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strongswan/src/pluto/constants.h

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/* manifest constants
* Copyright (C) 1997 Angelos D. Keromytis.
* Copyright (C) 1998-2002 D. Hugh Redelmeier.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
* Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
* option) any later version. See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License
* for more details.
*/
#ifndef _CONSTANTS_H
#define _CONSTANTS_H
#include <freeswan.h>
#include <kernel/kernel_ipsec.h>
#include <utils.h>
#include <utils/identification.h>
#include <crypto/hashers/hasher.h>
extern const char compile_time_interop_options[];
extern void init_constants(void);
/*
* NOTE:For debugging purposes, constants.c has tables to map numbers back to names.
* Any changes here should be reflected there.
*/
/* Many routines return only success or failure, but wish to describe
* the failure in a message. We use the convention that they return
* a NULL on success and a pointer to constant string on failure.
* The fact that the string is a constant is limiting, but it
* avoids storage management issues: the recipient is allowed to assume
* that the string will live "long enough" (usually forever).
* <freeswan.h> defines err_t for this return type.
*/
#define NULL_FD (-1) /* NULL file descriptor */
#define dup_any(fd) ((fd) == NULL_FD? NULL_FD : dup(fd))
#define close_any(fd) { if ((fd) != NULL_FD) { close(fd); (fd) = NULL_FD; } }
/* set type with room for at least 64 elements for ALG opts (was 32 in stock FS) */
typedef unsigned long long lset_t;
#define LEMPTY 0ULL
#define LELEM(opt) (1ULL << (opt))
#define LRANGE(lwb, upb) LRANGES(LELEM(lwb), LELEM(upb))
#define LRANGES(first, last) (last - first + last)
#define LHAS(set, elem) ((LELEM(elem) & (set)) != LEMPTY)
#define LIN(subset, set) (((subset) & (set)) == (subset))
#define LDISJOINT(a, b) (((a) & (b)) == LEMPTY)
/* Control and lock pathnames */
#ifndef IPSEC_PIDDIR
# define IPSEC_PIDDIR "/var/run"
#endif
#ifndef DEFAULT_CTLBASE
# define DEFAULT_CTLBASE IPSEC_PIDDIR "/pluto"
#endif
#define CTL_SUFFIX ".ctl" /* for UNIX domain socket pathname */
#define LOCK_SUFFIX ".pid" /* for pluto's lock */
#define INFO_SUFFIX ".info" /* for UNIX domain socket for apps */
/* Routines to check and display values.
*
* An enum_names describes an enumeration.
* enum_name() returns the name of an enum value, or NULL if invalid.
* enum_show() is like enum_name, except it formats a numeric representation
* for any invalid value (in a static area!)
*
* bitnames() formats a display of a set of named bits (in a static area)
*/
struct enum_names {
unsigned long en_first; /* first value in range */
unsigned long en_last; /* last value in range (inclusive) */
const char *const *en_names;
const struct enum_names *en_next_range; /* descriptor of next range */
};
typedef const struct enum_names enum_names;
extern const char *enum_name(enum_names *ed, unsigned long val);
extern const char *enum_show(enum_names *ed, unsigned long val);
extern int enum_search(enum_names *ed, const char *string);
extern bool testset(const char *const table[], lset_t val);
extern const char *bitnamesof(const char *const table[], lset_t val);
/* sparse_names is much like enum_names, except values are
* not known to be contiguous or ordered.
* The array of names is ended with one with the name sparse_end
* (this avoids having to reserve a value to signify the end).
* Often appropriate for enums defined by others.
*/
struct sparse_name {
unsigned long val;
const char *const name;
};
typedef const struct sparse_name sparse_names[];
extern const char *sparse_name(sparse_names sd, unsigned long val);
extern const char *sparse_val_show(sparse_names sd, unsigned long val);
extern const char sparse_end[];
#define FULL_INET_ADDRESS_SIZE 6
/* limits on nonce sizes. See RFC2409 "The internet key exchange (IKE)" 5 */
#define MINIMUM_NONCE_SIZE 8 /* bytes */
#define DEFAULT_NONCE_SIZE 16 /* bytes */
#define MAXIMUM_NONCE_SIZE 256 /* bytes */
#define COOKIE_SIZE 8
#define MAX_ISAKMP_SPI_SIZE 16
#define DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE (64 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
/* Maximum is required for SHA2_512 */
#define MAX_DIGEST_LEN HASH_SIZE_SHA512
/* RFC 2404 "HMAC-SHA-1-96" section 3 */
