This also changes how unknown/corrupted memory is handled in the free()
and realloc() hooks in general.
Incorporates changes provided by Thomas Egerer who ran into a similar
issue.
Due to the mangled C++ function names it's tricky to be more specific. The
"leaked" allocations are from a static hashtable containing EC groups.
There is another leak caused by the locking allocator singleton
(triggered by the first function that uses it, usually initialization of
a cipher, but could be a hasher in other test runners), but we can avoid
that with a Botan config option.
Simplifies public key loading and this way unencrypted PKCS#8-encoded
keys can be loaded directly without pkcs8 plugin (code for encrypted
keys could probably later be added, if necessary).
It also simplifies the implementation of private_key_t::get_public_key()
a lot.
Without OID we can't generate an algorithmIdentifier when loading the
key again. And older versions of OpenSSL insist on a public key when
e.g. converting a key to PKCS#8.
Simply unwrapping the ECPrivateKey structure avoids log messages when
parsing other keys in the KEY_ANY case.
Support MD5 in the Botan plugin if supported by Botan.
MD5 is required for RADIUS and obviously EAP-MD5,
and also for non-PKCS#8 encoded, encrypted private keys.
Botan only allows RSA generating keys >= 1,024 bits, which makes
the RSA test suite fail. It is questionable whether it makes
sense to test 768 bit RSA keys anymore. They are too weak
from today's perspective anyway.
This requires config changes if filelog is used with a path that
contains dots. This path must now be defined in the `path` setting of an
arbitrarily named subsection of `filelog`. Without that change the
whole strongswan.conf file will fail to load, which some users might
not notice immediately.
For inbound processing, it can be rather useful to apply the mark to the
packet in the SA, so the associated policy with that mark implicitly matches.
When using %unique as match mark, we don't know the mark beforehand, so
we most likely want to set the mark we match against.
%unique (and the upcoming %same key) are usable in specific contexts only.
To restrict the user from using it in other places where it does not get the
expected results, reject such keywords unless explicitly allowed.
We don't retransmit DPD requests like we do requests for proper exchanges,
so increasing the number with each sent DPD could result in the peer's state
getting out of sync if DPDs are lost. Because according to RFC 3706, DPDs
with an unexpected sequence number SHOULD be rejected (it does mention the
possibility of maintaining a window of acceptable numbers, but we currently
don't implement that). We partially ignore such messages (i.e. we don't
update the expected sequence number and the inbound message stats, so we
might send a DPD when none is required). However, we always send a response,
so a peer won't really notice this (it also ensures a reply for "retransmits"
caused by this change, i.e. multiple DPDs with the same number - hopefully,
other implementations behave similarly when receiving such messages).
Fixes#2714.
This is mainly for HA where a passive SA was already created when the
IKE keys were derived. If e.g. an authentication error occurs later that
SA wouldn't get cleaned up.
The reload of the configuration of the loggers so far only included
the log levels. In order to support the reload of all other options,
a reload function may be implemented.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer <thomas.egerer@secunet.com>
The options control whether the DF and ECN header bits/fields are copied
from the unencrypted packets to the encrypted packets in tunnel mode (DF only
for IPv4), and for ECN whether the same is done for inbound packets.
Note: This implementation only works with Linux/Netlink/XFRM.
Based on a patch by Markus Sattler.
During a test with ~12000 established SAs it was noted that vici
related operations hung.
The operations took over 16 minutes to finish. The time was spent in
the vici message parser, which was assigning the message over and over
again, to get rid of the already parsed portions.
First fixed by cutting the consumed parts off without copying the message.
Runtime for ~12000 SAs is now around 20 seconds.
Further optimization brought the runtime down to roughly 1-2 seconds
by using an fd to read through the message variable.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#103.
The code to support parallel Netlink queries (commit 3c7193f) made use
of nlmsg_len member from struct nlmsghdr to allocate and copy the
responses. Since NLMSG_NEXT is later used to parse these responses, they
must be aligned, or the results are undefined.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer <thomas.egerer@secunet.com>
Tobias Brunner