUNC, cipher_name);
return FALSE;
}
const char *hash_name = ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->name;
hash_algo = ssl_get_digest_by_name(hash_name);
if (!hash_algo) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't find hash function %s\n", G_STRFUNC, hash_name);
return FALSE;
}
key_length = (guint) gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen(cipher_algo);
/* AES-GCM/AES-CCM/Poly1305-ChaCha20 all have N_MIN=N_MAX = 12. */
iv_length = 12;
ssl_debug_printf("%s key_length %u iv_length %u\n", G_STRFUNC, key_length, iv_length);
const char *label_prefix = tls13_hkdf_label_prefix(ssl_session->session.tls13_draft_version);
if (!tls13_hkdf_expand_label(hash_algo, secret, label_prefix, "key", key_length, &write_key)) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s write_key expansion failed\n", G_STRFUNC);
return FALSE;
}
if (!tls13_hkdf_expand_label(hash_algo, secret, label_prefix, "iv", iv_length, &write_iv)) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s write_iv expansion failed\n", G_STRFUNC);
goto end;
}
ssl_print_data(is_from_server ? "Server Write Key" : "Client Write Key", write_key, key_length);
ssl_print_data(is_from_server ? "Server Write IV" : "Client Write IV", write_iv, iv_length);
ssl_debug_printf("%s ssl_create_decoder(%s)\n", G_STRFUNC, is_from_server ? "server" : "client");
decoder = ssl_create_decoder(cipher_suite, cipher_algo, 0, NULL, write_key, write_iv, iv_length);
if (!decoder) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't init %s decoder\n", G_STRFUNC, is_from_server ? "server" : "client");
goto end;
}
/* Continue the TLS session with new keys, but reuse old flow to keep things
* like "Follow TLS" working (by linking application data records). */
if (is_from_server) {
decoder->flow = ssl_session->server ? ssl_session->server->flow : ssl_create_flow();
ssl_session->server = decoder;
} else {
decoder->flow = ssl_session->client ? ssl_session->client->flow : ssl_create_flow();
ssl_session->client = decoder;
}
ssl_debug_printf("%s %s ready using cipher suite 0x%04x (cipher %s hash %s)\n", G_STRFUNC,
is_from_server ? "Server" : "Client", cipher_suite->number, cipher_name, hash_name);
success = TRUE;
end:
wmem_free(NULL, write_key);
wmem_free(NULL, write_iv);
return success;
}
/* (Pre-)master secrets calculations }}} */
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS
/* Decrypt RSA pre-master secret using RSA private key. {{{ */
static gboolean
ssl_decrypt_pre_master_secret(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session,
StringInfo *encrypted_pre_master, GHashTable *key_hash)
{
int ret;
if (!encrypted_pre_master)
return FALSE;
if (KEX_IS_DH(ssl_session->cipher_suite->kex)) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s: session uses Diffie-Hellman key exchange "
"(cipher suite 0x%04X %s) and cannot be decrypted "
"using a RSA private key file.\n",
G_STRFUNC, ssl_session->session.cipher,
val_to_str_ext_const(ssl_session->session.cipher,
&ssl_31_ciphersuite_ext, "unknown"));
return FALSE;
} else if (ssl_session->cipher_suite->kex != KEX_RSA) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s key exchange %d different from KEX_RSA (%d)\n",
G_STRFUNC, ssl_session->cipher_suite->kex, KEX_RSA);
return FALSE;
}
gnutls_privkey_t pk = (gnutls_privkey_t)g_hash_table_lookup(key_hash, ssl_session->cert_key_id);
ssl_print_string("pre master encrypted", encrypted_pre_master);
ssl_debug_printf("%s: RSA_private_decrypt\n", G_STRFUNC);
const gnutls_datum_t epms = { encrypted_pre_master->data, encrypted_pre_master->data_len };
gnutls_datum_t pms = { 0 };
if (pk) {
// Try to decrypt using the RSA keys table from (D)TLS preferences.
ret = gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data(pk, 0, &epms, &pms);
} else {
// Try to decrypt using a hardware token.
ret = secrets_rsa_decrypt(ssl_session->cert_key_id, epms.data, epms.size, &pms.data, &pms.size);
}
if (ret < 0) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s: decryption failed: %d (%s)\n", G_STRFUNC, ret, gnutls_strerror(ret));
return FALSE;
}
if (pms.size != 48) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s wrong pre_master_secret length (%d, expected %d)\n",
G_STRFUNC, pms.size, 48);
if (pk) {
gnutls_free(pms.data);
} else {
g_free(pms.data);
}
return FALSE;
}
ssl_session->pre_master_secret.data = (guint8 *)wmem_memdup(wmem_file_scope(), pms.data, 48);
ssl_session->pre_master_secret.data_len = 48;
if (pk) {
gnutls_free(pms.data);
} else {
g_free(pms.data);
}
ssl_print_string("pre master secret", &ssl_session->pre_master_secret);
/* Remove the master secret if it was there.
This forces keying material regeneration in
case we're renegotiating */
ssl_session->state &= ~(SSL_MASTER_SECRET|SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY);
ssl_session->state |= SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET;
return TRUE;
} /* }}} */
#endif /* HAVE_LIBGNUTLS */
/* Decryption integrity check {{{ */
static gint
tls_check_mac(SslDecoder*decoder, gint ct, gint ver, guint8* data,
guint32 datalen, guint8* mac)
{
SSL_HMAC hm;
gint md;
guint32 len;
guint8 buf[DIGEST_MAX_SIZE];
gint16 temp;
md=ssl_get_digest_by_name(ssl_cipher_suite_dig(decoder->cipher_suite)->name);
ssl_debug_printf("tls_check_mac mac type:%s md %d\n",
ssl_cipher_suite_dig(decoder->cipher_suite)->name, md);
if (ssl_hmac_init(&hm,decoder->mac_key.data,decoder->mac_key.data_len,md) != 0)
return -1;
/* hash sequence number */
phton64(buf, decoder->seq);
decoder->seq++;
ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,8);
/* hash content type */
buf[0]=ct;
ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,1);
/* hash version,data length and data*/
/* *((gint16*)buf) = g_htons(ver); */
temp = g_htons(ver);
memcpy(buf, &temp, 2);
ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,2);
/* *((gint16*)buf) = g_htons(datalen); */
temp = g_htons(datalen);
memcpy(buf, &temp, 2);
ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,2);
ssl_hmac_update(&hm,data,datalen);
/* get digest and digest len*/
len = sizeof(buf);
ssl_hmac_final(&hm,buf,&len);
ssl_hmac_cleanup(&hm);
ssl_print_data("Mac", buf, len);
if(memcmp(mac,buf,len))
return -1;
return 0;
}
static int
ssl3_check_mac(SslDecoder*decoder,int ct,guint8* data,
guint32 datalen, guint8* mac)
{
SSL_MD mc;
gint md;
guint32 len;
guint8 buf[64],dgst[20];
gint pad_ct;
gint16 temp;
pad_ct=(decoder->cipher_suite->dig==DIG_SHA)?40:48;
/* get cipher used for digest comptuation */
md=ssl_get_digest_by_name(ssl_cipher_suite_dig(decoder->cipher_suite)->name);
if (ssl_md_init(&mc,md) !=0)
return -1;
/* do hash computation on data && padding */
ssl_md_update(&mc,decoder->mac_key.data,decoder->mac_key.data_len);
/* hash padding*/
memset(buf,0x36,pad_ct);
ssl_md_update(&mc,buf,pad_ct);
/* hash sequence number */
phton64(buf, decoder->seq);
decoder->seq++;
ssl_md_update(&mc,buf,8);
/* hash content type */
buf[0]=ct;
ssl_md_update(&mc,buf,1);
/* hash data length in network byte order and data*/
/* *((gint16* )buf) = g_htons(datalen); */
temp = g_htons(datalen);
memcpy(buf, &temp, 2);
ssl_md_update(&mc,buf,2);
ssl_md_update(&mc,data,datalen);
/* get partial digest */
ssl_md_final(&mc,dgst,&len);
ssl_md_cleanup(&mc);
ssl_md_init(&mc,md);
/* hash mac key */
ssl_md_update(&mc,decoder->mac_key.data,decoder->mac_key.data_len);
/* hash padding and partial digest*/
memset(buf,0x5c,pad_ct);
ssl_md_update(&mc,buf,pad_ct);
ssl_md_update(&mc,dgst,len);
ssl_md_final(&mc,dgst,&len);
ssl_md_cleanup(&mc);
if(memcmp(mac,dgst,len))
return -1;
return(0);
}
static gint
dtls_check_mac(SslDecoder*decoder, gint ct,int ver, guint8* data,
guint32 datalen, guint8* mac)
{
SSL_HMAC hm;
gint md;
guint32 len;
guint8 buf[DIGEST_MAX_SIZE];
gint16 temp;
md=ssl_get_digest_by_name(ssl_cipher_suite_dig(decoder->cipher_suite)->name);
ssl_debug_printf("dtls_check_mac mac type:%s md %d\n",
ssl_cipher_suite_dig(decoder->cipher_suite)->name, md);
if (ssl_hmac_init(&hm,decoder->mac_key.data,decoder->mac_key.data_len,md) != 0)
return -1;
ssl_debug_printf("dtls_check_mac seq: %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT " epoch: %d\n",decoder->seq,decoder->epoch);
/* hash sequence number */
phton64(buf, decoder->seq);
buf[0]=decoder->epoch>>8;
buf[1]=(guint8)decoder->epoch;
ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,8);
/* hash content type */
buf[0]=ct;
ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,1);
/* hash version,data length and data */
temp = g_htons(ver);
memcpy(buf, &temp, 2);
ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,2);
temp = g_htons(datalen);
memcpy(buf, &temp, 2);
ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,2);
ssl_hmac_update(&hm,data,datalen);
/* get digest and digest len */
len = sizeof(buf);
ssl_hmac_final(&hm,buf,&len);
ssl_hmac_cleanup(&hm);
ssl_print_data("Mac", buf, len);
if(memcmp(mac,buf,len))
return -1;
return(0);
}
/* Decryption integrity check }}} */
static gboolean
tls_decrypt_aead_record(SslDecryptSession *ssl, SslDecoder *decoder,
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD
guint8 ct, guint16 record_version,
#else
guint8 ct _U_, guint16 record_version _U_,
#endif
gboolean ignore_mac_failed
#ifndef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD
_U_
#endif
,
const guchar *in, guint16 inl,
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD
const guchar *cid, guint8 cidl,
#else
const guchar *cid _U_, guint8 cidl _U_,
#endif
StringInfo *out_str, guint *outl)
{
/* RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2) 6.2.3.3 defines the TLSCipherText.fragment as:
* GenericAEADCipher: { nonce_explicit, [content] }
* In TLS 1.3 this explicit nonce is gone.
* With AES GCM/CCM, "[content]" is actually the concatenation of the
* ciphertext and authentication tag.
*/
const guint16 version = ssl->session.version;
const gboolean is_v12 = version == TLSV1DOT2_VERSION || version == DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION;
gcry_error_t err;
const guchar *explicit_nonce = NULL, *ciphertext;
guint ciphertext_len, auth_tag_len;
guchar nonce[12];
const ssl_cipher_mode_t cipher_mode = decoder->cipher_suite->mode;
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD
const gboolean is_cid = ct == SSL_ID_TLS12_CID && version == DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION;
const guint8 draft_version = ssl->session.tls13_draft_version;
const guchar *auth_tag_wire;
guchar auth_tag_calc[16];
#else
guchar nonce_with_counter[16] = { 0 };
#endif
switch (cipher_mode) {
case MODE_GCM:
case MODE_CCM:
case MODE_POLY1305:
auth_tag_len = 16;
break;
case MODE_CCM_8:
auth_tag_len = 8;
break;
default:
ssl_debug_printf("%s unsupported cipher!\n", G_STRFUNC);
return FALSE;
}
/* Parse input into explicit nonce (TLS 1.2 only), ciphertext and tag. */
if (is_v12 && cipher_mode != MODE_POLY1305) {
if (inl < EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN + auth_tag_len) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s input %d is too small for explicit nonce %d and auth tag %d\n",
G_STRFUNC, inl, EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN, auth_tag_len);
return FALSE;
}
explicit_nonce = in;
ciphertext = explicit_nonce + EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN;
ciphertext_len = inl - EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN - auth_tag_len;
} else if (version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION || cipher_mode == MODE_POLY1305) {
if (inl < auth_tag_len) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s input %d has no space for auth tag %d\n", G_STRFUNC, inl, auth_tag_len);
return FALSE;
}
ciphertext = in;
ciphertext_len = inl - auth_tag_len;
} else {
ssl_debug_printf("%s Unexpected TLS version %#x\n", G_STRFUNC, version);
return FALSE;
}
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD
auth_tag_wire = ciphertext + ciphertext_len;
#endif
/*
* Nonce construction is version-specific. Note that AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305
* (RFC 7905) uses a nonce construction similar to TLS 1.3.
*/
if (is_v12 && cipher_mode != MODE_POLY1305) {
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(decoder->write_iv.data_len == IMPLICIT_NONCE_LEN);
/* Implicit (4) and explicit (8) part of nonce. */
memcpy(nonce, decoder->write_iv.data, IMPLICIT_NONCE_LEN);
memcpy(nonce + IMPLICIT_NONCE_LEN, explicit_nonce, EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN);
#ifndef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD
if (cipher_mode == MODE_GCM) {
/* NIST SP 800-38D, sect. 7.2 says that the 32-bit counter part starts
* at 1, and gets incremented before passing to the block cipher. */
memcpy(nonce_with_counter, nonce, IMPLICIT_NONCE_LEN + EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN);
nonce_with_counter[IMPLICIT_NONCE_LEN + EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN + 3] = 2;
} else if (cipher_mode == MODE_CCM || cipher_mode == MODE_CCM_8) {
/* The nonce for CCM and GCM are the same, but the nonce is used as input
* in the CCM algorithm described in RFC 3610. The nonce generated here is
* the one from RFC 3610 sect 2.3. Encryption. */
/* Flags: (L-1) ; L = 16 - 1 - nonceSize */
nonce_with_counter[0] = 3 - 1;
memcpy(nonce_with_counter + 1, nonce, IMPLICIT_NONCE_LEN + EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN);
/* struct { opaque salt[4]; opaque nonce_explicit[8] } CCMNonce (RFC 6655) */
nonce_with_counter[IMPLICIT_NONCE_LEN + EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN + 3] = 1;
} else {
g_assert_not_reached();
}
#endif
} else if (version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION || cipher_mode == MODE_POLY1305) {
/*
* Technically the nonce length must be at least 8 bytes, but for
* AES-GCM, AES-CCM and Poly1305-ChaCha20 the nonce length is exact 12.
*/
const guint nonce_len = 12;
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(decoder->write_iv.data_len == nonce_len);
memcpy(nonce, decoder->write_iv.data, decoder->write_iv.data_len);
/* Sequence number is left-padded with zeroes and XORed with write_iv */
phton64(nonce + nonce_len - 8, pntoh64(nonce + nonce_len - 8) ^ decoder->seq);
ssl_debug_printf("%s seq %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT "\n", G_STRFUNC, decoder->seq);
}
/* Set nonce and additional authentication data */
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD
gcry_cipher_reset(decoder->evp);
ssl_print_data("nonce", nonce, 12);
err = gcry_cipher_setiv(decoder->evp, nonce, 12);
if (err) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s failed to set nonce: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, gcry_strerror(err));
return FALSE;
}
if (decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CCM || decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CCM_8) {
/* size of plaintext, additional authenticated data and auth tag. */
guint64 lengths[3] = { ciphertext_len, is_v12 ? 13 : 0, auth_tag_len };
if (is_cid) {
lengths[1] = 13 + 1 + cidl; /* cid length (1 byte) + cid (cidl bytes)*/
}
gcry_cipher_ctl(decoder->evp, GCRYCTL_SET_CCM_LENGTHS, lengths, sizeof(lengths));
}
/* (D)TLS 1.2 needs specific AAD, TLS 1.3 (before -25) uses empty AAD. */
if (is_cid) { /* if connection ID */
guchar aad[14+DTLS_MAX_CID_LENGTH];
guint aad_len = 14 + cidl;
phton64(aad, decoder->seq); /* record sequence number */
phton16(aad, decoder->epoch); /* DTLS 1.2 includes epoch. */
aad[8] = ct; /* TLSCompressed.type */
phton16(aad + 9, record_version); /* TLSCompressed.version */
memcpy(aad + 11, cid, cidl); /* cid */
aad[11 + cidl] = cidl; /* cid_length */
phton16(aad + 12 + cidl, ciphertext_len); /* TLSCompressed.length */
ssl_print_data("AAD", aad, aad_len);
err = gcry_cipher_authenticate(decoder->evp, aad, aad_len);
if (err) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s failed to set AAD: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, gcry_strerror(err));
return FALSE;
}
} else if (is_v12) {
guchar aad[13];
phton64(aad, decoder->seq); /* record sequence number */
if (version == DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION) {
phton16(aad, decoder->epoch); /* DTLS 1.2 includes epoch. */
}
aad[8] = ct; /* TLSCompressed.type */
phton16(aad + 9, record_version); /* TLSCompressed.version */
phton16(aad + 11, ciphertext_len); /* TLSCompressed.length */
ssl_print_data("AAD", aad, sizeof(aad));
err = gcry_cipher_authenticate(decoder->evp, aad, sizeof(aad));
if (err) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s failed to set AAD: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, gcry_strerror(err));
return FALSE;
}
} else if (draft_version >= 25 || draft_version == 0) {
guchar aad[5];
aad[0] = ct; /* TLSCiphertext.opaque_type (23) */
phton16(aad + 1, record_version); /* TLSCiphertext.legacy_record_version (0x0303) */
phton16(aad + 3, inl); /* TLSCiphertext.length */
ssl_print_data("AAD", aad, sizeof(aad));
err = gcry_cipher_authenticate(decoder->evp, aad, sizeof(aad));
if (err) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s failed to set AAD: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, gcry_strerror(err));
return FALSE;
}
}
#else
err = gcry_cipher_setctr(decoder->evp, nonce_with_counter, 16);
if (err) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s failed: failed to set CTR: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, gcry_strerror(err));
return FALSE;
}
#endif
/* Decrypt now that nonce and AAD are set. */
err = gcry_cipher_decrypt(decoder->evp, out_str->data, out_str->data_len, ciphertext, ciphertext_len);
if (err) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s decrypt failed: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, gcry_strerror(err));
return FALSE;
}
/* Check authentication tag for authenticity (replaces MAC) */
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD
err = gcry_cipher_gettag(decoder->evp, auth_tag_calc, auth_tag_len);
if (err == 0 && !memcmp(auth_tag_calc, auth_tag_wire, auth_tag_len)) {
ssl_print_data("auth_tag(OK)", auth_tag_calc, auth_tag_len);
} else {
if (err) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s cannot obtain tag: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, gcry_strerror(err));
} else {
ssl_debug_printf("%s auth tag mismatch\n", G_STRFUNC);
ssl_print_data("auth_tag(expect)", auth_tag_calc, auth_tag_len);
ssl_print_data("auth_tag(actual)", auth_tag_wire, auth_tag_len);
}
if (ignore_mac_failed) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s: auth check failed, but ignored for troubleshooting ;-)\n", G_STRFUNC);
} else {
return FALSE;
}
}
#else
ssl_debug_printf("Libgcrypt is older than 1.6, unable to verify auth tag!\n");
#endif
/*
* Increment the (implicit) sequence number for TLS 1.2/1.3. This is done
* after successful authentication to ensure that early data is skipped when
* CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET keys are unavailable.
*/
if (version == TLSV1DOT2_VERSION || version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
decoder->seq++;
}
ssl_print_data("Plaintext", out_str->data, ciphertext_len);
*outl = ciphertext_len;
return TRUE;
}
/* Record decryption glue based on security parameters {{{ */
/* Assume that we are called only for a non-NULL decoder which also means that
* we have a non-NULL decoder->cipher_suite. */
gint
ssl_decrypt_record(SslDecryptSession *ssl, SslDecoder *decoder, guint8 ct, guint16 record_version,
gboolean ignore_mac_failed,
const guchar *in, guint16 inl, const guchar *cid, guint8 cidl,
StringInfo *comp_str, StringInfo *out_str, guint *outl)
{
guint pad, worklen, uncomplen, maclen, mac_fraglen = 0;
guint8 *mac = NULL, *mac_frag = NULL;
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record ciphertext len %d\n", inl);
ssl_print_data("Ciphertext",in, inl);
if ((ssl->session.version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) != (decoder->cipher_suite->kex == KEX_TLS13)) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s Invalid cipher suite for the protocol version!\n", G_STRFUNC);
return -1;
}
/* ensure we have enough storage space for decrypted data */
if (inl > out_str->data_len)
{
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: allocating %d bytes for decrypt data (old len %d)\n",
inl + 32, out_str->data_len);
ssl_data_realloc(out_str, inl + 32);
}
/* AEAD ciphers (GenericAEADCipher in TLS 1.2; TLS 1.3) have no padding nor
* a separate MAC, so use a different routine for simplicity. */
if (decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_GCM ||
decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CCM ||
decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CCM_8 ||
decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_POLY1305 ||
ssl->session.version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
if (!tls_decrypt_aead_record(ssl, decoder, ct, record_version, ignore_mac_failed, in, inl, cid, cidl, out_str, &worklen)) {
/* decryption failed */
return -1;
}
goto skip_mac;
}
/* RFC 6101/2246: SSLCipherText/TLSCipherText has two structures for types:
* (notation: { unencrypted, [ encrypted ] })
* GenericStreamCipher: { [content, mac] }
* GenericBlockCipher: { IV (TLS 1.1+), [content, mac, padding, padding_len] }
* RFC 5426 (TLS 1.2): TLSCipherText has additionally:
* GenericAEADCipher: { nonce_explicit, [content] }
* RFC 4347 (DTLS): based on TLS 1.1, only GenericBlockCipher is supported.
* RFC 6347 (DTLS 1.2): based on TLS 1.2, includes GenericAEADCipher too.
