The GTK key provided in FT BSS Transition IE is encrypted. Update
dot11decrypt engine to return the decrypted key for dissection.
Change-Id: Id31a8cf77e12568f2e449470822a64792895673c
Support decrypting captures with Fast BSS Transition roaming present
by now also scanning (re)association frames for relevant information
elements and feeding it into the dot11decrypt engine.
Both (re)association request and response frames are scanned to allow
for potentially missing one frame and still be able to derive PTKs
needed for successful decryption.
Closes#17145
Change-Id: I08436582e4f83695dc606ddb92ff442d6258ef9b
Add partial support for decrypting captures with connections
established using FT BSS Transition (IEEE 802.11r).
FT BSS Transition decryption comes with the following limitations:
- Only FT-PSK is supported.
- Keys can only be derived from the FT 4-way handshake messages.
- Roaming is not supported.
Simplify the SA storage by replacing the static array with a
hash table. This way there's no need to keep track of whether
an entry is used or not and no need to traverse the whole
array for the non-matching case. This change should benefit
performance but was mainly done to prepare for coming changes
where code adding and searching for SA entries is modified. With
this change in place those changes become cleaner.
Change-Id: Ide572c5e4e7e872f1654d8d8f288cd6451f04435
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/37307
Petri-Dish: Anders Broman <a.broman58@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot
Reviewed-by: Anders Broman <a.broman58@gmail.com>
Remove some unused defines, function parameters and functions.
Change-Id: I1bbc3ff7e0a9d11e8521ddf24b35113d8e332f08
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/37305
Petri-Dish: Anders Broman <a.broman58@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot
Reviewed-by: Anders Broman <a.broman58@gmail.com>
dot11decrypt_system.h:274:11: warning: parameter 'decrypt_data' not found in the function declaration [-Wdocumentation]
dot11decrypt_system.h:277:11: warning: parameter 'decrypt_len' not found in the function declaration [-Wdocumentation]
dot11decrypt_system.h:279:11: warning: parameter 'key' not found in the function declaration [-Wdocumentation]
Change-Id: I9a0d1dd29ddd130b9425a38645777e4eb05e9fa3
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/36540
Reviewed-by: Mikael Kanstrup <mikael.kanstrup@sony.com>
Reviewed-by: Anders Broman <a.broman58@gmail.com>
Simplify the CCMP decryption implementation by letting libgcrypt
handle decryption, authentication and integrity check. This aims
to simplify the implementation in preparation for CCMP-256
decryption support where changes to the CCMP decryption implementation
is anyway needed.
Even though performance optimization was not the target for this
change it appears decryption speed is improved as well.
Change-Id: I6c36315291672f6313c9303ab8e50afb87aea9ce
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/36343
Petri-Dish: Alexis La Goutte <alexis.lagoutte@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot
Reviewed-by: Anders Broman <a.broman58@gmail.com>
Use AKM, cipher suite and group cipher suite from RSNA to determine
key lenghts and offsets. This allows keys of different lengths
for PTK derivation, MIC validation etc.
Ping-Bug: 16197
Change-Id: I9a721fb9811db89357218b50a2a107cf945d3dae
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/35064
Reviewed-by: Anders Broman <a.broman58@gmail.com>
Not all AKMS use same MIC length. Last part to support both 16 byte
24 byte long MIC is to actually make use of the now known in mic
length in MIC check / validation function. Instead of hardcoded
length use the length in eapol_parsed struct received from
dissector.
Ping-Bug: 16197
Change-Id: I6585b7a54de4def9e5ff846c19f12059b90ffdf6
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/35063
Reviewed-by: Anders Broman <a.broman58@gmail.com>
Simplify the still quite complex Dot11DecryptScanEapolForKeys function
and further reduce frame parsing inside Dot11Decrypt engine. This is
done by breaking out the EAPOL keydata decryption step into a new
function Dot11DecryptDecryptKeyData to be called from dissector.
After this Dot11DecryptScanEapolForKeys can now focus on one
task, to scan for keys in (unencrypted) EAPOL key frames.
With keydata decryption step separated from the broadcast
key parsing step the dissectors' GTK parsing can replace
the Dot11Decrypt internal RSN GTK TAG parsing.
