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<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd">
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<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A>
<A HREF="upgrading.html">Next</A>
<HR>
<H1><A name="intro">Introduction</A></H1>
<P>This section gives an overview of:</P>
<UL>
<LI>what IP Security (IPsec) does</LI>
<LI>how IPsec works</LI>
<LI>why we are implementing it for Linux</LI>
<LI>how this implementation works</LI>
</UL>
<P>This section is intended to cover only the essentials,<EM> things you
should know before trying to use FreeS/WAN.</EM></P>
<P>For more detailed background information, see the<A href="politics.html#politics">
history and politics</A> and<A href="ipsec.html#ipsec.detail"> IPsec
protocols</A> sections.</P>
<H2><A name="ipsec.intro">IPsec, Security for the Internet Protocol</A></H2>
<P>FreeS/WAN is a Linux implementation of the IPsec (IP security)
protocols. IPsec provides<A href="glossary.html#encryption"> encryption</A>
and<A href="glossary.html#authentication"> authentication</A> services
at the IP (Internet Protocol) level of the network protocol stack.</P>
<P>Working at this level, IPsec can protect any traffic carried over IP,
unlike other encryption which generally protects only a particular
higher-level protocol --<A href="glossary.html#PGP"> PGP</A> for mail,<A
href="glossary.html#SSH"> SSH</A> for remote login,<A href="glossary.html#SSL">
SSL</A> for web work, and so on. This approach has both considerable
advantages and some limitations. For discussion, see our<A href="ipsec.html#others">
IPsec section</A></P>
<P>IPsec can be used on any machine which does IP networking. Dedicated
IPsec gateway machines can be installed wherever required to protect
traffic. IPsec can also run on routers, on firewall machines, on
various application servers, and on end-user desktop or laptop
machines.</P>
<P>Three protocols are used</P>
<UL>
<LI><A href="glossary.html#AH">AH</A> (Authentication Header) provides a
packet-level authentication service</LI>
<LI><A href="glossary.html#ESP">ESP</A> (Encapsulating Security Payload)
provides encryption plus authentication</LI>
<LI><A href="glossary.html#IKE">IKE</A> (Internet Key Exchange)
negotiates connection parameters, including keys, for the other two</LI>
</UL>
<P>Our implementation has three main parts:</P>
<UL>
<LI><A href="glossary.html#KLIPS">KLIPS</A> (kernel IPsec) implements
AH, ESP, and packet handling within the kernel</LI>
<LI><A href="glossary.html#Pluto">Pluto</A> (an IKE daemon) implements
IKE, negotiating connections with other systems</LI>
<LI>various scripts provide an adminstrator's interface to the machinery</LI>
</UL>
<P>IPsec is optional for the current (version 4) Internet Protocol.
FreeS/WAN adds IPsec to the Linux IPv4 network stack. Implementations
of<A href="glossary.html#ipv6.gloss"> IP version 6</A> are required to
include IPsec. Work toward integrating FreeS/WAN into the Linux IPv6
stack has<A href="compat.html#ipv6"> started</A>.</P>
<P>For more information on IPsec, see our<A href="ipsec.html#ipsec.detail">
IPsec protocols</A> section, our collection of<A href="web.html#ipsec.link">
IPsec links</A> or the<A href="rfc.html#RFC"> RFCs</A> which are the
official definitions of these protocols.</P>
<H3><A name="intro.interop">Interoperating with other IPsec
implementations</A></H3>
<P>IPsec is designed to let different implementations work together. We
provide:</P>
<UL>
<LI>a<A href="web.html#implement"> list</A> of some other
implementations</LI>
<LI>information on<A href="interop.html#interop"> using FreeS/WAN with
other implementations</A></LI>
</UL>
<P>The VPN Consortium fosters cooperation among implementers and
interoperability among implementations. Their<A href="http://www.vpnc.org/">
web site</A> has much more information.</P>
<H3><A name="advantages">Advantages of IPsec</A></H3>
<P>IPsec has a number of security advantages. Here are some
independently written articles which discuss these:</P>
<P><A HREF="http://www.sans.org/rr/"> SANS institute papers</A>. See the
section on Encryption &amp;VPNs.
<BR><A HREF="http://www.cisco.com/en/US/netsol/ns110/ns170/ns171/ns128/networking_solutions_white_papers_list.html">
Cisco's white papers on &quot;Networking Solutions&quot;</A>.
<BR><A HREF="http://iscs.sourceforge.net/HowWhyBrief/HowWhyBrief.html">
Advantages of ISCS (Linux Integrated Secure Communications System;
includes FreeS/WAN and other software)</A>.</P>
<H3><A name="applications">Applications of IPsec</A></H3>
<P>Because IPsec operates at the network layer, it is remarkably
flexible and can be used to secure nearly any type of Internet traffic.
