forked from osmocom/wireshark
tvb_length_remaining() can return -1, so don't assign its return value to an unsigned integer. Fixes Coverity CID 281367: Improper use of negative value.
svn path=/trunk/; revision=43698
This commit is contained in:
Chris Maynard
parent
4d180fbe32
commit
a592bd657c
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@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ static guint32 iv_element_len = 0;
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/*------------------------------
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* Data Structures
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* Data Structures
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*------------------------------
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*/
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typedef struct _c1222_uat_data {
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@ -196,16 +196,16 @@ typedef struct _c1222_uat_data {
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} c1222_uat_data_t;
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static const value_string c1222_security_modes[] = {
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{ 0x00, "Cleartext"},
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{ 0x01, "Cleartext with authentication"},
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{ 0x02, "Ciphertext with authentication"},
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{ 0x00, "Cleartext"},
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{ 0x01, "Cleartext with authentication"},
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{ 0x02, "Ciphertext with authentication"},
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{ 0, NULL }
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};
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static const value_string c1222_response_control[] = {
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{ 0x00, "Always respond"},
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{ 0x01, "Respond on exception"},
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{ 0x02, "Never respond"},
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{ 0x00, "Always respond"},
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{ 0x01, "Respond on exception"},
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{ 0x02, "Never respond"},
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{ 0, NULL }
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};
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@ -285,37 +285,37 @@ static guint num_c1222_uat_data = 0;
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static uat_t *c1222_uat;
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/* these macros ares used to populate fields needed to verify crypto */
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#define FILL_START int length, start_offset = offset;
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#define FILL_START int length, start_offset = offset;
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#define FILL_TABLE(fieldname) \
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length = offset - start_offset; \
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fieldname = tvb_memdup(tvb, start_offset, length); \
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fieldname##_len = length;
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fieldname##_len = length;
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#define FILL_TABLE_TRUNCATE(fieldname, len) \
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length = 1 + 2*(offset - start_offset); \
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fieldname = tvb_memdup(tvb, start_offset, length); \
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fieldname##_len = len;
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fieldname##_len = len;
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#else /* HAVE_LIBGCRYPT */
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#define FILL_TABLE(fieldname)
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#define FILL_TABLE_TRUNCATE(fieldname, len)
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#define FILL_TABLE(fieldname)
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#define FILL_TABLE_TRUNCATE(fieldname, len)
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#define FILL_START
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#endif /* HAVE_LIBGCRYPT */
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/*------------------------------
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* Function Prototypes
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* Function Prototypes
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*------------------------------
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*/
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void proto_reg_handoff_c1222(void);
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/*------------------------------
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* Code
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* Code
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*------------------------------
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*/
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/**
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* Calculates simple one's complement checksum.
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*
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* \param tvb pointer to tvbuff containing data to be checksummed
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* \param tvb pointer to tvbuff containing data to be checksummed
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* \param offset offset within tvbuff to beginning of data
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* \param len length of data to be checksummed
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* \returns calculated checksum
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@ -354,9 +354,9 @@ parse_c1222_detailed(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, int cm
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guint16 packet_size;
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guint8 nbr_packet;
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/* timing setup parameters */
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guint8 traffic;
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guint8 inter_char;
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guint8 resp_to;
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guint8 traffic;
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guint8 inter_char;
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guint8 resp_to;
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guint8 nbr_retries;
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proto_item *item = NULL;
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@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ parse_c1222_detailed(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, int cm
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proto_tree_add_string(tree, hf_c1222_logon_user, tvb, *offset, 10, user_name);
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*offset += 10;
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*length -= 12;
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proto_item_set_text(tree, "C12.22 EPSEM: %s (id %d, user \"%s\")",
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proto_item_set_text(tree, "C12.22 EPSEM: %s (id %d, user \"%s\")",
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val_to_str(cmd,commandnames,"Unknown (0x%02x)"), user_id, user_name);
