Because `keylen` is unsigned the subtraction results in an integer
underflow if the key length is < 11 bytes.
This is only a problem when verifying signatures with a public key (for
private keys the plugin enforces a minimum modulus length) and to do so
we usually only use trusted keys. However, the x509 plugin actually
calls issued_by() on a parsed certificate to check if it is self-signed,
which is the reason this issue was found by OSS-Fuzz in the first place.
So, unfortunately, this can be triggered by sending an invalid client
cert to a peer.
Fixes: 5955db5b12 ("gmp: Don't parse PKCS1 v1.5 RSA signatures to verify them")
Fixes: CVE-2018-17540
Instead we generate the expected signature encoding and compare it to the
decrypted value.
Due to the lenient nature of the previous parsing code (minimum padding
length was not enforced, the algorithmIdentifier/OID parser accepts arbitrary
data after OIDs and in the parameters field etc.) it was susceptible to
Daniel Bleichenbacher's low-exponent attack (from 2006!), which allowed
forging signatures for keys that use low public exponents (i.e. e=3).
Since the public exponent is usually set to 0x10001 (65537) since quite a
while, the flaws in the previous code should not have had that much of a
practical impact in recent years.
Fixes: CVE-2018-16151, CVE-2018-16152
This also changes how unknown/corrupted memory is handled in the free()
and realloc() hooks in general.
Incorporates changes provided by Thomas Egerer who ran into a similar
issue.
Due to the mangled C++ function names it's tricky to be more specific. The
"leaked" allocations are from a static hashtable containing EC groups.
There is another leak caused by the locking allocator singleton
(triggered by the first function that uses it, usually initialization of
a cipher, but could be a hasher in other test runners), but we can avoid
that with a Botan config option.
Simplifies public key loading and this way unencrypted PKCS#8-encoded
keys can be loaded directly without pkcs8 plugin (code for encrypted
keys could probably later be added, if necessary).
It also simplifies the implementation of private_key_t::get_public_key()
a lot.
Without OID we can't generate an algorithmIdentifier when loading the
key again. And older versions of OpenSSL insist on a public key when
e.g. converting a key to PKCS#8.
Simply unwrapping the ECPrivateKey structure avoids log messages when
parsing other keys in the KEY_ANY case.
Support MD5 in the Botan plugin if supported by Botan.
MD5 is required for RADIUS and obviously EAP-MD5,
and also for non-PKCS#8 encoded, encrypted private keys.
Botan only allows RSA generating keys >= 1,024 bits, which makes
the RSA test suite fail. It is questionable whether it makes
sense to test 768 bit RSA keys anymore. They are too weak
from today's perspective anyway.
This requires config changes if filelog is used with a path that
contains dots. This path must now be defined in the `path` setting of an
arbitrarily named subsection of `filelog`. Without that change the
whole strongswan.conf file will fail to load, which some users might
not notice immediately.
For inbound processing, it can be rather useful to apply the mark to the
packet in the SA, so the associated policy with that mark implicitly matches.
When using %unique as match mark, we don't know the mark beforehand, so
we most likely want to set the mark we match against.
%unique (and the upcoming %same key) are usable in specific contexts only.
To restrict the user from using it in other places where it does not get the
expected results, reject such keywords unless explicitly allowed.
The type of the value was incorrect (void**) if NULL was passed to cas_ptr()
as expected value, which caused a compiler warning with Clang because
__atomic_compare_exchange_n() expects the types of the first two arguments
to be the same.
There was a potential chance for a race condition if the ensured section
was purged for some reason before using it later.
This also changes the behavior for NULL/empty strings via load_string*
with merge == FALSE, which now purges the config/section.
Similar to the `also` keyword in ipsec.conf, the new syntax allows adding
one or more references to other sections, which means all the settings and
subsections defined there are inherited (values may be overridden, even
with an empty value to clear it).
It's important to note that all subsections are inherited, so if this is
used to reference a connection in swanctl.conf all auth rounds and
children are inherited. There is currently no syntax to limit the
inclusion level or clear inherited sections (but as mentioned, settings
in those inherited sections may be overridden).
Another property is that inherited settings or sections always follow
explicitly defined entries in the current section when they are enumerated.
This is relevant if the order is important (e.g. for auth rounds if `round`
is not specified).
References are evaluated dynamically at runtime, so referring to
sections later in the config file or included via other files is no
problem.
The colon used as separator to reference other sections may be used in
section names by writing :: (e.g. for Windows log file paths).