*/
maclen = ssl_cipher_suite_dig(decoder->cipher_suite)->len;
/* (TLS 1.1 and later, DTLS) Extract explicit IV for GenericBlockCipher */
if (decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CBC) {
guint blocksize = 0;
switch (ssl->session.version) {
case TLSV1DOT1_VERSION:
case TLSV1DOT2_VERSION:
case DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION:
case DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION:
case DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION:
blocksize = ssl_get_cipher_blocksize(decoder->cipher_suite);
if (inl < blocksize) {
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record failed: input %d has no space for IV %d\n",
inl, blocksize);
return -1;
}
pad = gcry_cipher_setiv(decoder->evp, in, blocksize);
if (pad != 0) {
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record failed: failed to set IV: %s %s\n",
gcry_strsource (pad), gcry_strerror (pad));
}
inl -= blocksize;
in += blocksize;
break;
}
/* Encrypt-then-MAC for (D)TLS (RFC 7366) */
if (ssl->state & SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
/*
* MAC is calculated over (IV + ) ENCRYPTED contents:
*
* MAC(MAC_write_key, ... +
* IV + // for TLS 1.1 or greater
* TLSCiphertext.enc_content);
*/
if (inl < maclen) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s failed: input %d has no space for MAC %d\n",
G_STRFUNC, inl, maclen);
return -1;
}
inl -= maclen;
mac = (guint8 *)in + inl;
mac_frag = (guint8 *)in - blocksize;
mac_fraglen = blocksize + inl;
}
}
/* First decrypt*/
if ((pad = ssl_cipher_decrypt(&decoder->evp, out_str->data, out_str->data_len, in, inl)) != 0) {
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record failed: ssl_cipher_decrypt: %s %s\n", gcry_strsource (pad),
gcry_strerror (pad));
return -1;
}
ssl_print_data("Plaintext", out_str->data, inl);
worklen=inl;
/* strip padding for GenericBlockCipher */
if (decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CBC) {
if (inl < 1) { /* Should this check happen earlier? */
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record failed: input length %d too small\n", inl);
return -1;
}
pad=out_str->data[inl-1];
if (worklen <= pad) {
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record failed: padding %d too large for work %d\n",
pad, worklen);
return -1;
}
worklen-=(pad+1);
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record found padding %d final len %d\n",
pad, worklen);
}
/* MAC for GenericStreamCipher and GenericBlockCipher.
* (normal case without Encrypt-then-MAC (RFC 7366) extension. */
if (!mac) {
/*
* MAC is calculated over the DECRYPTED contents:
*
* MAC(MAC_write_key, ... + TLSCompressed.fragment);
*/
if (worklen < maclen) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s wrong record len/padding outlen %d\n work %d\n", G_STRFUNC, *outl, worklen);
return -1;
}
worklen -= maclen;
mac = out_str->data + worklen;
mac_frag = out_str->data;
mac_fraglen = worklen;
}
/* If NULL encryption active and no keys are available, do not bother
* checking the MAC. We do not have keys for that. */
if (decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_STREAM &&
decoder->cipher_suite->enc == ENC_NULL &&
!(ssl->state & SSL_MASTER_SECRET)) {
ssl_debug_printf("MAC check skipped due to missing keys\n");
goto skip_mac;
}
/* Now check the MAC */
ssl_debug_printf("checking mac (len %d, version %X, ct %d seq %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT ")\n",
worklen, ssl->session.version, ct, decoder->seq);
if(ssl->session.version==SSLV3_VERSION){
if(ssl3_check_mac(decoder,ct,mac_frag,mac_fraglen,mac) < 0) {
if(ignore_mac_failed) {
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac failed, but ignored for troubleshooting ;-)\n");
}
else{
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac failed\n");
return -1;
}
}
else{
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac ok\n");
}
}
else if(ssl->session.version==TLSV1_VERSION || ssl->session.version==TLSV1DOT1_VERSION || ssl->session.version==TLSV1DOT2_VERSION){
if(tls_check_mac(decoder,ct,ssl->session.version,mac_frag,mac_fraglen,mac)< 0) {
if(ignore_mac_failed) {
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac failed, but ignored for troubleshooting ;-)\n");
}
else{
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac failed\n");
return -1;
}
}
else{
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac ok\n");
}
}
else if(ssl->session.version==DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION ||
ssl->session.version==DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION ||
ssl->session.version==DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION){
/* Try rfc-compliant mac first, and if failed, try old openssl's non-rfc-compliant mac */
if(dtls_check_mac(decoder,ct,ssl->session.version,mac_frag,mac_fraglen,mac)>= 0) {
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac ok\n");
}
else if(tls_check_mac(decoder,ct,TLSV1_VERSION,mac_frag,mac_fraglen,mac)>= 0) {
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: dtls rfc-compliant mac failed, but old openssl's non-rfc-compliant mac ok\n");
}
else if(ignore_mac_failed) {
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac failed, but ignored for troubleshooting ;-)\n");
}
else{
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac failed\n");
return -1;
}
}
skip_mac:
*outl = worklen;
if (decoder->compression > 0) {
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: compression method %d\n", decoder->compression);
ssl_data_copy(comp_str, out_str);
ssl_print_data("Plaintext compressed", comp_str->data, worklen);
if (!decoder->decomp) {
ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: no decoder available\n");
return -1;
}
if (ssl_decompress_record(decoder->decomp, comp_str->data, worklen, out_str, &uncomplen) < 0) return -1;
ssl_print_data("Plaintext uncompressed", out_str->data, uncomplen);
*outl = uncomplen;
}
return 0;
}
/* Record decryption glue based on security parameters }}} */
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS
/* RSA private key file processing {{{ */
static void
ssl_find_private_key_by_pubkey(SslDecryptSession *ssl,
gnutls_datum_t *subjectPublicKeyInfo)
{
gnutls_pubkey_t pubkey = NULL;
cert_key_id_t key_id;
size_t key_id_len = sizeof(key_id);
int r;
if (!subjectPublicKeyInfo->size) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s: could not find SubjectPublicKeyInfo\n", G_STRFUNC);
return;
}
r = gnutls_pubkey_init(&pubkey);
if (r < 0) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s: failed to init pubkey: %s\n",
G_STRFUNC, gnutls_strerror(r));
return;
}
r = gnutls_pubkey_import(pubkey, subjectPublicKeyInfo, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
if (r < 0) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s: failed to import pubkey from handshake: %s\n",
G_STRFUNC, gnutls_strerror(r));
goto end;
}
if (gnutls_pubkey_get_pk_algorithm(pubkey, NULL) != GNUTLS_PK_RSA) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s: Not a RSA public key - ignoring.\n", G_STRFUNC);
goto end;
}
/* Generate a 20-byte SHA-1 hash. */
r = gnutls_pubkey_get_key_id(pubkey, 0, key_id.key_id, &key_id_len);
if (r < 0) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s: failed to extract key id from pubkey: %s\n",
G_STRFUNC, gnutls_strerror(r));
goto end;
}
if (key_id_len != sizeof(key_id)) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s: expected Key ID size %zu, got %zu\n",
G_STRFUNC, sizeof(key_id), key_id_len);
goto end;
}
ssl_print_data("Certificate.KeyID", key_id.key_id, key_id_len);
ssl->cert_key_id = wmem_new(wmem_file_scope(), cert_key_id_t);
*ssl->cert_key_id = key_id;
end:
gnutls_pubkey_deinit(pubkey);
}
/* RSA private key file processing }}} */
#endif /* HAVE_LIBGNUTLS */
/*--- Start of dissector-related code below ---*/
/* get ssl data for this session. if no ssl data is found allocate a new one*/
SslDecryptSession *
ssl_get_session(conversation_t *conversation, dissector_handle_t tls_handle)
{
void *conv_data;
SslDecryptSession *ssl_session;
int proto_ssl;
proto_ssl = dissector_handle_get_protocol_index(tls_handle);
conv_data = conversation_get_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl);
if (conv_data != NULL)
return (SslDecryptSession *)conv_data;
/* no previous SSL conversation info, initialize it. */
ssl_session = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), SslDecryptSession);
/* data_len is the part that is meaningful, not the allocated length */
ssl_session->master_secret.data_len = 0;
ssl_session->master_secret.data = ssl_session->_master_secret;
ssl_session->session_id.data_len = 0;
ssl_session->session_id.data = ssl_session->_session_id;
ssl_session->client_random.data_len = 0;
ssl_session->client_random.data = ssl_session->_client_random;
ssl_session->server_random.data_len = 0;
ssl_session->server_random.data = ssl_session->_server_random;
ssl_session->session_ticket.data_len = 0;
ssl_session->session_ticket.data = NULL; /* will be re-alloced as needed */
ssl_session->server_data_for_iv.data_len = 0;
ssl_session->server_data_for_iv.data = ssl_session->_server_data_for_iv;
ssl_session->client_data_for_iv.data_len = 0;
ssl_session->client_data_for_iv.data = ssl_session->_client_data_for_iv;
ssl_session->app_data_segment.data = NULL;
ssl_session->app_data_segment.data_len = 0;
ssl_session->handshake_data.data=NULL;
ssl_session->handshake_data.data_len=0;
/* Initialize parameters which are not necessary specific to decryption. */
ssl_session->session.version = SSL_VER_UNKNOWN;
clear_address(&ssl_session->session.srv_addr);
ssl_session->session.srv_ptype = PT_NONE;
ssl_session->session.srv_port = 0;
conversation_add_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl, ssl_session);
return ssl_session;
}
/* Resets the decryption parameters for the next decoder. */
static void ssl_reset_session(SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl, gboolean is_client)
{
if (ssl) {
/* Ensure that secrets are not restored using stale identifiers. Split
* between client and server in case the packets somehow got out of order. */
gint clear_flags = SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY | SSL_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET;
if (is_client) {
clear_flags |= SSL_CLIENT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET;
ssl->session_id.data_len = 0;
ssl->session_ticket.data_len = 0;
ssl->master_secret.data_len = 0;
ssl->client_random.data_len = 0;
ssl->has_early_data = FALSE;
} else {
clear_flags |= SSL_SERVER_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET;
ssl->server_random.data_len = 0;
ssl->pre_master_secret.data_len = 0;
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS
ssl->cert_key_id = NULL;
#endif
ssl->psk.data_len = 0;
}
if (ssl->state & clear_flags) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s detected renegotiation, clearing 0x%02x (%s side)\n",
G_STRFUNC, ssl->state & clear_flags, is_client ? "client" : "server");
ssl->state &= ~clear_flags;
}
}
/* These flags might be used for non-decryption purposes and may affect the
* dissection, so reset them as well. */
if (is_client) {
session->client_cert_type = 0;
} else {
session->compression = 0;
session->server_cert_type = 0;
/* session->is_session_resumed is already handled in the ServerHello dissection. */
}
}
void
tls_set_appdata_dissector(dissector_handle_t tls_handle, packet_info *pinfo,
dissector_handle_t app_handle)
{
conversation_t *conversation;
SslSession *session;
/* Ignore if the TLS or other dissector is disabled. */
if (!tls_handle || !app_handle)
return;
conversation = find_or_create_conversation(pinfo);
session = &ssl_get_session(conversation, tls_handle)->session;
session->app_handle = app_handle;
}
static guint32
ssl_starttls(dissector_handle_t tls_handle, packet_info *pinfo,
dissector_handle_t app_handle, guint32 last_nontls_frame)
{
conversation_t *conversation;
SslSession *session;
/* Ignore if the TLS dissector is disabled. */
if (!tls_handle)
return 0;
/* The caller should always pass a valid handle to its own dissector. */
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(app_handle);
conversation = find_or_create_conversation(pinfo);
session = &ssl_get_session(conversation, tls_handle)->session;
ssl_debug_printf("%s: old frame %d, app_handle=%p (%s)\n", G_STRFUNC,
session->last_nontls_frame,
(void *)session->app_handle,
dissector_handle_get_dissector_name(session->app_handle));
ssl_debug_printf("%s: current frame %d, app_handle=%p (%s)\n", G_STRFUNC,
pinfo->num, (void *)app_handle,
dissector_handle_get_dissector_name(app_handle));
/* Do not switch again if a dissector did it before. */
if (session->last_nontls_frame) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s: not overriding previous app handle!\n", G_STRFUNC);
return session->last_nontls_frame;
}
session->app_handle = app_handle;
/* The TLS dissector should be called first for this conversation. */
conversation_set_dissector(conversation, tls_handle);
/* TLS starts after this frame. */
session->last_nontls_frame = last_nontls_frame;
return 0;
}
/* ssl_starttls_ack: mark future frames as encrypted. */
guint32
ssl_starttls_ack(dissector_handle_t tls_handle, packet_info *pinfo,
dissector_handle_t app_handle)
{
return ssl_starttls(tls_handle, pinfo, app_handle, pinfo->num);
}
guint32
ssl_starttls_post_ack(dissector_handle_t tls_handle, packet_info *pinfo,
dissector_handle_t app_handle)
{
return ssl_starttls(tls_handle, pinfo, app_handle, pinfo->num - 1);
}
dissector_handle_t
ssl_find_appdata_dissector(const char *name)
{
/* Accept 'http' for backwards compatibility and sanity. */
if (!strcmp(name, "http"))
name = "http-over-tls";
return find_dissector(name);
}
/* Functions for TLS/DTLS sessions and RSA private keys hashtables. {{{ */
static gint
ssl_equal (gconstpointer v, gconstpointer v2)
{
const StringInfo *val1;
const StringInfo *val2;
val1 = (const StringInfo *)v;
val2 = (const StringInfo *)v2;
if (val1->data_len == val2->data_len &&
!memcmp(val1->data, val2->data, val2->data_len)) {
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static guint
ssl_hash (gconstpointer v)
{
guint l,hash;
const StringInfo* id;
const guint* cur;
hash = 0;
id = (const StringInfo*) v;
/* id and id->data are mallocated in ssl_save_master_key(). As such 'data'
* should be aligned for any kind of access (for example as a guint as
* is done below). The intermediate void* cast is to prevent "cast
* increases required alignment of target type" warnings on CPUs (such
* as SPARCs) that do not allow misaligned memory accesses.
*/
cur = (const guint*)(void*) id->data;
for (l=4; (l < id->data_len); l+=4, cur++)
hash = hash ^ (*cur);
return hash;
}
/* Functions for TLS/DTLS sessions and RSA private keys hashtables. }}} */
/* Handling of association between tls/dtls ports and clear text protocol. {{{ */
void
ssl_association_add(const char* dissector_table_name, dissector_handle_t main_handle, dissector_handle_t subdissector_handle, guint port, gboolean tcp)
{
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(main_handle);
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(subdissector_handle);
/* Registration is required for Export PDU feature to work properly. */
DISSECTOR_ASSERT_HINT(dissector_handle_get_dissector_name(subdissector_handle),
"SSL appdata dissectors must register with register_dissector()!");
ssl_debug_printf("association_add %s port %d handle %p\n", dissector_table_name, port, (void *)subdissector_handle);
if (port) {
dissector_add_uint(dissector_table_name, port, subdissector_handle);
if (tcp)
dissector_add_uint("tcp.port", port, main_handle);
else
dissector_add_uint("udp.port", port, main_handle);
dissector_add_uint("sctp.port", port, main_handle);
} else {
dissector_add_for_decode_as(dissector_table_name, subdissector_handle);
}
}
void
ssl_association_remove(const char* dissector_table_name, dissector_handle_t main_handle, dissector_handle_t subdissector_handle, guint port, gboolean tcp)
{
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_association_remove removing %s %u - handle %p\n",
tcp?"TCP":"UDP", port, (void *)subdissector_handle);
if (main_handle) {
dissector_delete_uint(tcp?"tcp.port":"udp.port", port, main_handle);
dissector_delete_uint("sctp.port", port, main_handle);
}
if (port) {
dissector_delete_uint(dissector_table_name, port, subdissector_handle);
}
}
void
ssl_set_server(SslSession *session, address *addr, port_type ptype, guint32 port)
{
copy_address_wmem(wmem_file_scope(), &session->srv_addr, addr);
session->srv_ptype = ptype;
session->srv_port = port;
}
int
ssl_packet_from_server(SslSession *session, dissector_table_t table, packet_info *pinfo)
{
gint ret;
if (session->srv_addr.type != AT_NONE) {
ret = (session->srv_ptype == pinfo->ptype) &&
(session->srv_port == pinfo->srcport) &&
addresses_equal(&session->srv_addr, &pinfo->src);
} else {
ret = (dissector_get_uint_handle(table, pinfo->srcport) != 0);
}
ssl_debug_printf("packet_from_server: is from server - %s\n", (ret)?"TRUE":"FALSE");
return ret;
}
/* Handling of association between tls/dtls ports and clear text protocol. }}} */
/* Links SSL records with the real packet data. {{{ */
SslPacketInfo *
tls_add_packet_info(gint proto, packet_info *pinfo, guint8 curr_layer_num_ssl)
{
SslPacketInfo *pi = (SslPacketInfo *)p_get_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto, curr_layer_num_ssl);
if (!pi) {
pi = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), SslPacketInfo);
pi->srcport = pinfo->srcport;
pi->destport = pinfo->destport;
p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto, curr_layer_num_ssl, pi);
}
return pi;
}
/**
* Remembers the decrypted TLS record fragment (TLSInnerPlaintext in TLS 1.3) to
* avoid the need for a decoder in the second pass. Additionally, it remembers
* sequence numbers (for reassembly and Follow TLS Stream).
*
* @param proto The protocol identifier (proto_ssl or proto_dtls).
* @param pinfo The packet where the record originates from.
* @param data Decrypted data to store in the record.
* @param data_len Length of decrypted record data.
* @param record_id The identifier for this record within the current packet.
* @param flow Information about sequence numbers, etc.
* @param type TLS Content Type (such as handshake or application_data).
* @param curr_layer_num_ssl The layer identifier for this TLS session.
