Checking for whitelisted functions in every backtrace is not very
efficient. And because OpenSSL 1.1 does no proper cleanup anymore until
the process is terminated there are now a lot more "leaks" to ignore.
For instance, in the openssl-ikev2/rw-cert scenario, just starting and
stopping the daemon (test vectors are checked) now causes 3594 whitelisted
leaks compared to the 849 before. This prolonged the shutdown of the
daemon on each guest in every scenario, amounting to multiple seconds of
additional runtime for every affected scenario. But even with this
patch there is still some overhead, compared to running the scenarios on
jessie.
This also changes how unknown/corrupted memory is handled in the free()
and realloc() hooks in general.
Incorporates changes provided by Thomas Egerer who ran into a similar
issue.
Due to the mangled C++ function names it's tricky to be more specific. The
"leaked" allocations are from a static hashtable containing EC groups.
There is another leak caused by the locking allocator singleton
(triggered by the first function that uses it, usually initialization of
a cipher, but could be a hasher in other test runners), but we can avoid
that with a Botan config option.
The type of the value was incorrect (void**) if NULL was passed to cas_ptr()
as expected value, which caused a compiler warning with Clang because
__atomic_compare_exchange_n() expects the types of the first two arguments
to be the same.
This patch allows for giving strongSwan only the runtime capabilities it
needs, rather than full root privileges.
Adds preprocessor directives which allow strongSwan to be configured to
1) start up as a non-root user
2) avoid modprobe()'ing IPsec kernel modules into the kernel, which
would normally require root or CAP_SYS_MODULE
Additionally, some small mods to charon/libstrongswan ensure that charon
fully supports starting as a non-root user.
Tested with strongSwan 5.5.3.
Recent releases of glibc don't include the full stdint.h header in some
network headers included by utils.h. So uintptr_t might not be defined.
Since we use fixed width integers, including the latter, all over the place
we make sure the complete file is included.
Fixes#2425.
That's not correct Base64 but invalid data could trigger this. Since
outlen would get reduced four times, but is only ever increased three
times per iteration, this could result in an integer underflow and then
a potential buffer overflow.
In case an external thread calls into our code and logs messages, a thread
object is allocated that will never be released. Even if we try to clean
up the object via thread value destructor there is no guarantee that the
thread actually terminates before we check for leaks, which seems to be the
case for the Ada Tasking threads.
Some of these are pretty broad, so maybe an alternative option is to
not use the soup plugin in the openssl-ikev2/rw-suite-b* scenarios. But
the plugin is not tested anywhere else so lets go with this for now.
If a function we whitelist allocates memory while leak detective is enabled
but only frees it after LD has already been disabled, free() will get called
with invalid pointers (not pointing to the actually allocated memory by LD),
which will cause checks in the C library to fail and the program to crash.
This tries to detect such cases and calling free with the correct pointer.
Lots of static data is allocated in this function, which isn't freed until
the library is unloaded (we can't call OPENSSL_cleanup() as initialization
would fail when calling it again later). When enabling the leak
detective the test runner eventually crashes as all the data allocated during
initialization has an invalid size when freed after leak detective has been
unloaded.
Newer versions of GCC are too "smart" and replace a call to malloc(X)
followed by a call to memset(0,X) with a call co calloc(), which obviously
results in an infinite loop when it does that in our own calloc()
implementation. Using `volatile` for the variable storing the total size
prevents the optimization and we actually call malloc().
While building against this level in general would break our app on
older systems, the NDK will automatically use this level for 64-bit
ABI builds (which are not supported in older levels). So to build
against 64-bit ABIs we have to support this API level.
The IKEv1 IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET, IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET, IPV4_ADDR_RANGE and
IPV6_ADDR_RANGE identities have been fully implemented and can be
used as owners of shared secrets (PSKs).