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Implement signatures with private keys bound to TPM 2.0

This commit is contained in:
Andreas Steffen 2017-02-13 19:06:18 +01:00
parent 72fcce92d7
commit e8736028e6
3 changed files with 215 additions and 8 deletions
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15
src/libtpmtss/tpm_tss.h
View File

@ -119,6 +119,21 @@ struct tpm_tss_t {
tpm_quote_mode_t *quote_mode,
tpm_tss_quote_info_t **quote_info, chunk_t *quote_sig);
/**
* Do a signature over a data hash using a TPM key handle (TPM 2.0 only)
*
* @param handle object handle of TPM key to be used for signature
* @param hierarchy hierarchy the TPM key object is attached to
* @param scheme scheme to be used for signature
* @param data data to be hashed and signed
* @param pin PIN code or empty chunk
* @param signature returns signature
* @return TRUE if signature succeeded
*/
bool (*sign)(tpm_tss_t *this, uint32_t hierarchy, uint32_t handle,
signature_scheme_t scheme, chunk_t data, chunk_t pin,
chunk_t *signature);
/**
* Destroy a tpm_tss_t.
*/

10
src/libtpmtss/tpm_tss_trousers.c
View File

@ -582,6 +582,13 @@ err1:
return success;
}
METHOD(tpm_tss_t, sign, bool,
private_tpm_tss_trousers_t *this, uint32_t hierarchy, uint32_t handle,
signature_scheme_t scheme, chunk_t data, chunk_t pin, chunk_t *signature)
{
return FALSE;
}
METHOD(tpm_tss_t, destroy, void,
private_tpm_tss_trousers_t *this)
{
@ -622,8 +629,9 @@ tpm_tss_t *tpm_tss_trousers_create()
.generate_aik = _generate_aik,
.get_public = _get_public,
.read_pcr = _read_pcr,
.quote = _quote,
.extend_pcr = _extend_pcr,
.quote = _quote,
.sign = _sign,
.destroy = _destroy,
},
.load_aik = _load_aik,

