forked from osmocom/wireshark
1354 lines
42 KiB
C
1354 lines
42 KiB
C
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/******************************************************************************/
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/* File includes */
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/* */
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#include "airpdcap_system.h"
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#include "airpdcap_int.h"
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#include "airpdcap_tkip.h"
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#include "airpdcap_ccmp.h"
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#include "airpdcap_wep.h"
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#include "airpdcap_sha1.h"
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#include "airpdcap_md5.h"
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#include "airpdcap_debug.h"
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/* */
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/******************************************************************************/
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/******************************************************************************/
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/* Constant definitions */
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/* */
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#define AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN 20
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/* EAPOL definitions */
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/*!
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/brief
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Length of the EAPOL-Key key confirmation key (KCK) used to calculate MIC over EAPOL frame and validate an EAPOL packet (128 bits)
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*/
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#define AIRPDCAP_WPA_KCK_LEN 16
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/*!
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/brief
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Offset of the Key MIC in the EAPOL packet body
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*/
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#define AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_OFFSET 77
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/*!
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/brief
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Maximum length of the EAPOL packet (it depends on the maximum MAC frame size)
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*/
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#define AIRPDCAP_WPA_MAX_EAPOL_LEN 4095
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/*!
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/brief
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EAPOL Key Descriptor Version 1, used for all EAPOL-Key frames to and from a STA when neither the
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group nor pairwise ciphers are CCMP for Key Descriptor 1.
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/note
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Defined in 802.11i-2004, page 78
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*/
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#define AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_CCMP 1
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/*!
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/brief
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EAPOL Key Descriptor Version 2, used for all EAPOL-Key frames to and from a STA when either the
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pairwise or the group cipher is AES-CCMP for Key Descriptor 2.
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/note
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Defined in 802.11i-2004, page 78
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*/
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#define AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP 2
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/* */
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/******************************************************************************/
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/******************************************************************************/
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/* Macro definitions */
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/* */
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extern const UINT32 crc32_table[256];
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#define CRC(crc, ch) (crc = (crc >> 8) ^ crc32_table[(crc ^ (ch)) & 0xff])
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#define AIRPDCAP_GET_TK(ptk) (ptk + 32)
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/* */
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/******************************************************************************/
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/******************************************************************************/
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/* Type definitions */
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/* */
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/* */
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/******************************************************************************/
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/******************************************************************************/
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/* Internal function prototype declarations */
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/* */
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#ifdef __cplusplus
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extern "C" {
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#endif
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/*!
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/brief
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It is a step of the PBKDF2 (specifically the PKCS #5 v2.0) defined in the RFC 2898 to derive a key (used as PMK in WPA)
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/param password
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[IN] pointer to a password (sequence of between 8 and 63 ASCII encoded characters)
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/param ssid
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[IN] pointer to the SSID string encoded in max 32 ASCII encoded characters
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/param iterations
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[IN] times to hash the password (4096 for WPA)
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/param count
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[IN] ???
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/param output
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[OUT] pointer to a preallocated buffer of AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN characters that will contain a part of the key
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*/
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INT AirPDcapRsnaPwd2PskStep(
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const CHAR *password,
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const CHAR *ssid,
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const size_t ssidLength,
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const INT iterations,
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const INT count,
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UCHAR *output)
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;
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/*!
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/brief
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It calculates the passphrase-to-PSK mapping reccomanded for use with RSNAs. This implementation uses the PBKDF2 method defined in the RFC 2898.
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/param password
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[IN] pointer to a password (sequence of between 8 and 63 ASCII encoded characters)
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/param ssid
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[IN] pointer to the SSID string encoded in max 32 ASCII encoded characters
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/param output
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[OUT] calculated PSK (to use as PMK in WPA)
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/note
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Described in 802.11i-2004, page 165
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*/
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INT AirPDcapRsnaPwd2Psk(
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const CHAR *password,
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const CHAR *ssid,
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const size_t ssidLength,
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UCHAR *output)
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;
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INT AirPDcapRsnaMng(
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UCHAR *decrypt_data,
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size_t *decrypt_len,
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PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
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AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
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INT offset,
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UINT8 fcsPresent)
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;
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INT AirPDcapWepMng(
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PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
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UCHAR *decrypt_data,
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size_t *decrypt_len,
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PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
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AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
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INT offset,
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UINT8 fcsPresent)
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;
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INT AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake(
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PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
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const UCHAR *data,
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AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
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PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
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INT offset)
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;
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;
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/*!
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/brief
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It checks whether the specified key is corrected or not.
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/note
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For a standard WEP key the length will be changed to the standard length, and the type changed in a generic WEP key.
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/param key
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[IN] pointer to the key to validate
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/return
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- TRUE: the key contains valid fields and values
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- FALSE: the key has some invalid field or value
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*/
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INT AirPDcapValidateKey(
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PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key)
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;
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INT AirPDcapRsnaMicCheck(
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UCHAR *eapol,
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const USHORT eapol_len,
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const UCHAR KCK[AIRPDCAP_WPA_KCK_LEN],
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const USHORT key_ver)
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;
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/*!