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} else {
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expert_add_info_format(pinfo, tree, PI_MALFORMED, PI_ERROR, "C12.22 LOGON command truncated");
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@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ parse_c1222_detailed(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, int cm
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proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_c1222_auth_data, tvb, *offset, auth_len, ENC_NA);
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*offset += auth_len;
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*length -= auth_len + 1;
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proto_item_set_text(tree, "C12.22 EPSEM: %s (%d bytes: %s)",
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proto_item_set_text(tree, "C12.22 EPSEM: %s (%d bytes: %s)",
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val_to_str(cmd,commandnames,"Unknown (0x%02x)"), auth_len, auth_req);
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} else {
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expert_add_info_format(pinfo, tree, PI_MALFORMED, PI_ERROR, "C12.22 AUTHENTICATE command truncated");
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@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ parse_c1222_detailed(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, int cm
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table = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, *offset);
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proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_c1222_read_table, tvb, *offset, 2, table);
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proto_item_set_text(tree, "C12.22 EPSEM: %s (%s-%d)",
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val_to_str(cmd,commandnames,"Unknown (0x%02x)"),
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val_to_str(cmd,commandnames,"Unknown (0x%02x)"),
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val_to_str((table >> 8) & 0xF8, tableflags,"Unknown (0x%04x)"), table & 0x7FF);
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*offset += 2;
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*length -= 2;
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@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ parse_c1222_detailed(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, int cm
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*offset += 2;
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*length -= 2;
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proto_item_set_text(tree, "C12.22 EPSEM: %s (%s-%d)",
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val_to_str(cmd,commandnames,"Unknown (0x%02x)"),
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val_to_str(cmd,commandnames,"Unknown (0x%02x)"),
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val_to_str((table >> 8) & 0xF8, tableflags,"Unknown (0x%04x)"), table & 0x7FF);
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} else {
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expert_add_info_format(pinfo, tree, PI_MALFORMED, PI_ERROR, "C12.22 READ command truncated");
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@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ parse_c1222_detailed(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, int cm
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expert_add_info_format(pinfo, item, PI_CHECKSUM, PI_ERROR, "Bad checksum [should be 0x%02x]", calcsum);
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}
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proto_item_set_text(tree, "C12.22 EPSEM: %s (%s-%d)",
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val_to_str(cmd,commandnames,"Unknown (0x%02x)"),
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val_to_str(cmd,commandnames,"Unknown (0x%02x)"),
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val_to_str((table >> 8) & 0xF8, tableflags,"Unknown (0x%04x)"), table & 0x7FF);
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*offset += 1;
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*length -= 1;
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@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ parse_c1222_detailed(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, int cm
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expert_add_info_format(pinfo, item, PI_CHECKSUM, PI_ERROR, "Bad checksum [should be 0x%02x]", calcsum);
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}
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proto_item_set_text(tree, "C12.22 EPSEM: %s (%s-%d)",
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val_to_str(cmd,commandnames,"Unknown (0x%02x)"),
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val_to_str(cmd,commandnames,"Unknown (0x%02x)"),
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val_to_str((table >> 8) & 0xF8, tableflags,"Unknown (0x%04x)"), table & 0x7FF);
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*offset += 1;
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*length -= 1;
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@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ parse_c1222_detailed(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, int cm
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}
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#ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT
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typedef struct tagTOP_ELEMENT_CONTROL
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typedef struct tagTOP_ELEMENT_CONTROL
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{
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/* TRUE if this tag is required */
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gboolean required;
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@ -657,11 +657,11 @@ encode_ber_len(guint8 *ptr, guint32 n, int maxsize)
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*ptr = (len -1) | 0x80;
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for (ptr += len-1; n; n >>= 8)
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*ptr-- = n & 0xff;
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}
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}
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return len;
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}
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/**
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* Checks a new encryption table item for validity.
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*
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@ -669,7 +669,7 @@ encode_ber_len(guint8 *ptr, guint32 n, int maxsize)
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* \param err is updated to point to an error string if needed
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*/
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static void
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c1222_uat_data_update_cb(void* n, const char** err)
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c1222_uat_data_update_cb(void* n, const char** err)
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{
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c1222_uat_data_t* new_rec = n;
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@ -685,10 +685,10 @@ c1222_uat_data_update_cb(void* n, const char** err)
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* Canonifies header fields in preparation for authenticating and/or decrypting the packet.
