This also restores the charon.signature_authentication_constraints
functionality, that is, if no explicit IKE signature schemes are
configured we apply all regular signature constraints as IKE constraints.
This allows for different signature schemes for IKE authentication and
trustchain verification.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer <thomas.egerer@secunet.com>
An attacker could blindly send a message with invalid nonce data (or none
at all) to DoS an initiator if we just destroy the SA. To prevent this we
ignore the message and wait for the one by the correct responder.
If the SA got redirected this would otherwise cause a reauthentication with
the original gateway. Reestablishing the SA to the original gateway, if e.g.
the new gateway is not reachable makes sense though.
We handle this similar to how we do reestablishing IKE_SAs with all CHILD_SAs,
which also includes the one actively queued during IKE_AUTH.
To delete the old SA we use the recently added ike_reauth_complete task.
To prevent the creation of the CHILD_SA we set a condition on the
IKE_SA. We also schedule a delete job in case the client does not
terminate the IKE_SA (which is a SHOULD in RFC 5685).
According to the mode-config draft there is no prefix sent for
IPv6 addresses in IKEv1. We still accept 17 bytes long addresses for
backwards compatibility with older strongSwan releases.
Fixes#1304.
When charon rekeys a CHILD_SA after a soft limit expired, it is only
deleted after the hard limit is reached. In case of packet/byte limits
this may not be the case for a long time since the packets/bytes are
usually sent using the new SA. This may result in a very large number of
stale CHILD_SAs and kernel states. With enough connections configured this
will ultimately exhaust the memory of the system.
This patch adds a strongswan.conf setting that, if enabled, causes the old
CHILD_SA to be deleted by the initiator after a successful rekeying.
Enabling this setting might create problems with implementations that
continue to use rekeyed SAs (e.g. if the DELETE notify is lost).
If it was necessary to pass the local certificates we could probably
clone the config (but we don't do that either when later looking for the
key to actually authenticate).
Passing auth adds the same subject cert to the config over and over
again (I guess we could also try to prevent that by searching for
duplicates).
The structs that make up a message sent to the kernel have all to be
aligned with XT_ALIGN. That was not necessarily the case when
initializing the complete message as struct.
Fixes#1212.
If there is no path to the other peer there is no point in trying to
send a NAT keepalive.
If the condition changes back and forth within the keepalive interval there
is a chance that multiple jobs get queued.
This logger can be used to easily register custom logging instances
using __attribute__((constructor)) benefiting from the global reload
mechanism (with reset of log levels).
Note that this is not intended to be used from plugins, which are loaded
after loggers have already been initialized.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer <thomas.egerer@secunet.com>
This could be helpful when debugging deadlocks that manifest around
wait_for_entry(), as it helps identifying other involved threads (the
thread object is seen in the thread_main() call in each thread's backtrace).
If the IKEv2 initiator acting as a TNC server receives invalid TNC measurements
from the IKEv2 responder acting as a TNC clienti, the exchange of PB-TNC batches
is continued until the IKEv2 responder acting as a TNC server has also finished
its TNC measurements.
In the past if these measurements in the other direction were correct
the IKEv2 responder acting as EAP server declared the IKEv2 EAP authentication
successful and the IPsec connection was established even though the TNC
measurement verification on the EAP peer side failed.
The fix adds an "allow" group membership on each endpoint if the corresponding
TNC measurements of the peer are successful. By requiring a "allow" group
membership in the IKEv2 connection definition the IPsec connection succeeds
only if the TNC measurements on both sides are valid.
If DPD timeout is set but to a value smaller than the DPD delay the code
in task_manager_v1.c:queue_liveliness_check will run into an integer
underrun.
With IKEv1 we have to reuse IKE_SAs as otherwise the responder might
detect the new SA as reauthentication and will "adopt" the CHILD_SAs of
the original IKE_SA, while the initiator will not do so. This could
cause CHILD_SA rekeying to fail later.
Fixes#1236.
Otherwise, libcharon's dependency on kernel-ipsec can't be satisfied.
This changed with db61c37690 ("kernel-interface: Return bool for
kernel interface registration") as the registration of further
kernel-ipsec implementations now fails and therefore even if other
plugins are loaded the dependency will not be satisfied anymore.