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/brief it gets the index of the Security Association structure for the specified BSSID and STA MAC address
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/param ctx
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[IN] pointer to the current context
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/param id
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[IN] id of the association (composed by BSSID and MAC of the station)
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/return
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- index of the Security Association structure if found
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- -1, if the specified addresses pair BSSID-STA MAC has not been found
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*/
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INT AirPDcapGetSa(
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PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
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AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID *id)
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;
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INT AirPDcapFreeSa(
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PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
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INT index) /* index of the structure to free */
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;
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INT AirPDcapStoreSa(
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PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
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AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID *id)
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;
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UCHAR * AirPDcapGetStaAddress(
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PAIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME frame)
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;
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UCHAR * AirPDcapGetBssidAddress(
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PAIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME frame)
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;
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void AirPDcapRsnaPrfX(
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AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
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const UCHAR pmk[32],
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const UCHAR snonce[32],
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const INT x, /* for TKIP 512, for CCMP 384 */
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UCHAR *ptk)
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;
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INT AirPDcapAlgCrc32(
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UCHAR *buf,
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size_t nr,
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ULONG *cval)
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;
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#ifdef __cplusplus
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}
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#endif
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/* */
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/******************************************************************************/
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/******************************************************************************/
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/* Exported function definitions */
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/* */
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#ifdef __cplusplus
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extern "C" {
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#endif
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INT AirPDcapPacketProcess(
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PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
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const UCHAR *data,
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const size_t len,
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UCHAR *decrypt_data,
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size_t *decrypt_len,
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PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
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UINT8 fcsPresent,
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UINT8 radioTapPresent,
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UINT8 mngHandshake,
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UINT8 mngDecrypt)
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{
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size_t mac_header_len;
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UCHAR *address;
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AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID id;
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INT index;
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PAIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION sa;
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INT offset;
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UINT16 bodyLength;
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#ifdef _DEBUG
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CHAR msgbuf[255];
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#endif
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AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapPacketProcess");
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if (ctx==NULL) {
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AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "NULL context", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
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AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapPacketProcess");
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return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
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}
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if (data==NULL || len==0) {
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AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "NULL data or length=0", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
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AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapPacketProcess");
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return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
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}
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if (radioTapPresent)
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offset=AIRPDCAP_RADIOTAP_HEADER_LEN;
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else
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offset=0;
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/* check if the packet is of data type */
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/* TODO consider packets send on an ad-hoc net (QoS) */
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if (AIRPDCAP_TYPE(data[offset])!=AIRPDCAP_TYPE_DATA) {
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AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "not data packet", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
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return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_DATA;
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}
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/* check correct packet size, to avoid wrong elaboration of encryption algorithms */
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mac_header_len=AIRPDCAP_HEADER_LEN(data[offset+1]);
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if (len < (UINT)(mac_header_len+AIRPDCAP_CRYPTED_DATA_MINLEN)) {
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AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "minimum length violated", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