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*
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* \param buff points to the allocated canonization buffer
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* \param offset points to start of unallocated space in buffer and
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* \param offset points to start of unallocated space in buffer and
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is updated as we put bytes into buffer
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* \param buffsize total size of allocated buffer
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* \return FALSE if element is required and not present; otherwise TRUE
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* \return FALSE if element is required and not present; otherwise TRUE
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*/
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static gboolean
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canonify_unencrypted_header(guchar *buff, guint32 *offset, guint32 buffsize)
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@ -696,17 +696,17 @@ canonify_unencrypted_header(guchar *buff, guint32 *offset, guint32 buffsize)
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const TOP_ELEMENT_CONTROL *t = canonifyTable;
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guint32 len;
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for (t = canonifyTable; t->element != NULL; t++)
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for (t = canonifyTable; t->element != NULL; t++)
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{
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len = *(t->length);
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if (t->required && *(t->element) == NULL)
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if (t->required && *(t->element) == NULL)
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return FALSE;
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if (*(t->element) != NULL) {
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if (t->addtag) {
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if (t->addtag) {
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/* recreate original tag and length */
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buff[(*offset)++] = t->tag;
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(*offset) += encode_ber_len(&buff[*offset], len, 4);
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}
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}
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if (t->truncate) {
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len = 3+2*get_ber_len_size(len);
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}
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@ -731,7 +731,7 @@ canonify_unencrypted_header(guchar *buff, guint32 *offset, guint32 buffsize)
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* \param keyid is the ID number of the desired key
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* \returns TRUE if key was found; otherwise FALSE
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*/
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static gboolean
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static gboolean
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keylookup(guint8 *keybuff, guint8 keyid)
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{
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guint i;
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@ -751,14 +751,14 @@ keylookup(guint8 *keybuff, guint8 keyid)
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/**
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* Authenticates and decrypts the passed packet.
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*
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* \param buffer points to a memory copy of the packet to be authenticated/decrypted
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* \param buffer points to a memory copy of the packet to be authenticated/decrypted
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* and contains the decrypted value on successful return.
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* \param length lenth of input packet
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* \param decrypt TRUE if packet is to be authenticated and decrypted; FALSE if authentication only is requested
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* \returns TRUE if the requested operation was successful; otherwise FALSE
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*/
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#ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT
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static gboolean
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static gboolean
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decrypt_packet(guchar *buffer, guint32 length, gboolean decrypt)
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{
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#define CANONBUFFSIZE 300U
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@ -769,7 +769,7 @@ decrypt_packet(guchar *buffer, guint32 length, gboolean decrypt)
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gboolean status = FALSE;
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/* must be at least 4 bytes long to include the MAC */
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if (length < 4)
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if (length < 4)
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return status;
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if (key_id_element != NULL)
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key_id = key_id_element[0];
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@ -788,17 +788,17 @@ decrypt_packet(guchar *buffer, guint32 length, gboolean decrypt)
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/* RETURNS: TRUE if message has been authenticated. */
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/* FALSE if not authenticated, invalid Mode, or error. */
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if (offset) {
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if (!keylookup((guint8 *)&c1222_key, key_id))
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if (!keylookup((guint8 *)&c1222_key, key_id))
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return FALSE;
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status = Eax_Decrypt(canonbuff, c1222_key, buffer,
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offset, EAX_SIZEOF_KEY, length-4,
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(MAC_T *)&buffer[length-4],
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offset, EAX_SIZEOF_KEY, length-4,
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(MAC_T *)&buffer[length-4],
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decrypt ? EAX_MODE_CIPHERTEXT_AUTH : EAX_MODE_CLEARTEXT_AUTH);
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}
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return status;
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}
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#else /* HAVE_LIBCRYPT */
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static gboolean
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#else /* HAVE_LIBCRYPT */
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static gboolean
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decrypt_packet(guchar *buffer _U_, guint32 length _U_, gboolean decrypt _U_)
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{
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return FALSE;
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@ -864,7 +864,7 @@ dissect_epsem(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, guint32 len, packet_info *pinfo, proto_
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proto_item *item = NULL;
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guint8 flags;
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int local_offset;
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guint32 len2;
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gint len2;
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int cmd_err;
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gboolean ind;
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guchar *buffer;
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@ -888,7 +888,7 @@ dissect_epsem(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, guint32 len, packet_info *pinfo, proto_
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hasmac = TRUE;
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len2 = tvb_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
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if (len2 <= 0)
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return offset;
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return offset;
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encrypted = TRUE;
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if (c1222_decrypt) {
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buffer = tvb_memdup(tvb, offset, len2);
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@ -931,7 +931,7 @@ dissect_epsem(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, guint32 len, packet_info *pinfo, proto_
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}
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/* it's only encrypted if we have an undecrypted payload */
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if (encrypted) {
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proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_c1222_epsem_total, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
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proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_c1222_epsem_total, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
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expert_add_info_format(pinfo, tree, PI_UNDECODED, PI_WARN, "C12.22 EPSEM could not be decrypted");
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local_offset = offset+len2-4;
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epsem_buffer = tvb;
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@ -947,13 +947,13 @@ dissect_epsem(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, guint32 len, packet_info *pinfo, proto_
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}
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}
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/* what follows are one or more <epsem-data> elements possibly followed by
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* a <mac>. Each <epsem-data> element is defined as <service-length><res-req>,
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* a <mac>. Each <epsem-data> element is defined as <service-length><res-req>,
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* so we fetch such pairs until there isn't anything left (except possibly
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* the <mac>).
