swanctl: Document most swanctl.conf options in manpage
This commit is contained in:
Martin Willi
parent
d909e51918
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.SH NAME
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swanctl.conf \- swanctl configuration file
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.SH DESCRIPTION
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Bla bla
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swanctl.conf is the configuration file used by the
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.BR swanctl (8)
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tool to load configurations and credentials into the strongSwan IKE daemon.
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For a description of the syntax refer to
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For a description of the basic file syntax refer to
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.BR strongswan.conf (5).
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.SH TIME FORMATS
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For all options that define a time, the time is specified in seconds. The
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.RI "" "s" ","
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.RI "" "m" ","
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.RI "" "h" ""
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and
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.RI "" "d" ""
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suffixes explicitly define the units for seconds, minutes, hours and days,
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respectively.
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.SH SETTINGS
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The following settings can be used to configure IKE and CHILD SAs and
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credentials.
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The following settings can be used to configure connections, credentials and
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pools.
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@ -1,188 +1,739 @@
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connections.conn1 { # }
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An IKE configuration named conn1
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connections { # }
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Section defining IKE connection configurations.
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connections.conn1.version = 2
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IKE version to use
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Section defining IKE connection configurations.
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connections.conn1.local_addrs = 0.0.0.0
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List of acceptable local addresses/subnets
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The connections section defines IKE connection configurations, each in
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its own subsections. In the keyword description below, the connection
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is named _<conn>_, but an arbitrary yet unique connection name can be
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chosen for each connection subsection.
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connections.conn1.remote_addrs = 192.168.5.1
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Peer address, additional addresses/subnets as responder
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connections.<conn> { # }
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Section for an IKE connection named <conn>.
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connections.conn1.local_port = 500
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Local UPD port for IKE
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connections.<conn>.version = 0
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IKE major version to use for connection.
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connections.conn1.remote_port = 500
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Remote UDP port for IKE
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IKE major version to use for connection. _1_ uses IKEv1 aka ISAKMP, _2_
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uses IKEv2. A connection using the default of _0_ accepts both IKEv1
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and IKEv2 as responder, and initiates the connection actively with IKEv2.
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connections.conn1.proposals = aes128gcm16-prfsha256-modp2048, default
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Proposals for IKE, "default" is the default proposal
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connections.<conn>.local_addrs = %any
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Local address(es) to use for IKE communication, comma separated.
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connections.conn1.vips =
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Virtual IPs to request, such as 0.0.0.0 or ::
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Local address(es) to use for IKE communication, comma separated. Takes
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single IPv4/IPv6 addresses, DNS names, CIDR subnets or IP address ranges.
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connections.conn1.aggressive = no
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IKEv1 aggressive mode
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As initiator, the first non-range/non-subnet is used to initiate the
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connection from. As responder, the local destination address must match at
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least to one of the specified addresses, subnets or ranges.
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connections.conn1.pull = yes
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Use of pull/push in IKEv1 mode config
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connections.<conn>.remote_addrs = %any
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Remote address(es) to use for IKE communication, comma separated.
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connections.conn1.encap = no
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Enforce UDP encapsulation by faking NAT-D payloads
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Remote address(es) to use for IKE communication, comma separated. Takes
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single IPv4/IPv6 addresses, DNS names, CIDR subnets or IP address ranges.
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connections.conn1.mobike = yes
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Enable IKEv2 MOBIKE
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As initiator, the first non-range/non-subnet is used to initiate the
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connection to. As responder, the initiator source address must match at
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least to one of the specified addresses, subnets or ranges.
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connections.conn1.dpd_delay = 10s
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Interval of liveness checks
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To initiate a connection, at least one specific address or DNS name must
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be specified.
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connections.conn1.dpd_timeout = 30s
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Timeout for DPD checks (IKEV1 only)
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connections.<conn>.local_port = 500
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Local UPD port for IKE communication.
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connections.conn1.fragmentation = force
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Use IKEv1 UDP packet fragmentation
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Local UPD port for IKE communication. By default the port of the socket
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backend is used, which is usually _500_. If port _500_ is used, automatic
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IKE port floating to port 4500 is used to work around NAT issues.
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connections.conn1.send_certreq = yes
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Send certificate requests
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Using a non-default local IKE port requires support from the socket backend
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in use (socket-dynamic).
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connections.conn1.send_cert = ifasked
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Send certificate payloads
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connections.<conn>.remote_port = 500
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Remote UDP port for IKE communication.
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connections.conn1.keyingtries = 0
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Number of retransmission sequences to do before givin up
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Remote UPD port for IKE communication. If the default of port _500_ is used,
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automatic IKE port floating to port 4500 is used to work around NAT issues.
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connections.conn1.unique = no
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Uniquness policy, never|no|keep|replace|
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connections.<conn>.proposals = default
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Comma separated proposals to accept for IKE.