References #953.
When handling a rekey collision we might have to delete an already
installed redundant CHILD_SA (or expect the other peer to do so).
We don't want to trigger updown events for these as neither do we do
so for successfully rekeyed CHILD_SAs.
Fixes#853.
To handle Phase 2 exchanges on the other HA host we need to sync the last
block of the last Phase 1 message (or the last expected IV). If the
gateway is the initiator of a Main Mode SA the last message is an
inbound message. When handling such messages the expected IV is not
updated until it is successfully decrypted so we can't sync the IV
when processing the still encrypted (!plain) message. However, as responder,
i.e. if the last message is an outbound message, the reverse applies, that
is, we get the next IV after successfully encrypting the message, not
while handling the plain message.
Fixes#1267.
It is required for IKEv1 to determine the DH group of the CHILD SAs
during rekeying. It also fixes the status output for HA SAs, which so
far haven't shown the DH group on the passive side.
Fixes#1267.
If the retransmit of an initial message is processed concurrently with the
original message it might not have been handled as intended as the
thread processing the retransmit might not have seen the correct value
of entry->processing set by the thread handling the original request.
For IKEv1, i.e. without proper message IDs, there might still be races e.g.
when receiving a retransmit of the initial IKE message while processing the
initiator's second request.
Fixes#1269.
- Switch.pm, which was implemented as a source filter, has been deprecated in
Perl 5.10 and was later removed from the core modules in Perl 5.14 or so.
Unfortunately, its replacement, the given/when/default construct, has since
been downgraded to "experimental" status because of problems with the underlying
"smart-match" operator.
Thus, as of Perl 5.22, Perl still has no actually usable "switch"-like construct.
So just use boring, old and ugly "if/elsif/else" constructs instead, which are
compatible with almost any Perl version.
- None of the Perl modules here does anything that would require "AutoLoader".
- "Exporter" can be used to export plain functions into another modules name
space. But the things that were exported here are meant to be called as
methods. In this case, it is neither necessary nor advisable to export those
symbols.
Just export nothing (the POD documentation already said so).
- It is usually the calling script that enables (or does not enable) warnings
globally. When a module says "use warnings;" however, the caller looses control
over what warnings should be enabled in that module.
The default ESP cipher suite is now
AES_CBC-128/HMAC_SHA2_256_128
and requires SHA-2 HMAC support in the Linux kernel (correctly implemented
since 2.6.33).
The default IKE cipher suite is now
AES_CBC-128/HMAC_SHA2_256_128/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256/ECP_256
if the openssl plugin is loaded or
AES_CBC-128/HMAC_SHA2_256_128/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256/MODP_3072
if ECC is not available.
The use of the SHA-1 hash algorithm and the MODP_2048 DH group has been
deprecated and ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305 has been added to the default
IKE AEAD algorithms.
The certificate_printer class allows the printing of certificate
information to a text file (usually stdout). This class is used
by the pki --print and swanctl --list-certs commands as well as
by the stroke plugin.
If two IKE configurations have CHILD configurations with the same name,
we have no control about the CHILD_SA that actually gets controlled. The
new "ike" parameter specifies the peer config name to find the "child" config
under.
In some situations the vici client is not interested in waiting for a
timeout at all, so don't register a logging callback if the timeout argument
is negative.
If we mistakenly detect a new IKE_SA as a reauthentication the client
won't request the previous virtual IP, but since we already migrated
it we already triggered the assign_vips() hook, so we should reassign
the migrated virtual IP.
Fixes#1152.
Since we don't use the kernel-netlink plugin anymore and the headers
in the NDK are reasonably recent, we don't need this anymore (at least
when building the app).
Fixes#1172.
We already did so during Phase 1 but because all three Quick Mode
message have the same message ID we occasionally dropped the third
message as retransmit, so we do it there too. For INFORMATIONAL
and TRANSACTION exchanges we don't expect more than one inbound message
with the same message ID so we still use them there.
Fixes#1198.
This ensures we don't pass data (via msg_control) defined in a different
scope to sendmsg(). Actually, some compilers (e.g. GCC 5.2.1) might
optimize the memcpy() call away causing the packets not to get sent from
the intended source address.
