gmp: Fix RSA signature verification for m >= n

By definition, m must be <= n-1, we didn't enforce that and because
mpz_export() returns NULL if the passed value is zero a crash could have
been triggered with m == n.

Fixes CVE-2017-11185.
This commit is contained in:
Tobias Brunner 2017-05-29 11:59:34 +02:00 committed by Andreas Steffen
parent d35183e33e
commit ef5c37fcdf
1 changed files with 9 additions and 3 deletions

View File

@ -78,11 +78,17 @@ static chunk_t rsaep(private_gmp_rsa_public_key_t *this, chunk_t data)
mpz_t m, c;
chunk_t encrypted;
mpz_init(c);
mpz_init(m);
mpz_import(m, data.len, 1, 1, 1, 0, data.ptr);
if (mpz_cmp_ui(m, 0) <= 0 || mpz_cmp(m, this->n) >= 0)
{ /* m must be <= n-1, and while 0 is technically a valid value, it
* doesn't really make sense here, so we filter that too */
mpz_clear(m);
return chunk_empty;
}
mpz_init(c);
mpz_powm(c, m, this->e, this->n);
encrypted.len = this->k;
@ -150,7 +156,7 @@ static bool verify_emsa_pkcs1_signature(private_gmp_rsa_public_key_t *this,
*/
/* check magic bytes */
if (*(em.ptr) != 0x00 || *(em.ptr+1) != 0x01)
if (em.len < 2 || *(em.ptr) != 0x00 || *(em.ptr+1) != 0x01)
{
goto end;
}