#define HMAC_SHA1_KEY_LEN HASH_SIZE_SHA1
/* RFC 2403 "HMAC-MD5-96" section 3 */
#define HMAC_MD5_KEY_LEN HASH_SIZE_MD5
#define IKE_UDP_PORT 500
/* IPsec AH transform values
* RFC2407 The Internet IP security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP 4.4.3
* and in http://www.iana.org/assignments/isakmp-registry
*/
enum ipsec_authentication_algo {
AH_NONE = 0,
AH_MD5 = 2,
AH_SHA = 3,
AH_DES = 4,
AH_SHA2_256 = 5,
AH_SHA2_384 = 6,
AH_SHA2_512 = 7,
AH_RIPEMD = 8,
AH_AES_XCBC_MAC = 9,
AH_RSA = 10,
AH_AES_128_GMAC = 11,
AH_AES_192_GMAC = 12,
AH_AES_256_GMAC = 13,
AH_SHA2_256_96 = 252
};
extern enum_names ah_transform_names;
/* IPsec ESP transform values
* RFC2407 The Internet IP security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP 4.4.4
* and from http://www.iana.org/assignments/isakmp-registry
*/
enum ipsec_cipher_algo {
ESP_NONE = 0,
ESP_DES_IV64 = 1,
ESP_DES = 2,
ESP_3DES = 3,
ESP_RC5 = 4,
ESP_IDEA = 5,
ESP_CAST = 6,
ESP_BLOWFISH = 7,
ESP_3IDEA = 8,
ESP_DES_IV32 = 9,
ESP_RC4 = 10,
ESP_NULL = 11,
ESP_AES = 12,
ESP_AES_CTR = 13,
ESP_AES_CCM_8 = 14,
ESP_AES_CCM_12 = 15,
ESP_AES_CCM_16 = 16,
ESP_UNASSIGNED_17 = 17,
ESP_AES_GCM_8 = 18,
ESP_AES_GCM_12 = 19,
ESP_AES_GCM_16 = 20,
ESP_SEED_CBC = 21,
ESP_CAMELLIA = 22,
ESP_AES_GMAC = 23,
ESP_SERPENT = 252,
ESP_TWOFISH = 253
};
extern enum_names esp_transform_names;
/* IPCOMP transform values
* RFC2407 The Internet IP security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP 4.4.5
* now defined in kernel/kernel_ipsec.h
*/
extern enum_names ipcomp_transformid_names;
/* Certificate type values
* RFC 2408 ISAKMP, chapter 3.9
*/
enum ipsec_cert_type {
CERT_NONE= 0,
CERT_PKCS7_WRAPPED_X509= 1,
CERT_PGP= 2,
CERT_DNS_SIGNED_KEY= 3,
CERT_X509_SIGNATURE= 4,
CERT_X509_KEY_EXCHANGE= 5,
CERT_KERBEROS_TOKENS= 6,
CERT_CRL= 7,
CERT_ARL= 8,
CERT_SPKI= 9,
CERT_X509_ATTRIBUTE= 10,
CERT_RAW_RSA_KEY= 11
};
/* RFC 2560 OCSP - certificate status */
typedef enum {
CERT_GOOD = 0,
CERT_REVOKED = 1,
CERT_UNKNOWN = 2,
CERT_UNDEFINED = 3
} cert_status_t;
/* RFC 3706 Dead Peer Detection */
extern enum_name_t *dpd_action_names;
typedef enum {
DPD_ACTION_NONE = 0,
DPD_ACTION_CLEAR = 1,
DPD_ACTION_HOLD = 2,
DPD_ACTION_RESTART = 3,
DPD_ACTION_UNKNOWN = 4
} dpd_action_t;
/* Timer events */
extern enum_name_t *timer_event_names;
enum event_type {
EVENT_NULL, /* non-event */
EVENT_REINIT_SECRET, /* Refresh cookie secret */
EVENT_SO_DISCARD, /* discard unfinished state object */
EVENT_RETRANSMIT, /* Retransmit packet */
EVENT_SA_REPLACE, /* SA replacement event */
EVENT_SA_REPLACE_IF_USED, /* SA replacement event */
EVENT_SA_EXPIRE, /* SA expiration event */
EVENT_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE, /* NAT Traversal Keepalive */
EVENT_DPD, /* dead peer detection */
EVENT_DPD_TIMEOUT, /* dead peer detection timeout */
EVENT_LOG_DAILY /* reset certain log events/stats */
};
#define EVENT_REINIT_SECRET_DELAY 3600 /* 1 hour */
#define EVENT_RETRANSMIT_DELAY_0 10 /* 10 seconds */
/* Misc. stuff */
#define MAXIMUM_RETRANSMISSIONS 2
#define MAXIMUM_RETRANSMISSIONS_INITIAL 20
#define MAX_INPUT_UDP_SIZE 65536
#define MAX_OUTPUT_UDP_SIZE 65536
/* Version numbers */
#define ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION 0x1
#define ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION 0x0
extern enum_names version_names;
/* Domain of Interpretation */
extern enum_names doi_names;
#define ISAKMP_DOI_ISAKMP 0
#define ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC 1
/* IPsec DOI things */
#define IPSEC_DOI_SITUATION_LENGTH 4
#define IPSEC_DOI_LDI_LENGTH 4
#define IPSEC_DOI_SPI_SIZE 4
/* SPI value 0 is invalid and values 1-255 are reserved to IANA.
* ESP: RFC 2402 2.4; AH: RFC 2406 2.1
* IPComp RFC 2393 substitutes a CPI in the place of an SPI.
* see also draft-shacham-ippcp-rfc2393bis-05.txt.
* We (FreeS/WAN) reserve 0x100 to 0xFFF for manual keying, so
* Pluto won't generate these values.
*/
#define IPSEC_DOI_SPI_MIN 0x100
#define IPSEC_DOI_SPI_OUR_MIN 0x1000
/* debugging settings: a set of selections for reporting
* These would be more naturally situated in log.h,
* but they are shared with whack.
* IMPAIR_* actually change behaviour, usually badly,
* to aid in testing. Naturally, these are not included in ALL.
*
* NOTE: changes here must be done in concert with changes to DBGOPT_*
* in whack.c. A change to WHACK_MAGIC in whack.h will be required too.