It also makes the code clearer than with all these ifdefs.
Fixes#1171.
In some scenarios an IKE_SA might get restarted multiple times (e.g.
due to retransmits and delayed INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD notifies) so that
two IKE_SA_INIT messages might be sent that only differ in the
previously randomly generated NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP payload.
This could cause an authentication failure on the responder if the two
peers don't use the same IKE_SA_INIT message in their InitiatorSignedOctets.
While the payload is generated in a reproducible way it will still change
when the daemon is restarted, which should make detecting the payloads
as fake a bit harder (compared to e.g. just using 0.0.0.0:0 as address).
Fixes#1131.
If the job gets queued for a newly created IKE_SA it might not yet be
checked in when the job is running, reschedule the job in that case.
This should fix the two p2pnat test scenarios, which occasionally
failed because one of the peers did not initiate the connection to
the mediation server.
In some cases we call wait_for_entry() but don't actually check out the
entry afterwards (e.g. because it doesn't match certain criteria). So
there won't be a call to checkin() for such entries causing waiting
threads to get signaled. Instead, such threads would be blocked until
another thread properly checks out/in the entry (or does a blocking
enumeration).
The `nat-local` and `nat-remote` keys contain information on the NAT
status of the local and remote IKE endpoints, respectively. If a
responder did not detect a NAT but is configured to fake a NAT situation
this is indicated by `nat-fake` (if an initiator fakes a NAT situation
`nat-local` is set). If any NAT is detected or faked `nat-any` is set.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#16.
If we haven't received the third QM message for multiple exchanges the
return value of NEED_MORE for passive tasks that are not responsible for
a specific exchange would trigger a fourth empty QM message.
Fixes: 4de361d92c ("ikev1: Fix handling of overlapping Quick Mode exchanges")
References #1076.
Previously, the current segment was held while checking for duplicate
SAs, which requires acquiring all segments. If multiple threads did this
concurrently this resulted in a deadlock as they couldn't acquire the
segments held by the other threads attempting to do the same. With the
default configuration only one segment is used, which prevents the problem
as only one thread can check in an IKE SA concurrently.
Fixes: a064eaa8a6 ("Handling of initial contact")
left|rightsubnet default to %dynamic, which is basically 0.0.0.0/0 until an
address is assigned to it. So if only one side was undefined and the other
traffic selector was IPv6 an address family mismatch would occur.
References #595.
From recvfrom(2) (which UDPSocket#recv backs into):
The return value will be 0 when the peer has performed an orderly
shutdown.
(i.e. it will return an empty string)
Previously in this scenario, Vici::Transport#recv_all would spin
forever trying to pull more data off the socket. I'm not entirely
clear what happened that caused strongSwan to shutdown the socket, but
it probably should not cause vici Ruby apps to spin.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#13.
When retrying due to a DH group mismatch this is already done by the
child-create task itself. And in other cases where the task returns
NEED_MORE we actually will need access to a possible proposal to properly
delete it.
If the responder declines our KE payload during a CHILD_SA rekeying migrate()
is called to reuse the child-create task. But the child-rekey task then
calls the same method again.
Fixes: 32df0d81fb ("child-create: Destroy nonceg in migrate()")
Since 11c14bd2f5 CA certificates referenced in ca sections were
enumerated by two credential sets if they were also stored in
ipsec.d/cacerts. This caused duplicate certificate requests to
get sent. All CA certificates, whether loaded automatically or
via a ca section, are now stored in stroke_ca_t.
Certificates referenced in ca sections are now also reloaded
when `ipsec rereadcacerts` is used.
In some cases the third message of a Quick Mode exchange might arrive
after the first message of a subsequent Quick Mode exchange. Previously
these messages were handled incorrectly and the second Quick Mode
exchange failed.
Some implementations might even try to establish multiple Quick Modes
simultaneously, which is explicitly allowed in RFC 2409. We don't fully
support that, though, in particular in case of retransmits.
Fixes#1076.
While this doesn't really create any problems it is not 100% correct to
accept such messages because, of course, the sender of an IKE_SA_INIT
request is always the original initiator of an IKE_SA.
