RFC 7296, section 2.21.3:
If a peer parsing a request notices that it is badly formatted (after
it has passed the message authentication code checks and window
checks) and it returns an INVALID_SYNTAX notification, then this
error notification is considered fatal in both peers, meaning that
the IKE SA is deleted without needing an explicit Delete payload.
RFC 7296, section 2.21.3:
If a peer parsing a request notices that it is badly formatted (after
it has passed the message authentication code checks and window
checks) and it returns an INVALID_SYNTAX notification, then this
error notification is considered fatal in both peers, meaning that
the IKE SA is deleted without needing an explicit Delete payload.
This avoids having to register certificates with authority/ca backends
beforehand, which is tricky for intermediate CA certificates loaded
themselves via authority/ca sections. On the other hand, the form of
these URLs can't be determined by config backends anymore (not an issue
for the two current implementations, no idea if custom implementations
ever made use of that possibility). If that became necessary, we could
perhaps pass the certificate to the CDP enumerator or add a new method
to the credential_set_t interface.
This avoids having to call strip_dh() in child_cfg_t::get_proposals().
It also inverts the ALLOW_PRIVATE flag (i.e. makes it SKIP_PRIVATE) so
nothing has to be supplied to clone complete proposals.
During proposal selection with ike/child_cfgs a couple of boolean
variables can be set (e.g. private, prefer_self, strip_dh). To simplify
the addition of new parameters, these functions now use a set of flags
instead of indiviual boolean values.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer <thomas.egerer@secunet.com>
There seem to be servers around that, upon receiving a delete from the
client, instead of responding with an empty INFORMATIONAL, send a delete
themselves.
If CHILD_SAs are created while waiting for the third QM message we'd not
notice the redundancy and updown events would be triggered unevenly.
This is consistent with the behavior on the initiator, which already does
this check right before installation. Moving the existing check is not
possible due to the narrow hook and moving the installation changes which
peer installs the SAs first and could have other side-effects (e.g. in
error or conflict cases). Still, this might result in CHILD_SA state
discrepancies between the two peers.
Fixes#3060.
Previously, the initiator would install the SA in transport mode if the
peer sent back the USE_TRANSPORT_MODE notify, even if that was not
requested originally.
Might be useful for users of other daemons too. Note that compared to the
previous implementation in charon-tkm, the mask/label are applied in
network order.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#134.
Previously, attributes in an incorrectly sent CFG_REPLY would still be passed
to attribute handlers. This does not prevent handlers from receiving
unrequested attributes if they requested at least one other.
There was a race condition between install() and uninstall()
where one thread was in the process of installing a trap
entry, and had destroyed the child_sa, while the other
thread was uninstalling the same trap entry and ended up
trying to destroy the already destroyed child_sa, resulting
in a segmentation fault in the destroy_entry() function.
The uninstall() function needs to wait until all the threads
are done with the installing before proceeding to uninstall
a trap entry.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#131.
A temporary DROP policy is added to avoid traffic leak
while the SA is being updated. It is added with
manual_prio set but when the temporary policy is removed
it is removed with manual_prio parameter set to 0.
The call to del_policies_outbound does not match the original
policy and we end up with an ever increasing refcount.
If we try to manually remove the policy, it is not removed
due to the positive refcount. Then new SA requests fail with
"unable to install policy out for reqid 1618,
the same policy for reqid 1528 exists"
Fixes: 35ef1b032d ("child-sa: Install drop policies while updating IPsec SAs and policies")
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#129.
The peer might not have seen the CREATE_CHILD_SA response yet, receiving a
DELETE for the SA could then trigger it to abort the rekeying, causing
the deletion of the newly established SA (it can't know whether the
DELETE was sent due to an expire or because the user manually deleted
it). We just treat this SA as if we received a DELETE for it. This is
not an ideal situation anyway, as it causes some traffic to get dropped,
so it should usually be avoided by setting appropriate soft and hard limits.
References #2815.
If a lot of QUICK_MODE tasks are queued and the other side
sends a DPD request, there is a good chance for timeouts.
Observed this in cases where other side is quite slow in responding
QUICK_MODE requests (e.g. Cisco ASA v8.x) and about 100 CHILD_SAs
are to be spawned.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#115.
Josh Soref