*/
#ifdef DEBUG
extern const char *const debug_bit_names[];
#endif
#define DBG_RAW LELEM(0) /* raw packet I/O */
#define DBG_CRYPT LELEM(1) /* encryption/decryption of messages */
#define DBG_PARSING LELEM(2) /* show decoding of messages */
#define DBG_EMITTING LELEM(3) /* show encoding of messages */
#define DBG_CONTROL LELEM(4) /* control flow within Pluto */
#define DBG_LIFECYCLE LELEM(5) /* SA lifecycle */
#define DBG_KERNEL LELEM(6) /* messages to kernel */
#define DBG_DNS LELEM(7) /* DNS activity */
#define DBG_NATT LELEM(8) /* NAT-T */
#define DBG_OPPO LELEM(9) /* opportunism */
#define DBG_CONTROLMORE LELEM(10) /* more detailed debugging */
#define DBG_PRIVATE LELEM(11) /* private information: DANGER! */
#define IMPAIR0 12 /* first bit for IMPAIR_* */
#define IMPAIR_DELAY_ADNS_KEY_ANSWER LELEM(IMPAIR0+0) /* sleep before answering */
#define IMPAIR_DELAY_ADNS_TXT_ANSWER LELEM(IMPAIR0+1) /* sleep before answering */
#define IMPAIR_BUST_MI2 LELEM(IMPAIR0+2) /* make MI2 really large */
#define IMPAIR_BUST_MR2 LELEM(IMPAIR0+3) /* make MI2 really large */
#define DBG_NONE 0 /* no options on, including impairments */
#define DBG_ALL LRANGES(DBG_RAW, DBG_CONTROLMORE) /* all logging options on EXCEPT DBG_PRIVATE */
/* State of exchanges
*
* The name of the state describes the last message sent, not the
* message currently being input or output (except during retry).
* In effect, the state represents the last completed action.
*
* Messages are named [MQ][IR]n where
* - M stands for Main Mode (Phase 1);
* Q stands for Quick Mode (Phase 2)
* - I stands for Initiator;
* R stands for Responder
* - n, a digit, stands for the number of the message
*
* It would be more convenient if each state accepted a message
* and produced one. This is the case for states at the start
* or end of an exchange. To fix this, we pretend that there are
* MR0 and QR0 messages before the MI1 and QR1 messages. Similarly,
* we pretend that there are MR4 and QR2 messages.
*
* STATE_MAIN_R0 and STATE_QUICK_R0 are intermediate states (not
* retained between messages) representing the state that accepts the
* first message of an exchange has been read but not processed.
*
* state_microcode state_microcode_table in demux.c describes
* other important details.
*/
extern enum_names state_names;
extern const char *const state_story[];
enum state_kind {
STATE_UNDEFINED, /* 0 -- most likely accident */
/* IKE states */
STATE_MAIN_R0,
STATE_MAIN_I1,
STATE_MAIN_R1,
STATE_MAIN_I2,
STATE_MAIN_R2,
STATE_MAIN_I3,
STATE_MAIN_R3,
STATE_MAIN_I4,
STATE_QUICK_R0,
STATE_QUICK_I1,
STATE_QUICK_R1,
STATE_QUICK_I2,
STATE_QUICK_R2,
STATE_INFO,
STATE_INFO_PROTECTED,
/* XAUTH states */
STATE_XAUTH_I0, /* initiator state (client) */
STATE_XAUTH_R1, /* responder state (server) */
STATE_XAUTH_I1,
STATE_XAUTH_R2,
STATE_XAUTH_I2,
STATE_XAUTH_R3,
/* Mode Config pull states */
STATE_MODE_CFG_R0, /* responder state (server) */
STATE_MODE_CFG_I1, /* initiator state (client) */
STATE_MODE_CFG_R1,
STATE_MODE_CFG_I2,
/* Mode Config push states */
STATE_MODE_CFG_I0, /* initiator state (client) */
STATE_MODE_CFG_R3, /* responder state (server) */
STATE_MODE_CFG_I3,
STATE_MODE_CFG_R4,
STATE_IKE_ROOF
};
#define STATE_IKE_FLOOR STATE_MAIN_R0
#define PHASE1_INITIATOR_STATES (LELEM(STATE_MAIN_I1) | LELEM(STATE_MAIN_I2) \
| LELEM(STATE_MAIN_I3) | LELEM(STATE_MAIN_I4))
#define ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED_STATES ( \
LELEM(STATE_MAIN_R3) | LELEM(STATE_MAIN_I4) \
| LELEM(STATE_XAUTH_R1) | LELEM(STATE_XAUTH_R2) | LELEM(STATE_XAUTH_R3) \
| LELEM(STATE_XAUTH_I1) | LELEM(STATE_XAUTH_I2) \
| LELEM(STATE_MODE_CFG_I1) | LELEM(STATE_MODE_CFG_R1) | LELEM(STATE_MODE_CFG_I2) \
| LELEM(STATE_MODE_CFG_R3) | LELEM(STATE_MODE_CFG_I3) | LELEM(STATE_MODE_CFG_R4))
#define IS_PHASE1(s) ((STATE_MAIN_R0 <= (s) && (s) <= STATE_MAIN_I4) \
|| (STATE_XAUTH_I0 <= (s) && (s) <= STATE_XAUTH_R3) \
|| (STATE_MODE_CFG_R0 <= (s) && (s) <= STATE_MODE_CFG_R4))
#define IS_QUICK(s) (STATE_QUICK_R0 <= (s) && (s) <= STATE_QUICK_R2)
#define IS_ISAKMP_ENCRYPTED(s) (STATE_MAIN_I2 <= (s))
#define IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(s) ( \
(s) == STATE_MAIN_R3 \
|| (s) == STATE_MAIN_I4 \
|| (s) == STATE_XAUTH_I2 \
|| (s) == STATE_XAUTH_R3 \
|| (s) == STATE_MODE_CFG_R1 \
|| (s) == STATE_MODE_CFG_I2 \
|| (s) == STATE_MODE_CFG_I3 \
|| (s) == STATE_MODE_CFG_R4)
#define IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(s) ((s) == STATE_QUICK_I2 || (s) == STATE_QUICK_R2)
#define IS_ONLY_INBOUND_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(s) ((s) == STATE_QUICK_R1)
/* kind of struct connection
* Ordered (mostly) by concreteness. Order is exploited.
