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wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ssl.c

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/* packet-ssl.c
* Routines for ssl dissection
* Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Scott Renfro <scott@renfro.org>
*
* $Id$
*
* Wireshark - Network traffic analyzer
* By Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
* Copyright 1998 Gerald Combs
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
* of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
*
* See
*
* http://www.netscape.com/eng/security/SSL_2.html
*
* for SSL 2.0 specs.
*
* See
*
* http://www.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/
*
* for SSL 3.0 specs.
*
* See RFC 2246 for SSL 3.1/TLS 1.0 specs.
*
* See (among other places)
*
* http://www.graphcomp.com/info/specs/ms/pct.htm
*
* for PCT 1 draft specs.
*
* See
*
* http://research.sun.com/projects/crypto/draft-ietf-tls-ecc-05.txt
*
* for Elliptic Curve Cryptography cipher suites.
*
* See
*
* http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-camellia-04.txt
*
* for Camellia-based cipher suites.
*
* Notes:
*
* - Does not support dissection
* of frames that would require state maintained between frames
* (e.g., single ssl records spread across multiple tcp frames)
*
* - Identifies, but does not fully dissect the following messages:
*
* - SSLv3/TLS (These need more state from previous handshake msgs)
* - Server Key Exchange
* - Client Key Exchange
* - Certificate Verify
*
* - SSLv2 (These don't appear in the clear)
* - Error
* - Client Finished
* - Server Verify
* - Server Finished
* - Request Certificate
* - Client Certificate
*
* - Decryption is supported only for session that use RSA key exchange,
* if the host private key is provided via preference.
*
* - Decryption need to be performed 'sequentially', so it's done
* at packet reception time. This may cause a significative packet capture
* slow down. This also cause do dissect some ssl info that in previous
* dissector version were dissected only when a proto_tree context was
* available
*
* We are at Packet reception if time pinfo->fd->flags.visited == 0
*
*/
#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
# include "config.h"
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H
#include <sys/socket.h>
#endif
#include <glib.h>
#include <epan/conversation.h>
#include <epan/reassemble.h>
#include <epan/prefs.h>
#include <epan/emem.h>
#include <epan/dissectors/packet-tcp.h>
#include <epan/asn1.h>
#include <epan/dissectors/packet-x509af.h>
#include <epan/tap.h>
#include <epan/filesystem.h>
#include <epan/report_err.h>
#include <epan/expert.h>
#include "inet_v6defs.h"
#include "packet-x509if.h"
#include "packet-ssl.h"
#include "packet-ssl-utils.h"
#include <wsutil/file_util.h>
static gboolean ssl_desegment = TRUE;
static gboolean ssl_desegment_app_data = TRUE;
/*********************************************************************
*
* Protocol Constants, Variables, Data Structures
*
*********************************************************************/
/* Initialize the protocol and registered fields */
static gint ssl_tap = -1;
static gint proto_ssl = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_record = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_record_content_type = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_record_version = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_record_length = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_record_appdata = -1;
static gint hf_ssl2_record = -1;
static gint hf_ssl2_record_is_escape = -1;
static gint hf_ssl2_record_padding_length = -1;
static gint hf_ssl2_msg_type = -1;
static gint hf_pct_msg_type = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_change_cipher_spec = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_alert_message = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_alert_message_level = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_alert_message_description = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_protocol = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_type = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_length = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_client_version = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_server_version = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_random_time = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_random_bytes = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites_len = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suite = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_session_id = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_comp_methods_len = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_comp_methods = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_comp_method = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_extensions_len = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_extension_type = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_extension_len = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_extension_data = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_certificates_len = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_certificates = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_certificate = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_certificate_len = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_cert_types_count = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_cert_types = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_cert_type = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_finished = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_md5_hash = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_sha_hash = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_session_id_len = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_dnames_len = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_dnames = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_dname_len = -1;
static gint hf_ssl_handshake_dname = -1;
static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec_len = -1;
static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_len = -1;
static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge_len = -1;
static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec = -1;
static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge = -1;
static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key_len = -1;
static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key_len = -1;
static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg_len = -1;
static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key = -1;
static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key = -1;
static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg = -1;
static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_hit = -1;
static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_cert_type = -1;
static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id_len = -1;
static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id = -1;
static gint hf_pct_handshake_cipher_spec = -1;
static gint hf_pct_handshake_hash_spec = -1;
static gint hf_pct_handshake_cert_spec = -1;
static gint hf_pct_handshake_cert = -1;
static gint hf_pct_handshake_server_cert = -1;
static gint hf_pct_handshake_exch_spec = -1;
static gint hf_pct_handshake_hash = -1;
static gint hf_pct_handshake_cipher = -1;
static gint hf_pct_handshake_exch = -1;
static gint hf_pct_handshake_sig = -1;
static gint hf_pct_msg_error_type = -1;
static int hf_ssl_reassembled_in = -1;
static int hf_ssl_segments = -1;
static int hf_ssl_segment = -1;
static int hf_ssl_segment_overlap = -1;
static int hf_ssl_segment_overlap_conflict = -1;
static int hf_ssl_segment_multiple_tails = -1;
static int hf_ssl_segment_too_long_fragment = -1;
static int hf_ssl_segment_error = -1;
/* Initialize the subtree pointers */
static gint ett_ssl = -1;
static gint ett_ssl_record = -1;
static gint ett_ssl_alert = -1;
static gint ett_ssl_handshake = -1;
static gint ett_ssl_cipher_suites = -1;
static gint ett_ssl_comp_methods = -1;
static gint ett_ssl_extension = -1;
static gint ett_ssl_certs = -1;
static gint ett_ssl_cert_types = -1;
static gint ett_ssl_dnames = -1;
static gint ett_ssl_random = -1;
static gint ett_pct_cipher_suites = -1;
static gint ett_pct_hash_suites = -1;
static gint ett_pct_cert_suites = -1;
static gint ett_pct_exch_suites = -1;
static gint ett_ssl_segments = -1;
static gint ett_ssl_segment = -1;
/* not all of the hf_fields below make sense for SSL but we have to provide
them anyways to comply with the api (which was aimed for ip fragment
reassembly) */
static const fragment_items ssl_segment_items = {
&ett_ssl_segment,
&ett_ssl_segments,
&hf_ssl_segments,
&hf_ssl_segment,
&hf_ssl_segment_overlap,
&hf_ssl_segment_overlap_conflict,
&hf_ssl_segment_multiple_tails,
&hf_ssl_segment_too_long_fragment,
&hf_ssl_segment_error,
&hf_ssl_reassembled_in,
"Segments"
};
static GHashTable *ssl_session_hash = NULL;
static GHashTable *ssl_key_hash = NULL;
static GTree* ssl_associations = NULL;
static dissector_handle_t ssl_handle = NULL;
static StringInfo ssl_compressed_data = {NULL, 0};
static StringInfo ssl_decrypted_data = {NULL, 0};
static gint ssl_decrypted_data_avail = 0;
static gchar* ssl_keys_list = NULL;
#if defined(SSL_DECRYPT_DEBUG) || defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS)
static gchar* ssl_debug_file_name = NULL;
#endif
const gchar* ssl_version_short_names[] = {
"SSL",
"SSLv2",
"SSLv3",
"TLSv1",
"TLSv1.1",
"DTLSv1.0",
"PCT"
};
/* Forward declaration we need below */
void proto_reg_handoff_ssl(void);
/* Desegmentation of SSL streams */
/* table to hold defragmented SSL streams */
static GHashTable *ssl_fragment_table = NULL;
static void
ssl_fragment_init(void)
{
fragment_table_init(&ssl_fragment_table);
}
/* initialize/reset per capture state data (ssl sessions cache) */
static void
ssl_init(void)
{
ssl_common_init(&ssl_session_hash, &ssl_decrypted_data, &ssl_compressed_data);
ssl_fragment_init();
ssl_debug_flush();
}
/* parse ssl related preferences (private keys and ports association strings) */
static void
ssl_parse(void)
{
ep_stack_t tmp_stack;
SslAssociation *tmp_assoc;
FILE *ssl_keys_file;
struct stat statb;
size_t size;
gchar *tmp_buf;
size_t nbytes;
gboolean read_failed;
ssl_set_debug(ssl_debug_file_name);
if (ssl_key_hash)
{
g_hash_table_foreach(ssl_key_hash, ssl_private_key_free, NULL);
g_hash_table_destroy(ssl_key_hash);
}
/* remove only associations created from key list */
tmp_stack = ep_stack_new();
g_tree_foreach(ssl_associations, ssl_assoc_from_key_list, tmp_stack);
while ((tmp_assoc = ep_stack_pop(tmp_stack)) != NULL) {
ssl_association_remove(ssl_associations, tmp_assoc);
}
/* parse private keys string, load available keys and put them in key hash*/
ssl_key_hash = g_hash_table_new(ssl_private_key_hash,ssl_private_key_equal);
if (ssl_keys_list && (ssl_keys_list[0] != 0))
{
if (file_exists(ssl_keys_list)) {
if ((ssl_keys_file = ws_fopen(ssl_keys_list, "r"))) {
read_failed = FALSE;
fstat(fileno(ssl_keys_file), &statb);
size = statb.st_size;
tmp_buf = ep_alloc0(size + 1);
nbytes = fread(tmp_buf, 1, size, ssl_keys_file);
if (ferror(ssl_keys_file)) {
report_read_failure(ssl_keys_list, errno);
read_failed = TRUE;
}
fclose(ssl_keys_file);
tmp_buf[nbytes] = '\0';
if (!read_failed)
ssl_parse_key_list(tmp_buf,ssl_key_hash,ssl_associations,ssl_handle,TRUE);
} else {
report_open_failure(ssl_keys_list, errno, FALSE);
}
} else {
ssl_parse_key_list(ssl_keys_list,ssl_key_hash,ssl_associations,ssl_handle,TRUE);
}
}
ssl_debug_flush();
}
/*********************************************************************
*
* Forward Declarations
*
*********************************************************************/
/*
* SSL version 3 and TLS dissectors
*
*/
/* record layer dissector */
static gint dissect_ssl3_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
guint *conv_version,
gboolean *need_desegmentation,
SslDecryptSession *conv_data,
gboolean first_record_in_frame);
/* change cipher spec dissector */
static void dissect_ssl3_change_cipher_spec(tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree,
guint32 offset,
guint *conv_version, guint8 content_type);
/* alert message dissector */
static void dissect_ssl3_alert(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
guint *conv_version);
/* handshake protocol dissector */
static void dissect_ssl3_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
guint32 record_length,
guint *conv_version,
SslDecryptSession *conv_data, guint8 content_type);
static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree,
guint32 offset, guint32 length,
SslDecryptSession* ssl);
static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree,
guint32 offset, guint32 length,
SslDecryptSession* ssl);
static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert(tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo);
static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert_req(tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree,
guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo);
static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_finished(tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree,
guint32 offset,
guint* conv_version);
/*
* SSL version 2 dissectors
*
*/
/* record layer dissector */
static gint dissect_ssl2_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
guint *conv_version,
gboolean *need_desegmentation,
SslDecryptSession* ssl);
/* client hello dissector */
static void dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree,
guint32 offset,
SslDecryptSession* ssl);
static void dissect_pct_msg_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree,
guint32 offset);
/* client master key dissector */
static void dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_master_key(tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree,
guint32 offset);
static void dissect_pct_msg_client_master_key(tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree,
guint32 offset);
/* server hello dissector */
static void dissect_ssl2_hnd_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree,
guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo);
static void dissect_pct_msg_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree,
guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo);
static void dissect_pct_msg_server_verify(tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree,
guint32 offset);
static void dissect_pct_msg_error(tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree,
guint32 offset);
/*
* Support Functions
*
*/
/*static void ssl_set_conv_version(packet_info *pinfo, guint version);*/
static gint ssl_is_valid_handshake_type(guint8 type);
static gint ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(guint16 version);
static gint ssl_is_authoritative_version_message(guint8 content_type,
guint8 next_byte);
static gint ssl_is_v2_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset);
static gint ssl_looks_like_sslv2(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset);
static gint ssl_looks_like_sslv3(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset);
static gint ssl_looks_like_valid_v2_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb,
guint32 offset,
guint32 record_length);
static gint ssl_looks_like_valid_pct_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb,
guint32 offset,
guint32 record_length);
/*********************************************************************
*
* Main dissector
*
*********************************************************************/
/*
* Code to actually dissect the packets
*/
static void
dissect_ssl(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree)
{
conversation_t *conversation;
void *conv_data;
proto_item *ti;
proto_tree *ssl_tree;
guint32 offset;
gboolean first_record_in_frame;
gboolean need_desegmentation;
SslDecryptSession* ssl_session;
guint* conv_version;
Ssl_private_key_t * private_key;
guint32 port;
ti = NULL;
ssl_tree = NULL;
offset = 0;
first_record_in_frame = TRUE;
ssl_session = NULL;
port = 0;
ssl_debug_printf("\ndissect_ssl enter frame #%u (%s)\n", pinfo->fd->num, (pinfo->fd->flags.visited)?"already visited":"first time");
/* Track the version using conversations to reduce the
* chance that a packet that simply *looks* like a v2 or
* v3 packet is dissected improperly. This also allows
* us to more frequently set the protocol column properly
* for continuation data frames.