This is based on a patch originally written in 2016.
This was quite confusing previously: While calling insert_before()
and then remove_at() properly replaced the current item, calling them the
other way around inserted the new item before the previous item because
remove_at() changed the enumerator's position to the previous item.
The behavior in corner cases (calling the methods before or after
enumeration) is also changed slightly.
Allow charon to start as a non-root user without CAP_CHOWN and still be
able to change the group on files that need to be accessed by charon
after capabilities have been dropped. This requires the user charon starts
as to have access to socket/pidfile directory as well as belong to the
group that charon will run as after dropping capabilities.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#105.
The keylength fix for ChaCha20Poly1305 (5a7b0be2) removes the keylength
attribute from the AEAD transform. This breaks compatibility between
versions with the patch and those without. The ChaCha20Poly1305 AEAD
won't match in proposals between such versions, and if no other algorithm
is available, negotiating SAs fails.
As a migration strategy, this patch introduces a new string identifier for a
ChaCha20Poly1305 proposal keyword which uses the explicit keylength, exactly
as it was used before the mentioned patch. Administrators that care about
the use of that AEAD with old clients can temporarily add this keyword to
the list of proposals, until all clients have been upgraded.
The used approach is the least invasive, as it just adds an additional
keyword that can't do any harm if not explicitly configured. Nontheless
allows it the administrator to smoothly keep ChaCha20Poly1305 working,
even if upgrading all peers simultaneously is not an option. It requires
manual configuration edits, though, but we assume that ChaCha20Poly1305
is not that widely used, and not as the only transform in proposals.
Removing the compat keyword in a future version is an option; it might
be helpful for other implementations, though, that falsely use an
explicit key length in ChaCha20Poly1305 AEAD transforms.
If the certificate is revoked, we immediately returned and the chain was
invalid, however, if we couldn't fetch the CRL that result was not stored
for intermediate CAs and we weren't able to enforce a strict CRL policy
later.
Using such CRLs can be a problem if the clock on the host doing the
revocation check is trailing behind that of the host issuing CRLs in
scenarios where expired certificates are removed from CRLs. As revoked
certificates that expired will then not be part of new CRLs a host with
trailing clock might still accept such a certificate if it is still
valid according to its system clock but is not contained anymore in the
not yet valid CRL.
According to RFC 4945, section 5.1.3.2, a certificate for IKE must
either not contain the keyUsage extension, or, if it does, have at least
one of the digitalSignature or nonReputiation bits set.
This patch allows for giving strongSwan only the runtime capabilities it
needs, rather than full root privileges.
Adds preprocessor directives which allow strongSwan to be configured to
1) start up as a non-root user
2) avoid modprobe()'ing IPsec kernel modules into the kernel, which
would normally require root or CAP_SYS_MODULE
Additionally, some small mods to charon/libstrongswan ensure that charon
fully supports starting as a non-root user.
Tested with strongSwan 5.5.3.
This algorithm uses a fixed-length key and we MUST NOT send a key length
attribute when proposing such algorithms.
While we could accept transforms with key length this would only work as
responder, as original initiator it wouldn't because we won't know if a
peer requires the key length. And as exchange initiator (e.g. for
rekeyings), while being original responder, we'd have to go to great
lengths to store the condition and modify the sent proposal to patch in
the key length. This doesn't seem worth it for only a partial fix.
This means, however, that ChaCha20/Poly1305 can't be used with previous
releases (5.3.3 an newer) that don't contain this fix.
Fixes#2614.
Fixes: 3232c0e64e ("Merge branch 'chapoly'")
This helps to distinguish between port and protocol if only one of them
is set. If no protocol is set it's printed as 0, if the traffic
selector covers any port (0-65535) the slash that separates the two values
and the port is omitted.
According to RFC 5114 the exponent length for these groups should always equal
the size of their prime order subgroup.
This was handled correctly before the initialization was done during
library initialization.
Fixes: 46184b07c1 ("diffie-hellman: Explicitly initialize DH exponent sizes during initialization")
We can't use ASN1_DEF, which would technically be more correct, as the
ASN.1 parser currently can't handle that. For algorithm identifiers we
often use ASN1_EOC as type (with ASN1_RAW), however, that doesn't work with
ASN1_DEF because the element is assumed missing if the type doesn't match.
On the other hand, we can't set the type to ASN1_SEQUENCE because then the
parser skips the following rule if the element is missing (it does so for
all constructed types, but I guess is mainly intended for context tags),
which in this case overruns the parser rules array.
