strongswan/src/libstrongswan/plugins/gmp/gmp_rsa_public_key.c

507 lines
12 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright (C) 2017-2018 Tobias Brunner
* Copyright (C) 2005-2009 Martin Willi
* Copyright (C) 2005 Jan Hutter
* HSR Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
* Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
* option) any later version. See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License
* for more details.
*/
#include <gmp.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "gmp_rsa_public_key.h"
#include <utils/debug.h>
#include <asn1/oid.h>
#include <asn1/asn1.h>
#include <asn1/asn1_parser.h>
#include <crypto/hashers/hasher.h>
#include <credentials/keys/signature_params.h>
#ifdef HAVE_MPZ_POWM_SEC
# undef mpz_powm
# define mpz_powm mpz_powm_sec
#endif
typedef struct private_gmp_rsa_public_key_t private_gmp_rsa_public_key_t;
/**
* Private data structure with signing context.
*/
struct private_gmp_rsa_public_key_t {
/**
* Public interface for this signer.
*/
gmp_rsa_public_key_t public;
/**
* Public modulus.
*/
mpz_t n;
/**
* Public exponent.
*/
mpz_t e;
/**
* Keysize in bytes.
*/
size_t k;
/**
* reference counter
*/
refcount_t ref;
};
/**
* Shared functions defined in gmp_rsa_private_key.c
*/
chunk_t gmp_mpz_to_chunk(const mpz_t value);
bool gmp_emsa_pkcs1_signature_data(hash_algorithm_t hash_algorithm,
chunk_t data, size_t keylen, chunk_t *em);
/**
* RSAEP algorithm specified in PKCS#1.
*/
static chunk_t rsaep(private_gmp_rsa_public_key_t *this, chunk_t data)
{
mpz_t m, c;
chunk_t encrypted;
mpz_init(m);
mpz_import(m, data.len, 1, 1, 1, 0, data.ptr);
if (mpz_cmp_ui(m, 0) <= 0 || mpz_cmp(m, this->n) >= 0)
{ /* m must be <= n-1, and while 0 is technically a valid value, it
* doesn't really make sense here, so we filter that too */
mpz_clear(m);
return chunk_empty;
}
mpz_init(c);
mpz_powm(c, m, this->e, this->n);
encrypted.len = this->k;
encrypted.ptr = mpz_export(NULL, NULL, 1, encrypted.len, 1, 0, c);
if (encrypted.ptr == NULL)
{
encrypted.len = 0;
}
mpz_clear(c);
mpz_clear(m);
return encrypted;
}
/**
* RSAVP1 algorithm specified in PKCS#1.
*/
static chunk_t rsavp1(private_gmp_rsa_public_key_t *this, chunk_t data)
{
return rsaep(this, data);
}
/**
* Verification of an EMSA PKCS1 signature described in PKCS#1
*/
static bool verify_emsa_pkcs1_signature(private_gmp_rsa_public_key_t *this,
hash_algorithm_t algorithm,
chunk_t data, chunk_t signature)
{
chunk_t em_expected, em;
bool success = FALSE;
/* remove any preceding 0-bytes from signature */
while (signature.len && *(signature.ptr) == 0x00)
{
signature = chunk_skip(signature, 1);
}
if (signature.len == 0 || signature.len > this->k)
{
return FALSE;
}
/* generate expected signature value */
if (!gmp_emsa_pkcs1_signature_data(algorithm, data, this->k, &em_expected))
{
return FALSE;
}
/* unpack signature */
em = rsavp1(this, signature);
success = chunk_equals_const(em_expected, em);
chunk_free(&em_expected);
chunk_free(&em);
return success;
}
/**
* Verification of an EMSA PSS signature described in PKCS#1
*/
static bool verify_emsa_pss_signature(private_gmp_rsa_public_key_t *this,
rsa_pss_params_t *params, chunk_t data,
chunk_t signature)
{
ext_out_function_t xof;
hasher_t *hasher = NULL;
xof_t *mgf = NULL;
chunk_t em, hash, salt, db, h, dbmask, m;
size_t embits, maskbits;
int i;
bool success = FALSE;
if (!params)
{
return FALSE;
}
xof = xof_mgf1_from_hash_algorithm(params->mgf1_hash);
if (xof == XOF_UNDEFINED)
{
DBG1(DBG_LIB, "%N is not supported for MGF1", hash_algorithm_names,
params->mgf1_hash);
return FALSE;
}
chunk_skip_zero(signature);
if (signature.len == 0 || signature.len > this->k)
{
return FALSE;
}
/* EM = RSAVP1((n, e), S) */