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*/
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while (tvb_offset_exists(epsem_buffer, local_offset+(hasmac?5:1))) {
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if (ber_len_ok(epsem_buffer, local_offset)) {
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local_offset = dissect_ber_length(pinfo, tree, epsem_buffer, local_offset, &len2, &ind);
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local_offset = dissect_ber_length(pinfo, tree, epsem_buffer, local_offset, (guint32 *)&len2, &ind);
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} else {
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expert_add_info_format(pinfo, tree, PI_MALFORMED, PI_ERROR, "C12.22 EPSEM BER length error");
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return offset+len;
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@ -962,7 +962,7 @@ dissect_epsem(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, guint32 len, packet_info *pinfo, proto_
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cmd_err = tvb_get_guint8(epsem_buffer, local_offset);
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ct = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_c1222_epsem_total, epsem_buffer, local_offset, len2, ENC_NA);
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cmd_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ct, ett_c1222_cmd);
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parse_c1222_detailed(epsem_buffer, pinfo, cmd_tree, cmd_err, &len2, &local_offset);
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parse_c1222_detailed(epsem_buffer, pinfo, cmd_tree, cmd_err, (guint32 *)&len2, &local_offset);
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local_offset += len2;
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} else {
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expert_add_info_format(pinfo, tree, PI_MALFORMED, PI_ERROR, "C12.22 EPSEM field length error");
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@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ dissect_epsem(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, guint32 len, packet_info *pinfo, proto_
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}
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}
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if (hasmac) {
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if (tvb_offset_exists(epsem_buffer, local_offset+4-1)) {
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if (tvb_offset_exists(epsem_buffer, local_offset+4-1)) {
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yt = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_c1222_epsem_mac, epsem_buffer, local_offset, 4, ENC_NA);
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/* now we have enough information to fill in the crypto subtree */
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crypto_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(yt, ett_c1222_crypto);
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@ -1041,10 +1041,10 @@ get_c1222_message_len(packet_info *pinfo, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset)
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* \param pinfo
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* \param tree
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*/
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static void
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static void
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dissect_c1222(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree)
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{
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tcp_dissect_pdus(tvb, pinfo, tree, c1222_desegment, 5,
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tcp_dissect_pdus(tvb, pinfo, tree, c1222_desegment, 5,
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get_c1222_message_len, dissect_c1222_full);
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}
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@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ static gint ett_c1222_Calling_authentication_value_c1221_U = -1;