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return AIRPDCAP_RET_WRONG_DATA_SIZE;
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}
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/* get BSSID */
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if ( (address=AirPDcapGetBssidAddress((PAIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME)(data+offset))) != NULL) {
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memcpy(id.bssid, address, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
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#ifdef _DEBUG
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sprintf(msgbuf, "BSSID: %2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X\t", id.bssid[0],id.bssid[1],id.bssid[2],id.bssid[3],id.bssid[4],id.bssid[5]);
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#endif
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AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", msgbuf, AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
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} else {
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AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "BSSID not found", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
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return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
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}
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/* get STA address */
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if ( (address=AirPDcapGetStaAddress((PAIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME)(data+offset))) != NULL) {
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memcpy(id.sta, address, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
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#ifdef _DEBUG
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sprintf(msgbuf, "ST_MAC: %2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X\t", id.sta[0],id.sta[1],id.sta[2],id.sta[3],id.sta[4],id.sta[5]);
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#endif
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AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", msgbuf, AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
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} else {
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AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "SA not found", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
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return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
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}
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/* search for a cached Security Association for current BSSID and station MAC */
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if ((index=AirPDcapGetSa(ctx, &id))==-1) {
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/* create a new Security Association */
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if ((index=AirPDcapStoreSa(ctx, &id))==-1) {
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return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
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}
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}
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/* get the Security Association structure */
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sa=&ctx->sa[index];
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/* cache offset in the packet data (to scan encryption data) */
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offset+=AIRPDCAP_HEADER_LEN(data[offset+1]);
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/* check if data is encrypted (use the WEP bit in the Frame Control field) */
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if (AIRPDCAP_WEP(data[1])==0)
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{
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if (mngHandshake) {
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/* data is sent in cleartext, check if is an authentication message or end the process */
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AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "Unencrypted data", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
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/* check if the packet as an LLC header and the packet is 802.1X authentication (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 24) */
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if (data[offset]==0xAA && /* DSAP=SNAP */
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data[offset+1]==0xAA && /* SSAP=SNAP */
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data[offset+2]==0x03 && /* Control field=Unnumbered frame */
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data[offset+3]==0x00 && /* Org. code=encaps. Ethernet */
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data[offset+4]==0x00 &&
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data[offset+5]==0x00 &&
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data[offset+6]==0x88 && /* Type: 802.1X authentication */
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data[offset+7]==0x8E) {
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AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "Authentication: EAPOL packet", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
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/* skip LLC header */
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offset+=8;
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/* check the version of the EAPOL protocol used (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 24) */
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/* TODO EAPOL protocol version to check? */
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/*if (data[offset]!=2) {
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AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("EAPOL protocol version not recognized", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
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return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
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}*/
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/* check if the packet is a EAPOL-Key (0x03) (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 25) */
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if (data[offset+1]!=3) {
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AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "Not EAPOL-Key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
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return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
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}
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/* get and check the body length (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 25) */
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bodyLength=ntohs(*(UINT16 *)(data+offset+2));
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if (((len-offset-4)!=bodyLength && !fcsPresent) || ((len-offset-8)!=bodyLength && fcsPresent)) {
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AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "EAPOL body not valid (wrong length)", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
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return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
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}
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/* skip EAPOL MPDU and go to the first byte of the body */
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offset+=4;
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/* check if the key descriptor type is valid (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 27) */
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if (/*data[offset]!=0x1 &&*/ /* RC4 Key Descriptor Type (deprecated) */
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data[offset]!=0x2 && /* IEEE 802.11 Key Descriptor Type */
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data[offset]!=0xFE) /* TODO what's this value??? */
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{
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AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "Not valid key descriptor type", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