em = rsavp1(this, signature);
if (!em.len)
{
goto error;
}
/* emBits = modBits - 1 */
embits = mpz_sizeinbase(this->n, 2) - 1;
/* mHash = Hash(M) */
hasher = lib->crypto->create_hasher(lib->crypto, params->hash);
if (!hasher)
{
DBG1(DBG_LIB, "hash algorithm %N not supported",
hash_algorithm_names, params->hash);
goto error;
}
hash = chunk_alloca(hasher->get_hash_size(hasher));
if (!hasher->get_hash(hasher, data, hash.ptr))
{
goto error;
}
salt.len = params->salt_len;
/* verify general structure of EM */
maskbits = (8 * em.len) - embits;
if (em.len < (hash.len + salt.len + 2) || em.ptr[em.len-1] != 0xbc ||
(em.ptr[0] & (0xff << (8-maskbits))))
{ /* inconsistent */
goto error;
}
/* split EM in maskedDB and H */
db = chunk_create(em.ptr, em.len - hash.len - 1);
h = chunk_create(em.ptr + db.len, hash.len);
/* dbMask = MGF(H, emLen - hLen - 1) */
mgf = lib->crypto->create_xof(lib->crypto, xof);
if (!mgf)
{
DBG1(DBG_LIB, "%N not supported", ext_out_function_names, xof);
goto error;
}
dbmask = chunk_alloca(db.len);
if (!mgf->set_seed(mgf, h) ||
!mgf->get_bytes(mgf, dbmask.len, dbmask.ptr))
{
DBG1(DBG_LIB, "%N not supported or failed", ext_out_function_names, xof);
goto error;
}
/* DB = maskedDB xor dbMask */
memxor(db.ptr, dbmask.ptr, db.len);
if (maskbits)
{
db.ptr[0] &= (0xff >> maskbits);
}
/* check DB = PS | 0x01 | salt */
for (i = 0; i < (db.len - salt.len - 1); i++)
{
if (db.ptr[i])
{ /* padding not 0 */
goto error;
}
}
if (db.ptr[i++] != 0x01)
{ /* 0x01 not found */
goto error;
}
salt.ptr = &db.ptr[i];
/* M' = 0x0000000000000000 | mHash | salt */
m = chunk_cata("ccc",
chunk_from_chars(0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00),
hash, salt);
if (!hasher->get_hash(hasher, m, hash.ptr))
{
goto error;
}
success = memeq_const(h.ptr, hash.ptr, hash.len);
error:
DESTROY_IF(hasher);
DESTROY_IF(mgf);
free(em.ptr);
return success;
}
METHOD(public_key_t, get_type, key_type_t,
private_gmp_rsa_public_key_t *this)
{
return KEY_RSA;
}
METHOD(public_key_t, verify, bool,
private_gmp_rsa_public_key_t *this, signature_scheme_t scheme, void *params,
chunk_t data, chunk_t signature)
{
switch (scheme)
{
case SIGN_RSA_EMSA_PKCS1_NULL:
return verify_emsa_pkcs1_signature(this, HASH_UNKNOWN, data, signature);
case SIGN_RSA_EMSA_PKCS1_SHA2_224:
return verify_emsa_pkcs1_signature(this, HASH_SHA224, data, signature);
case SIGN_RSA_EMSA_PKCS1_SHA2_256:
return verify_emsa_pkcs1_signature(this, HASH_SHA256, data, signature);
case SIGN_RSA_EMSA_PKCS1_SHA2_384:
return verify_emsa_pkcs1_signature(this, HASH_SHA384, data, signature);
case SIGN_RSA_EMSA_PKCS1_SHA2_512:
return verify_emsa_pkcs1_signature(this, HASH_SHA512, data, signature);
case SIGN_RSA_EMSA_PKCS1_SHA3_224:
return verify_emsa_pkcs1_signature(this, HASH_SHA3_224, data, signature);
case SIGN_RSA_EMSA_PKCS1_SHA3_256:
return verify_emsa_pkcs1_signature(this, HASH_SHA3_256, data, signature);
case SIGN_RSA_EMSA_PKCS1_SHA3_384:
return verify_emsa_pkcs1_signature(this, HASH_SHA3_384, data, signature);
case SIGN_RSA_EMSA_PKCS1_SHA3_512:
return verify_emsa_pkcs1_signature(this, HASH_SHA3_512, data, signature);
case SIGN_RSA_EMSA_PKCS1_SHA1:
return verify_emsa_pkcs1_signature(this, HASH_SHA1, data, signature);
case SIGN_RSA_EMSA_PKCS1_MD5:
return verify_emsa_pkcs1_signature(this, HASH_MD5, data, signature);
case SIGN_RSA_EMSA_PSS:
return verify_emsa_pss_signature(this, params, data, signature);
default:
DBG1(DBG_LIB, "signature scheme %N not supported in RSA",
signature_scheme_names, scheme);
return FALSE;
}
}
#define MIN_PS_PADDING 8
METHOD(public_key_t, encrypt_, bool,
private_gmp_rsa_public_key_t *this, encryption_scheme_t scheme,
chunk_t plain, chunk_t *crypto)
{
chunk_t em;
u_char *pos;
int padding;