Two applications, however, are extremely widespread:</P>
<UL>
<LI>a<A href="glossary.html#VPN"> Virtual Private Network</A>, or VPN,
allows multiple sites to communicate securely over an insecure Internet
by encrypting all communication between the sites.</LI>
<LI>&quot;Road Warriors&quot; connect to the office from home, or perhaps from a
hotel somewhere</LI>
</UL>
<P>There is enough opportunity in these applications that vendors are
flocking to them. IPsec is being built into routers, into firewall
products, and into major operating systems, primarily to support these
applications. See our<A href="web.html#implement"> list</A> of
implementations for details.</P>
<P>We support both of those applications, and various less common IPsec
applications as well, but we also add one of our own:</P>
<UL>
<LI>opportunistic encryption, the ability to set up FreeS/WAN gateways
so that any two of them can encrypt to each other, and will do so
whenever packets pass between them.</LI>
</UL>
<P>This is an extension we are adding to the protocols. FreeS/WAN is the
first prototype implementation, though we hope other IPsec
implementations will adopt the technique once we demonstrate it. See<A href="#goals">
project goals</A> below for why we think this is important.</P>
<P>A somewhat more detailed description of each of these applications is
below. Our<A href="quickstart.html#quick_guide"> quickstart</A> section
will show you how to build each of them.</P>
<H4><A name="makeVPN">Using secure tunnels to create a VPN</A></H4>
<P>A VPN, or<STRONG> V</STRONG>irtual<STRONG> P</STRONG>rivate<STRONG> N</STRONG>
etwork lets two networks communicate securely when the only connection
between them is over a third network which they do not trust.</P>
<P>The method is to put a security gateway machine between each of the
communicating networks and the untrusted network. The gateway machines
encrypt packets entering the untrusted net and decrypt packets leaving
it, creating a secure tunnel through it.</P>
<P>If the cryptography is strong, the implementation is careful, and the
administration of the gateways is competent, then one can reasonably
trust the security of the tunnel. The two networks then behave like a
single large private network, some of whose links are encrypted tunnels
through untrusted nets.</P>
<P>Actual VPNs are often more complex. One organisation may have fifty
branch offices, plus some suppliers and clients, with whom it needs to
communicate securely. Another might have 5,000 stores, or 50,000
point-of-sale devices. The untrusted network need not be the Internet.
All the same issues arise on a corporate or institutional network
whenever two departments want to communicate privately with each other.</P>
<P>Administratively, the nice thing about many VPN setups is that large
parts of them are static. You know the IP addresses of most of the
machines involved. More important, you know they will not change on
you. This simplifies some of the admin work. For cases where the
addresses do change, see the next section.</P>
<H4><A name="road.intro">Road Warriors</A></H4>
<P>The prototypical &quot;Road Warrior&quot; is a traveller connecting to home
base from a laptop machine. Administratively, most of the same problems
arise for a telecommuter connecting from home to the office, especially
if the telecommuter does not have a static IP address.</P>
<P>For purposes of this document:</P>
<UL>
<LI>anyone with a dynamic IP address is a &quot;Road Warrior&quot;.</LI>
<LI>any machine doing IPsec processing is a &quot;gateway&quot;. Think of the
single-user road warrior machine as a gateway with a degenerate subnet
(one machine, itself) behind it.</LI>
</UL>
<P>These require somewhat different setup than VPN gateways with static
addresses and with client systems behind them, but are basically not
problematic.</P>
<P>There are some difficulties which appear for some road warrior
connections:</P>
<UL>
<LI>Road Wariors who get their addresses via DHCP may have a problem.
FreeS/WAN can quite happily build and use a tunnel to such an address,
but when the DHCP lease expires, FreeS/WAN does not know that. The
tunnel fails, and the only recovery method is to tear it down and
re-build it.</LI>
<LI>If<A href="glossary.html#NAT.gloss"> Network Address Translation</A>
(NAT) is applied between the two IPsec Gateways, this breaks IPsec.