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connections.conn1.reauth_time = 3h
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Time to schedule IKE reauthentication
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A proposal is a set of algorithms. For non-AEAD algorithms, this includes
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for IKE an encryption algorithm, an integrity algorithm, a pseudo random
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function and a Diffie-Hellman group. For AEAD algorithms, instead of
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encryption and integrity algorithms, a combined algorithm is used.
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connections.conn1.rekey_time = 2h
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Time to schedule IKE rekeying
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In IKEv2, multiple algorithms of the same kind can be specified in a single
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proposal, from which one gets selected. In IKEv1, only one algorithm per
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kind is allowed per proposal, more algorithms get implicitly stripped. Use
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multiple proposals to offer different algorithms combinations in IKEv1.
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connections.conn1.over_time = 10m
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Hard IKE_SA lifetime if rekey/reauth does not complete
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Algorithm keywords get separated using dashes. Multiple proposals may be
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separated by commas. The special value _default_ forms a default proposal
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of supported algorithms considered safe, and is usually a good choice
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for interoperability.
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connections.conn1.rand_time = 10m
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Range of random time to subtract from rekey/rauth times
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connections.<conn>.vips =
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Virtual IPs to request in configuration payload / Mode Config.
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connections.conn1.pools = pool1
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Hand out addresses and attributes from pool1 as responder
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Comma separated list of virtual IPs to request in IKEv2 configuration
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payloads or IKEv1 Mode Config. The wildcard addresses _0.0.0.0_ and _::_
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request an arbitrary address, specific addresses may be defined. The
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responder may return a different address, though, or none at all.
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connections.conn1.vips = 0.0.0.0
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Request a virtual IP as initiator
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connections.<conn>.aggressive = no
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Use Aggressive Mode in IKEv1.
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connections.conn1.local {}
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Local authentication, first round
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Enables Aggressive Mode instead of Main Mode with Identity Protection.
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Aggressive Mode is considered less secure, because the ID and HASH
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payloads are exchanged unprotected. This allows a passive attacker to
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snoop peer identities, and even worse, start dictionary attacks on the
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Preshared Key.
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connections.conn1.local.certs = a.pem, xy.der
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Additional certificates to load
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connections.<conn>.pull = yes
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Set the Mode Config mode to use.
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connections.conn1.local.auth = pubkey
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Authentication to perform locally
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If the default of _yes_ is used, Mode Config works in pull mode, where
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the initiator actively requests a virtual IP. With _no_, push mode is used,
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where the responder pushes down a virtual IP to the initiating peer.
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connections.conn1.local.id = win@strongswan.org
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IKE identity for local
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Push mode is currently supported for IKEv1, but not in IKEv2. It is used
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by a few implementations only, pull mode is recommended.
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connections.conn1.local.eap_id = moon
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Client EAP-Identity to use
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connections.<conn>.encap = no
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Enforce UDP encapsulation by faking NAT-D payloads.
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connections.conn1.local.aaa_identity = srv
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Server side EAP identity to use, EAP-TTLS etc.
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To enforce UDP encapsulation of ESP packets, the IKE daemon can fake the
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NAT detection payloads. This makes the peer believe that NAT takes
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place on the path, forcing it to encapsulate ESP packets in UDP.
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connections.conn1.local.xauth_id = moon
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IKEv1 XAuth username
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Usually this is not required, but it can help to work around connectivity
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issues with too restrictive intermediary firewalls.
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connections.conn1.remote {}
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Remote authentication, first round
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connections.<conn>.mobike = yes
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Enables MOBIKE on IKEv2 connections.
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connections.conn1.remote.id = %any
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IKE identity for peer
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Enables MOBIKE on IKEv2 connections. MOBIKE is enabled by default on IKEv2
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connections, and allows mobility of clients and multi-homing on servers by
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migrating active IPsec tunnels.
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connections.conn1.remote.certs = client.pem
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List of acceptable peer certificates
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Usually keeping MOBIKE enabled is unproblematic, as it is not used if the
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peer does not indicate support for it. However, due to the design of MOBIKE,
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IKEv2 always floats to port 4500 starting from the second exchange. Some
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implementations don't like this behavior, hence it can be disabled.
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connections.conn1.remote.cacert = ca.der
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List of acceptable CA certificates
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connections.<conn>.dpd_delay = 0s
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Interval of liveness checks (DPD).
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connections.conn1.remote.revocation = ifuri
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Revocation policy, strict|ifuri
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Interval to check the liveness of a peer actively using IKEv2 INFORMATIONAL
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exchanges or IKEv1 R_U_THERE messages. Active DPD checking is only enforced
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if no IKE or ESP/AH packet has been received for the configured DPD delay.
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connections.conn1.remote.auth = pubkey
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Authentication to expect from remote
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connections.<conn>.dpd_timeout = 0s
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Timeout for DPD checks (IKEV1 only).
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connections.conn1.children.child1 {}
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First CHILD_SA configuration
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Charon by default uses the normal retransmission mechanism and timeouts to
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check the liveness of a peer, as all messages are used for liveness
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checking. For compatibility reasons, with IKEv1 a custom interval may be
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specified; this option has no effect on connections using IKE2.