*
* Also: We use the copy in conv_version as our cached copy,
* so that we don't have to search the conversation
* table every time we want the version; when setting
* the conv_version, must set the copy in the conversation
* in addition to conv_version
*/
conversation = find_conversation(pinfo->fd->num, &pinfo->src, &pinfo->dst, pinfo->ptype,
pinfo->srcport, pinfo->destport, 0);
if (!conversation)
{
/* create a new conversation */
conversation = conversation_new(pinfo->fd->num, &pinfo->src, &pinfo->dst, pinfo->ptype,
pinfo->srcport, pinfo->destport, 0);
ssl_debug_printf(" new conversation = %p created\n", (void *)conversation);
}
conv_data = conversation_get_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl);
/* PAOLO: manage ssl decryption data */
/*get a valid ssl session pointer*/
if (conv_data != NULL)
ssl_session = conv_data;
else {
SslService dummy;
char ip_addr_any[] = {0,0,0,0};
ssl_session = se_alloc0(sizeof(SslDecryptSession));
ssl_session_init(ssl_session);
ssl_session->version = SSL_VER_UNKNOWN;
conversation_add_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl, ssl_session);
/* we need to know witch side of conversation is speaking*/
if (ssl_packet_from_server(ssl_associations, pinfo->srcport, pinfo->ptype == PT_TCP)) {
dummy.addr = pinfo->src;
dummy.port = port = pinfo->srcport;
}
else {
dummy.addr = pinfo->dst;
dummy.port = port = pinfo->destport;
}
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl server %s:%u\n",
address_to_str(&dummy.addr),dummy.port);
/* try to retrive private key for this service. Do it now 'cause pinfo
* is not always available
* Note that with HAVE_LIBGNUTLS undefined private_key is allways 0
* and thus decryption never engaged*/
ssl_session->private_key = 0;
private_key = g_hash_table_lookup(ssl_key_hash, &dummy);
if (!private_key) {
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl can't find private key for this server! Try it again with universal port 0\n");
dummy.port = 0;
private_key = g_hash_table_lookup(ssl_key_hash, &dummy);
}
if (!private_key) {
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl can't find private key for this server (universal port)! Try it again with universal address 0.0.0.0\n");
dummy.addr.type = AT_IPv4;
dummy.addr.len = 4;
dummy.addr.data = ip_addr_any;
dummy.port = port;
private_key = g_hash_table_lookup(ssl_key_hash, &dummy);
}
if (!private_key) {
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl can't find any private key!\n");
}
else {
ssl_session->private_key = private_key->sexp_pkey;
}
}
conv_version= & ssl_session->version;
/* try decryption only the first time we see this packet
* (to keep cipher syncronized)and only if we have
* the server private key*/
if (pinfo->fd->flags.visited)
ssl_session = NULL;
ssl_debug_printf(" conversation = %p, ssl_session = %p\n", (void *)conversation, (void *)ssl_session);
/* Initialize the protocol column; we'll set it later when we
* figure out what flavor of SSL it is (assuming we don't
* throw an exception before we get the chance to do so). */
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL))
{
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "SSL");
}
/* clear the the info column */
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
col_clear(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO);
/* TCP packets and SSL records are orthogonal.
* A tcp packet may contain multiple ssl records and an ssl
* record may be spread across multiple tcp packets.
*
* This loop accounts for multiple ssl records in a single
* frame, but not a single ssl record across multiple tcp
* packets.
*
* Handling the single ssl record across multiple packets
* may be possible using wireshark conversations, but
* probably not cleanly. May have to wait for tcp stream
* reassembly.
*/
/* Create display subtree for SSL as a whole */
if (tree)
{
ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, proto_ssl, tvb, 0, -1, FALSE);
ssl_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl);
}
/* iterate through the records in this tvbuff */
while (tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) != 0)
{
ssl_debug_printf(" record: offset = %d, reported_length_remaining = %d\n", offset, tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset));
/* on second and subsequent records per frame
* add a delimiter on info column
*/
if (!first_record_in_frame
&& check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
{
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", ");
}
/*
* Assume, for now, that this doesn't need desegmentation.
*/
need_desegmentation = FALSE;
/* first try to dispatch off the cached version
* known to be associated with the conversation
*/
switch(*conv_version) {
case SSL_VER_SSLv2:
case SSL_VER_PCT:
offset = dissect_ssl2_record(tvb, pinfo, ssl_tree,
offset, conv_version,
&need_desegmentation,
ssl_session);
break;
case SSL_VER_SSLv3:
case SSL_VER_TLS:
/* the version tracking code works too well ;-)
* at times, we may visit a v2 client hello after
* we already know the version of the connection;
* work around that here by detecting and calling
* the v2 dissector instead
*/
if (ssl_is_v2_client_hello(tvb, offset))
{
offset = dissect_ssl2_record(tvb, pinfo, ssl_tree,
offset, conv_version,
&need_desegmentation,
ssl_session);
}
else
{
offset = dissect_ssl3_record(tvb, pinfo, ssl_tree,
offset, conv_version,
&need_desegmentation,
ssl_session,
first_record_in_frame);
}
break;
/* that failed, so apply some heuristics based
* on this individual packet
*/
default:
if (ssl_looks_like_sslv2(tvb, offset))
{
/* looks like sslv2 or pct client hello */
offset = dissect_ssl2_record(tvb, pinfo, ssl_tree,
offset, conv_version,
&need_desegmentation,
ssl_session);
}
else if (ssl_looks_like_sslv3(tvb, offset))
{
/* looks like sslv3 or tls */
offset = dissect_ssl3_record(tvb, pinfo, ssl_tree,
offset, conv_version,
&need_desegmentation,
ssl_session,
first_record_in_frame);
}
else
{
/* looks like something unknown, so lump into
* continuation data
*/
offset = tvb_length(tvb);
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO,
"Continuation Data");
/* Set the protocol column */
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL))
{
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL,
ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version]);
}
}
break;
}
/* Desegmentation return check */
if (need_desegmentation) {
ssl_debug_printf(" need_desegmentation: offset = %d, reported_length_remaining = %d\n", offset, tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset));
return;
}
/* set up for next record in frame, if any */
first_record_in_frame = FALSE;
}
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
col_set_fence(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO);
ssl_debug_flush();
tap_queue_packet(ssl_tap, pinfo, GINT_TO_POINTER(proto_ssl));
}
static gint
decrypt_ssl3_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, guint32 offset,
guint32 record_length, guint8 content_type, SslDecryptSession* ssl,
gboolean save_plaintext)
{
gint ret;
gint direction;
StringInfo* data_for_iv;
gint data_for_iv_len;
SslDecoder* decoder;
ret = 0;
/* if we can decrypt and decryption have success
* add decrypted data to this packet info*/
ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: app_data len %d ssl, state 0x%02X\n",
record_length, ssl->state);
direction = ssl_packet_from_server(ssl_associations, pinfo->srcport, pinfo->ptype == PT_TCP);
/* retrive decoder for this packet direction*/
if (direction != 0) {
ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: using server decoder\n");
decoder = ssl->server;
}
else {
ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: using client decoder\n");
decoder = ssl->client;
}
/* save data to update IV if decoder is available or updated later */
data_for_iv = (direction != 0) ? &ssl->server_data_for_iv : &ssl->client_data_for_iv;
data_for_iv_len = (record_length < 24) ? record_length : 24;
ssl_data_set(data_for_iv, (guchar*)tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset + record_length - data_for_iv_len, data_for_iv_len), data_for_iv_len);
if (!decoder) {
ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: no decoder available\n");
return ret;
}
/* run decryption and add decrypted payload to protocol data, if decryption
* is successful*/
ssl_decrypted_data_avail = ssl_decrypted_data.data_len;
if (ssl_decrypt_record(ssl, decoder,
content_type, tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, record_length),
record_length, &ssl_compressed_data, &ssl_decrypted_data, &ssl_decrypted_data_avail) == 0)
ret = 1;
/* */
if (!ret) {
/* save data to update IV if valid session key is obtained later */
data_for_iv = (direction != 0) ? &ssl->server_data_for_iv : &ssl->client_data_for_iv;
data_for_iv_len = (record_length < 24) ? record_length : 24;
ssl_data_set(data_for_iv, (guchar*)tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset + record_length - data_for_iv_len, data_for_iv_len), data_for_iv_len);
}
if (ret && save_plaintext) {
ssl_add_data_info(proto_ssl, pinfo, ssl_decrypted_data.data, ssl_decrypted_data_avail, TVB_RAW_OFFSET(tvb)+offset, decoder->flow);
}
return ret;
}
static void
process_ssl_payload(tvbuff_t *tvb, volatile int offset, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, SslAssociation* association);
static void
desegment_ssl(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, int offset,
guint32 seq, guint32 nxtseq,
SslAssociation* association,
proto_tree *root_tree, proto_tree *tree,
SslFlow *flow)
{
fragment_data *ipfd_head;
gboolean must_desegment;
gboolean called_dissector;
int another_pdu_follows;
int deseg_offset;
guint32 deseg_seq;
gint nbytes;
proto_item *item;
proto_item *frag_tree_item;
proto_item *ssl_tree_item;
struct tcp_multisegment_pdu *msp;
again:
ipfd_head=NULL;
must_desegment = FALSE;
called_dissector = FALSE;
another_pdu_follows = 0;
msp=NULL;
/*
* Initialize these to assume no desegmentation.
* If that's not the case, these will be set appropriately
* by the subdissector.
*/
pinfo->desegment_offset = 0;
pinfo->desegment_len = 0;
/*
* Initialize this to assume that this segment will just be
* added to the middle of a desegmented chunk of data, so
* that we should show it all as data.
* If that's not the case, it will be set appropriately.
*/
deseg_offset = offset;
/* find the most previous PDU starting before this sequence number */
msp=se_tree_lookup32_le(flow->multisegment_pdus, seq-1);
if(msp && msp->seq<=seq && msp->nxtpdu>seq){
int len;
if(!pinfo->fd->flags.visited){
msp->last_frame=pinfo->fd->num;
msp->last_frame_time=pinfo->fd->abs_ts;
}
/* OK, this PDU was found, which means the segment continues
a higher-level PDU and that we must desegment it.
*/
if(msp->flags&MSP_FLAGS_REASSEMBLE_ENTIRE_SEGMENT){
/* The dissector asked for the entire segment */
len=tvb_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
} else {
len=MIN(nxtseq, msp->nxtpdu) - seq;
}
ipfd_head = fragment_add(tvb, offset, pinfo, msp->first_frame,
ssl_fragment_table,
seq - msp->seq,
len,
(LT_SEQ (nxtseq,msp->nxtpdu)) );
if(msp->flags&MSP_FLAGS_REASSEMBLE_ENTIRE_SEGMENT){
msp->flags&=(~MSP_FLAGS_REASSEMBLE_ENTIRE_SEGMENT);
/* If we consumed the entire segment there is no
* other pdu starting anywhere inside this segment.
* So update nxtpdu to point at least to the start
* of the next segment.
* (If the subdissector asks for even more data we
* will advance nxtpdu even furhter later down in
* the code.)
*/
msp->nxtpdu=nxtseq;
}
if( (msp->nxtpdu<nxtseq)
&& (msp->nxtpdu>=seq)
&& (len>0) ){
another_pdu_follows=msp->nxtpdu-seq;
}
} else {
/* This segment was not found in our table, so it doesn't
contain a continuation of a higher-level PDU.
Call the normal subdissector.
*/
process_ssl_payload(tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, association);
called_dissector = TRUE;
/* Did the subdissector ask us to desegment some more data
before it could handle the packet?
If so we have to create some structures in our table but
this is something we only do the first time we see this
packet.
*/
if(pinfo->desegment_len) {
if (!pinfo->fd->flags.visited)
must_desegment = TRUE;
/*
* Set "deseg_offset" to the offset in "tvb"
* of the first byte of data that the
* subdissector didn't process.
*/
deseg_offset = offset + pinfo->desegment_offset;
}
/* Either no desegmentation is necessary, or this is
segment contains the beginning but not the end of
a higher-level PDU and thus isn't completely
desegmented.
*/
ipfd_head = NULL;
}
/* is it completely desegmented? */
if(ipfd_head){
/*
* Yes, we think it is.
* We only call subdissector for the last segment.
* Note that the last segment may include more than what
* we needed.
*/
if(ipfd_head->reassembled_in==pinfo->fd->num){
/*
* OK, this is the last segment.
* Let's call the subdissector with the desegmented
* data.
*/
tvbuff_t *next_tvb;
int old_len;
/* create a new TVB structure for desegmented data */
next_tvb = tvb_new_real_data(ipfd_head->data,
ipfd_head->datalen, ipfd_head->datalen);
/* add this tvb as a child to the original one */
tvb_set_child_real_data_tvbuff(tvb, next_tvb);
/* add desegmented data to the data source list */
add_new_data_source(pinfo, next_tvb, "Reassembled SSL");
/* call subdissector */
process_ssl_payload(next_tvb, 0, pinfo, tree, association);
called_dissector = TRUE;
/*
* OK, did the subdissector think it was completely
* desegmented, or does it think we need even more
* data?
*/
old_len=(int)(tvb_reported_length(next_tvb)-tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset));
if(pinfo->desegment_len &&
pinfo->desegment_offset<=old_len){
/*
* "desegment_len" isn't 0, so it needs more
* data for something - and "desegment_offset"
* is before "old_len", so it needs more data
* to dissect the stuff we thought was
* completely desegmented (as opposed to the
* stuff at the beginning being completely
* desegmented, but the stuff at the end
* being a new higher-level PDU that also
* needs desegmentation).
*/
fragment_set_partial_reassembly(pinfo,msp->first_frame,ssl_fragment_table);
/* Update msp->nxtpdu to point to the new next
* pdu boundary.
*/
if(pinfo->desegment_len==DESEGMENT_ONE_MORE_SEGMENT){
/* We want reassembly of at least one
* more segment so set the nxtpdu
* boundary to one byte into the next
* segment.
* This means that the next segment
* will complete reassembly even if it
* is only one single byte in length.
*/
msp->nxtpdu=seq+tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) + 1;
msp->flags|=MSP_FLAGS_REASSEMBLE_ENTIRE_SEGMENT;
} else {
msp->nxtpdu=seq+tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) + pinfo->desegment_len;
}
/* Since we need at least some more data
* there can be no pdu following in the
* tail of this segment.
*/
another_pdu_follows=0;
} else {
/*
* Show the stuff in this TCP segment as
* just raw TCP segment data.
*/
nbytes =
tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, -1,
"SSL segment data (%u byte%s)", nbytes,
plurality(nbytes, "", "s"));
/*
* The subdissector thought it was completely
* desegmented (although the stuff at the
* end may, in turn, require desegmentation),
* so we show a tree with all segments.
*/
show_fragment_tree(ipfd_head, &ssl_segment_items,
root_tree, pinfo, next_tvb, &frag_tree_item);
/*
* The toplevel fragment subtree is now
* behind all desegmented data; move it
* right behind the TCP tree.
*/
ssl_tree_item = proto_tree_get_parent(tree);
if(frag_tree_item && ssl_tree_item) {
proto_tree_move_item(root_tree, ssl_tree_item, frag_tree_item);
}
/* Did the subdissector ask us to desegment
some more data? This means that the data
at the beginning of this segment completed
a higher-level PDU, but the data at the
end of this segment started a higher-level
PDU but didn't complete it.
If so, we have to create some structures
in our table, but this is something we
only do the first time we see this packet.
*/
if(pinfo->desegment_len) {
if (!pinfo->fd->flags.visited)
must_desegment = TRUE;
/* The stuff we couldn't dissect
must have come from this segment,
so it's all in "tvb".
"pinfo->desegment_offset" is
relative to the beginning of
"next_tvb"; we want an offset
relative to the beginning of "tvb".