*/
extern enum_names connection_kind_names;
enum connection_kind {
CK_GROUP, /* policy group: instantiates to template */
CK_TEMPLATE, /* abstract connection, with wildcard */
CK_PERMANENT, /* normal connection */
CK_INSTANCE, /* instance of template, created for a particular attempt */
CK_GOING_AWAY /* instance being deleted -- don't delete again */
};
/* routing status.
* Note: routing ignores source address, but erouting does not!
* Note: a connection can only be routed if it is NEVER_NEGOTIATE
* or HAS_IPSEC_POLICY.
*/
extern enum_names routing_story;
/* note that this is assumed to be ordered! */
enum routing_t {
RT_UNROUTED, /* unrouted */
RT_UNROUTED_HOLD, /* unrouted, but HOLD shunt installed */
RT_ROUTED_ECLIPSED, /* RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE except bare HOLD or instance has eroute */
RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE, /* routed, and prospective shunt installed */
RT_ROUTED_HOLD, /* routed, and HOLD shunt installed */
RT_ROUTED_FAILURE, /* routed, and failure-context shunt installed */
RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL, /* routed, and erouted to an IPSEC SA group */
RT_UNROUTED_KEYED /* keyed, but not routed, on purpose */
};
#define routed(rs) ((rs) > RT_UNROUTED_HOLD)
#define erouted(rs) ((rs) != RT_UNROUTED)
#define shunt_erouted(rs) (erouted(rs) && (rs) != RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL)
/* Payload types
* RFC2408 Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)
* section 3.1
*
* RESERVED 14-127
* Private USE 128-255
*/
extern enum_names payload_names;
extern const char *const payload_name[];
#define ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE 0 /* No other payload following */
#define ISAKMP_NEXT_SA 1 /* Security Association */
#define ISAKMP_NEXT_P 2 /* Proposal */
#define ISAKMP_NEXT_T 3 /* Transform */
#define ISAKMP_NEXT_KE 4 /* Key Exchange */
#define ISAKMP_NEXT_ID 5 /* Identification */
#define ISAKMP_NEXT_CERT 6 /* Certificate */
#define ISAKMP_NEXT_CR 7 /* Certificate Request */
#define ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH 8 /* Hash */
#define ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG 9 /* Signature */
#define ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE 10 /* Nonce */
#define ISAKMP_NEXT_N 11 /* Notification */
#define ISAKMP_NEXT_D 12 /* Delete */
#define ISAKMP_NEXT_VID 13 /* Vendor ID */
#define ISAKMP_NEXT_ATTR 14 /* Mode config Attribute */
#define ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC 20 /* NAT-Traversal: NAT-D (rfc) */
#define ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_RFC 21 /* NAT-Traversal: NAT-OA (rfc) */
#define ISAKMP_NEXT_ROOF 22 /* roof on payload types */
#define ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_DRAFTS 130 /* NAT-Traversal: NAT-D (drafts) */
#define ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_DRAFTS 131 /* NAT-Traversal: NAT-OA (drafts) */
/* These values are to be used within the Type field of an Attribute (14)
* ISAKMP payload.
*/
#define ISAKMP_CFG_REQUEST 1
#define ISAKMP_CFG_REPLY 2
#define ISAKMP_CFG_SET 3
#define ISAKMP_CFG_ACK 4
extern enum_names attr_msg_type_names;
extern enum_names modecfg_attr_names;
/* XAUTH authentication types */
#define XAUTH_TYPE_GENERIC 0
#define XAUTH_TYPE_CHAP 1
#define XAUTH_TYPE_OTP 2
#define XAUTH_TYPE_SKEY 3
/* Values for XAUTH_STATUS */
#define XAUTH_STATUS_FAIL 0
#define XAUTH_STATUS_OK 1
extern enum_names xauth_type_names;
/* Exchange types
* RFC2408 "Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)"
* section 3.1
*
* ISAKMP Future Use 6 - 31
* DOI Specific Use 32 - 239
* Private Use 240 - 255
*
* Note: draft-ietf-ipsec-dhless-enc-mode-00.txt Appendix A
* defines "DHless RSA Encryption" as 6.
