2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
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/* packet-ssl.c
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* Routines for ssl dissection
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* Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Scott Renfro <scott@renfro.org>
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*
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2004-07-18 00:24:25 +00:00
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* $Id$
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2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
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*
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* Ethereal - Network traffic analyzer
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* By Gerald Combs <gerald@ethereal.com>
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* Copyright 1998 Gerald Combs
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
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* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
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* of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
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* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
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*
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2003-07-19 07:06:01 +00:00
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* See
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*
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* http://www.netscape.com/eng/security/SSL_2.html
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*
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* for SSL 2.0 specs.
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*
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* See
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*
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* http://www.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/
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*
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* for SSL 3.0 specs.
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*
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* See RFC 2246 for SSL 3.1/TLS 1.0 specs.
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*
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2004-06-01 01:03:49 +00:00
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* See (among other places)
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*
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* http://www.graphcomp.com/info/specs/ms/pct.htm
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*
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* for PCT 1 draft specs.
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*
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2004-07-17 10:56:34 +00:00
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* See
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*
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* http://research.sun.com/projects/crypto/draft-ietf-tls-ecc-05.txt
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*
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* for Elliptic Curve Cryptography cipher suites.
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*
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* See
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*
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* http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-camellia-04.txt
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*
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* for Camellia-based cipher suites.
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*
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2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
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* Notes:
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*
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* - Uses conversations in a no-malloc fashion. Since we just want to
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* remember the version of the conversation, we store the version
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* integer directly in the void *data member of the conversation
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* structure. This means that we don't have to manage any memory,
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* but will cause problems if anyone assumes that all data pointers
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* are actually pointers to memory allocated by g_mem_chunk_alloc.
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*
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* - Does not support decryption of encrypted frames, nor dissection
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* of frames that would require state maintained between frames
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* (e.g., single ssl records spread across multiple tcp frames)
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*
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* - Identifies, but does not fully dissect the following messages:
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*
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* - SSLv3/TLS (These need more state from previous handshake msgs)
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* - Server Key Exchange
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* - Client Key Exchange
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* - Certificate Verify
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*
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* - SSLv2 (These don't appear in the clear)
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* - Error
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* - Client Finished
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* - Server Verify
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* - Server Finished
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* - Request Certificate
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* - Client Certificate
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*
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*/
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#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
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# include "config.h"
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#endif
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <glib.h>
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2002-01-21 07:37:49 +00:00
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#include <epan/conversation.h>
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2002-01-04 07:01:54 +00:00
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#include "prefs.h"
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2004-08-02 08:57:40 +00:00
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#include <epan/dissectors/packet-x509af.h>
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2002-01-04 07:01:54 +00:00
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static gboolean ssl_desegment = TRUE;
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2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
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/*********************************************************************
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*
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* Protocol Constants, Variables, Data Structures
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*
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*********************************************************************/
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/* Initialize the protocol and registered fields */
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static int proto_ssl = -1;
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static int hf_ssl_record = -1;
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static int hf_ssl_record_content_type = -1;
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static int hf_ssl_record_version = -1;
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static int hf_ssl_record_length = -1;
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static int hf_ssl_record_appdata = -1;
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static int hf_ssl2_record = -1;
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static int hf_ssl2_record_is_escape = -1;
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static int hf_ssl2_record_padding_length = -1;
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static int hf_ssl2_msg_type = -1;
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2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
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static int hf_pct_msg_type = -1;
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2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
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static int hf_ssl_change_cipher_spec = -1;
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static int hf_ssl_alert_message = -1;
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static int hf_ssl_alert_message_level = -1;
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static int hf_ssl_alert_message_description = -1;
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static int hf_ssl_handshake_protocol = -1;
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static int hf_ssl_handshake_type = -1;
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static int hf_ssl_handshake_length = -1;
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static int hf_ssl_handshake_client_version = -1;
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static int hf_ssl_handshake_server_version = -1;
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static int hf_ssl_handshake_random_time = -1;
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static int hf_ssl_handshake_random_bytes = -1;
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2001-07-16 01:38:34 +00:00
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static int hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites_len = -1;
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2001-07-16 04:02:22 +00:00
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static int hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites = -1;
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2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
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static int hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suite = -1;
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static int hf_ssl_handshake_session_id = -1;
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2001-07-16 01:38:34 +00:00
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static int hf_ssl_handshake_comp_methods_len = -1;
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2001-07-16 04:02:22 +00:00
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static int hf_ssl_handshake_comp_methods = -1;
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2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
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static int hf_ssl_handshake_comp_method = -1;
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2001-07-16 01:38:34 +00:00
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static int hf_ssl_handshake_certificates_len = -1;
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2001-07-16 04:02:22 +00:00
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static int hf_ssl_handshake_certificates = -1;
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2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
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static int hf_ssl_handshake_certificate = -1;
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static int hf_ssl_handshake_certificate_len = -1;
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2001-07-16 01:38:34 +00:00
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static int hf_ssl_handshake_cert_types_count = -1;
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2001-07-16 04:02:22 +00:00
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static int hf_ssl_handshake_cert_types = -1;
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2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
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static int hf_ssl_handshake_cert_type = -1;
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static int hf_ssl_handshake_finished = -1;
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static int hf_ssl_handshake_md5_hash = -1;
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static int hf_ssl_handshake_sha_hash = -1;
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static int hf_ssl_handshake_session_id_len = -1;
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2001-07-16 01:38:34 +00:00
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static int hf_ssl_handshake_dnames_len = -1;
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2001-07-16 04:02:22 +00:00
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static int hf_ssl_handshake_dnames = -1;
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2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
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static int hf_ssl_handshake_dname_len = -1;
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static int hf_ssl_handshake_dname = -1;
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static int hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec_len = -1;
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static int hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_len = -1;
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static int hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge_len = -1;
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static int hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec = -1;
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static int hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge = -1;
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static int hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key_len = -1;
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static int hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key_len = -1;
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static int hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg_len = -1;
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static int hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key = -1;
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static int hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key = -1;
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static int hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg = -1;
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static int hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_hit = -1;
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static int hf_ssl2_handshake_cert_type = -1;
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static int hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id_len = -1;
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static int hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id = -1;
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2004-06-01 01:03:49 +00:00
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static int hf_pct_handshake_cipher_spec = -1;
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static int hf_pct_handshake_hash_spec = -1;
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static int hf_pct_handshake_cert_spec = -1;
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static int hf_pct_handshake_cert = -1;
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2004-08-02 08:57:40 +00:00
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static int hf_pct_handshake_server_cert = -1;
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2004-06-01 01:03:49 +00:00
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static int hf_pct_handshake_exch_spec = -1;
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static int hf_pct_handshake_hash = -1;
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static int hf_pct_handshake_cipher = -1;
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static int hf_pct_handshake_exch = -1;
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static int hf_pct_handshake_sig = -1;
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static int hf_pct_msg_error_type = -1;
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2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
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/* Initialize the subtree pointers */
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static gint ett_ssl = -1;
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static gint ett_ssl_record = -1;
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static gint ett_ssl_alert = -1;
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static gint ett_ssl_handshake = -1;
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static gint ett_ssl_cipher_suites = -1;
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static gint ett_ssl_comp_methods = -1;
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static gint ett_ssl_certs = -1;
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static gint ett_ssl_cert_types = -1;
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static gint ett_ssl_dnames = -1;
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2004-06-01 01:03:49 +00:00
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static gint ett_pct_cipher_suites = -1;
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static gint ett_pct_hash_suites = -1;
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static gint ett_pct_cert_suites = -1;
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static gint ett_pct_exch_suites = -1;
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2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
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/* The TCP port to associate with by default */
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#define TCP_PORT_SSL 443
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2002-02-02 04:02:28 +00:00
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#define TCP_PORT_SSL_LDAP 636
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#define TCP_PORT_SSL_IMAP 993
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#define TCP_PORT_SSL_POP 995
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2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
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/* version state tables */
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#define SSL_VER_UNKNOWN 0
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#define SSL_VER_SSLv2 1
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#define SSL_VER_SSLv3 2
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#define SSL_VER_TLS 3
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2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
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#define SSL_VER_PCT 4
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2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
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/* corresponds to the #defines above */
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static gchar* ssl_version_short_names[] = {
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"SSL",
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"SSLv2",
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"SSLv3",
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"TLS",
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2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
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"PCT"
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2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
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};
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/* other defines */
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#define SSL_ID_CHG_CIPHER_SPEC 0x14
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#define SSL_ID_ALERT 0x15
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#define SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE 0x16
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#define SSL_ID_APP_DATA 0x17
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2003-07-19 07:06:01 +00:00
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#define SSL_HND_HELLO_REQUEST 0
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#define SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO 1
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#define SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO 2
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#define SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE 11
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#define SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG 12
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#define SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST 13
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#define SSL_HND_SVR_HELLO_DONE 14
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#define SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY 15
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#define SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG 16
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#define SSL_HND_FINISHED 20