First, compute the offset relative
to the *end* of "next_tvb" - i.e.,
the number of bytes before the end
of "next_tvb" at which the
subdissector stopped. That's the
length of "next_tvb" minus the
offset, relative to the beginning
of "next_tvb, at which the
subdissector stopped.
*/
deseg_offset =
ipfd_head->datalen - pinfo->desegment_offset;
/* "tvb" and "next_tvb" end at the
same byte of data, so the offset
relative to the end of "next_tvb"
of the byte at which we stopped
is also the offset relative to
the end of "tvb" of the byte at
which we stopped.
Convert that back into an offset
relative to the beginninng of
"tvb", by taking the length of
"tvb" and subtracting the offset
relative to the end.
*/
deseg_offset=tvb_reported_length(tvb) - deseg_offset;
}
}
}
}
if (must_desegment) {
/* If the dissector requested "reassemble until FIN"
* just set this flag for the flow and let reassembly
* proceed at normal. We will check/pick up these
* reassembled PDUs later down in dissect_tcp() when checking
* for the FIN flag.
*/
if(pinfo->desegment_len==DESEGMENT_UNTIL_FIN){
flow->flags|=TCP_FLOW_REASSEMBLE_UNTIL_FIN;
}
/*
* The sequence number at which the stuff to be desegmented
* starts is the sequence number of the byte at an offset
* of "deseg_offset" into "tvb".
*
* The sequence number of the byte at an offset of "offset"
* is "seq", i.e. the starting sequence number of this
* segment, so the sequence number of the byte at
* "deseg_offset" is "seq + (deseg_offset - offset)".
*/
deseg_seq = seq + (deseg_offset - offset);
if( ((nxtseq - deseg_seq) <= 1024*1024)
&& (!pinfo->fd->flags.visited) ){
if(pinfo->desegment_len==DESEGMENT_ONE_MORE_SEGMENT){
/* The subdissector asked to reassemble using the
* entire next segment.
* Just ask reassembly for one more byte
* but set this msp flag so we can pick it up
* above.
*/
msp = pdu_store_sequencenumber_of_next_pdu(pinfo,
deseg_seq, nxtseq+1, flow->multisegment_pdus);
msp->flags|=MSP_FLAGS_REASSEMBLE_ENTIRE_SEGMENT;
} else {
msp = pdu_store_sequencenumber_of_next_pdu(pinfo,
deseg_seq, nxtseq+pinfo->desegment_len, flow->multisegment_pdus);
}
/* add this segment as the first one for this new pdu */
fragment_add(tvb, deseg_offset, pinfo, msp->first_frame,
ssl_fragment_table,
0,
nxtseq - deseg_seq,
LT_SEQ(nxtseq, msp->nxtpdu));
}
}
if (!called_dissector || pinfo->desegment_len != 0) {
if (ipfd_head != NULL && ipfd_head->reassembled_in != 0 &&
!(ipfd_head->flags & FD_PARTIAL_REASSEMBLY)) {
/*
* We know what frame this PDU is reassembled in;
* let the user know.
*/
item=proto_tree_add_uint(tree, *ssl_segment_items.hf_reassembled_in,
tvb, 0, 0, ipfd_head->reassembled_in);
PROTO_ITEM_SET_GENERATED(item);
}
/*
* Either we didn't call the subdissector at all (i.e.,
* this is a segment that contains the middle of a
* higher-level PDU, but contains neither the beginning
* nor the end), or the subdissector couldn't dissect it
* all, as some data was missing (i.e., it set
* "pinfo->desegment_len" to the amount of additional
* data it needs).
*/
if (pinfo->desegment_offset == 0) {
/*
* It couldn't, in fact, dissect any of it (the
* first byte it couldn't dissect is at an offset
* of "pinfo->desegment_offset" from the beginning
* of the payload, and that's 0).
* Just mark this as SSL.
*/
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL)){
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "SSL");
}
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO)){
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "[SSL segment of a reassembled PDU]");
}
}
/*
* Show what's left in the packet as just raw TCP segment
* data.
* XXX - remember what protocol the last subdissector
* was, and report it as a continuation of that, instead?
*/
nbytes = tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, deseg_offset);
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, deseg_offset, -1,
"SSL segment data (%u byte%s)", nbytes,
plurality(nbytes, "", "s"));
}
pinfo->can_desegment=0;
pinfo->desegment_offset = 0;
pinfo->desegment_len = 0;
if(another_pdu_follows){
/* there was another pdu following this one. */
pinfo->can_desegment=2;
/* we also have to prevent the dissector from changing the
* PROTOCOL and INFO colums since what follows may be an
* incomplete PDU and we dont want it be changed back from
* <Protocol> to <TCP>
* XXX There is no good way to block the PROTOCOL column
* from being changed yet so we set the entire row unwritable.
*/
col_set_fence(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO);
col_set_writable(pinfo->cinfo, FALSE);
offset += another_pdu_follows;
seq += another_pdu_follows;
goto again;
}
}
static void
process_ssl_payload(tvbuff_t *tvb, volatile int offset, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, SslAssociation* association)
{
tvbuff_t *next_tvb;
next_tvb = tvb_new_subset(tvb, offset, -1, -1);
if (association && association->handle) {
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_record found association %p\n", (void *)association);
call_dissector(association->handle, next_tvb, pinfo, proto_tree_get_root(tree));
}
}
void
dissect_ssl_payload(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, int offset, proto_tree *tree, SslAssociation* association)
{
gboolean save_fragmented;
guint16 save_can_desegment;
SslDataInfo *appl_data;
tvbuff_t *next_tvb;
/* Preserve current desegmentation ability to prevent the subdissector
* from messing up the ssl desegmentation */
save_can_desegment = pinfo->can_desegment;
/* show decrypted data info, if available */
appl_data = ssl_get_data_info(proto_ssl, pinfo, TVB_RAW_OFFSET(tvb)+offset);
if (!appl_data || !appl_data->plain_data.data_len) return;
/* try to dissect decrypted data*/
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_record decrypted len %d\n", appl_data->plain_data.data_len);
ssl_print_text_data("decrypted app data fragment", appl_data->plain_data.data, appl_data->plain_data.data_len);
/* create a new TVB structure for desegmented data */
next_tvb = tvb_new_real_data(appl_data->plain_data.data, appl_data->plain_data.data_len, appl_data->plain_data.data_len);
/* add this tvb as a child to the original one */
tvb_set_child_real_data_tvbuff(tvb, next_tvb);
/* add desegmented data to the data source list */
add_new_data_source(pinfo, next_tvb, "Decrypted SSL data");
/* Can we desegment this segment? */
if (ssl_desegment_app_data) {
/* Yes. */
pinfo->can_desegment = 2;
desegment_ssl(next_tvb, pinfo, 0, appl_data->seq, appl_data->nxtseq, association, proto_tree_get_root(tree), tree, appl_data->flow);
} else if (association && association->handle) {
/* No - just call the subdissector.
Mark this as fragmented, so if somebody throws an exception,
we don't report it as a malformed frame. */
pinfo->can_desegment = 0;
save_fragmented = pinfo->fragmented;
pinfo->fragmented = TRUE;
process_ssl_payload(next_tvb, 0, pinfo, tree, association);
pinfo->fragmented = save_fragmented;
}
/* restore desegmentation ability */
pinfo->can_desegment = save_can_desegment;
}
/*********************************************************************
*
* SSL version 3 and TLS Dissection Routines
*
*********************************************************************/
static gint
dissect_ssl3_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
guint *conv_version, gboolean *need_desegmentation,
SslDecryptSession* ssl, gboolean first_record_in_frame _U_)
{
/*
* struct {
* uint8 major, minor;
* } ProtocolVersion;
*
*
* enum {
* change_cipher_spec(20), alert(21), handshake(22),
* application_data(23), (255)
* } ContentType;
*
* struct {
* ContentType type;
* ProtocolVersion version;
* uint16 length;
* opaque fragment[TLSPlaintext.length];
* } TLSPlaintext;
*/
guint32 record_length;
guint16 version;
guint8 content_type;
guint8 next_byte;
proto_tree *ti;
proto_tree *ssl_record_tree;
SslAssociation* association;
guint32 available_bytes;
ti = NULL;
ssl_record_tree = NULL;
available_bytes = 0;
available_bytes = tvb_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
/* TLS 1.0/1.1 just ignores unknown records - RFC 2246 chapter 6. The TLS Record Protocol */
if ((*conv_version==SSL_VER_TLS || *conv_version==SSL_VER_TLSv1DOT1) &&
(available_bytes >=1 ) && !ssl_is_valid_content_type(tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset))) {
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, available_bytes, "Ignored Unknown Record");
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Ignored Unknown Record");
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL))
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version]);
return offset + available_bytes;
}
/*
* Can we do reassembly?
*/
if (ssl_desegment && pinfo->can_desegment) {
/*
* Yes - is the record header split across segment boundaries?
*/
if (available_bytes < 5) {
/*
* Yes. Tell the TCP dissector where the data for this
* message starts in the data it handed us, and how many
* more bytes we need, and return.
*/
pinfo->desegment_offset = offset;
pinfo->desegment_len = 5 - available_bytes;
*need_desegmentation = TRUE;
return offset;
}
}
/*
* Get the record layer fields of interest
*/
content_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 1);
record_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 3);
if (ssl_is_valid_content_type(content_type)) {
/*
* Can we do reassembly?
*/
if (ssl_desegment && pinfo->can_desegment) {
/*
* Yes - is the record split across segment boundaries?
*/
if (available_bytes < record_length + 5) {
/*
* Yes. Tell the TCP dissector where the data for this
* message starts in the data it handed us, and how many
* more bytes we need, and return.
*/
pinfo->desegment_offset = offset;
pinfo->desegment_len = (record_length + 5) - available_bytes;
*need_desegmentation = TRUE;
return offset;
}
}
} else {
/* if we don't have a valid content_type, there's no sense
* continuing any further
*/
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Continuation Data");
/* Set the protocol column */
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL))
{
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL,
ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version]);
}
return offset + 5 + record_length;
}
/*
* If GUI, fill in record layer part of tree
*/
if (tree)
{
/* add the record layer subtree header */
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, 5 + record_length);
ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_record, tvb,
offset, 5 + record_length, 0);
ssl_record_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_record);
}
if (ssl_record_tree)
{
/* show the one-byte content type */
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_record_tree, hf_ssl_record_content_type,
tvb, offset, 1, 0);
offset++;
/* add the version */
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_record_tree, hf_ssl_record_version, tvb,
offset, 2, FALSE);
offset += 2;
/* add the length */
proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_record_tree, hf_ssl_record_length, tvb,
offset, 2, record_length);
offset += 2; /* move past length field itself */
}
else
{
/* if no GUI tree, then just skip over those fields */
offset += 5;
}
/*
* if we don't already have a version set for this conversation,
* but this message's version is authoritative (i.e., it's
* not client_hello, then save the version to to conversation
* structure and print the column version
*/
next_byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
if (*conv_version == SSL_VER_UNKNOWN
&& ssl_is_authoritative_version_message(content_type, next_byte))
{
if (version == SSLV3_VERSION)
{
*conv_version = SSL_VER_SSLv3;
if (ssl) {
ssl->version_netorder = version;
ssl->state |= SSL_VERSION;
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_record found version 0x%04X -> state 0x%02X\n", ssl->version_netorder, ssl->state);
}
/*ssl_set_conv_version(pinfo, ssl->version);*/
}
else if (version == TLSV1_VERSION)
{
*conv_version = SSL_VER_TLS;
if (ssl) {
ssl->version_netorder = version;
ssl->state |= SSL_VERSION;
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_record found version 0x%04X -> state 0x%02X\n", ssl->version_netorder, ssl->state);
}
/*ssl_set_conv_version(pinfo, ssl->version);*/
}
else if (version == TLSV1DOT1_VERSION)
{
*conv_version = SSL_VER_TLSv1DOT1;
if (ssl) {
ssl->version_netorder = version;
ssl->state |= SSL_VERSION;
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_record found version 0x%04X -> state 0x%02X\n", ssl->version_netorder, ssl->state);
}
/*ssl_set_conv_version(pinfo, ssl->version);*/
}
}
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL))
{
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL,
ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version]);
}
/*
* now dissect the next layer
*/
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_record: content_type %d\n",content_type);
/* PAOLO try to decrypt each record (we must keep ciphers "in sync")
* store plain text only for app data */
switch (content_type) {
case SSL_ID_CHG_CIPHER_SPEC:
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_change_cipher_spec\n");
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Change Cipher Spec");
dissect_ssl3_change_cipher_spec(tvb, ssl_record_tree,
offset, conv_version, content_type);
if (ssl) ssl_change_cipher(ssl, ssl_packet_from_server(ssl_associations, pinfo->srcport, pinfo->ptype == PT_TCP));
break;
case SSL_ID_ALERT:
{
tvbuff_t* decrypted;
decrypted=0;
if (ssl&&decrypt_ssl3_record(tvb, pinfo, offset,
record_length, content_type, ssl, FALSE))
ssl_add_record_info(proto_ssl, pinfo, ssl_decrypted_data.data,
ssl_decrypted_data_avail, offset);
/* try to retrive and use decrypted alert record, if any. */
decrypted = ssl_get_record_info(proto_ssl, pinfo, offset);
if (decrypted)
dissect_ssl3_alert(decrypted, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, 0,
conv_version);
else
dissect_ssl3_alert(tvb, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, offset,
conv_version);
break;
}
case SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE:
{
tvbuff_t* decrypted;
decrypted=0;
/* try to decrypt handshake record, if possible. Store decrypted
* record for later usage. The offset is used as 'key' to itentify
* this record into the packet (we can have multiple handshake records
* in the same frame) */
if (ssl && decrypt_ssl3_record(tvb, pinfo, offset,
record_length, content_type, ssl, FALSE))
ssl_add_record_info(proto_ssl, pinfo, ssl_decrypted_data.data,
ssl_decrypted_data_avail, offset);
/* try to retrive and use decrypted handshake record, if any. */
decrypted = ssl_get_record_info(proto_ssl, pinfo, offset);
if (decrypted) {
/* add desegmented data to the data source list */
add_new_data_source(pinfo, decrypted, "Decrypted SSL record");
dissect_ssl3_handshake(decrypted, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, 0,
decrypted->length, conv_version, ssl, content_type);
} else {
dissect_ssl3_handshake(tvb, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, offset,
record_length, conv_version, ssl, content_type);
}
break;
}
case SSL_ID_APP_DATA:
if (ssl){
decrypt_ssl3_record(tvb, pinfo, offset,
record_length, content_type, ssl, TRUE);
/* if application data desegmentation is allowed and needed */
/*if(ssl_desegment_app_data && *need_desegmentation)
ssl_desegment_ssl_app_data(ssl,pinfo);
*/
}
/* show on info colum what we are decoding */
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Application Data");
/* we need dissector information when the selected packet is shown.