*/
extern enum_names exchange_names;
#define ISAKMP_XCHG_NONE 0
#define ISAKMP_XCHG_BASE 1
#define ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT 2 /* ID Protection */
#define ISAKMP_XCHG_AO 3 /* Authentication Only */
#define ISAKMP_XCHG_AGGR 4 /* Aggressive */
#define ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO 5 /* Informational */
#define ISAKMP_XCHG_MODE_CFG 6 /* Mode Config */
/* Extra exchange types, defined by Oakley
* RFC2409 "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)", near end of Appendix A
*/
#define ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK 32 /* Oakley Quick Mode */
#define ISAKMP_XCHG_NGRP 33 /* Oakley New Group Mode */
/* added in draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt, near end of Appendix A */
#define ISAKMP_XCHG_ACK_INFO 34 /* Oakley Acknowledged Informational */
/* Flag bits */
extern const char *const flag_bit_names[];
#define ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION 0x1
#define ISAKMP_FLAG_COMMIT 0x2
/* Situation definition for IPsec DOI */
extern const char *const sit_bit_names[];
#define SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY 0x01
#define SIT_SECRECY 0x02
#define SIT_INTEGRITY 0x04
/* Protocol IDs
* RFC2407 The Internet IP security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP 4.4.1
*/
extern enum_names protocol_names;
#define PROTO_ISAKMP 1
#define PROTO_IPSEC_AH 2
#define PROTO_IPSEC_ESP 3
#define PROTO_IPCOMP 4
/* warning: trans_show uses enum_show, so same static buffer is used */
#define trans_show(p, t) \
((p)==PROTO_IPSEC_AH ? enum_show(&ah_transformid_names, (t)) \
: (p)==PROTO_IPSEC_ESP ? enum_show(&esp_transformid_names, (t)) \
: (p)==PROTO_IPCOMP ? enum_show(&ipcomp_transformid_names, (t)) \
: "??")
#define KEY_IKE 1
extern enum_names isakmp_transformid_names;
/* the following are from RFC 2393/draft-shacham-ippcp-rfc2393bis-05.txt 3.3 */
typedef u_int16_t cpi_t;
#define IPCOMP_CPI_SIZE 2
#define IPCOMP_FIRST_NEGOTIATED 256
#define IPCOMP_LAST_NEGOTIATED 61439
/* Identification type values
* RFC 2407 The Internet IP security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP 4.6.2.1
*/
extern enum_names ident_names;
extern enum_names cert_type_names;
extern enum_name_t *cert_policy_names;
typedef enum certpolicy {
CERT_ALWAYS_SEND = 0,
CERT_SEND_IF_ASKED = 1,
CERT_NEVER_SEND = 2,
CERT_YES_SEND = 3, /* synonym for CERT_ALWAYS_SEND */
CERT_NO_SEND = 4 /* synonym for CERT_NEVER_SEND */
} certpolicy_t;
/* Policies for establishing an SA
*
* These are used to specify attributes (eg. encryption) and techniques
* (eg PFS) for an SA.
* Note: certain CD_ definitions in whack.c parallel these -- keep them
* in sync!
*/
extern const char *const sa_policy_bit_names[];
extern const char *prettypolicy(lset_t policy);
/* ISAKMP auth techniques (none means never negotiate) */
#define POLICY_PSK LELEM(0)
#define POLICY_PUBKEY LELEM(1)
#define POLICY_ISAKMP_SHIFT 0 /* log2(POLICY_PSK) */
#define POLICY_ID_AUTH_MASK (POLICY_PSK | POLICY_PUBKEY | POLICY_XAUTH_PSK | POLICY_XAUTH_RSASIG)
#define POLICY_ISAKMP_MASK POLICY_ID_AUTH_MASK /* all so far */
/* Quick Mode (IPSEC) attributes */
#define POLICY_ENCRYPT LELEM(2) /* must be first of IPSEC policies */
#define POLICY_AUTHENTICATE LELEM(3) /* must be second */
#define POLICY_COMPRESS LELEM(4) /* must be third */
#define POLICY_TUNNEL LELEM(5)
#define POLICY_PFS LELEM(6)
#define POLICY_DISABLEARRIVALCHECK LELEM(7) /* suppress tunnel egress address checking */
#define POLICY_IPSEC_SHIFT 2 /* log2(POLICY_ENCRYPT) */
#define POLICY_IPSEC_MASK LRANGES(POLICY_ENCRYPT, POLICY_DISABLEARRIVALCHECK)
/* shunt attributes: what to do when routed without tunnel (2 bits) */
#define POLICY_SHUNT_SHIFT 8 /* log2(POLICY_SHUNT_PASS) */
#define POLICY_SHUNT_MASK (03ul << POLICY_SHUNT_SHIFT)
#define POLICY_SHUNT_TRAP (0ul << POLICY_SHUNT_SHIFT) /* default: negotiate */
#define POLICY_SHUNT_PASS (1ul << POLICY_SHUNT_SHIFT)
#define POLICY_SHUNT_DROP (2ul << POLICY_SHUNT_SHIFT)
#define POLICY_SHUNT_REJECT (3ul << POLICY_SHUNT_SHIFT)
/* fail attributes: what to do with failed negotiation (2 bits) */
#define POLICY_FAIL_SHIFT 10 /* log2(POLICY_FAIL_PASS) */
#define POLICY_FAIL_MASK (03ul << POLICY_FAIL_SHIFT)
#define POLICY_FAIL_NONE (0ul << POLICY_FAIL_SHIFT) /* default */
#define POLICY_FAIL_PASS (1ul << POLICY_FAIL_SHIFT)
#define POLICY_FAIL_DROP (2ul << POLICY_FAIL_SHIFT)
#define POLICY_FAIL_REJECT (3ul << POLICY_FAIL_SHIFT)
/* connection policy
* Other policies could vary per state object. These live in connection.
