Fixed some typos, courtesy of codespell
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82cd511cc9
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NEWS
2
NEWS
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@ -1966,7 +1966,7 @@ strongswan-4.3.1
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fuzzing techniques: 1) Sending a malformed IKE_SA_INIT request leaved an
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incomplete state which caused a null pointer dereference if a subsequent
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CREATE_CHILD_SA request was sent. 2) Sending an IKE_AUTH request with either
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a missing TSi or TSr payload caused a null pointer derefence because the
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a missing TSi or TSr payload caused a null pointer dereference because the
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checks for TSi and TSr were interchanged. The IKEv2 fuzzer used was
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developed by the Orange Labs vulnerability research team. The tool was
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initially written by Gabriel Campana and is now maintained by Laurent Butti.
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@ -45,13 +45,13 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
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if (!enum_from_name(hash_algorithm_short_names, argv[1], &alg))
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{
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fprintf(stderr, "unknown hash algorthm: %s\n", argv[1]);
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fprintf(stderr, "unknown hash algorithm: %s\n", argv[1]);
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return 1;
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}
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hasher = lib->crypto->create_hasher(lib->crypto, alg);
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if (!hasher)
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{
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fprintf(stderr, "hash algorthm not supported: %N\n",
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fprintf(stderr, "hash algorithm not supported: %N\n",
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hash_algorithm_names, alg);
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return 1;
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}
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@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ static encoding_rule_t encodings[] = {
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{ FLAG, offsetof(private_ike_header_t, flags.encryption)},
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/* 4 Byte message id, stored in the field message_id */
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{ U_INT_32, offsetof(private_ike_header_t, message_id) },
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/* 4 Byte length fied, stored in the field length */
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/* 4 Byte length field, stored in the field length */
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{ HEADER_LENGTH, offsetof(private_ike_header_t, length) }
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};
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@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ struct sql_config_t {
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backend_t backend;
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/**
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* Destry the backend.
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* Destroy the backend.
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*/
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void (*destroy)(sql_config_t *this);
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};
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@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ struct sql_cred_t {
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credential_set_t set;
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/**
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* Destry the backend.
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* Destroy the backend.
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*/
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void (*destroy)(sql_cred_t *this);
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};
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@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ struct sql_logger_t {
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logger_t logger;
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/**
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* Destry the backend.
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* Destroy the backend.
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*/
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void (*destroy)(sql_logger_t *this);
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};
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@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ struct keymat_t {
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*
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* @param version requested IKE version
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* @param initiator TRUE if we are initiator
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* @return keymat_t implmenetation
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* @return keymat_t implementation
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*/
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keymat_t *keymat_create(ike_version_t version, bool initiator);
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@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ struct private_imv_scanner_state_t {
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uint32_t action_flags;
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/**
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* IMV database session associatied with TNCCS connection
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* IMV database session associated with TNCCS connection
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*/
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imv_session_t *session;
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@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ struct ocsp_response_t {
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* @param revocation_time receives time of revocation, if revoked
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* @param revocation_reason receives reason of revocation, if revoked
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* @param this_update creation time of revocation list
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* @param next_update exptected time of next revocation list
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* @param next_update expected time of next revocation list
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* @return certificate revocation status
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*/
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cert_validation_t (*get_status)(ocsp_response_t *this,
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@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ typedef struct credential_set_t credential_set_t;
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*
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* A credential set enumerator may not block the credential set, i.e. multiple
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* threads must be able to hold multiple enumerators, as the credential manager
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* is higly parallelized. The best way to achieve this is by using shared
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* is highly parallelized. The best way to achieve this is by using shared
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* read locks for the enumerators only. Otherwise deadlocks will occur.
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* The writing cache_cert() routine is called by the manager only if no
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* enumerator is alive, so it is save to use a write lock there.
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@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ METHOD(pkcs7_t, get_attribute, bool,
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return FALSE;
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}
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/* "i" gets incremeneted after enumerate(), hence read from previous */
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/* "i" gets incremented after enumerate(), hence read from previous */
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si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(e->signers, e->i - 1);
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for (i = 0; i < CMS_signed_get_attr_count(si); i++)
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{
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@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
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typedef enum tty_escape_t tty_escape_t;
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/**
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* Excape codes for tty colors
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* Escape codes for tty colors
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*/
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enum tty_escape_t {
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/** text properties */
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@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ cp ${CA_CERT} ${DIR}/hosts/alice/etc/raddb/certs
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# Convert strongSwan Root CA certificate into DER format
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openssl x509 -in ${CA_CERT} -outform der -out ${CA_CERT_DER}
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# Gernerate a stale CRL
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# Generate a stale CRL
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pki --signcrl --cakey ${CA_KEY} --cacert ${CA_CERT} \
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--this-update "${START}" --lifetime 1 > ${CA_LAST_CRL}
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@ -857,7 +857,7 @@ pki --acert --issuerkey ${TEST_KEY} --issuercert ${TEST_CERT} \
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--in ${CA_DIR}/certs/01.pem --group sales \
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--not-before "${SH_END}" --not-after "${EE_END}" --outform pem > ${ACERT_CS}
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# Put a copy into the ikev2/acert-inline scenarion
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# Put a copy into the ikev2/acert-inline scenario
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TEST="${TEST_DIR}/ikev2/acert-inline"
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mkdir -p ${TEST}/hosts/moon/${IPSEC_DIR}/private
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mkdir -p ${TEST}/hosts/moon/${IPSEC_DIR}/aacerts
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@ -880,7 +880,7 @@ pki --issue --cakey ${CA_KEY} --cacert ${CA_CERT} --crl ${CA_CDP} --type rsa \
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--outform pem > ${TEST_CERT}
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cp ${TEST_CERT} ${CA_DIR}/certs/${SERIAL}.pem
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# Genrate dave's attribute certificate for sales from expired AA
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# Generate dave's attribute certificate for sales from expired AA
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ACERT=${TEST}/hosts/dave/${IPSEC_DIR}/acerts/dave-expired-aa.pem
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mkdir -p ${TEST}/hosts/dave/${IPSEC_DIR}/acerts
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pki --acert --issuerkey ${TEST_KEY} --issuercert ${TEST_CERT} \
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