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connections.conn1.children.child1.ah_proposals = default
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AH proposals to offer
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connections.<conn>.fragmentation = no
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Use IKEv1 UDP packet fragmentation (_yes_, _no_ or _force_).
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connections.conn1.children.child1.esp_proposals = aes128gcm16-modp2048, default
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ESP proposals to offer
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The default of _no_ disables IKEv1 fragmentation mechanism, _yes_ enables
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it if support has been indicated by the peer. _force_ enforces
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fragmentation if required even before the peer had a chance to indicate
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support for it.
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connections.conn1.children.child1.local_ts = 192.168.3.0/24
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Local subnets to tunnel
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IKE fragmentation is currently not supported with IKEv2.
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connections.conn1.children.child1.remote_ts = 192.168.1.0/24
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Remote subnets to tunnel
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connections.<conn>.send_certreq = yes
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Send certificate requests payloads (_yes_ or _no_).
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connections.conn1.children.child1.updown = path-to-script
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Updown script to invoke
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Send certificate request payloads to offer trusted root CA certificates
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to the peer. Certificate requests help the peer to choose an appropriate
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certificate/private key for authentication and are enabled by default.
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connections.conn1.children.child1.hostaccess = yes
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Hostaccess variable to pass to updown
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Disabling certificate requests can be useful if too many trusted root CA
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certificates are installed, as each certificate request increases the size
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of the initial IKE packets.
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connections.conn1.children.child1.mode = tunnel
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IPsec mode, tunnel|transport|pass|drop
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connections.<conn>.send_cert = ifasked
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Send certificate payloads (_yes_, _no_ or _ifasked_).
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connections.conn1.children.child1.dpd_action = restart
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Action to perform on DPD timeout
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Send certificate payloads when using certificate authentication. With the
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default of _ifasked_ the daemon sends certificate payloads only if
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certificate requests have been received. _no_ disables sending of
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certificate payloads, _yes_ always sends certificate payloads whenever
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certificate authentication is used.
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connections.conn1.children.child1.ipcomp = no
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Enable IPComp
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connections.<conn>.keyingtries = 1
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Number of retransmission sequences to perform during initial connect.
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connections.conn1.children.child1.inactivity = 2m
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Inactivity timeout before closing CHILD_SA
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Number of retransmission sequences to perform during initial connect.
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Instead of giving up initiation after the first retransmission sequence with
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the default value of _1_, additional sequences may be started according to
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the configured value. A value of _0_ initiates a new sequence until the
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connection establishes or fails with a permanent error.
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connections.conn1.children.child1.reqid = 5
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Fixed reqid to use for this CHILD_SA
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connections.<conn>.unique = no
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Connection uniqueness policy (_never_, _no_, _keep_ or _replace_).
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connections.conn1.children.child1.mark_in = 1
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Netfilter mark for input traffic
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Connection uniqueness policy to enforce. To avoid multiple connections
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from the same user, a uniqueness policy can be enforced. The value _never_
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does never enforce such a policy, even if a peer included INITIAL_CONTACT
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notification messages, whereas _no_ replaces existing connections for the
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same identity if a new one has the INITIAL_CONTACT notify. _keep_ rejects
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new connection attempts if the same user already has an active connection,
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_replace_ deletes any existing connection if a new one for the same user
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gets established.
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connections.conn1.children.child1.mark_out = 5/0xffffffff
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Netfilter mark for output traffic
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To compare connections for uniqueness, the remote IKE identity is used. If
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EAP or XAuth authentication is involved, the EAP-Identity or XAuth username
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is used to enforce the uniqueness policy instead.
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connections.conn1.children.child1.tfc_padding = 1500
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Traffic Flow Confidentiality padding
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connections.<conn>.reauth_time = 0s
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Time to schedule IKE reauthentication.
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secrets.eap1 { # }
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EAP secret section
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Time to schedule IKE reauthentication. IKE reauthentication recreates the
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IKE/ISAKMP SA from scratch and re-evaluates the credentials. In asymmetric
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configurations (with EAP or configuration payloads) it might not be possible
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to actively reauthenticate as responder. The IKEv2 reauthentication lifetime
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negotiation can instruct the client to perform reauthentication.
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secrets.eap1.secret = testpassword
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Password for EAP secret
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Reauthentication is disabled by default. Enabling it usually may lead
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to small connection interruptions, as strongSwan uses a break-before-make
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policy with IKEv2 to avoid any conflicts with associated tunnel resources.
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secrets.eap1.id = tester
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User EAP secret belongs to
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connections.<conn>.rekey_time = 4h
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Time to schedule IKE rekeying.
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secrets.ike-moon { # }
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IKE secret for moon
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IKE rekeying refreshes key material using a Diffie-Hellman exchange, but
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does not re-check associated credentials. It is supported in IKEv2 only,
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IKEv1 performs a reauthentication procedure instead.
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secrets.ike-moon.secret = 0x12345678
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IKE shared secret for moon
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With the default value IKE rekeying is scheduled every 4 hours, minus the
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configured **rand_time**.