*/
#define POLICY_DONT_REKEY LELEM(12) /* don't rekey state either Phase */
#define POLICY_OPPO LELEM(13) /* is this opportunistic? */
#define POLICY_GROUP LELEM(14) /* is this a group template? */
#define POLICY_GROUTED LELEM(15) /* do we want this group routed? */
#define POLICY_UP LELEM(16) /* do we want this up? */
#define POLICY_MODECFG_PUSH LELEM(17) /* is modecfg pushed by server? */
#define POLICY_XAUTH_PSK LELEM(18) /* do we support XAUTH????PreShared? */
#define POLICY_XAUTH_RSASIG LELEM(19) /* do we support XAUTH????RSA? */
#define POLICY_XAUTH_SERVER LELEM(20) /* are we an XAUTH server? */
#define POLICY_DONT_REAUTH LELEM(21) /* don't reauthenticate on rekeying, IKEv2 only */
#define POLICY_BEET LELEM(22) /* bound end2end tunnel, IKEv2 */
#define POLICY_MOBIKE LELEM(23) /* enable MOBIKE for IKEv2 */
#define POLICY_FORCE_ENCAP LELEM(24) /* force UDP encapsulation (IKEv2) */
#define POLICY_PROXY LELEM(25) /* proxy transport mode (MIPv6) */
/* Any IPsec policy? If not, a connection description
* is only for ISAKMP SA, not IPSEC SA. (A pun, I admit.)
* Note: a connection can only be routed if it is NEVER_NEGOTIATE
* or HAS_IPSEC_POLICY.
*/
#define HAS_IPSEC_POLICY(p) (((p) & POLICY_IPSEC_MASK) != 0)
/* Don't allow negotiation? */
#define NEVER_NEGOTIATE(p) (LDISJOINT((p), POLICY_ID_AUTH_MASK))
/* Oakley transform attributes
* draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt appendix A
*/
extern enum_names oakley_attr_names;
extern const char *const oakley_attr_bit_names[];
#define OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM 1
#define OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM 2
#define OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD 3
#define OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION 4
#define OAKLEY_GROUP_TYPE 5
#define OAKLEY_GROUP_PRIME 6 /* B/V */
#define OAKLEY_GROUP_GENERATOR_ONE 7 /* B/V */
#define OAKLEY_GROUP_GENERATOR_TWO 8 /* B/V */
#define OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE_A 9 /* B/V */
#define OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE_B 10 /* B/V */
#define OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE 11
#define OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION 12 /* B/V */
#define OAKLEY_PRF 13
#define OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH 14
#define OAKLEY_FIELD_SIZE 15
#define OAKLEY_GROUP_ORDER 16 /* B/V */
#define OAKLEY_BLOCK_SIZE 17
/* for each Oakley attribute, which enum_names describes its values? */
extern enum_names *oakley_attr_val_descs[];
/* IPsec DOI attributes
* RFC2407 The Internet IP security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP 4.5
*/
extern enum_names ipsec_attr_names;
#define SA_LIFE_TYPE 1
#define SA_LIFE_DURATION 2 /* B/V */
#define GROUP_DESCRIPTION 3
#define ENCAPSULATION_MODE 4
#define AUTH_ALGORITHM 5
#define KEY_LENGTH 6
#define KEY_ROUNDS 7
#define COMPRESS_DICT_SIZE 8
#define COMPRESS_PRIVATE_ALG 9 /* B/V */
/* for each IPsec attribute, which enum_names describes its values? */
extern enum_names *ipsec_attr_val_descs[];
/* SA Lifetime Type attribute
* RFC2407 The Internet IP security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP 4.5
* Default time specified in 4.5
*
* There are two defaults for IPSEC SA lifetime, SA_LIFE_DURATION_DEFAULT,
* and PLUTO_SA_LIFE_DURATION_DEFAULT.
* SA_LIFE_DURATION_DEFAULT is specified in RFC2407 "The Internet IP
* Security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP" 4.5. It applies when
* an ISAKMP negotiation does not explicitly specify a life duration.
* PLUTO_SA_LIFE_DURATION_DEFAULT is specified in pluto(8). It applies
* when a connection description does not specify --ipseclifetime.
* The value of SA_LIFE_DURATION_MAXIMUM is our local policy.