This way there will be a mismatch if one of the proposals contains
transform types not contained in the other (the fix list of transform
types used previously resulted in a match if unknown transform types
were contained in one of the proposals). Merging the sets of types
makes comparing proposals with optional transform types easier (e.g.
DH for ESP with MODP_NONE).
The timed wait functions tested in the threading unit tests often but
randomly trigger a bit early on AppVeyor Windows containers. We allow this
if it is not earlier than 5ms.
Depending on the plugins that eventually parse the certificate and CRL,
serials with MSB set (i.e. negative numbers that have a zero byte prefixed
when encoded as ASN.1 INTEGER) might have (x509 plugin) or not have
(openssl plugin) a zero byte prefix when returned by get_serial() or
enumerated from the CRL. Strip them before doing the comparison or
revocation checking might fail if not both credentials are parsed by the
same plugin (which should be rare and only happen if parsing of either
cert or CRL fails with one of the plugins and there is a fallback to the
implementation provided by the other plugin).
Fixes#2509.
Reset errno to 0 before calling strtoul() since it sets errno only on
error cases. So the following test fails even on correct conversions if
errno had a value != 0.
Fixes#2506.
Support for mark=%unique/%unique-dir is implemented by using designated
magic mark values.
Use of masks is orthogonal to the 'unique' feature, as it is useful to be
able to designate portions of the packet mark for other purposes, while
still using different marks for different connections.
When these magic values are masked, their magic meaning is lost.
Perform masking only on explicit mark values.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#87.
This allows us to use it without having to initialize libcharon, which
was required for the logging (we probably could have included debug.h
instead of daemon.h to workaround that but this seems more correct).
libstrongswan and kernel-netlink are the only two components which do
not adhere to the naming scheme used for all other tests. If the tests
are run by an external application this imposes problems due to clashing
names.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer <thomas.egerer@secunet.com>
In theory we should treat any parameters and the identifier itself as
restriction to only use the key to create signatures accordingly (e.g.
only use RSA with PSS padding or even use specific hash algorithms).
But that's currently tricky as we'd have to store and pass this information
along with our private keys (i.e. use PKCS#8 to store them and change the
builder calls to pass along the identifier and parameters). That would
require quite some work.
For salt lengths other than 20 this requires 0bd8137e68c2 ("cipher:
Add option to specify salt length for PSS verification."), which was
included in libgcrypt 1.7.0 (for Ubuntu requires 17.04). As that makes
it pretty much useless for us (SHA-1 is a MUST NOT), we require that version
to even provide the feature.
Since not all implementations allow setting a specific salt value when
generating signatures (e.g. OpenSSL doesn't), we are often limited to
only using the test vectors with salt length of 0.
We also exclude test vectors with SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-384.
This is not ideal as the call to C_Finalize() should be the last one via
the PKCS#11 API. Since the order in which jobs are canceled is undefined
we can't be sure there is no other thread still using the library (it could
even be the canceled job that still handles a previous slot event).
According to PKCS#11 the behavior of C_Finalize() is undefined while other
threads still make calls over the API.
However, canceling the thread, as done previously, could also be problematic
as PKCS#11 libraries could hold locks while in the C_WaitForSlotEvent() call,
which might not get released properly when the thread is just canceled,
and which then might cause later calls to other API functions to block.
Fixes#2437.
This can happen if a stream is used blocking exclusively (the FD is
never registered with watcher, but is removed in the stream's destructor
just in case it ever was - doing this conditionally would require an
additional flag in streams). There may be no thread reading from
the read end of the notify pipe (e.g. in starter), causing the write
to the notify pipe to block after it's full. Anyway, doing a relatively
expensive FD update is unnecessary if there were no changes.
Fixes#1453.
This allows systemd socket activation by passing URIs such as systemd://foo
to plugins such as VICI.
For example setting charon.plugins.vici.socket = systemd://vici, a
systemd socket file descriptor with the name "vici" will be picked up.
So these would be the corresponding unit options:
[Socket]
FileDescriptorName=vici
Service=strongswan.service
ListenStream=/run/charon.vici
The implementation currently is very basic and right now only the first
file descriptor for a particular identifier is picked up if there are
multiple socket units with the same FileDescriptorName.
Signed-off-by: aszlig <aszlig@redmoonstudios.org>
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#79.
The order of arguments in X509_CRL_get0_signature() is not the same as that
of X509_get0_signature().
Fixes: 989ba4b6cd ("openssl: Update CRL API to OpenSSL 1.1.0")
ambiso