* ssl session pointer is NULL at that time, so we can't access
* info cached there*/
association = ssl_association_find(ssl_associations, pinfo->srcport, pinfo->ptype == PT_TCP);
association = association ? association: ssl_association_find(ssl_associations, pinfo->destport, pinfo->ptype == PT_TCP);
proto_item_set_text(ssl_record_tree,
"%s Record Layer: %s Protocol: %s",
ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version],
val_to_str(content_type, ssl_31_content_type, "unknown"),
association?association->info:"Application Data");
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_record_tree, hf_ssl_record_appdata, tvb,
offset, record_length, 0);
dissect_ssl_payload(tvb, pinfo, offset, tree, association);
break;
default:
/* shouldn't get here since we check above for valid types */
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Bad SSLv3 Content Type");
break;
}
offset += record_length; /* skip to end of record */
return offset;
}
/* dissects the change cipher spec procotol, filling in the tree */
static void
dissect_ssl3_change_cipher_spec(tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
guint* conv_version, guint8 content_type)
{
/*
* struct {
* enum { change_cipher_spec(1), (255) } type;
* } ChangeCipherSpec;
*
*/
if (tree)
{
proto_item_set_text(tree,
"%s Record Layer: %s Protocol: Change Cipher Spec",
ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version],
val_to_str(content_type, ssl_31_content_type, "unknown"));
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_change_cipher_spec, tvb,
offset++, 1, FALSE);
}
}
/* dissects the alert message, filling in the tree */
static void
dissect_ssl3_alert(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
guint* conv_version)
{
/* struct {
* AlertLevel level;
* AlertDescription description;
* } Alert;
*/
proto_tree *ti;
proto_tree *ssl_alert_tree;
const gchar *level;
const gchar *desc;
guint8 byte;
ssl_alert_tree = NULL;
if (tree)
{
ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_alert_message, tvb,
offset, 2, 0);
ssl_alert_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_alert);
}
/*
* set the record layer label
*/
/* first lookup the names for the alert level and description */
byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); /* grab the level byte */
level = match_strval(byte, ssl_31_alert_level);
byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset+1); /* grab the desc byte */
desc = match_strval(byte, ssl_31_alert_description);
/* now set the text in the record layer line */
if (level && desc)
{
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO,
"Alert (Level: %s, Description: %s)",
level, desc);
}
else
{
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Encrypted Alert");
}
if (tree)
{
if (level && desc)
{
proto_item_set_text(tree, "%s Record Layer: Alert "
"(Level: %s, Description: %s)",
ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version],
level, desc);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_alert_tree, hf_ssl_alert_message_level,
tvb, offset++, 1, FALSE);
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_alert_tree, hf_ssl_alert_message_description,
tvb, offset++, 1, FALSE);
}
else
{
proto_item_set_text(tree,
"%s Record Layer: Encrypted Alert",
ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version]);
proto_item_set_text(ssl_alert_tree,
"Alert Message: Encrypted Alert");
}
}
}
/* dissects the handshake protocol, filling the tree */
static void
dissect_ssl3_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
guint32 record_length, guint *conv_version,
SslDecryptSession* ssl, guint8 content_type)
{
/* struct {
* HandshakeType msg_type;
* uint24 length;
* select (HandshakeType) {
* case hello_request: HelloRequest;
* case client_hello: ClientHello;
* case server_hello: ServerHello;
* case certificate: Certificate;
* case server_key_exchange: ServerKeyExchange;
* case certificate_request: CertificateRequest;
* case server_hello_done: ServerHelloDone;
* case certificate_verify: CertificateVerify;
* case client_key_exchange: ClientKeyExchange;
* case finished: Finished;
* } body;
* } Handshake;
*/
proto_tree *ti;
proto_tree *ssl_hand_tree;
const gchar *msg_type_str;
guint8 msg_type;
guint32 length;
gboolean first_iteration;
ti = NULL;
ssl_hand_tree = NULL;
msg_type_str = NULL;
first_iteration = TRUE;
/* just as there can be multiple records per packet, there
* can be multiple messages per record as long as they have
* the same content type
*
* we really only care about this for handshake messages
*/
/* set record_length to the max offset */
record_length += offset;
while (offset < record_length)
{
msg_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
length = tvb_get_ntoh24(tvb, offset + 1);
/* Check the length in the handshake message. Assume it's an
* encrypted handshake message if the message would pass
* the record_length boundary. This is a workaround for the
* situation where the first octet of the encrypted handshake
* message is actually a known handshake message type.
*/
if ( offset + length <= record_length )
msg_type_str = match_strval(msg_type, ssl_31_handshake_type);
else
msg_type_str = NULL;
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_handshake iteration %d type %d offset %d length %d "
"bytes, remaining %d \n", first_iteration, msg_type, offset, length, record_length);
if (!msg_type_str && !first_iteration)
{
/* only dissect / report messages if they're
* either the first message in this record
* or they're a valid message type
*/
return;
}
/* on second and later iterations, add comma to info col */
if (!first_iteration)
{
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", ");
}
/*
* Update our info string
*/
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, (msg_type_str != NULL)
? msg_type_str : "Encrypted Handshake Message");
if (tree)
{
/* set the label text on the record layer expanding node */
if (first_iteration)
{
proto_item_set_text(tree, "%s Record Layer: %s Protocol: %s",
ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version],
val_to_str(content_type, ssl_31_content_type, "unknown"),
(msg_type_str!=NULL) ? msg_type_str :
"Encrypted Handshake Message");
}
else
{
proto_item_set_text(tree, "%s Record Layer: %s Protocol: %s",
ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version],
val_to_str(content_type, ssl_31_content_type, "unknown"),
"Multiple Handshake Messages");
}
/* add a subtree for the handshake protocol */
ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_protocol, tvb,
offset, length + 4, 0);
ssl_hand_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_handshake);
if (ssl_hand_tree)
{
/* set the text label on the subtree node */
proto_item_set_text(ssl_hand_tree, "Handshake Protocol: %s",
(msg_type_str != NULL) ? msg_type_str :
"Encrypted Handshake Message");
}
}
/* if we don't have a valid handshake type, just quit dissecting */
if (!msg_type_str)
return;
/* PAOLO: if we are doing ssl decryption we must dissect some requests type */
if (ssl_hand_tree || ssl)
{
/* add nodes for the message type and message length */
if (ssl_hand_tree)
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_hand_tree, hf_ssl_handshake_type,
tvb, offset, 1, msg_type);
offset++;
if (ssl_hand_tree)
proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_hand_tree, hf_ssl_handshake_length,
tvb, offset, 3, length);
offset += 3;
/* now dissect the handshake message, if necessary */
switch (msg_type) {
case SSL_HND_HELLO_REQUEST:
/* hello_request has no fields, so nothing to do! */
break;
case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_hello(tvb, pinfo, ssl_hand_tree, offset, length, ssl);
break;
case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_hello(tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset, length, ssl);
break;
case SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE:
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert(tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset, pinfo);
break;
case SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG:
/* unimplemented */
break;
case SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST:
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert_req(tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset, pinfo);
break;
case SSL_HND_SVR_HELLO_DONE:
/* server_hello_done has no fields, so nothing to do! */
break;
case SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY:
/* unimplemented */
break;
case SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG:
{
/* PAOLO: here we can have all the data to build session key*/
StringInfo encrypted_pre_master;
gint ret;
guint encrlen, skip;
encrlen = length;
skip = 0;
if (!ssl)
break;
/* check for required session data */
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_handshake found SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG state 0x%X\n",
ssl->state);
if ((ssl->state & (SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION)) !=
(SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION)) {
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_handshake not enough data to generate key (required 0x%02X)\n",
(SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION));
break;
}
/* get encrypted data, on tls1 we have to skip two bytes
* (it's the encrypted len and should be equal to record len - 2)
*/
if (ssl->version == SSL_VER_TLS||ssl->version == SSL_VER_TLSv1DOT1)
{
encrlen = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
skip = 2;
if (encrlen > length - 2)
{
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_handshake wrong encrypted length (%d max %d)\n",
encrlen, length);
break;
}
}
encrypted_pre_master.data = se_alloc(encrlen);
encrypted_pre_master.data_len = encrlen;
tvb_memcpy(tvb, encrypted_pre_master.data, offset+skip, encrlen);
if (!ssl->private_key) {
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_handshake can't find private key\n");
break;
}
/* go with ssl key processessing; encrypted_pre_master
* will be used for master secret store*/
ret = ssl_decrypt_pre_master_secret(ssl, &encrypted_pre_master, ssl->private_key);
if (ret < 0) {
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_handshake can't decrypt pre master secret\n");
break;
}
if (ssl_generate_keyring_material(ssl)<0) {
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_handshake can't generate keyring material\n");
break;
}
ssl->state |= SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY;
ssl_save_session(ssl, ssl_session_hash);
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_handshake session keys succesfully generated\n");
}
break;
case SSL_HND_FINISHED:
dissect_ssl3_hnd_finished(tvb, ssl_hand_tree,
offset, conv_version);
break;
}
}
else
offset += 4; /* skip the handshake header when handshake is not processed*/
offset += length;
first_iteration = FALSE; /* set up for next pass, if any */
}
}
static gint
dissect_ssl3_hnd_hello_common(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree,
guint32 offset, SslDecryptSession* ssl, gint from_server)
{
/* show the client's random challenge */
nstime_t gmt_unix_time;
guint8 session_id_length;
proto_item *ti_rnd;
proto_tree *ssl_rnd_tree;
session_id_length = 0;
if (ssl)
{
/* PAOLO: get proper peer information*/
StringInfo* rnd;
if (from_server)
rnd = &ssl->server_random;
else
rnd = &ssl->client_random;
/* get provided random for keyring generation*/
tvb_memcpy(tvb, rnd->data, offset, 32);
rnd->data_len = 32;
if (from_server)
ssl->state |= SSL_SERVER_RANDOM;
else
ssl->state |= SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM;
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_hnd_hello_common found %s RANDOM -> state 0x%02X\n",
(from_server)?"SERVER":"CLIENT", ssl->state);
session_id_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 32);
/* check stored session id info */
if (from_server && (session_id_length == ssl->session_id.data_len) &&
(tvb_memeql(tvb, offset+33, ssl->session_id.data, session_id_length) == 0))
{
/* clinet/server id match: try to restore a previous cached session*/
ssl_restore_session(ssl, ssl_session_hash);
}
else {
tvb_memcpy(tvb,ssl->session_id.data, offset+33, session_id_length);
ssl->session_id.data_len = session_id_length;
}
}
if (tree)
{
ti_rnd = proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 32, "Random");
ssl_rnd_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti_rnd, ett_ssl_random);
/* show the time */
gmt_unix_time.secs = tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset);
gmt_unix_time.nsecs = 0;
proto_tree_add_time(ssl_rnd_tree, hf_ssl_handshake_random_time,
tvb, offset, 4, &gmt_unix_time);
offset += 4;
/* show the random bytes */
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_rnd_tree, hf_ssl_handshake_random_bytes,
tvb, offset, 28, FALSE);
offset += 28;
/* show the session id */
session_id_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_session_id_len,
tvb, offset++, 1, 0);
if (session_id_length > 0)
{
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, session_id_length);
proto_tree_add_bytes(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_session_id,
tvb, offset, session_id_length,
tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, session_id_length));
offset += session_id_length;
}
}
/* XXXX */
return session_id_length+33;
}
static gint
dissect_ssl3_hnd_hello_ext(tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 left)
{
guint16 extension_length;
guint16 ext_type;
guint16 ext_len;
proto_item *pi;
proto_tree *ext_tree;
if (left < 2)
return offset;
extension_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_extensions_len,
tvb, offset, 2, extension_length);
offset += 2;
left -= 2;
while (left >= 4)
{
ext_type = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
ext_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 2);
pi = proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 4 + ext_len,
"Extension: %s",
val_to_str(ext_type,
tls_hello_extension_types,
"Unknown %u"));
ext_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(pi, ett_ssl_extension);
if (!ext_tree)
ext_tree = tree;
proto_tree_add_uint(ext_tree, hf_ssl_handshake_extension_type,
tvb, offset, 2, ext_type);
offset += 2;
proto_tree_add_uint(ext_tree, hf_ssl_handshake_extension_len,
tvb, offset, 2, ext_len);
offset += 2;
proto_tree_add_bytes_format(ext_tree, hf_ssl_handshake_extension_data,
tvb, offset, ext_len,
tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, ext_len),
"Data (%u byte%s)",
ext_len, plurality(ext_len, "", "s"));
offset += ext_len;
left -= 2 + 2 + ext_len;
}
return offset;
}
static void
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 length,
SslDecryptSession*ssl)
{
/* struct {
* ProtocolVersion client_version;
* Random random;
* SessionID session_id;
* CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-1>;
* CompressionMethod compression_methods<1..2^8-1>;
* Extension client_hello_extension_list<0..2^16-1>;
* } ClientHello;
*
*/
proto_tree *ti;
proto_tree *cs_tree;
gint cipher_suite_length;
guint8 compression_methods_length;
guint8 compression_method;
guint16 start_offset;
cipher_suite_length = 0;
compression_methods_length = 0;
start_offset = offset;
if (tree || ssl)
{
/* show the client version */
if (tree)
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_client_version, tvb,
offset, 2, FALSE);
offset += 2;
/* show the fields in common with server hello */
offset += dissect_ssl3_hnd_hello_common(tvb, tree, offset, ssl, 0);
/* tell the user how many cipher suites there are */
cipher_suite_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
if (!tree)
return;
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites_len,
tvb, offset, 2, cipher_suite_length);
offset += 2; /* skip opaque length */
if (cipher_suite_length > 0)
{
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, cipher_suite_length);
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites,
tvb, offset, cipher_suite_length,
"Cipher Suites (%d suite%s)",
cipher_suite_length / 2,
plurality(cipher_suite_length/2, "", "s"));
if (cipher_suite_length % 2) {
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2,
"Invalid cipher suite length: %d", cipher_suite_length);
expert_add_info_format(pinfo, NULL, PI_MALFORMED, PI_ERROR,
"Cipher suite length (%d) must be a multiple of 2",
cipher_suite_length);
return;
}
/* make this a subtree */
cs_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_cipher_suites);
if (!cs_tree)
{
cs_tree = tree; /* failsafe */
}
while (cipher_suite_length > 0)
{
proto_tree_add_item(cs_tree, hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suite,
tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
offset += 2;
cipher_suite_length -= 2;
}
}
/* tell the user how man compression methods there are */
compression_methods_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_comp_methods_len,
tvb, offset, 1, compression_methods_length);
offset++;
if (compression_methods_length > 0)
{
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, compression_methods_length);
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
hf_ssl_handshake_comp_methods,
tvb, offset, compression_methods_length,
"Compression Methods (%u method%s)",
compression_methods_length,
plurality(compression_methods_length,
"", "s"));
/* make this a subtree */
cs_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_comp_methods);
if (!cs_tree)
{
cs_tree = tree; /* failsafe */
}
while (compression_methods_length > 0)
{
compression_method = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
if (compression_method < 64)
proto_tree_add_uint(cs_tree, hf_ssl_handshake_comp_method,
tvb, offset, 1, compression_method);
else if (compression_method > 63 && compression_method < 193)
proto_tree_add_text(cs_tree, tvb, offset, 1,
"Compression Method: Reserved - to be assigned by IANA (%u)",
compression_method);
else