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2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
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#define SSL2_HND_ERROR 0x00
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#define SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO 0x01
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#define SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY 0x02
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#define SSL2_HND_CLIENT_FINISHED 0x03
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#define SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO 0x04
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#define SSL2_HND_SERVER_VERIFY 0x05
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#define SSL2_HND_SERVER_FINISHED 0x06
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#define SSL2_HND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE 0x07
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#define SSL2_HND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 0x08
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2004-06-01 01:03:49 +00:00
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#define PCT_VERSION_1 0x8001
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#define PCT_MSG_CLIENT_HELLO 0x01
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#define PCT_MSG_SERVER_HELLO 0x02
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#define PCT_MSG_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY 0x03
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#define PCT_MSG_SERVER_VERIFY 0x04
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#define PCT_MSG_ERROR 0x05
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#define PCT_CH_OFFSET_V1 0xa
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#define PCT_CIPHER_DES 0x01
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#define PCT_CIPHER_IDEA 0x02
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#define PCT_CIPHER_RC2 0x03
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#define PCT_CIPHER_RC4 0x04
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#define PCT_CIPHER_DES_112 0x05
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#define PCT_CIPHER_DES_168 0x06
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#define PCT_HASH_MD5 0x0001
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#define PCT_HASH_MD5_TRUNC_64 0x0002
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#define PCT_HASH_SHA 0x0003
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#define PCT_HASH_SHA_TRUNC_80 0x0004
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#define PCT_HASH_DES_DM 0x0005
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#define PCT_CERT_NONE 0x00
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#define PCT_CERT_X509 0x01
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#define PCT_CERT_PKCS7 0x02
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#define PCT_SIG_NONE 0x0000
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#define PCT_SIG_RSA_MD5 0x0001
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#define PCT_SIG_RSA_SHA 0x0002
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#define PCT_SIG_DSA_SHA 0x0003
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#define PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1 0x01
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#define PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_DES 0x02
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#define PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_DES3 0x03
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#define PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_RC2 0x04
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#define PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_RC4 0x05
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#define PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3 0x06
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#define PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3_TOKEN_DES 0x07
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#define PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3_TOKEN_DES3 0x08
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#define PCT_EXCH_FORTEZZA_TOKEN 0x09
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#define PCT_ERR_BAD_CERTIFICATE 0x01
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#define PCT_ERR_CLIENT_AUTH_FAILED 0x02
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#define PCT_ERR_ILLEGAL_MESSAGE 0x03
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#define PCT_ERR_INTEGRITY_CHECK_FAILED 0x04
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#define PCT_ERR_SERVER_AUTH_FAILED 0x05
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#define PCT_ERR_SPECS_MISMATCH 0x06
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2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
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2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
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/*
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* Lookup tables
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*
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*/
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static const value_string ssl_20_msg_types[] = {
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{ SSL2_HND_ERROR, "Error" },
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{ SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO, "Client Hello" },
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{ SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, "Client Master Key" },
|
|
|
|
{ SSL2_HND_CLIENT_FINISHED, "Client Finished" },
|
|
|
|
{ SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO, "Server Hello" },
|
|
|
|
{ SSL2_HND_SERVER_VERIFY, "Server Verify" },
|
|
|
|
{ SSL2_HND_SERVER_FINISHED, "Server Finished" },
|
|
|
|
{ SSL2_HND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, "Request Certificate" },
|
|
|
|
{ SSL2_HND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, "Client Certificate" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL },
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const value_string ssl_20_cipher_suites[] = {
|
|
|
|
{ 0x010080, "SSL2_RC4_128_WITH_MD5" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x020080, "SSL2_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x030080, "SSL2_RC2_CBC_128_CBC_WITH_MD5" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x040080, "SSL2_RC2_CBC_128_CBC_WITH_MD5" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x050080, "SSL2_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x060040, "SSL2_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0700c0, "SSL2_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5" },
|
2002-02-07 18:56:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{ 0x080080, "SSL2_RC4_64_WITH_MD5" },
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
{ 0x000000, "TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000001, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000002, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000003, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000004, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000005, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000006, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000007, "TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000008, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000009, "TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00000a, "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00000b, "TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00000c, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00000d, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00000e, "TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00000f, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000010, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000011, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000012, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000013, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000014, "TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000015, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000016, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000017, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000018, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000019, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00001a, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00001b, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00001c, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00001d, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00001e, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
|
2003-12-07 02:26:03 +00:00
|
|
|
{ 0x00002f, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000030, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000031, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000032, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000033, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000034, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000035, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000036, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000037, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000038, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000039, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00003A, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
2004-07-17 10:56:34 +00:00
|
|
|
{ 0x000041, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000042, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000043, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000044, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000045, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000046, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000047, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000048, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000049, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00004A, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00004B, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00004C, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
2002-02-07 18:56:55 +00:00
|
|
|
{ 0x000060, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000061, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5" },
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
{ 0x000062, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000063, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000064, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000065, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000066, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
|
2004-07-17 10:56:34 +00:00
|
|
|
{ 0x000084, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000085, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000086, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000087, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000088, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000089, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
2001-10-16 07:13:01 +00:00
|
|
|
/* these from http://www.mozilla.org/projects/
|
|
|
|
security/pki/nss/ssl/fips-ssl-ciphersuites.html */
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00fefe, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"},
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00feff, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00ffe0, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00ffe1, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"},
|
2002-04-11 09:20:33 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Microsoft's old PCT protocol. These are from Eric Rescorla's
|
|
|
|
book "SSL and TLS" */
|
|
|
|
{ 0x8f8001, "PCT_SSL_COMPAT | PCT_VERSION_1" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x800003, "PCT_SSL_CERT_TYPE | PCT1_CERT_X509_CHAIN" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x800001, "PCT_SSL_CERT_TYPE | PCT1_CERT_X509" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x810001, "PCT_SSL_HASH_TYPE | PCT1_HASH_MD5" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x810003, "PCT_SSL_HASH_TYPE | PCT1_HASH_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x820001, "PCT_SSL_EXCH_TYPE | PCT1_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x830004, "PCT_SSL_CIPHER_TYPE_1ST_HALF | PCT1_CIPHER_RC4" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x848040, "PCT_SSL_CIPHER_TYPE_2ND_HALF | PCT1_ENC_BITS_128 | PCT1_MAC_BITS_128" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x842840, "PCT_SSL_CIPHER_TYPE_2ND_HALF | PCT1_ENC_BITS_40 | PCT1_MAC_BITS_128" },
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
/* note that ciphersuites of {0x00????} are TLS cipher suites in
|
|
|
|
* a sslv2 client hello message; the ???? above is the two-byte
|
|
|
|
* tls cipher suite id
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const value_string ssl_20_certificate_type[] = {
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00, "N/A" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x01, "X.509 Certificate" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL },
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const value_string ssl_31_content_type[] = {
|
|
|
|
{ 20, "Change Cipher Spec" },
|
|
|
|
{ 21, "Alert" },
|
|
|
|
{ 22, "Handshake" },
|
|
|
|
{ 23, "Application Data" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const value_string ssl_versions[] = {
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0301, "TLS 1.0" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0300, "SSL 3.0" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0002, "SSL 2.0" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2003-07-19 07:06:01 +00:00
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
|
|
/* XXX - would be used if we dissected the body of a Change Cipher Spec
|
|
|
|
message. */
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
static const value_string ssl_31_change_cipher_spec[] = {
|
|
|
|
{ 1, "Change Cipher Spec" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL },
|
|
|
|
};
|
2003-07-19 07:06:01 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const value_string ssl_31_alert_level[] = {
|
|
|
|
{ 1, "Warning" },
|
|
|
|
{ 2, "Fatal" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const value_string ssl_31_alert_description[] = {
|
|
|
|
{ 0, "Close Notify" },
|
|
|
|
{ 10, "Unexpected Message" },
|
|
|
|
{ 20, "Bad Record MAC" },
|
|
|
|
{ 21, "Decryption Failed" },
|
|
|
|
{ 22, "Record Overflow" },
|
|
|
|
{ 30, "Decompression Failure" },
|
|
|
|
{ 40, "Handshake Failure" },
|
|
|
|
{ 42, "Bad Certificate" },
|
|
|
|
{ 43, "Unsupported Certificate" },
|
|
|
|
{ 44, "Certificate Revoked" },
|
|
|
|
{ 45, "Certificate Expired" },
|
|
|
|
{ 46, "Certificate Unknown" },
|
|
|
|
{ 47, "Illegal Parameter" },
|
|
|
|
{ 48, "Unknown CA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 49, "Access Denied" },
|
|
|
|
{ 50, "Decode Error" },
|
|
|
|
{ 51, "Decrypt Error" },
|
|
|
|
{ 60, "Export Restriction" },
|
|
|
|
{ 70, "Protocol Version" },
|
|
|
|
{ 71, "Insufficient Security" },
|
|
|
|
{ 80, "Internal Error" },
|
|
|
|
{ 90, "User Canceled" },
|
|
|
|
{ 100, "No Renegotiation" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const value_string ssl_31_handshake_type[] = {
|
|
|
|
{ SSL_HND_HELLO_REQUEST, "Hello Request" },
|
|
|
|
{ SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO, "Client Hello" },
|
|
|
|
{ SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO, "Server Hello" },
|
|
|
|
{ SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE, "Certificate" },
|
|
|
|
{ SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG, "Server Key Exchange" },
|
|
|
|
{ SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST, "Certificate Request" },
|
|
|
|
{ SSL_HND_SVR_HELLO_DONE, "Server Hello Done" },
|
|
|
|
{ SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY, "Certificate Verify" },
|
|
|
|
{ SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG, "Client Key Exchange" },
|
|
|
|
{ SSL_HND_FINISHED, "Finished" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const value_string ssl_31_compression_method[] = {
|
|
|
|
{ 0, "null" },
|
2003-01-27 19:50:05 +00:00
|
|
|
{ 1, "ZLIB" },
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2003-07-19 07:06:01 +00:00
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
|
|
/* XXX - would be used if we dissected a Signature, as would be
|
|
|
|
seen in a server key exchange or certificate verify message. */
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
static const value_string ssl_31_key_exchange_algorithm[] = {
|
|
|
|
{ 0, "RSA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 1, "Diffie Hellman" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const value_string ssl_31_signature_algorithm[] = {
|
|
|
|
{ 0, "Anonymous" },
|
|
|
|
{ 1, "RSA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 2, "DSA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
|
|
};
|
2003-07-19 07:06:01 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const value_string ssl_31_client_certificate_type[] = {
|
|
|
|
{ 1, "RSA Sign" },
|
|
|
|
{ 2, "DSS Sign" },
|
|
|
|
{ 3, "RSA Fixed DH" },
|
|
|
|
{ 4, "DSS Fixed DH" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2003-07-19 07:06:01 +00:00
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
|
|
/* XXX - would be used if we dissected exchnage keys, as would be
|
|
|
|
seen in a client key exchange message. */
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
static const value_string ssl_31_public_value_encoding[] = {
|
|
|
|
{ 0, "Implicit" },
|
|
|
|
{ 1, "Explicit" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
|
|
};
|
2003-07-19 07:06:01 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const value_string ssl_31_ciphersuite[] = {
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0000, "TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0001, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0002, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0003, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0004, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0005, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0006, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0007, "TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0008, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0009, "TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000a, "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000b, "TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000c, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000d, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000e, "TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x000f, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0010, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0011, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0012, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0013, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0014, "TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0015, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0016, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0017, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0018, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0019, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x001a, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x001b, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x001c, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x001d, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x001e, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
|
2003-01-27 19:50:05 +00:00
|
|
|
{ 0x002f, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0030, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0031, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0032, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0033, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0034, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0035, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0036, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0037, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0038, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0039, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x003A, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
2004-07-18 03:34:37 +00:00
|
|
|
{ 0x0041, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0042, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0043, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0044, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0045, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0046, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0047, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0048, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0049, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x004A, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x004B, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x004C, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
2004-02-05 19:08:59 +00:00
|
|
|
{ 0x0060, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0061, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5" },
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
{ 0x0062, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0063, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0064, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0065, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0066, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
|
2004-07-18 03:34:37 +00:00
|
|
|
{ 0x0084, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0085, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0086, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0087, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0088, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x0089, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