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/*------------------------------
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* Data Structures
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* Data Structures
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*------------------------------
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*/
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typedef struct _c1222_uat_data {
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@ -241,16 +241,16 @@ typedef struct _c1222_uat_data {
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} c1222_uat_data_t;
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static const value_string c1222_security_modes[] = {
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{ 0x00, "Cleartext"},
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{ 0x01, "Cleartext with authentication"},
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{ 0x02, "Ciphertext with authentication"},
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{ 0x00, "Cleartext"},
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{ 0x01, "Cleartext with authentication"},
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{ 0x02, "Ciphertext with authentication"},
|
||||
{ 0, NULL }
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
static const value_string c1222_response_control[] = {
|
||||
{ 0x00, "Always respond"},
|
||||
{ 0x01, "Respond on exception"},
|
||||
{ 0x02, "Never respond"},
|
||||
{ 0x00, "Always respond"},
|
||||
{ 0x01, "Respond on exception"},
|
||||
{ 0x02, "Never respond"},
|
||||
{ 0, NULL }
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -330,37 +330,37 @@ static guint num_c1222_uat_data = 0;
|
|||
static uat_t *c1222_uat;
|
||||
|
||||
/* these macros ares used to populate fields needed to verify crypto */
|
||||
#define FILL_START int length, start_offset = offset;
|
||||
#define FILL_START int length, start_offset = offset;
|
||||
#define FILL_TABLE(fieldname) \
|
||||
length = offset - start_offset; \
|
||||
fieldname = tvb_memdup(tvb, start_offset, length); \
|
||||
fieldname##_len = length;
|
||||
fieldname##_len = length;
|
||||
#define FILL_TABLE_TRUNCATE(fieldname, len) \
|
||||
length = 1 + 2*(offset - start_offset); \
|
||||
fieldname = tvb_memdup(tvb, start_offset, length); \
|
||||
fieldname##_len = len;
|
||||
fieldname##_len = len;
|
||||
#else /* HAVE_LIBGCRYPT */
|
||||
#define FILL_TABLE(fieldname)
|
||||
#define FILL_TABLE_TRUNCATE(fieldname, len)
|
||||
#define FILL_TABLE(fieldname)
|
||||
#define FILL_TABLE_TRUNCATE(fieldname, len)
|
||||
#define FILL_START
|
||||
#endif /* HAVE_LIBGCRYPT */
|
||||
|
||||
/*------------------------------
|
||||
* Function Prototypes
|
||||
* Function Prototypes
|
||||
*------------------------------
|
||||
*/
|
||||
void proto_reg_handoff_c1222(void);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
/*------------------------------
|
||||
* Code
|
||||
* Code
|
||||
*------------------------------
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Calculates simple one's complement checksum.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* \param tvb pointer to tvbuff containing data to be checksummed
|
||||
* \param tvb pointer to tvbuff containing data to be checksummed
|
||||
* \param offset offset within tvbuff to beginning of data
|
||||
* \param len length of data to be checksummed
|
||||
* \returns calculated checksum
|
||||
|
|
@ -399,9 +399,9 @@ parse_c1222_detailed(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, int cm
|
|||
guint16 packet_size;
|
||||
guint8 nbr_packet;
|
||||
/* timing setup parameters */
|
||||
guint8 traffic;
|
||||
guint8 inter_char;
|
||||
guint8 resp_to;
|
||||
guint8 traffic;
|
||||
guint8 inter_char;
|
||||
guint8 resp_to;
|
||||
guint8 nbr_retries;
|
||||
proto_item *item = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ parse_c1222_detailed(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, int cm
|
|||
proto_tree_add_string(tree, hf_c1222_logon_user, tvb, *offset, 10, user_name);
|
||||
*offset += 10;
|
||||