proto_tree_add_text(cs_tree, tvb, offset, 1,
"Compression Method: Private use range (%u)",
compression_method);
offset++;
compression_methods_length--;
}
}
if (length > offset - start_offset)
{
offset = dissect_ssl3_hnd_hello_ext(tvb, tree, offset,
length -
(offset - start_offset));
}
}
}
static void
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 length, SslDecryptSession* ssl)
{
/* struct {
* ProtocolVersion server_version;
* Random random;
* SessionID session_id;
* CipherSuite cipher_suite;
* CompressionMethod compression_method;
* Extension server_hello_extension_list<0..2^16-1>;
* } ServerHello;
*/
guint16 start_offset;
start_offset = offset;
if (tree || ssl)
{
/* show the server version */
if (tree)
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_server_version, tvb,
offset, 2, FALSE);
offset += 2;
/* first display the elements conveniently in
* common with client hello
*/
offset += dissect_ssl3_hnd_hello_common(tvb, tree, offset, ssl, 1);
/* PAOLO: handle session cipher suite */
if (ssl) {
/* store selected cipher suite for decryption */
ssl->cipher = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
if (ssl_find_cipher(ssl->cipher,&ssl->cipher_suite) < 0) {
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_hello can't find cipher suite 0x%X\n", ssl->cipher);
goto no_cipher;
}
ssl->state |= SSL_CIPHER;
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_hello found CIPHER 0x%04X -> state 0x%02X\n",
ssl->cipher, ssl->state);
/* if we have restored a session now we can have enought material
* to build session key, check it out*/
if ((ssl->state &
(SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION|SSL_MASTER_SECRET)) !=
(SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION|SSL_MASTER_SECRET)) {
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_hello not enough data to generate key (required 0x%02X)\n",
(SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION|SSL_MASTER_SECRET));
goto no_cipher;
}
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_hello trying to generate keys\n");
if (ssl_generate_keyring_material(ssl)<0) {
ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_hello can't generate keyring material\n");
goto no_cipher;
}
ssl->state |= SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY;
}
no_cipher:
/* now the server-selected cipher suite */
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suite,
tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
offset += 2;
if (ssl) {
/* store selected compression method for decryption */
ssl->compression = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
}
/* and the server-selected compression method */
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_comp_method,
tvb, offset, 1, FALSE);
offset++;
if (length > offset - start_offset)
{
offset = dissect_ssl3_hnd_hello_ext(tvb, tree, offset,
length -
(offset - start_offset));
}
}
}
static void
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert(tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo)
{
/* opaque ASN.1Cert<2^24-1>;
*
* struct {
* ASN.1Cert certificate_list<1..2^24-1>;
* } Certificate;
*/
guint32 certificate_list_length;
proto_tree *ti;
proto_tree *subtree;
asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx;
asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo);
if (tree)
{
certificate_list_length = tvb_get_ntoh24(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_certificates_len,
tvb, offset, 3, certificate_list_length);
offset += 3; /* 24-bit length value */
if (certificate_list_length > 0)
{
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, certificate_list_length);
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
hf_ssl_handshake_certificates,
tvb, offset, certificate_list_length,
"Certificates (%u byte%s)",
certificate_list_length,
plurality(certificate_list_length,
"", "s"));
/* make it a subtree */
subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_certs);
if (!subtree)
{
subtree = tree; /* failsafe */
}
/* iterate through each certificate */
while (certificate_list_length > 0)
{
/* get the length of the current certificate */
guint32 cert_length;
cert_length = tvb_get_ntoh24(tvb, offset);
certificate_list_length -= 3 + cert_length;
proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf_ssl_handshake_certificate_len,
tvb, offset, 3, FALSE);
offset += 3;
dissect_x509af_Certificate(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, subtree, hf_ssl_handshake_certificate);
offset += cert_length;
}
}
}
}
static void
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert_req(tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo)
{
/*
* enum {
* rsa_sign(1), dss_sign(2), rsa_fixed_dh(3), dss_fixed_dh(4),
* (255)
* } ClientCertificateType;
*
* opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>;
*
* struct {
* ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
* DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<3..2^16-1>;
* } CertificateRequest;
*
*/
proto_tree *ti;
proto_tree *subtree;
guint8 cert_types_count;
gint dnames_length;
asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx;
cert_types_count = 0;
dnames_length = 0;
asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo);
if (tree)
{
cert_types_count = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_cert_types_count,
tvb, offset, 1, cert_types_count);
offset++;
if (cert_types_count > 0)
{
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
hf_ssl_handshake_cert_types,
tvb, offset, cert_types_count,
"Certificate types (%u type%s)",
cert_types_count,
plurality(cert_types_count, "", "s"));
subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_cert_types);
if (!subtree)
{
subtree = tree;
}
while (cert_types_count > 0)
{
proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf_ssl_handshake_cert_type,
tvb, offset, 1, FALSE);
offset++;
cert_types_count--;
}
}
dnames_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_dnames_len,
tvb, offset, 2, dnames_length);
offset += 2;
if (dnames_length > 0)
{
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, dnames_length);
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
hf_ssl_handshake_dnames,
tvb, offset, dnames_length,
"Distinguished Names (%d byte%s)",
dnames_length,
plurality(dnames_length, "", "s"));
subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_dnames);
if (!subtree)
{
subtree = tree;
}
while (dnames_length > 0)
{
/* get the length of the current certificate */
guint16 name_length;
name_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
dnames_length -= 2 + name_length;
proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf_ssl_handshake_dname_len,
tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
offset += 2;
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, name_length);
(void) dissect_x509if_DistinguishedName(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, subtree, hf_ssl_handshake_dname);
offset += name_length;
}
}
}
}
static void
dissect_ssl3_hnd_finished(tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
guint* conv_version)
{
/* For TLS:
* struct {
* opaque verify_data[12];
* } Finished;
*
* For SSLv3:
* struct {
* opaque md5_hash[16];
* opaque sha_hash[20];
* } Finished;
*/
/* this all needs a tree, so bail if we don't have one */
if (!tree)
{
return;
}
switch(*conv_version) {
case SSL_VER_TLS:
case SSL_VER_TLSv1DOT1:
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_finished,
tvb, offset, 12, FALSE);
break;
case SSL_VER_SSLv3:
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_md5_hash,
tvb, offset, 16, FALSE);
offset += 16;
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_sha_hash,
tvb, offset, 20, FALSE);
offset += 20;
break;
}
}
/*********************************************************************
*
* SSL version 2 Dissectors
*
*********************************************************************/
/* record layer dissector */
static gint
dissect_ssl2_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
guint32 offset, guint* conv_version,
gboolean *need_desegmentation,
SslDecryptSession* ssl)
{
guint32 initial_offset;
guint8 byte;
guint8 record_length_length;
guint32 record_length;
gint is_escape;
gint16 padding_length;
guint8 msg_type;
const gchar *msg_type_str;
guint32 available_bytes;
proto_tree *ti;
proto_tree *ssl_record_tree;
initial_offset = offset;
byte = 0;
record_length_length = 0;
record_length = 0;
is_escape = -1;
padding_length = -1;
msg_type = 0;
msg_type_str = NULL;
available_bytes = 0;
ssl_record_tree = NULL;
/* pull first byte; if high bit is unset, then record
* length is three bytes due to padding; otherwise
* record length is two bytes
*/
byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
record_length_length = (byte & 0x80) ? 2 : 3;
/*
* Can we do reassembly?
*/
available_bytes = tvb_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
if (ssl_desegment && pinfo->can_desegment) {
/*
* Yes - is the record header split across segment boundaries?
*/
if (available_bytes < record_length_length) {
/*
* Yes. Tell the TCP dissector where the data for this
* message starts in the data it handed us, and how many
* more bytes we need, and return.
*/
pinfo->desegment_offset = offset;
pinfo->desegment_len = record_length_length - available_bytes;
*need_desegmentation = TRUE;
return offset;
}
}
/* parse out the record length */
switch(record_length_length) {
case 2: /* two-byte record length */
record_length = (byte & 0x7f) << 8;
byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 1);
record_length += byte;
break;
case 3: /* three-byte record length */
is_escape = (byte & 0x40) ? TRUE : FALSE;
record_length = (byte & 0x3f) << 8;
byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 1);
record_length += byte;
byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 2);
padding_length = byte;
}
/*
* Can we do reassembly?
*/
if (ssl_desegment && pinfo->can_desegment) {
/*
* Yes - is the record split across segment boundaries?
*/
if (available_bytes < (record_length_length + record_length)) {
/*
* Yes. Tell the TCP dissector where the data for this
* message starts in the data it handed us, and how many
* more bytes we need, and return.
*/
pinfo->desegment_offset = offset;
pinfo->desegment_len = (record_length_length + record_length)
- available_bytes;
*need_desegmentation = TRUE;
return offset;
}
}
offset += record_length_length;
/* add the record layer subtree header */
ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_record, tvb, initial_offset,
record_length_length + record_length, 0);
ssl_record_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_record);
/* pull the msg_type so we can bail if it's unknown */
msg_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, initial_offset + record_length_length);
/* if we get a server_hello or later handshake in v2, then set
* this to sslv2
*/
if (*conv_version == SSL_VER_UNKNOWN)
{
if (ssl_looks_like_valid_pct_handshake(tvb,
(initial_offset +
record_length_length),
record_length)) {
*conv_version = SSL_VER_PCT;
/*ssl_set_conv_version(pinfo, ssl->version);*/
}
else if (msg_type >= 2 && msg_type <= 8)
{
*conv_version = SSL_VER_SSLv2;
/*ssl_set_conv_version(pinfo, ssl->version);*/
}
}
/* if we get here, but don't have a version set for the
* conversation, then set a version for just this frame
* (e.g., on a client hello)
*/
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL))
{
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL,
(*conv_version == SSL_VER_PCT) ? "PCT" : "SSLv2");
}
/* see if the msg_type is valid; if not the payload is
* probably encrypted, so note that fact and bail
*/
msg_type_str = match_strval(msg_type,
(*conv_version == SSL_VER_PCT)
? pct_msg_types : ssl_20_msg_types);
if (!msg_type_str
|| ((*conv_version != SSL_VER_PCT) &&
!ssl_looks_like_valid_v2_handshake(tvb, initial_offset
+ record_length_length,
record_length))
|| ((*conv_version == SSL_VER_PCT) &&
!ssl_looks_like_valid_pct_handshake(tvb, initial_offset
+ record_length_length,
record_length)))
{
if (ssl_record_tree)
{
proto_item_set_text(ssl_record_tree, "%s Record Layer: %s",
(*conv_version == SSL_VER_PCT)
? "PCT" : "SSLv2",
"Encrypted Data");
/* Unlike SSLv3, the SSLv2 record layer does not have a
* version field. To make it possible to filter on record
* layer version we create a generated field with ssl
* record layer version 0x0002
*/
ti = proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_record_tree,
hf_ssl_record_version, tvb,
initial_offset, 0, 0x0002);
PROTO_ITEM_SET_GENERATED(ti);
}
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Encrypted Data");
return initial_offset + record_length_length + record_length;
}
else
{
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, msg_type_str);
if (ssl_record_tree)
{
proto_item_set_text(ssl_record_tree, "%s Record Layer: %s",
(*conv_version == SSL_VER_PCT)
? "PCT" : "SSLv2",
msg_type_str);
}
}
/* We have a valid message type, so move foward, filling in the
* tree by adding the length, is_escape boolean and padding_length,
* if present in the original packet
*/
if (ssl_record_tree)
{
/* Unlike SSLv3, the SSLv2 record layer does not have a
* version field. To make it possible to filter on record
* layer version we create a generated field with ssl
* record layer version 0x0002
*/
ti = proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_record_tree,
hf_ssl_record_version, tvb,
initial_offset, 0, 0x0002);
PROTO_ITEM_SET_GENERATED(ti);
/* add the record length */
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, record_length_length);
ti = proto_tree_add_uint (ssl_record_tree,
hf_ssl_record_length, tvb,
initial_offset, record_length_length,
record_length);
}
if (ssl_record_tree && is_escape != -1)
{
proto_tree_add_boolean(ssl_record_tree,
hf_ssl2_record_is_escape, tvb,
initial_offset, 1, is_escape);
}
if (ssl_record_tree && padding_length != -1)
{
proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_record_tree,
hf_ssl2_record_padding_length, tvb,
initial_offset + 2, 1, padding_length);
}
/*
* dissect the record data
*/
/* jump forward to the start of the record data */
offset = initial_offset + record_length_length;
/* add the message type */
if (ssl_record_tree)
{
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_record_tree,
(*conv_version == SSL_VER_PCT)
? hf_pct_msg_type : hf_ssl2_msg_type,
tvb, offset, 1, 0);
}
offset++; /* move past msg_type byte */
if (*conv_version != SSL_VER_PCT)
{
/* dissect the message (only handle client hello right now) */
switch (msg_type) {
case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_hello(tvb, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, offset, ssl);
break;
case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY:
dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_master_key(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset);
break;
case SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
dissect_ssl2_hnd_server_hello(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset, pinfo);
break;
case SSL2_HND_ERROR:
case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_FINISHED:
case SSL2_HND_SERVER_VERIFY:
case SSL2_HND_SERVER_FINISHED:
case SSL2_HND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE:
case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:
/* unimplemented */
break;
default: /* unknown */
break;
}
}
else
{
/* dissect the message */
switch (msg_type) {
case PCT_MSG_CLIENT_HELLO:
dissect_pct_msg_client_hello(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset);
break;
case PCT_MSG_SERVER_HELLO:
dissect_pct_msg_server_hello(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset, pinfo);
break;
case PCT_MSG_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY:
dissect_pct_msg_client_master_key(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset);
break;
case PCT_MSG_SERVER_VERIFY:
dissect_pct_msg_server_verify(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset);
break;
case PCT_MSG_ERROR:
dissect_pct_msg_error(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset);
break;
default: /* unknown */
break;
}
}
return (initial_offset + record_length_length + record_length);
}
static void
dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
SslDecryptSession* ssl)
{
/* struct {
* uint8 msg_type;
* Version version;
* uint16 cipher_spec_length;
* uint16 session_id_length;
* uint16 challenge_length;
* V2CipherSpec cipher_specs[V2ClientHello.cipher_spec_length];
* opaque session_id[V2ClientHello.session_id_length];
* Random challenge;
* } V2ClientHello;
*
* Note: when we get here, offset's already pointing at Version
*
*/
guint16 version;
guint16 cipher_spec_length;
guint16 session_id_length;
guint16 challenge_length;
proto_tree *ti;
proto_tree *cs_tree;
cs_tree=0;
version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
if (!ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(version))
{
/* invalid version; probably encrypted data */
return;
}
if (tree || ssl)
{
/* show the version */
if (tree)
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_client_version, tvb,
offset, 2, FALSE);
offset += 2;
cipher_spec_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
if (tree)
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec_len,
tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
offset += 2;
session_id_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
if (tree)
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_len,
tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
if (session_id_length > SSLV2_MAX_SESSION_ID_LENGTH_IN_BYTES) {
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2,
"Invalid session ID length: %d", session_id_length);
expert_add_info_format(pinfo, NULL, PI_MALFORMED, PI_ERROR,
"Session ID length (%u) must be less than %u.",
session_id_length, SSLV2_MAX_SESSION_ID_LENGTH_IN_BYTES);
offset = tvb_length(tvb);
return;
}