|
2001-10-16 07:13:01 +00:00
|
|
|
/* these from http://www.mozilla.org/projects/
|
|
|
|
security/pki/nss/ssl/fips-ssl-ciphersuites.html */
|
|
|
|
{ 0xfefe, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"},
|
|
|
|
{ 0xfeff, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0xffe0, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0xffe1, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"},
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
/* note that ciphersuites 0xff00 - 0xffff are private */
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL }
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
static const value_string pct_msg_types[] = {
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_MSG_CLIENT_HELLO, "Client Hello" },
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_MSG_SERVER_HELLO, "Server Hello" },
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_MSG_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, "Client Master Key" },
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_MSG_SERVER_VERIFY, "Server Verify" },
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_MSG_ERROR, "Error" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL },
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2004-06-01 01:03:49 +00:00
|
|
|
static const value_string pct_cipher_type[] = {
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_CIPHER_DES, "DES" },
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_CIPHER_IDEA, "IDEA" },
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_CIPHER_RC2, "RC2" },
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_CIPHER_RC4, "RC4" },
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_CIPHER_DES_112, "DES 112 bit" },
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_CIPHER_DES_168, "DES 168 bit" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL },
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const value_string pct_hash_type[] = {
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_HASH_MD5, "MD5" },
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_HASH_MD5_TRUNC_64, "MD5_TRUNC_64"},
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_HASH_SHA, "SHA"},
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_HASH_SHA_TRUNC_80, "SHA_TRUNC_80"},
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_HASH_DES_DM, "DES_DM"},
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL },
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const value_string pct_cert_type[] = {
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_CERT_NONE, "None" },
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_CERT_X509, "X.509" },
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_CERT_PKCS7, "PKCS #7" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL },
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const value_string pct_sig_type[] = {
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_SIG_NONE, "None" },
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_SIG_RSA_MD5, "MD5" },
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_SIG_RSA_SHA, "RSA SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_SIG_DSA_SHA, "DSA SHA" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL },
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const value_string pct_exch_type[] = {
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1, "RSA PKCS#1" },
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_DES, "RSA PKCS#1 Token DES" },
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_DES3, "RSA PKCS#1 Token 3DES" },
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_RC2, "RSA PKCS#1 Token RC-2" },
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_RC4, "RSA PKCS#1 Token RC-4" },
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3, "DH PKCS#3" },
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3_TOKEN_DES, "DH PKCS#3 Token DES" },
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3_TOKEN_DES3, "DH PKCS#3 Token 3DES" },
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_EXCH_FORTEZZA_TOKEN, "Fortezza" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL },
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const value_string pct_error_code[] = {
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_ERR_BAD_CERTIFICATE, "PCT_ERR_BAD_CERTIFICATE" },
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_ERR_CLIENT_AUTH_FAILED, "PCT_ERR_CLIENT_AUTH_FAILE" },
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_ERR_ILLEGAL_MESSAGE, "PCT_ERR_ILLEGAL_MESSAGE" },
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_ERR_INTEGRITY_CHECK_FAILED, "PCT_ERR_INTEGRITY_CHECK_FAILED" },
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_ERR_SERVER_AUTH_FAILED, "PCT_ERR_SERVER_AUTH_FAILED" },
|
|
|
|
{ PCT_ERR_SPECS_MISMATCH, "PCT_ERR_SPECS_MISMATCH" },
|
|
|
|
{ 0x00, NULL },
|
|
|
|
};
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
/*********************************************************************
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Forward Declarations
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
*********************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* SSL version 3 and TLS dissectors
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* record layer dissector */
|
|
|
|
static int dissect_ssl3_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
|
2002-01-17 09:24:05 +00:00
|
|
|
guint *conv_version,
|
|
|
|
gboolean *need_desegmentation);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* change cipher spec dissector */
|
2002-04-08 10:05:19 +00:00
|
|
|
static void dissect_ssl3_change_cipher_spec(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree,
|
|
|
|
guint32 offset,
|
|
|
|
guint *conv_version);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* alert message dissector */
|
|
|
|
static void dissect_ssl3_alert(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
|
|
|
|
guint *conv_version);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* handshake protocol dissector */
|
|
|
|
static void dissect_ssl3_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
|
|
|
|
guint32 record_length,
|
|
|
|
guint *conv_version);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-04-08 10:05:19 +00:00
|
|
|
static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree,
|
|
|
|
guint32 offset);
|
|
|
|
|
2002-04-08 10:05:19 +00:00
|
|
|
static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree,
|
|
|
|
guint32 offset);
|
|
|
|
|
2002-04-08 10:05:19 +00:00
|
|
|
static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
2004-08-02 08:57:40 +00:00
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2002-04-08 10:05:19 +00:00
|
|
|
static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert_req(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree,
|
|
|
|
guint32 offset);
|
|
|
|
|
2002-04-08 10:05:19 +00:00
|
|
|
static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_finished(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree,
|
|
|
|
guint32 offset,
|
|
|
|
guint *conv_version);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* SSL version 2 dissectors
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* record layer dissector */
|
|
|
|
static int dissect_ssl2_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
|
2002-01-17 09:24:05 +00:00
|
|
|
guint *conv_version,
|
|
|
|
gboolean *need_desegmentation);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* client hello dissector */
|
2002-04-08 10:05:19 +00:00
|
|
|
static void dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree,
|
|
|
|
guint32 offset);
|
|
|
|
|
2004-06-01 01:03:49 +00:00
|
|
|
static void dissect_pct_msg_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree,
|
|
|
|
guint32 offset);
|
|
|
|
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
/* client master key dissector */
|
|
|
|
static void dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_master_key(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree,
|
|
|
|
guint32 offset);
|
2004-06-01 01:03:49 +00:00
|
|
|
static void dissect_pct_msg_client_master_key(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree,
|
|
|
|
guint32 offset);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* server hello dissector */
|
|
|
|
static void dissect_ssl2_hnd_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree,
|
2004-08-02 08:57:40 +00:00
|
|
|
guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo);
|
2004-06-01 01:03:49 +00:00
|
|
|
static void dissect_pct_msg_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree,
|
2004-08-02 08:57:40 +00:00
|
|
|
guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo);
|
2004-06-01 01:03:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void dissect_pct_msg_server_verify(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree,
|
|
|
|
guint32 offset);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void dissect_pct_msg_error(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree,
|
|
|
|
guint32 offset);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Support Functions
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void ssl_set_conv_version(packet_info *pinfo, guint version);
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_is_valid_handshake_type(guint8 type);
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_is_valid_content_type(guint8 type);
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(guint16 version);
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_is_authoritative_version_message(guint8 content_type,
|
|
|
|
guint8 next_byte);
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_is_v2_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset);
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_looks_like_sslv2(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset);
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_looks_like_sslv3(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset);
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_looks_like_valid_v2_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
|
|
guint32 offset,
|
|
|
|
guint32 record_length);
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
static int ssl_looks_like_valid_pct_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
|
|
guint32 offset,
|
|
|
|
guint32 record_length);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*********************************************************************
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Main dissector
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
*********************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Code to actually dissect the packets
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
dissect_ssl(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
conversation_t *conversation;
|
2001-09-03 10:33:12 +00:00
|
|
|
void *conv_data;
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
guint conv_version = SSL_VER_UNKNOWN;
|
|
|
|
proto_item *ti = NULL;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *ssl_tree = NULL;
|
|
|
|
guint32 offset = 0;
|
|
|
|
gboolean first_record_in_frame = TRUE;
|
2002-01-17 09:24:05 +00:00
|
|
|
gboolean need_desegmentation;
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Track the version using conversations to reduce the
|
|
|
|
* chance that a packet that simply *looks* like a v2 or
|
|
|
|
* v3 packet is dissected improperly. This also allows
|
|
|
|
* us to more frequently set the protocol column properly
|
|
|
|
* for continuation data frames.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Also: We use the copy in conv_version as our cached copy,
|
|
|
|
* so that we don't have to search the conversation
|
|
|
|
* table every time we want the version; when setting
|
|
|
|
* the conv_version, must set the copy in the conversation
|
|
|
|
* in addition to conv_version
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
conversation = find_conversation(&pinfo->src, &pinfo->dst, pinfo->ptype,
|
|
|
|
pinfo->srcport, pinfo->destport, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (!conversation)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* create a new conversation */
|
|
|
|
conversation = conversation_new(&pinfo->src, &pinfo->dst, pinfo->ptype,
|
2001-09-03 10:33:12 +00:00
|
|
|
pinfo->srcport, pinfo->destport, 0);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2001-09-03 10:33:12 +00:00
|
|
|
conv_data = conversation_get_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl);
|
|
|
|
if (conv_data != NULL)
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2003-03-10 02:06:33 +00:00
|
|
|
conv_version = GPOINTER_TO_UINT(conv_data);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize the protocol column; we'll set it later when we
|
|
|
|
* figure out what flavor of SSL it is (assuming we don't
|
|
|
|
* throw an exception before we get the chance to do so). */
|
2001-12-10 00:26:21 +00:00
|
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL))
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2001-12-10 00:26:21 +00:00
|
|
|
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "SSL");
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* clear the the info column */
|
2001-12-10 00:26:21 +00:00
|
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
|
|
|
|
col_clear(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* TCP packets and SSL records are orthogonal.
|
|
|
|
* A tcp packet may contain multiple ssl records and an ssl
|
|
|
|
* record may be spread across multiple tcp packets.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This loop accounts for multiple ssl records in a single
|
|
|
|
* frame, but not a single ssl record across multiple tcp
|
|
|
|
* packets.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Handling the single ssl record across multiple packets
|
|
|
|
* may be possible using ethereal conversations, but
|
|
|
|
* probably not cleanly. May have to wait for tcp stream
|
|
|
|
* reassembly.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Create display subtree for SSL as a whole */
|
|
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2002-01-24 09:20:54 +00:00
|
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, proto_ssl, tvb, 0, -1, FALSE);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
ssl_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2002-03-28 09:15:28 +00:00
|
|
|
/* iterate through the records in this tvbuff */
|
|
|
|
while (tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) != 0)
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* on second and subsequent records per frame
|
|
|
|
* add a delimiter on info column
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!first_record_in_frame
|
2001-12-10 00:26:21 +00:00
|
|
|
&& check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2001-12-10 00:26:21 +00:00
|
|
|
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", ");
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2002-01-17 09:24:05 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Assume, for now, that this doesn't need desegmentation.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
need_desegmentation = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
/* first try to dispatch off the cached version
|
|
|
|
* known to be associated with the conversation
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
switch(conv_version) {
|
|
|
|
case SSL_VER_SSLv2:
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
case SSL_VER_PCT:
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
offset = dissect_ssl2_record(tvb, pinfo, ssl_tree,
|
2002-01-17 09:24:05 +00:00
|
|
|
offset, &conv_version,
|
|
|
|
&need_desegmentation);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL_VER_SSLv3:
|
|
|
|
case SSL_VER_TLS:
|
|
|
|
/* the version tracking code works too well ;-)
|
|
|
|
* at times, we may visit a v2 client hello after
|
|
|
|
* we already know the version of the connection;
|
|
|
|
* work around that here by detecting and calling
|
|
|
|
* the v2 dissector instead
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_is_v2_client_hello(tvb, offset))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
offset = dissect_ssl2_record(tvb, pinfo, ssl_tree,
|
2002-01-17 09:24:05 +00:00
|
|
|
offset, &conv_version,
|
|
|
|
&need_desegmentation);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
offset = dissect_ssl3_record(tvb, pinfo, ssl_tree,
|
2002-01-17 09:24:05 +00:00
|
|
|
offset, &conv_version,
|
|
|
|
&need_desegmentation);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* that failed, so apply some heuristics based
|
|
|
|
* on this individual packet
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_looks_like_sslv2(tvb, offset))
|
|
|
|
{
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
/* looks like sslv2 or pct client hello */
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
offset = dissect_ssl2_record(tvb, pinfo, ssl_tree,
|
2002-01-17 09:24:05 +00:00
|
|
|
offset, &conv_version,
|
|
|
|
&need_desegmentation);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else if (ssl_looks_like_sslv3(tvb, offset))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* looks like sslv3 or tls */
|
|
|
|
offset = dissect_ssl3_record(tvb, pinfo, ssl_tree,
|
2002-01-17 09:24:05 +00:00
|
|
|
offset, &conv_version,
|
|
|
|
&need_desegmentation);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* looks like something unknown, so lump into
|
|
|
|
* continuation data
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
offset = tvb_length(tvb);
|
2001-12-10 00:26:21 +00:00
|
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
|
|
|
|
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO,
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
"Continuation Data");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Set the protocol column */
|
2001-12-10 00:26:21 +00:00
|
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL))
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2001-12-10 00:26:21 +00:00
|
|
|
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL,
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
ssl_version_short_names[conv_version]);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2002-01-04 07:01:54 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Desegmentation return check */
|
2002-01-17 09:24:05 +00:00
|
|
|
if (need_desegmentation)
|
2002-01-04 07:01:54 +00:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
2001-09-03 10:33:12 +00:00
|
|
|
/* If we haven't already set the version information for
|
|
|
|
* this conversation, do so. */
|
|
|
|
if (conv_data == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2003-03-10 02:06:33 +00:00
|
|
|
conv_data = GINT_TO_POINTER(conv_version);
|
2001-09-03 10:33:12 +00:00
|
|
|
conversation_add_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl, conv_data);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
/* set up for next record in frame, if any */
|
|
|
|
first_record_in_frame = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*********************************************************************
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* SSL version 3 and TLS Dissection Routines
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
*********************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
dissect_ssl3_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
|
2002-01-17 09:24:05 +00:00
|
|
|
guint *conv_version, gboolean *need_desegmentation)
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* struct {
|
|
|
|
* uint8 major, minor;
|
|
|
|
* } ProtocolVersion;
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* enum {
|
|
|
|
* change_cipher_spec(20), alert(21), handshake(22),
|
|
|
|
* application_data(23), (255)
|
|
|
|
* } ContentType;
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* struct {
|
|
|
|
* ContentType type;
|
|
|
|
* ProtocolVersion version;
|
|
|
|
* uint16 length;
|
|
|
|
* opaque fragment[TLSPlaintext.length];
|
|
|
|
* } TLSPlaintext;
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
guint32 record_length;
|
|
|
|
guint16 version;
|
|
|
|
guint8 content_type;
|
|
|
|
guint8 next_byte;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *ti = NULL;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *ssl_record_tree = NULL;
|
2002-01-04 07:01:54 +00:00
|
|
|
guint32 available_bytes = 0;
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2002-03-28 09:15:28 +00:00
|
|
|
available_bytes = tvb_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Can we do reassembly?
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_desegment && pinfo->can_desegment) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Yes - is the record header split across segment boundaries?
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (available_bytes < 5) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Yes. Tell the TCP dissector where the data for this
|
|
|
|
* message starts in the data it handed us, and how many
|
|
|
|
* more bytes we need, and return.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
pinfo->desegment_offset = offset;
|
|
|
|
pinfo->desegment_len = 5 - available_bytes;
|
|
|
|
*need_desegmentation = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
return offset;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Get the record layer fields of interest
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
content_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 1);
|
|
|
|
record_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 3);
|
|
|
|
|
2002-01-04 07:01:54 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ssl_is_valid_content_type(content_type)) {
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2002-03-28 09:15:28 +00:00
|
|
|
* Can we do reassembly?
|
2002-01-04 07:01:54 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2002-03-28 09:15:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ssl_desegment && pinfo->can_desegment) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Yes - is the record split across segment boundaries?