*length -= 12;
|
||||
proto_item_set_text(tree, "C12.22 EPSEM: %s (id %d, user \"%s\")",
|
||||
proto_item_set_text(tree, "C12.22 EPSEM: %s (id %d, user \"%s\")",
|
||||
val_to_str(cmd,commandnames,"Unknown (0x%02x)"), user_id, user_name);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
expert_add_info_format(pinfo, tree, PI_MALFORMED, PI_ERROR, "C12.22 LOGON command truncated");
|
||||
|
|
@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ parse_c1222_detailed(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, int cm
|
|||
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_c1222_auth_data, tvb, *offset, auth_len, ENC_NA);
|
||||
*offset += auth_len;
|
||||
*length -= auth_len + 1;
|
||||
proto_item_set_text(tree, "C12.22 EPSEM: %s (%d bytes: %s)",
|
||||
proto_item_set_text(tree, "C12.22 EPSEM: %s (%d bytes: %s)",
|
||||
val_to_str(cmd,commandnames,"Unknown (0x%02x)"), auth_len, auth_req);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
expert_add_info_format(pinfo, tree, PI_MALFORMED, PI_ERROR, "C12.22 AUTHENTICATE command truncated");
|
||||
|
|
@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ parse_c1222_detailed(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, int cm
|
|||
table = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, *offset);
|
||||
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_c1222_read_table, tvb, *offset, 2, table);
|
||||
proto_item_set_text(tree, "C12.22 EPSEM: %s (%s-%d)",
|
||||
val_to_str(cmd,commandnames,"Unknown (0x%02x)"),
|
||||
val_to_str(cmd,commandnames,"Unknown (0x%02x)"),
|
||||
val_to_str((table >> 8) & 0xF8, tableflags,"Unknown (0x%04x)"), table & 0x7FF);
|
||||
*offset += 2;
|
||||
*length -= 2;
|
||||
|
|
@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ parse_c1222_detailed(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, int cm
|
|||
*offset += 2;
|
||||
*length -= 2;
|
||||
proto_item_set_text(tree, "C12.22 EPSEM: %s (%s-%d)",
|
||||
val_to_str(cmd,commandnames,"Unknown (0x%02x)"),
|
||||
val_to_str(cmd,commandnames,"Unknown (0x%02x)"),
|
||||
val_to_str((table >> 8) & 0xF8, tableflags,"Unknown (0x%04x)"), table & 0x7FF);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
expert_add_info_format(pinfo, tree, PI_MALFORMED, PI_ERROR, "C12.22 READ command truncated");
|
||||
|
|
@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ parse_c1222_detailed(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, int cm
|
|||
expert_add_info_format(pinfo, item, PI_CHECKSUM, PI_ERROR, "Bad checksum [should be 0x%02x]", calcsum);
|
||||
}
|
||||
proto_item_set_text(tree, "C12.22 EPSEM: %s (%s-%d)",
|
||||
val_to_str(cmd,commandnames,"Unknown (0x%02x)"),
|
||||
val_to_str(cmd,commandnames,"Unknown (0x%02x)"),
|
||||
val_to_str((table >> 8) & 0xF8, tableflags,"Unknown (0x%04x)"), table & 0x7FF);
|
||||
*offset += 1;
|
||||
*length -= 1;
|
||||
|
|
@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ parse_c1222_detailed(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, int cm
|
|||
expert_add_info_format(pinfo, item, PI_CHECKSUM, PI_ERROR, "Bad checksum [should be 0x%02x]", calcsum);
|
||||
}
|
||||
proto_item_set_text(tree, "C12.22 EPSEM: %s (%s-%d)",
|
||||
val_to_str(cmd,commandnames,"Unknown (0x%02x)"),
|
||||
val_to_str(cmd,commandnames,"Unknown (0x%02x)"),
|
||||
val_to_str((table >> 8) & 0xF8, tableflags,"Unknown (0x%04x)"), table & 0x7FF);
|
||||
*offset += 1;
|
||||
*length -= 1;
|
||||
|
|
@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ parse_c1222_detailed(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, int cm
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT
|
||||
typedef struct tagTOP_ELEMENT_CONTROL
|
||||
typedef struct tagTOP_ELEMENT_CONTROL
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* TRUE if this tag is required */
|
||||
gboolean required;
|
||||
|
|
@ -702,11 +702,11 @@ encode_ber_len(guint8 *ptr, guint32 n, int maxsize)
|
|||
*ptr = (len -1) | 0x80;
|
||||
for (ptr += len-1; n; n >>= 8)
|
||||
*ptr-- = n & 0xff;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return len;
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Checks a new encryption table item for validity.