*/
void
ssl_add_record_info(gint proto, packet_info *pinfo, const guchar *data, gint data_len, gint record_id, SslFlow *flow, ContentType type, guint8 curr_layer_num_ssl)
{
SslRecordInfo* rec, **prec;
SslPacketInfo *pi = tls_add_packet_info(proto, pinfo, curr_layer_num_ssl);
rec = wmem_new(wmem_file_scope(), SslRecordInfo);
rec->plain_data = (guchar *)wmem_memdup(wmem_file_scope(), data, data_len);
rec->data_len = data_len;
rec->id = record_id;
rec->type = type;
rec->next = NULL;
if (flow && type == SSL_ID_APP_DATA) {
rec->seq = flow->byte_seq;
rec->flow = flow;
flow->byte_seq += data_len;
ssl_debug_printf("%s stored decrypted record seq=%d nxtseq=%d flow=%p\n",
G_STRFUNC, rec->seq, rec->seq + data_len, (void*)flow);
}
/* Remember decrypted records. */
prec = &pi->records;
while (*prec) prec = &(*prec)->next;
*prec = rec;
}
/* search in packet data for the specified id; return a newly created tvb for the associated data */
tvbuff_t*
ssl_get_record_info(tvbuff_t *parent_tvb, int proto, packet_info *pinfo, gint record_id, guint8 curr_layer_num_ssl, SslRecordInfo **matched_record)
{
SslRecordInfo* rec;
SslPacketInfo* pi;
pi = (SslPacketInfo *)p_get_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto, curr_layer_num_ssl);
if (!pi)
return NULL;
for (rec = pi->records; rec; rec = rec->next)
if (rec->id == record_id) {
*matched_record = rec;
/* link new real_data_tvb with a parent tvb so it is freed when frame dissection is complete */
return tvb_new_child_real_data(parent_tvb, rec->plain_data, rec->data_len, rec->data_len);
}
return NULL;
}
/* Links SSL records with the real packet data. }}} */
/* initialize/reset per capture state data (ssl sessions cache). {{{ */
void
ssl_common_init(ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map,
StringInfo *decrypted_data, StringInfo *compressed_data)
{
mk_map->session = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
mk_map->tickets = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
mk_map->crandom = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
mk_map->pre_master = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
mk_map->pms = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
mk_map->tls13_client_early = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
mk_map->tls13_client_handshake = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
mk_map->tls13_server_handshake = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
mk_map->tls13_client_appdata = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
mk_map->tls13_server_appdata = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
mk_map->tls13_early_exporter = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
mk_map->tls13_exporter = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
ssl_data_alloc(decrypted_data, 32);
ssl_data_alloc(compressed_data, 32);
}
void
ssl_common_cleanup(ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map, FILE **ssl_keylog_file,
StringInfo *decrypted_data, StringInfo *compressed_data)
{
g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->session);
g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->tickets);
g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->crandom);
g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->pre_master);
g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->pms);
g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->tls13_client_early);
g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->tls13_client_handshake);
g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->tls13_server_handshake);
g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->tls13_client_appdata);
g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->tls13_server_appdata);
g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->tls13_early_exporter);
g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->tls13_exporter);
g_free(decrypted_data->data);
g_free(compressed_data->data);
/* close the previous keylog file now that the cache are cleared, this
* allows the cache to be filled with the full keylog file contents. */
if (*ssl_keylog_file) {
fclose(*ssl_keylog_file);
*ssl_keylog_file = NULL;
}
}
/* }}} */
/* parse ssl related preferences (private keys and ports association strings) */
#if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS)
/* Load a single RSA key file item from preferences. {{{ */
void
ssl_parse_key_list(const ssldecrypt_assoc_t *uats, GHashTable *key_hash, const char* dissector_table_name, dissector_handle_t main_handle, gboolean tcp)
{
gnutls_x509_privkey_t x509_priv_key;
gnutls_privkey_t priv_key = NULL;
FILE* fp = NULL;
int ret;
size_t key_id_len = 20;
guchar *key_id = NULL;
char *err = NULL;
dissector_handle_t handle;
/* try to load keys file first */
fp = ws_fopen(uats->keyfile, "rb");
if (!fp) {
report_open_failure(uats->keyfile, errno, FALSE);
return;
}
if ((gint)strlen(uats->password) == 0) {
x509_priv_key = rsa_load_pem_key(fp, &err);
} else {
x509_priv_key = rsa_load_pkcs12(fp, uats->password, &err);
}
fclose(fp);
if (!x509_priv_key) {
if (err) {
report_failure("Can't load private key from %s: %s",
uats->keyfile, err);
g_free(err);
} else
report_failure("Can't load private key from %s: unknown error",
uats->keyfile);
return;
}
if (err) {
report_failure("Load of private key from %s \"succeeded\" with error %s",
uats->keyfile, err);
g_free(err);
}
gnutls_privkey_init(&priv_key);
ret = gnutls_privkey_import_x509(priv_key, x509_priv_key,
GNUTLS_PRIVKEY_IMPORT_AUTO_RELEASE|GNUTLS_PRIVKEY_IMPORT_COPY);
if (ret < 0) {
report_failure("Can't convert private key %s: %s",
uats->keyfile, gnutls_strerror(ret));
goto end;
}
key_id = (guchar *) g_malloc0(key_id_len);
ret = gnutls_x509_privkey_get_key_id(x509_priv_key, 0, key_id, &key_id_len);
if (ret < 0) {
report_failure("Can't calculate public key ID for %s: %s",
uats->keyfile, gnutls_strerror(ret));
goto end;
}
ssl_print_data("KeyID", key_id, key_id_len);
if (key_id_len != 20) {
report_failure("Expected Key ID size %u for %s, got %zu", 20,
uats->keyfile, key_id_len);
goto end;
}
g_hash_table_replace(key_hash, key_id, priv_key);
key_id = NULL; /* used in key_hash, do not free. */
priv_key = NULL;
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_init private key file %s successfully loaded.\n", uats->keyfile);
handle = ssl_find_appdata_dissector(uats->protocol);
if (handle) {
/* Port to subprotocol mapping */
guint16 port = 0;
if (ws_strtou16(uats->port, NULL, &port)) {
if (port > 0) {
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_init port '%d' filename '%s' password(only for p12 file) '%s'\n",
port, uats->keyfile, uats->password);
ssl_association_add(dissector_table_name, main_handle, handle, port, tcp);
}
} else {
if (strcmp(uats->port, "start_tls"))
ssl_debug_printf("invalid ssl_init_port: %s\n", uats->port);
}
}
end:
gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit(x509_priv_key);
gnutls_privkey_deinit(priv_key);
g_free(key_id);
}
/* }}} */
#endif
/* Store/load a known (pre-)master secret from/for this SSL session. {{{ */
/** store a known (pre-)master secret into cache */
static void
ssl_save_master_key(const char *label, GHashTable *ht, StringInfo *key,
StringInfo *mk)
{
StringInfo *ht_key, *master_secret;
if (key->data_len == 0) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s: not saving empty %s!\n", G_STRFUNC, label);
return;
}
if (mk->data_len == 0) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s not saving empty (pre-)master secret for %s!\n",
G_STRFUNC, label);
return;
}
/* ssl_hash() depends on session_ticket->data being aligned for guint access
* so be careful in changing how it is allocated. */
ht_key = ssl_data_clone(key);
master_secret = ssl_data_clone(mk);
g_hash_table_insert(ht, ht_key, master_secret);
ssl_debug_printf("%s inserted (pre-)master secret for %s\n", G_STRFUNC, label);
ssl_print_string("stored key", ht_key);
ssl_print_string("stored (pre-)master secret", master_secret);
}
/** restore a (pre-)master secret given some key in the cache */
static gboolean
ssl_restore_master_key(SslDecryptSession *ssl, const char *label,
gboolean is_pre_master, GHashTable *ht, StringInfo *key)
{
StringInfo *ms;
if (key->data_len == 0) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't restore %smaster secret using an empty %s\n",
G_STRFUNC, is_pre_master ? "pre-" : "", label);
return FALSE;
}
ms = (StringInfo *)g_hash_table_lookup(ht, key);
if (!ms) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't find %smaster secret by %s\n", G_STRFUNC,
is_pre_master ? "pre-" : "", label);
return FALSE;
}
/* (pre)master secret found, clear knowledge of other keys and set it in the
* current conversation */
ssl->state &= ~(SSL_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET |
SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY);
if (is_pre_master) {
/* unlike master secret, pre-master secret has a variable size (48 for
* RSA, varying for PSK) and is therefore not statically allocated */
ssl->pre_master_secret.data = (guchar *) wmem_alloc(wmem_file_scope(),
ms->data_len);
ssl_data_set(&ssl->pre_master_secret, ms->data, ms->data_len);
ssl->state |= SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET;
} else {
ssl_data_set(&ssl->master_secret, ms->data, ms->data_len);
ssl->state |= SSL_MASTER_SECRET;
}
ssl_debug_printf("%s %smaster secret retrieved using %s\n", G_STRFUNC,
is_pre_master ? "pre-" : "", label);
ssl_print_string(label, key);
ssl_print_string("(pre-)master secret", ms);
return TRUE;
}
/* Store/load a known (pre-)master secret from/for this SSL session. }}} */
/* Should be called when all parameters are ready (after ChangeCipherSpec), and
* the decoder should be attempted to be initialized. {{{*/
void
ssl_finalize_decryption(SslDecryptSession *ssl, ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map)
{
if (ssl->session.version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
/* TLS 1.3 implementations only provide secrets derived from the master
* secret which are loaded in tls13_change_key. No master secrets can be
* loaded here, so just return. */
return;
}
ssl_debug_printf("%s state = 0x%02X\n", G_STRFUNC, ssl->state);
if (ssl->state & SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY) {
ssl_debug_printf(" session key already available, nothing to do.\n");
return;
}
if (!(ssl->state & SSL_CIPHER)) {
ssl_debug_printf(" Cipher suite (Server Hello) is missing!\n");
return;
}
/* for decryption, there needs to be a master secret (which can be derived
* from pre-master secret). If missing, try to pick a master key from cache
* (an earlier packet in the capture or key logfile). */
if (!(ssl->state & (SSL_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET)) &&
!ssl_restore_master_key(ssl, "Session ID", FALSE,
mk_map->session, &ssl->session_id) &&
(!ssl->session.is_session_resumed ||
!ssl_restore_master_key(ssl, "Session Ticket", FALSE,
mk_map->tickets, &ssl->session_ticket)) &&
!ssl_restore_master_key(ssl, "Client Random", FALSE,
mk_map->crandom, &ssl->client_random)) {
if (ssl->cipher_suite->enc != ENC_NULL) {
/* how unfortunate, the master secret could not be found */
ssl_debug_printf(" Cannot find master secret\n");
return;
} else {
ssl_debug_printf(" Cannot find master secret, continuing anyway "
"because of a NULL cipher\n");
}
}
if (ssl_generate_keyring_material(ssl) < 0) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't generate keyring material\n", G_STRFUNC);
return;
}
/* Save Client Random/ Session ID for "SSL Export Session keys" */
ssl_save_master_key("Client Random", mk_map->crandom,
&ssl->client_random, &ssl->master_secret);
ssl_save_master_key("Session ID", mk_map->session,
&ssl->session_id, &ssl->master_secret);
/* Only save the new secrets if the server sent the ticket. The client
* ticket might have become stale. */
if (ssl->state & SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
ssl_save_master_key("Session Ticket", mk_map->tickets,
&ssl->session_ticket, &ssl->master_secret);
}
} /* }}} */
/* Load the traffic key secret from the keylog file. */
StringInfo *
tls13_load_secret(SslDecryptSession *ssl, ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map,
gboolean is_from_server, TLSRecordType type)
{
GHashTable *key_map;
const char *label;
if (ssl->session.version != TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s TLS version %#x is not 1.3\n", G_STRFUNC, ssl->session.version);
return NULL;
}
if (ssl->client_random.data_len == 0) {
/* May happen if Hello message is missing and Finished is found. */
ssl_debug_printf("%s missing Client Random\n", G_STRFUNC);
return NULL;
}
switch (type) {
case TLS_SECRET_0RTT_APP:
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(!is_from_server);
label = "CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET";
key_map = mk_map->tls13_client_early;
break;
case TLS_SECRET_HANDSHAKE:
if (is_from_server) {
label = "SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET";
key_map = mk_map->tls13_server_handshake;
} else {
label = "CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET";
key_map = mk_map->tls13_client_handshake;
}
break;
case TLS_SECRET_APP:
if (is_from_server) {
label = "SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0";
key_map = mk_map->tls13_server_appdata;
} else {
label = "CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0";
key_map = mk_map->tls13_client_appdata;
}
break;
default:
g_assert_not_reached();
}
/* Transitioning to new keys, mark old ones as unusable. */
ssl_debug_printf("%s transitioning to new key, old state 0x%02x\n", G_STRFUNC, ssl->state);
ssl->state &= ~(SSL_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY);
StringInfo *secret = (StringInfo *)g_hash_table_lookup(key_map, &ssl->client_random);
if (!secret) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s Cannot find %s, decryption impossible\n", G_STRFUNC, label);
/* Disable decryption, the keys are invalid. */
if (is_from_server) {
ssl->server = NULL;
} else {
ssl->client = NULL;
}
return NULL;
}
/* TLS 1.3 secret found, set new keys. */
ssl_debug_printf("%s Retrieved TLS 1.3 traffic secret.\n", G_STRFUNC);
ssl_print_string("Client Random", &ssl->client_random);
ssl_print_string(label, secret);
return secret;
}
/* Load the new key. */
void
tls13_change_key(SslDecryptSession *ssl, ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map,
gboolean is_from_server, TLSRecordType type)
{
if (ssl->state & SSL_QUIC_RECORD_LAYER) {
/*
* QUIC does not use the TLS record layer for message protection.
* The required keys will be extracted later by QUIC.
*/
return;
}
StringInfo *secret = tls13_load_secret(ssl, mk_map, is_from_server, type);
if (!secret) {
return;
}
if (tls13_generate_keys(ssl, secret, is_from_server)) {
/*
* Remember the application traffic secret to support Key Update. The
* other secrets cannot be used for this purpose, so free them.
*/
SslDecoder *decoder = is_from_server ? ssl->server : ssl->client;
StringInfo *app_secret = &decoder->app_traffic_secret;
if (type == TLS_SECRET_APP) {
app_secret->data = (guchar *) wmem_realloc(wmem_file_scope(),
app_secret->data,
secret->data_len);
ssl_data_set(app_secret, secret->data, secret->data_len);
} else {
wmem_free(wmem_file_scope(), app_secret->data);
app_secret->data = NULL;
app_secret->data_len = 0;
}
}
}
/**
* Update to next application data traffic secret for TLS 1.3. The previous
* secret should have been set by tls13_change_key.
*/
void
tls13_key_update(SslDecryptSession *ssl, gboolean is_from_server)
{
/* RFC 8446 Section 7.2:
* application_traffic_secret_N+1 =
* HKDF-Expand-Label(application_traffic_secret_N,
* "traffic upd", "", Hash.length)
*
* Both application_traffic_secret_N are of the same length (Hash.length).
*/
const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite = ssl->cipher_suite;
SslDecoder *decoder = is_from_server ? ssl->server : ssl->client;
StringInfo *app_secret = decoder ? &decoder->app_traffic_secret : NULL;
guint8 tls13_draft_version = ssl->session.tls13_draft_version;
if (!cipher_suite || !app_secret || app_secret->data_len == 0) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s Cannot perform Key Update due to missing info\n", G_STRFUNC);
return;
}
/*
* Previous traffic secret is available, so find the hash function,
* expand the new traffic secret and generate new keys.
*/
const char *hash_name = ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->name;
int hash_algo = ssl_get_digest_by_name(hash_name);
const guint hash_len = app_secret->data_len;
guchar *new_secret;
const char *label = "traffic upd";
if (tls13_draft_version && tls13_draft_version < 20) {
label = "application traffic secret";
}
if (!tls13_hkdf_expand_label(hash_algo, app_secret,
tls13_hkdf_label_prefix(tls13_draft_version),
label, hash_len, &new_secret)) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s traffic_secret_N+1 expansion failed\n", G_STRFUNC);
return;
}
ssl_data_set(app_secret, new_secret, hash_len);
wmem_free(NULL, new_secret);
tls13_generate_keys(ssl, app_secret, is_from_server);
}
/** SSL keylog file handling. {{{ */
static GRegex *
ssl_compile_keyfile_regex(void)
{
#define OCTET "(?:[[:xdigit:]]{2})"
const gchar *pattern =
"(?:"
/* Matches Client Hellos having this Client Random */
"PMS_CLIENT_RANDOM (?<client_random_pms>" OCTET "{32}) "
/* Matches first part of encrypted RSA pre-master secret */
"|RSA (?<encrypted_pmk>" OCTET "{8}) "
/* Pre-Master-Secret is given, it is 48 bytes for RSA,
but it can be of any length for DHE */
")(?<pms>" OCTET "+)"
"|(?:"
/* Matches Server Hellos having a Session ID */
"RSA Session-ID:(?<session_id>" OCTET "+) Master-Key:"
/* Matches Client Hellos having this Client Random */
"|CLIENT_RANDOM (?<client_random>" OCTET "{32}) "
/* Master-Secret is given, its length is fixed */
")(?<master_secret>" OCTET "{" G_STRINGIFY(SSL_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH) "})"
"|(?"
/* TLS 1.3 Client Random to Derived Secrets mapping. */
/* Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-17 keys are the same as TLS 1.3.
* TODO remove this old format. */
":(?:QUIC_)?CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET (?<client_early>" OCTET "{32})"
"|(?:QUIC_)?CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET (?<client_handshake>" OCTET "{32})"
"|(?:QUIC_)?SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET (?<server_handshake>" OCTET "{32})"
"|(?:QUIC_)?CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 (?<client_appdata>" OCTET "{32})"
"|(?:QUIC_)?SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 (?<server_appdata>" OCTET "{32})"
"|EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET (?<early_exporter>" OCTET "{32})"
"|EXPORTER_SECRET (?<exporter>" OCTET "{32})"
") (?<derived_secret>" OCTET "+)";
#undef OCTET
static GRegex *regex = NULL;
GError *gerr = NULL;
if (!regex) {
regex = g_regex_new(pattern,
(GRegexCompileFlags)(G_REGEX_OPTIMIZE | G_REGEX_ANCHORED | G_REGEX_RAW),
G_REGEX_MATCH_ANCHORED, &gerr);
if (gerr) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s failed to compile regex: %s\n", G_STRFUNC,
gerr->message);
g_error_free(gerr);
regex = NULL;
}
}
return regex;
}
typedef struct ssl_master_key_match_group {
const char *re_group_name;
GHashTable *master_key_ht;
} ssl_master_key_match_group_t;
void
tls_keylog_process_lines(const ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map, const guint8 *data, guint datalen)
{
ssl_master_key_match_group_t mk_groups[] = {
{ "encrypted_pmk", mk_map->pre_master },
{ "session_id", mk_map->session },
{ "client_random", mk_map->crandom },
{ "client_random_pms", mk_map->pms },
/* TLS 1.3 map from Client Random to derived secret. */
{ "client_early", mk_map->tls13_client_early },
{ "client_handshake", mk_map->tls13_client_handshake },
{ "server_handshake", mk_map->tls13_server_handshake },
{ "client_appdata", mk_map->tls13_client_appdata },
{ "server_appdata", mk_map->tls13_server_appdata },
{ "early_exporter", mk_map->tls13_early_exporter },
{ "exporter", mk_map->tls13_exporter },
};
/* The format of the file is a series of records with one of the following formats:
* - "RSA xxxx yyyy"
* Where xxxx are the first 8 bytes of the encrypted pre-master secret (hex-encoded)
* Where yyyy is the cleartext pre-master secret (hex-encoded)
* (this is the original format introduced with bug 4349)
*
* - "RSA Session-ID:xxxx Master-Key:yyyy"
* Where xxxx is the SSL session ID (hex-encoded)
* Where yyyy is the cleartext master secret (hex-encoded)
* (added to support openssl s_client Master-Key output)
* This is somewhat is a misnomer because there's nothing RSA specific
* about this.
*
* - "PMS_CLIENT_RANDOM xxxx yyyy"
* Where xxxx is the client_random from the ClientHello (hex-encoded)
* Where yyyy is the cleartext pre-master secret (hex-encoded)
* (This format allows SSL connections to be decrypted, if a user can
* capture the PMS but could not recover the MS for a specific session
* with a SSL Server.)
*
* - "CLIENT_RANDOM xxxx yyyy"
* Where xxxx is the client_random from the ClientHello (hex-encoded)
* Where yyyy is the cleartext master secret (hex-encoded)
* (This format allows non-RSA SSL connections to be decrypted, i.e.
* ECDHE-RSA.)
*
* - "CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET xxxx yyyy"
* - "CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET xxxx yyyy"
* - "SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET xxxx yyyy"
* - "CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 xxxx yyyy"
* - "SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 xxxx yyyy"
* - "EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET xxxx yyyy"
* - "EXPORTER_SECRET xxxx yyyy"
* Where xxxx is the client_random from the ClientHello (hex-encoded)
* Where yyyy is the secret (hex-encoded) derived from the early,
* handshake or master secrets. (This format is introduced with TLS 1.3
* and supported by BoringSSL, OpenSSL, etc. See bug 12779.)
*/
GRegex *regex = ssl_compile_keyfile_regex();
if (!regex)
return;
const char *next_line = (const char *)data;
const char *line_end = next_line + datalen;
while (next_line && next_line < line_end) {
const char *line = next_line;
next_line = (const char *)memchr(line, '\n', line_end - line);
gssize linelen;
if (next_line) {
linelen = next_line - line;
next_line++; /* drop LF */
} else {
linelen = (gssize)(line_end - line);
}
if (linelen > 0 && line[linelen - 1] == '\r') {
linelen--; /* drop CR */
}
ssl_debug_printf(" checking keylog line: %.*s\n", (int)linelen, line);
GMatchInfo *mi;
if (g_regex_match_full(regex, line, linelen, 0, G_REGEX_MATCH_ANCHORED, &mi, NULL)) {
gchar *hex_key, *hex_pre_ms_or_ms;
StringInfo *key = wmem_new(wmem_file_scope(), StringInfo);
StringInfo *pre_ms_or_ms = NULL;
GHashTable *ht = NULL;
/* Is the PMS being supplied with the PMS_CLIENT_RANDOM
* otherwise we will use the Master Secret
*/
hex_pre_ms_or_ms = g_match_info_fetch_named(mi, "master_secret");
if (hex_pre_ms_or_ms == NULL || !*hex_pre_ms_or_ms) {
g_free(hex_pre_ms_or_ms);
hex_pre_ms_or_ms = g_match_info_fetch_named(mi, "pms");
}
if (hex_pre_ms_or_ms == NULL || !*hex_pre_ms_or_ms) {
g_free(hex_pre_ms_or_ms);
hex_pre_ms_or_ms = g_match_info_fetch_named(mi, "derived_secret");
}
/* There is always a match, otherwise the regex is wrong. */
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(hex_pre_ms_or_ms && strlen(hex_pre_ms_or_ms));
/* convert from hex to bytes and save to hashtable */
pre_ms_or_ms = wmem_new(wmem_file_scope(), StringInfo);
from_hex(pre_ms_or_ms, hex_pre_ms_or_ms, strlen(hex_pre_ms_or_ms));
g_free(hex_pre_ms_or_ms);
/* Find a master key from any format (CLIENT_RANDOM, SID, ...) */
for (unsigned i = 0; i < G_N_ELEMENTS(mk_groups); i++) {
ssl_master_key_match_group_t *g = &mk_groups[i];
hex_key = g_match_info_fetch_named(mi, g->re_group_name);
if (hex_key && *hex_key) {
ssl_debug_printf(" matched %s\n", g->re_group_name);
ht = g->master_key_ht;
from_hex(key, hex_key, strlen(hex_key));
g_free(hex_key);
break;
}
g_free(hex_key);
}
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(ht); /* Cannot be reached, or regex is wrong. */
g_hash_table_insert(ht, key, pre_ms_or_ms);
} else {
ssl_debug_printf(" unrecognized line\n");
}
/* always free match info even if there is no match. */
g_match_info_free(mi);
}
}
void
ssl_load_keyfile(const gchar *tls_keylog_filename, FILE **keylog_file,
const ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map)
{
/* no need to try if no key log file is configured. */
if (!tls_keylog_filename || !*tls_keylog_filename) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s dtls/tls.keylog_file is not configured!\n",
G_STRFUNC);
return;
}
/* Validate regexes before even trying to use it. */
if (!ssl_compile_keyfile_regex()) {
return;
}
ssl_debug_printf("trying to use TLS keylog in %s\n", tls_keylog_filename);
/* if the keylog file was deleted/overwritten, re-open it */
if (*keylog_file && file_needs_reopen(ws_fileno(*keylog_file), tls_keylog_filename)) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s file got deleted, trying to re-open\n", G_STRFUNC);
fclose(*keylog_file);
*keylog_file = NULL;
}
if (*keylog_file == NULL) {
*keylog_file = ws_fopen(tls_keylog_filename, "r");
if (!*keylog_file) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s failed to open SSL keylog\n", G_STRFUNC);
return;
}
}
for (;;) {
char buf[1110], *line;
line = fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), *keylog_file);
if (!line) {
if (feof(*keylog_file)) {
/* Ensure that newly appended keys can be read in the future. */
clearerr(*keylog_file);
} else if (ferror(*keylog_file)) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s Error while reading key log file, closing it!\n", G_STRFUNC);
fclose(*keylog_file);
*keylog_file = NULL;
}
break;
}
tls_keylog_process_lines(mk_map, (guint8 *)line, (int)strlen(line));
}
}
/** SSL keylog file handling. }}} */
#ifdef SSL_DECRYPT_DEBUG /* {{{ */
static FILE* ssl_debug_file=NULL;
void
ssl_set_debug(const gchar* name)
{
static gint debug_file_must_be_closed;
gint use_stderr;
use_stderr = name?(strcmp(name, SSL_DEBUG_USE_STDERR) == 0):0;
if (debug_file_must_be_closed)
fclose(ssl_debug_file);
if (use_stderr)
ssl_debug_file = stderr;
else if (!name || (strcmp(name, "") ==0))
ssl_debug_file = NULL;
else
ssl_debug_file = ws_fopen(name, "w");
if (!use_stderr && ssl_debug_file)
debug_file_must_be_closed = 1;
else
debug_file_must_be_closed = 0;
ssl_debug_printf("Wireshark SSL debug log \n\n");
ssl_debug_printf("Wireshark version: %s\n", get_ws_vcs_version_info());
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS
ssl_debug_printf("GnuTLS version: %s\n", gnutls_check_version(NULL));
#endif
ssl_debug_printf("Libgcrypt version: %s\n", gcry_check_version(NULL));
ssl_debug_printf("\n");
}
void
ssl_debug_flush(void)
{
if (ssl_debug_file)
fflush(ssl_debug_file);
}
void
ssl_debug_printf(const gchar* fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
if (!ssl_debug_file)
return;
va_start(ap, fmt);
vfprintf(ssl_debug_file, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
}
void
ssl_print_data(const gchar* name, const guchar* data, size_t len)
{
size_t i, j, k;
if (!ssl_debug_file)
return;
fprintf(ssl_debug_file,"%s[%d]:\n",name, (int) len);
for (i=0; i<len; i+=16) {
fprintf(ssl_debug_file,"| ");
for (j=i, k=0; k<16 && j<len; ++j, ++k)
fprintf(ssl_debug_file,"%.2x ",data[j]);
for (; k<16; ++k)
fprintf(ssl_debug_file," ");
fputc('|', ssl_debug_file);
for (j=i, k=0; k<16 && j<len; ++j, ++k) {
guchar c = data[j];
if (!g_ascii_isprint(c) || (c=='\t')) c = '.';
fputc(c, ssl_debug_file);
}
for (; k<16; ++k)
fputc(' ', ssl_debug_file);
fprintf(ssl_debug_file,"|\n");
}
}
void
ssl_print_string(const gchar* name, const StringInfo* data)
{
ssl_print_data(name, data->data, data->data_len);
}
#endif /* SSL_DECRYPT_DEBUG }}} */
/* UAT preferences callbacks. {{{ */
/* checks for SSL and DTLS UAT key list fields */
gboolean
ssldecrypt_uat_fld_ip_chk_cb(void* r _U_, const char* p _U_, guint len _U_, const void* u1 _U_, const void* u2 _U_, char** err)
{
// This should be removed in favor of Decode As. Make it optional.