IPsec authenticates packets on an end-to-end basis, to ensure they are
not altered en route. NAT rewrites packets as they go by. See our<A href="firewall.html#NAT">
firewalls</A> document for details.</LI>
</UL>
<P>In most situations, however, FreeS/WAN supports road warrior
connections just fine.</P>
<H4><A name="opp.intro">Opportunistic encryption</A></H4>
<P>One of the reasons we are working on FreeS/WAN is that it gives us
the opportunity to add what we call opportuntistic encryption. This
means that any two FreeS/WAN gateways will be able to encrypt their
traffic, even if the two gateway administrators have had no prior
contact and neither system has any preset information about the other.</P>
<P>Both systems pick up the authentication information they need from
the<A href="glossary.html#DNS"> DNS</A> (domain name service), the
service they already use to look up IP addresses. Of course the
administrators must put that information in the DNS, and must set up
their gateways with opportunistic encryption enabled. Once that is
done, everything is automatic. The gateways look for opportunities to
encrypt, and encrypt whatever they can. Whether they also accept
unencrypted communication is a policy decision the administrator can
make.</P>
<P>This technique can give two large payoffs:</P>
<UL>
<LI>It reduces the administrative overhead for IPsec enormously. You
configure your gateway and thereafter everything is automatic. The need
to configure the system on a per-tunnel basis disappears. Of course,
FreeS/WAN allows specifically configured tunnels to co-exist with
opportunistic encryption, but we hope to make them unnecessary in most
cases.</LI>
<LI>It moves us toward a more secure Internet, allowing users to create
an environment where message privacy is the default. All messages can
be encrypted, provided the other end is willing to co-operate. See our<A
href="politics.html#politics"> history and politics of cryptography</A>
section for discussion of why we think this is needed.</LI>
</UL>
<P>Opportunistic encryption is not (yet?) a standard part of the IPsec
protocols, but an extension we are proposing and demonstrating. For
details of our design, see<A href="#applied"> links</A> below.</P>
<P>Only one current product we know of implements a form of
opportunistic encryption.<A href="web.html#ssmail"> Secure sendmail</A>
will automatically encrypt server-to-server mail transfers whenever
possible.</P>
<H3><A name="types">The need to authenticate gateways</A></H3>
<P>A complication, which applies to any type of connection -- VPN, Road
Warrior or opportunistic -- is that a secure connection cannot be
created magically.<EM> There must be some mechanism which enables the
gateways to reliably identify each other.</EM> Without this, they
cannot sensibly trust each other and cannot create a genuinely secure
link.</P>
<P>Any link they do create without some form of<A href="glossary.html#authentication">
authentication</A> will be vulnerable to a<A href="glossary.html#middle">
man-in-the-middle attack</A>. If<A href="glossary.html#alicebob"> Alice
and Bob</A> are the people creating the connection, a villian who can
re-route or intercept the packets can pose as Alice while talking to
Bob and pose as Bob while talking to Alice. Alice and Bob then both
talk to the man in the middle, thinking they are talking to each other,
and the villain gets everything sent on the bogus &quot;secure&quot; connection.</P>
<P>There are two ways to build links securely, both of which exclude the
man-in-the middle:</P>
<UL>
<LI>with<STRONG> manual keying</STRONG>, Alice and Bob share a secret
key (which must be transmitted securely, perhaps in a note or via PGP
or SSH) to encrypt their messages. For FreeS/WAN, such keys are stored
in the<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> ipsec.conf(5)</A> file. Of
course, if an enemy gets the key, all is lost.</LI>
<LI>with<STRONG> automatic keying</STRONG>, the two systems authenticate
each other and negotiate their own secret keys. The keys are
automatically changed periodically.</LI>
</UL>
<P>Automatic keying is much more secure, since if an enemy gets one key
only messages between the previous re-keying and the next are exposed.
It is therefore the usual mode of operation for most IPsec deployment,
and the mode we use in our setup examples. FreeS/WAN does support
manual keying for special circumstanes. See this<A href="adv_config.html#prodman">
section</A>.</P>
<P>For automatic keying, the two systems must authenticate each other
during the negotiations. There is a choice of methods for this:</P>
<UL>
<LI>a<STRONG> shared secret</STRONG> provides authentication. If Alice
and Bob are the only ones who know a secret and Alice recives a message
which could not have been created without that secret, then Alice can
safely believe the message came from Bob.</LI>
<LI>a<A href="glossary.html#public"> public key</A> can also provide
authentication. If Alice receives a message signed with Bob's private
key (which of course only he should know) and she has a trustworthy
copy of his public key (so that she can verify the signature), then she
can safely believe the message came from Bob.</LI>
</UL>
<P>Public key techniques are much preferable, for reasons discussed<A href="config.html#choose">
later</A>, and will be used in all our setup examples. FreeS/WAN does
also support auto-keying with shared secret authentication. See this<A href="adv_config.html#prodsecrets">
section</A>.</P>
<H2><A name="project">The FreeS/WAN project</A></H2>
<P>For complete information on the project, see our web site,<A href="http://liberty.freeswan.org">
freeswan.org</A>.</P>
<P>In summary, we are implementing the<A href="glossary.html#IPsec">
IPsec</A> protocols for Linux and extending them to do<A href="glossary.html#carpediem">
opportunistic encryption</A>.</P>
<H3><A name="goals">Project goals</A></H3>
<P>Our overall goal in FreeS/WAN is to make the Internet more secure and
more private.</P>
<P>Our IPsec implementation supports VPNs and Road Warriors of course.