|
||||
*
|
||||
|
|
@ -714,7 +714,7 @@ encode_ber_len(guint8 *ptr, guint32 n, int maxsize)
|
|||
* \param err is updated to point to an error string if needed
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static void
|
||||
c1222_uat_data_update_cb(void* n, const char** err)
|
||||
c1222_uat_data_update_cb(void* n, const char** err)
|
||||
{
|
||||
c1222_uat_data_t* new_rec = n;
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -730,10 +730,10 @@ c1222_uat_data_update_cb(void* n, const char** err)
|
|||
* Canonifies header fields in preparation for authenticating and/or decrypting the packet.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* \param buff points to the allocated canonization buffer
|
||||
* \param offset points to start of unallocated space in buffer and
|
||||
* \param offset points to start of unallocated space in buffer and
|
||||
is updated as we put bytes into buffer
|
||||
* \param buffsize total size of allocated buffer
|
||||
* \return FALSE if element is required and not present; otherwise TRUE
|
||||
* \return FALSE if element is required and not present; otherwise TRUE
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static gboolean
|
||||
canonify_unencrypted_header(guchar *buff, guint32 *offset, guint32 buffsize)
|
||||
|
|
@ -741,17 +741,17 @@ canonify_unencrypted_header(guchar *buff, guint32 *offset, guint32 buffsize)
|
|||
const TOP_ELEMENT_CONTROL *t = canonifyTable;
|
||||
guint32 len;
|
||||
|
||||
for (t = canonifyTable; t->element != NULL; t++)
|
||||
for (t = canonifyTable; t->element != NULL; t++)
|
||||
{
|
||||
len = *(t->length);
|
||||
if (t->required && *(t->element) == NULL)
|
||||
if (t->required && *(t->element) == NULL)
|
||||
return FALSE;
|
||||
if (*(t->element) != NULL) {
|
||||
if (t->addtag) {
|
||||
if (t->addtag) {
|
||||
/* recreate original tag and length */
|
||||
buff[(*offset)++] = t->tag;
|
||||
(*offset) += encode_ber_len(&buff[*offset], len, 4);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (t->truncate) {
|
||||
len = 3+2*get_ber_len_size(len);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ canonify_unencrypted_header(guchar *buff, guint32 *offset, guint32 buffsize)
|
|||
* \param keyid is the ID number of the desired key
|
||||
* \returns TRUE if key was found; otherwise FALSE
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static gboolean
|
||||
static gboolean
|
||||
keylookup(guint8 *keybuff, guint8 keyid)
|
||||
{
|
||||
guint i;
|
||||
|
|
@ -796,14 +796,14 @@ keylookup(guint8 *keybuff, guint8 keyid)
|
|||
/**
|
||||
* Authenticates and decrypts the passed packet.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* \param buffer points to a memory copy of the packet to be authenticated/decrypted
|
||||
* \param buffer points to a memory copy of the packet to be authenticated/decrypted
|
||||
* and contains the decrypted value on successful return.
|
||||
* \param length lenth of input packet
|
||||
* \param decrypt TRUE if packet is to be authenticated and decrypted; FALSE if authentication only is requested
|
||||
* \returns TRUE if the requested operation was successful; otherwise FALSE
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT
|
||||
static gboolean
|
||||
static gboolean
|
||||
decrypt_packet(guchar *buffer, guint32 length, gboolean decrypt)
|
||||
{
|
||||
#define CANONBUFFSIZE 300U
|
||||
|
|
@ -814,7 +814,7 @@ decrypt_packet(guchar *buffer, guint32 length, gboolean decrypt)
|
|||
gboolean status = FALSE;
|
||||
|
||||
/* must be at least 4 bytes long to include the MAC */
|
||||
if (length < 4)
|
||||
if (length < 4)
|
||||
return status;
|
||||
if (key_id_element != NULL)
|
||||
key_id = key_id_element[0];
|
||||
|
|
@ -833,17 +833,17 @@ decrypt_packet(guchar *buffer, guint32 length, gboolean decrypt)
|
|||
/* RETURNS: TRUE if message has been authenticated. */
|
||||
/* FALSE if not authenticated, invalid Mode, or error. */
|
||||
if (offset) {
|
||||
if (!keylookup((guint8 *)&c1222_key, key_id))
|
||||
if (!keylookup((guint8 *)&c1222_key, key_id))
|
||||
return FALSE;
|
||||
status = Eax_Decrypt(canonbuff, c1222_key, buffer,
|
||||
offset, EAX_SIZEOF_KEY, length-4,
|
||||
(MAC_T *)&buffer[length-4],
|
||||
offset, EAX_SIZEOF_KEY, length-4,
|
||||
(MAC_T *)&buffer[length-4],
|
||||
decrypt ? EAX_MODE_CIPHERTEXT_AUTH : EAX_MODE_CLEARTEXT_AUTH);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return status;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else /* HAVE_LIBCRYPT */
|
||||
static gboolean
|
||||
#else /* HAVE_LIBCRYPT */
|
||||
static gboolean
|
||||