*err = NULL;
return TRUE;
}
gboolean
ssldecrypt_uat_fld_port_chk_cb(void* r _U_, const char* p, guint len _U_, const void* u1 _U_, const void* u2 _U_, char** err)
{
if (!p || strlen(p) == 0u) {
// This should be removed in favor of Decode As. Make it optional.
*err = NULL;
return TRUE;
}
if (strcmp(p, "start_tls") != 0){
guint16 port;
if (!ws_strtou16(p, NULL, &port)) {
*err = g_strdup("Invalid port given.");
return FALSE;
}
}
*err = NULL;
return TRUE;
}
gboolean
ssldecrypt_uat_fld_fileopen_chk_cb(void* r _U_, const char* p, guint len _U_, const void* u1 _U_, const void* u2 _U_, char** err)
{
ws_statb64 st;
if (!p || strlen(p) == 0u) {
*err = g_strdup("No filename given.");
return FALSE;
} else {
if (ws_stat64(p, &st) != 0) {
*err = g_strdup_printf("File '%s' does not exist or access is denied.", p);
return FALSE;
}
}
*err = NULL;
return TRUE;
}
gboolean
ssldecrypt_uat_fld_password_chk_cb(void *r _U_, const char *p _U_, guint len _U_, const void *u1 _U_, const void *u2 _U_, char **err)
{
#if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS)
ssldecrypt_assoc_t* f = (ssldecrypt_assoc_t *)r;
FILE *fp = NULL;
if (p && (strlen(p) > 0u)) {
fp = ws_fopen(f->keyfile, "rb");
if (fp) {
char *msg = NULL;
gnutls_x509_privkey_t priv_key = rsa_load_pkcs12(fp, p, &msg);
if (!priv_key) {
fclose(fp);
*err = g_strdup_printf("Could not load PKCS#12 key file: %s", msg);
g_free(msg);
return FALSE;
}
g_free(msg);
gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit(priv_key);
fclose(fp);
} else {
*err = g_strdup_printf("Leave this field blank if the keyfile is not PKCS#12.");
return FALSE;
}
}
*err = NULL;
return TRUE;
#else
*err = g_strdup("Cannot load key files, support is not compiled in.");
return FALSE;
#endif
}
/* UAT preferences callbacks. }}} */
/** maximum size of ssl_association_info() string */
#define SSL_ASSOC_MAX_LEN 8192
typedef struct ssl_association_info_callback_data
{
gchar *str;
const char *table_protocol;
} ssl_association_info_callback_data_t;
/**
* callback function used by ssl_association_info() to traverse the SSL associations.
*/
static void
ssl_association_info_(const gchar *table _U_, gpointer handle, gpointer user_data)
{
ssl_association_info_callback_data_t* data = (ssl_association_info_callback_data_t*)user_data;
const int l = (const int)strlen(data->str);
g_snprintf(data->str+l, SSL_ASSOC_MAX_LEN-l, "'%s' %s\n", dissector_handle_get_short_name((dissector_handle_t)handle), data->table_protocol);
}
/**
* @return an information string on the SSL protocol associations. The string has ephemeral lifetime/scope.
*/
gchar*
ssl_association_info(const char* dissector_table_name, const char* table_protocol)
{
ssl_association_info_callback_data_t data;
data.str = (gchar *)g_malloc0(SSL_ASSOC_MAX_LEN);
data.table_protocol = table_protocol;
dissector_table_foreach_handle(dissector_table_name, ssl_association_info_, &data);
return data.str;
}
/** Begin of code related to dissection of wire data. */
/* Helpers for dissecting Variable-Length Vectors. {{{ */
gboolean
ssl_add_vector(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
guint offset, guint offset_end, guint32 *ret_length,
int hf_length, guint32 min_value, guint32 max_value)
{
guint veclen_size;
guint32 veclen_value;
proto_item *pi;
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(offset <= offset_end);
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(min_value <= max_value);
if (max_value > 0xffffff) {
veclen_size = 4;
} else if (max_value > 0xffff) {
veclen_size = 3;
} else if (max_value > 0xff) {
veclen_size = 2;
} else {
veclen_size = 1;
}
if (offset_end - offset < veclen_size) {
proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, pinfo, &hf->ei.malformed_buffer_too_small,
tvb, offset, offset_end - offset,
"No more room for vector of length %u",
veclen_size);
*ret_length = 0;
return FALSE; /* Cannot read length. */
}
pi = proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(tree, hf_length, tvb, offset, veclen_size, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &veclen_value);
offset += veclen_size;
if (veclen_value < min_value) {
expert_add_info_format(pinfo, pi, &hf->ei.malformed_vector_length,
"Vector length %u is smaller than minimum %u",
veclen_value, min_value);
} else if (veclen_value > max_value) {
expert_add_info_format(pinfo, pi, &hf->ei.malformed_vector_length,
"Vector length %u is larger than maximum %u",
veclen_value, max_value);
}
if (offset_end - offset < veclen_value) {
expert_add_info_format(pinfo, pi, &hf->ei.malformed_buffer_too_small,
"Vector length %u is too large, truncating it to %u",
veclen_value, offset_end - offset);
*ret_length = offset_end - offset;
return FALSE; /* Length is truncated to avoid overflow. */
}
*ret_length = veclen_value;
return TRUE; /* Length is OK. */
}
gboolean
ssl_end_vector(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
guint offset, guint offset_end)
{
if (offset < offset_end) {
guint trailing = offset_end - offset;
proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, pinfo, &hf->ei.malformed_trailing_data,
tvb, offset, trailing,
"%u trailing byte%s unprocessed",
trailing, plurality(trailing, " was", "s were"));
return FALSE; /* unprocessed data warning */
} else if (offset > offset_end) {
/*
* Returned offset runs past the end. This should not happen and is
* possibly a dissector bug.
*/
guint excess = offset - offset_end;
proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, pinfo, &hf->ei.malformed_buffer_too_small,
tvb, offset_end, excess,
"Dissector processed too much data (%u byte%s)",
excess, plurality(excess, "", "s"));
return FALSE; /* overflow error */
}
return TRUE; /* OK, offset matches. */
}
/** }}} */
static guint32
ssl_dissect_digitally_signed(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
guint16 version, gint hf_sig_len, gint hf_sig);
/* change_cipher_spec(20) dissection */
void
ssl_dissect_change_cipher_spec(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
guint32 offset, SslSession *session,
gboolean is_from_server,
const SslDecryptSession *ssl)
{
/*
* struct {
* enum { change_cipher_spec(1), (255) } type;
* } ChangeCipherSpec;
*/
proto_item *ti;
proto_item_set_text(tree,
"%s Record Layer: %s Protocol: Change Cipher Spec",
val_to_str_const(session->version, ssl_version_short_names, "SSL"),
val_to_str_const(SSL_ID_CHG_CIPHER_SPEC, ssl_31_content_type, "unknown"));
ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.change_cipher_spec, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA);
if (session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
/* CCS is a dummy message in TLS 1.3, do not parse it further. */
return;
}
/* Remember frame number of first CCS */
guint32 *ccs_frame = is_from_server ? &session->server_ccs_frame : &session->client_ccs_frame;
if (*ccs_frame == 0)
*ccs_frame = pinfo->num;
/* Use heuristics to detect an abbreviated handshake, assume that missing
* ServerHelloDone implies reusing previously negotiating keys. Then when
* a Session ID or ticket is present, it must be a resumed session.
* Normally this should be done at the Finished message, but that may be
* encrypted so we do it here, at the last cleartext message. */
if (is_from_server && ssl) {
if (session->is_session_resumed) {
const char *resumed = NULL;
if (ssl->session_ticket.data_len) {
resumed = "Session Ticket";
} else if (ssl->session_id.data_len) {
resumed = "Session ID";
}
if (resumed) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s Session resumption using %s\n", G_STRFUNC, resumed);
} else {
/* Can happen if the capture somehow starts in the middle */
ssl_debug_printf("%s No Session resumption, missing packets?\n", G_STRFUNC);
}
} else {
ssl_debug_printf("%s Not using Session resumption\n", G_STRFUNC);
}
}
if (is_from_server && session->is_session_resumed)
expert_add_info(pinfo, ti, &hf->ei.resumed);
}
/** Begin of handshake(22) record dissections */
/* Dissects a SignatureScheme (TLS 1.3) or SignatureAndHashAlgorithm (TLS 1.2).
* {{{ */
static void
tls_dissect_signature_algorithm(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
{
guint32 sighash, hashalg, sigalg;
proto_item *ti_sigalg;
proto_tree *sigalg_tree;
ti_sigalg = proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(tree, hf->hf.hs_sig_hash_alg, tvb,
offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &sighash);
sigalg_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti_sigalg, hf->ett.hs_sig_hash_alg);
/* TLS 1.2: SignatureAndHashAlgorithm { hash, signature } */
proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(sigalg_tree, hf->hf.hs_sig_hash_hash, tvb,
offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &hashalg);
proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(sigalg_tree, hf->hf.hs_sig_hash_sig, tvb,
offset + 1, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &sigalg);
/* No TLS 1.3 SignatureScheme? Fallback to TLS 1.2 interpretation. */
if (!try_val_to_str(sighash, tls13_signature_algorithm)) {
proto_item_set_text(ti_sigalg, "Signature Algorithm: %s %s (0x%04x)",
val_to_str_const(hashalg, tls_hash_algorithm, "Unknown"),
val_to_str_const(sigalg, tls_signature_algorithm, "Unknown"),
sighash);
}
} /* }}} */
/* dissect a list of hash algorithms, return the number of bytes dissected
this is used for the signature algorithms extension and for the
TLS1.2 certificate request. {{{ */
static gint
ssl_dissect_hash_alg_list(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree,
packet_info* pinfo, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
{
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1
* struct {
* HashAlgorithm hash;
* SignatureAlgorithm signature;
* } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm;
* SignatureAndHashAlgorithm supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
*/
proto_tree *subtree;
proto_item *ti;
guint sh_alg_length;
guint32 next_offset;
/* SignatureAndHashAlgorithm supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &sh_alg_length,
hf->hf.hs_sig_hash_alg_len, 2, G_MAXUINT16 - 1)) {
return offset_end;
}
offset += 2;
next_offset = offset + sh_alg_length;
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree, hf->hf.hs_sig_hash_algs, tvb, offset, sh_alg_length,
"Signature Hash Algorithms (%u algorithm%s)",
sh_alg_length / 2, plurality(sh_alg_length / 2, "", "s"));
subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.hs_sig_hash_algs);
while (offset + 2 <= next_offset) {
tls_dissect_signature_algorithm(hf, tvb, subtree, offset);
offset += 2;
}
if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, next_offset)) {
offset = next_offset;
}
return offset;
} /* }}} */
/* Dissection of DistinguishedName (for CertificateRequest and
* certificate_authorities extension). {{{ */
static guint32
tls_dissect_certificate_authorities(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
{
proto_item *ti;
proto_tree *subtree;
guint32 dnames_length, next_offset;
asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx;
int dnames_count = 100; /* the maximum number of DNs to add to the tree */
/* Note: minimum length is 0 for TLS 1.1/1.2 and 3 for earlier/later */
/* DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &dnames_length,
hf->hf.hs_dnames_len, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
return offset_end;
}
offset += 2;
next_offset = offset + dnames_length;
if (dnames_length > 0) {
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
hf->hf.hs_dnames,
tvb, offset, dnames_length,
"Distinguished Names (%d byte%s)",
dnames_length,
plurality(dnames_length, "", "s"));
subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.dnames);
asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo);
while (offset < next_offset) {
/* get the length of the current certificate */
guint32 name_length;
if (dnames_count-- == 0) {
/* stop adding to tree when the list is considered too large
* https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/issues/16202
Note: dnames_count must be set low enough not to hit the
limit set by PINFO_LAYER_MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH in packet.c
*/
ti = proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf->hf.hs_dnames_truncated,
tvb, offset, next_offset - offset, ENC_NA);
proto_item_set_generated(ti);
return next_offset;
}
/* opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, next_offset, &name_length,
hf->hf.hs_dname_len, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) {
return next_offset;
}
offset += 2;
dissect_x509if_DistinguishedName(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx,
subtree, hf->hf.hs_dname);
offset += name_length;
}
}
return offset;
} /* }}} */
/** TLS Extensions (in Client Hello and Server Hello). {{{ */
static gint
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_sig_hash_algs(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree, packet_info* pinfo, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
{
return ssl_dissect_hash_alg_list(hf, tvb, tree, pinfo, offset, offset_end);
}
static gint
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_alpn(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
guint8 hnd_type, SslSession *session,
gboolean is_dtls)
{
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7301#section-3.1
* opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>;
* struct {
* ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1>
* } ProtocolNameList;
*/
proto_tree *alpn_tree;
proto_item *ti;
guint32 next_offset, alpn_length, name_length;
guint8 *proto_name = NULL;
/* ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &alpn_length,
hf->hf.hs_ext_alpn_len, 2, G_MAXUINT16)) {
return offset_end;
}
offset += 2;
next_offset = offset + alpn_length;
ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_alpn_list,
tvb, offset, alpn_length, ENC_NA);
alpn_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.hs_ext_alpn);
/* Parse list (note missing check for end of vector, ssl_add_vector below
* ensures that data is always available.) */
while (offset < next_offset) {
/* opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, alpn_tree, offset, next_offset, &name_length,
hf->hf.hs_ext_alpn_str_len, 1, G_MAXUINT8)) {
return next_offset;
}
offset++;
proto_tree_add_item(alpn_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_alpn_str,
tvb, offset, name_length, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA);
/* Remember first ALPN ProtocolName entry for server. */
if (hnd_type == SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO || hnd_type == SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
/* '\0'-terminated string for dissector table match and prefix
* comparison purposes. */
proto_name = tvb_get_string_enc(wmem_packet_scope(), tvb, offset,
name_length, ENC_ASCII);
}
offset += name_length;
}
/* If ALPN is given in ServerHello, then ProtocolNameList MUST contain
* exactly one "ProtocolName". */
if (proto_name) {
dissector_handle_t handle;
session->alpn_name = wmem_strdup(wmem_file_scope(), proto_name);
if (is_dtls) {
handle = dissector_get_string_handle(dtls_alpn_dissector_table,
proto_name);
} else {
handle = dissector_get_string_handle(ssl_alpn_dissector_table,
proto_name);
if (handle == NULL) {
/* Try prefix matching */
for (size_t i = 0; i < G_N_ELEMENTS(ssl_alpn_prefix_match_protocols); i++) {
const ssl_alpn_prefix_match_protocol_t *alpn_proto = &ssl_alpn_prefix_match_protocols[i];
/* string_string is inappropriate as it compares strings
* while "byte strings MUST NOT be truncated" (RFC 7301) */
if (g_str_has_prefix(proto_name, alpn_proto->proto_prefix)) {
handle = find_dissector(alpn_proto->dissector_name);
break;
}
}
}
}
if (handle != NULL) {
/* ProtocolName match, so set the App data dissector handle.
* This may override protocols given via the UAT dialog, but
* since the ALPN hint is precise, do it anyway. */
ssl_debug_printf("%s: changing handle %p to %p (%s)", G_STRFUNC,
(void *)session->app_handle,
(void *)handle,
dissector_handle_get_dissector_name(handle));
session->app_handle = handle;
}
}
return offset;
}
static gint
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_npn(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
{
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-nextprotoneg-04#page-3
* The "extension_data" field of a "next_protocol_negotiation" extension
* in a "ServerHello" contains an optional list of protocols advertised
* by the server. Protocols are named by opaque, non-empty byte strings
* and the list of protocols is serialized as a concatenation of 8-bit,
* length prefixed byte strings. Implementations MUST ensure that the
* empty string is not included and that no byte strings are truncated.
*/
guint32 npn_length;
proto_tree *npn_tree;
/* List is optional, do not add tree if there are no entries. */
if (offset == offset_end) {
return offset;
}
npn_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, hf->ett.hs_ext_npn, NULL, "Next Protocol Negotiation");
while (offset < offset_end) {
/* non-empty, 8-bit length prefixed strings means range 1..255 */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, npn_tree, offset, offset_end, &npn_length,
hf->hf.hs_ext_npn_str_len, 1, G_MAXUINT8)) {
return offset_end;
}
offset++;
proto_tree_add_item(npn_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_npn_str,
tvb, offset, npn_length, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA);
offset += npn_length;
}
return offset;
}
static gint
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_reneg_info(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
{
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5746#section-3.2
* struct {
* opaque renegotiated_connection<0..255>;
* } RenegotiationInfo;
*
*/
proto_tree *reneg_info_tree;
guint32 reneg_info_length;
reneg_info_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, hf->ett.hs_ext_reneg_info, NULL, "Renegotiation Info extension");
/* opaque renegotiated_connection<0..255> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, reneg_info_tree, offset, offset_end, &reneg_info_length,
hf->hf.hs_ext_reneg_info_len, 0, 255)) {
return offset_end;
}
offset++;
if (reneg_info_length > 0) {
proto_tree_add_item(reneg_info_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_reneg_info, tvb, offset, reneg_info_length, ENC_NA);
offset += reneg_info_length;
}
return offset;
}
static gint
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_key_share_entry(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
{
/* RFC 8446 Section 4.2.8
* struct {
* NamedGroup group;
* opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>;
* } KeyShareEntry;
*/
guint32 key_exchange_length, group;
proto_tree *ks_tree;
ks_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, 4, hf->ett.hs_ext_key_share_ks, NULL, "Key Share Entry");
proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(ks_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_key_share_group, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &group);
offset += 2;
proto_item_append_text(ks_tree, ": Group: %s", val_to_str(group, ssl_extension_curves, "Unknown (%u)"));
/* opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, ks_tree, offset, offset_end, &key_exchange_length,
hf->hf.hs_ext_key_share_key_exchange_length, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) {
return offset_end; /* Bad (possible truncated) length, skip to end of KeyShare extension. */
}
offset += 2;
proto_item_set_len(ks_tree, 2 + 2 + key_exchange_length);
proto_item_append_text(ks_tree, ", Key Exchange length: %u", key_exchange_length);
proto_tree_add_item(ks_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_key_share_key_exchange, tvb, offset, key_exchange_length, ENC_NA);
offset += key_exchange_length;
return offset;
}
static gint
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_key_share(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
guint8 hnd_type)
{
proto_tree *key_share_tree;
guint32 next_offset;
guint32 client_shares_length;
if (offset_end <= offset) { /* Check if ext_len == 0 and "overflow" (offset + ext_len) > guint32) */
return offset;
}
key_share_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, hf->ett.hs_ext_key_share, NULL, "Key Share extension");
switch(hnd_type){
case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
/* KeyShareEntry client_shares<0..2^16-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, key_share_tree, offset, offset_end, &client_shares_length,
hf->hf.hs_ext_key_share_client_length, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
return offset_end;
}
offset += 2;
next_offset = offset + client_shares_length;
while (offset + 4 <= next_offset) { /* (NamedGroup (2 bytes), key_exchange (1 byte for length, 1 byte minimum data) */
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_key_share_entry(hf, tvb, pinfo, key_share_tree, offset, next_offset);
}
if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, key_share_tree, offset, next_offset)) {
return next_offset;
}
break;
case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_key_share_entry(hf, tvb, pinfo, key_share_tree, offset, offset_end);
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
proto_tree_add_item(key_share_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_key_share_selected_group, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN );
offset += 2;
break;
default: /* no default */
break;
}
return offset;
}
static gint
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_pre_shared_key(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
guint8 hnd_type)
{
/* RFC 8446 Section 4.2.11
* struct {
* opaque identity<1..2^16-1>;
* uint32 obfuscated_ticket_age;
* } PskIdentity;
* opaque PskBinderEntry<32..255>;
* struct {
* select (Handshake.msg_type) {
* case client_hello:
* PskIdentity identities<7..2^16-1>;
* PskBinderEntry binders<33..2^16-1>;
* case server_hello:
* uint16 selected_identity;
* };
* } PreSharedKeyExtension;
*/
proto_tree *psk_tree;
psk_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, hf->ett.hs_ext_pre_shared_key, NULL, "Pre-Shared Key extension");
switch (hnd_type){
case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO: {
guint32 identities_length, identities_end, binders_length;
/* PskIdentity identities<7..2^16-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, psk_tree, offset, offset_end, &identities_length,
hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_identities_length, 7, G_MAXUINT16)) {
return offset_end;
}
offset += 2;
identities_end = offset + identities_length;
while (offset < identities_end) {
guint32 identity_length;
proto_tree *identity_tree;
identity_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(psk_tree, tvb, offset, 4, hf->ett.hs_ext_psk_identity, NULL, "PSK Identity (");
/* opaque identity<1..2^16-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, identity_tree, offset, identities_end, &identity_length,
hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_identity_identity_length, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) {
return identities_end;
}
offset += 2;
proto_item_append_text(identity_tree, "length: %u)", identity_length);
proto_tree_add_item(identity_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_identity_identity, tvb, offset, identity_length, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += identity_length;
proto_tree_add_item(identity_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_identity_obfuscated_ticket_age, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
proto_item_set_len(identity_tree, 2 + identity_length + 4);
}
if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, psk_tree, offset, identities_end)) {
offset = identities_end;
}
/* PskBinderEntry binders<33..2^16-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, psk_tree, offset, offset_end, &binders_length,
hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_binders_length, 33, G_MAXUINT16)) {
return offset_end;
}
offset += 2;
proto_tree_add_item(psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_binders, tvb, offset, binders_length, ENC_NA);
offset += binders_length;
}
break;
case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO: {
proto_tree_add_item(psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_identity_selected, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
return offset;
}
static guint32
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_early_data(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo _U_,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end _U_,
guint8 hnd_type, SslDecryptSession *ssl)
{
/* RFC 8446 Section 4.2.10
* struct {} Empty;
* struct {
* select (Handshake.msg_type) {
* case new_session_ticket: uint32 max_early_data_size;
* case client_hello: Empty;
* case encrypted_extensions: Empty;
* };
* } EarlyDataIndication;
*/
switch (hnd_type) {
case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
/* Remember that early_data will follow the handshake. */
if (ssl) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s found early_data extension\n", G_STRFUNC);
ssl->has_early_data = TRUE;
}
break;
case SSL_HND_NEWSESSION_TICKET:
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_max_early_data_size, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
break;
default:
break;
}
return offset;
}
static gint
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_supported_versions(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
SslSession *session)
{
/* RFC 8446 Section 4.2.1
* struct {
* ProtocolVersion versions<2..254>; // ClientHello
* } SupportedVersions;
* Note that ServerHello and HelloRetryRequest are handled by the caller.