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (available_bytes < record_length + 5) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Yes. Tell the TCP dissector where the data for this
|
|
|
|
* message starts in the data it handed us, and how many
|
|
|
|
* more bytes we need, and return.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
pinfo->desegment_offset = offset;
|
|
|
|
pinfo->desegment_len = (record_length + 5) - available_bytes;
|
|
|
|
*need_desegmentation = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
return offset;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-01-04 07:01:54 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2002-08-28 21:04:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2002-01-04 07:01:54 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2002-08-28 21:04:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
/* if we don't have a valid content_type, there's no sense
|
|
|
|
* continuing any further
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2001-12-10 00:26:21 +00:00
|
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
|
|
|
|
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Continuation Data");
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Set the protocol column */
|
2001-12-10 00:26:21 +00:00
|
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL))
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2001-12-10 00:26:21 +00:00
|
|
|
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL,
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version]);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return offset + 5 + record_length;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If GUI, fill in record layer part of tree
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* add the record layer subtree header */
|
|
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_record, tvb,
|
|
|
|
offset, 5 + record_length, 0);
|
|
|
|
ssl_record_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_record);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_record_tree)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* show the one-byte content type */
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_record_tree, hf_ssl_record_content_type,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 1, 0);
|
|
|
|
offset++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* add the version */
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_record_tree, hf_ssl_record_version, tvb,
|
|
|
|
offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* add the length */
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_record_tree, hf_ssl_record_length, tvb,
|
|
|
|
offset, 2, record_length);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2; /* move past length field itself */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* if no GUI tree, then just skip over those fields */
|
|
|
|
offset += 5;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* if we don't already have a version set for this conversation,
|
|
|
|
* but this message's version is authoritative (i.e., it's
|
|
|
|
* not client_hello, then save the version to to conversation
|
|
|
|
* structure and print the column version
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
next_byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
if (*conv_version == SSL_VER_UNKNOWN
|
|
|
|
&& ssl_is_authoritative_version_message(content_type, next_byte))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (version == 0x0300)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
*conv_version = SSL_VER_SSLv3;
|
|
|
|
ssl_set_conv_version(pinfo, *conv_version);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else if (version == 0x0301)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
*conv_version = SSL_VER_TLS;
|
|
|
|
ssl_set_conv_version(pinfo, *conv_version);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2001-12-10 00:26:21 +00:00
|
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL))
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (version == 0x0300)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-12-10 00:26:21 +00:00
|
|
|
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL,
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
ssl_version_short_names[SSL_VER_SSLv3]);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else if (version == 0x0301)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-12-10 00:26:21 +00:00
|
|
|
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL,
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
ssl_version_short_names[SSL_VER_TLS]);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-12-10 00:26:21 +00:00
|
|
|
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL,
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version]);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* now dissect the next layer
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
switch (content_type) {
|
|
|
|
case SSL_ID_CHG_CIPHER_SPEC:
|
2001-12-10 00:26:21 +00:00
|
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
|
|
|
|
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Change Cipher Spec");
|
2002-04-08 10:05:19 +00:00
|
|
|
dissect_ssl3_change_cipher_spec(tvb, ssl_record_tree,
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
offset, conv_version);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_ID_ALERT:
|
|
|
|
dissect_ssl3_alert(tvb, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, offset,
|
|
|
|
conv_version);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE:
|
|
|
|
dissect_ssl3_handshake(tvb, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, offset,
|
|
|
|
record_length, conv_version);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_ID_APP_DATA:
|
2001-12-10 00:26:21 +00:00
|
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
|
|
|
|
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Application Data");
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ssl_record_tree)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
proto_item_set_text(ssl_record_tree,
|
|
|
|
"%s Record Layer: Application Data",
|
|
|
|
ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version]);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_record_tree, hf_ssl_record_appdata, tvb,
|
|
|
|
offset, record_length, 0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
/* shouldn't get here since we check above for valid types */
|
2001-12-10 00:26:21 +00:00
|
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
|
|
|
|
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Bad SSLv3 Content Type");
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
offset += record_length; /* skip to end of record */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return offset;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* dissects the change cipher spec procotol, filling in the tree */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
2002-04-08 10:05:19 +00:00
|
|
|
dissect_ssl3_change_cipher_spec(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
|
|
|
|
guint *conv_version)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* struct {
|
|
|
|
* enum { change_cipher_spec(1), (255) } type;
|
|
|
|
* } ChangeCipherSpec;
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
proto_item_set_text(tree,
|
|
|
|
"%s Record Layer: Change Cipher Spec",
|
|
|
|
ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version]);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_change_cipher_spec, tvb,
|
|
|
|
offset++, 1, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* dissects the alert message, filling in the tree */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
dissect_ssl3_alert(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
|
|
|
|
guint *conv_version)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* struct {
|
|
|
|
* AlertLevel level;
|
|
|
|
* AlertDescription description;
|
|
|
|
* } Alert;
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *ti;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *ssl_alert_tree = NULL;
|
|
|
|
gchar *level;
|
|
|
|
gchar *desc;
|
|
|
|
guint8 byte;
|
|
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_alert_message, tvb,
|
|
|
|
offset, 2, 0);
|
|
|
|
ssl_alert_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_alert);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* set the record layer label
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* first lookup the names for the alert level and description */
|
|
|
|
byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); /* grab the level byte */
|
|
|
|
level = match_strval(byte, ssl_31_alert_level);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset+1); /* grab the desc byte */
|
|
|
|
desc = match_strval(byte, ssl_31_alert_description);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* now set the text in the record layer line */
|
|
|
|
if (level && desc)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-12-10 00:26:21 +00:00
|
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
|
|
|
|
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO,
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
"Alert (Level: %s, Description: %s)",
|
|
|
|
level, desc);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-12-10 00:26:21 +00:00
|
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
|
|
|
|
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Encrypted Alert");
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (level && desc)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
proto_item_set_text(tree, "%s Record Layer: Alert "
|
|
|
|
"(Level: %s, Description: %s)",
|
|
|
|
ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version],
|
|
|
|
level, desc);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_alert_tree, hf_ssl_alert_message_level,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset++, 1, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_alert_tree, hf_ssl_alert_message_description,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset++, 1, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
proto_item_set_text(tree,
|
|
|
|
"%s Record Layer: Encrypted Alert",
|
|
|
|
ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version]);
|
|
|
|
proto_item_set_text(ssl_alert_tree,
|
|
|
|
"Alert Message: Encrypted Alert");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* dissects the handshake protocol, filling the tree */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
dissect_ssl3_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
|
|
|
|
guint32 record_length, guint *conv_version)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* struct {
|
|
|
|
* HandshakeType msg_type;
|
|
|
|
* uint24 length;
|
|
|
|
* select (HandshakeType) {
|
|
|
|
* case hello_request: HelloRequest;
|
|
|
|
* case client_hello: ClientHello;
|
|
|
|
* case server_hello: ServerHello;
|
|
|
|
* case certificate: Certificate;
|
|
|
|
* case server_key_exchange: ServerKeyExchange;
|
|
|
|
* case certificate_request: CertificateRequest;
|
|
|
|
* case server_hello_done: ServerHelloDone;
|
|
|
|
* case certificate_verify: CertificateVerify;
|
|
|
|
* case client_key_exchange: ClientKeyExchange;
|
|
|
|
* case finished: Finished;
|
|
|
|
* } body;
|
|
|
|
* } Handshake;
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *ti = NULL;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *ssl_hand_tree = NULL;
|
|
|
|
gchar *msg_type_str = NULL;
|
|
|
|
guint8 msg_type;
|
|
|
|
guint32 length;
|
|
|
|
gboolean first_iteration = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* just as there can be multiple records per packet, there
|
|
|
|
* can be multiple messages per record as long as they have
|
|
|
|
* the same content type
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* we really only care about this for handshake messages
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* set record_length to the max offset */
|
|
|
|
record_length += offset;
|
|
|
|
while (offset < record_length)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
msg_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
msg_type_str = match_strval(msg_type, ssl_31_handshake_type);
|
|
|
|
length = tvb_get_ntoh24(tvb, offset + 1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!msg_type_str && !first_iteration)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* only dissect / report messages if they're
|
|
|
|
* either the first message in this record
|
|
|
|
* or they're a valid message type
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* on second and later iterations, add comma to info col */
|
|
|
|
if (!first_iteration)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-12-10 00:26:21 +00:00
|
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
|
|
|
|
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", ");
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Update our info string
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2001-12-10 00:26:21 +00:00
|
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
|
|
|
|
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "%s", (msg_type_str != NULL)
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
? msg_type_str : "Encrypted Handshake Message");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* set the label text on the record layer expanding node */
|
|
|
|
if (first_iteration)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
proto_item_set_text(tree, "%s Record Layer: %s",
|
|
|
|
ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version],
|
|
|
|
(msg_type_str!=NULL) ? msg_type_str :
|
|
|
|
"Encrypted Handshake Message");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
proto_item_set_text(tree, "%s Record Layer: %s",
|
|
|
|
ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version],
|
|
|
|
"Multiple Handshake Messages");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* add a subtree for the handshake protocol */
|
|
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_protocol, tvb,
|
|
|
|
offset, length + 4, 0);
|
|
|
|
ssl_hand_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_handshake);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_hand_tree)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* set the text label on the subtree node */
|
|
|
|
proto_item_set_text(ssl_hand_tree, "Handshake Protocol: %s",
|
|
|
|
(msg_type_str != NULL) ? msg_type_str :
|
|
|
|
"Encrypted Handshake Message");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* if we don't have a valid handshake type, just quit dissecting */
|
|
|
|
if (!msg_type_str)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_hand_tree)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* add nodes for the message type and message length */
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_hand_tree, hf_ssl_handshake_type,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 1, msg_type);
|
|
|
|
offset++;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_hand_tree, hf_ssl_handshake_length,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 3, length);
|
|
|
|
offset += 3;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* now dissect the handshake message, if necessary */
|
|
|
|
switch (msg_type) {
|
|
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_REQUEST:
|
|
|
|
/* hello_request has no fields, so nothing to do! */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
|
2002-04-08 10:05:19 +00:00
|
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_hello(tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
|
2002-04-08 10:05:19 +00:00
|
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_hello(tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE:
|
2004-08-02 08:57:40 +00:00
|
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert(tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset, pinfo);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
2003-07-19 07:06:01 +00:00
|
|
|
case SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG:
|
|
|
|
/* unimplemented */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
case SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST:
|
2002-04-08 10:05:19 +00:00
|
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert_req(tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL_HND_SVR_HELLO_DONE:
|
|
|
|
/* server_hello_done has no fields, so nothing to do! */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
2003-07-19 07:06:01 +00:00
|
|
|
case SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY:
|
|
|
|
/* unimplemented */
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG:
|
|
|
|
/* unimplemented */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2003-07-19 07:06:01 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL_HND_FINISHED:
|
|
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_finished(tvb, ssl_hand_tree,
|
|
|
|
offset, conv_version);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
offset += 4; /* skip the handshake header */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
offset += length;
|
|
|
|
first_iteration = FALSE; /* set up for next pass, if any */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_hello_common(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree,
|
|
|
|
guint32 offset)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* show the client's random challenge */
|
|
|
|
guint32 initial_offset = offset;
|
2001-09-14 07:10:13 +00:00
|
|
|
nstime_t gmt_unix_time;
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
guint8 session_id_length = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* show the time */
|
2001-09-14 07:10:13 +00:00
|
|
|
gmt_unix_time.secs = tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
gmt_unix_time.nsecs = 0;
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_time(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_random_time,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 4, &gmt_unix_time);
|
|
|
|
offset += 4;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* show the random bytes */
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_random_bytes,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 28, 0);
|
|
|
|
offset += 28;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* show the session id */
|
|
|
|
session_id_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_session_id_len,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset++, 1, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (session_id_length > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-07-16 01:38:34 +00:00
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_bytes_format(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_session_id,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, session_id_length,
|
|
|
|
tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, session_id_length),
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
"Session ID (%u byte%s)",
|
|
|
|
session_id_length,
|
|
|
|
plurality(session_id_length, "", "s"));
|
|
|
|
offset += session_id_length;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return offset - initial_offset;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