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return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
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}
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/* start with descriptor body */
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offset+=1;
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/* manage the 4-way handshake to define the key */
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return AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake(ctx, data, sa, key, offset);
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} else {
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/* cleartext message, not authentication */
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AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "No authentication data", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
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return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_DATA_ENCRYPTED;
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}
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}
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} else {
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if (mngDecrypt) {
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if (decrypt_data==NULL)
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return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
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/* create new header and data to modify */
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*decrypt_len=len;
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memcpy(decrypt_data, data, *decrypt_len);
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/* encrypted data */
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AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "Encrypted data", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
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if (fcsPresent)
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/* remove from next computation FCS */
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*decrypt_len-=4;
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|
|
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/* check the Extension IV to distinguish between WEP encryption and WPA encryption */
|
||
|
/* refer to IEEE 802.11i-2004, 8.2.1.2, pag.35 for WEP, */
|
||
|
/* IEEE 802.11i-2004, 8.3.2.2, pag. 45 for TKIP, */
|
||
|
/* IEEE 802.11i-2004, 8.3.3.2, pag. 57 for CCMP */
|
||
|
if (AIRPDCAP_EXTIV(data[offset+3])==0) {
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "WEP encryption", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
||
|
return AirPDcapWepMng(ctx, decrypt_data, decrypt_len, key, sa, offset, fcsPresent);
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "TKIP or CCMP encryption", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
||
|
return AirPDcapRsnaMng(decrypt_data, decrypt_len, key, sa, offset, fcsPresent);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
INT AirPDcapSetKeys(
|
||
|
PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM keys[],
|
||
|
const size_t keys_nr)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
INT i;
|
||
|
INT success;
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapSetKeys");
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (ctx==NULL || keys==NULL) {
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapSetKeys", "NULL context or NULL keys array", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapSetKeys");
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (keys_nr>AIRPDCAP_MAX_KEYS_NR) {
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapSetKeys", "Keys number greater than maximum", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapSetKeys");
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* clean keys collection before setting new ones */
|
||
|
AirPDcapCleanKeys(ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* check and insert keys */
|
||
|
for (i=0, success=0; i<(INT)keys_nr; i++) {
|
||
|
if (AirPDcapValidateKey(keys+i)==TRUE) {
|
||
|
if (keys[i].KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD) {
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapSetKeys", "Set a WPA-PWD key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_4);
|
||
|
AirPDcapRsnaPwd2Psk(keys[i].KeyData.Wpa.UserPwd.Passphrase, keys[i].KeyData.Wpa.UserPwd.Ssid, keys[i].KeyData.Wpa.UserPwd.SsidLen, keys[i].KeyData.Wpa.Psk);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#ifdef _DEBUG
|
||
|
else if (keys[i].KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK) {
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapSetKeys", "Set a WPA-PMK key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_4);
|
||
|
} else if (keys[i].KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP) {
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapSetKeys", "Set a WEP key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_4);
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapSetKeys", "Set a key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_4);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
ctx->keys[success].KeyType=keys[i].KeyType;
|
||
|
memcpy(&ctx->keys[success].KeyData, &keys[i].KeyData, sizeof(keys[i].KeyData));
|
||
|
|
||
|
success++;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
ctx->keys_nr=success;
|
||
|
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapSetKeys");
|
||
|
return success;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
INT AirPDcapCleanKeys(
|
||
|
PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
INT i;
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapCleanKeys");
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (ctx==NULL) {
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapCleanKeys", "NULL context", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapCleanKeys");
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
for (i=0; i<AIRPDCAP_MAX_KEYS_NR; i++) {
|
||
|
memset(&ctx->keys[i], 0, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM));
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
ctx->keys_nr=0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapCleanKeys", "Keys collection cleaned!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapCleanKeys");
|
||
|
|
||
|
return i;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
INT AirPDcapGetKeys(
|
||
|
const PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM keys[],
|
||
|
const size_t keys_nr)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
UINT i;
|
||
|
UINT j;
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapGetKeys");
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (ctx==NULL) {
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapGetKeys", "NULL context", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapGetKeys");
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
} else if (keys==NULL) {
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapGetKeys", "NULL keys array", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapGetKeys");
|
||
|
return (INT)ctx->keys_nr;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
for (i=0, j=0; i<ctx->keys_nr && i<keys_nr && i<AIRPDCAP_MAX_KEYS_NR; i++) {
|
||
|
keys[j].KeyType=ctx->keys[i].KeyType;
|
||
|
memcpy(&keys[j].KeyData, &ctx->keys[i].KeyData, sizeof(keys[j].KeyData));
|
||
|
j++;
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapGetKeys", "Got a key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapGetKeys");
|
||
|
return j;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
INT AirPDcapInitContext(
|
||
|
PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapInitContext");
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (ctx==NULL) {
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapInitContext", "NULL context", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapInitContext");
|
||
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
AirPDcapCleanKeys(ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
ctx->first_free_index=0;
|
||
|
ctx->index=-1;
|
||
|
ctx->last_stored_index=-1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapInitContext", "Context initialized!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapInitContext");
|
||
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
INT AirPDcapDestroyContext(
|
||
|
PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapDestroyContext");