We currently don't check the flag later, so we wouldn't notice if the
peer doesn't set it in later messages (ike_sa_id_t.equals doesn't
compare it anymore since we added support for IKEv1, in particular since
17ec1c74de).
If multiple certificates use the same subjects we might choose the wrong
one otherwise. This way we use the one referenced with leftcert and
stored in the auth-cfg and we actually do the same thing later in the
pubkey authenticator.
Fixes#1077.
This allows symmetric configuration of EAP methods (i.e. the same value
in leftauth and rightauth) when mutual EAP-only authentication is used.
Previously the client had to configure rightauth=eap or rightauth=any,
which prevented it from using this same config as responder.
When reestablishing the IKE_SA we should still use the original port
when right resolves to %any as some implementations might not like
initial IKE messages on port 4500 (especially for IKEv1).
This may happen if something like `echo ... > /path/to/fifo` is used
before the plugin was able to create the FIFO. In that case we'd end
up in a loop always reading the same values from the static file.
Some implementations don't send a Key Length attribute for AES-128.
This was allowed for IKE in early drafts of RFC 3602, however, some
implementations also seem to do it for ESP, where it never was allowed.
And the final version of RFC 3602 demands a Key Length attribute for both
phases so they shouldn't do it anymore anyway.
Fixes#1064.
During a rekeying we want to reuse the current reqid, but if the new SA
does not allocate it via kernel-interface the state there will disappear
when the old SA is destroyed after the rekeying. When the IKE_SA is
later reauthenticated with make-before-break reauthentication the new
CHILD_SAs there will get new reqids as no existing state is found in the
kernel-interface, breaking policy installation in the kernel.
Fixes: a49393954f ("child-sa: Use any fixed reqid configured on the CHILD_SA config")
Vendor specific EAP methods may be registered with:
PLUGIN_CALLBACK(eap_method_register, <constructor>),
PLUGIN_PROVIDE(EAP_SERVER_VENDOR, <type>, <vendor>),
Same for client implementations via EAP_PEER_VENDOR.
References #969.
strongSwan uses PrintableString when encoding DNs from strings (if the
character set permits it, otherwise T61String is currently used) but
certificates might be encoded with UTF8String even for simple ASCII strings.
By ignoring this string type when hashing RDNs we make sure the same hash
results in this case as long as the actual string values are the same.
Fixes#991.
If a client does Mode Config during reauthentication the assign_vips()
event might be triggered twice, we should not send another Start message
in that case.
Fixes#937.
Some clients won't do Mode Config or XAuth during reauthentication.
Because Start messages previously were triggered by TRANSACTION exchanges
none were sent for new SAs of such clients, while Stop messages were still
sent for the old SAs when they were destroyed. This resulted in an
incorrect state on the RADIUS server.
Since 31be582399 the assign_vips() event is also triggered during
reauthentication if the client does not do a Mode Config exchange.
So instead of waiting for a TRANSACTION exchange we trigger the Start
message when a virtual IP is assigned to a client.
With this the charon.plugins.eap-radius.accounting_requires_vip option
would not have any effect for IKEv1 anymore. However, it previously also
only worked if the client did an XAuth exchange, which is probably
rarely used without virtual IPs, so this might not be much of a
regression.
Fixes#937.
If AEAD algorithms are used no integrity algorithm will be received from
the other HA node. But since AUTH_UNDEFINED is 1024 and not 0 this value
was incorrectly added to the proposal, resulting in a failure during key
derivation. The variables are now explicitly initialized to 0, as already
was the case for the IKE SAs.
Fixes#1051.
When the IKE_SA is synced without the remote address, after a
reauthentication charon is not able to find it in its connected_peers
table since the destination host will be %any (it's missing in the
message, hence the default from the newly created ike_sa_t -- %any --
will be used).
By adding the value to the HA_IKE_ADD message, we should be able to
solve this problem.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer <thomas.egerer@secunet.com>
The destroy() method sets the IKE_SA on the bus to NULL, we reset it to
the current IKE_SA so any events and log messages that follow happen in
the correct context.