*/
guint32 versions_length, next_offset;
/* ProtocolVersion versions<2..254> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &versions_length,
hf->hf.hs_ext_supported_versions_len, 2, 254)) {
return offset_end;
}
offset++;
next_offset = offset + versions_length;
guint version;
guint8 draft_version, max_draft_version = 0;
while (offset + 2 <= next_offset) {
proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_supported_version, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &version);
offset += 2;
draft_version = extract_tls13_draft_version(version);
max_draft_version = MAX(draft_version, max_draft_version);
}
if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, next_offset)) {
offset = next_offset;
}
/* XXX remove this when draft 19 support is dropped,
* this is only required for early data decryption. */
if (max_draft_version) {
session->tls13_draft_version = max_draft_version;
}
return offset;
}
static gint
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_cookie(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
{
/* RFC 8446 Section 4.2.2
* struct {
* opaque cookie<1..2^16-1>;
* } Cookie;
*/
guint32 cookie_length;
/* opaque cookie<1..2^16-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &cookie_length,
hf->hf.hs_ext_cookie_len, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) {
return offset_end;
}
offset += 2;
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cookie, tvb, offset, cookie_length, ENC_NA);
offset += cookie_length;
return offset;
}
static gint
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_psk_key_exchange_modes(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
{
/* RFC 8446 Section 4.2.9
* enum { psk_ke(0), psk_dhe_ke(1), (255) } PskKeyExchangeMode;
*
* struct {
* PskKeyExchangeMode ke_modes<1..255>;
* } PskKeyExchangeModes;
*/
guint32 ke_modes_length, next_offset;
/* PskKeyExchangeMode ke_modes<1..255> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &ke_modes_length,
hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_ke_modes_length, 1, 255)) {
return offset_end;
}
offset++;
next_offset = offset + ke_modes_length;
while (offset < next_offset) {
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_ke_mode, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA);
offset++;
}
return offset;
}
static guint32
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_certificate_authorities(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
{
/* RFC 8446 Section 4.2.4
* opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>;
* struct {
* DistinguishedName authorities<3..2^16-1>;
* } CertificateAuthoritiesExtension;
*/
return tls_dissect_certificate_authorities(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end);
}
static gint
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_oid_filters(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
{
/* RFC 8446 Section 4.2.5
* struct {
* opaque certificate_extension_oid<1..2^8-1>;
* opaque certificate_extension_values<0..2^16-1>;
* } OIDFilter;
* struct {
* OIDFilter filters<0..2^16-1>;
* } OIDFilterExtension;
*/
proto_tree *subtree;
guint32 filters_length, oid_length, values_length, value_offset;
asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx;
const char *oid, *name;
/* OIDFilter filters<0..2^16-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &filters_length,
hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_ke_modes_length, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
return offset_end;
}
offset += 2;
offset_end = offset + filters_length;
asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo);
while (offset < offset_end) {
subtree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset,
hf->ett.hs_ext_oid_filter, NULL, "OID Filter");
/* opaque certificate_extension_oid<1..2^8-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, offset_end, &oid_length,
hf->hf.hs_ext_oid_filters_oid_length, 1, G_MAXUINT8)) {
return offset_end;
}
offset++;
dissect_ber_object_identifier_str(FALSE, &asn1_ctx, subtree, tvb, offset,
hf->hf.hs_ext_oid_filters_oid, &oid);
offset += oid_length;
/* Append OID to tree label */
name = oid_resolved_from_string(wmem_packet_scope(), oid);
proto_item_append_text(subtree, " (%s)", name ? name : oid);
/* opaque certificate_extension_values<0..2^16-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, offset_end, &values_length,
hf->hf.hs_ext_oid_filters_values_length, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
return offset_end;
}
offset += 2;
proto_item_set_len(subtree, 1 + oid_length + 2 + values_length);
if (values_length > 0) {
value_offset = offset;
value_offset = dissect_ber_identifier(pinfo, subtree, tvb, value_offset, NULL, NULL, NULL);
value_offset = dissect_ber_length(pinfo, subtree, tvb, value_offset, NULL, NULL);
call_ber_oid_callback(oid, tvb, value_offset, pinfo, subtree, NULL);
}
offset += values_length;
}
return offset;
}
static gint
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_server_name(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
{
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066#section-3
*
* struct {
* NameType name_type;
* select (name_type) {
* case host_name: HostName;
* } name;
* } ServerName;
*
* enum {
* host_name(0), (255)
* } NameType;
*
* opaque HostName<1..2^16-1>;
*
* struct {
* ServerName server_name_list<1..2^16-1>
* } ServerNameList;
*/
proto_tree *server_name_tree;
guint32 list_length, server_name_length, next_offset;
/* The server SHALL include "server_name" extension with empty data. */
if (offset == offset_end) {
return offset;
}
server_name_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, hf->ett.hs_ext_server_name, NULL, "Server Name Indication extension");
/* ServerName server_name_list<1..2^16-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, server_name_tree, offset, offset_end, &list_length,
hf->hf.hs_ext_server_name_list_len, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) {
return offset_end;
}
offset += 2;
next_offset = offset + list_length;
while (offset < next_offset) {
proto_tree_add_item(server_name_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_server_name_type,
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA);
offset++;
/* opaque HostName<1..2^16-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, server_name_tree, offset, next_offset, &server_name_length,
hf->hf.hs_ext_server_name_len, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) {
return next_offset;
}
offset += 2;
proto_tree_add_item(server_name_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_server_name,
tvb, offset, server_name_length, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA);
offset += server_name_length;
}
return offset;
}
static gint
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_session_ticket(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint8 hnd_type, SslDecryptSession *ssl)
{
guint ext_len = offset_end - offset;
if (hnd_type == SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO && ssl && ext_len != 0) {
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, ext_len);
/* Save the Session Ticket such that it can be used as identifier for
* restoring a previous Master Secret (in ChangeCipherSpec) */
ssl->session_ticket.data = (guchar*)wmem_realloc(wmem_file_scope(),
ssl->session_ticket.data, ext_len);
ssl->session_ticket.data_len = ext_len;
tvb_memcpy(tvb,ssl->session_ticket.data, offset, ext_len);
}
proto_tree_add_bytes_format(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_data,
tvb, offset, ext_len, NULL,
"Data (%u byte%s)",
ext_len, plurality(ext_len, "", "s"));
return offset + ext_len;
}
static gint
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_cert_type(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
guint8 hnd_type, guint16 ext_type, SslSession *session)
{
guint8 cert_list_length;
guint8 cert_type;
proto_tree *cert_list_tree;
proto_item *ti;
switch(hnd_type){
case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
cert_list_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_types_len,
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 1;
if (offset_end - offset != (guint32)cert_list_length)
return offset;
ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_types, tvb, offset,
cert_list_length, cert_list_length);
proto_item_append_text(ti, " (%d)", cert_list_length);
/* make this a subtree */
cert_list_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.hs_ext_cert_types);
/* loop over all point formats */
while (cert_list_length > 0)
{
proto_tree_add_item(cert_list_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset++;
cert_list_length--;
}
break;
case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
case SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
case SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE:
cert_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 1;
if (ext_type == SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CERT_TYPE || ext_type == SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CLIENT_CERT_TYPE) {
session->client_cert_type = cert_type;
}
if (ext_type == SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CERT_TYPE || ext_type == SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SERVER_CERT_TYPE) {
session->server_cert_type = cert_type;
}
break;
default: /* no default */
break;
}
return offset;
}
static guint32
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_compress_certificate(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
guint8 hnd_type, SslDecryptSession *ssl _U_)
{
guint32 compress_certificate_algorithms_length, next_offset;
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-certificate-compression-03#section-3.0
* enum {
* zlib(1),
* brotli(2),
* (65535)
* } CertificateCompressionAlgorithm;
*
* struct {
* CertificateCompressionAlgorithm algorithms<1..2^8-1>;
* } CertificateCompressionAlgorithms;
*/
switch (hnd_type) {
case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
case SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST:
/* CertificateCompressionAlgorithm algorithms<1..2^8-1>;*/
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &compress_certificate_algorithms_length,
hf->hf.hs_ext_compress_certificate_algorithms_length, 1, G_MAXUINT8-1)) {
return offset_end;
}
offset += 1;
next_offset = offset + compress_certificate_algorithms_length;
while (offset < next_offset) {
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_compress_certificate_algorithm,
tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
return offset;
}
static guint32
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_quic_transport_parameters(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
guint8 hnd_type _U_, SslDecryptSession *ssl _U_)
{
gboolean use_varint_encoding = TRUE; // Whether this is draft -27 or newer.
guint32 next_offset;
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-transport-25#section-18
*
* Note: the following structures are not literally defined in the spec,
* they instead use an ASCII diagram.
*
* struct {
* uint16 id;
* opaque value<0..2^16-1>;
* } TransportParameter; // before draft -27
* TransportParameter TransportParameters<0..2^16-1>; // before draft -27
*
* struct {
* opaque ipv4Address[4];
* uint16 ipv4Port;
* opaque ipv6Address[16];
* uint16 ipv6Port;
* opaque connectionId<0..18>;
* opaque statelessResetToken[16];
* } PreferredAddress;
*/
if (offset_end - offset >= 6 &&
2 + (guint)tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset) == offset_end - offset &&
6 + (guint)tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 4) <= offset_end - offset) {
// Assume encoding of Transport Parameters draft -26 or older with at
// least one transport parameter that has a valid length.
use_varint_encoding = FALSE;
}
if (use_varint_encoding) {
next_offset = offset_end;
} else {
guint32 quic_length;
// Assume draft -26 or earlier.
/* TransportParameter TransportParameters<0..2^16-1>; */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &quic_length,
hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_len, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
return offset_end;
}
offset += 2;
next_offset = offset + quic_length;
}
while (offset < next_offset) {
guint64 parameter_type; /* 62-bit space */
guint32 parameter_length;
proto_tree *parameter_tree;
guint32 parameter_end_offset;
guint64 value;
guint32 len = 0, i;
parameter_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, 2, hf->ett.hs_ext_quictp_parameter,
NULL, "Parameter");
/* TransportParameter ID and Length. */
if (use_varint_encoding) {
guint64 parameter_length64;
guint32 type_len = 0;
proto_tree_add_item_ret_varint(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_type,
tvb, offset, -1, ENC_VARINT_QUIC, &parameter_type, &type_len);
offset += type_len;
proto_tree_add_item_ret_varint(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_len,
tvb, offset, -1, ENC_VARINT_QUIC, &parameter_length64, &len);
parameter_length = (guint32)parameter_length64;
offset += len;
proto_item_set_len(parameter_tree, type_len + len + parameter_length);
} else {
parameter_type = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_type,
tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
/* opaque value<0..2^16-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, parameter_tree, offset, next_offset, &parameter_length,
hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_len_old, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
return next_offset;
}
offset += 2;
proto_item_set_len(parameter_tree, 4 + parameter_length);
}
/* GREASE? https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-transport-27#section-18.1 */
if (((parameter_type - 27) % 31) == 0) {
proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, ": GREASE");
} else if (parameter_type > G_MAXUINT) {
/* There are currently no known TP larger than 32 bits, therefore
* quic_transport_parameter_id assumes that. If larger (up to 62
* bits) TPs are available, then it needs to be revisited.
*/
proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, ": Unknown 0x%08" G_GINT64_MODIFIER "x", parameter_type);
} else {
proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, ": %s", val_to_str((guint32)parameter_type, quic_transport_parameter_id, "Unknown 0x%04x"));
}
proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, " (len=%u)", parameter_length);
parameter_end_offset = offset + parameter_length;
proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_value,
tvb, offset, parameter_length, ENC_NA);
switch (parameter_type) {
case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_ORIGINAL_DESTINATION_CONNECTION_ID:
proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_original_destination_connection_id,
tvb, offset, parameter_length, ENC_NA);
offset += parameter_length;
break;
case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_MAX_IDLE_TIMEOUT:
proto_tree_add_item_ret_varint(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_max_idle_timeout,
tvb, offset, -1, ENC_VARINT_QUIC, &value, &len);
proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, " %" G_GINT64_MODIFIER "u ms", value);
offset += len;
break;
case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_STATELESS_RESET_TOKEN:
proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_stateless_reset_token,
tvb, offset, 16, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 16;
break;
case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_MAX_UDP_PAYLOAD_SIZE:
proto_tree_add_item_ret_varint(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_max_udp_payload_size,
tvb, offset, -1, ENC_VARINT_QUIC, &value, &len);
proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, " %" G_GINT64_MODIFIER "u", value);
/*TODO display expert info about invalid value (< 1252 or >65527) ? */
offset += len;
break;
case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_DATA:
proto_tree_add_item_ret_varint(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_initial_max_data,
tvb, offset, -1, ENC_VARINT_QUIC, &value, &len);
proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, " %" G_GINT64_MODIFIER "u", value);
offset += len;
break;
case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_STREAM_DATA_BIDI_LOCAL:
proto_tree_add_item_ret_varint(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_initial_max_stream_data_bidi_local,
tvb, offset, -1, ENC_VARINT_QUIC, &value, &len);
proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, " %" G_GINT64_MODIFIER "u", value);
offset += len;
break;
case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_STREAM_DATA_BIDI_REMOTE:
proto_tree_add_item_ret_varint(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_initial_max_stream_data_bidi_remote,
tvb, offset, -1, ENC_VARINT_QUIC, &value, &len);
proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, " %" G_GINT64_MODIFIER "u", value);
offset += len;
break;
case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_STREAM_DATA_UNI:
proto_tree_add_item_ret_varint(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_initial_max_stream_data_uni,
tvb, offset, -1, ENC_VARINT_QUIC, &value, &len);
proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, " %" G_GINT64_MODIFIER "u", value);
offset += len;
break;
case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_STREAMS_UNI:
proto_tree_add_item_ret_varint(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_initial_max_streams_uni,
tvb, offset, -1, ENC_VARINT_QUIC, &value, &len);
proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, " %" G_GINT64_MODIFIER "u", value);
offset += len;
break;
case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_STREAMS_BIDI:
proto_tree_add_item_ret_varint(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_initial_max_streams_bidi,
tvb, offset, -1, ENC_VARINT_QUIC, &value, &len);
proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, " %" G_GINT64_MODIFIER "u", value);
offset += len;
break;
case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_ACK_DELAY_EXPONENT:
proto_tree_add_item_ret_varint(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_ack_delay_exponent,
tvb, offset, -1, ENC_VARINT_QUIC, NULL, &len);
/*TODO display multiplier (x8) and expert info about invalid value (> 20) ? */
offset += len;
break;
case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_MAX_ACK_DELAY:
proto_tree_add_item_ret_varint(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_max_ack_delay,
tvb, offset, -1, ENC_VARINT_QUIC, &value, &len);
proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, " %" G_GINT64_MODIFIER "u", value);
offset += len;
break;
case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_DISABLE_ACTIVE_MIGRATION:
/* No Payload */
break;
case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_PREFERRED_ADDRESS: {
guint32 connectionid_length;
proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_pa_ipv4address,
tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_pa_ipv4port,
tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_pa_ipv6address,
tvb, offset, 16, ENC_NA);
offset += 16;
proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_pa_ipv6port,
tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &connectionid_length,
hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_pa_connectionid_length, 0, 20)) {
break;
}
offset += 1;
proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_pa_connectionid,
tvb, offset, connectionid_length, ENC_NA);
offset += connectionid_length;
proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_pa_statelessresettoken,
tvb, offset, 16, ENC_NA);
offset += 16;
}
break;
case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_ACTIVE_CONNECTION_ID_LIMIT:
proto_tree_add_item_ret_varint(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_active_connection_id_limit,
tvb, offset, -1, ENC_VARINT_QUIC, &value, &len);
proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, " %" G_GINT64_MODIFIER "u", value);
offset += len;
break;
case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_SOURCE_CONNECTION_ID:
proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_initial_source_connection_id,
tvb, offset, parameter_length, ENC_NA);
offset += parameter_length;
break;
case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_RETRY_SOURCE_CONNECTION_ID:
proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_retry_source_connection_id,
tvb, offset, parameter_length, ENC_NA);
offset += parameter_length;
break;
case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_MAX_DATAGRAM_FRAME_SIZE:
proto_tree_add_item_ret_varint(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_max_datagram_frame_size,
tvb, offset, -1, ENC_VARINT_QUIC, &value, &len);
proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, " %" G_GINT64_MODIFIER "u", value);
offset += len;
break;
case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_LOSS_BITS:
proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_loss_bits,
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 1;
break;
case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_MIN_ACK_DELAY:
proto_tree_add_item_ret_varint(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_min_ack_delay,
tvb, offset, -1, ENC_VARINT_QUIC, &value, &len);
proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, " %" G_GINT64_MODIFIER "u", value);
offset += len;
break;
case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_GOOGLE_USER_AGENT:
proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_google_user_agent_id,
tvb, offset, parameter_length, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA);
offset += parameter_length;
break;
case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_GOOGLE_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_YET_SUPPORTED:
proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_google_key_update_not_yet_supported,
tvb, offset, parameter_length, ENC_NA);
offset += parameter_length;
break;
case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_GOOGLE_QUIC_VERSION:
for (i = 0; i < parameter_length; i += 4) {
proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_google_quic_version,
tvb, offset + i, 4, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA);
}
offset += parameter_length;
break;
case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_GOOGLE_INITIAL_RTT:
proto_tree_add_item_ret_varint(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_google_initial_rtt,
tvb, offset, -1, ENC_VARINT_QUIC, &value, &len);
proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, " %" G_GINT64_MODIFIER "u us", value);
offset += len;
break;
case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_GOOGLE_SUPPORT_HANDSHAKE_DONE:
proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_google_support_handshake_done,
tvb, offset, parameter_length, ENC_NA);
offset += parameter_length;
break;
case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_GOOGLE_QUIC_PARAMS:
/* This field was used for non-standard Google-specific parameters encoded as a
* Google QUIC_CRYPTO CHLO and it has been replaced (version >= T051) by individual
* parameters. Report it as a bytes blob... */
proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_google_quic_params,
tvb, offset, parameter_length, ENC_NA);
/* ... and try decoding it: not sure what the first 4 bytes are (but they seems to be always 0) */
proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_google_quic_params_unknown_field,
tvb, offset, 4, ENC_NA);
dissect_gquic_tags(tvb, pinfo, parameter_tree, offset + 4);
offset += parameter_length;
break;
case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_GOOGLE_CONNECTION_OPTIONS:
proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_google_connection_options,
tvb, offset, parameter_length, ENC_NA);
offset += parameter_length;
break;
case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_ENABLE_TIME_STAMP:
/* No Payload */
break;
case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_ENABLE_TIME_STAMP_V2:
proto_tree_add_item_ret_varint(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_enable_time_stamp_v2,
tvb, offset, -1, ENC_VARINT_QUIC, &value, &len);
offset += parameter_length;
break;
case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_FACEBOOK_PARTIAL_RELIABILITY:
proto_tree_add_item_ret_varint(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_facebook_partial_reliability,
tvb, offset, -1, ENC_VARINT_QUIC, &value, &len);
offset += parameter_length;
break;
default:
offset += parameter_length;
/*TODO display expert info about unknown ? */
break;
}
if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, parameter_tree, offset, parameter_end_offset)) {
/* Dissection did not end at expected location, fix it. */
offset = parameter_end_offset;
}
}
return offset;
}
static gint
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_common(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl,
gboolean from_server, gboolean is_hrr)
{
guint8 sessid_length;
proto_tree *rnd_tree;
proto_tree *ti_rnd;
guint8 draft_version = session->tls13_draft_version;
/* Prepare for renegotiation by resetting the state. */
ssl_reset_session(session, ssl, !from_server);
if (ssl) {
StringInfo *rnd;
if (from_server)
rnd = &ssl->server_random;
else
rnd = &ssl->client_random;
/* save provided random for later keyring generation */
tvb_memcpy(tvb, rnd->data, offset, 32);
rnd->data_len = 32;
if (from_server)
ssl->state |= SSL_SERVER_RANDOM;
else
ssl->state |= SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM;
ssl_debug_printf("%s found %s RANDOM -> state 0x%02X\n", G_STRFUNC,
from_server ? "SERVER" : "CLIENT", ssl->state);
}
ti_rnd = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_random, tvb, offset, 32, ENC_NA);
if (session->version != TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { /* No time on first bytes random with TLS 1.3 */
rnd_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti_rnd, hf->ett.hs_random);
/* show the time */
proto_tree_add_item(rnd_tree, hf->hf.hs_random_time,
tvb, offset, 4, ENC_TIME_SECS|ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
/* show the random bytes */
proto_tree_add_item(rnd_tree, hf->hf.hs_random_bytes,
tvb, offset, 28, ENC_NA);
offset += 28;
} else {
if (is_hrr) {
proto_item_append_text(ti_rnd, " (HelloRetryRequest magic)");
}
offset += 32;
}
/* No Session ID with TLS 1.3 on Server Hello before draft -22 */
if (from_server == 0 || !(session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION && draft_version > 0 && draft_version < 22)) {
/* show the session id (length followed by actual Session ID) */
sessid_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_session_id_len,
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset++;
if (ssl) {
/* save the authorative SID for later use in ChangeCipherSpec.