*/
extern enum_names sa_lifetime_names;
#define SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS 1
#define SA_LIFE_TYPE_KBYTES 2
#define SA_LIFE_DURATION_DEFAULT 28800 /* eight hours (RFC2407 4.5) */
#define PLUTO_SA_LIFE_DURATION_DEFAULT 3600 /* one hour (pluto(8)) */
#define SA_LIFE_DURATION_MAXIMUM 86400 /* one day */
#define SA_REPLACEMENT_MARGIN_DEFAULT 540 /* (IPSEC & IKE) nine minutes */
#define SA_REPLACEMENT_FUZZ_DEFAULT 100 /* (IPSEC & IKE) 100% of MARGIN */
#define SA_REPLACEMENT_RETRIES_DEFAULT 3 /* (IPSEC & IKE) */
#define SA_LIFE_DURATION_K_DEFAULT 0xFFFFFFFFlu
/* Encapsulation Mode attribute */
extern enum_names enc_mode_names;
#define ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UNSPECIFIED 0 /* not legal -- used internally */
#define ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL 1
#define ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT 2
#define ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TUNNEL_RFC 3
#define ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TRANSPORT_RFC 4
#define ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TUNNEL_DRAFTS 61443
#define ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TRANSPORT_DRAFTS 61444
/* Auth Algorithm attribute */
extern enum_names auth_alg_names, extended_auth_alg_names;
#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_NONE 0 /* our private designation */
#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5 1
#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1 2
#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_DES_MAC 3
#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_KPDK 4
#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_256 5
#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_384 6
#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_512 7
#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_RIPEMD 8
#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_AES_XCBC_MAC 9
#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_SIG_RSA 10
#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_AES_128_GMAC 11
#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_AES_192_GMAC 12
#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_AES_256_GMAC 13
#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_NULL 251
#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_256_96 252
/* Oakley Lifetime Type attribute
* draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt appendix A
* As far as I can see, there is not specification for
* OAKLEY_ISAKMP_SA_LIFETIME_DEFAULT. This could lead to interop problems!
* For no particular reason, we chose three hours.
* The value of OAKLEY_ISAKMP_SA_LIFETIME_MAXIMUM is our local policy.
*/
extern enum_names oakley_lifetime_names;
#define OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS 1
#define OAKLEY_LIFE_KILOBYTES 2
#define OAKLEY_ISAKMP_SA_LIFETIME_DEFAULT 10800 /* three hours */
#define OAKLEY_ISAKMP_SA_LIFETIME_MAXIMUM 86400 /* one day */
/* Oakley PRF attribute (none defined)
* draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt appendix A
*/
extern enum_names oakley_prf_names;
/* HMAC (see rfc2104.txt) */
#define HMAC_IPAD 0x36
#define HMAC_OPAD 0x5C
/* Oakley Encryption Algorithm attribute
* draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt appendix A
* and from http://www.isi.edu/in-notes/iana/assignments/ipsec-registry
*/
extern enum_names oakley_enc_names;
#define OAKLEY_DES_CBC 1
#define OAKLEY_IDEA_CBC 2
#define OAKLEY_BLOWFISH_CBC 3
#define OAKLEY_RC5_R16_B64_CBC 4
#define OAKLEY_3DES_CBC 5
#define OAKLEY_CAST_CBC 6
#define OAKLEY_AES_CBC 7
#define OAKLEY_CAMELLIA_CBC 8
#define OAKLEY_MARS_CBC 65001
#define OAKLEY_RC6_CBC 65002
#define OAKLEY_ID_65003 65003
#define OAKLEY_SERPENT_CBC 65004
#define OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC 65005
#define OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC_SSH 65289
#define OAKLEY_ENCRYPT_MAX 65535 /* pretty useless :) */
/* Oakley Hash Algorithm attribute
* draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt appendix A
* and from http://www.isi.edu/in-notes/iana/assignments/ipsec-registry
*/
extern enum_names oakley_hash_names;
#define OAKLEY_MD5 1
#define OAKLEY_SHA 2
#define OAKLEY_TIGER 3
#define OAKLEY_SHA2_256 4
#define OAKLEY_SHA2_384 5
#define OAKLEY_SHA2_512 6
#define OAKLEY_HASH_MAX 7
/* Oakley Authentication Method attribute
* draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt appendix A
* Goofy Hybrid extensions from draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-hybrid-auth-05.txt
* Goofy XAUTH extensions from draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-xauth-06.txt
*/
extern enum_names oakley_auth_names;
#define OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY 1
#define OAKLEY_DSS_SIG 2
#define OAKLEY_RSA_SIG 3
#define OAKLEY_RSA_ENC 4
#define OAKLEY_RSA_ENC_REV 5
#define OAKLEY_ELGAMAL_ENC 6
#define OAKLEY_ELGAMAL_ENC_REV 7
#define OAKLEY_ECDSA_SIG 8
#define OAKLEY_ECDSA_256 9
#define OAKLEY_ECDSA_384 10
#define OAKLEY_ECDSA_521 11
#define OAKLEY_AUTH_ROOF 12 /* roof on auth values THAT WE SUPPORT */