A practical example where this is problematic is a DH group mismatch,
which causes the first CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange to fail. Because the SA
was not reset previously, the message() hook for the CREATE_CHILD_SA
response, for instance, was triggered outside the context of an IKE_SA,
that is, the ike_sa parameter was NULL, which is definitely not expected
by several plugins.
Fixes#862.
When flush() is called there might be threads in install() waiting for
trap policies to get installed (without holding the lock). We have to
wait until they updated the entries with the respective CHILD_SAs before
destroying the list.
We also have to prevent further trap policy installations (and wait until
threads in install() are really finished), otherwise we might end up
destroying CHILD_SA objects after the kernel interface implementations
have already been unloaded (avoiding this is the whole point of calling
flush() before unloading the plugins).
This fixes potential race conditions in case complete() or flush() is
executed before or concurrently with a thread that handles an acquire.
It will also simplify tracking multiple acquires created for the same
trap policy in the future.
Also fixes the behavior in some error situations.
This basically reverts f4e822c1b4 ("trap-manager: don't check-in
nonexisting IKE_SA if acquire fails"). As checkout_by_config() could
return an already existing and established IKE_SA we have to properly
destroy it, for instance, in case other threads are waiting to check
it out. checkin_and_destroy() should handle the case of a new SA
properly (it produces a log message on level 1, though).
In some situations it might be valid for a host that configures
right=%any to reestablish or reauthenticate an IKE_SA. Using %any would
immediately abort the initiation causing the new SA to fail (which
might already have the existing CHILD_SAs assigned).
Fixes#1027.
If static local addresses are configured we should use their address family
as a hint when resolving the remote address.
We don't do this if %any is configured as this might break existing
configurations (%any4 and %any6 are however used as hint).
CDP and OCSP URIs for a one or multiple certification authorities
can be added via the VICI interface. swanctl allows to read
definitions from a new authorities section.
Threads might still be allocating SPIs (e.g. triggered by an acquire or
an inbound message) while the main thread calls flush(). If there is a
context switch right after such a thread successfully checked this->rng
in get_spi() and the main thread destroys the RNG instance right then,
that worker thread will cause a segmentation fault when it continues and
attempts to call get_bytes().
Fixes#1014.
The vici logger uses the listener_t.log() callback to raise vici events.
When doing so, it holds the bus lock as reader while acquiring the vici socket
mutex (1). If at the same time the vici socket enables a writer, that thread
tries to lock the watcher mutex (2). The watcher thread uses debugging while
holding the lock, i.e. acquires the bus read lock (3).
(1) bus.rlock -> vici.lock!
(2) vici.lock -> watcher.lock!
(3) watcher.lock -> bus.rlock!
This all actually would resolve just fine, as we have a shared read lock on the
bus. However, under Windows we seem to have a strict writer preference when
acquiring the rwlock (4). This results in blocking read locks until any pending
write lock can be fulfilled, and makes the constellation deadlock. The relevant
threads are:
Thread (1)
6 0x71313d25 in wait_ at threading/windows/mutex.c:137
7 0x7054c8a2 in find_entry at vici_socket.c:201
8 0x7054d690 in send_ at vici_socket.c:624
9 0x7054f6c1 in send_op at vici_dispatcher.c:119
10 0x705502c1 in raise_event at vici_dispatcher.c:469
12 0x704c3878 in log_cb at bus/bus.c:332
13 0x712c7c3a in invoke_function at collections/linked_list.c:414
14 0x704c3a63 in vlog at bus/bus.c:400
15 0x704c3b36 in log_ at bus/bus.c:430
18 0x70508f1f in process_response at sa/ikev2/task_manager_v2.c:664
20 0x704f5430 in process_message at sa/ike_sa.c:1369
21 0x704e3823 in execute at processing/jobs/process_message_job.c:74
22 0x712e629f in process_job at processing/processor.c:235
Thread (2)
4 0x71313b61 in lock at threading/windows/mutex.c:66
5 0x712e81fd in add at processing/watcher.c:441
6 0x712e1ab9 in add_watcher at networking/streams/stream.c:213
7 0x712e1b4d in on_write at networking/streams/stream.c:237
8 0x7054d606 in _cb_enable_writer at vici_socket.c:609
9 0x712e5e34 in execute at processing/jobs/callback_job.c:77