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secrets.ike-moon.id-local = sun.strongswan.org
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First identity secret belongs to
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connections.<conn>.over_time = 10% of rekey_time/reauth_time
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Hard IKE_SA lifetime if rekey/reauth does not complete, as time.
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secrets.ike-moon.id-remote = moon.strongswan.org
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Second identity secret belongs to
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Hard IKE_SA lifetime if rekey/reauth does not complete, as time.
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To avoid having an IKE/ISAKMP kept alive if IKE reauthentication or rekeying
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fails perpetually, a maximum hard lifetime may be specified. If the
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IKE_SA fails to rekey or reauthenticate within the specified time, the
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IKE_SA gets closed.
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pools.poolx { # }
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Section defining an address pool
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In contrast to CHILD_SA rekeying, **over_time** is relative in time to the
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**rekey_time** _and_ **reauth_time** values, as it applies to both.
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pools.poolx.addrs = 10.1.2.0/24
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Define addresses for this pool
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The default is 10% of the longer of **rekey_time** and **reauth_time**.
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pools.poolx.dns = 10.1.1.1, 10.1.2.1
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Define DNS server addresses associated to pool
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connections.<conn>.rand_time = over_time
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Range of random time to subtract from rekey/reauth times.
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Time range from which to choose a random value to subtract from
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rekey/reauth times. To avoid having both peers initiating the rekey/reauth
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procedure simultaneously, a random time gets subtracted from the
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rekey/reauth times.
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The default is equal to the configured **over_time**.
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connections.<conn>.pools =
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Comma separated list of named IP pools.
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Comma separated list of named IP pools to allocate virtual IP addresses and
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other configuration attributes from. Each name references a pool by name
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from either the **pools** section or an external pool.
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connections.<conn>.local<suffix> {}
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Section for a local authentication round.
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Section for a local authentication round. A local authentication round
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defines the rules how authentication is performed for the local peer.
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Multiple rounds may be defined to use IKEv2 RFC 4739 Multiple Authentication
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or IKEv1 XAuth.
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Each round is defined in a section having _local_ as prefix, and an optional
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unique suffix. To define a single authentication round, the suffix may be
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omitted.
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connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.certs =
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Comma separated list of certificate candidates to use for authentication.
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Comma separated list of certificate candidates to use for authentication.
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The certificates may use a relative path from the **swanctl** _x509_
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directory, or an absolute path.
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The certificate used for authentication is selected based on the received
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certificate request payloads. If no appropriate CA can be located, the
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first certificate is used.
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connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.auth = pubkey
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Authentication to perform locally (_pubkey_, _psk_, _xauth[-backend]_ or
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_eap[-method]_).
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Authentication to perform locally. _pubkey_ uses public key authentication
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using a private key associated to a usable certificate. _psk_ uses
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pre-shared key authentication. The IKEv1 specific _xauth_ is used for
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XAuth or Hybrid authentication, while the IKEv2 specific _eap_ keyword
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defines EAP authentication.
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|
||||
For _xauth_, a specific backend name may be appended, separated by a dash.
|
||||
The appropriate _xauth_ backend is selected to perform the XAuth exchange.
|
||||
For traditional XAuth, the _xauth_ method is usually defined in the second
|
||||
authentication round following an initial _pubkey_ (or _psk_) round. Using
|
||||
_xauth_ in the first round performs Hybrid Mode client authentication.
|
||||
|
||||
For _eap_, a specific EAP method name may be appended, separated by a dash.
|
||||
An EAP module implementing the appropriate method is selected to perform
|
||||
the EAP conversation.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.id =
|
||||
IKE identity to use for authentication round.
|
||||
|
||||
IKE identity to use for authentication round. When using certificate
|
||||
authentication, the IKE identity must be contained in the certificate,
|
||||
either as subject or as subjectAltName.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.eap_id = id
|
||||
Client EAP-Identity to use in EAP-Identity exchange and the EAP method.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.aaa_id = remote-id
|
||||
Server side EAP-Identity to expect in the EAP method.
|
||||
|
||||
Server side EAP-Identity to expect in the EAP method. Some EAP methods, such
|
||||
as EAP-TLS, use an identity for the server to perform mutual authentication.
|
||||
This identity may differ from the IKE identity, especially when EAP
|
||||
authentication is delegated from the IKE responder to an AAA backend.
|
||||
|
||||
For EAP-(T)TLS, this defines the identity for wich the server must provide
|
||||
a certificate in the TLS exchange.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.xauth_id = id
|
||||
Client XAuth username used in the XAuth exchange.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix> {}
|
||||
Section for a remote authentication round.
|
||||
|
||||
Section for a remote authentication round. A remote authentication round
|
||||
defines the constraints how the peers must authenticate to use this
|
||||
connection. Multiple rounds may be defined to use IKEv2 RFC 4739 Multiple
|
||||
Authentication or IKEv1 XAuth.