rng_t *rng;
if (scheme != ENCRYPT_RSA_PKCS1)
{
DBG1(DBG_LIB, "encryption scheme %N not supported",
encryption_scheme_names, scheme);
return FALSE;
}
/* number of pseudo-random padding octets */
padding = this->k - plain.len - 3;
if (padding < MIN_PS_PADDING)
{
DBG1(DBG_LIB, "pseudo-random padding must be at least %d octets",
MIN_PS_PADDING);
return FALSE;
}
rng = lib->crypto->create_rng(lib->crypto, RNG_WEAK);
if (rng == NULL)
{
DBG1(DBG_LIB, "no random generator available");
return FALSE;
}
/* padding according to PKCS#1 7.2.1 (RSAES-PKCS1-v1.5-ENCRYPT) */
DBG2(DBG_LIB, "padding %u bytes of data to the rsa modulus size of"
" %u bytes", plain.len, this->k);
em.len = this->k;
em.ptr = malloc(em.len);
pos = em.ptr;
*pos++ = 0x00;
*pos++ = 0x02;
/* fill with pseudo random octets */
if (!rng_get_bytes_not_zero(rng, padding, pos, TRUE))
{
DBG1(DBG_LIB, "failed to allocate padding");
chunk_clear(&em);
rng->destroy(rng);
return FALSE;
}
rng->destroy(rng);
pos += padding;
/* append the padding terminator */
*pos++ = 0x00;
/* now add the data */
memcpy(pos, plain.ptr, plain.len);
DBG3(DBG_LIB, "padded data before rsa encryption: %B", &em);
/* rsa encryption using PKCS#1 RSAEP */
*crypto = rsaep(this, em);
DBG3(DBG_LIB, "rsa encrypted data: %B", crypto);
chunk_clear(&em);
return TRUE;
}
METHOD(public_key_t, get_keysize, int,
private_gmp_rsa_public_key_t *this)
{
return mpz_sizeinbase(this->n, 2);
}
METHOD(public_key_t, get_encoding, bool,
private_gmp_rsa_public_key_t *this, cred_encoding_type_t type,
chunk_t *encoding)
{
chunk_t n, e;
bool success;
n = gmp_mpz_to_chunk(this->n);
e = gmp_mpz_to_chunk(this->e);
success = lib->encoding->encode(lib->encoding, type, NULL, encoding,
CRED_PART_RSA_MODULUS, n, CRED_PART_RSA_PUB_EXP, e, CRED_PART_END);
chunk_free(&n);
chunk_free(&e);
return success;
}
METHOD(public_key_t, get_fingerprint, bool,
private_gmp_rsa_public_key_t *this, cred_encoding_type_t type, chunk_t *fp)
{
chunk_t n, e;
bool success;
if (lib->encoding->get_cache(lib->encoding, type, this, fp))
{
return TRUE;
}
n = gmp_mpz_to_chunk(this->n);
e = gmp_mpz_to_chunk(this->e);
success = lib->encoding->encode(lib->encoding, type, this, fp,
CRED_PART_RSA_MODULUS, n, CRED_PART_RSA_PUB_EXP, e, CRED_PART_END);
chunk_free(&n);
chunk_free(&e);
return success;
}
METHOD(public_key_t, get_ref, public_key_t*,
private_gmp_rsa_public_key_t *this)
{
ref_get(&this->ref);
return &this->public.key;
}
METHOD(public_key_t, destroy, void,
private_gmp_rsa_public_key_t *this)
{
if (ref_put(&this->ref))
{
mpz_clear(this->n);
mpz_clear(this->e);
lib->encoding->clear_cache(lib->encoding, this);
free(this);
}
}
/**
* See header.
*/
gmp_rsa_public_key_t *gmp_rsa_public_key_load(key_type_t type, va_list args)
{
private_gmp_rsa_public_key_t *this;
chunk_t n, e;
n = e = chunk_empty;
while (TRUE)
{
switch (va_arg(args, builder_part_t))
{
case BUILD_RSA_MODULUS:
n = va_arg(args, chunk_t);
continue;
case BUILD_RSA_PUB_EXP:
e = va_arg(args, chunk_t);
continue;
case BUILD_END:
break;
default:
return NULL;
}
break;
}
if (!e.len || !n.len || (n.ptr[n.len-1] & 0x01) == 0)
{
return NULL;
}
INIT(this,
.public = {
.key = {
.get_type = _get_type,
.verify = _verify,
.encrypt = _encrypt_,
.equals = public_key_equals,
.get_keysize = _get_keysize,
.get_fingerprint = _get_fingerprint,
.has_fingerprint = public_key_has_fingerprint,
.get_encoding = _get_encoding,
.get_ref = _get_ref,
.destroy = _destroy,
},
},
.ref = 1,
);
mpz_init(this->n);
mpz_init(this->e);
mpz_import(this->n, n.len, 1, 1, 1, 0, n.ptr);
mpz_import(this->e, e.len, 1, 1, 1, 0, e.ptr);
this->k = (mpz_sizeinbase(this->n, 2) + 7) / BITS_PER_BYTE;
if (!mpz_sgn(this->e))
{
destroy(this);
return NULL;
}
return &this->public;
}