offset += 2;
challenge_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
if (tree)
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge_len,
tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
offset += 2;
if (tree)
{
/* tell the user how many cipher specs they've won */
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, cipher_spec_length);
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites,
tvb, offset, cipher_spec_length,
"Cipher Specs (%u specs)",
cipher_spec_length/3);
/* make this a subtree and expand the actual specs below */
cs_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_cipher_suites);
if (!cs_tree)
{
cs_tree = tree; /* failsafe */
}
}
/* iterate through the cipher specs, showing them */
while (cipher_spec_length > 0)
{
if (cs_tree)
proto_tree_add_item(cs_tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec,
tvb, offset, 3, FALSE);
offset += 3; /* length of one cipher spec */
cipher_spec_length -= 3;
}
/* if there's a session id, show it */
if (session_id_length > 0)
{
if (tree)
{
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, session_id_length);
proto_tree_add_bytes_format(tree,
hf_ssl_handshake_session_id,
tvb, offset, session_id_length,
tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, session_id_length),
"Session ID (%u byte%s)",
session_id_length,
plurality(session_id_length, "", "s"));
}
/* PAOLO: get session id and reset session state for key [re]negotiation */
if (ssl)
{
tvb_memcpy(tvb,ssl->session_id.data, offset, session_id_length);
ssl->session_id.data_len = session_id_length;
ssl->state &= ~(SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY|SSL_MASTER_SECRET|
SSL_CIPHER|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM);
}
offset += session_id_length;
}
/* if there's a challenge, show it */
if (challenge_length > 0)
{
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, challenge_length);
if (tree)
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge,
tvb, offset, challenge_length, 0);
if (ssl)
{
/* PAOLO: get client random data; we get at most 32 bytes from
challenge */
gint max;
max = challenge_length > 32? 32: challenge_length;
ssl_debug_printf("client random len: %d padded to 32\n",
challenge_length);
/* client random is padded with zero and 'right' aligned */
memset(ssl->client_random.data, 0, 32 - max);
tvb_memcpy(tvb, &ssl->client_random.data[32 - max], offset, max);
ssl->client_random.data_len = 32;
ssl->state |= SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM;
}
offset += challenge_length;
}
}
}
static void
dissect_pct_msg_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
{
guint16 CH_CLIENT_VERSION, CH_OFFSET, CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH, CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH, CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH, CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH, CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH;
proto_item *CH_CIPHER_SPECS_ti, *CH_HASH_SPECS_ti, *CH_CERT_SPECS_ti, *CH_EXCH_SPECS_ti;
proto_tree *CH_CIPHER_SPECS_tree, *CH_HASH_SPECS_tree, *CH_CERT_SPECS_tree, *CH_EXCH_SPECS_tree;
gint i;
CH_CLIENT_VERSION = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
if(CH_CLIENT_VERSION != PCT_VERSION_1)
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Client Version, should be %x in PCT version 1", PCT_VERSION_1);
else
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Client Version (%x)", PCT_VERSION_1);
offset += 2;
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "PAD");
offset += 1;
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 32, "Client Session ID Data (32 bytes)");
offset += 32;
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 32, "Challange Data(32 bytes)");
offset += 32;
CH_OFFSET = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
if(CH_OFFSET != PCT_CH_OFFSET_V1)
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "CH_OFFSET: %d, should be %d in PCT version 1", CH_OFFSET, PCT_CH_OFFSET_V1);
else
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "CH_OFFSET: %d", CH_OFFSET);
offset += 2;
CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "CIPHER_SPECS Length: %d", CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH);
offset += 2;
CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "HASH_SPECS Length: %d", CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH);
offset += 2;
CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "CERT_SPECS Length: %d", CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH);
offset += 2;
CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "EXCH_SPECS Length: %d", CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH);
offset += 2;
CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "IV Length: %d", CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH);
offset += 2;
if(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH) {
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH);
CH_CIPHER_SPECS_ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_cipher_spec, tvb, offset, CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH, FALSE);
CH_CIPHER_SPECS_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_ti, ett_pct_cipher_suites);
for(i=0; i<(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH/4); i++) {
proto_tree_add_item(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_tree, hf_pct_handshake_cipher, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
offset += 2;
proto_tree_add_text(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_tree, tvb, offset, 1, "Encryption key length: %d", tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset));
offset += 1;
proto_tree_add_text(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_tree, tvb, offset, 1, "MAC key length in bits: %d", tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) + 64);
offset += 1;
}
}
if(CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH) {
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH);
CH_HASH_SPECS_ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_hash_spec, tvb, offset, CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH, FALSE);
CH_HASH_SPECS_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(CH_HASH_SPECS_ti, ett_pct_hash_suites);
for(i=0; i<(CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH/2); i++) {
proto_tree_add_item(CH_HASH_SPECS_tree, hf_pct_handshake_hash, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
offset += 2;
}
}
if(CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH) {
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH);
CH_CERT_SPECS_ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_cert_spec, tvb, offset, CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH, FALSE);
CH_CERT_SPECS_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(CH_CERT_SPECS_ti, ett_pct_cert_suites);
for(i=0; i< (CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH/2); i++) {
proto_tree_add_item(CH_CERT_SPECS_tree, hf_pct_handshake_cert, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
offset += 2;
}
}
if(CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH) {
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH);
CH_EXCH_SPECS_ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_exch_spec, tvb, offset, CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH, FALSE);
CH_EXCH_SPECS_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(CH_EXCH_SPECS_ti, ett_pct_exch_suites);
for(i=0; i<(CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH/2); i++) {
proto_tree_add_item(CH_EXCH_SPECS_tree, hf_pct_handshake_exch, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
offset += 2;
}
}
if(CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH) {
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH);
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH, "IV data (%d bytes)", CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH);
offset += CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH;
}
}
static void
dissect_pct_msg_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo)
{
/* structure:
char SH_MSG_SERVER_HELLO
char SH_PAD
char SH_SERVER_VERSION_MSB
char SH_SERVER_VERSION_LSB
char SH_RESTART_SESSION_OK
char SH_CLIENT_AUTH_REQ
char SH_CIPHER_SPECS_DATA[4]
char SH_HASH_SPECS_DATA[2]
char SH_CERT_SPECS_DATA[2]
char SH_EXCH_SPECS_DATA[2]
char SH_CONNECTION_ID_DATA[32]
char SH_CERTIFICATE_LENGTH_MSB
char SH_CERTIFICATE_LENGTH_LSB
char SH_CLIENT_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH_MSB
char SH_CLIENT_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH_LSB
char SH_CLIENT_SIG_SPECS_LENGTH_MSB
char SH_CLIENT_SIG_SPECS_LENGTH_LSB
char SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH_MSB
char SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH_LSB
char SH_CERTIFICATE_DATA[MSB<<8|LSB]
char SH_CLIENT_CERT_SPECS_DATA[MSB<<8|LSB]
char SH_CLIENT_SIG_SPECS_DATA[MSB<<8|LSB]
char SH_RESPONSE_DATA[MSB<<8|LSB]
*/
guint16 SH_SERVER_VERSION, SH_CERT_LENGTH, SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH, SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH, SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH;
asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx;
asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo);
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "PAD");
offset += 1;
SH_SERVER_VERSION = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
if(SH_SERVER_VERSION != PCT_VERSION_1)
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Server Version, should be %x in PCT version 1", PCT_VERSION_1);
else
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Server Version (%x)", PCT_VERSION_1);
offset += 2;
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SH_RESTART_SESSION_OK flag");
offset += 1;
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SH_CLIENT_AUTH_REQ flag");
offset += 1;
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_cipher, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
offset += 2;
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "Encryption key length: %d", tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset));
offset += 1;
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "MAC key length in bits: %d", tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) + 64);
offset += 1;
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_hash, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
offset += 2;
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_cert, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
offset += 2;
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_exch, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
offset += 2;
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 32, "Connection ID Data (32 bytes)");
offset += 32;
SH_CERT_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Server Certificate Length: %d", SH_CERT_LENGTH);
offset += 2;
SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Client CERT_SPECS Length: %d", SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH);
offset += 2;
SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Client SIG_SPECS Length: %d", SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH);
offset += 2;
SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Response Length: %d", SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
offset += 2;
if(SH_CERT_LENGTH) {
dissect_x509af_Certificate(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, tree, hf_pct_handshake_server_cert);
offset += SH_CERT_LENGTH;
}
if(SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH) {
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH);
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH, "Client CERT_SPECS (%d bytes)", SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH);
offset += SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH;
}
if(SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH) {
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH);
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH, "Client Signature (%d bytes)", SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH);
offset += SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH;
}
if(SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH) {
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH, "Server Response (%d bytes)", SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
offset += SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH;
}
}
static void
dissect_pct_msg_client_master_key(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
{
guint16 CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH, CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH, CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH, CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE, CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH, CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH;
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "PAD");
offset += 1;
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_cert, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
offset += 2;
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_sig, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
offset += 2;
CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Clear Key Length: %d",CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH);
offset += 2;
CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Encrypted Key Length: %d",CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH);
offset += 2;
CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH= tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "IV Length: %d",CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH);
offset += 2;
CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Verify Prelude Length: %d",CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE);
offset += 2;
CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Client Cert Length: %d",CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH);
offset += 2;
CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Response Length: %d",CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
offset += 2;
if(CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH) {
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH);
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH, "Clear Key data (%d bytes)", CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH);
offset += CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH;
}
if(CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH) {
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH);
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH, "Encrypted Key data (%d bytes)", CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH);
offset += CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH;
}
if(CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH) {
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH);
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH, "IV data (%d bytes)", CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH);
offset += CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH;
}
if(CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE) {
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE);
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE, "Verify Prelude data (%d bytes)", CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE);
offset += CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE;
}
if(CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH) {
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH);
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH, "Client Certificate data (%d bytes)", CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH);
offset += CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH;
}
if(CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH) {
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH, "Response data (%d bytes)", CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
offset += CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH;
}
}
static void
dissect_pct_msg_server_verify(tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
{
guint16 SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH;
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "PAD");
offset += 1;
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 32, "Server Session ID data (32 bytes)");
offset += 32;
SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Server Response Length: %d", SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
offset += 2;
if(SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH) {
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH, "Server Response (%d bytes)", SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
offset += SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH;
}
}
static void
dissect_pct_msg_error(tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
{
guint16 ERROR_CODE, INFO_LEN;
ERROR_CODE = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_msg_error_type, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
offset += 2;
INFO_LEN = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Eror Information Length: %d", INFO_LEN);
offset += 2;
if (ERROR_CODE == PCT_ERR_SPECS_MISMATCH && INFO_LEN == 6)
{
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SPECS_MISMATCH_CIPHER");
offset += 1;
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SPECS_MISMATCH_HASH");
offset += 1;
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SPECS_MISMATCH_CERT");
offset += 1;
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SPECS_MISMATCH_EXCH");
offset += 1;
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SPECS_MISMATCH_CLIENT_CERT");
offset += 1;