|
||||
|
||||
Each round is defined in a section having _remote_ as prefix, and an
|
||||
optional unique suffix. To define a single authentication round, the suffix
|
||||
may be omitted.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.id = %any
|
||||
IKE identity to expect for authentication round.
|
||||
|
||||
IKE identity to expect for authentication round. When using certificate
|
||||
authentication, the IKE identity must be contained in the certificate,
|
||||
either as subject or as subjectAltName.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.groups =
|
||||
Authorization group memberships to require.
|
||||
|
||||
Comma separated authorization group memberships to require. The peer must
|
||||
prove membership to at least one of the specified groups. Group membership
|
||||
can be certified by different means, for example by appropriate Attribute
|
||||
Certificates or by an AAA backend involved in the authentication.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.certs =
|
||||
Comma separated list of certificate to accept for authentication.
|
||||
|
||||
Comma separated list of certificates to accept for authentication.
|
||||
The certificates may use a relative path from the **swanctl** _x509_
|
||||
directory, or an absolute path.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.cacert =
|
||||
Comma separated list of CA certificates to accept for authentication.
|
||||
|
||||
Comma separated list of CA certificates to accept for authentication.
|
||||
The certificates may use a relative path from the **swanctl** _x509ca_
|
||||
directory, or an absolute path.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.revocation = relaxed
|
||||
Certificate revocation policy, (_strict_, _ifuri_ or _relaxed_).
|
||||
|
||||
Certificate revocation policy for CRL or OCSP revocation.
|
||||
|
||||
A _strict_ revocation policy fails if no revocation information is
|
||||
available, i.e. the certificate is not known to be unrevoked.
|
||||
|
||||
_ifuri_ fails only if a CRL/OCSP URI is available, but certificate
|
||||
revocation checking fails, i.e. there should be revocation information
|
||||
available, but it could not be obtained.
|
||||
|
||||
The default revocation policy _relaxed_ fails only if a certificate
|
||||
is revoked, i.e. it is explicitly known that it is bad.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.auth = pubkey
|
||||
Authentication to expect from remote (_pubkey_, _psk_, _xauth[-backend]_ or
|
||||
_eap[-method]_).
|
||||
|
||||
Authentication to expect from remote. See the **local** sections **auth**
|
||||
keyword description about the details of supported mechanisms.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.children.<child> {}
|
||||
CHILD_SA configuration sub-section.
|
||||
|
||||
CHILD_SA configuration sub-section. Each connection definition may have
|
||||
one or more sections in its _children_ subsection. The section name
|
||||
defines the name of the CHILD_SA configuration, which must be unique within
|
||||
the connection.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.ah_proposals =
|
||||
AH proposals to offer for the CHILD_SA.
|
||||
|
||||
AH proposals to offer for the CHILD_SA. A proposal is a set of algorithms.
|
||||
For AH, this includes an integrity algorithm and an optional Diffie-Hellman
|
||||
group. If a DH group is specified, CHILD_SA/Quick Mode rekeying and initial
|
||||
negotiation uses a separate Diffie-Hellman exchange using the specified
|
||||
group.
|
||||
|
||||
In IKEv2, multiple algorithms of the same kind can be specified in a single
|
||||
proposal, from which one gets selected. In IKEv1, only one algorithm per
|
||||
kind is allowed per proposal, more algorithms get implicitly stripped. Use
|
||||
multiple proposals to offer different algorithms combinations in IKEv1.
|
||||
|
||||
Algorithm keywords get separated using dashes. Multiple proposals may be
|
||||
separated by commas. The special value _default_ forms a default proposal
|
||||
of supported algorithms considered safe, and is usually a good choice
|
||||
for interoperability. By default no AH proposals are included, instead ESP
|
||||
is proposed.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.esp_proposals = default
|
||||
ESP proposals to offer for the CHILD_SA.
|
||||
|
||||
ESP proposals to offer for the CHILD_SA. A proposal is a set of algorithms.
|
||||
For ESP non-AEAD proposals, this includes an integrity algorithm, an
|
||||
encryption algorithm, an optional Diffie-Hellman group and an optional
|
||||
Extended Sequence Number Mode indicator. For AEAD proposals, a combined
|
||||
mode algorithm is used instead of the separate encryption/integrity
|
||||
algorithms.
|
||||
|
||||
If a DH group is specified, CHILD_SA/Quick Mode rekeying and initial (non
|
||||
IKE_AUTH piggybacked) negotiation uses a separate Diffie-Hellman exchange
|
||||
using the specified group. Extended Sequence Number support may be indicated
|
||||
with the _esn_ and _noesn_ values, both may be included to indicate support
|
||||
for both modes. If omitted, _noesn_ is assumed.
|
||||
|
||||
In IKEv2, multiple algorithms of the same kind can be specified in a single
|
||||
proposal, from which one gets selected. In IKEv1, only one algorithm per
|
||||
kind is allowed per proposal, more algorithms get implicitly stripped. Use
|
||||
multiple proposals to offer different algorithms combinations in IKEv1.
