Add partial support for decrypting captures with connections
established using FT-EAP. To support deriving keys for FT-EAP
the MSK is needed. This change adds MSK as a valid IEEE 802.11
protocol input key type preference as well.
Note that FT-EAP support comes with the following imitations:
- Keys can only be derived from the FT 4-way handshake messages.
- Roaming is not supported.
Add support for TK user input keys. With this Wireshark can
decrypt packet captures where 4WHS frames are missing and
packet captures with non-supported AKMS, for example
802.11r / Fast BSS Transitioning.
Decryption using user TK works as a backup if the normal
decryption flow does not succeed. Having TK decryption keys
added will affect general IEEE 802.11 dissector performance
as each encrypted packet will be tested with every TK.
Worst case scenario is plenty of TKs where none of them
matches encrypted frames.
On successful user TK decryption an SA is formed based on
parameters used to decrypt the frame. This SA is similar to
what is formed when Wireshark detects and derive keys from
4WHS messages. With the SA entry in place the decryption
performance (success case) should be on par with "normal"
decryption flow.
Bug: 16579
Change-Id: I72c2c1e2c6693131d3ba07f8ddb8ff772c1b54a9
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/37217
Petri-Dish: Anders Broman <a.broman58@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot
Reviewed-by: Anders Broman <a.broman58@gmail.com>
Remove some unused defines, function parameters and functions.
Change-Id: I1bbc3ff7e0a9d11e8521ddf24b35113d8e332f08
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/37305
Petri-Dish: Anders Broman <a.broman58@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot
Reviewed-by: Anders Broman <a.broman58@gmail.com>
With AKMS 00-0F-AC:12 a 384 bit long PMK shall be used. To be able
to support key derivation and decryption from this larger sized
PMK the user PSK / PMK key input validation code is updated as well
as the various places where a hard coded PMK size is used.
Ping-Bug: 16197
Change-Id: I39c9337e8a84095246e3db5ef33dc96fb78e5dc3
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/35065
Reviewed-by: Anders Broman <a.broman58@gmail.com>
Use AKM, cipher suite and group cipher suite from RSNA to determine
key lenghts and offsets. This allows keys of different lengths
for PTK derivation, MIC validation etc.
Ping-Bug: 16197
Change-Id: I9a721fb9811db89357218b50a2a107cf945d3dae
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/35064
Reviewed-by: Anders Broman <a.broman58@gmail.com>
Add support for decrypting IEEE 802.11 WPA3-Personal / SAE traffic.
SAE uses AES encryption but a different key derivation function (KDF)
making Wireshark fail to decrypt such captures. Also both KDF and
decryption method is determined based only on EAPOL key description
version. This is not enough to figure out that SAE is being used.
Implement the alternative KDF needed to derive valid PTK. Also
implement a function to parse pairwise + group cipher suites and
auth key management type from RSNE tag. Using this new function
together with a number of new cipher and AKM lookup functions
correct KDF for SAE can be selected.
Bug: 15621
Change-Id: I8f6c917af1c9642c276a244943dd35f850ee3757
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/32485
Petri-Dish: Anders Broman <a.broman58@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot
Reviewed-by: Anders Broman <a.broman58@gmail.com>
Our 802.11 decryption code isn't tied to any specific product. Change
the file and API names to dot11decrypt.
Change-Id: I14fd951be3ae9b656a4e1959067fc0bdcc681ee2
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/26058
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>