Those are important applications. Many users will want FreeS/WAN to
build corporate VPNs or to provide secure remote access.</P>
<P>However, our goals in building it go beyond that. We are trying to
help<STRONG> build security into the fabric of the Internet</STRONG> so
that anyone who choses to communicate securely can do so, as easily as
they can do anything else on the net.</P>
<P>More detailed objectives are:</P>
<UL>
<LI>extend IPsec to do<A href="glossary.html#carpediem"> opportunistic
encryption</A> so that
<UL>
<LI>any two systems can secure their communications without a
pre-arranged connection</LI>
<LI><STRONG>secure connections can be the default</STRONG>, falling back
to unencrypted connections only if:
<UL>
<LI><EM>both</EM> the partner is not set up to co-operate on securing
the connection</LI>
<LI><EM>and</EM> your policy allows insecure connections</LI>
</UL>
</LI>
<LI>a significant fraction of all Internet traffic is encrypted</LI>
<LI>wholesale monitoring of the net (<A href="politics.html#intro.poli">
examples</A>) becomes difficult or impossible</LI>
</UL>
</LI>
<LI>help make IPsec widespread by providing an implementation with no
restrictions:
<UL>
<LI>freely available in source code under the<A href="glossary.html#GPL">
GNU General Public License</A></LI>
<LI>running on a range of readily available hardware</LI>
<LI>not subject to US or other nations'<A href="politics.html#exlaw">
export restrictions</A>.
<BR> Note that in order to avoid<EM> even the appearance</EM> of being
subject to those laws, the project cannot accept software contributions
--<EM> not even one-line bug fixes</EM> -- from US residents or
citizens.</LI>
</UL>
</LI>
<LI>provide a high-quality IPsec implementation for Linux
<UL>
<LI>portable to all CPUs Linux supports:<A href="compat.html#CPUs">
(current list)</A></LI>
<LI>interoperable with other IPsec implementations:<A href="interop.html#interop">
(current list)</A></LI>
</UL>
</LI>
</UL>
<P>If we can get opportunistic encryption implemented and widely
deployed, then it becomes impossible for even huge well-funded agencies
to monitor the net.</P>
<P>See also our section on<A href="politics.html#politics"> history and
politics</A> of cryptography, which includes our project leader's<A href="politics.html#gilmore">
rationale</A> for starting the project.</P>
<H3><A name="staff">Project team</A></H3>
<P>Two of the team are from the US and can therefore contribute no code:</P>
<UL>
<LI>John Gilmore: founder and policy-maker (<A href="http://www.toad.com/gnu/">
home page</A>)</LI>
<LI>Hugh Daniel: project manager, Most Demented Tester, and occasionally
Pointy-Haired Boss</LI>
</UL>
<P>The rest of the team are Canadians, working in Canada. (<A href="politics.html#status">
Why Canada?</A>)</P>
<UL>
<LI>Hugh Redelmeier:<A href="glossary.html#Pluto"> Pluto daemon</A>
programmer</LI>
<LI>Richard Guy Briggs:<A href="glossary.html#KLIPS"> KLIPS</A>
programmer</LI>
<LI>Michael Richardson: hacker without portfolio</LI>
<LI>Claudia Schmeing: documentation</LI>
<LI>Sam Sgro: technical support via the<A href="mail.html#lists">
mailing lists</A></LI>
</UL>
<P>The project is funded by civil libertarians who consider our goals
worthwhile. Most of the team are paid for this work.</P>
<P>People outside this core team have made substantial contributions.
See</P>
<UL>
<LI>our<A href="../CREDITS"> CREDITS</A> file</LI>
<LI>the<A href="web.html#patch"> patches and add-ons</A> section of our
web references file</LI>
<LI>lists below of user-written<A href="#howto"> HowTos</A> and<A href="#applied">
other papers</A></LI>
</UL>
<P>Additional contributions are welcome. See the<A href="faq.html#contrib.faq">
FAQ</A> for details.</P>
<H2><A name="products">Products containing FreeS/WAN</A></H2>
<P>Unfortunately the<A href="politics.html#exlaw"> export laws</A> of
some countries restrict the distribution of strong cryptography.