10 0x712e629f in process_job at processing/processor.c:235
Thread (3)
3 0x71313f38 in read_lock at threading/windows/rwlock.c:74
4 0x704c3971 in vlog at bus/bus.c:373
5 0x704cc156 in dbg_bus at daemon.c:126
6 0x712e7bf9 in watch at processing/watcher.c:316
7 0x712e5e34 in execute at processing/jobs/callback_job.c:77
8 0x712e629f in process_job at processing/processor.c:235
Thread (4)
3 0x71313f70 in write_lock at threading/windows/rwlock.c:82
4 0x704c378b in remove_logger at bus/bus.c:290
5 0x704cb284 in listener_unregister at control/controller.c:166
6 0x713136cd in thread_cleanup_pop at threading/windows/thread.c:558
8 0x704cb94e in initiate at control/controller.c:435
9 0x70553996 in _cb_initiate at vici_control.c:187
12 0x7054d200 in _cb_process_queue at vici_socket.c:508
13 0x712e5e34 in execute at processing/jobs/callback_job.c:77
14 0x712e629f in process_job at processing/processor.c:235
To avoid such a situation, we dissolve the (1) lock sequence. It's actually
never good practice to acquire shared locks during bus hooks, as it is
problematic if we raise bus events while holding the lock. We do so by
raising vici events for log message asynchronously, but of curse must keep
log order as is using a synchronized queue.
Previously the constraints in the authentication configuration of an
initiator were enforced only after all authentication rounds were
complete. This posed a problem if an initiator used EAP or PSK
authentication while the responder was authenticated with a certificate
and if a rogue server was able to authenticate itself with a valid
certificate issued by any CA the initiator trusted.
Because any constraints for the responder's identity (rightid) or other
aspects of the authentication (e.g. rightca) the initiator had were not
enforced until the initiator itself finished its authentication such a rogue
responder was able to acquire usernames and password hashes from the client.
And if a client supported EAP-GTC it was even possible to trick it into
sending plaintext passwords.
This patch enforces the configured constraints right after the responder's
authentication successfully finished for each round and before the initiator
starts with its own authentication.
Fixes CVE-2015-4171.
Global reqid allocation (94eb09ac) broke fixed reqid allocation. Resupport them
by bypassing allocation in the kernel if a fixed reqid has been configured.
Fixes#976.
This fixes a DoS and potential remote code execution vulnerability that was
caused because the original payload type that was returned previously was
used to cast such payload objects to payloads of the indicated type (e.g.
when logging notify payloads with a payload type for the wrong IKE version).
Fixes CVE-2015-3991.
When using a cipher with sequential IVs, we never must pass an identical IV
to the IV generator. To avoid it when using IKEv2 fragmentation, use the lower
bits of the 64-bit message ID as the fragment number.
Only one of `--user-install` and `--install-dir` may be set and if
`--user-install` is the default on a system installation will fail
unless we disable it explicitly.
Fixes#914.
Installing them might not work well when building distro packages (e.g.
with DESTDIR installs). It might be easier to install them later with a
script in the distro package.
When building from source on the local system it could still be useful to
install the packages directly, which can be enabled with separate configure
options.
The main problem with DESTDIR installations of the Python Egg is that
easy_install creates or modifies a file called easy-install.pth in the
installation directory. So it's not actually possible to simply copy
the results in DESTDIR over to the actual system as that file would have
to be merged with any existing one.
Fixes#914.
We also don't require setup.py to exist during cleanup, as e.g. with
make distcheck the source directory is not writable when the build directory
is cleaned, so setup.py can't be created (to just get removed again anyway
if VICI and the Python Eggs haven't been enabled previously).
Instead of just implicitly destroying the old SA we properly delete it to
notify the other peer (if the other peer keeps the SA up after the
reauthentication and sends DPDs it might consider us dead even though the
new SA is up, that seems to be the case with racoon). We delay the DELETE
a bit to give the other peer time to get the new SA fully established.
Since DELETE messages are not retransmitted it is still possible that
the other peer misses that we deleted the SA.