2002-04-08 10:05:19 +00:00
|
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* struct {
|
|
|
|
* ProtocolVersion client_version;
|
|
|
|
* Random random;
|
|
|
|
* SessionID session_id;
|
|
|
|
* CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-1>;
|
|
|
|
* CompressionMethod compression_methods<1..2^8-1>;
|
|
|
|
* } ClientHello;
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *ti;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *cs_tree;
|
|
|
|
guint16 cipher_suite_length = 0;
|
|
|
|
guint8 compression_methods_length = 0;
|
2003-01-27 19:50:05 +00:00
|
|
|
guint8 compression_method;
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* show the client version */
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_client_version, tvb,
|
|
|
|
offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* show the fields in common with server hello */
|
|
|
|
offset += dissect_ssl3_hnd_hello_common(tvb, tree, offset);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* tell the user how many cipher suites there are */
|
|
|
|
cipher_suite_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
2001-07-16 01:38:34 +00:00
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites_len,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, cipher_suite_length);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
offset += 2; /* skip opaque length */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (cipher_suite_length > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-07-16 04:02:22 +00:00
|
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
|
|
|
|
hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, cipher_suite_length,
|
|
|
|
"Cipher Suites (%u suite%s)",
|
|
|
|
cipher_suite_length / 2,
|
|
|
|
plurality(cipher_suite_length/2, "", "s"));
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* make this a subtree */
|
|
|
|
cs_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_cipher_suites);
|
|
|
|
if (!cs_tree)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
cs_tree = tree; /* failsafe */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (cipher_suite_length > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(cs_tree, hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suite,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
cipher_suite_length -= 2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* tell the user how man compression methods there are */
|
2001-07-16 01:38:34 +00:00
|
|
|
compression_methods_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_comp_methods_len,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 1, compression_methods_length);
|
|
|
|
offset++;
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (compression_methods_length > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-07-16 04:02:22 +00:00
|
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
|
|
|
|
hf_ssl_handshake_comp_methods,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, compression_methods_length,
|
|
|
|
"Compression Methods (%u method%s)",
|
|
|
|
compression_methods_length,
|
|
|
|
plurality(compression_methods_length,
|
|
|
|
"", "s"));
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* make this a subtree */
|
|
|
|
cs_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_comp_methods);
|
|
|
|
if (!cs_tree)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
cs_tree = tree; /* failsafe */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (compression_methods_length > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2003-01-27 19:50:05 +00:00
|
|
|
compression_method = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
if (compression_method < 64)
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(cs_tree, hf_ssl_handshake_comp_method,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 1, compression_method);
|
|
|
|
else if (compression_method > 63 && compression_method < 193)
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(cs_tree, tvb, offset, 1,
|
|
|
|
"Compression Method: Reserved - to be assigned by IANA (%u)",
|
|
|
|
compression_method);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(cs_tree, tvb, offset, 1,
|
|
|
|
"Compression Method: Private use range (%u)",
|
|
|
|
compression_method);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
offset++;
|
|
|
|
compression_methods_length--;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
2002-04-08 10:05:19 +00:00
|
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* struct {
|
|
|
|
* ProtocolVersion server_version;
|
|
|
|
* Random random;
|
|
|
|
* SessionID session_id;
|
|
|
|
* CipherSuite cipher_suite;
|
|
|
|
* CompressionMethod compression_method;
|
|
|
|
* } ServerHello;
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* show the server version */
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_server_version, tvb,
|
|
|
|
offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* first display the elements conveniently in
|
|
|
|
* common with client hello
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
offset += dissect_ssl3_hnd_hello_common(tvb, tree, offset);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* now the server-selected cipher suite */
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suite,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* and the server-selected compression method */
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_comp_method,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 1, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
2002-04-08 10:05:19 +00:00
|
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
2004-08-02 08:57:40 +00:00
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo)
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* opaque ASN.1Cert<2^24-1>;
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* struct {
|
|
|
|
* ASN.1Cert certificate_list<1..2^24-1>;
|
|
|
|
* } Certificate;
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
guint32 certificate_list_length;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *ti;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *subtree;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
certificate_list_length = tvb_get_ntoh24(tvb, offset);
|
2001-07-16 01:38:34 +00:00
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_certificates_len,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 3, certificate_list_length);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
offset += 3; /* 24-bit length value */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (certificate_list_length > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-07-16 04:02:22 +00:00
|
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
|
|
|
|
hf_ssl_handshake_certificates,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, certificate_list_length,
|
|
|
|
"Certificates (%u byte%s)",
|
|
|
|
certificate_list_length,
|
|
|
|
plurality(certificate_list_length,
|
|
|
|
"", "s"));
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* make it a subtree */
|
|
|
|
subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_certs);
|
|
|
|
if (!subtree)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
subtree = tree; /* failsafe */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* iterate through each certificate */
|
|
|
|
while (certificate_list_length > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* get the length of the current certificate */
|
|
|
|
guint32 cert_length = tvb_get_ntoh24(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
certificate_list_length -= 3 + cert_length;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf_ssl_handshake_certificate_len,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 3, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 3;
|
|
|
|
|
2004-08-02 08:57:40 +00:00
|
|
|
dissect_x509af_Certificate(FALSE, tvb, offset, pinfo, subtree, hf_ssl_handshake_certificate);
|
|
|
|
offset += cert_length;
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
2002-04-08 10:05:19 +00:00
|
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert_req(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* enum {
|
|
|
|
* rsa_sign(1), dss_sign(2), rsa_fixed_dh(3), dss_fixed_dh(4),
|
|
|
|
* (255)
|
|
|
|
* } ClientCertificateType;
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>;
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* struct {
|
|
|
|
* ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
|
|
|
|
* DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<3..2^16-1>;
|
|
|
|
* } CertificateRequest;
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *ti;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *subtree;
|
|
|
|
guint8 cert_types_count = 0;
|
|
|
|
int dnames_length = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
cert_types_count = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
2001-07-16 01:38:34 +00:00
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_cert_types_count,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 1, cert_types_count);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
offset++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (cert_types_count > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-07-16 04:02:22 +00:00
|
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
|
|
|
|
hf_ssl_handshake_cert_types,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, cert_types_count,
|
|
|
|
"Certificate types (%u type%s)",
|
|
|
|
cert_types_count,
|
|
|
|
plurality(cert_types_count, "", "s"));
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_cert_types);
|
|
|
|
if (!subtree)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
subtree = tree;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (cert_types_count > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf_ssl_handshake_cert_type,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 1, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset++;
|
|
|
|
cert_types_count--;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dnames_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
2001-07-16 01:38:34 +00:00
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_dnames_len,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, dnames_length);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (dnames_length > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-07-16 04:02:22 +00:00
|
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
|
|
|
|
hf_ssl_handshake_dnames,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, dnames_length,
|
|
|
|
"Distinguished Names (%d byte%s)",
|
|
|
|
dnames_length,
|
|
|
|
plurality(dnames_length, "", "s"));
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_dnames);
|
|
|
|
if (!subtree)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
subtree = tree;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (dnames_length > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* get the length of the current certificate */
|
|
|
|
guint16 name_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
dnames_length -= 2 + name_length;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf_ssl_handshake_dname_len,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
2001-07-16 01:38:34 +00:00
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_bytes_format(subtree,
|
|
|
|
hf_ssl_handshake_dname,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, name_length,
|
|
|
|
tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, name_length),
|
|
|
|
"Distinguished Name (%u byte%s)",
|
|
|
|
name_length,
|
|
|
|
plurality(name_length, "", "s"));
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
offset += name_length;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
2002-04-08 10:05:19 +00:00
|
|
|
dissect_ssl3_hnd_finished(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
|
|
|
|
guint *conv_version)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* For TLS:
|
|
|
|
* struct {
|
|
|
|
* opaque verify_data[12];
|
|
|
|
* } Finished;
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* For SSLv3:
|
|
|
|
* struct {
|
|
|
|
* opaque md5_hash[16];
|
|
|
|
* opaque sha_hash[20];
|
|
|
|
* } Finished;
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* this all needs a tree, so bail if we don't have one */
|
|
|
|
if (!tree)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch(*conv_version) {
|
|
|
|
case SSL_VER_TLS:
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_finished,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 12, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL_VER_SSLv3:
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_md5_hash,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 16, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 16;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_sha_hash,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 20, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 20;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*********************************************************************
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* SSL version 2 Dissectors
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
*********************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* record layer dissector */
|
|
|
|
static int
|
2002-03-28 09:15:28 +00:00
|
|
|
dissect_ssl2_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
|
|
|
|
guint32 offset, guint *conv_version,
|
2002-01-17 09:24:05 +00:00
|
|
|
gboolean *need_desegmentation)
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
guint32 initial_offset = offset;
|
|
|
|
guint8 byte = 0;
|
|
|
|
guint8 record_length_length = 0;
|
2002-01-04 07:01:54 +00:00
|
|
|
guint32 record_length = 0;
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
gint is_escape = -1;
|
|
|
|
gint16 padding_length = -1;
|
|
|
|
guint8 msg_type = 0;
|
|
|
|
gchar *msg_type_str = NULL;
|
2002-01-04 07:01:54 +00:00
|
|
|
guint32 available_bytes = 0;
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *ti;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *ssl_record_tree = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* pull first byte; if high bit is set, then record
|
|
|
|
* length is three bytes due to padding; otherwise
|
|
|
|
* record length is two bytes
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
record_length_length = (byte & 0x80) ? 2 : 3;
|
|
|
|
|
2002-03-28 09:15:28 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Can we do reassembly?
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
available_bytes = tvb_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_desegment && pinfo->can_desegment) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Yes - is the record header split across segment boundaries?
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (available_bytes < record_length_length) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Yes. Tell the TCP dissector where the data for this
|
|
|
|
* message starts in the data it handed us, and how many
|
|
|
|
* more bytes we need, and return.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
pinfo->desegment_offset = offset;
|
|
|
|
pinfo->desegment_len = record_length_length - available_bytes;
|
|
|
|
*need_desegmentation = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
return offset;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
/* parse out the record length */
|
|
|
|
switch(record_length_length) {
|
|
|
|
case 2: /* two-byte record length */
|
|
|
|
record_length = (byte & 0x7f) << 8;
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 1);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
record_length += byte;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 3: /* three-byte record length */
|
|
|
|
is_escape = (byte & 0x40) ? TRUE : FALSE;
|
|
|
|
record_length = (byte & 0x3f) << 8;
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 1);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
record_length += byte;
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 2);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
padding_length = byte;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2002-01-04 07:01:54 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2002-03-28 09:15:28 +00:00
|
|
|
* Can we do reassembly?
|
2002-01-04 07:01:54 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2002-03-28 09:15:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ssl_desegment && pinfo->can_desegment) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Yes - is the record split across segment boundaries?
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (available_bytes < (record_length_length + record_length)) {
|
2002-03-28 09:15:28 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Yes. Tell the TCP dissector where the data for this
|
|
|
|
* message starts in the data it handed us, and how many
|
|
|
|
* more bytes we need, and return.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
pinfo->desegment_offset = offset;
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
pinfo->desegment_len = (record_length_length + record_length)
|
|
|
|
- available_bytes;
|
2002-03-28 09:15:28 +00:00
|
|
|
*need_desegmentation = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
return offset;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
offset += record_length_length;
|
2002-01-04 07:01:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
/* add the record layer subtree header */
|
|
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_record, tvb, initial_offset,
|
|
|
|
record_length_length + record_length, 0);
|
|
|
|
ssl_record_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_record);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* pull the msg_type so we can bail if it's unknown */
|
|
|
|
msg_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, initial_offset + record_length_length);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* if we get a server_hello or later handshake in v2, then set
|
|
|
|
* this to sslv2
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (*conv_version == SSL_VER_UNKNOWN)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_looks_like_valid_pct_handshake(tvb,
|
|
|
|
(initial_offset +
|
|
|
|
record_length_length),
|
|
|
|
record_length)) {
|
|
|
|
*conv_version = SSL_VER_PCT;
|
|
|
|
ssl_set_conv_version(pinfo, *conv_version);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else if (msg_type >= 2 && msg_type <= 8)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
*conv_version = SSL_VER_SSLv2;
|
|
|
|
ssl_set_conv_version(pinfo, *conv_version);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-08-28 21:04:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
/* if we get here, but don't have a version set for the
|
|
|
|
* conversation, then set a version for just this frame
|
|
|
|
* (e.g., on a client hello)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL))
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL,
|
|
|
|
(*conv_version == SSL_VER_PCT) ? "PCT" : "SSLv2");
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* see if the msg_type is valid; if not the payload is
|
|
|
|
* probably encrypted, so note that fact and bail