FreeS/WAN is therefore not in the standard Linux kernel and not in all
CD or web distributions.</P>
<P>FreeS/WAN is, however, quite widely used. Products we know of that
use it are listed below. We would appreciate hearing, via the<A href="mail.html#lists">
mailing lists</A>, of any we don't know of.</P>
<H3><A name="distwith">Full Linux distributions</A></H3>
<P>FreeS/WAN is included in various general-purpose Linux distributions,
mostly from countries (shown in brackets) with more sensible laws:</P>
<UL>
<LI><A href="http://www.suse.com/">SuSE Linux</A> (Germany)</LI>
<LI><A href="http://www.conectiva.com">Conectiva</A> (Brazil)</LI>
<LI><A href="http://www.linux-mandrake.com/en/">Mandrake</A> (France)</LI>
<LI><A href="http://www.debian.org">Debian</A></LI>
<LI>the<A href="http://www.pld.org.pl/"> Polish(ed) Linux Distribution</A>
(Poland)</LI>
<LI><A>Best Linux</A> (Finland)</LI>
</UL>
<P>For distributions which do not include FreeS/WAN and are not Redhat
(which we develop and test on), there is additional information in our<A
href="compat.html#otherdist"> compatibility</A> section.</P>
<P>The server edition of<A href="http://www.corel.com"> Corel</A> Linux
(Canada) also had FreeS/WAN, but Corel have dropped that product line.</P>
<H3><A name="kernel_dist">Linux kernel distributions</A></H3>
<UL>
<LI><A href="http://sourceforge.net/projects/wolk/">Working Overloaded
Linux Kernel (WOLK)</A></LI>
</UL>
<H3><A name="office_dist">Office server distributions</A></H3>
<P>FreeS/WAN is also included in several distributions aimed at the
market for turnkey business servers:</P>
<UL>
<LI><A href="http://www.e-smith.com/">e-Smith</A> (Canada), which has
recently been acquired and become the Network Server Solutions group of<A
href="http://www.mitel.com/"> Mitel Networks</A> (Canada)</LI>
<LI><A href="http://www.clarkconnect.org/">ClarkConnect</A> from Point
Clark Networks (Canada)</LI>
<LI><A href="http://www.trustix.net/">Trustix Secure Linux</A> (Norway)</LI>
</UL>
<H3><A name="fw_dist">Firewall distributions</A></H3>
<P>Several distributions intended for firewall and router applications
include FreeS/WAN:</P>
<UL>
<LI>The<A href="http://www.linuxrouter.org/"> Linux Router Project</A>
produces a Linux distribution that will boot from a single floppy. The<A
href="http://leaf.sourceforge.net"> LEAF</A> firewall project provides
several different LRP-based firewall packages. At least one of them,
Charles Steinkuehler's Dachstein, includes FreeS/WAN with X.509
patches.</LI>
<LI>there are several distributions bootable directly from CD-ROM,
usable on a machine without hard disk.
<UL>
<LI>Dachstein (see above) can be used this way</LI>
<LI><A href="http://www.gibraltar.at/">Gibraltar</A> is based on Debian
GNU/Linux.</LI>
<LI>at time of writing,<A href="www.xiloo.com"> Xiloo</A> is available
only in Chinese. An English version is expected.</LI>
</UL>
</LI>
<LI><A href="http://www.astaro.com/products/index.html">Astaro Security
Linux</A> includes FreeS/WAN. It has some web-based tools for managing
the firewall that include FreeS/WAN configuration management.</LI>
<LI><A href="http://www.linuxwall.de">Linuxwall</A></LI>
<LI><A href="http://www.smoothwall.org/">Smoothwall</A></LI>
<LI><A href="http://www.devil-linux.org/">Devil Linux</A></LI>
<LI>Coyote Linux has a<A href="http://embedded.coyotelinux.com/wolverine/index.php">
Wolverine</A> firewall/VPN server</LI>
</UL>
<P>There are also several sets of scripts available for managing a
firewall which is also acting as a FreeS/WAN IPsec gateway. See this<A href="firewall.html#rules.pub">
list</A>.</P>
<H3><A name="turnkey">Firewall and VPN products</A></H3>
<P>Several vendors use FreeS/WAN as the IPsec component of a turnkey
firewall or VPN product.</P>
<P>Software-only products:</P>
<UL>
<LI><A href="http://www.linuxmagic.com/vpn/index.html">Linux Magic</A>
offer a VPN/Firewall product using FreeS/WAN</LI>
<LI>The Software Group's<A href="http://www.wanware.com/sentinet/">
Sentinet</A> product uses FreeS/WAN</LI>
<LI><A href="http://www.merilus.com">Merilus</A> use FreeS/WAN in their
Gateway Guardian firewall product</LI>
</UL>
<P>Products that include the hardware:</P>
<UL>
<LI>The<A href="http://www.lasat.com"> LASAT SafePipe[tm]</A> series. is
an IPsec box based on an embedded MIPS running Linux with FreeS/WAN and
a web-config front end. This company also host our freeswan.org web
site.</LI>
<LI>Merilus<A href="http://www.merilus.com/products/fc/index.shtml">
Firecard</A> is a Linux firewall on a PCI card.</LI>
<LI><A href="http://www.kyzo.com/">Kyzo</A> have a &quot;pizza box&quot; product
line with various types of server, all running from flash. One of them
is an IPsec/PPTP VPN server</LI>
<LI><A href="http://www.pfn.com">PFN</A> use FreeS/WAN in some of their
products</LI>
</UL>
<P><A href="www.rebel.com">Rebel.com</A>, makers of the Netwinder Linux
machines (ARM or Crusoe based), had a product that used FreeS/WAN. The
company is in receivership so the future of the Netwinder is at best
unclear.<A href="web.html#patch"> PKIX patches</A> for FreeS/WAN
developed at Rebel are listed in our web links document.</P>
<H2><A name="docs">Information sources</A></H2>
<H3><A name="docformats">This HowTo, in multiple formats</A></H3>
<P>FreeS/WAN documentation up to version 1.5 was available only in HTML.