* (D)TLS restricts the SID to 32 chars, it does not make sense to
* save more, so ignore larger ones. */
if (from_server && sessid_length <= 32) {
tvb_memcpy(tvb, ssl->session_id.data, offset, sessid_length);
ssl->session_id.data_len = sessid_length;
}
}
if (sessid_length > 0) {
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_session_id,
tvb, offset, sessid_length, ENC_NA);
offset += sessid_length;
}
}
return offset;
}
static gint
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
gboolean has_length)
{
/* TLS 1.2/1.3 status_request Client Hello Extension.
* TLS 1.2 status_request_v2 CertificateStatusRequestItemV2 type.
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066#section-8 (status_request)
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6961#section-2.2 (status_request_v2)
* struct {
* CertificateStatusType status_type;
* uint16 request_length; // for status_request_v2
* select (status_type) {
* case ocsp: OCSPStatusRequest;
* case ocsp_multi: OCSPStatusRequest;
* } request;
* } CertificateStatusRequest; // CertificateStatusRequestItemV2
*
* enum { ocsp(1), ocsp_multi(2), (255) } CertificateStatusType;
* struct {
* ResponderID responder_id_list<0..2^16-1>;
* Extensions request_extensions;
* } OCSPStatusRequest;
* opaque ResponderID<1..2^16-1>;
* opaque Extensions<0..2^16-1>;
*/
guint cert_status_type;
cert_status_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_status_type,
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA);
offset++;
if (has_length) {
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_status_request_len,
tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
}
switch (cert_status_type) {
case SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS_TYPE_OCSP:
case SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS_TYPE_OCSP_MULTI:
{
guint32 responder_id_list_len;
guint32 request_extensions_len;
/* ResponderID responder_id_list<0..2^16-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &responder_id_list_len,
hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_status_responder_id_list_len, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
return offset_end;
}
offset += 2;
if (responder_id_list_len != 0) {
proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, pinfo, &hf->ei.hs_ext_cert_status_undecoded,
tvb, offset, responder_id_list_len,
"Responder ID list is not implemented, contact Wireshark"
" developers if you want this to be supported");
}
offset += responder_id_list_len;
/* opaque Extensions<0..2^16-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &request_extensions_len,
hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_status_request_extensions_len, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
return offset_end;
}
offset += 2;
if (request_extensions_len != 0) {
proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, pinfo, &hf->ei.hs_ext_cert_status_undecoded,
tvb, offset, request_extensions_len,
"Request Extensions are not implemented, contact"
" Wireshark developers if you want this to be supported");
}
offset += request_extensions_len;
break;
}
}
return offset;
}
static guint
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request_v2(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
{
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6961#section-2.2
* struct {
* CertificateStatusRequestItemV2 certificate_status_req_list<1..2^16-1>;
* } CertificateStatusRequestListV2;
*/
guint32 req_list_length, next_offset;
/* CertificateStatusRequestItemV2 certificate_status_req_list<1..2^16-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &req_list_length,
hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_status_request_list_len, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) {
return offset_end;
}
offset += 2;
next_offset = offset + req_list_length;
while (offset < next_offset) {
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, next_offset, TRUE);
}
return offset;
}
static guint32
tls_dissect_ocsp_response(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
{
guint32 response_length;
proto_item *ocsp_resp;
proto_tree *ocsp_resp_tree;
asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx;
/* opaque OCSPResponse<1..2^24-1>; */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &response_length,
hf->hf.hs_ocsp_response_len, 1, G_MAXUINT24)) {
return offset_end;
}
offset += 3;
ocsp_resp = proto_tree_add_item(tree, proto_ocsp, tvb, offset,
response_length, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
proto_item_set_text(ocsp_resp, "OCSP Response");
ocsp_resp_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ocsp_resp, hf->ett.ocsp_response);
if (proto_is_protocol_enabled(find_protocol_by_id(proto_ocsp))) {
asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo);
dissect_ocsp_OCSPResponse(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, ocsp_resp_tree, -1);
}
offset += response_length;;
return offset;
}
guint32
tls_dissect_hnd_certificate_status(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
{
/* TLS 1.2 "CertificateStatus" handshake message.
* TLS 1.3 "status_request" Certificate extension.
* struct {
* CertificateStatusType status_type;
* select (status_type) {
* case ocsp: OCSPResponse;
* case ocsp_multi: OCSPResponseList; // status_request_v2
* } response;
* } CertificateStatus;
* opaque OCSPResponse<1..2^24-1>;
* struct {
* OCSPResponse ocsp_response_list<1..2^24-1>;
* } OCSPResponseList; // status_request_v2
*/
guint32 status_type, resp_list_length, next_offset;
proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_status_type,
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &status_type);
offset += 1;
switch (status_type) {
case SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS_TYPE_OCSP:
offset = tls_dissect_ocsp_response(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end);
break;
case SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS_TYPE_OCSP_MULTI:
/* OCSPResponse ocsp_response_list<1..2^24-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &resp_list_length,
hf->hf.hs_ocsp_response_list_len, 1, G_MAXUINT24)) {
return offset_end;
}
offset += 3;
next_offset = offset + resp_list_length;
while (offset < next_offset) {
offset = tls_dissect_ocsp_response(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, next_offset);
}
break;
}
return offset;
}
static guint
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_supported_groups(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
{
/* RFC 8446 Section 4.2.7
* enum { ..., (0xFFFF) } NamedGroup;
* struct {
* NamedGroup named_group_list<2..2^16-1>
* } NamedGroupList;
*
* NOTE: "NamedCurve" (RFC 4492) is renamed to "NamedGroup" (RFC 7919) and
* the extension itself from "elliptic_curves" to "supported_groups".
*/
guint32 groups_length, next_offset;
proto_tree *groups_tree;
proto_item *ti;
/* NamedGroup named_group_list<2..2^16-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &groups_length,
hf->hf.hs_ext_supported_groups_len, 2, G_MAXUINT16)) {
return offset_end;
}
offset += 2;
next_offset = offset + groups_length;
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
hf->hf.hs_ext_supported_groups,
tvb, offset, groups_length,
"Supported Groups (%d group%s)",
groups_length / 2,
plurality(groups_length/2, "", "s"));
/* make this a subtree */
groups_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.hs_ext_groups);
/* loop over all groups */
while (offset + 2 <= offset_end) {
proto_tree_add_item(groups_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_supported_group, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
}
if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, groups_tree, offset, next_offset)) {
offset = next_offset;
}
return offset;
}
static gint
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_ec_point_formats(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
{
guint8 ecpf_length;
proto_tree *ecpf_tree;
proto_item *ti;
ecpf_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_ec_point_formats_len,
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 1;
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
hf->hf.hs_ext_ec_point_formats,
tvb, offset, ecpf_length,
"Elliptic curves point formats (%d)",
ecpf_length);
/* make this a subtree */
ecpf_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.hs_ext_curves_point_formats);
/* loop over all point formats */
while (ecpf_length > 0)
{
proto_tree_add_item(ecpf_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_ec_point_format, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset++;
ecpf_length--;
}
return offset;
}
static guint32
tls_dissect_sct(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint16 version)
{
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-3.2
* enum { v1(0), (255) } Version;
* struct {
* opaque key_id[32];
* } LogID;
* opaque CtExtensions<0..2^16-1>;
* struct {
* Version sct_version;
* LogID id;
* uint64 timestamp;
* CtExtensions extensions;
* digitally-signed struct { ... };
* } SignedCertificateTimestamp;
*/
guint32 sct_version;
guint64 sct_timestamp_ms;
nstime_t sct_timestamp;
guint32 exts_len;
const gchar *log_name;
proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(tree, hf->hf.sct_sct_version, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA, &sct_version);
offset++;
if (sct_version != 0) {
// TODO expert info about unknown SCT version?
return offset;
}
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.sct_sct_logid, tvb, offset, 32, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
log_name = bytesval_to_str(tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, 32), 32, ct_logids, "Unknown Log");
proto_item_append_text(tree, " (%s)", log_name);
offset += 32;
sct_timestamp_ms = tvb_get_ntoh64(tvb, offset);
sct_timestamp.secs = (time_t)(sct_timestamp_ms / 1000);
sct_timestamp.nsecs = (int)((sct_timestamp_ms % 1000) * 1000000);
proto_tree_add_time(tree, hf->hf.sct_sct_timestamp, tvb, offset, 8, &sct_timestamp);
offset += 8;
/* opaque CtExtensions<0..2^16-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &exts_len,
hf->hf.sct_sct_extensions_length, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
return offset_end;
}
offset += 2;
if (exts_len > 0) {
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.sct_sct_extensions, tvb, offset, exts_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += exts_len;
}
offset = ssl_dissect_digitally_signed(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, version,
hf->hf.sct_sct_signature_length,
hf->hf.sct_sct_signature);
return offset;
}
guint32
tls_dissect_sct_list(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint16 version)
{
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-3.3
* opaque SerializedSCT<1..2^16-1>;
* struct {
* SerializedSCT sct_list <1..2^16-1>;
* } SignedCertificateTimestampList;
*/
guint32 list_length, sct_length, next_offset;
proto_tree *subtree;
/* SerializedSCT sct_list <1..2^16-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &list_length,
hf->hf.sct_scts_length, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) {
return offset_end;
}
offset += 2;
while (offset < offset_end) {
subtree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, 2, hf->ett.sct, NULL, "Signed Certificate Timestamp");
/* opaque SerializedSCT<1..2^16-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, offset_end, &sct_length,
hf->hf.sct_sct_length, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) {
return offset_end;
}
offset += 2;
next_offset = offset + sct_length;
proto_item_set_len(subtree, 2 + sct_length);
offset = tls_dissect_sct(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, next_offset, version);
if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, next_offset)) {
offset = next_offset;
}
}
return offset;
}
static guint32
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_esni(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
guint8 hnd_type, SslDecryptSession *ssl _U_)
{
guint32 record_digest_length, encrypted_sni_length;
switch (hnd_type) {
case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
/*
* struct {
* CipherSuite suite;
* KeyShareEntry key_share;
* opaque record_digest<0..2^16-1>;
* opaque encrypted_sni<0..2^16-1>;
* } ClientEncryptedSNI;
*/
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.esni_suite, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_key_share_entry(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end);
/* opaque record_digest<0..2^16-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &record_digest_length,
hf->hf.esni_record_digest_length, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
return offset_end;
}
offset += 2;
if (record_digest_length > 0) {
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.esni_record_digest, tvb, offset, record_digest_length, ENC_NA);
offset += record_digest_length;
}
/* opaque encrypted_sni<0..2^16-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &encrypted_sni_length,
hf->hf.esni_encrypted_sni_length, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
return offset_end;
}
offset += 2;
if (encrypted_sni_length > 0) {
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.esni_encrypted_sni, tvb, offset, encrypted_sni_length, ENC_NA);
offset += encrypted_sni_length;
}
break;
case SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.esni_nonce, tvb, offset, 16, ENC_NA);
offset += 16;
break;
}
return offset;
}
/** TLS Extensions (in Client Hello and Server Hello). }}} */
/* Connection ID dissection. {{{ */
static guint32
ssl_dissect_ext_connection_id(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, SslDecryptSession *ssl,
guint8 cidl, guint8 **session_cid, guint8 *session_cidl)
{
/* keep track of the decrypt session only for the first pass */
if (cidl > 0 && !PINFO_FD_VISITED(pinfo)) {
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset + 1, cidl);
*session_cidl = cidl;
*session_cid = (guint8*)wmem_alloc0(wmem_file_scope(), cidl);
tvb_memcpy(tvb, *session_cid, offset + 1, cidl);
if (ssl) {
ssl_add_session_by_cid(ssl);
}
}
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_connection_id_length,
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA);
offset++;
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_connection_id,
tvb, offset, cidl, ENC_NA);
offset += cidl;
return offset;
}
static guint32
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_connection_id(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint8 hnd_type,
SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl)
{
guint8 cidl = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
switch (hnd_type) {
case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
return ssl_dissect_ext_connection_id(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, ssl,
cidl, &session->client_cid, &session->client_cid_len);
case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
return ssl_dissect_ext_connection_id(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, ssl,
cidl, &session->server_cid, &session->server_cid_len);
default:
return offset;
}
} /* }}} */
/* Whether the Content and Handshake Types are valid; handle Protocol Version. {{{ */
gboolean
ssl_is_valid_content_type(guint8 type)
{
switch ((ContentType) type) {
case SSL_ID_CHG_CIPHER_SPEC:
case SSL_ID_ALERT:
case SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE:
case SSL_ID_APP_DATA:
case SSL_ID_HEARTBEAT:
case SSL_ID_TLS12_CID:
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
gboolean
ssl_is_valid_handshake_type(guint8 hs_type, gboolean is_dtls)
{
switch ((HandshakeType) hs_type) {
case SSL_HND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
/* hello_verify_request is DTLS-only */
return is_dtls;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_REQUEST:
case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
case SSL_HND_NEWSESSION_TICKET:
case SSL_HND_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
case SSL_HND_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
case SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
case SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE:
case SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG:
case SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST:
case SSL_HND_SVR_HELLO_DONE:
case SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY:
case SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG:
case SSL_HND_FINISHED:
case SSL_HND_CERT_URL:
case SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS:
case SSL_HND_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA:
case SSL_HND_KEY_UPDATE:
case SSL_HND_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE:
case SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTS:
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
static gboolean
ssl_is_authoritative_version_message(guint8 content_type, guint8 handshake_type,
gboolean is_dtls)
{
/* Consider all valid Handshake messages (except for Client Hello) and
* all other valid record types (other than Handshake) */
return (content_type == SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE &&
ssl_is_valid_handshake_type(handshake_type, is_dtls) &&
handshake_type != SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO) ||
(content_type != SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE &&
ssl_is_valid_content_type(content_type));
}
/**
* Scan a Server Hello handshake message for the negotiated version. For TLS 1.3
* draft 22 and newer, it also checks whether it is a HelloRetryRequest.
*/
void
tls_scan_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
guint16 *server_version, gboolean *is_hrr)
{
/* SHA256("HelloRetryRequest") */
static const guint8 tls13_hrr_random_magic[] = {
0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02, 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91,
0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e, 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c
};
guint8 session_id_length;
*server_version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
/*
* Try to look for supported_versions extension. Minimum length:
* 2 + 32 + 1 = 35 (version, random, session id length)
* 2 + 1 + 2 = 5 (cipher suite, compression method, extensions length)
* 2 + 2 + 2 = 6 (ext type, ext len, version)
*/
if (*server_version == TLSV1DOT2_VERSION && offset_end - offset >= 46) {
offset += 2;
*is_hrr = tvb_memeql(tvb, offset, tls13_hrr_random_magic, sizeof(tls13_hrr_random_magic)) == 0;
offset += 32;
session_id_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
offset++;
if (offset_end - offset < session_id_length + 5u) {
return;
}
offset += session_id_length + 5;
while (offset_end - offset >= 6) {
guint16 ext_type = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
guint16 ext_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 2);
if (offset_end - offset < 4u + ext_len) {
break; /* not enough data for type, length and data */
}
if (ext_type == SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS && ext_len == 2) {
*server_version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 4);
return;
}
offset += 4 + ext_len;
}
} else {
*is_hrr = FALSE;
}
}
void
ssl_try_set_version(SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl,
guint8 content_type, guint8 handshake_type,
gboolean is_dtls, guint16 version)
{
guint8 tls13_draft = 0;
if (!ssl_is_authoritative_version_message(content_type, handshake_type,
is_dtls))
return;
if (handshake_type == SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO) {
tls13_draft = extract_tls13_draft_version(version);
if (tls13_draft != 0) {
/* This is TLS 1.3 (a draft version). */
version = TLSV1DOT3_VERSION;
}
if (version == 0xfb17 || version == 0xfb1a) {
/* Unofficial TLS 1.3 draft version for Facebook fizz. */
tls13_draft = (guint8)version;
version = TLSV1DOT3_VERSION;
}
}
switch (version) {
case SSLV3_VERSION:
case TLSV1_VERSION:
case TLSV1DOT1_VERSION:
case TLSV1DOT2_VERSION:
case TLSV1DOT3_VERSION:
if (is_dtls)
return;
break;
case DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION:
case DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION:
case DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION:
if (!is_dtls)
return;
break;
default: /* invalid version number */
return;
}
session->tls13_draft_version = tls13_draft;
session->version = version;
if (ssl) {
ssl->state |= SSL_VERSION;
ssl_debug_printf("%s found version 0x%04X -> state 0x%02X\n", G_STRFUNC, version, ssl->state);
}
}
void
ssl_check_record_length(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, packet_info *pinfo,
ContentType content_type,
guint record_length, proto_item *length_pi,
guint16 version, tvbuff_t *decrypted_tvb)
{
guint max_expansion;
if (version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
/* TLS 1.3: Max length is 2^14 + 256 */
max_expansion = 256;
} else {
/* RFC 5246, Section 6.2.3: TLSCiphertext.fragment length MUST NOT exceed 2^14 + 2048 */
max_expansion = 2048;
}
/*
* RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2), Section 6.2.1 forbids zero-length Handshake, Alert
* and ChangeCipherSpec.
* RFC 6520 (Heartbeats) does not mention zero-length Heartbeat fragments,
* so assume it is permitted.
* RFC 6347 (DTLS 1.2) does not mention zero-length fragments either, so
* assume TLS 1.2 requirements.