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
msg_type_str = match_strval(msg_type,
|
|
|
|
(*conv_version == SSL_VER_PCT)
|
|
|
|
? pct_msg_types : ssl_20_msg_types);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!msg_type_str
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
|| ((*conv_version != SSL_VER_PCT) &&
|
|
|
|
!ssl_looks_like_valid_v2_handshake(tvb, initial_offset
|
|
|
|
+ record_length_length,
|
|
|
|
record_length))
|
|
|
|
|| ((*conv_version == SSL_VER_PCT) &&
|
|
|
|
!ssl_looks_like_valid_pct_handshake(tvb, initial_offset
|
|
|
|
+ record_length_length,
|
|
|
|
record_length)))
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_record_tree)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
proto_item_set_text(ssl_record_tree, "%s Record Layer: %s",
|
|
|
|
(*conv_version == SSL_VER_PCT)
|
|
|
|
? "PCT" : "SSLv2",
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
"Encrypted Data");
|
|
|
|
}
|
2001-12-10 00:26:21 +00:00
|
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
|
|
|
|
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Encrypted Data");
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
return initial_offset + record_length_length + record_length;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-12-10 00:26:21 +00:00
|
|
|
if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO))
|
|
|
|
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, msg_type_str);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_record_tree)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
proto_item_set_text(ssl_record_tree, "%s Record Layer: %s",
|
|
|
|
(*conv_version == SSL_VER_PCT)
|
|
|
|
? "PCT" : "SSLv2",
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
msg_type_str);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We have a valid message type, so move foward, filling in the
|
|
|
|
* tree by adding the length, is_escape boolean and padding_length,
|
|
|
|
* if present in the original packet
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2002-01-04 07:01:54 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ssl_record_tree)
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* add the record length */
|
|
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_uint (ssl_record_tree,
|
|
|
|
hf_ssl_record_length, tvb,
|
|
|
|
initial_offset, record_length_length,
|
|
|
|
record_length);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_record_tree && is_escape != -1)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_boolean(ssl_record_tree,
|
|
|
|
hf_ssl2_record_is_escape, tvb,
|
|
|
|
initial_offset, 1, is_escape);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_record_tree && padding_length != -1)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_record_tree,
|
|
|
|
hf_ssl2_record_padding_length, tvb,
|
|
|
|
initial_offset + 2, 1, padding_length);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* dissect the record data
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* jump forward to the start of the record data */
|
|
|
|
offset = initial_offset + record_length_length;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* add the message type */
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_record_tree)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(ssl_record_tree,
|
|
|
|
(*conv_version == SSL_VER_PCT)
|
|
|
|
? hf_pct_msg_type : hf_ssl2_msg_type,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 1, 0);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
offset++; /* move past msg_type byte */
|
|
|
|
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (*conv_version != SSL_VER_PCT)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* dissect the message (only handle client hello right now) */
|
|
|
|
switch (msg_type) {
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
|
|
|
|
dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_hello(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY:
|
|
|
|
dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_master_key(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
case SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
|
2004-08-02 08:57:40 +00:00
|
|
|
dissect_ssl2_hnd_server_hello(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset, pinfo);
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
case SSL2_HND_ERROR:
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_FINISHED:
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_HND_SERVER_VERIFY:
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_HND_SERVER_FINISHED:
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_HND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE:
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:
|
|
|
|
/* unimplemented */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
default: /* unknown */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
2002-08-28 21:04:11 +00:00
|
|
|
/* dissect the message */
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
switch (msg_type) {
|
|
|
|
case PCT_MSG_CLIENT_HELLO:
|
2004-06-01 01:03:49 +00:00
|
|
|
dissect_pct_msg_client_hello(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
case PCT_MSG_SERVER_HELLO:
|
2004-08-02 08:57:40 +00:00
|
|
|
dissect_pct_msg_server_hello(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset, pinfo);
|
2004-06-01 01:03:49 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
case PCT_MSG_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY:
|
2004-06-01 01:03:49 +00:00
|
|
|
dissect_pct_msg_client_master_key(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
case PCT_MSG_SERVER_VERIFY:
|
2004-06-01 01:03:49 +00:00
|
|
|
dissect_pct_msg_server_verify(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PCT_MSG_ERROR:
|
|
|
|
dissect_pct_msg_error(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset);
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
default: /* unknown */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
return (initial_offset + record_length_length + record_length);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
2002-04-08 10:05:19 +00:00
|
|
|
dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* struct {
|
|
|
|
* uint8 msg_type;
|
|
|
|
* Version version;
|
|
|
|
* uint16 cipher_spec_length;
|
|
|
|
* uint16 session_id_length;
|
|
|
|
* uint16 challenge_length;
|
|
|
|
* V2CipherSpec cipher_specs[V2ClientHello.cipher_spec_length];
|
|
|
|
* opaque session_id[V2ClientHello.session_id_length];
|
|
|
|
* Random challenge;
|
|
|
|
* } V2ClientHello;
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Note: when we get here, offset's already pointing at Version
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
guint16 version;
|
|
|
|
guint16 cipher_spec_length;
|
|
|
|
guint16 session_id_length;
|
|
|
|
guint16 challenge_length;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *ti;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *cs_tree;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(version))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* invalid version; probably encrypted data */
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (tree)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* show the version */
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_record_version, tvb,
|
|
|
|
offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cipher_spec_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec_len,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
session_id_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_len,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
challenge_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge_len,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* tell the user how many cipher specs they've won */
|
2001-07-16 04:02:22 +00:00
|
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, cipher_spec_length,
|
|
|
|
"Cipher Specs (%u specs)",
|
|
|
|
cipher_spec_length/3);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* make this a subtree and expand the actual specs below */
|
|
|
|
cs_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_cipher_suites);
|
|
|
|
if (!cs_tree)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
cs_tree = tree; /* failsafe */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* iterate through the cipher specs, showing them */
|
|
|
|
while (cipher_spec_length > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(cs_tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 3, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 3; /* length of one cipher spec */
|
|
|
|
cipher_spec_length -= 3;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* if there's a session id, show it */
|
|
|
|
if (session_id_length > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-07-16 01:38:34 +00:00
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_bytes_format(tree,
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
hf_ssl_handshake_session_id,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, session_id_length,
|
2001-07-16 01:38:34 +00:00
|
|
|
tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, session_id_length),
|
|
|
|
"Session ID (%u byte%s)",
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
session_id_length,
|
|
|
|
plurality(session_id_length, "", "s"));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
offset += session_id_length;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* if there's a challenge, show it */
|
|
|
|
if (challenge_length > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, challenge_length, 0);
|
|
|
|
offset += challenge_length;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-06-01 01:03:49 +00:00
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
dissect_pct_msg_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
guint16 CH_CLIENT_VERSION, CH_OFFSET, CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH, CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH, CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH, CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH, CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
proto_item *CH_CIPHER_SPECS_ti, *CH_HASH_SPECS_ti, *CH_CERT_SPECS_ti, *CH_EXCH_SPECS_ti;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *CH_CIPHER_SPECS_tree, *CH_HASH_SPECS_tree, *CH_CERT_SPECS_tree, *CH_EXCH_SPECS_tree;
|
|
|
|
gint i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CH_CLIENT_VERSION = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
if(CH_CLIENT_VERSION != PCT_VERSION_1)
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Client Version, should be %x in PCT version 1", PCT_VERSION_1);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Client Version (%x)", PCT_VERSION_1);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "PAD");
|
|
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 32, "Client Session ID Data (32 bytes)");
|
|
|
|
offset += 32;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 32, "Challange Data(32 bytes)");
|
|
|
|
offset += 32;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CH_OFFSET = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
if(CH_OFFSET != PCT_CH_OFFSET_V1)
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "CH_OFFSET: %d, should be %d in PCT version 1", CH_OFFSET, PCT_CH_OFFSET_V1);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "CH_OFFSET: %d", CH_OFFSET);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "CIPHER_SPECS Length: %d", CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "HASH_SPECS Length: %d", CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "CERT_SPECS Length: %d", CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "EXCH_SPECS Length: %d", CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "IV Length: %d", CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH) {
|
|
|
|
CH_CIPHER_SPECS_ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_cipher_spec, tvb, offset, CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
CH_CIPHER_SPECS_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_ti, ett_pct_cipher_suites);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for(i=0; i<(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH/4); i++) {
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_tree, hf_pct_handshake_cipher, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_tree, tvb, offset, 1, "Encryption key length: %d", tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset));
|
|
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_tree, tvb, offset, 1, "MAC key length in bits: %d", tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) + 64);
|
|
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH) {
|
|
|
|
CH_HASH_SPECS_ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_hash_spec, tvb, offset, CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
CH_HASH_SPECS_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(CH_HASH_SPECS_ti, ett_pct_hash_suites);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for(i=0; i<(CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH/2); i++) {
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(CH_HASH_SPECS_tree, hf_pct_handshake_hash, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH) {
|
|
|
|
CH_CERT_SPECS_ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_cert_spec, tvb, offset, CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
CH_CERT_SPECS_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(CH_CERT_SPECS_ti, ett_pct_cert_suites);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for(i=0; i< (CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH/2); i++) {
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(CH_CERT_SPECS_tree, hf_pct_handshake_cert, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH) {
|
|
|
|
CH_EXCH_SPECS_ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_exch_spec, tvb, offset, CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
CH_EXCH_SPECS_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(CH_EXCH_SPECS_ti, ett_pct_exch_suites);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for(i=0; i<(CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH/2); i++) {
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(CH_EXCH_SPECS_tree, hf_pct_handshake_exch, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH) {
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH, "IV data (%d bytes)", CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
offset += CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
2004-08-02 08:57:40 +00:00
|
|
|
dissect_pct_msg_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo)
|
2004-06-01 01:03:49 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* structure:
|
|
|
|
char SH_MSG_SERVER_HELLO
|
|
|
|
char SH_PAD
|
|
|
|
char SH_SERVER_VERSION_MSB
|
|
|
|
char SH_SERVER_VERSION_LSB
|
|
|
|
char SH_RESTART_SESSION_OK
|
|
|
|
char SH_CLIENT_AUTH_REQ
|
|
|
|
char SH_CIPHER_SPECS_DATA[4]
|
|
|
|
char SH_HASH_SPECS_DATA[2]
|
|
|
|
char SH_CERT_SPECS_DATA[2]
|
|
|
|
char SH_EXCH_SPECS_DATA[2]
|
|
|
|
char SH_CONNECTION_ID_DATA[32]
|
|
|
|
char SH_CERTIFICATE_LENGTH_MSB
|
|
|
|
char SH_CERTIFICATE_LENGTH_LSB
|
|
|
|
char SH_CLIENT_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH_MSB
|
|
|
|
char SH_CLIENT_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH_LSB
|
|
|
|
char SH_CLIENT_SIG_SPECS_LENGTH_MSB
|
|
|
|
char SH_CLIENT_SIG_SPECS_LENGTH_LSB
|
|
|
|
char SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH_MSB
|
|
|
|
char SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH_LSB
|
|
|
|
char SH_CERTIFICATE_DATA[MSB<<8|LSB]
|
|
|
|
char SH_CLIENT_CERT_SPECS_DATA[MSB<<8|LSB]
|
|
|
|
char SH_CLIENT_SIG_SPECS_DATA[MSB<<8|LSB]
|
|
|
|
char SH_RESPONSE_DATA[MSB<<8|LSB]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
guint16 SH_SERVER_VERSION, SH_CERT_LENGTH, SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH, SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH, SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "PAD");
|
|
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SH_SERVER_VERSION = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
if(SH_SERVER_VERSION != PCT_VERSION_1)
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Server Version, should be %x in PCT version 1", PCT_VERSION_1);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Server Version (%x)", PCT_VERSION_1);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SH_RESTART_SESSION_OK flag");
|
|
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SH_CLIENT_AUTH_REQ flag");
|
|
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_cipher, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "Encryption key length: %d", tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset));
|
|
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "MAC key length in bits: %d", tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) + 64);
|
|
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_hash, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_cert, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_exch, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 32, "Connection ID Data (32 bytes)");
|
|
|
|
offset += 32;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SH_CERT_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Server Certificate Length: %d", SH_CERT_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Client CERT_SPECS Length: %d", SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Client SIG_SPECS Length: %d", SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Response Length: %d", SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(SH_CERT_LENGTH) {
|
2004-08-02 08:57:40 +00:00
|
|
|
dissect_x509af_Certificate(FALSE, tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, hf_pct_handshake_server_cert);
|
2004-06-01 01:03:49 +00:00
|
|
|
offset += SH_CERT_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH) {
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH, "Client CERT_SPECS (%d bytes)", SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
offset += SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH) {
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH, "Client Signature (%d bytes)", SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
offset += SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH) {
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH, "Server Response (%d bytes)", SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
offset += SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
dissect_pct_msg_client_master_key(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
guint16 CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH, CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH, CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH, CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE, CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH, CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "PAD");
|
|
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_cert, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_sig, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Clear Key Length: %d",CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Encrypted Key Length: %d",CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH= tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "IV Length: %d",CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Verify Prelude Length: %d",CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Client Cert Length: %d",CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Response Length: %d",CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH) {
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH, "Clear Key data (%d bytes)", CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
offset += CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH) {
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH, "Encrypted Key data (%d bytes)", CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
offset += CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH) {
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH, "IV data (%d bytes)", CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
offset += CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE) {
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE, "Verify Prelude data (%d bytes)", CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE);
|
|
|
|
offset += CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH) {
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH, "Client Certificate data (%d bytes)", CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
offset += CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH) {
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH, "Response data (%d bytes)", CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
offset += CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
dissect_pct_msg_server_verify(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
guint16 SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "PAD");
|
|
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 32, "Server Session ID data (32 bytes)");
|
|
|
|
offset += 32;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Server Response Length: %d", SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH) {
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH, "Server Response (%d bytes)", SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
offset += SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
dissect_pct_msg_error(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
guint16 ERROR_CODE, INFO_LEN;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ERROR_CODE = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_msg_error_type, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
INFO_LEN = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Eror Information Length: %d", INFO_LEN);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
if (ERROR_CODE == PCT_ERR_SPECS_MISMATCH && INFO_LEN == 6)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SPECS_MISMATCH_CIPHER");
|
|
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SPECS_MISMATCH_HASH");
|
|
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SPECS_MISMATCH_CERT");
|
|
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SPECS_MISMATCH_EXCH");
|
|
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SPECS_MISMATCH_CLIENT_CERT");
|
|
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SPECS_MISMATCH_CLIENT_SIG");
|
|
|
|
offset += 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else if(INFO_LEN) {
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, INFO_LEN, "Error Information dta (%d bytes)", INFO_LEN);
|
|
|
|
offset += INFO_LEN;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
static void
|
2002-04-08 10:05:19 +00:00
|
|
|
dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_master_key(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* struct {
|
|
|
|
* uint8 msg_type;
|
|
|
|
* V2Cipherspec cipher;
|
|
|
|
* uint16 clear_key_length;
|
|
|
|
* uint16 encrypted_key_length;
|
|
|
|
* uint16 key_arg_length;
|
|
|
|
* opaque clear_key_data[V2ClientMasterKey.clear_key_length];
|
|
|
|
* opaque encrypted_key_data[V2ClientMasterKey.encrypted_key_length];
|
|
|
|
* opaque key_arg_data[V2ClientMasterKey.key_arg_length];
|
|
|
|
* } V2ClientMasterKey;
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Note: when we get here, offset's already pointing at cipher
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
guint16 clear_key_length;
|
|
|
|
guint16 encrypted_key_length;
|
|
|
|
guint16 key_arg_length;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* at this point, everything we do involves the tree,
|
|
|
|
* so quit now if we don't have one ;-)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!tree)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* show the selected cipher */
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 3, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 3;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* get the fixed fields */
|
|
|
|
clear_key_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key_len,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
encrypted_key_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key_len,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
key_arg_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg_len,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* show the variable length fields */
|
|
|
|
if (clear_key_length > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, clear_key_length, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += clear_key_length;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (encrypted_key_length > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, encrypted_key_length, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += encrypted_key_length;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (key_arg_length > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, key_arg_length, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += key_arg_length;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
2002-04-08 10:05:19 +00:00
|
|
|
dissect_ssl2_hnd_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb,
|
2004-08-02 08:57:40 +00:00
|
|
|
proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo)
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* struct {
|
|
|
|
* uint8 msg_type;
|
|
|
|
* uint8 session_id_hit;
|
|
|
|
* uint8 certificate_type;
|
|
|
|
* uint16 server_version;
|
|
|
|
* uint16 certificate_length;
|
|
|
|
* uint16 cipher_specs_length;
|
|
|
|
* uint16 connection_id_length;
|
|
|
|
* opaque certificate_data[V2ServerHello.certificate_length];
|
|
|
|
* opaque cipher_specs_data[V2ServerHello.cipher_specs_length];
|
|
|
|
* opaque connection_id_data[V2ServerHello.connection_id_length];
|
|
|
|
* } V2ServerHello;
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Note: when we get here, offset's already pointing at session_id_hit
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
guint16 certificate_length;
|
|
|
|
guint16 cipher_spec_length;
|
|
|
|
guint16 connection_id_length;
|
|
|
|
guint16 version;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *ti;
|
|
|
|
proto_tree *subtree;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* everything we do only makes sense with a tree, so
|
|
|
|
* quit now if we don't have one
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!tree)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 2);
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(version))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* invalid version; probably encrypted data */
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* is there a hit? */
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_hit,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 1, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* what type of certificate is this? */
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cert_type,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 1, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* now the server version */
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_server_version,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* get the fixed fields */
|
|
|
|
certificate_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_certificate_len,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, certificate_length);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cipher_spec_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec_len,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, cipher_spec_length);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
connection_id_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id_len,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 2, connection_id_length);
|
|
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* now the variable length fields */
|
|
|
|
if (certificate_length > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2004-08-02 08:57:40 +00:00
|
|
|
dissect_x509af_Certificate(FALSE, tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, hf_ssl_handshake_certificate);
|
|
|
|
offset += certificate_length;
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (cipher_spec_length > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* provide a collapsing node for the cipher specs */
|
2002-08-28 21:04:11 +00:00
|
|
|
ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
|
2001-07-16 04:02:22 +00:00
|
|
|
hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, cipher_spec_length,
|
|
|
|
"Cipher Specs (%u spec%s)",
|
|
|
|
cipher_spec_length/3,
|
|
|
|
plurality(cipher_spec_length/3, "", "s"));
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_cipher_suites);
|
|
|
|
if (!subtree)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
subtree = tree;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* iterate through the cipher specs */
|
|
|
|
while (cipher_spec_length > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, 3, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += 3;
|
|
|
|
cipher_spec_length -= 3;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (connection_id_length > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id,
|
|
|
|
tvb, offset, connection_id_length, FALSE);
|
|
|
|
offset += connection_id_length;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*********************************************************************
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Support Functions
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
*********************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
ssl_set_conv_version(packet_info *pinfo, guint version)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
conversation_t *conversation;
|
2001-09-03 10:33:12 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (pinfo->fd->flags.visited)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* We've already processed this frame; no need to do any more
|
|
|
|
* work on it.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
conversation = find_conversation(&pinfo->src, &pinfo->dst, pinfo->ptype,
|
|
|
|
pinfo->srcport, pinfo->destport, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
2001-09-03 10:33:12 +00:00
|
|
|
if (conversation == NULL)
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2001-09-03 10:33:12 +00:00
|
|
|
/* create a new conversation */
|
|
|
|
conversation = conversation_new(&pinfo->src, &pinfo->dst, pinfo->ptype,
|
|
|
|
pinfo->srcport, pinfo->destport, 0);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2001-09-03 10:33:12 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (conversation_get_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl) != NULL)
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2001-09-03 10:33:12 +00:00
|
|
|
/* get rid of the current data */
|
|
|
|
conversation_delete_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2003-03-10 02:06:33 +00:00
|
|
|
conversation_add_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl, GINT_TO_POINTER(version));
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
ssl_is_valid_handshake_type(guint8 type)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (type) {
|
|
|
|
case SSL_HND_HELLO_REQUEST:
|
|
|
|
case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
|
|
|
|
case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
|
|
|
|
case SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE:
|
|
|
|
case SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG:
|
|
|
|
case SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST:
|
|
|
|
case SSL_HND_SVR_HELLO_DONE:
|
|
|
|
case SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY:
|
|
|
|
case SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG:
|
|
|
|
case SSL_HND_FINISHED:
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
ssl_is_valid_content_type(guint8 type)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (type >= 0x14 && type <= 0x17)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(guint16 version)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
gchar *version_str = match_strval(version, ssl_versions);
|
|
|
|
return version_str != NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
ssl_is_authoritative_version_message(guint8 content_type,
|
|
|
|
guint8 next_byte)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (content_type == SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE
|
|
|
|
&& ssl_is_valid_handshake_type(next_byte))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return (next_byte != SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else if (ssl_is_valid_content_type(content_type)
|
|
|
|
&& content_type != SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
ssl_is_v2_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
guint8 byte;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
if (byte != 0x80) /* v2 client hello should start this way */
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset+2);
|
|
|
|
if (byte != 0x01) /* v2 client hello msg type */
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* 1 in 2^16 of being right; improve later if necessary */
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* this applies a heuristic to determine whether
|
|
|
|
* or not the data beginning at offset looks like a
|
|
|
|
* valid sslv2 record. this isn't really possible,
|
|
|
|
* but we'll try to do a reasonable job anyway.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
ssl_looks_like_sslv2(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* here's the current approach:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* we only try to catch unencrypted handshake messages, so we can
|
|
|
|
* assume that there is not padding. This means that the
|
|
|
|
* first byte must be >= 0x80 and there must be a valid sslv2
|
|
|
|
* msg_type in the third byte
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* get the first byte; must have high bit set */
|
|
|
|
guint8 byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
if (byte < 0x80)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* get the supposed msg_type byte; since we only care about
|
|
|
|
* unencrypted handshake messages (we can't tell the type for
|
|
|
|
* encrypted messages), we just check against that list
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 2);
|
|
|
|
switch(byte) {
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_HND_ERROR:
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY:
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
case PCT_MSG_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY:
|
|
|
|
case PCT_MSG_ERROR:
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* this applies a heuristic to determine whether
|
|
|
|
* or not the data beginning at offset looks like a
|
|
|
|
* valid sslv3 record. this is somewhat more reliable
|
|
|
|
* than sslv2 due to the structure of the v3 protocol
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
ssl_looks_like_sslv3(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* have to have a valid content type followed by a valid
|
|
|
|
* protocol version
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
guint8 byte;
|
|
|
|
guint16 version;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* see if the first byte is a valid content type */
|
|
|
|
byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_is_valid_content_type(byte))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* now check to see if the version byte appears valid */
|
|
|
|
version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 1);
|
|
|
|
if (version != 0x0300 && version != 0x0301)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* applies a heuristic to determine whether
|
|
|
|
* or not the data beginning at offset looks
|
|
|
|
* like a valid, unencrypted v2 handshake message.
|
|
|
|
* since it isn't possible to completely tell random
|
|
|
|
* data apart from a valid message without state,
|
|
|
|
* we try to help the odds.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
ssl_looks_like_valid_v2_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset,
|
|
|
|
guint32 record_length)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* first byte should be a msg_type.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* - we know we only see client_hello, client_master_key,
|
|
|
|
* and server_hello in the clear, so check to see if
|
|
|
|
* msg_type is one of those (this gives us a 3 in 2^8
|
|
|
|
* chance of saying yes with random payload)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* - for those three types that we know about, do some
|
|
|
|
* further validation to reduce the chance of an error
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
guint8 msg_type;
|
|
|
|
guint16 version;
|
|
|
|
guint32 sum;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* fetch the msg_type */
|
|
|
|
msg_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (msg_type) {
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
|
|
|
|
/* version follows msg byte, so verify that this is valid */
|
|
|
|
version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset+1);
|
|
|
|
return ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(version);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
|
|
|
|
/* version is three bytes after msg_type */
|
|
|
|
version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset+3);
|
|
|
|
return ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(version);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY:
|
|
|
|
/* sum of clear_key_length, encrypted_key_length, and key_arg_length
|
|
|
|
* must be less than record length
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
sum = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 4); /* clear_key_length */
|
|
|
|
sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 6); /* encrypted_key_length */
|
|
|
|
sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 8); /* key_arg_length */
|
|
|
|
if (sum > record_length)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
/* applies a heuristic to determine whether
|
|
|
|
* or not the data beginning at offset looks
|
|
|
|
* like a valid, unencrypted v2 handshake message.