decrypt_packet(guchar *buffer _U_, guint32 length _U_, gboolean decrypt _U_)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return FALSE;
|
||||
|
|
@ -909,7 +909,7 @@ dissect_epsem(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, guint32 len, packet_info *pinfo, proto_
|
|||
proto_item *item = NULL;
|
||||
guint8 flags;
|
||||
int local_offset;
|
||||
guint32 len2;
|
||||
gint len2;
|
||||
int cmd_err;
|
||||
gboolean ind;
|
||||
guchar *buffer;
|
||||
|
|
@ -933,7 +933,7 @@ dissect_epsem(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, guint32 len, packet_info *pinfo, proto_
|
|||
hasmac = TRUE;
|
||||
len2 = tvb_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
|
||||
if (len2 <= 0)
|
||||
return offset;
|
||||
return offset;
|
||||
encrypted = TRUE;
|
||||
if (c1222_decrypt) {
|
||||
buffer = tvb_memdup(tvb, offset, len2);
|
||||
|
|
@ -976,7 +976,7 @@ dissect_epsem(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, guint32 len, packet_info *pinfo, proto_
|
|||
}
|
||||
/* it's only encrypted if we have an undecrypted payload */
|
||||
if (encrypted) {
|
||||
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_c1222_epsem_total, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
|
||||
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_c1222_epsem_total, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
|
||||
expert_add_info_format(pinfo, tree, PI_UNDECODED, PI_WARN, "C12.22 EPSEM could not be decrypted");
|
||||
local_offset = offset+len2-4;
|
||||
epsem_buffer = tvb;
|
||||
|
|
@ -992,13 +992,13 @@ dissect_epsem(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, guint32 len, packet_info *pinfo, proto_
|
|||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* what follows are one or more <epsem-data> elements possibly followed by
|
||||
* a <mac>. Each <epsem-data> element is defined as <service-length><res-req>,
|
||||
* a <mac>. Each <epsem-data> element is defined as <service-length><res-req>,
|
||||
* so we fetch such pairs until there isn't anything left (except possibly
|
||||
* the <mac>).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
while (tvb_offset_exists(epsem_buffer, local_offset+(hasmac?5:1))) {
|
||||
if (ber_len_ok(epsem_buffer, local_offset)) {
|
||||
local_offset = dissect_ber_length(pinfo, tree, epsem_buffer, local_offset, &len2, &ind);
|
||||
local_offset = dissect_ber_length(pinfo, tree, epsem_buffer, local_offset, (guint32 *)&len2, &ind);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
expert_add_info_format(pinfo, tree, PI_MALFORMED, PI_ERROR, "C12.22 EPSEM BER length error");
|
||||
return offset+len;
|
||||
|
|
@ -1007,7 +1007,7 @@ dissect_epsem(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, guint32 len, packet_info *pinfo, proto_
|
|||
cmd_err = tvb_get_guint8(epsem_buffer, local_offset);
|
||||
ct = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_c1222_epsem_total, epsem_buffer, local_offset, len2, ENC_NA);
|
||||
cmd_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ct, ett_c1222_cmd);
|
||||
parse_c1222_detailed(epsem_buffer, pinfo, cmd_tree, cmd_err, &len2, &local_offset);
|
||||
parse_c1222_detailed(epsem_buffer, pinfo, cmd_tree, cmd_err, (guint32 *)&len2, &local_offset);
|
||||
local_offset += len2;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
expert_add_info_format(pinfo, tree, PI_MALFORMED, PI_ERROR, "C12.22 EPSEM field length error");
|
||||
|
|
@ -1016,7 +1016,7 @@ dissect_epsem(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, guint32 len, packet_info *pinfo, proto_
|
|||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (hasmac) {
|
||||
if (tvb_offset_exists(epsem_buffer, local_offset+4-1)) {
|
||||
if (tvb_offset_exists(epsem_buffer, local_offset+4-1)) {
|
||||
yt = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_c1222_epsem_mac, epsem_buffer, local_offset, 4, ENC_NA);
|
||||
/* now we have enough information to fill in the crypto subtree */
|
||||
crypto_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(yt, ett_c1222_crypto);
|
||||
|
|
@ -1514,10 +1514,10 @@ get_c1222_message_len(packet_info *pinfo, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset)
|
|||
* \param pinfo
|
||||
* \param tree
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static void
|
||||
static void
|
||||
dissect_c1222(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree)
|
||||
{
|
||||
tcp_dissect_pdus(tvb, pinfo, tree, c1222_desegment, 5,
|
||||
tcp_dissect_pdus(tvb, pinfo, tree, c1222_desegment, 5,
|
||||
get_c1222_message_len, dissect_c1222_full);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue