forked from osmocom/wireshark
ncp2222: don't overflow buffer constructing string
Fixes stack-smashing vuln. Somehow there was already an XXX in the code about this, but nobody realized at the time it was worth fixing... really? Bug: 10552 Change-Id: I849068bd6c45146339444f295b72430d3c6e08f2 Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/4653 Reviewed-by: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com>
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@ -2755,8 +2755,7 @@ build_expert_data(proto_tree *ncp_tree, const char *hf_name, char *buffer,
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case 18:
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case 19:
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case 20: /* string */
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/* XXX: Should we verify: buffer_size is as large as value returned by get_finfo_length(...) ??? */
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uni_to_string(get_finfo_value_string(PTREE_FINFO(tree_pointer)), get_finfo_length(PTREE_FINFO(tree_pointer)), buffer);
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uni_to_string(get_finfo_value_string(PTREE_FINFO(tree_pointer)), MIN(get_finfo_length(PTREE_FINFO(tree_pointer)), buffer_size), buffer);
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if (repeat_lookup > 0) {
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if (strlen(temp_buffer) + strlen(buffer) < 250) {
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g_strlcat(temp_buffer, buffer, 256);
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