*/
if (record_length == 0 &&
(content_type == SSL_ID_CHG_CIPHER_SPEC ||
content_type == SSL_ID_ALERT ||
content_type == SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE)) {
expert_add_info_format(pinfo, length_pi, &hf->ei.record_length_invalid,
"Zero-length %s fragments are not allowed",
val_to_str_const(content_type, ssl_31_content_type, "unknown"));
}
if (record_length > TLS_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH + max_expansion) {
expert_add_info_format(pinfo, length_pi, &hf->ei.record_length_invalid,
"TLSCiphertext length MUST NOT exceed 2^14 + %u", max_expansion);
}
if (decrypted_tvb && tvb_captured_length(decrypted_tvb) > TLS_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH) {
expert_add_info_format(pinfo, length_pi, &hf->ei.record_length_invalid,
"TLSPlaintext length MUST NOT exceed 2^14");
}
}
static void
ssl_set_cipher(SslDecryptSession *ssl, guint16 cipher)
{
/* store selected cipher suite for decryption */
ssl->session.cipher = cipher;
const SslCipherSuite *cs = ssl_find_cipher(cipher);
if (!cs) {
ssl->cipher_suite = NULL;
ssl->state &= ~SSL_CIPHER;
ssl_debug_printf("%s can't find cipher suite 0x%04X\n", G_STRFUNC, cipher);
} else if (ssl->session.version == SSLV3_VERSION && !(cs->dig == DIG_MD5 || cs->dig == DIG_SHA)) {
/* A malicious packet capture contains a SSL 3.0 session using a TLS 1.2
* cipher suite that uses for example MACAlgorithm SHA256. Reject that
* to avoid a potential buffer overflow in ssl3_check_mac. */
ssl->cipher_suite = NULL;
ssl->state &= ~SSL_CIPHER;
ssl_debug_printf("%s invalid SSL 3.0 cipher suite 0x%04X\n", G_STRFUNC, cipher);
} else {
/* Cipher found, save this for the delayed decoder init */
ssl->cipher_suite = cs;
ssl->state |= SSL_CIPHER;
ssl_debug_printf("%s found CIPHER 0x%04X %s -> state 0x%02X\n", G_STRFUNC, cipher,
val_to_str_ext_const(cipher, &ssl_31_ciphersuite_ext, "unknown"),
ssl->state);
}
}
/* }}} */
/* Client Hello and Server Hello dissections. {{{ */
static gint
ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree,
packet_info* pinfo, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint8 hnd_type,
SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl,
gboolean is_dtls);
void
ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_hello(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
guint32 offset_end, SslSession *session,
SslDecryptSession *ssl, dtls_hfs_t *dtls_hfs)
{
/* struct {
* ProtocolVersion client_version;
* Random random;
* SessionID session_id;
* opaque cookie<0..32>; //new field for DTLS
* CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-1>;
* CompressionMethod compression_methods<1..2^8-1>;
* Extension client_hello_extension_list<0..2^16-1>;
* } ClientHello;
*/
proto_item *ti;
proto_tree *cs_tree;
guint32 cipher_suite_length;
guint32 compression_methods_length;
guint8 compression_method;
guint32 next_offset;
/* show the client version */
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_client_version, tvb,
offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
/* dissect fields that are also present in ClientHello */
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_common(hf, tvb, tree, offset, session, ssl, FALSE, FALSE);
/* fields specific for DTLS (cookie_len, cookie) */
if (dtls_hfs != NULL) {
guint32 cookie_length;
/* opaque cookie<0..32> (for DTLS only) */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &cookie_length,
dtls_hfs->hf_dtls_handshake_cookie_len, 0, 32)) {
return;
}
offset++;
if (cookie_length > 0) {
proto_tree_add_item(tree, dtls_hfs->hf_dtls_handshake_cookie,
tvb, offset, cookie_length, ENC_NA);
offset += cookie_length;
}
}
/* CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &cipher_suite_length,
hf->hf.hs_cipher_suites_len, 2, G_MAXUINT16)) {
return;
}
offset += 2;
next_offset = offset + cipher_suite_length;
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
hf->hf.hs_cipher_suites,
tvb, offset, cipher_suite_length,
"Cipher Suites (%d suite%s)",
cipher_suite_length / 2,
plurality(cipher_suite_length/2, "", "s"));
cs_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.cipher_suites);
while (offset + 2 <= next_offset) {
proto_tree_add_item(cs_tree, hf->hf.hs_cipher_suite, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
}
if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, cs_tree, offset, next_offset)) {
offset = next_offset;
}
/* CompressionMethod compression_methods<1..2^8-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &compression_methods_length,
hf->hf.hs_comp_methods_len, 1, G_MAXUINT8)) {
return;
}
offset++;
next_offset = offset + compression_methods_length;
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
hf->hf.hs_comp_methods,
tvb, offset, compression_methods_length,
"Compression Methods (%u method%s)",
compression_methods_length,
plurality(compression_methods_length,
"", "s"));
cs_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.comp_methods);
while (offset < next_offset) {
compression_method = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
/* TODO: make reserved/private comp meth. fields selectable */
if (compression_method < 64)
proto_tree_add_uint(cs_tree, hf->hf.hs_comp_method,
tvb, offset, 1, compression_method);
else if (compression_method > 63 && compression_method < 193)
proto_tree_add_uint_format_value(cs_tree, hf->hf.hs_comp_method, tvb, offset, 1,
compression_method, "Reserved - to be assigned by IANA (%u)",
compression_method);
else
proto_tree_add_uint_format_value(cs_tree, hf->hf.hs_comp_method, tvb, offset, 1,
compression_method, "Private use range (%u)",
compression_method);
offset++;
}
/* SSL v3.0 has no extensions, so length field can indeed be missing. */
if (offset < offset_end) {
ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(hf, tvb, tree, pinfo, offset,
offset_end, SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO,
session, ssl, dtls_hfs != NULL);
}
}
void
ssl_dissect_hnd_srv_hello(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
packet_info* pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl,
gboolean is_dtls, gboolean is_hrr)
{
/* struct {
* ProtocolVersion server_version;
* Random random;
* SessionID session_id; // TLS 1.2 and before
* CipherSuite cipher_suite;
* CompressionMethod compression_method; // TLS 1.2 and before
* Extension server_hello_extension_list<0..2^16-1>;
* } ServerHello;
*/
guint8 draft_version = session->tls13_draft_version;
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL,
val_to_str_const(session->version, ssl_version_short_names, "SSL"));
/* Initially assume that the session is resumed. If this is not the case, a
* ServerHelloDone will be observed before the ChangeCipherSpec message
* which will reset this flag. */
session->is_session_resumed = TRUE;
/* show the server version */
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_server_version, tvb,
offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
/* dissect fields that are also present in ClientHello */
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_common(hf, tvb, tree, offset, session, ssl, TRUE, is_hrr);
if (ssl) {
/* store selected cipher suite for decryption */
ssl_set_cipher(ssl, tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset));
}
/* now the server-selected cipher suite */
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_cipher_suite,
tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
/* No compression with TLS 1.3 before draft -22 */
if (!(session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION && draft_version > 0 && draft_version < 22)) {
if (ssl) {
/* store selected compression method for decryption */
ssl->session.compression = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
}
/* and the server-selected compression method */
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_comp_method,
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset++;
}
/* SSL v3.0 has no extensions, so length field can indeed be missing. */
if (offset < offset_end) {
ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(hf, tvb, tree, pinfo, offset,
offset_end,
is_hrr ? SSL_HND_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST : SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO,
session, ssl, is_dtls);
}
}
/* Client Hello and Server Hello dissections. }}} */
/* New Session Ticket dissection. {{{ */
void
ssl_dissect_hnd_new_ses_ticket(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl,
gboolean is_dtls, GHashTable *session_hash)
{
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5077#section-3.3 (TLS >= 1.0):
* struct {
* uint32 ticket_lifetime_hint;
* opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>;
* } NewSessionTicket;
*
* RFC 8446 Section 4.6.1 (TLS 1.3):
* struct {
* uint32 ticket_lifetime;
* uint32 ticket_age_add;
* opaque ticket_nonce<0..255>; // new in draft -21, updated in -22
* opaque ticket<1..2^16-1>;
* Extension extensions<0..2^16-2>;
* } NewSessionTicket;
*/
proto_tree *subtree;
proto_item *subitem;
guint32 ticket_len;
gboolean is_tls13 = session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION;
guchar draft_version = session->tls13_draft_version;
guint32 lifetime_hint;
subtree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset,
hf->ett.session_ticket, NULL,
"TLS Session Ticket");
/* ticket lifetime hint */
subitem = proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(subtree, hf->hf.hs_session_ticket_lifetime_hint,
tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &lifetime_hint);
offset += 4;
if (lifetime_hint >= 60) {
gchar *time_str = unsigned_time_secs_to_str(wmem_packet_scope(), lifetime_hint);
proto_item_append_text(subitem, " (%s)", time_str);
}
if (is_tls13) {
/* for TLS 1.3: ticket_age_add */
proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf->hf.hs_session_ticket_age_add,
tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
/* for TLS 1.3: ticket_nonce (coming with Draft 21)*/
if (draft_version == 0 || draft_version >= 21) {
guint32 ticket_nonce_len;
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, offset_end, &ticket_nonce_len,
hf->hf.hs_session_ticket_nonce_len, 0, 255)) {
return;
}
offset++;
proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf->hf.hs_session_ticket_nonce, tvb, offset, ticket_nonce_len, ENC_NA);
offset += ticket_nonce_len;
}
}
/* opaque ticket<0..2^16-1> (with TLS 1.3 the minimum is 1) */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, offset_end, &ticket_len,
hf->hf.hs_session_ticket_len, is_tls13 ? 1 : 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
return;
}
offset += 2;
/* Content depends on implementation, so just show data! */
proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf->hf.hs_session_ticket,
tvb, offset, ticket_len, ENC_NA);
/* save the session ticket to cache for ssl_finalize_decryption */
if (ssl && !is_tls13) {
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, ticket_len);
ssl->session_ticket.data = (guchar*)wmem_realloc(wmem_file_scope(),
ssl->session_ticket.data, ticket_len);
ssl->session_ticket.data_len = ticket_len;
tvb_memcpy(tvb, ssl->session_ticket.data, offset, ticket_len);
/* NewSessionTicket is received after the first (client)
* ChangeCipherSpec, and before the second (server) ChangeCipherSpec.
* Since the second CCS has already the session key available it will
* just return. To ensure that the session ticket is mapped to a
* master key (from the first CCS), save the ticket here too. */
ssl_save_master_key("Session Ticket", session_hash,
&ssl->session_ticket, &ssl->master_secret);
ssl->state |= SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET;
}
offset += ticket_len;
if (is_tls13) {
ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(hf, tvb, subtree, pinfo, offset,
offset_end, SSL_HND_NEWSESSION_TICKET,
session, ssl, is_dtls);
}
} /* }}} */
void
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_retry_request(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
packet_info* pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl,
gboolean is_dtls)
{
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-19#section-4.1.4
* struct {
* ProtocolVersion server_version;
* CipherSuite cipher_suite; // not before draft -19
* Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>;
* } HelloRetryRequest;
* Note: no longer used since draft -22
*/
guint32 version;
guint8 draft_version;
proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(tree, hf->hf.hs_server_version, tvb,
offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &version);
draft_version = extract_tls13_draft_version(version);
offset += 2;
if (draft_version == 0 || draft_version >= 19) {
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_cipher_suite,
tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
}
ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(hf, tvb, tree, pinfo, offset,
offset_end, SSL_HND_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
session, ssl, is_dtls);
}
void
ssl_dissect_hnd_encrypted_extensions(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
packet_info* pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl,
gboolean is_dtls)
{
/* RFC 8446 Section 4.3.1
* struct {
* Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
* } EncryptedExtensions;
*/
ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(hf, tvb, tree, pinfo, offset,
offset_end, SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
session, ssl, is_dtls);
}
/* Certificate and Certificate Request dissections. {{{ */
void
ssl_dissect_hnd_cert(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree,
guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, packet_info *pinfo,
SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl _U_,
gboolean is_from_server, gboolean is_dtls)
{
/* opaque ASN.1Cert<1..2^24-1>;
*
* Before RFC 8446 (TLS <= 1.2):
* struct {
* select(certificate_type) {
*
* // certificate type defined in RFC 7250
* case RawPublicKey:
* opaque ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>;
*
* // X.509 certificate defined in RFC 5246
* case X.509:
* ASN.1Cert certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
* };
* } Certificate;
*
* RFC 8446 (since draft -20):
* struct {
* select(certificate_type){
* case RawPublicKey:
* // From RFC 7250 ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo
* opaque ASN1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>;
*
* case X.509:
* opaque cert_data<1..2^24-1>;
* }
* Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
* } CertificateEntry;
* struct {
* opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
* CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
* } Certificate;
*/
enum { CERT_X509, CERT_RPK } cert_type;
asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx;
#if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS)
gnutls_datum_t subjectPublicKeyInfo = { NULL, 0 };
#endif
guint32 next_offset, certificate_list_length, cert_length;
proto_tree *subtree = tree;
guint certificate_index = 0;
asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo);
if ((is_from_server && session->server_cert_type == SSL_HND_CERT_TYPE_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY) ||
(!is_from_server && session->client_cert_type == SSL_HND_CERT_TYPE_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY)) {
cert_type = CERT_RPK;
} else {
cert_type = CERT_X509;
}
#if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS)
/* Ask the pkcs1 dissector to return the public key details */
if (ssl)
asn1_ctx.private_data = &subjectPublicKeyInfo;
#endif
/* TLS 1.3: opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1> */
if (session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
guint32 context_length;
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &context_length,
hf->hf.hs_certificate_request_context_length, 0, G_MAXUINT8)) {
return;
}
offset++;
if (context_length > 0) {
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_certificate_request_context,
tvb, offset, context_length, ENC_NA);
offset += context_length;
}
}
if (session->version != TLSV1DOT3_VERSION && cert_type == CERT_RPK) {
/* For RPK before TLS 1.3, the single RPK is stored directly without
* another "certificate_list" field. */
certificate_list_length = offset_end - offset;
next_offset = offset_end;
} else {
/* CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &certificate_list_length,
hf->hf.hs_certificates_len, 0, G_MAXUINT24)) {
return;
}
offset += 3; /* 24-bit length value */
next_offset = offset + certificate_list_length;
}
/* RawPublicKey must have one cert, but X.509 can have multiple. */
if (certificate_list_length > 0 && cert_type == CERT_X509) {
proto_item *ti;
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
hf->hf.hs_certificates,
tvb, offset, certificate_list_length,
"Certificates (%u bytes)",
certificate_list_length);
/* make it a subtree */
subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.certificates);
}
while (offset < next_offset) {
switch (cert_type) {
case CERT_RPK:
/* TODO add expert info if there is more than one RPK entry (certificate_index > 0) */
/* opaque ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, next_offset, &cert_length,
hf->hf.hs_certificate_len, 1, G_MAXUINT24)) {
return;
}
offset += 3;
dissect_x509af_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, subtree, hf->hf.hs_certificate);
offset += cert_length;
break;
case CERT_X509:
/* opaque ASN1Cert<1..2^24-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, next_offset, &cert_length,
hf->hf.hs_certificate_len, 1, G_MAXUINT24)) {
return;
}
offset += 3;
dissect_x509af_Certificate(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, subtree, hf->hf.hs_certificate);
#if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS)
if (is_from_server && ssl && certificate_index == 0) {
ssl_find_private_key_by_pubkey(ssl, &subjectPublicKeyInfo);
/* Only attempt to get the RSA modulus for the first cert. */
asn1_ctx.private_data = NULL;
}
#endif
offset += cert_length;
break;
}
/* TLS 1.3: Extension extensions<0..2^16-1> */
if (session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(hf, tvb, subtree, pinfo, offset,
next_offset, SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE,
session, ssl, is_dtls);
}
certificate_index++;
}
}
void
ssl_dissect_hnd_cert_req(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
SslSession *session, gboolean is_dtls)
{
/* From SSL 3.0 and up (note that since TLS 1.1 certificate_authorities can be empty):
* enum {
* rsa_sign(1), dss_sign(2), rsa_fixed_dh(3), dss_fixed_dh(4),
* (255)
* } ClientCertificateType;
*
* opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>;
*
* struct {
* ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
* DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<3..2^16-1>;
* } CertificateRequest;
*
*
* As per TLSv1.2 (RFC 5246) the format has changed to:
*
* enum {
* rsa_sign(1), dss_sign(2), rsa_fixed_dh(3), dss_fixed_dh(4),
* rsa_ephemeral_dh_RESERVED(5), dss_ephemeral_dh_RESERVED(6),
* fortezza_dms_RESERVED(20), (255)
* } ClientCertificateType;
*
* enum {
* none(0), md5(1), sha1(2), sha224(3), sha256(4), sha384(5),
* sha512(6), (255)
* } HashAlgorithm;
*
* enum { anonymous(0), rsa(1), dsa(2), ecdsa(3), (255) }
* SignatureAlgorithm;
*
* struct {
* HashAlgorithm hash;
* SignatureAlgorithm signature;
* } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm;
*
* SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
* supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
*
* opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>;
*
* struct {
* ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
* SignatureAndHashAlgorithm supported_signature_algorithms<2^16-1>;
* DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
* } CertificateRequest;
*
* draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18:
* struct {
* opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
* SignatureScheme
* supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
* DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
* CertificateExtension certificate_extensions<0..2^16-1>;
* } CertificateRequest;
*
* RFC 8446 (since draft-ietf-tls-tls13-19):
*
* struct {
* opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
* Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>;
* } CertificateRequest;
*/
proto_item *ti;
proto_tree *subtree;
guint32 next_offset;
asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx;
gboolean is_tls13 = session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION;
guchar draft_version = session->tls13_draft_version;
if (!tree)
return;
asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo);
if (is_tls13) {
guint32 context_length;
/* opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &context_length,
hf->hf.hs_certificate_request_context_length, 0, G_MAXUINT8)) {
return;
}
offset++;
if (context_length > 0) {
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_certificate_request_context,
tvb, offset, context_length, ENC_NA);
offset += context_length;
}
} else {
guint32 cert_types_count;
/* ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &cert_types_count,
hf->hf.hs_cert_types_count, 1, G_MAXUINT8)) {
return;
}
offset++;
next_offset = offset + cert_types_count;
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
hf->hf.hs_cert_types,
tvb, offset, cert_types_count,
"Certificate types (%u type%s)",
cert_types_count,
plurality(cert_types_count, "", "s"));
subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.cert_types);
while (offset < next_offset) {
proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf->hf.hs_cert_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset++;
}
}
if (session->version == TLSV1DOT2_VERSION || session->version == DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION ||
(is_tls13 && (draft_version > 0 && draft_version < 19))) {
offset = ssl_dissect_hash_alg_list(hf, tvb, tree, pinfo, offset, offset_end);
}
if (is_tls13 && (draft_version == 0 || draft_version >= 19)) {
/*
* TLS 1.3 draft 19 and newer: Extensions.
* SslDecryptSession pointer is NULL because Certificate Extensions
* should not influence decryption state.
*/
ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(hf, tvb, tree, pinfo, offset,
offset_end, SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST,
session, NULL, is_dtls);
} else if (is_tls13 && draft_version <= 18) {
/*
* TLS 1.3 draft 18 and older: certificate_authorities and
* certificate_extensions (a vector of OID mappings).
*/
offset = tls_dissect_certificate_authorities(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end);
ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_oid_filters(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end);
} else {
/* for TLS 1.2 and older, the certificate_authorities field. */
tls_dissect_certificate_authorities(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end);
}
}
/* Certificate and Certificate Request dissections. }}} */
void
ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_cert_verify(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint16 version)
{
ssl_dissect_digitally_signed(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, version,
hf->hf.hs_client_cert_vrfy_sig_len,
hf->hf.hs_client_cert_vrfy_sig);
}
/* Finished dissection. {{{ */
void
ssl_dissect_hnd_finished(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
const SslSession *session, ssl_hfs_t *ssl_hfs)
{
/* For SSLv3:
* struct {
* opaque md5_hash[16];
* opaque sha_hash[20];
* } Finished;
*
* For (D)TLS:
* struct {
* opaque verify_data[12];
* } Finished;
*
* For TLS 1.3:
* struct {
* opaque verify_data[Hash.length];
* }
*/
if (!tree)
return;
if (session->version == SSLV3_VERSION) {
if (ssl_hfs != NULL) {
proto_tree_add_item(tree, ssl_hfs->hs_md5_hash,
tvb, offset, 16, ENC_NA);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, ssl_hfs->hs_sha_hash,
tvb, offset + 16, 20, ENC_NA);
}
} else {
/* Length should be 12 for TLS before 1.3, assume this is the case. */
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_finished,
tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, ENC_NA);
}
} /* }}} */
/* RFC 6066 Certificate URL handshake message dissection. {{{ */
void
ssl_dissect_hnd_cert_url(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
{
guint16 url_hash_len;
/* enum {
* individual_certs(0), pkipath(1), (255)
* } CertChainType;
*
* struct {
* CertChainType type;
* URLAndHash url_and_hash_list<1..2^16-1>;
* } CertificateURL;
*
* struct {
* opaque url<1..2^16-1>;
* unint8 padding;
* opaque SHA1Hash[20];
* } URLAndHash;
*/
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_url_type,
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA);
offset++;
url_hash_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_url_url_hash_list_len,
tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
while (url_hash_len-- > 0) {
proto_item *urlhash_item;
proto_tree *urlhash_tree;
guint16 url_len;
urlhash_item = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_url_item,
tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
urlhash_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(urlhash_item, hf->ett.urlhash);
url_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(urlhash_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_url_url_len,
tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
proto_tree_add_item(urlhash_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_url_url,
tvb, offset, url_len, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA);
offset += url_len;
proto_tree_add_item(urlhash_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_url_padding,
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA);
offset++;
/* Note: RFC 6066 says that padding must be 0x01 */
proto_tree_add_item(urlhash_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_url_sha1,
tvb, offset, 20, ENC_NA);
offset += 20;
}
} /* }}} */
void
ssl_dissect_hnd_compress_certificate(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree,
guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, packet_info *pinfo,
SslSession *session _U_, SslDecryptSession *ssl _U_,
gboolean is_from_server _U_, gboolean is_dtls _U_)
{
guint32 compressed_certificate_message_length;
/*
* struct {
* CertificateCompressionAlgorithm algorithm;
* uint24 uncompressed_length;
* opaque compressed_certificate_message<1..2^24-1>;
* } CompressedCertificate;
*/
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_compress_certificate_algorithm,
tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_compress_certificate_uncompressed_length,
tvb, offset, 3, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 3;
/* opaque compressed_certificate_message<1..2^24-1>; */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &compressed_certificate_message_length,
hf->hf.hs_ext_compress_certificate_compressed_certificate_message_length, 1, G_MAXUINT24)) {
return;
}
offset += 3;
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_compress_certificate_compressed_certificate_message,
tvb, offset, compressed_certificate_message_length, ENC_NA);
/* TODO: Add Certificate decompression following algo... (Need to implement brotli too)*/
}
/* Dissection of TLS Extensions in Client Hello, Server Hello, etc. {{{ */
static gint
ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree,
packet_info* pinfo, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint8 hnd_type,
SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl,
gboolean is_dtls)
{
guint32 exts_len;
guint16 ext_type;
guint32 ext_len;
guint32 next_offset;
proto_tree *ext_tree;
gboolean is_tls13 = session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION;
/* Extension extensions<0..2^16-2> (for TLS 1.3 HRR/CR min-length is 2) */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &exts_len,
hf->hf.hs_exts_len, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
return offset_end;
}
offset += 2;
offset_end = offset + exts_len;
while (offset_end - offset >= 4)
{
ext_type = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
ext_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 2);
ext_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree_format(tree, tvb, offset, 4 + ext_len, hf->ett.hs_ext, NULL,
"Extension: %s (len=%u)", val_to_str(ext_type,
tls_hello_extension_types,
"Unknown type %u"), ext_len);
proto_tree_add_uint(ext_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_type,
tvb, offset, 2, ext_type);
offset += 2;
/* opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1> */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, offset_end, &ext_len,
hf->hf.hs_ext_len, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
return offset_end;
}
offset += 2;
next_offset = offset + ext_len;
switch (ext_type) {
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SERVER_NAME:
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_server_name(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset);
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH:
proto_tree_add_item(ext_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_max_fragment_length, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA);
offset += 1;
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST:
if (hnd_type == SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO) {
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, FALSE);
} else if (is_tls13 && hnd_type == SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE) {
offset = tls_dissect_hnd_certificate_status(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset);
}
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CERT_TYPE:
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_cert_type(hf, tvb, ext_tree,
offset, next_offset,
hnd_type, ext_type,
session);
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS:
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_supported_groups(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset);
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_EC_POINT_FORMATS:
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_ec_point_formats(hf, tvb, ext_tree, offset);
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS:
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_CERT: /* since TLS 1.3 draft -23 */
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_sig_hash_algs(hf, tvb, ext_tree, pinfo, offset, next_offset);
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_USE_SRTP:
if (is_dtls) {
offset = dtls_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_use_srtp(tvb, ext_tree, offset, next_offset);
} else {
// XXX expert info: This extension MUST only be used with DTLS, and not with TLS.