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (ctx==NULL) {
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapDestroyContext", "NULL context", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapDestroyContext");
|
||
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
AirPDcapCleanKeys(ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
ctx->first_free_index=0;
|
||
|
ctx->index=-1;
|
||
|
ctx->last_stored_index=-1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapDestroyContext", "Context destroyed!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapDestroyContext");
|
||
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifdef __cplusplus
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
/* */
|
||
|
/******************************************************************************/
|
||
|
|
||
|
/******************************************************************************/
|
||
|
/* Internal function definitions */
|
||
|
/* */
|
||
|
#ifdef __cplusplus
|
||
|
extern "C" {
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
INT AirPDcapRsnaMng(
|
||
|
UCHAR *decrypt_data,
|
||
|
size_t *decrypt_len,
|
||
|
PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
|
||
|
INT offset,
|
||
|
UINT8 fcsPresent)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
INT ret_value;
|
||
|
ULONG crc;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (sa->key==NULL) {
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "No key associated", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
||
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (sa->validKey==FALSE) {
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "Key not yet valid", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
||
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (sa->wpa.key_ver==1) {
|
||
|
/* CCMP -> HMAC-MD5 is the EAPOL-Key MIC, RC4 is the EAPOL-Key encryption algorithm */
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "TKIP", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
||
|
|
||
|
ret_value=AirPDcapTkipDecrypt(decrypt_data+offset, *decrypt_len-offset, decrypt_data+AIRPDCAP_TA_OFFSET, AIRPDCAP_GET_TK(sa->wpa.ptk));
|
||
|
if (ret_value)
|
||
|
return ret_value;
|
||
|
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "TKIP DECRYPTED!!!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
||
|
/* remove MIC (8bytes) and ICV (4bytes) from the end of packet */
|
||
|
*decrypt_len-=12;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
/* AES-CCMP -> HMAC-SHA1-128 is the EAPOL-Key MIC, AES wep_key wrap is the EAPOL-Key encryption algorithm */
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "CCMP", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
||
|
|
||
|
ret_value=AirPDcapCcmpDecrypt(decrypt_data, (INT)*decrypt_len, AIRPDCAP_GET_TK(sa->wpa.ptk));
|
||
|
if (ret_value)
|
||
|
return ret_value;
|
||
|
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "CCMP DECRYPTED!!!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
||
|
/* remove MIC (8bytes) from the end of packet */
|
||
|
*decrypt_len-=8;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* remove protection bit */
|
||
|
decrypt_data[1]&=0xBF;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* remove TKIP/CCMP header */
|
||
|
offset=AIRPDCAP_HEADER_LEN(decrypt_data[1]);
|
||
|
*decrypt_len-=8;
|
||
|
memcpy(decrypt_data+offset, decrypt_data+offset+8, *decrypt_len-offset);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (fcsPresent) {
|
||
|
/* calculate FCS */
|
||
|
AirPDcapAlgCrc32(decrypt_data, *decrypt_len, &crc);
|
||
|
*(unsigned long*)(decrypt_data+*decrypt_len)=crc;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* add FCS in packet */
|
||
|
*decrypt_len+=4;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (key!=NULL) {
|
||
|
memcpy(key, sa->key, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM));
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (sa->wpa.key_ver==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_CCMP)
|
||
|
key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_TKIP;
|
||
|
else if (sa->wpa.key_ver==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP)
|
||
|
key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_CCMP;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
INT AirPDcapWepMng(
|
||
|
PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
|
||
|
UCHAR *decrypt_data,
|
||
|
size_t *decrypt_len,
|
||
|
PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
|
||
|
INT offset,
|
||
|
UINT8 fcsPresent)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
UCHAR wep_key[AIRPDCAP_WEP_KEY_MAXLEN+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN];
|
||
|
size_t keylen;
|
||
|
INT ret_value=1;
|
||
|
ULONG crc;
|
||
|
INT key_index;
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM *tmp_key;
|
||
|
UINT8 useCache=FALSE;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (sa->key!=NULL)
|
||
|
useCache=TRUE;
|
||
|
|
||
|
for (key_index=0; key_index<(INT)ctx->keys_nr; key_index++) {
|
||
|
/* use the cached one, or try all keys */
|
||
|
if (!useCache) {
|
||
|
tmp_key=&ctx->keys[key_index];
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
if (sa->key!=NULL && sa->key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP) {
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapWepMng", "Try cached WEP key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
||
|
tmp_key=sa->key;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapWepMng", "Cached key is not valid, try another WEP key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
||
|
tmp_key=&ctx->keys[key_index];
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* obviously, try only WEP keys... */
|
||
|
if (tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapWepMng", "Try WEP key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
||
|
|
||
|
memset(wep_key, 0, sizeof(wep_key));
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Costruct the WEP seed: copy the IV in first 3 bytes and then the WEP key (refer to 802-11i-2004, 8.2.1.4.3, pag. 36) */
|
||
|
memcpy(wep_key, decrypt_data+AIRPDCAP_HEADER_LEN(decrypt_data[1]), AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN);
|
||
|
keylen=tmp_key->KeyData.Wep.WepKeyLen;
|
||
|
memcpy(wep_key+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN, tmp_key->KeyData.Wep.WepKey, keylen);
|
||
|
|
||
|
ret_value=AirPDcapWepDecrypt(wep_key,
|
||
|
keylen+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN,
|
||
|
decrypt_data + (AIRPDCAP_HEADER_LEN(decrypt_data[1])+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN+AIRPDCAP_WEP_KIDLEN),
|
||
|
*decrypt_len-(AIRPDCAP_HEADER_LEN(decrypt_data[1])+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN+AIRPDCAP_WEP_KIDLEN+AIRPDCAP_CRC_LEN));
|
||
|
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!ret_value && tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP) {
|
||
|
/* the tried key is the correct one, cached in the Security Association */
|
||
|
|
||
|
sa->key=tmp_key;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (key!=NULL) {
|
||
|
memcpy(key, &sa->key, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM));
|
||
|
key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
/* the cached key was not valid, try other keys */
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (useCache==TRUE) {
|
||
|
useCache=FALSE;
|
||
|
key_index--;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (ret_value)
|
||
|
return ret_value;
|
||
|
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapWepMng", "WEP DECRYPTED!!!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* remove ICV (4bytes) from the end of packet */
|
||
|
*decrypt_len-=4;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* remove protection bit */
|
||
|
decrypt_data[1]&=0xBF;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* remove IC header */
|
||
|
offset=AIRPDCAP_HEADER_LEN(decrypt_data[1]);
|
||
|
*decrypt_len-=4;
|
||
|
memcpy(decrypt_data+offset, decrypt_data+offset+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN+AIRPDCAP_WEP_KIDLEN, *decrypt_len-offset);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (fcsPresent) {
|
||
|
/* calculate FCS and append it at the end of the decrypted packet */
|
||
|
AirPDcapAlgCrc32(decrypt_data, *decrypt_len, &crc);
|
||
|
*(unsigned long*)(decrypt_data+*decrypt_len)=crc;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* add FCS in packet */
|
||
|
*decrypt_len += 4;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Refer to IEEE 802.11i-2004, 8.5.3, pag. 85 */