#define HybridInitRSA 64221
#define HybridRespRSA 64222
#define HybridInitDSS 64223
#define HybridRespDSS 64224
#define XAUTHInitPreShared 65001
#define XAUTHRespPreShared 65002
#define XAUTHInitDSS 65003
#define XAUTHRespDSS 65004
#define XAUTHInitRSA 65005
#define XAUTHRespRSA 65006
#define XAUTHInitRSAEncryption 65007
#define XAUTHRespRSAEncryption 65008
#define XAUTHInitRSARevisedEncryption 65009
#define XAUTHRespRSARevisedEncryption 65010
/* Oakley Group Description attribute
* draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt appendix A
*/
extern enum_names oakley_group_names;
/* you must also touch: constants.c, crypto.c */
/* Oakley Group Type attribute
* draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt appendix A
*/
extern enum_names oakley_group_type_names;
#define OAKLEY_GROUP_TYPE_MODP 1
#define OAKLEY_GROUP_TYPE_ECP 2
#define OAKLEY_GROUP_TYPE_EC2N 3
/* Notify messages -- error types
* See RFC2408 ISAKMP 3.14.1
*/
extern enum_names notification_names;
extern enum_names ipsec_notification_names;
typedef enum {
ISAKMP_NOTHING_WRONG = 0, /* unofficial! */
ISAKMP_INVALID_PAYLOAD_TYPE = 1,
ISAKMP_DOI_NOT_SUPPORTED = 2,
ISAKMP_SITUATION_NOT_SUPPORTED = 3,
ISAKMP_INVALID_COOKIE = 4,
ISAKMP_INVALID_MAJOR_VERSION = 5,
ISAKMP_INVALID_MINOR_VERSION = 6,
ISAKMP_INVALID_EXCHANGE_TYPE = 7,
ISAKMP_INVALID_FLAGS = 8,
ISAKMP_INVALID_MESSAGE_ID = 9,
ISAKMP_INVALID_PROTOCOL_ID = 10,
ISAKMP_INVALID_SPI = 11,
ISAKMP_INVALID_TRANSFORM_ID = 12,
ISAKMP_ATTRIBUTES_NOT_SUPPORTED = 13,
ISAKMP_NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN = 14,
ISAKMP_BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX = 15,
ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_MALFORMED = 16,
ISAKMP_INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION = 17,
ISAKMP_INVALID_ID_INFORMATION = 18,
ISAKMP_INVALID_CERT_ENCODING = 19,
ISAKMP_INVALID_CERTIFICATE = 20,
ISAKMP_CERT_TYPE_UNSUPPORTED = 21,
ISAKMP_INVALID_CERT_AUTHORITY = 22,
ISAKMP_INVALID_HASH_INFORMATION = 23,
ISAKMP_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED = 24,
ISAKMP_INVALID_SIGNATURE = 25,
ISAKMP_ADDRESS_NOTIFICATION = 26,
ISAKMP_NOTIFY_SA_LIFETIME = 27,
ISAKMP_CERTIFICATE_UNAVAILABLE = 28,
ISAKMP_UNSUPPORTED_EXCHANGE_TYPE = 29,
ISAKMP_UNEQUAL_PAYLOAD_LENGTHS = 30,
/* ISAKMP status type */
ISAKMP_CONNECTED = 16384,
/* IPSEC DOI additions; status types (RFC2407 IPSEC DOI 4.6.3)
* These must be sent under the protection of an ISAKMP SA.
*/
IPSEC_RESPONDER_LIFETIME = 24576,
IPSEC_REPLAY_STATUS = 24577,
IPSEC_INITIAL_CONTACT = 24578,
/* RFC 3706 DPD */
R_U_THERE = 36136,
R_U_THERE_ACK = 36137,
/* Juniper SRX private use */
NS_NHTB_INFORM = 40001
} notification_t;
/* Public key algorithm number
* Same numbering as used in DNSsec
* See RFC 2535 DNSsec 3.2 The KEY Algorithm Number Specification.
* Also found in BIND 8.2.2 include/isc/dst.h as DST algorithm codes.
*/
enum pubkey_alg
{
PUBKEY_ALG_RSA = 1,
PUBKEY_ALG_DSA = 3,
};
/* Limits on size of RSA moduli.
* The upper bound matches that of DNSsec (see RFC 2537).
* The lower bound must be more than 11 octets for certain
* the encoding to work, but it must be much larger for any
* real security. For now, we require 512 bits.
*/
#define RSA_MIN_OCTETS_RFC 12
#define RSA_MIN_OCTETS (512 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
#define RSA_MIN_OCTETS_UGH "RSA modulus too small for security: less than 512 bits"
#define RSA_MAX_OCTETS (8192 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
#define RSA_MAX_OCTETS_UGH "RSA modulus too large: more than 8192 bits"
/* Note: RFC 2537 encoding adds a few bytes. If you use a small
* modulus like 3, the overhead is only 2 bytes
*/
#define RSA_MAX_ENCODING_BYTES (RSA_MAX_OCTETS + 2)
/* socket address family info */
struct af_info
{
int af;
const char *name;
size_t ia_sz;
size_t sa_sz;
int mask_cnt;
u_int8_t id_addr, id_subnet, id_range;
const ip_address *any;
const ip_subnet *none; /* 0.0.0.0/32 or IPv6 equivalent */
const ip_subnet *all; /* 0.0.0.0/0 or IPv6 equivalent */
};
extern const struct af_info
af_inet4_info,
af_inet6_info;
extern const struct af_info *aftoinfo(int af);
extern enum_names af_names;
#define subnetisaddr(sn, a) (subnetishost(sn) && addrinsubnet((a), (sn)))
extern bool subnetisnone(const ip_subnet *sn);
/* BIND enumerated types */
extern enum_names
rr_qtype_names,
rr_type_names,
rr_class_names;
/* How authenticated is info that might have come from DNS?
* In order of increasing confidence.
*/
enum dns_auth_level {
DAL_UNSIGNED, /* AD in response, but no signature: no authentication */
DAL_NOTSEC, /* no AD in response: authentication impossible */
DAL_SIGNED, /* AD and signature in response: authentic */
DAL_LOCAL /* locally provided (pretty good) */
};
/*
* define a macro for use in error messages
*/
#ifdef USE_KEYRR
#define RRNAME "TXT or KEY"
#else
#define RRNAME "TXT"
#endif
/* natt traversal types */
extern const char *const natt_type_bitnames[];
/* secret value for responder cookies */
extern u_char secret_of_the_day[HASH_SIZE_SHA1];
#endif /* _CONSTANTS_H */
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