|
||||
|
||||
Algorithm keywords get separated using dashes. Multiple proposals may be
|
||||
separated by commas. The special value _default_ forms a default proposal
|
||||
of supported algorithms considered safe, and is usually a good choice
|
||||
for interoperability. If no algorithms are specified for AH nor ESP,
|
||||
the _default_ set of algorithms for ESP is included.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.local_ts = dynamic
|
||||
Local traffic selectors to include in CHILD_SA.
|
||||
|
||||
Comma separated list of local traffic selectors to include in CHILD_SA.
|
||||
Each selector is a CIDR subnet definition, followed by an optional
|
||||
proto/port selector. The special value _dynamic_ may be used instead of a
|
||||
subnet definition, which gets replaced by the tunnel outer address or the
|
||||
virtual IP, if negotiated. This is the default.
|
||||
|
||||
A protocol/port selector is surrounded by opening and closing square
|
||||
brackets. Between these brackets, a numeric or **getservent**(3) protocol
|
||||
name may be specified. After the optional protocol restriction, an optional
|
||||
port restriction may be specified, separated by a slash. The port
|
||||
restriction may be numeric, a **getservent**(3) service name, or the special
|
||||
value _opaque_ for RFC 4301 OPAQUE selectors. Port ranges may be specified
|
||||
as well, none of the kernel backends currently support port ranges, though.
|
||||
|
||||
Unless the Unity extension is used, IKEv1 supports the first specified
|
||||
selector only. IKEv1 uses very similar traffic selector narrowing as it is
|
||||
supported in the IKEv2 protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.remote_ts = dynamic
|
||||
Remote selectors to include in CHILD_SA.
|
||||
|
||||
Comma separated list of remote selectors to include in CHILD_SA. See
|
||||
**local_ts** for a description of the selector syntax.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.rekey_time = 1h
|
||||
Time to schedule CHILD_SA rekeying.
|
||||
|
||||
Time to schedule CHILD_SA rekeying. CHILD_SA rekeying refreshes key
|
||||
material, optionally using a Diffie-Hellman exchange if a group is
|
||||
specified in the proposal.
|
||||
|
||||
To avoid rekey collisions initiated by both ends simultaneously, a value
|
||||
in the range of **rand_time** gets subtracted to form the effective soft
|
||||
lifetime.
|
||||
|
||||
By default CHILD_SA rekeying is scheduled every hour, minus **rand_time**.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.life_time = rekey_time + 10%
|
||||
Maximum lifetime before CHILD_SA gets closed, as time.
|
||||
|
||||
Maximum lifetime before CHILD_SA gets closed. Usually this hard lifetime
|
||||
is never reached, because the CHILD_SA gets rekeyed before.
|
||||
If that fails for whatever reason, this limit closes the CHILD_SA.
|
||||
|
||||
The default is 10% more than the **rekey_time**.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.rand_time = life_time - rekey_time
|
||||
Range of random time to subtract from **rekey_time**.
|
||||
|
||||
Time range from which to choose a random value to subtract from
|
||||
**rekey_time**. The default is the difference between **life_time** and
|
||||
**rekey_time**.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.rekey_bytes = 0
|
||||
Number of bytes processed before initiating CHILD_SA rekeying.
|
||||
|
||||
Number of bytes processed before initiating CHILD_SA rekeying. CHILD_SA
|
||||
rekeying refreshes key material, optionally using a Diffie-Hellman exchange
|
||||
if a group is specified in the proposal.
|
||||
|
||||
To avoid rekey collisions initiated by both ends simultaneously, a value
|
||||
in the range of **rand_bytes** gets subtracted to form the effective soft
|
||||
volume limit.
|
||||
|
||||
Volume based CHILD_SA rekeying is disabled by default.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.life_bytes = rekey_bytes + 10%
|
||||
Maximum bytes processed before CHILD_SA gets closed.
|
||||
|
||||
Maximum bytes processed before CHILD_SA gets closed. Usually this hard
|
||||
volume limit is never reached, because the CHILD_SA gets rekeyed before.
|
||||
If that fails for whatever reason, this limit closes the CHILD_SA.
|
||||
|
||||
The default is 10% more than **rekey_bytes**.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.rand_bytes = life_bytes - rekey_bytes
|
||||
Range of random bytes to subtract from **rekey_bytes**.
|
||||
|
||||
Byte range from which to choose a random value to subtract from
|
||||
**rekey_bytes**. The default is the difference between **life_bytes** and
|
||||
**rekey_bytes**.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.rekey_packets = 0
|
||||
Number of packets processed before initiating CHILD_SA rekeying.
|
||||
|
||||
Number of packets processed before initiating CHILD_SA rekeying. CHILD_SA
|
||||
rekeying refreshes key material, optionally using a Diffie-Hellman exchange
|
||||
if a group is specified in the proposal.
|
||||
|
||||
To avoid rekey collisions initiated by both ends simultaneously, a value
|
||||
in the range of **rand_packets** gets subtracted to form the effective soft
|
||||
packet count limit.