Change-Id: I3b89f40586b8b7dbe2ff74cfc30761010d5b80bc
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/35022
Petri-Dish: Anders Broman <a.broman58@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot
Reviewed-by: Anders Broman <a.broman58@gmail.com>
To be able to support authentication key management suites that use
different MIC, PMK, PTK lengths the engine would need to be extended
to support parsing EAPOL Key frames with variable field lengts. Though
as the IEEE 802.11 dissector already support this the alternative
(implemented in this patch) is to remove the EAPOL frame parsing inside
the engine and have the dissector feed it with a struct of parsed
fields instead.
For this a new type DOT11DECRYPT_EAPOL_PARSED is exported and
dot11decrypt now expects dissector to fill this struct with parsed
EAPOL fields before calling Dot11DecryptScanEapolForKeys.
Dissection of EAPOL fields is scattered over several functions in the
dissector code so parsed fields are temporarily stored in proto data
and then gathered before fed into dot11decrypt engine.
Change-Id: Ic6aeb4900f373dcde1ea3f1f0f24df2ae827576e
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/35020
Petri-Dish: Alexis La Goutte <alexis.lagoutte@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot
Reviewed-by: Anders Broman <a.broman58@gmail.com>
EAPOL key message type is known by dissector so no need for dot11decrypt
to parse frames to determine this. Instead feed engine with message
type from dissector. With this some code duplication can be avoided.
Change-Id: Icfd119186ebab5b0db29968df3eb94275d921e76
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/34929
Reviewed-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
Petri-Dish: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot
Reviewed-by: Roland Knall <rknall@gmail.com>
As a step towards removing the parsing of frames inside dot11decrypt
engine separate the key extraction step from the decryption step.
Two new functions for extracting keys are now provided by the
do11decrypt engine. One to be called for EAPOL key frames that
will extract and feed the engine with keys present in 4-way handshake
and group handshake messages. And one to be called for TDLS action
frames to extract keys and feed the engine with keys during TDLS
session establishement.
The old Dot11DecryptPacketProcess function called for all 802.11
frames is simplified and now only has one purpose. To decrypt
encrypted packets. Hence renamed to Dot11DecryptDecryptPacket.
Change-Id: Idb38d538f435ec352c6bbb200a09bc2a2347c42e
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/34928
Reviewed-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
Petri-Dish: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot
Reviewed-by: Roland Knall <rknall@gmail.com>
Add support for decrypting IEEE 802.11 WPA3-Personal / SAE traffic.
SAE uses AES encryption but a different key derivation function (KDF)
making Wireshark fail to decrypt such captures. Also both KDF and
decryption method is determined based only on EAPOL key description
version. This is not enough to figure out that SAE is being used.
Implement the alternative KDF needed to derive valid PTK. Also
implement a function to parse pairwise + group cipher suites and
auth key management type from RSNE tag. Using this new function
together with a number of new cipher and AKM lookup functions
correct KDF for SAE can be selected.
Bug: 15621
Change-Id: I8f6c917af1c9642c276a244943dd35f850ee3757
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/32485
Petri-Dish: Anders Broman <a.broman58@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot
Reviewed-by: Anders Broman <a.broman58@gmail.com>
Encrypted packets were decrypted two times. One time to scan for
new keys. If no keys were found the decrypted data was simply
discarded. Then later on the packet was decrypted again for
dissection.
Avoid decrypting packets two times by storing the result from first
decryption if no key was found. Skip the second attempt.
Note though that in the special case where a key was actually found
inside an encrypted packet the decryption will still be performed
twice. First time decrypt, discover the key, and return the EAPOL
keydata. Second time decrypt and return the decrypted frame.
Change-Id: I1acd0060d4e1f351fb15070f8d7aa78c0035ce39
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/30568
Reviewed-by: Anders Broman <a.broman58@gmail.com>
Decrypt EAPOL keydata information and have it dissected with the
ieee80211 dissector.
This is achieved by letting the Dot11Decrypt engine retrieve the EAPOL
keydata decrypted while extracting the GTK during 4-way handshake.
The ieee80211 dissector then stores the decrypted data in packet proto
data so that the wlan_rsna_eapol subdissector can retrieve it for
dissection.
Change-Id: I2145f47396cf3261b40e623fddc9ed06b3d7e72b
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/30530
Petri-Dish: Anders Broman <a.broman58@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot
Reviewed-by: Anders Broman <a.broman58@gmail.com>
Our 802.11 decryption code isn't tied to any specific product. Change
the file and API names to dot11decrypt.
Change-Id: I14fd951be3ae9b656a4e1959067fc0bdcc681ee2
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/26058
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Moshe Kaplan