Now we ship two formats:</P>
<UL>
<LI>as HTML, one file for each doc section plus a global<A href="toc.html">
Table of Contents</A></LI>
<LI><A href="HowTo.html">one big HTML file</A> for easy searching</LI>
</UL>
<P>and provide a Makefile to generate other formats if required:</P>
<UL>
<LI><A href="HowTo.pdf">PDF</A></LI>
<LI><A href="HowTo.ps">Postscript</A></LI>
<LI><A href="HowTo.txt">ASCII text</A></LI>
</UL>
<P>The Makefile assumes the htmldoc tool is available. You can download
it from<A href="http://www.easysw.com"> Easy Software</A>.</P>
<P>All formats should be available at the following websites:</P>
<UL>
<LI><A href="http://www.freeswan.org/doc.html">FreeS/WAN project</A></LI>
<LI><A href="http://www.linuxdoc.org">Linux Documentation Project</A></LI>
</UL>
<P>The distribution tarball has only the two HTML formats.</P>
<P><STRONG>Note:</STRONG> If you need the latest doc version, for
example to see if anyone has managed to set up interoperation between
FreeS/WAN and whatever, then you should download the current snapshot.
What is on the web is documentation as of the last release. Snapshots
have all changes I've checked in to date.</P>
<H3><A name="rtfm">RTFM (please Read The Fine Manuals)</A></H3>
<P>As with most things on any Unix-like system, most parts of Linux
FreeS/WAN are documented in online manual pages. We provide a list of<A href="/mnt/floppy/manpages.html">
FreeS/WAN man pages</A>, with links to HTML versions of them.</P>
<P>The man pages describing configuration files are:</P>
<UL>
<LI><A href="/mnt/floppy/manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf(5)</A></LI>
<LI><A href="/mnt/floppy/manpage.d/ipsec.secrets.5.html">
ipsec.secrets(5)</A></LI>
</UL>
<P>Man pages for common commands include:</P>
<UL>
<LI><A href="/mnt/floppy/manpage.d/ipsec.8.html">ipsec(8)</A></LI>
<LI><A href="/mnt/floppy/manpage.d/ipsec_pluto.8.html">ipsec_pluto(8)</A>
</LI>
<LI><A href="/mnt/floppy/manpage.d/ipsec_newhostkey.8.html">
ipsec_newhostkey(8)</A></LI>
<LI><A href="/mnt/floppy/manpage.d/ipsec_auto.8.html">ipsec_auto(8)</A></LI>
</UL>
<P>You can read these either in HTML using the links above or with the<VAR>
man(1)</VAR> command.</P>
<P>In the event of disagreement between this HTML documentation and the
man pages, the man pages are more likely correct since they are written
by the implementers. Please report any such inconsistency on the<A href="mail.html#lists">
mailing list</A>.</P>
<H3><A name="text">Other documents in the distribution</A></H3>
<P>Text files in the main distribution directory are README, INSTALL,
CREDITS, CHANGES, BUGS and COPYING.</P>
<P>The Libdes encryption library we use has its own documentation. You
can find it in the library directory..</P>
<H3><A name="assumptions">Background material</A></H3>
<P>Throughout this documentation, I write as if the reader had at least
a general familiarity with Linux, with Internet Protocol networking,
and with the basic ideas of system and network security. Of course that
will certainly not be true for all readers, and quite likely not even
for a majority.</P>
<P>However, I must limit amount of detail on these topics in the main
text. For one thing, I don't understand all the details of those topics
myself. Even if I did, trying to explain everything here would produce
extremely long and almost completely unreadable documentation.</P>
<P>If one or more of those areas is unknown territory for you, there are
plenty of other resources you could look at:</P>
<DL>
<DT>Linux</DT>
<DD>the<A href="http://www.linuxdoc.org"> Linux Documentation Project</A>
or a local<A href="http://www.linux.org/groups/"> Linux User Group</A>
and these<A href="web.html#linux.link"> links</A></DD>
<DT>IP networks</DT>
<DD>Rusty Russell's<A href="http://netfilter.samba.org/unreliable-guides/networking-concepts-HOWTO/index.html">
Networking Concepts HowTo</A> and these<A href="web.html#IP.background">
links</A></DD>
<DT>Security</DT>
<DD>Schneier's book<A href="biblio.html#secrets"> Secrets and Lies</A>
and these<A href="web.html#crypto.link"> links</A></DD>
</DL>
<P>Also, I do make an effort to provide some background material in
these documents. All the basic ideas behind IPsec and FreeS/WAN are
explained here. Explanations that do not fit in the main text, or that
not everyone will need, are often in the<A href="glossary.html#ourgloss">
glossary</A>, which is the largest single file in this document set.