|
||
|
INT AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake(
|
||
|
PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
|
||
|
const UCHAR *data,
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
|
||
|
PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
|
||
|
INT offset)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM *tmp_key;
|
||
|
INT key_index;
|
||
|
INT ret_value=1;
|
||
|
UCHAR useCache=FALSE;
|
||
|
UCHAR eapol[AIRPDCAP_EAPOL_MAX_LEN];
|
||
|
USHORT eapol_len;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (sa->key!=NULL)
|
||
|
useCache=TRUE;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* a 4-way handshake packet use a Pairwise key type (IEEE 802.11i-2004, pg. 79) */
|
||
|
if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY(data[offset+1])!=1) {
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "Group/STAKey message (not used)", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
||
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* TODO timeouts? reauthentication? */
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* TODO consider key-index */
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* TODO considera Deauthentications */
|
||
|
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* manage 4-way handshake packets; this step completes the 802.1X authentication process (IEEE 802.11i-2004, pag. 85) */
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* message 1: Authenticator->Supplicant (Sec=0, Mic=0, Ack=1, Inst=0, Key=1(pairwise), KeyRSC=0, Nonce=ANonce, MIC=0) */
|
||
|
if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_INST(data[offset+1])==0 &&
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_EAP_ACK(data[offset+1])==1 &&
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_EAP_MIC(data[offset])==0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake message 1", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* On reception of Message 1, the Supplicant determines whether the Key Replay Counter field value has been */
|
||
|
/* used before with the current PMKSA. If the Key Replay Counter field value is less than or equal to the current */
|
||
|
/* local value, the Supplicant discards the message. */
|
||
|
/* -> not checked, the Authenticator will be send another Message 1 (hopefully!) */
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* save ANonce (from authenticator) to derive the PTK with the SNonce (from the 2 message) */
|
||
|
memcpy(sa->wpa.nonce, data+offset+12, 32);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* get the Key Descriptor Version (to select algorithm used in decryption -CCMP or TKIP-) */
|
||
|
sa->wpa.key_ver=AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY_DESCR_VER(data[offset+1]);
|
||
|
|
||
|
sa->handshake=1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* message 2|4: Supplicant->Authenticator (Sec=0|1, Mic=1, Ack=0, Inst=0, Key=1(pairwise), KeyRSC=0, Nonce=SNonce|0, MIC=MIC(KCK,EAPOL)) */
|
||
|
if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_INST(data[offset+1])==0 &&
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_EAP_ACK(data[offset+1])==0 &&
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_EAP_MIC(data[offset])==1)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_SEC(data[offset])==0) {
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* PATCH: some implementations set secure bit to 0 also in the 4th message */
|
||
|
/* to recognize which message is this check if wep_key data lenght is 0 */
|
||
|
/* in the 4th message */
|
||
|
if (*(UINT16 *)(data+offset+92)!=0) {
|
||
|
/* message 2 */
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake message 2", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* On reception of Message 2, the Authenticator checks that the key replay counter corresponds to the */
|
||
|
/* outstanding Message 1. If not, it silently discards the message. */
|
||
|
/* If the calculated MIC does not match the MIC that the Supplicant included in the EAPOL-Key frame, */
|
||
|
/* the Authenticator silently discards Message 2. */
|
||
|
/* -> not checked; the Supplicant will send another message 2 (hopefully!) */
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* now you can derive the PTK */
|
||
|
for (key_index=0; key_index<(INT)ctx->keys_nr || sa->key!=NULL; key_index++) {
|
||
|
/* use the cached one, or try all keys */
|
||
|
if (!useCache) {
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "Try WPA key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
||
|
tmp_key=&ctx->keys[key_index];
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
/* there is a cached key in the security association, if it's a WPA key try it... */
|
||
|
if (sa->key!=NULL &&
|
||
|
sa->key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD ||
|
||
|
sa->key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK ||
|
||
|
sa->key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK) {
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "Try cached WPA key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
||
|
tmp_key=sa->key;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "Cached key is of a wrong type, try WPA key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
||
|
tmp_key=&ctx->keys[key_index];
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* obviously, try only WPA keys... */
|
||
|
if (tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD ||
|
||
|
tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK ||
|
||
|
tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* derive the PTK from the BSSID, STA MAC, PMK, SNonce, ANonce */
|
||
|
AirPDcapRsnaPrfX(sa, /* authenticator nonce, bssid, station mac */
|
||
|
tmp_key->KeyData.Wpa.Pmk, /* PMK */
|
||
|
data+offset+12, /* supplicant nonce */
|
||
|
512,
|
||
|
sa->wpa.ptk);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* verify the MIC (compare the MIC in the packet included in this message with a MIC calculated with the PTK) */
|
||
|
eapol_len=(USHORT)(ntohs(*(UINT16 *)(data+offset-3))+4);
|
||
|
memcpy(eapol, &data[offset-5], (eapol_len<AIRPDCAP_EAPOL_MAX_LEN?eapol_len:AIRPDCAP_EAPOL_MAX_LEN));
|
||
|
ret_value=AirPDcapRsnaMicCheck(eapol, /* eapol frame (header also) */
|
||
|
eapol_len, /* eapol frame length */
|
||
|
sa->wpa.ptk, /* Key Confirmation Key */
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY_DESCR_VER(data[offset+1])); /* EAPOL-Key description version */
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* If the MIC is valid, the Authenticator checks that the RSN information element bit-wise matches */
|
||
|
/* that from the (Re)Association Request message. */
|
||
|
/* i) TODO If these are not exactly the same, the Authenticator uses MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request */
|
||
|
/* primitive to terminate the association. */
|
||
|
/* ii) If they do match bit-wise, the Authenticator constructs Message 3. */
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!ret_value &&
|
||
|
(tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD ||
|
||
|
tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK ||
|
||
|
tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* the temporary key is the correct one, cached in the Security Association */
|
||
|
|
||
|
sa->key=tmp_key;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (key!=NULL) {
|
||
|
memcpy(key, &tmp_key, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM));
|
||
|
if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY_DESCR_VER(data[offset+1])==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_CCMP)
|
||
|
key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_TKIP;
|
||
|
else if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY_DESCR_VER(data[offset+1])==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP)
|
||
|
key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_CCMP;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
/* the cached key was not valid, try other keys */
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (useCache==TRUE) {
|
||
|
useCache=FALSE;
|
||
|
key_index--;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (ret_value) {
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "handshake step failed", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
||
|
return ret_value;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
sa->handshake=2;
|
||
|
|
||
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
/* message 4 */