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SPECS_MISMATCH_CLIENT_SIG");
offset += 1;
}
else if(INFO_LEN) {
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, INFO_LEN, "Error Information dta (%d bytes)", INFO_LEN);
offset += INFO_LEN;
}
}
static void
dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_master_key(tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
{
/* struct {
* uint8 msg_type;
* V2Cipherspec cipher;
* uint16 clear_key_length;
* uint16 encrypted_key_length;
* uint16 key_arg_length;
* opaque clear_key_data[V2ClientMasterKey.clear_key_length];
* opaque encrypted_key_data[V2ClientMasterKey.encrypted_key_length];
* opaque key_arg_data[V2ClientMasterKey.key_arg_length];
* } V2ClientMasterKey;
*
* Note: when we get here, offset's already pointing at cipher
*/
guint16 clear_key_length;
guint16 encrypted_key_length;
guint16 key_arg_length;
/* at this point, everything we do involves the tree,
* so quit now if we don't have one ;-)
*/
if (!tree)
{
return;
}
/* show the selected cipher */
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec,
tvb, offset, 3, FALSE);
offset += 3;
/* get the fixed fields */
clear_key_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key_len,
tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
offset += 2;
encrypted_key_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key_len,
tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
offset += 2;
key_arg_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg_len,
tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
offset += 2;
/* show the variable length fields */
if (clear_key_length > 0)
{
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, clear_key_length);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key,
tvb, offset, clear_key_length, FALSE);
offset += clear_key_length;
}
if (encrypted_key_length > 0)
{
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, encrypted_key_length);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key,
tvb, offset, encrypted_key_length, FALSE);
offset += encrypted_key_length;
}
if (key_arg_length > 0)
{
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, key_arg_length);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg,
tvb, offset, key_arg_length, FALSE);
offset += key_arg_length;
}
}
static void
dissect_ssl2_hnd_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo)
{
/* struct {
* uint8 msg_type;
* uint8 session_id_hit;
* uint8 certificate_type;
* uint16 server_version;
* uint16 certificate_length;
* uint16 cipher_specs_length;
* uint16 connection_id_length;
* opaque certificate_data[V2ServerHello.certificate_length];
* opaque cipher_specs_data[V2ServerHello.cipher_specs_length];
* opaque connection_id_data[V2ServerHello.connection_id_length];
* } V2ServerHello;
*
* Note: when we get here, offset's already pointing at session_id_hit
*/
guint16 certificate_length;
guint16 cipher_spec_length;
guint16 connection_id_length;
guint16 version;
proto_tree *ti;
proto_tree *subtree;
asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx;
asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo);
/* everything we do only makes sense with a tree, so
* quit now if we don't have one
*/
if (!tree)
{
return;
}
version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 2);
if (!ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(version))
{
/* invalid version; probably encrypted data */
return;
}
/* is there a hit? */
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_hit,
tvb, offset, 1, FALSE);
offset++;
/* what type of certificate is this? */
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cert_type,
tvb, offset, 1, FALSE);
offset++;
/* now the server version */
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_server_version,
tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
offset += 2;
/* get the fixed fields */
certificate_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_certificate_len,
tvb, offset, 2, certificate_length);
offset += 2;
cipher_spec_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec_len,
tvb, offset, 2, cipher_spec_length);
offset += 2;
connection_id_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id_len,
tvb, offset, 2, connection_id_length);
offset += 2;
/* now the variable length fields */
if (certificate_length > 0)
{
dissect_x509af_Certificate(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, tree, hf_ssl_handshake_certificate);
offset += certificate_length;
}
if (cipher_spec_length > 0)
{
/* provide a collapsing node for the cipher specs */
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, cipher_spec_length);
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites,
tvb, offset, cipher_spec_length,
"Cipher Specs (%u spec%s)",
cipher_spec_length/3,
plurality(cipher_spec_length/3, "", "s"));
subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_cipher_suites);
if (!subtree)
{
subtree = tree;
}
/* iterate through the cipher specs */
while (cipher_spec_length > 0)
{
proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec,
tvb, offset, 3, FALSE);
offset += 3;
cipher_spec_length -= 3;
}
}
if (connection_id_length > 0)
{
tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, connection_id_length);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id,
tvb, offset, connection_id_length, FALSE);
offset += connection_id_length;
}
}
void ssl_set_master_secret(guint32 frame_num, address *addr_srv, address *addr_cli,
port_type ptype, guint32 port_srv, guint32 port_cli,
guint32 version, gint cipher, const guchar *_master_secret,
const guchar *_client_random, const guchar *_server_random,
guint32 client_seq, guint32 server_seq)
{
conversation_t *conversation = NULL;
void *conv_data = NULL;
SslDecryptSession *ssl = NULL;
guint iv_len;
ssl_debug_printf("\nssl_set_master_secret enter frame #%u\n", frame_num);
conversation = find_conversation(frame_num, addr_srv, addr_cli, ptype, port_srv, port_cli, 0);
if (!conversation) {
/* create a new conversation */
conversation = conversation_new(frame_num, addr_srv, addr_cli, ptype, port_srv, port_cli, 0);
ssl_debug_printf(" new conversation = %p created\n", (void *)conversation);
}
conv_data = conversation_get_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl);
if (conv_data) {
ssl = conv_data;
} else {
ssl = se_alloc0(sizeof(SslDecryptSession));
ssl_session_init(ssl);
ssl->version = SSL_VER_UNKNOWN;
conversation_add_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl, ssl);
}
ssl_debug_printf(" conversation = %p, ssl_session = %p\n", (void *)conversation, (void *)ssl);
/* version */
if ((ssl->version==SSL_VER_UNKNOWN) && (version!=SSL_VER_UNKNOWN)) {
switch (version) {
case SSL_VER_SSLv3:
ssl->version = SSL_VER_SSLv3;
ssl->version_netorder = SSLV3_VERSION;
ssl->state |= SSL_VERSION;
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_set_master_secret set version 0x%04X -> state 0x%02X\n", ssl->version_netorder, ssl->state);
break;
case SSL_VER_TLS:
ssl->version = SSL_VER_TLS;
ssl->version_netorder = TLSV1_VERSION;
ssl->state |= SSL_VERSION;
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_set_master_secret set version 0x%04X -> state 0x%02X\n", ssl->version_netorder, ssl->state);
break;
case SSL_VER_TLSv1DOT1:
ssl->version = SSL_VER_TLSv1DOT1;
ssl->version_netorder = TLSV1DOT1_VERSION;
ssl->state |= SSL_VERSION;
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_set_master_secret set version 0x%04X -> state 0x%02X\n", ssl->version_netorder, ssl->state);
break;
}
}
/* cipher */
if (cipher > 0) {
ssl->cipher = cipher;
if (ssl_find_cipher(ssl->cipher,&ssl->cipher_suite) < 0) {
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_set_master_secret can't find cipher suite 0x%X\n", ssl->cipher);
} else {
ssl->state |= SSL_CIPHER;
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_set_master_secret set CIPHER 0x%04X -> state 0x%02X\n", ssl->cipher, ssl->state);
}
}
/* client random */
if (_client_random) {
ssl_data_set(&ssl->client_random, _client_random, 32);
ssl->state |= SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM;
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_set_master_secret set CLIENT RANDOM -> state 0x%02X\n", ssl->state);
}
/* server random */
if (_server_random) {
ssl_data_set(&ssl->server_random, _server_random, 32);
ssl->state |= SSL_SERVER_RANDOM;
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_set_master_secret set SERVER RANDOM -> state 0x%02X\n", ssl->state);
}
/* master secret */
if (_master_secret) {
ssl_data_set(&ssl->master_secret, _master_secret, 48);
ssl->state |= SSL_MASTER_SECRET;
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_set_master_secret set MASTER SECRET -> state 0x%02X\n", ssl->state);
}
if ((ssl->state &
(SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION|SSL_MASTER_SECRET)) !=
(SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION|SSL_MASTER_SECRET)) {
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_set_master_secret not enough data to generate key (has 0x%02X but required 0x%02X)\n",
ssl->state, (SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION|SSL_MASTER_SECRET));
return;
}
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_set_master_secret trying to generate keys\n");
if (ssl_generate_keyring_material(ssl)<0) {
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_set_master_secret can't generate keyring material\n");
return;
}
ssl->state |= SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY;
/* chenge ciphers immediately */
ssl_change_cipher(ssl, TRUE);
ssl_change_cipher(ssl, FALSE);
/* update seq numbers is available */
if (ssl->client && (client_seq != (guint32)-1)) {
ssl->client->seq = client_seq;
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_set_master_secret client->seq updated to %u\n", ssl->client->seq);
}
if (ssl->server && (server_seq != (guint32)-1)) {
ssl->server->seq = server_seq;
ssl_debug_printf("ssl_set_master_secret server->seq updated to %u\n", ssl->server->seq);
}
/* update IV from last data */
iv_len = (ssl->cipher_suite.block>1) ? ssl->cipher_suite.block : 8;
if (ssl->client && ((ssl->client->seq > 0) || (ssl->client_data_for_iv.data_len > iv_len))) {
ssl_cipher_setiv(&ssl->client->evp, ssl->client_data_for_iv.data + ssl->client_data_for_iv.data_len - iv_len, iv_len);
ssl_print_data("ssl_set_master_secret client IV updated",ssl->client_data_for_iv.data + ssl->client_data_for_iv.data_len - iv_len, iv_len);
}
if (ssl->server && ((ssl->server->seq > 0) || (ssl->server_data_for_iv.data_len > iv_len))) {
ssl_cipher_setiv(&ssl->server->evp, ssl->server_data_for_iv.data + ssl->server_data_for_iv.data_len - iv_len, iv_len);
ssl_print_data("ssl_set_master_secret server IV updated",ssl->server_data_for_iv.data + ssl->server_data_for_iv.data_len - iv_len, iv_len);
}
}
/*********************************************************************
*
* Support Functions
*
*********************************************************************/
#if 0
static void
ssl_set_conv_version(packet_info *pinfo, guint version)
{
conversation_t *conversation;
if (pinfo->fd->flags.visited)
{
/* We've already processed this frame; no need to do any more
* work on it.
*/
return;
}
conversation = find_conversation(pinfo->fd->num, &pinfo->src, &pinfo->dst, pinfo->ptype,
pinfo->srcport, pinfo->destport, 0);
if (conversation == NULL)
{
/* create a new conversation */
conversation = conversation_new(pinfo->fd->num, &pinfo->src, &pinfo->dst, pinfo->ptype,
pinfo->srcport, pinfo->destport, 0);
}
if (conversation_get_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl) != NULL)
{
/* get rid of the current data */
conversation_delete_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl);
}
conversation_add_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl, GINT_TO_POINTER(version));
}
#endif
static gint
ssl_is_valid_handshake_type(guint8 type)
{
switch (type) {
case SSL_HND_HELLO_REQUEST:
case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
case SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE:
case SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG:
case SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST:
case SSL_HND_SVR_HELLO_DONE:
case SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY:
case SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG:
case SSL_HND_FINISHED:
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static gint
ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(guint16 version)
{
const gchar *version_str;
version_str = match_strval(version, ssl_versions);
return version_str != NULL;
}
static gint
ssl_is_authoritative_version_message(guint8 content_type,
guint8 next_byte)
{
if (content_type == SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE
&& ssl_is_valid_handshake_type(next_byte))
{
return (next_byte != SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO);
}
else if (ssl_is_valid_content_type(content_type)
&& content_type != SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE)
{
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static gint
ssl_is_v2_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset)
{
guint8 byte;
byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
if (byte != 0x80) /* v2 client hello should start this way */
{
return 0;
}
byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset+2);
if (byte != 0x01) /* v2 client hello msg type */
{
return 0;
}
/* 1 in 2^16 of being right; improve later if necessary */
return 1;
}
/* this applies a heuristic to determine whether
* or not the data beginning at offset looks like a
* valid sslv2 record. this isn't really possible,
* but we'll try to do a reasonable job anyway.
*/
static gint
ssl_looks_like_sslv2(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset)
{
/* here's the current approach:
*
* we only try to catch unencrypted handshake messages, so we can
* assume that there is not padding. This means that the
* first byte must be >= 0x80 and there must be a valid sslv2
* msg_type in the third byte
*/
/* get the first byte; must have high bit set */
guint8 byte;
byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
if (byte < 0x80)
{
return 0;
}
/* get the supposed msg_type byte; since we only care about
* unencrypted handshake messages (we can't tell the type for
* encrypted messages), we just check against that list
*/
byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 2);
switch(byte) {
case SSL2_HND_ERROR:
case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY:
case SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
case PCT_MSG_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY:
case PCT_MSG_ERROR:
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/* this applies a heuristic to determine whether
* or not the data beginning at offset looks like a
* valid sslv3 record. this is somewhat more reliable
* than sslv2 due to the structure of the v3 protocol
*/
static gint
ssl_looks_like_sslv3(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset)
{
/* have to have a valid content type followed by a valid
* protocol version
*/
guint8 byte;
guint16 version;
/* see if the first byte is a valid content type */
byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
if (!ssl_is_valid_content_type(byte))
{
return 0;
}
/* now check to see if the version byte appears valid */
version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 1);
if (version != SSLV3_VERSION && version != TLSV1_VERSION && version != TLSV1DOT1_VERSION)
{
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/* applies a heuristic to determine whether
* or not the data beginning at offset looks
* like a valid, unencrypted v2 handshake message.
* since it isn't possible to completely tell random
* data apart from a valid message without state,
* we try to help the odds.
*/
static gint
ssl_looks_like_valid_v2_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset,
guint32 record_length)
{
/* first byte should be a msg_type.
*
* - we know we only see client_hello, client_master_key,
* and server_hello in the clear, so check to see if
* msg_type is one of those (this gives us a 3 in 2^8
* chance of saying yes with random payload)
*
* - for those three types that we know about, do some
* further validation to reduce the chance of an error
*/
guint8 msg_type;
guint16 version;
guint32 sum;
gint ret = 0;
/* fetch the msg_type */
msg_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
switch (msg_type) {
case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
/* version follows msg byte, so verify that this is valid */
version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset+1);
ret = ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(version);
break;
case SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
/* version is three bytes after msg_type */
version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset+3);
ret = ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(version);
break;
case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY:
/* sum of clear_key_length, encrypted_key_length, and key_arg_length
* must be less than record length
*/
sum = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 4); /* clear_key_length */
sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 6); /* encrypted_key_length */
sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 8); /* key_arg_length */
if (sum <= record_length) {
ret = 1;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
return ret;
}
/* applies a heuristic to determine whether
* or not the data beginning at offset looks
* like a valid, unencrypted v2 handshake message.
* since it isn't possible to completely tell random
* data apart from a valid message without state,
* we try to help the odds.
*/
static gint
ssl_looks_like_valid_pct_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset,
guint32 record_length)
{
/* first byte should be a msg_type.