|
|
|
|
* since it isn't possible to completely tell random
|
|
|
|
* data apart from a valid message without state,
|
|
|
|
* we try to help the odds.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
ssl_looks_like_valid_pct_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset,
|
|
|
|
guint32 record_length)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* first byte should be a msg_type.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* - we know we only see client_hello, client_master_key,
|
|
|
|
* and server_hello in the clear, so check to see if
|
|
|
|
* msg_type is one of those (this gives us a 3 in 2^8
|
|
|
|
* chance of saying yes with random payload)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* - for those three types that we know about, do some
|
|
|
|
* further validation to reduce the chance of an error
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
guint8 msg_type;
|
|
|
|
guint16 version;
|
|
|
|
guint32 sum;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* fetch the msg_type */
|
|
|
|
msg_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (msg_type) {
|
|
|
|
case PCT_MSG_CLIENT_HELLO:
|
|
|
|
/* version follows msg byte, so verify that this is valid */
|
|
|
|
version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset+1);
|
|
|
|
return version == PCT_VERSION_1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case PCT_MSG_SERVER_HELLO:
|
|
|
|
/* version is one byte after msg_type */
|
|
|
|
version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset+2);
|
|
|
|
return version == PCT_VERSION_1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case PCT_MSG_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY:
|
|
|
|
/* sum of various length fields must be less than record length */
|
|
|
|
sum = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 6); /* clear_key_length */
|
|
|
|
sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 8); /* encrypted_key_length */
|
|
|
|
sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 10); /* key_arg_length */
|
|
|
|
sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 12); /* verify_prelude_length */
|
|
|
|
sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 14); /* client_cert_length */
|
|
|
|
sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 16); /* response_length */
|
|
|
|
if (sum > record_length)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case PCT_MSG_SERVER_VERIFY:
|
|
|
|
/* record is 36 bytes longer than response_length */
|
|
|
|
sum = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 34); /* response_length */
|
|
|
|
if ((sum + 36) == record_length)
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
/*********************************************************************
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Standard Ethereal Protocol Registration and housekeeping
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
*********************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
proto_register_ssl(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Setup list of header fields See Section 1.6.1 for details*/
|
|
|
|
static hf_register_info hf[] = {
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_record,
|
|
|
|
{ "Record Layer", "ssl.record",
|
|
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Record layer", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_record_content_type,
|
|
|
|
{ "Content Type", "ssl.record.content_type",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_content_type), 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Content type", HFILL}
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_msg_type,
|
|
|
|
{ "Handshake Message Type", "ssl.handshake.type",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_20_msg_types), 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"SSLv2 handshake message type", HFILL}
|
|
|
|
},
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
{ &hf_pct_msg_type,
|
|
|
|
{ "Handshake Message Type", "ssl.pct_handshake.type",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(pct_msg_types), 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"PCT handshake message type", HFILL}
|
|
|
|
},
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_record_version,
|
|
|
|
{ "Version", "ssl.record.version",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(ssl_versions), 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Record layer version.", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_record_length,
|
|
|
|
{ "Length", "ssl.record.length",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Length of SSL record data", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_record_appdata,
|
|
|
|
{ "Application Data", "ssl.app_data",
|
|
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Payload is application data", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ & hf_ssl2_record,
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
{ "SSLv2/PCT Record Header", "ssl.record",
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
2002-04-11 09:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
"SSLv2/PCT record data", HFILL }
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_record_is_escape,
|
|
|
|
{ "Is Escape", "ssl.record.is_escape",
|
|
|
|
FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Indicates a security escape", HFILL}
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_record_padding_length,
|
|
|
|
{ "Padding Length", "ssl.record.padding_length",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Length of padding at end of record", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_change_cipher_spec,
|
|
|
|
{ "Change Cipher Spec Message", "ssl.change_cipher_spec",
|
|
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Signals a change in cipher specifications", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ & hf_ssl_alert_message,
|
|
|
|
{ "Alert Message", "ssl.alert_message",
|
|
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Alert message", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ & hf_ssl_alert_message_level,
|
|
|
|
{ "Level", "ssl.alert_message.level",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_alert_level), 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Alert message level", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_alert_message_description,
|
|
|
|
{ "Description", "ssl.alert_message.desc",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_alert_description), 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Alert message description", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_protocol,
|
|
|
|
{ "Handshake Protocol", "ssl.handshake",
|
|
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Handshake protocol message", HFILL}
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_type,
|
|
|
|
{ "Handshake Type", "ssl.handshake.type",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_handshake_type), 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Type of handshake message", HFILL}
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_length,
|
|
|
|
{ "Length", "ssl.handshake.length",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT24, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Length of handshake message", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_client_version,
|
|
|
|
{ "Version", "ssl.handshake.version",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(ssl_versions), 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Maximum version supported by client", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_server_version,
|
|
|
|
{ "Version", "ssl.handshake.version",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(ssl_versions), 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Version selected by server", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_random_time,
|
|
|
|
{ "Random.gmt_unix_time", "ssl.handshake.random_time",
|
|
|
|
FT_ABSOLUTE_TIME, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Unix time field of random structure", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_random_bytes,
|
|
|
|
{ "Random.bytes", "ssl.handshake.random",
|
|
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Random challenge used to authenticate server", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
2001-07-16 01:38:34 +00:00
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites_len,
|
2001-07-16 05:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
{ "Cipher Suites Length", "ssl.handshake.cipher_suites_length",
|
2001-07-16 01:38:34 +00:00
|
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Length of cipher suites field", HFILL }
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
},
|
2001-07-16 04:02:22 +00:00
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites,
|
|
|
|
{ "Cipher Suites", "ssl.handshake.ciphersuites",
|
|
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"List of cipher suites supported by client", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suite,
|
|
|
|
{ "Cipher Suite", "ssl.handshake.ciphersuite",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(ssl_31_ciphersuite), 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Cipher suite", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec,
|
|
|
|
{ "Cipher Spec", "ssl.handshake.cipherspec",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT24, BASE_HEX, VALS(ssl_20_cipher_suites), 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Cipher specification", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_session_id,
|
|
|
|
{ "Session ID", "ssl.handshake.session_id",
|
2001-07-16 01:38:34 +00:00
|
|
|
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
"Identifies the SSL session, allowing later resumption", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
2001-07-16 01:38:34 +00:00
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_comp_methods_len,
|
|
|
|
{ "Compression Methods Length", "ssl.handshake.comp_methods_length",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Length of compression methods field", HFILL }
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
},
|
2001-07-16 04:02:22 +00:00
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_comp_methods,
|
|
|
|
{ "Compression Methods", "ssl.handshake.comp_methods",
|
|
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"List of compression methods supported by client", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_comp_method,
|
|
|
|
{ "Compression Method", "ssl.handshake.comp_method",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_compression_method), 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Compression Method", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
2001-07-16 01:38:34 +00:00
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_certificates_len,
|
2001-07-16 04:02:22 +00:00
|
|
|
{ "Certificates Length", "ssl.handshake.certificates_length",
|
2001-07-16 01:38:34 +00:00
|
|
|
FT_UINT24, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Length of certificates field", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
2001-07-16 04:02:22 +00:00
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_certificates,
|
|
|
|
{ "Certificates", "ssl.handshake.certificates",
|
|
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"List of certificates", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_certificate,
|
|
|
|
{ "Certificate", "ssl.handshake.certificate",
|
2001-07-16 01:38:34 +00:00
|
|
|
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
"Certificate", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_certificate_len,
|
|
|
|
{ "Certificate Length", "ssl.handshake.certificate_length",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT24, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Length of certificate", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
2001-07-16 01:38:34 +00:00
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_cert_types_count,
|
|
|
|
{ "Certificate types count", "ssl.handshake.cert_types_count",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Count of certificate types", HFILL }
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
},
|
2001-07-16 04:02:22 +00:00
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_cert_types,
|
|
|
|
{ "Certificate types", "ssl.handshake.cert_types",
|
|
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"List of certificate types", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_cert_type,
|
|
|
|
{ "Certificate type", "ssl.handshake.cert_type",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_client_certificate_type), 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Certificate type", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_finished,
|
|
|
|
{ "Verify Data", "ssl.handshake.verify_data",
|
|
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Opaque verification data", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_md5_hash,
|
|
|
|
{ "MD5 Hash", "ssl.handshake.md5_hash",
|
|
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Hash of messages, master_secret, etc.", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_sha_hash,
|
|
|
|
{ "SHA-1 Hash", "ssl.handshake.sha_hash",
|
|
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Hash of messages, master_secret, etc.", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_session_id_len,
|
|
|
|
{ "Session ID Length", "ssl.handshake.session_id_length",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Length of session ID field", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
2001-07-16 01:38:34 +00:00
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_dnames_len,
|
|
|
|
{ "Distinguished Names Length", "ssl.handshake.dnames_len",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Length of list of CAs that server trusts", HFILL }
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
},
|
2001-07-16 04:02:22 +00:00
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_dnames,
|
|
|
|
{ "Distinguished Names", "ssl.handshake.dnames",
|
|
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"List of CAs that server trusts", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_dname_len,
|
|
|
|
{ "Distinguished Name Length", "ssl.handshake.dname_len",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Length of distinguished name", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl_handshake_dname,
|
2001-07-15 19:09:07 +00:00
|
|
|
{ "Distinguished Name", "ssl.handshake.dname",
|
2001-07-16 01:38:34 +00:00
|
|
|
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
"Distinguished name of a CA that server trusts", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge,
|
|
|
|
{ "Challenge", "ssl.handshake.challenge",
|
|
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Challenge data used to authenticate server", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec_len,
|
|
|
|
{ "Cipher Spec Length", "ssl.handshake.cipher_spec_len",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Length of cipher specs field", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_len,
|
|
|
|
{ "Session ID Length", "ssl.handshake.session_id_length",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Length of session ID field", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge_len,
|
|
|
|
{ "Challenge Length", "ssl.handshake.challenge_length",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Length of challenge field", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key_len,
|
|
|
|
{ "Clear Key Data Length", "ssl.handshake.clear_key_length",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Length of clear key data", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key_len,
|
|
|
|
{ "Encrypted Key Data Length", "ssl.handshake.encrypted_key_length",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Length of encrypted key data", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg_len,
|
|
|
|
{ "Key Argument Length", "ssl.handshake.key_arg_length",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Length of key argument", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key,
|
|
|
|
{ "Clear Key Data", "ssl.handshake.clear_key_data",
|
|
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Clear portion of MASTER-KEY", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key,
|
|
|
|
{ "Encrypted Key", "ssl.handshake.encrypted_key",
|
|
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Secret portion of MASTER-KEY encrypted to server", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg,
|
|
|
|
{ "Key Argument", "ssl.handshake.key_arg",
|
|
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Key Argument (e.g., Initialization Vector)", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_hit,
|
|
|
|
{ "Session ID Hit", "ssl.handshake.session_id_hit",
|
|
|
|
FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Did the server find the client's Session ID?", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_cert_type,
|
|
|
|
{ "Certificate Type", "ssl.handshake.cert_type",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_20_certificate_type), 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Certificate Type", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id_len,
|
|
|
|
{ "Connection ID Length", "ssl.handshake.connection_id_length",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Length of connection ID", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id,
|
|
|
|
{ "Connection ID", "ssl.handshake.connection_id",
|
|
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"Server's challenge to client", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
2004-06-01 01:03:49 +00:00
|
|
|
{ &hf_pct_handshake_cipher_spec,
|
|
|
|
{ "Cipher Spec", "pct.handshake.cipherspec",
|
|
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"PCT Cipher specification", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_pct_handshake_cipher,
|
|
|
|
{ "Cipher", "pct.handshake.cipher",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(pct_cipher_type), 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"PCT Ciper", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_pct_handshake_hash_spec,
|
|
|
|
{ "Hash Spec", "pct.handshake.hashspec",
|
|
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"PCT Hash specification", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_pct_handshake_hash,
|
|
|
|
{ "Hash", "pct.handshake.hash",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(pct_hash_type), 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"PCT Hash", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_pct_handshake_cert_spec,
|
|
|
|
{ "Cert Spec", "pct.handshake.certspec",
|
|
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"PCT Certificate specification", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_pct_handshake_cert,
|
2004-08-02 08:57:40 +00:00
|
|
|
{ "Cert", "pct.handshake.cert",
|
2004-06-01 01:03:49 +00:00
|
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(pct_cert_type), 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"PCT Certificate", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_pct_handshake_exch_spec,
|
|
|
|
{ "Exchange Spec", "pct.handshake.exchspec",
|
|
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"PCT Exchange specification", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_pct_handshake_exch,
|
|
|
|
{ "Exchange", "pct.handshake.exch",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(pct_exch_type), 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"PCT Exchange", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_pct_handshake_sig,
|
|
|
|
{ "Sig Spec", "pct.handshake.sig",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(pct_sig_type), 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"PCT Signature", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ &hf_pct_msg_error_type,
|
|
|
|
{ "PCT Error Code", "pct.msg_error_code",
|
|
|
|
FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(pct_error_code), 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"PCT Error Code", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
2004-08-02 08:57:40 +00:00
|
|
|
{ &hf_pct_handshake_server_cert,
|
|
|
|
{ "Server Cert", "pct.handshake.server_cert",
|
|
|
|
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL , 0x0,
|
|
|
|
"PCT Server Certificate", HFILL }
|
|
|
|
},
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Setup protocol subtree array */
|
|
|
|
static gint *ett[] = {
|
|
|
|
&ett_ssl,
|
|
|
|
&ett_ssl_record,
|
|
|
|
&ett_ssl_alert,
|
|
|
|
&ett_ssl_handshake,
|
|
|
|
&ett_ssl_cipher_suites,
|
|
|
|
&ett_ssl_comp_methods,
|
|
|
|
&ett_ssl_certs,
|
|
|
|
&ett_ssl_cert_types,
|
|
|
|
&ett_ssl_dnames,
|
2004-06-01 01:03:49 +00:00
|
|
|
&ett_pct_cipher_suites,
|
|
|
|
&ett_pct_hash_suites,
|
|
|
|
&ett_pct_cert_suites,
|
|
|
|
&ett_pct_exch_suites,
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Register the protocol name and description */
|
|
|
|
proto_ssl = proto_register_protocol("Secure Socket Layer",
|
|
|
|
"SSL", "ssl");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Required function calls to register the header fields and
|
|
|
|
* subtrees used */
|
|
|
|
proto_register_field_array(proto_ssl, hf, array_length(hf));
|
|
|
|
proto_register_subtree_array(ett, array_length(ett));
|
2002-01-04 07:01:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
module_t *ssl_module = prefs_register_protocol(proto_ssl, NULL);
|
|
|
|
prefs_register_bool_preference(ssl_module,
|
2004-08-21 09:02:52 +00:00
|
|
|
"desegment_ssl_records",
|
|
|
|
"Reassemble SSL records spanning multiple TCP segments",
|
|
|
|
"Whether the SSL dissector should reassemble SSL records spanning multiple TCP segments. "
|
|
|
|
"To use this option, you must also enable \"Allow subdissectors to reassemble TCP streams\" in the TCP protocol settings.",
|
|
|
|
&ssl_desegment);
|
2002-01-04 07:01:54 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2002-08-28 21:04:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2002-02-25 23:28:32 +00:00
|
|
|
register_dissector("ssl", dissect_ssl, proto_ssl);
|
|
|
|
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If this dissector uses sub-dissector registration add a registration
|
|
|
|
* routine. This format is required because a script is used to find
|
|
|
|
* these routines and create the code that calls these routines.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
proto_reg_handoff_ssl(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-12-03 04:00:26 +00:00
|
|
|
dissector_handle_t ssl_handle;
|
|
|
|
|
2002-02-25 23:28:32 +00:00
|
|
|
ssl_handle = find_dissector("ssl");
|
2001-12-03 04:00:26 +00:00
|
|
|
dissector_add("tcp.port", TCP_PORT_SSL, ssl_handle);
|
2002-02-02 04:02:28 +00:00
|
|
|
dissector_add("tcp.port", TCP_PORT_SSL_LDAP, ssl_handle);
|
|
|
|
dissector_add("tcp.port", TCP_PORT_SSL_IMAP, ssl_handle);
|
|
|
|
dissector_add("tcp.port", TCP_PORT_SSL_POP, ssl_handle);
|
2001-07-11 18:19:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|