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* TODO "Note that when the 4-Way Handshake is first used Message 4 is sent in the clear." */
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* TODO check MIC and Replay Counter */
|
||
|
/* On reception of Message 4, the Authenticator verifies that the Key Replay Counter field value is one */
|
||
|
/* that it used on this 4-Way Handshake; if it is not, it silently discards the message. */
|
||
|
/* If the calculated MIC does not match the MIC that the Supplicant included in the EAPOL-Key frame, the */
|
||
|
/* Authenticator silently discards Message 4. */
|
||
|
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake message 4 (patched)", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
||
|
|
||
|
sa->handshake=4;
|
||
|
|
||
|
sa->validKey=TRUE;
|
||
|
|
||
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/* END OF PATCH */
|
||
|
/* */
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
/* message 4 */
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* TODO "Note that when the 4-Way Handshake is first used Message 4 is sent in the clear." */
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* TODO check MIC and Replay Counter */
|
||
|
/* On reception of Message 4, the Authenticator verifies that the Key Replay Counter field value is one */
|
||
|
/* that it used on this 4-Way Handshake; if it is not, it silently discards the message. */
|
||
|
/* If the calculated MIC does not match the MIC that the Supplicant included in the EAPOL-Key frame, the */
|
||
|
/* Authenticator silently discards Message 4. */
|
||
|
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake message 4", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
||
|
|
||
|
sa->handshake=4;
|
||
|
|
||
|
sa->validKey=TRUE;
|
||
|
|
||
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* message 3: Authenticator->Supplicant (Sec=1, Mic=1, Ack=1, Inst=0/1, Key=1(pairwise), KeyRSC=???, Nonce=ANonce, MIC=1) */
|
||
|
if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_ACK(data[offset+1])==1 &&
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_EAP_MIC(data[offset])==1)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake message 3", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* On reception of Message 3, the Supplicant silently discards the message if the Key Replay Counter field */
|
||
|
/* value has already been used or if the ANonce value in Message 3 differs from the ANonce value in Message 1. */
|
||
|
/* -> not checked, the Authenticator will send another message 3 (hopefully!) */
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* TODO check page 88 (RNS) */
|
||
|
|
||
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
INT AirPDcapRsnaMicCheck(
|
||
|
UCHAR *eapol,
|
||
|
const USHORT eapol_len,
|
||
|
const UCHAR KCK[AIRPDCAP_WPA_KCK_LEN],
|
||
|
const USHORT key_ver)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
UCHAR mic[AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_LEN];
|
||
|
UCHAR c_mic[20]; /* MIC 16 byte, the HMAC-SHA1 use a buffer of 20 bytes */
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* copy the MIC from the EAPOL packet */
|
||
|
memcpy(mic, eapol+AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_OFFSET+4, AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_LEN);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* set to 0 the MIC in the EAPOL packet (to calculate the MIC) */
|
||
|
memset(eapol+AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_OFFSET+4, 0, AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_LEN);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (key_ver==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_CCMP) {
|
||
|
/* use HMAC-MD5 for the EAPOL-Key MIC */
|
||
|
AirPDcapAlgHmacMd5((UCHAR *)KCK, AIRPDCAP_WPA_KCK_LEN, eapol, eapol_len, c_mic);
|
||
|
} else if (key_ver==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP) {
|
||
|
/* use HMAC-SHA1-128 for the EAPOL-Key MIC */
|
||
|
AirPDcapAlgHmacSha1(KCK, AIRPDCAP_WPA_KCK_LEN, eapol, eapol_len, c_mic);
|
||
|
} else
|
||
|
/* key descriptor version not recognized */
|
||
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* compare calculated MIC with the Key MIC and return result (0 means success) */
|
||
|
return memcmp(mic, c_mic, AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_LEN);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
INT AirPDcapValidateKey(
|
||
|
PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
size_t len;
|
||
|
UCHAR ret=TRUE;
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapValidateKey");
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (key==NULL) {
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapValidateKey", "NULL key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapValidateKey");
|
||
|
return FALSE;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
switch (key->KeyType) {
|
||
|
case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP:
|
||
|
/* check key size limits */
|
||
|
len=key->KeyData.Wep.WepKeyLen;
|
||
|
if (len<AIRPDCAP_WEP_KEY_MINLEN || len>AIRPDCAP_WEP_KEY_MAXLEN) {
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapValidateKey", "WEP key: key length not accepted", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
||
|
ret=FALSE;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP_40:
|
||
|
/* set the standard length and use a generic WEP key type */
|
||
|
key->KeyData.Wep.WepKeyLen=AIRPDCAP_WEP_40_KEY_LEN;
|
||
|
key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP_104:
|
||
|
/* set the standard length and use a generic WEP key type */
|
||
|
key->KeyData.Wep.WepKeyLen=AIRPDCAP_WEP_104_KEY_LEN;
|
||
|
key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD:
|
||
|
/* check passphrase and SSID size limits */
|
||
|
len=strlen(key->KeyData.Wpa.UserPwd.Passphrase);
|
||
|
if (len<AIRPDCAP_WPA_PASSPHRASE_MIN_LEN || len>AIRPDCAP_WPA_PASSPHRASE_MAX_LEN) {
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapValidateKey", "WPA-PWD key: passphrase length not accepted", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
||
|
ret=FALSE;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
len=key->KeyData.Wpa.UserPwd.SsidLen;
|
||
|
if (len<AIRPDCAP_WPA_SSID_MIN_LEN || len>AIRPDCAP_WPA_SSID_MAX_LEN) {
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapValidateKey", "WPA-PWD key: ssid length not accepted", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
|
||
|
ret=FALSE;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK:
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK:
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
|
||
|
default:
|
||
|
ret=FALSE;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapValidateKey");
|
||
|
return ret;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
INT AirPDcapGetSa(
|
||
|
PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID *id)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
INT index;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (ctx->last_stored_index!=-1) {
|
||
|
/* at least one association was stored */
|
||
|
/* search for the association from last_stored_index to 0 (most recent added) */
|
||
|
for (index=ctx->last_stored_index; index>=0; index--) {
|
||
|
if (ctx->sa[index].used) {
|
||
|
if (memcmp(id, &(ctx->sa[index].saId), sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID))==0) {
|
||
|
ctx->index=index;
|
||
|
return index;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
INT AirPDcapFreeSa(
|
||
|
PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
|
||
|
INT index) /* index of the structure to free */
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
/* set the structure as free (the reset will be done in AIRPDCAP_store_sta_info) */
|
||
|
ctx->sa[index].used=0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* set the first_free_index to avoid free blocks in the middle */
|
||
|
if (index<ctx->first_free_index)
|
||
|
ctx->first_free_index=index;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* decrement the last_stored_index if this was the last stored block */
|
||
|
if (index==ctx->last_stored_index)
|
||
|
ctx->last_stored_index--;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* if the list is empty, set the index */
|
||
|
if (ctx->last_stored_index==-1)
|
||
|
ctx->index=-1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
return ctx->index;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
INT AirPDcapStoreSa(
|
||
|
PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID *id)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