There is also a<A href="background.html#background"> background</A>
file containing various explanations too long to fit in glossary
definitions. All files are heavily sprinkled with links to each other
and to the glossary.<STRONG> If some passage makes no sense to you, try
the links</STRONG>.</P>
<P>For other reference material, see the<A href="biblio.html#biblio">
bibliography</A> and our collection of<A href="web.html#weblinks"> web
links</A>.</P>
<P>Of course, no doubt I get this (and other things) wrong sometimes.
Feedback via the<A href="mail.html#lists"> mailing lists</A> is
welcome.</P>
<H3><A name="archives">Archives of the project mailing list</A></H3>
<P>Until quite recently, there was only one FreeS/WAN mailing list, and
archives of it were:</P>
<UL>
<LI><A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec">Canada</A></LI>
<LI><A href="http://www.nexial.com">Holland</A></LI>
</UL>
The two archives use completely different search engines. You might
want to try both.
<P>More recently we have expanded to five lists, each with its own
archive.</P>
<P><A href="mail.html#lists">More information</A> on mailing lists.</P>
<H3><A name="howto">User-written HowTo information</A></H3>
<P>Various user-written HowTo documents are available. The ones covering
FreeS/WAN-to-FreeS/WAN connections are:</P>
<UL>
<LI>Jean-Francois Nadeau's<A href="http://jixen.tripod.com/"> practical
configurations</A> document</LI>
<LI>Jens Zerbst's HowTo on<A href="http://dynipsec.tripod.com/"> Using
FreeS/WAN with dynamic IP addresses</A>.</LI>
<LI>an entry in Kurt Seifried's<A href="http://www.securityportal.com/lskb/kben00000013.html">
Linux Security Knowledge Base</A>.</LI>
<LI>a section of David Ranch's<A href="http://www.ecst.csuchico.edu/~dranch/LINUX/index-linux.html#trinityos">
Trinity OS Guide</A></LI>
<LI>a section in David Bander's book<A href="biblio.html#bander"> Linux
Security Toolkit</A></LI>
</UL>
<P>User-wriiten HowTo material may be<STRONG> especially helpful if you
need to interoperate with another IPsec implementation</STRONG>. We
have neither the equipment nor the manpower to test such
configurations. Users seem to be doing an admirable job of filling the
gaps.</P>
<UL>
<LI>list of user-written<A href="interop.html#otherpub"> interoperation
HowTos</A> in our interop document</LI>
</UL>
<P>Check what version of FreeS/WAN user-written documents cover. The
software is under active development and the current version may be
significantly different from what an older document describes.</P>
<H3><A name="applied">Papers on FreeS/WAN</A></H3>
<P>Two design documents show team thinking on new developments:</P>
<UL>
<LI><A href="opportunism.spec">Opportunistic Encryption</A> by technical
lead Henry Spencer and Pluto programmer Hugh Redelemeier</LI>
<LI>discussion of<A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/SSW/freeswan/klips2req/">
KLIPS redesign</A></LI>
</UL>
<P>Both documents are works in progress and are frequently revised. For
the latest version, see the<A href="mail.html#lists"> design mailing
list</A>. Comments should go to that list.</P>
<P>There is now an<A href="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-richardson-ipsec-opportunistic-06.txt">
Internet Draft on Opportunistic Encryption</A> by Michael Richardson,
Hugh Redelmeier and Henry Spencer. This is a first step toward getting
the protocol standardised so there can be multiple implementations of
it. Discussion of it takes place on the<A href="http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/ipsec-charter.html">
IETF IPsec Working Group</A> mailing list.</P>
<P>A number of papers giving further background on FreeS/WAN, or
exploring its future or its applications, are also available:</P>
<UL>
<LI>Both Henry and Richard gave talks on FreeS/WAN at the 2000<A href="http://www.linuxsymposium.org">
Ottawa Linux Symposium</A>.
