forked from osmocom/wireshark
![]() A pointer to a EAPOL_RSN_KEY is set on the packet presuming the whole EAPOL_RSN_KEY is there. That's not always the case for fuzzed/malicious captures. Bug: 11585 Change-Id: Ib94b8aceef444c7820e43b969596efdb8dbecccd Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15540 Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net> Petri-Dish: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net> Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org> Reviewed-by: Anders Broman <a.broman58@gmail.com> |
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.. | ||
airpdcap.c | ||
airpdcap_ccmp.c | ||
airpdcap_debug.c | ||
airpdcap_debug.h | ||
airpdcap_int.h | ||
airpdcap_interop.h | ||
airpdcap_rijndael.c | ||
airpdcap_rijndael.h | ||
airpdcap_system.h | ||
airpdcap_tkip.c | ||
airpdcap_user.h | ||
airpdcap_ws.h | ||
CMakeLists.txt | ||
CMakeListsCustom.txt.example | ||
Custom.common | ||
kasumi.h | ||
Makefile.am | ||
Makefile.common | ||
Makefile.nmake | ||
wep-wpadefs.h |