INT last_free;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (ctx->sa[ctx->first_free_index].used) {
|
||
|
/* last addition was in the middle of the array (and the first_free_index was just incremented by 1) */
|
||
|
/* search for a free space from the first_free_index to AIRPDCAP_STA_INFOS_NR (to avoid free blocks in */
|
||
|
/* the middle) */
|
||
|
for (last_free=ctx->first_free_index; last_free<AIRPDCAP_MAX_SEC_ASSOCIATIONS_NR; last_free++)
|
||
|
if (!ctx->sa[last_free].used)
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (last_free>=AIRPDCAP_MAX_SEC_ASSOCIATIONS_NR) {
|
||
|
/* there is no empty space available. FAILURE */
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* store first free space index */
|
||
|
ctx->first_free_index=last_free;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* use this info */
|
||
|
ctx->index=ctx->first_free_index;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* reset the info structure */
|
||
|
memset(ctx->sa+ctx->index, 0, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION));
|
||
|
|
||
|
ctx->sa[ctx->index].used=1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* set the info structure */
|
||
|
memcpy(&(ctx->sa[ctx->index].saId), id, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID));
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* increment by 1 the first_free_index (heuristic) */
|
||
|
ctx->first_free_index++;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* set the last_stored_index if the added index is greater the the last_stored_index */
|
||
|
if (ctx->index > ctx->last_stored_index)
|
||
|
ctx->last_stored_index=ctx->index;
|
||
|
|
||
|
return ctx->index;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
UCHAR * AirPDcapGetStaAddress(
|
||
|
PAIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME frame)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (AIRPDCAP_TO_DS(frame->fc[1])==0) {
|
||
|
if (AIRPDCAP_FROM_DS(frame->fc[1])==0)
|
||
|
return NULL;
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
return frame->addr1;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
if (AIRPDCAP_FROM_DS(frame->fc[1])==0)
|
||
|
return frame->addr2;
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
return NULL;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
UCHAR * AirPDcapGetBssidAddress(
|
||
|
PAIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME frame)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
if (AIRPDCAP_TO_DS(frame->fc[1])==0) {
|
||
|
if (AIRPDCAP_FROM_DS(frame->fc[1])==0)
|
||
|
return frame->addr3;
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
return frame->addr2;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
if (AIRPDCAP_FROM_DS(frame->fc[1])==0)
|
||
|
return frame->addr1;
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
return NULL;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Function used to derive the PTK. Refer to IEEE 802.11I-2004, pag. 74 */
|
||
|
void AirPDcapRsnaPrfX(
|
||
|
AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
|
||
|
const UCHAR pmk[32],
|
||
|
const UCHAR snonce[32],
|
||
|
const INT x, /* for TKIP 512, for CCMP 384 */
|
||
|
UCHAR *ptk)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
UINT8 i;
|
||
|
UCHAR R[100];
|
||
|
INT offset=sizeof("Pairwise key expansion");
|
||
|
|
||
|
memset(R, 0, 100);
|
||
|
|
||
|
memcpy(R, "Pairwise key expansion", offset);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Min(AA, SPA) || Max(AA, SPA) */
|
||
|
if (memcmp(sa->saId.sta, sa->saId.bssid, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN) < 0)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
memcpy(R + offset, sa->saId.sta, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
|
||
|
memcpy(R + offset+AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN, sa->saId.bssid, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
memcpy(R + offset, sa->saId.bssid, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
|
||
|
memcpy(R + offset+AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN, sa->saId.sta, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
offset+=AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN*2;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Min(ANonce,SNonce) || Max(ANonce,SNonce) */
|
||
|
if( memcmp(snonce, sa->wpa.nonce, 32) < 0 )
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
memcpy(R + offset, snonce, 32);
|
||
|
memcpy(R + offset + 32, sa->wpa.nonce, 32);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
memcpy(R + offset, sa->wpa.nonce, 32);
|
||
|
memcpy(R + offset + 32, snonce, 32);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
offset+=32*2;
|
||
|
|
||
|
for(i = 0; i < (x+159)/160; i++)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
R[offset] = i;
|
||
|
AirPDcapAlgHmacSha1(pmk, 32, R, 100, ptk + i * 20);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
INT AirPDcapRsnaPwd2PskStep(
|
||
|
const CHAR *password,
|
||
|
const CHAR *ssid,
|
||
|
const size_t ssidLength,
|
||
|
const INT iterations,
|
||
|
const INT count,
|
||
|
UCHAR *output)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
UCHAR digest[36], digest1[AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN];
|
||
|
INT i, j;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* U1 = PRF(P, S || INT(i)) */
|
||
|
memcpy(digest, ssid, ssidLength);
|
||
|
digest[ssidLength] = (UCHAR)((count>>24) & 0xff);
|
||
|
digest[ssidLength+1] = (UCHAR)((count>>16) & 0xff);
|
||
|
digest[ssidLength+2] = (UCHAR)((count>>8) & 0xff);
|
||
|
digest[ssidLength+3] = (UCHAR)(count & 0xff);
|
||
|
AirPDcapAlgHmacSha1((UCHAR *)password, strlen(password), digest, ssidLength+4, digest1);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* output = U1 */
|
||
|
memcpy(output, digest1, AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN);
|
||
|
for (i = 1; i < iterations; i++) {
|
||
|
/* Un = PRF(P, Un-1) */
|
||
|
AirPDcapAlgHmacSha1((UCHAR *)password, strlen(password), digest1, AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN, digest);
|
||
|
|
||
|
memcpy(digest1, digest, AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN);
|
||
|
/* output = output xor Un */
|
||
|
for (j = 0; j < AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN; j++) {
|
||
|
output[j] ^= digest[j];
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
INT AirPDcapRsnaPwd2Psk(
|
||
|
const CHAR *password,
|
||
|
const CHAR *ssid,
|
||
|
const size_t ssidLength,
|
||
|
UCHAR *output)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
UCHAR m_output[AIRPDCAP_WPA_PSK_LEN];
|
||
|
|
||
|
memset(m_output, 0, AIRPDCAP_WPA_PSK_LEN);
|
||
|
|
||
|
memset(m_output, 0, 40);
|
||
|
|
||
|
AirPDcapRsnaPwd2PskStep(password, ssid, ssidLength, 4096, 1, m_output);
|
||
|
AirPDcapRsnaPwd2PskStep(password, ssid, ssidLength, 4096, 2, &m_output[AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN]);
|
||
|
|
||
|
memcpy(output, m_output, AIRPDCAP_WPA_PSK_LEN);
|
||
|
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/**************************************************************************/
|
||
|
/* The following code come from freeBSD and implements the AUTODIN II
|
||
|
/* polynomial used by 802.11.
|
||
|
/* It can be used to calculate multicast address hash indices.
|
||
|
/* It assumes that the low order bits will be transmitted first,
|
||
|
/* and consequently the low byte should be sent first when
|
||
|
/* the crc computation is finished. The crc should be complemented
|
||
|
/* before transmission.
|
||
|
/* The variable corresponding to the macro argument "crc" should
|
||
|
/* be an unsigned long and should be preset to all ones for Ethernet
|
||
|
/* use. An error-free packet will leave 0xDEBB20E3 in the crc.
|
||
|
/**************************************************************************/
|
||
|
INT AirPDcapAlgCrc32(
|
||
|
UCHAR *buf,
|
||
|
size_t nr,
|
||
|
ULONG *cval)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
ULONG crc32_total = 0 ;
|
||
|
ULONG crc = ~(ULONG)0;
|
||
|
UCHAR *p ;
|
||
|
size_t len;
|
||
|
|
||
|
len = 0 ;
|
||
|
crc32_total = ~crc32_total ;
|
||
|
|
||
|
for(len += nr, p = buf; nr--; ++p)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
CRC(crc, *p) ;
|
||
|
CRC(crc32_total, *p) ;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
*cval = ~crc ;
|
||
|
crc32_total = ~crc32_total ;
|
||
|
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifdef __cplusplus
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
/* */
|
||
|
/******************************************************************************/
|