|
||||
|
||||
Packet count based CHILD_SA rekeying is disabled by default.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.life_packets = rekey_packets + 10%
|
||||
Maximum number of packets processed before CHILD_SA gets closed.
|
||||
|
||||
Maximum number of packets processed before CHILD_SA gets closed. Usually
|
||||
this hard packets limit is never reached, because the CHILD_SA gets rekeyed
|
||||
before. If that fails for whatever reason, this limit closes the CHILD_SA.
|
||||
|
||||
The default is 10% more than **rekey_bytes**.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.rand_packets = life_packets - rekey_packets
|
||||
Range of random packets to subtract from **packets_bytes**.
|
||||
|
||||
Packet range from which to choose a random value to subtract from
|
||||
**rekey_packets**. The default is the difference between **life_packets**
|
||||
and **rekey_packets**.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.updown =
|
||||
Updown script to invoke on CHILD_SA up and down events.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.hostaccess = yes
|
||||
Hostaccess variable to pass to **updown** script.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.mode = tunnel
|
||||
IPsec Mode to establish (_tunnel_, _transport_, _beet_, _pass_ or _drop_).
|
||||
|
||||
IPsec Mode to establish CHILD_SA with. _tunnel_ negotiates the CHILD_SA
|
||||
in IPsec Tunnel Mode, whereas _transport_ uses IPsec Transport Mode. _beet_
|
||||
is the Bound End to End Tunnel mixture mode, working with fixed inner
|
||||
addresses without the need to include them in each packet.
|
||||
|
||||
Both _transport_ and _beet_ modes are subject to mode negotiation; _tunnel_
|
||||
mode is negotiated if the preferred mode is not available.
|
||||
|
||||
_pass_ and _drop_ are used to install shunt policies, which explicitly
|
||||
bypass the defined traffic from IPsec processing, or drop it, respectively.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.dpd_action = clear
|
||||
Action to perform on DPD timeout (_clear_, _trap_ or _restart_).
|
||||
|
||||
Action to perform for this CHILD_SA on DPD timeout. The default _clear_
|
||||
closes the CHILD_SA and does not take further action. _trap_ installs
|
||||
a trap policy, which will catch matching traffic and tries to re-negotiate
|
||||
the tunnel on-demand. _restart_ immediately tries to re-negotiate the
|
||||
CHILD_SA under a fresh IKE_SA.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.ipcomp = no
|
||||
Enable IPComp compression before encryption.
|
||||
|
||||
Enable IPComp compression before encryption. If enabled, IKE tries to
|
||||
negotiate IPComp compression to compress ESP payload data prior to
|
||||
encryption.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.inactivity = 0s
|
||||
Timeout before closing CHILD_SA after inactivity.
|
||||
|
||||
Timeout before closing CHILD_SA after inactivity. If no traffic has
|
||||
been processed in either direction for the configured timeout, the CHILD_SA
|
||||
gets closed due to inactivity. The default value of _0_ disables inactivity
|
||||
checks.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.reqid = 0
|
||||
Fixed reqid to use for this CHILD_SA.
|
||||
|
||||
Fixed reqid to use for this CHILD_SA. This might be helpful in some
|
||||
scenarios, but works only if each CHILD_SA configuration is instantiated
|
||||
not more than once. The default of _0_ uses dynamic reqids, allocated
|
||||
incrementally.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.mark_in = 0/0x00000000
|
||||
Netfilter mark and mask for input traffic.
|
||||
|
||||
Netfilter mark and mask for input traffic. On Linux Netfilter may apply
|
||||
marks to each packet coming from a tunnel having that option set. The
|
||||
mark may then be used by Netfilter to match rules.
|
||||
|
||||
An additional mask may be appended to the mark, separated by _/_. The
|
||||
default mask if omitted is 0xffffffff.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.mark_out = 0/0x00000000
|
||||
Netfilter mark and mask for output traffic.
|
||||
|
||||
Netfilter mark and mask for output traffic. On Linux Netfilter may require
|
||||
marks on each packet to match a policy having that option set. This allows
|
||||
Netfilter rules to select specific tunnels for outgoing traffic.
|
||||
|
||||
An additional mask may be appended to the mark, separated by _/_. The
|
||||
default mask if omitted is 0xffffffff.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.tfc_padding = 0
|
||||
Traffic Flow Confidentiality padding.
|
||||
|
||||
Pads ESP packets with additional data to have a consistent ESP packet size
|
||||
for improved Traffic Flow Confidentiality. The padding defines the minimum
|
||||
size of all ESP packets sent.
|
||||
|
||||
The default value of 0 disables TFC padding, the special value _mtu_ adds
|
||||
TFC padding to create a packet size equal to the Path Maximum Transfer Unit.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.start_action = none
|
||||
Action to perform after loading the configuration (_none_, _trap_, _start_).
|
||||
|
||||
Action to perform after loading the configuration. The default of _none_
|
||||
loads the connection only, which then can be manually initiated or used as
|
||||
a responder configuration.