<UL>
<LI>Richard's<A href="http://www.conscoop.ottawa.on.ca/rgb/freeswan/ols2k/">
slides</A></LI>
<LI>Henry's paper</LI>
<LI>MP3 audio of their talks is available from the<A href="http://www.linuxsymposium.org/">
conference page</A></LI>
</UL>
</LI>
<LI><CITE>Moat: A Virtual Private Network Appliances and Services
Platform</CITE> is a paper about large-scale (a few 100 links) use of
FreeS/WAN in a production application at AT&amp;T Research. It is available
in Postscript or PDF from co-author Steve Bellovin's<A href="http://www.research.att.com/~smb/papers/index.html">
papers list page</A>.</LI>
<LI>One of the Moat co-authors, John Denker, has also written
<UL>
<LI>a<A href="http://www.av8n.com/vpn/ipsec+routing.htm"> proposal</A>
for how future versions of FreeS/WAN might interact with routing
protocols</LI>
<LI>a<A href="http://www.av8n.com/vpn/wishlist.htm"> wishlist</A> of
possible new features</LI>
</UL>
</LI>
<LI>Bart Trojanowski's web page has a draft design for<A href="http://www.jukie.net/~bart/linux-ipsec/">
hardware acceleration</A> of FreeS/WAN</LI>
</UL>
<P>Several of these provoked interesting discussions on the mailing
lists, worth searching for in the<A href="mail.html#archive"> archives</A>
.</P>
<P>There are also several papers in languages other than English, see
our<A href="web.html#otherlang"> web links</A>.</P>
<H3><A name="licensing">License and copyright information</A></H3>
<P>All code and documentation written for this project is distributed
under either the GNU General Public License (<A href="glossary.html#GPL">
GPL</A>) or the GNU Library General Public License. For details see the
COPYING file in the distribution.</P>
<P>Not all code in the distribution is ours, however. See the CREDITS
file for details. In particular, note that the<A href="glossary.html#LIBDES">
Libdes</A> library and the version of<A href="glossary.html#MD5"> MD5</A>
that we use each have their own license.</P>
<H2><A name="sites">Distribution sites</A></H2>
<P>FreeS/WAN is available from a number of sites.</P>
<H3><A NAME="1_5_1">Primary site</A></H3>
<P>Our primary site, is at xs4all (Thanks, folks!) in Holland:</P>
<UL>
<LI><A href="http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeswan">HTTP</A></LI>
<LI><A href="ftp://ftp.xs4all.nl/pub/crypto/freeswan">FTP</A></LI>
</UL>
<H3><A name="mirrors">Mirrors</A></H3>
<P>There are also mirror sites all over the world:</P>
<UL>
<LI><A href="http://www.flora.org/freeswan">Eastern Canada</A> (limited
resouces)</LI>
<LI><A href="ftp://ludwig.doculink.com/pub/freeswan/">Eastern Canada</A>
(has older versions too)</LI>
<LI><A href="ftp://ntsc.notBSD.org/pub/crypto/freeswan/">Eastern Canada</A>
(has older versions too)</LI>
<LI><A href="ftp://ftp.kame.net/pub/freeswan/">Japan</A></LI>
<LI><A href="ftp://ftp.futuredynamics.com/freecrypto/FreeSWAN/">Hong
Kong</A></LI>
<LI><A href="ftp://ipsec.dk/pub/freeswan/">Denmark</A></LI>
<LI><A href="ftp://ftp.net.lut.ac.uk/freeswan">the UK</A></LI>
<LI><A href="http://storm.alert.sk/comp/mirrors/freeswan/">Slovak
Republic</A></LI>
<LI><A href="http://the.wiretapped.net/security/vpn-tunnelling/freeswan/">
Australia</A></LI>
<LI><A href="http://freeswan.technolust.cx/">technolust</A></LI>
<LI><A href="http://freeswan.devguide.de/">Germany</A></LI>
<LI>Ivan Moore's<A href="http://snowcrash.tdyc.com/freeswan/"> site</A></LI>
<LI>the<A href="http://www.cryptoarchive.net/"> Crypto Archive</A> on
the<A href="http://www.securityportal.com/"> Security Portal</A> site</LI>
<LI><A href="http://www.wiretapped.net/">Wiretapped.net</A> in Australia</LI>
</UL>
<P>Thanks to those folks as well.</P>
<H3><A name="munitions">The &quot;munitions&quot; archive of Linux crypto software</A>
</H3>
<P>There is also an archive of Linux crypto software called &quot;munitions&quot;,
with its own mirrors in a number of countries. It includes FreeS/WAN,
though not always the latest version. Some of its sites are:</P>
<UL>
<LI><A href="http://munitions.vipul.net/">Germany</A></LI>
<LI><A href="http://munitions.iglu.cjb.net/">Italy</A></LI>
<LI><A href="http://munitions2.xs4all.nl/">Netherlands</A></LI>
</UL>
<P>Any of those will have a list of other &quot;munitions&quot; mirrors. There is
also a CD available.</P>
<H2><A NAME="1_6">Links to other sections</A></H2>
<P>For more detailed background information, see:</P>
<UL>
<LI><A href="politics.html#politics">history and politics</A> of
cryptography</LI>
<LI><A href="ipsec.html#ipsec.detail">IPsec protocols</A></LI>
</UL>
<P>To begin working with FreeS/WAN, go to our<A href="quickstart.html#quick.guide">
quickstart</A> guide.</P>
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