}
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_HEARTBEAT:
proto_tree_add_item(ext_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_heartbeat_mode,
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset++;
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_ALPN:
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_alpn(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, hnd_type, session, is_dtls);
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST_V2:
if (hnd_type == SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO)
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request_v2(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset);
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SIGNED_CERTIFICATE_TIMESTAMP:
// TLS 1.3 note: SCT only appears in EE in draft -16 and before.
if (hnd_type == SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO || hnd_type == SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS || hnd_type == SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE)
offset = tls_dissect_sct_list(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, session->version);
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CLIENT_CERT_TYPE:
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SERVER_CERT_TYPE:
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_cert_type(hf, tvb, ext_tree,
offset, next_offset,
hnd_type, ext_type,
session);
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_PADDING:
proto_tree_add_item(ext_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_padding_data, tvb, offset, ext_len, ENC_NA);
offset += ext_len;
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC:
if (ssl && hnd_type == SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO) {
ssl_debug_printf("%s enabling Encrypt-then-MAC\n", G_STRFUNC);
ssl->state |= SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
}
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET:
if (ssl) {
switch (hnd_type) {
case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
ssl->state |= SSL_CLIENT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET;
break;
case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
ssl->state |= SSL_SERVER_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET;
break;
default: /* no default */
break;
}
}
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_COMPRESS_CERTIFICATE:
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_compress_certificate(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, hnd_type, ssl);
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT:
proto_tree_add_item(ext_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_record_size_limit,
tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_QUIC_TRANSPORT_PARAMETERS:
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_quic_transport_parameters(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, hnd_type, ssl);
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SESSION_TICKET_TLS:
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_session_ticket(hf, tvb, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, hnd_type, ssl);
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_KEY_SHARE_OLD: /* used before TLS 1.3 draft -23 */
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_KEY_SHARE:
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_key_share(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, hnd_type);
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY:
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_pre_shared_key(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, hnd_type);
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_EARLY_DATA:
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_TICKET_EARLY_DATA_INFO:
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_early_data(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, hnd_type, ssl);
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS:
switch (hnd_type) {
case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_supported_versions(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, session);
break;
case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
case SSL_HND_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
proto_tree_add_item(ext_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_supported_version, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
break;
}
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_COOKIE:
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_cookie(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset);
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES:
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_psk_key_exchange_modes(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset);
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITIES:
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_certificate_authorities(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset);
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_OID_FILTERS:
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_oid_filters(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset);
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH:
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_NPN:
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_npn(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset);
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO:
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_reneg_info(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset);
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_ENCRYPTED_SERVER_NAME:
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_esni(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, hnd_type, ssl);
break;
case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CONNECTION_ID:
offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_connection_id(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, hnd_type, session, ssl);
break;
default:
proto_tree_add_item(ext_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_data,
tvb, offset, ext_len, ENC_NA);
offset += ext_len;
break;
}
if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset)) {
/* Dissection did not end at expected location, fix it. */
offset = next_offset;
}
}
/* Check if Extensions vector is correctly terminated. */
if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end)) {
offset = offset_end;
}
return offset;
} /* }}} */
/* ClientKeyExchange algo-specific dissectors. {{{ */
static void
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_ecdh(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
guint32 length)
{
gint point_len;
proto_tree *ssl_ecdh_tree;
ssl_ecdh_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length,
hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "EC Diffie-Hellman Client Params");
/* point */
point_len = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecdh_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_point_len, tvb,
offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecdh_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_point, tvb,
offset + 1, point_len, ENC_NA);
}
static void
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_dh(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 length)
{
gint yc_len;
proto_tree *ssl_dh_tree;
ssl_dh_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length,
hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "Diffie-Hellman Client Params");
/* ClientDiffieHellmanPublic.dh_public (explicit) */
yc_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_dh_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_yc_len, tvb,
offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_dh_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_yc, tvb,
offset + 2, yc_len, ENC_NA);
}
static void
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_rsa(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
guint32 length, const SslSession *session)
{
gint epms_len;
proto_tree *ssl_rsa_tree;
ssl_rsa_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length,
hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "RSA Encrypted PreMaster Secret");
/* EncryptedPreMasterSecret.pre_master_secret */
switch (session->version) {
case SSLV2_VERSION:
case SSLV3_VERSION:
case DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION:
/* OpenSSL pre-0.9.8f DTLS and pre-TLS quirk: 2-octet length vector is
* not present. The handshake contents represents the EPMS, see:
* https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/issues/10222 */
epms_len = length;
break;
default:
/* TLS and DTLS include vector length before EPMS */
epms_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_rsa_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_epms_len, tvb,
offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
break;
}
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_rsa_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_epms, tvb,
offset, epms_len, ENC_NA);
}
/* Used in PSK cipher suites */
static void
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_psk(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 length)
{
guint identity_len;
proto_tree *ssl_psk_tree;
ssl_psk_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length,
hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "PSK Client Params");
/* identity */
identity_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_identity_len, tvb,
offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_identity, tvb,
offset + 2, identity_len, ENC_NA);
}
/* Used in RSA PSK cipher suites */
static void
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_rsa_psk(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
guint32 length)
{
gint identity_len, epms_len;
proto_tree *ssl_psk_tree;
ssl_psk_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length,
hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "RSA PSK Client Params");
/* identity */
identity_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_identity_len,
tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_identity,
tvb, offset + 2, identity_len, ENC_NA);
offset += 2 + identity_len;
/* Yc */
epms_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_epms_len, tvb,
offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_epms, tvb,
offset + 2, epms_len, ENC_NA);
}
/* Used in EC J-PAKE cipher suites */
static void
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_ecjpake(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
guint32 length)
{
/*
* struct {
* ECPoint V;
* opaque r<1..2^8-1>;
* } ECSchnorrZKP;
*
* struct {
* ECPoint X;
* ECSchnorrZKP zkp;
* } ECJPAKEKeyKP;
*
* struct {
* ECJPAKEKeyKP ecjpake_key_kp;
* } ClientECJPAKEParams;
*
* select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
* case ecjpake:
* ClientECJPAKEParams params;
* } ClientKeyExchange;
*/
gint point_len;
proto_tree *ssl_ecjpake_tree;
ssl_ecjpake_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length,
hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL,
"EC J-PAKE Client Params");
/* ECJPAKEKeyKP.X */
point_len = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecjpake_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_xc_len, tvb,
offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecjpake_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_xc, tvb,
offset + 1, point_len, ENC_NA);
offset += 1 + point_len;
/* ECJPAKEKeyKP.zkp.V */
point_len = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecjpake_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_vc_len, tvb,
offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecjpake_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_vc, tvb,
offset + 1, point_len, ENC_NA);
offset += 1 + point_len;
/* ECJPAKEKeyKP.zkp.r */
point_len = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecjpake_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_rc_len, tvb,
offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecjpake_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_rc, tvb,
offset + 1, point_len, ENC_NA);
}
/* ClientKeyExchange algo-specific dissectors. }}} */
/* Dissects DigitallySigned (see RFC 5246 4.7 Cryptographic Attributes). {{{ */
static guint32
ssl_dissect_digitally_signed(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
guint16 version, gint hf_sig_len, gint hf_sig)
{
guint32 sig_len;
switch (version) {
case TLSV1DOT2_VERSION:
case DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION:
case TLSV1DOT3_VERSION:
tls_dissect_signature_algorithm(hf, tvb, tree, offset);
offset += 2;
break;
default:
break;
}
/* Sig */
if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &sig_len,
hf_sig_len, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
return offset_end;
}
offset += 2;
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_sig, tvb, offset, sig_len, ENC_NA);
offset += sig_len;
return offset;
} /* }}} */
/* ServerKeyExchange algo-specific dissectors. {{{ */
/* dissects signed_params inside a ServerKeyExchange for some keyex algos */
static void
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_sig(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
guint16 version)
{
/*
* TLSv1.2 (RFC 5246 sec 7.4.8)
* struct {
* digitally-signed struct {
* opaque handshake_messages[handshake_messages_length];
* }
* } CertificateVerify;
*
* TLSv1.0/TLSv1.1 (RFC 5436 sec 7.4.8 and 7.4.3) works essentially the same
* as TLSv1.2, but the hash algorithms are not explicit in digitally-signed.
*
* SSLv3 (RFC 6101 sec 5.6.8) essentially works the same as TLSv1.0 but it
* does more hashing including the master secret and padding.
*/
ssl_dissect_digitally_signed(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, version,
hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_sig_len,
hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_sig);
}
static guint32
dissect_tls_ecparameters(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
{
/*
* RFC 4492 ECC cipher suites for TLS
*
* struct {
* ECCurveType curve_type;
* select (curve_type) {
* case explicit_prime:
* ...
* case explicit_char2:
* ...
* case named_curve:
* NamedCurve namedcurve;
* };
* } ECParameters;
*/
gint curve_type;
/* ECParameters.curve_type */
curve_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_curve_type, tvb,
offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset++;
if (curve_type != 3)
return offset_end; /* only named_curves are supported */
/* case curve_type == named_curve; ECParameters.namedcurve */
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_named_curve, tvb,
offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
return offset;
}
static void
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecdh(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
guint16 version, gboolean anon)
{
/*
* RFC 4492 ECC cipher suites for TLS
*
* struct {
* opaque point <1..2^8-1>;
* } ECPoint;
*
* struct {
* ECParameters curve_params;
* ECPoint public;
* } ServerECDHParams;
*
* select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
* case ec_diffie_hellman:
* ServerECDHParams params;
* Signature signed_params;
* } ServerKeyExchange;
*/
gint point_len;
proto_tree *ssl_ecdh_tree;
ssl_ecdh_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset,
hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "EC Diffie-Hellman Server Params");
offset = dissect_tls_ecparameters(hf, tvb, ssl_ecdh_tree, offset, offset_end);
if (offset >= offset_end)
return; /* only named_curves are supported */
/* ECPoint.point */
point_len = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecdh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_point_len, tvb,
offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecdh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_point, tvb,
offset + 1, point_len, ENC_NA);
offset += 1 + point_len;
/* Signature (if non-anonymous KEX) */
if (!anon) {
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_sig(hf, tvb, pinfo, ssl_ecdh_tree, offset, offset_end, version);
}
}
static void
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_dhe(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
guint16 version, gboolean anon)
{
gint p_len, g_len, ys_len;
proto_tree *ssl_dh_tree;
ssl_dh_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset,
hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "Diffie-Hellman Server Params");
/* p */
p_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_dh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_p_len, tvb,
offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_dh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_p, tvb,
offset + 2, p_len, ENC_NA);
offset += 2 + p_len;
/* g */
g_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_dh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_g_len, tvb,
offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_dh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_g, tvb,
offset + 2, g_len, ENC_NA);
offset += 2 + g_len;
/* Ys */
ys_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_dh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_ys_len, tvb,
offset, 2, ys_len);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_dh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_ys, tvb,
offset + 2, ys_len, ENC_NA);
offset += 2 + ys_len;
/* Signature (if non-anonymous KEX) */
if (!anon) {
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_sig(hf, tvb, pinfo, ssl_dh_tree, offset, offset_end, version);
}
}
/* Only used in RSA-EXPORT cipher suites */
static void
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_rsa(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
guint16 version)
{
gint modulus_len, exponent_len;
proto_tree *ssl_rsa_tree;
ssl_rsa_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset,
hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "RSA-EXPORT Server Params");
/* modulus */
modulus_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_rsa_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_modulus_len, tvb,
offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_rsa_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_modulus, tvb,
offset + 2, modulus_len, ENC_NA);
offset += 2 + modulus_len;
/* exponent */
exponent_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_rsa_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_exponent_len,
tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_rsa_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_exponent,
tvb, offset + 2, exponent_len, ENC_NA);
offset += 2 + exponent_len;
/* Signature */
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_sig(hf, tvb, pinfo, ssl_rsa_tree, offset, offset_end, version);
}
/* Used in RSA PSK and PSK cipher suites */
static void
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_psk(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 length)
{
guint hint_len;
proto_tree *ssl_psk_tree;
hint_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
if ((2 + hint_len) != length) {
/* Lengths don't line up (wasn't what we expected?) */
return;
}
ssl_psk_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length,
hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "PSK Server Params");
/* hint */
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_hint_len, tvb,
offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_hint, tvb,
offset + 2, hint_len, ENC_NA);
}
/* Used in EC J-PAKE cipher suites */
static void
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecjpake(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
{
/*
* struct {
* ECPoint V;
* opaque r<1..2^8-1>;
* } ECSchnorrZKP;
*
* struct {
* ECPoint X;
* ECSchnorrZKP zkp;
* } ECJPAKEKeyKP;
*
* struct {
* ECParameters curve_params;
* ECJPAKEKeyKP ecjpake_key_kp;
* } ServerECJPAKEParams;
*
* select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
* case ecjpake:
* ServerECJPAKEParams params;
* } ServerKeyExchange;
*/
gint point_len;
proto_tree *ssl_ecjpake_tree;
ssl_ecjpake_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset,
hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL,
"EC J-PAKE Server Params");
offset = dissect_tls_ecparameters(hf, tvb, ssl_ecjpake_tree, offset, offset_end);
if (offset >= offset_end)
return; /* only named_curves are supported */
/* ECJPAKEKeyKP.X */
point_len = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecjpake_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_xs_len, tvb,
offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecjpake_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_xs, tvb,
offset + 1, point_len, ENC_NA);
offset += 1 + point_len;
/* ECJPAKEKeyKP.zkp.V */
point_len = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecjpake_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_vs_len, tvb,
offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecjpake_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_vs, tvb,
offset + 1, point_len, ENC_NA);
offset += 1 + point_len;
/* ECJPAKEKeyKP.zkp.r */
point_len = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecjpake_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_rs_len, tvb,
offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecjpake_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_rs, tvb,
offset + 1, point_len, ENC_NA);
}
/* ServerKeyExchange algo-specific dissectors. }}} */
/* Client Key Exchange and Server Key Exchange handshake dissections. {{{ */
void
ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_keyex(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 length,
const SslSession *session)
{
switch (ssl_get_keyex_alg(session->cipher)) {
case KEX_DH_ANON: /* RFC 5246; DHE_DSS, DHE_RSA, DH_DSS, DH_RSA, DH_ANON: ClientDiffieHellmanPublic */
case KEX_DH_DSS:
case KEX_DH_RSA:
case KEX_DHE_DSS:
case KEX_DHE_RSA:
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_dh(hf, tvb, tree, offset, length);
break;
case KEX_DHE_PSK: /* RFC 4279; diffie_hellman_psk: psk_identity, ClientDiffieHellmanPublic */
/* XXX: implement support for DHE_PSK */
break;
case KEX_ECDH_ANON: /* RFC 4492; ec_diffie_hellman: ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic */
case KEX_ECDH_ECDSA:
case KEX_ECDH_RSA:
case KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA:
case KEX_ECDHE_RSA:
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_ecdh(hf, tvb, tree, offset, length);
break;
case KEX_ECDHE_PSK: /* RFC 5489; ec_diffie_hellman_psk: psk_identity, ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic */
/* XXX: implement support for ECDHE_PSK */
break;
case KEX_KRB5: /* RFC 2712; krb5: KerberosWrapper */
/* XXX: implement support for KRB5 */
break;
case KEX_PSK: /* RFC 4279; psk: psk_identity */
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_psk(hf, tvb, tree, offset, length);
break;
case KEX_RSA: /* RFC 5246; rsa: EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_rsa(hf, tvb, tree, offset, length, session);
break;
case KEX_RSA_PSK: /* RFC 4279; rsa_psk: psk_identity, EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_rsa_psk(hf, tvb, tree, offset, length);
break;
case KEX_SRP_SHA: /* RFC 5054; srp: ClientSRPPublic */
case KEX_SRP_SHA_DSS:
case KEX_SRP_SHA_RSA:
/* XXX: implement support for SRP_SHA* */
break;
case KEX_ECJPAKE: /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake-01 used in Thread Commissioning */
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_ecjpake(hf, tvb, tree, offset, length);
break;
default:
/* XXX: add info message for not supported KEX algo */
break;
}
}
void
ssl_dissect_hnd_srv_keyex(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
const SslSession *session)
{
switch (ssl_get_keyex_alg(session->cipher)) {
case KEX_DH_ANON: /* RFC 5246; ServerDHParams */
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_dhe(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, session->version, TRUE);
break;
case KEX_DH_DSS: /* RFC 5246; not allowed */
case KEX_DH_RSA:
/* XXX: add error on not allowed KEX */
break;
case KEX_DHE_DSS: /* RFC 5246; dhe_dss, dhe_rsa: ServerDHParams, Signature */
case KEX_DHE_RSA:
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_dhe(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, session->version, FALSE);
break;
case KEX_DHE_PSK: /* RFC 4279; diffie_hellman_psk: psk_identity_hint, ServerDHParams */
/* XXX: implement support for DHE_PSK */
break;
case KEX_ECDH_ANON: /* RFC 4492; ec_diffie_hellman: ServerECDHParams (without signature for anon) */
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecdh(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, session->version, TRUE);
break;
case KEX_ECDHE_PSK: /* RFC 5489; psk_identity_hint, ServerECDHParams */
/* XXX: implement support for ECDHE_PSK */
break;
case KEX_ECDH_ECDSA: /* RFC 4492; ec_diffie_hellman: ServerECDHParams, Signature */
case KEX_ECDH_RSA:
case KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA:
case KEX_ECDHE_RSA:
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecdh(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, session->version, FALSE);
break;
case KEX_KRB5: /* RFC 2712; not allowed */
/* XXX: add error on not allowed KEX */
break;
case KEX_PSK: /* RFC 4279; psk, rsa: psk_identity*/
case KEX_RSA_PSK:
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_psk(hf, tvb, tree, offset, offset_end - offset);
break;
case KEX_RSA: /* only allowed if the public key in the server certificate is longer than 512 bits*/
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_rsa(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, session->version);
break;
case KEX_SRP_SHA: /* RFC 5054; srp: ServerSRPParams, Signature */
case KEX_SRP_SHA_DSS:
case KEX_SRP_SHA_RSA:
/* XXX: implement support for SRP_SHA* */
break;
case KEX_ECJPAKE: /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake-01 used in Thread Commissioning */
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecjpake(hf, tvb, tree, offset, offset_end);
break;
default:
/* XXX: add info message for not supported KEX algo */
break;
}
}
/* Client Key Exchange and Server Key Exchange handshake dissections. }}} */
void
tls13_dissect_hnd_key_update(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
{
/* RFC 8446 Section 4.6.3
* enum {
* update_not_requested(0), update_requested(1), (255)
* } KeyUpdateRequest;
*
* struct {
* KeyUpdateRequest request_update;
* } KeyUpdate;
*/
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_key_update_request_update, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA);
}
void
ssl_common_register_ssl_alpn_dissector_table(const char *name,
const char *ui_name, const int proto)
{
ssl_alpn_dissector_table = register_dissector_table(name, ui_name,
proto, FT_STRING, FALSE);
register_dissector_table_alias(ssl_alpn_dissector_table, "ssl.handshake.extensions_alpn_str");
}
void
ssl_common_register_dtls_alpn_dissector_table(const char *name,
const char *ui_name, const int proto)
{
dtls_alpn_dissector_table = register_dissector_table(name, ui_name,
proto, FT_STRING, FALSE);
register_dissector_table_alias(ssl_alpn_dissector_table, "dtls.handshake.extensions_alpn_str");
}
void
ssl_common_register_options(module_t *module, ssl_common_options_t *options, gboolean is_dtls)
{
prefs_register_string_preference(module, "psk", "Pre-Shared Key",
"Pre-Shared Key as HEX string. Should be 0 to 16 bytes.",
&(options->psk));
if (is_dtls) {
prefs_register_obsolete_preference(module, "keylog_file");
prefs_register_static_text_preference(module, "keylog_file_removed",
"The (Pre)-Master-Secret log filename preference can be configured in the TLS protocol preferences.",
"Use the TLS protocol preference to configure the keylog file for both DTLS and TLS.");
return;
}
prefs_register_filename_preference(module, "keylog_file", "(Pre)-Master-Secret log filename",
"The name of a file which contains a list of \n"
"(pre-)master secrets in one of the following formats:\n"
"\n"
"RSA <EPMS> <PMS>\n"
"RSA Session-ID:<SSLID> Master-Key:<MS>\n"
"CLIENT_RANDOM <CRAND> <MS>\n"
"PMS_CLIENT_RANDOM <CRAND> <PMS>\n"
"\n"
"Where:\n"
"<EPMS> = First 8 bytes of the Encrypted PMS\n"
"<PMS> = The Pre-Master-Secret (PMS) used to derive the MS\n"
"<SSLID> = The SSL Session ID\n"
"<MS> = The Master-Secret (MS)\n"
"<CRAND> = The Client's random number from the ClientHello message\n"
"\n"
"(All fields are in hex notation)",
&(options->keylog_filename), FALSE);
}
void
ssl_calculate_handshake_hash(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset, guint32 length)
{
if (ssl_session && ssl_session->session.version != TLSV1DOT3_VERSION && !(ssl_session->state & SSL_MASTER_SECRET)) {
guint32 old_length = ssl_session->handshake_data.data_len;
ssl_debug_printf("Calculating hash with offset %d %d\n", offset, length);
ssl_session->handshake_data.data = (guchar *)wmem_realloc(wmem_file_scope(), ssl_session->handshake_data.data, old_length + length);
if (tvb) {
tvb_memcpy(tvb, ssl_session->handshake_data.data + old_length, offset, length);
} else {
memset(ssl_session->handshake_data.data + old_length, 0, length);
}
ssl_session->handshake_data.data_len += length;
}
}
/*
* Editor modelines - https://www.wireshark.org/tools/modelines.html
*
* Local variables:
* c-basic-offset: 4
* tab-width: 8
* indent-tabs-mode: nil
* End:
*
* vi: set shiftwidth=4 tabstop=8 expandtab:
* :indentSize=4:tabSize=8:noTabs=true:
*/
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