|
||||
|
||||
The value _trap_ installs a trap policy, which triggers the tunnel as soon
|
||||
as matching traffic has been detected. The value _start_ initiates
|
||||
the connection actively.
|
||||
|
||||
When unloading or replacing a CHILD_SA configuration having a
|
||||
**start_action** different from _none_, the inverse action is performed.
|
||||
Configurations with _start_ get closed, while such with _trap_ get
|
||||
uninstalled.
|
||||
|
||||
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.close_action = none
|
||||
Action to perform after a CHILD_SA gets closed (_none_, _trap_, _start_).
|
||||
|
||||
Action to perform after a CHILD_SA gets closed by the peer. The default of
|
||||
_none_ does not take any action, _trap_ installs a trap policy for the
|
||||
CHILD_SA. _start_ tries to re-create the CHILD_SA.
|
||||
|
||||
**close_action** does not provide any guarantee that the CHILD_SA is kept
|
||||
alive. It acts on explicit close messages only, but not on negotiation
|
||||
failures. Use trap policies to reliably re-create failed CHILD_SAs.
|
||||
|
||||
secrets { # }
|
||||
Section defining secrets for IKE and EAP/XAuth authentication.
|
||||
|
||||
Section defining secrets for IKE and EAP/XAuth authentication. The
|
||||
**secrets** section takes sub-sections having a specific prefix which
|
||||
defines the secret type.
|
||||
|
||||
secrets.eap<suffix> { # }
|
||||
EAP secret section for a specific secret.
|
||||
|
||||
EAP secret section for a specific secret. Each EAP secret is defined in
|
||||
a unique section having the _eap_ prefix. EAP secrets are used for XAuth
|
||||
authentication as well.
|
||||
|
||||
secrets.xauth<suffix> { # }
|
||||
XAuth secret section for a specific secret.
|
||||
|
||||
XAuth secret section for a specific secret. **xauth** is just an alias
|
||||
for **eap**, secrets under both section prefixes are used for both EAP and
|
||||
XAuth authentication.
|
||||
|
||||
secrets.eap<suffix>.secret =
|
||||
Value of the EAP/XAuth secret.
|
||||
|
||||
Value of the EAP/XAuth secret. It may either be an ASCII string, a hex
|
||||
encoded string if it has a _0x_ prefix, or a Base64 encoded string if it
|
||||
has a _0s_ prefix in its value.
|
||||
|
||||
secrets.eap<suffix>.id<suffix> =
|
||||
Identity the EAP/XAuth secret belongs to.
|
||||
|
||||
Identity the EAP/XAuth secret belongs to. Multiple unique identities may
|
||||
be specified, each having an _id_ prefix, if a secret is shared between
|
||||
multiple users.
|
||||
|
||||
secrets.ike<suffix> { # }
|
||||
IKE preshared secret section for a specific secret.
|
||||
|
||||
IKE preshared secret section for a specific secret. Each IKE PSK is defined
|
||||
in a unique section having the _ike_ prefix.
|
||||
|
||||
secrets.ike<suffix>.secret =
|
||||
Value of the IKE preshared secret.
|
||||
|
||||
Value of the IKE preshared secret. It may either be an ASCII string,
|
||||
a hex encoded string if it has a _0x_ prefix, or a Base64 encoded string if
|
||||
it has a _0s_ prefix in its value.
|
||||
|
||||
secrets.ike<suffix>.id<suffix> =
|
||||
IKE identity the IKE preshared secret belongs to.
|
||||
|
||||
IKE identity the IKE preshared secret belongs to. Multiple unique identities
|
||||
may be specified, each having an _id_ prefix, if a secret is shared between
|
||||
multiple peers.
|
||||
|
||||
pools { # }
|
||||
Section defining named pools.
|
||||
|
||||
Section defining named pools. Named pools may be referenced by connections
|
||||
with the **pools** option to assign virtual IPs and other configuration
|
||||
attributes.
|
||||
|
||||
pools.<name> { # }
|
||||
Section defining a single pool with a unique name.
|
||||
|
||||
pools.<name>.addrs =
|
||||
Subnet defining addresses allocated in pool.
|
||||
|
||||
Subnet defining addresses allocated in pool. Accepts a single CIDR subnet
|
||||
defining the pool to allocate addresses from. Pools must be unique and
|
||||
non-overlapping.
|
||||
|
||||
pools.<name>.<attr> =
|
||||
Comma separated list of additional attributes from type <attr>.
|
||||
|
||||
Comma separated list of additional attributes of type **<attr>**. The
|
||||
attribute type may be one of _dns_, _nbns_, _dhcp_, _netmask_, _server_,
|
||||
_subnet_, _split_include_ and _split_exclude_ to define addresses or CIDR
|
||||
subnets for the corresponding attribute types. Alternatively, **<attr>** can
|
||||
be a numerical identifier, for which string attribute values are accepted
|
||||
as well.
|
||||
|
|
|
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Reference in New Issue