*
* - we know we only see client_hello, client_master_key,
* and server_hello in the clear, so check to see if
* msg_type is one of those (this gives us a 3 in 2^8
* chance of saying yes with random payload)
*
* - for those three types that we know about, do some
* further validation to reduce the chance of an error
*/
guint8 msg_type;
guint16 version;
guint32 sum;
gint ret = 0;
/* fetch the msg_type */
msg_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
switch (msg_type) {
case PCT_MSG_CLIENT_HELLO:
/* version follows msg byte, so verify that this is valid */
version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset+1);
ret = (version == PCT_VERSION_1);
case PCT_MSG_SERVER_HELLO:
/* version is one byte after msg_type */
version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset+2);
ret = (version == PCT_VERSION_1);
case PCT_MSG_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY:
/* sum of various length fields must be less than record length */
sum = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 6); /* clear_key_length */
sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 8); /* encrypted_key_length */
sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 10); /* key_arg_length */
sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 12); /* verify_prelude_length */
sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 14); /* client_cert_length */
sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 16); /* response_length */
if (sum <= record_length) {
ret = 1;
}
break;
case PCT_MSG_SERVER_VERIFY:
/* record is 36 bytes longer than response_length */
sum = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 34); /* response_length */
if ((sum + 36) == record_length) {
ret = 1;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
return ret;
}
/*********************************************************************
*
* Standard Wireshark Protocol Registration and housekeeping
*
*********************************************************************/
void
proto_register_ssl(void)
{
/* Setup list of header fields See Section 1.6.1 for details*/
static hf_register_info hf[] = {
{ &hf_ssl_record,
{ "Record Layer", "ssl.record",
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"Record layer", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_record_content_type,
{ "Content Type", "ssl.record.content_type",
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_content_type), 0x0,
"Content type", HFILL}
},
{ &hf_ssl2_msg_type,
{ "Handshake Message Type", "ssl.handshake.type",
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_20_msg_types), 0x0,
"SSLv2 handshake message type", HFILL}
},
{ &hf_pct_msg_type,
{ "Handshake Message Type", "ssl.pct_handshake.type",
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(pct_msg_types), 0x0,
"PCT handshake message type", HFILL}
},
{ &hf_ssl_record_version,
{ "Version", "ssl.record.version",
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(ssl_versions), 0x0,
"Record layer version.", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_record_length,
{ "Length", "ssl.record.length",
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
"Length of SSL record data", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_record_appdata,
{ "Encrypted Application Data", "ssl.app_data",
FT_BYTES, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0,
"Payload is encrypted application data", HFILL }
},
{ & hf_ssl2_record,
{ "SSLv2/PCT Record Header", "ssl.record",
FT_NONE, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
"SSLv2/PCT record data", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl2_record_is_escape,
{ "Is Escape", "ssl.record.is_escape",
FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"Indicates a security escape", HFILL}
},
{ &hf_ssl2_record_padding_length,
{ "Padding Length", "ssl.record.padding_length",
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
"Length of padding at end of record", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_change_cipher_spec,
{ "Change Cipher Spec Message", "ssl.change_cipher_spec",
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"Signals a change in cipher specifications", HFILL }
},
{ & hf_ssl_alert_message,
{ "Alert Message", "ssl.alert_message",
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"Alert message", HFILL }
},
{ & hf_ssl_alert_message_level,
{ "Level", "ssl.alert_message.level",
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_alert_level), 0x0,
"Alert message level", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_alert_message_description,
{ "Description", "ssl.alert_message.desc",
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_alert_description), 0x0,
"Alert message description", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_protocol,
{ "Handshake Protocol", "ssl.handshake",
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"Handshake protocol message", HFILL}
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_type,
{ "Handshake Type", "ssl.handshake.type",
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_handshake_type), 0x0,
"Type of handshake message", HFILL}
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_length,
{ "Length", "ssl.handshake.length",
FT_UINT24, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
"Length of handshake message", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_client_version,
{ "Version", "ssl.handshake.version",
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(ssl_versions), 0x0,
"Maximum version supported by client", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_server_version,
{ "Version", "ssl.handshake.version",
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(ssl_versions), 0x0,
"Version selected by server", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_random_time,
{ "gmt_unix_time", "ssl.handshake.random_time",
FT_ABSOLUTE_TIME, 0, NULL, 0x0,
"Unix time field of random structure", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_random_bytes,
{ "random_bytes", "ssl.handshake.random_bytes",
FT_BYTES, 0, NULL, 0x0,
"Random challenge used to authenticate server", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites_len,
{ "Cipher Suites Length", "ssl.handshake.cipher_suites_length",
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
"Length of cipher suites field", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites,
{ "Cipher Suites", "ssl.handshake.ciphersuites",
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"List of cipher suites supported by client", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suite,
{ "Cipher Suite", "ssl.handshake.ciphersuite",
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(ssl_31_ciphersuite), 0x0,
"Cipher suite", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec,
{ "Cipher Spec", "ssl.handshake.cipherspec",
FT_UINT24, BASE_HEX, VALS(ssl_20_cipher_suites), 0x0,
"Cipher specification", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_session_id,
{ "Session ID", "ssl.handshake.session_id",
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"Identifies the SSL session, allowing later resumption", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_comp_methods_len,
{ "Compression Methods Length", "ssl.handshake.comp_methods_length",
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
"Length of compression methods field", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_comp_methods,
{ "Compression Methods", "ssl.handshake.comp_methods",
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"List of compression methods supported by client", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_comp_method,
{ "Compression Method", "ssl.handshake.comp_method",
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_compression_method), 0x0,
"Compression Method", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_extensions_len,
{ "Extensions Length", "ssl.handshake.extensions_length",
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
"Length of hello extensions", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_extension_type,
{ "Type", "ssl.handshake.extension.type",
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(tls_hello_extension_types), 0x0,
"Hello extension type", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_extension_len,
{ "Length", "ssl.handshake.extension.len",
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
"Length of a hello extension", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_extension_data,
{ "Data", "ssl.handshake.extension.data",
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"Hello Extension data", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_certificates_len,
{ "Certificates Length", "ssl.handshake.certificates_length",
FT_UINT24, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
"Length of certificates field", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_certificates,
{ "Certificates", "ssl.handshake.certificates",
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"List of certificates", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_certificate,
{ "Certificate", "ssl.handshake.certificate",
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"Certificate", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_certificate_len,
{ "Certificate Length", "ssl.handshake.certificate_length",
FT_UINT24, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
"Length of certificate", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_cert_types_count,
{ "Certificate types count", "ssl.handshake.cert_types_count",
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
"Count of certificate types", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_cert_types,
{ "Certificate types", "ssl.handshake.cert_types",
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"List of certificate types", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_cert_type,
{ "Certificate type", "ssl.handshake.cert_type",
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_client_certificate_type), 0x0,
"Certificate type", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_finished,
{ "Verify Data", "ssl.handshake.verify_data",
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"Opaque verification data", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_md5_hash,
{ "MD5 Hash", "ssl.handshake.md5_hash",
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"Hash of messages, master_secret, etc.", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_sha_hash,
{ "SHA-1 Hash", "ssl.handshake.sha_hash",
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"Hash of messages, master_secret, etc.", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_session_id_len,
{ "Session ID Length", "ssl.handshake.session_id_length",
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
"Length of session ID field", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_dnames_len,
{ "Distinguished Names Length", "ssl.handshake.dnames_len",
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
"Length of list of CAs that server trusts", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_dnames,
{ "Distinguished Names", "ssl.handshake.dnames",
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"List of CAs that server trusts", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_dname_len,
{ "Distinguished Name Length", "ssl.handshake.dname_len",
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
"Length of distinguished name", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_dname,
{ "Distinguished Name", "ssl.handshake.dname",
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"Distinguished name of a CA that server trusts", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge,
{ "Challenge", "ssl.handshake.challenge",
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"Challenge data used to authenticate server", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec_len,
{ "Cipher Spec Length", "ssl.handshake.cipher_spec_len",
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
"Length of cipher specs field", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_len,
{ "Session ID Length", "ssl.handshake.session_id_length",
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
"Length of session ID field", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge_len,
{ "Challenge Length", "ssl.handshake.challenge_length",
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
"Length of challenge field", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key_len,
{ "Clear Key Data Length", "ssl.handshake.clear_key_length",
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
"Length of clear key data", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key_len,
{ "Encrypted Key Data Length", "ssl.handshake.encrypted_key_length",
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
"Length of encrypted key data", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg_len,
{ "Key Argument Length", "ssl.handshake.key_arg_length",
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
"Length of key argument", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key,
{ "Clear Key Data", "ssl.handshake.clear_key_data",
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"Clear portion of MASTER-KEY", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key,
{ "Encrypted Key", "ssl.handshake.encrypted_key",
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"Secret portion of MASTER-KEY encrypted to server", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg,
{ "Key Argument", "ssl.handshake.key_arg",
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"Key Argument (e.g., Initialization Vector)", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_hit,
{ "Session ID Hit", "ssl.handshake.session_id_hit",
FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"Did the server find the client's Session ID?", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_cert_type,
{ "Certificate Type", "ssl.handshake.cert_type",
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_20_certificate_type), 0x0,
"Certificate Type", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id_len,
{ "Connection ID Length", "ssl.handshake.connection_id_length",
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
"Length of connection ID", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id,
{ "Connection ID", "ssl.handshake.connection_id",
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"Server's challenge to client", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_pct_handshake_cipher_spec,
{ "Cipher Spec", "pct.handshake.cipherspec",
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"PCT Cipher specification", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_pct_handshake_cipher,
{ "Cipher", "pct.handshake.cipher",
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(pct_cipher_type), 0x0,
"PCT Ciper", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_pct_handshake_hash_spec,
{ "Hash Spec", "pct.handshake.hashspec",
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"PCT Hash specification", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_pct_handshake_hash,
{ "Hash", "pct.handshake.hash",
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(pct_hash_type), 0x0,
"PCT Hash", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_pct_handshake_cert_spec,
{ "Cert Spec", "pct.handshake.certspec",
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"PCT Certificate specification", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_pct_handshake_cert,
{ "Cert", "pct.handshake.cert",
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(pct_cert_type), 0x0,
"PCT Certificate", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_pct_handshake_exch_spec,
{ "Exchange Spec", "pct.handshake.exchspec",
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"PCT Exchange specification", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_pct_handshake_exch,
{ "Exchange", "pct.handshake.exch",
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(pct_exch_type), 0x0,
"PCT Exchange", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_pct_handshake_sig,
{ "Sig Spec", "pct.handshake.sig",
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(pct_sig_type), 0x0,
"PCT Signature", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_pct_msg_error_type,
{ "PCT Error Code", "pct.msg_error_code",
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(pct_error_code), 0x0,
"PCT Error Code", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_pct_handshake_server_cert,
{ "Server Cert", "pct.handshake.server_cert",
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL , 0x0,
"PCT Server Certificate", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_ssl_segment_overlap,
{ "Segment overlap", "ssl.segment.overlap", FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"Segment overlaps with other segments", HFILL }},
{ &hf_ssl_segment_overlap_conflict,
{ "Conflicting data in segment overlap", "ssl.segment.overlap.conflict", FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"Overlapping segments contained conflicting data", HFILL }},
{ &hf_ssl_segment_multiple_tails,
{ "Multiple tail segments found", "ssl.segment.multipletails", FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"Several tails were found when reassembling the pdu", HFILL }},
{ &hf_ssl_segment_too_long_fragment,
{ "Segment too long", "ssl.segment.toolongfragment", FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"Segment contained data past end of the pdu", HFILL }},
{ &hf_ssl_segment_error,
{ "Reassembling error", "ssl.segment.error", FT_FRAMENUM, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"Reassembling error due to illegal segments", HFILL }},
{ &hf_ssl_segment,
{ "SSL Segment", "ssl.segment", FT_FRAMENUM, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"SSL Segment", HFILL }},
{ &hf_ssl_segments,
{ "Reassembled SSL Segments", "ssl.segments", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"SSL Segments", HFILL }},
{ &hf_ssl_reassembled_in,
{ "Reassembled PDU in frame", "ssl.reassembled_in", FT_FRAMENUM, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"The PDU that doesn't end in this segment is reassembled in this frame", HFILL }},
};
/* Setup protocol subtree array */
static gint *ett[] = {
&ett_ssl,
&ett_ssl_record,
&ett_ssl_alert,
&ett_ssl_handshake,
&ett_ssl_cipher_suites,
&ett_ssl_comp_methods,
&ett_ssl_extension,
&ett_ssl_certs,
&ett_ssl_cert_types,
&ett_ssl_dnames,
&ett_ssl_random,
&ett_pct_cipher_suites,
&ett_pct_hash_suites,
&ett_pct_cert_suites,
&ett_pct_exch_suites,
&ett_ssl_segments,
&ett_ssl_segment,
};
/* Register the protocol name and description */
proto_ssl = proto_register_protocol("Secure Socket Layer",
"SSL", "ssl");
/* Required function calls to register the header fields and
* subtrees used */
proto_register_field_array(proto_ssl, hf, array_length(hf));
proto_register_subtree_array(ett, array_length(ett));
{
module_t *ssl_module = prefs_register_protocol(proto_ssl, proto_reg_handoff_ssl);
prefs_register_bool_preference(ssl_module,
"desegment_ssl_records",
"Reassemble SSL records spanning multiple TCP segments",
"Whether the SSL dissector should reassemble SSL records spanning multiple TCP segments. "
"To use this option, you must also enable \"Allow subdissectors to reassemble TCP streams\" in the TCP protocol settings.",
&ssl_desegment);
prefs_register_bool_preference(ssl_module,
"desegment_ssl_application_data",
"Reassemble SSL Application Data spanning multiple SSL records",
"Whether the SSL dissector should reassemble SSL Application Data spanning multiple SSL records. ",
&ssl_desegment_app_data);
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS
prefs_register_string_preference(ssl_module, "keys_list", "RSA keys list",
"Semicolon-separated list of private RSA keys used for SSL decryption; "
"each list entry must be in the form of <ip>,<port>,<protocol>,<key_file_name>. "
"<key_file_name> is the local file name of the RSA private key used by the specified server "
"(or name of the file containing such a list)",
(const gchar **)&ssl_keys_list);
prefs_register_string_preference(ssl_module, "debug_file", "SSL debug file",
"redirect ssl debug to file name; leave empty to disable debug, "
"use \"" SSL_DEBUG_USE_STDERR "\" to redirect output to stderr\n",
(const gchar **)&ssl_debug_file_name);
#endif
}
register_dissector("ssl", dissect_ssl, proto_ssl);
ssl_handle = find_dissector("ssl");
ssl_associations = g_tree_new(ssl_association_cmp);
register_init_routine(ssl_init);
ssl_lib_init();
ssl_tap = register_tap("ssl");
ssl_debug_printf("proto_register_ssl: registered tap %s:%d\n",
"ssl", ssl_tap);
}
/* If this dissector uses sub-dissector registration add a registration
* routine. This format is required because a script is used to find
* these routines and create the code that calls these routines.
*/
void
proto_reg_handoff_ssl(void)
{
/* parse key list */
ssl_parse();
/* add ssl dissection to defaults ports */
ssl_dissector_add(993, "imap", TRUE);
ssl_dissector_add(995, "pop", TRUE);
}
void
ssl_dissector_add(guint port, const gchar *protocol, gboolean tcp)
{
SslAssociation *assoc;
assoc = ssl_association_find(ssl_associations, port, tcp);
if (assoc) {
ssl_association_remove(ssl_associations, assoc);
}
ssl_association_add(ssl_associations, ssl_handle, port, protocol, tcp, FALSE);
}
void
ssl_dissector_delete(guint port, const gchar *protocol, gboolean tcp)
{
SslAssociation *assoc;
assoc = ssl_association_find(ssl_associations, port, tcp);
if (assoc && (assoc->handle == find_dissector(protocol))) {
ssl_association_remove(ssl_associations, assoc);
}
}
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