198
src/libtpmtss/tpm_tss_tss2.c
View File

@ -317,16 +317,9 @@ bool read_public(private_tpm_tss_tss2_t *this, TPMI_DH_OBJECT handle,
sessions_data.rspAuths = &session_data_array[0];
sessions_data.rspAuthsCount = 1;
/* always send simulator platform command, ignored by true RM */
PlatformCommand(this->tcti_context ,MS_SIM_POWER_ON );
PlatformCommand(this->tcti_context, MS_SIM_NV_ON );
/* read public key for a given object handle from TPM 2.0 NVRAM */
rval = Tss2_Sys_ReadPublic(this->sys_context, handle, 0, public, &name,
&qualified_name, &sessions_data);
PlatformCommand(this->tcti_context, MS_SIM_POWER_OFF);
if (rval != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
{
DBG1(DBG_PTS, "%s could not read public key from handle 0x%08x: 0x%06x",
@ -646,6 +639,196 @@ METHOD(tpm_tss_t, quote, bool,
return TRUE;
}
METHOD(tpm_tss_t, sign, bool,
private_tpm_tss_tss2_t *this, uint32_t hierarchy, uint32_t handle,
signature_scheme_t scheme, chunk_t data, chunk_t pin, chunk_t *signature)
{
key_type_t key_type;
hash_algorithm_t hash_alg;
uint32_t rval;
TPM_ALG_ID alg_id;
TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER buffer;
TPM2B_DIGEST hash = { { sizeof(TPM2B_DIGEST)-2, } };
TPMT_TK_HASHCHECK validation;
TPM2B_PUBLIC public = { { 0, } };
TPMT_SIG_SCHEME sig_scheme;
TPMT_SIGNATURE sig;
TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND session_data_cmd;
TPMS_AUTH_RESPONSE session_data_rsp;
TSS2_SYS_CMD_AUTHS sessions_data_cmd;
TSS2_SYS_RSP_AUTHS sessions_data_rsp;
TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND *session_data_cmd_array[1];
TPMS_AUTH_RESPONSE *session_data_rsp_array[1];
session_data_cmd_array[0] = &session_data_cmd;
session_data_rsp_array[0] = &session_data_rsp;
sessions_data_cmd.cmdAuths = &session_data_cmd_array[0];
sessions_data_rsp.rspAuths = &session_data_rsp_array[0];
sessions_data_cmd.cmdAuthsCount = 1;
sessions_data_rsp.rspAuthsCount = 1;
session_data_cmd.sessionHandle = TPM_RS_PW;
session_data_cmd.nonce.t.size = 0;
session_data_cmd.hmac.t.size = 0;
if (pin.len > 0)
{
session_data_cmd.hmac.t.size = min(sizeof(session_data_cmd.hmac.t) - 2,
pin.len);
memcpy(session_data_cmd.hmac.t.buffer, pin.ptr,
session_data_cmd.hmac.t.size);
}
*( (uint8_t *)((void *)&session_data_cmd.sessionAttributes ) ) = 0;
key_type = key_type_from_signature_scheme(scheme);
hash_alg = hasher_from_signature_scheme(scheme);
/* Check if hash algorithm is supported by TPM */
alg_id = hash_alg_to_tpm_alg_id(hash_alg);
if (!is_supported_alg(this, alg_id))
{
DBG1(DBG_PTS, "%s %N hash algorithm not supported by TPM",
LABEL, hash_algorithm_short_names, hash_alg);
return FALSE;
}
/* Get public key */
if (!read_public(this, handle, &public))
{
return FALSE;
}
if (key_type == KEY_RSA && public.t.publicArea.type == TPM_ALG_RSA)
{
sig_scheme.scheme = TPM_ALG_RSASSA;
sig_scheme.details.rsassa.hashAlg = alg_id;
}
else if (key_type == KEY_ECDSA && public.t.publicArea.type == TPM_ALG_ECC)
{
sig_scheme.scheme = TPM_ALG_ECDSA;
sig_scheme.details.ecdsa.hashAlg = alg_id;
}
else
{
DBG1(DBG_PTS, "%s signature scheme %N not supported by TPM key",
LABEL, signature_scheme_names, scheme);
return FALSE;
}
if (data.len <= MAX_DIGEST_BUFFER)
{
memcpy(buffer.t.buffer, data.ptr, data.len);
buffer.t.size = data.len;
rval = Tss2_Sys_Hash(this->sys_context, 0, &buffer, alg_id, hierarchy,
&hash, &validation, 0);
if (rval != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
{
DBG1(DBG_PTS,"%s Tss2_Sys_Hash failed: 0x%06x", LABEL, rval);
return FALSE;
}
}
else
{
TPMI_DH_OBJECT sequence_handle;
TPM2B_AUTH null_auth;
null_auth.t.size = 0;
rval = Tss2_Sys_HashSequenceStart(this->sys_context, 0, &null_auth,
alg_id, &sequence_handle, 0);
if (rval != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
{
DBG1(DBG_PTS,"%s Tss2_Sys_HashSequenceStart failed: 0x%06x",
LABEL, rval);
return FALSE;
}
while (data.len > 0)
{
buffer.t.size = min(data.len, MAX_DIGEST_BUFFER);
memcpy(buffer.t.buffer, data.ptr, buffer.t.size);
data.ptr += buffer.t.size;
data.len -= buffer.t.size;
rval = Tss2_Sys_SequenceUpdate(this->sys_context, sequence_handle,
&sessions_data_cmd, &buffer, 0);
if (rval != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
{
DBG1(DBG_PTS,"%s Tss2_Sys_SequenceUpdate failed: 0x%06x",
LABEL, rval);
return FALSE;
}
}
buffer.t.size = 0;
rval = Tss2_Sys_SequenceComplete(this->sys_context, sequence_handle,
&sessions_data_cmd, &buffer, hierarchy,
&hash, &validation, 0);
if (rval != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
{
DBG1(DBG_PTS,"%s Tss2_Sys_SequenceComplete failed: 0x%06x",
LABEL, rval);
return FALSE;
}
}
rval = Tss2_Sys_Sign(this->sys_context, handle, &sessions_data_cmd, &hash,
&sig_scheme, &validation, &sig, &sessions_data_rsp);
if (rval != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
{
DBG1(DBG_PTS,"%s Tss2_Sys_Sign failed: 0x%06x", LABEL, rval);
return FALSE;
}
/* extract signature */
switch (scheme)
{
case SIGN_RSA_EMSA_PKCS1_SHA1:
case SIGN_RSA_EMSA_PKCS1_SHA2_256:
case SIGN_RSA_EMSA_PKCS1_SHA2_384:
case SIGN_RSA_EMSA_PKCS1_SHA2_512:
*signature = chunk_clone(
chunk_create(
sig.signature.rsassa.sig.t.buffer,
sig.signature.rsassa.sig.t.size));
break;
case SIGN_ECDSA_256:
case SIGN_ECDSA_384:
case SIGN_ECDSA_521:
*signature = chunk_cat("cc",
chunk_create(
sig.signature.ecdsa.signatureR.t.buffer,
sig.signature.ecdsa.signatureR.t.size),
chunk_create(
sig.signature.ecdsa.signatureS.t.buffer,
sig.signature.ecdsa.signatureS.t.size));
break;
case SIGN_ECDSA_WITH_SHA256_DER:
case SIGN_ECDSA_WITH_SHA384_DER:
case SIGN_ECDSA_WITH_SHA512_DER:
*signature = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "mm",
asn1_integer("c",
chunk_create(
sig.signature.ecdsa.signatureR.t.buffer,
sig.signature.ecdsa.signatureR.t.size)),
asn1_integer("c",
chunk_create(
sig.signature.ecdsa.signatureS.t.buffer,
sig.signature.ecdsa.signatureS.t.size)));
break;
default:
DBG1(DBG_PTS, "%s unsupported %N signature scheme",
LABEL, signature_scheme_names, scheme);
return FALSE;
};
return TRUE;
}
METHOD(tpm_tss_t, destroy, void,
private_tpm_tss_tss2_t *this)
{
@ -670,6 +853,7 @@ tpm_tss_t *tpm_tss_tss2_create()
.read_pcr = _read_pcr,
.extend_pcr = _extend_pcr,
.quote = _quote,
.sign = _sign,
.destroy = _destroy,
},
);