Provide AF_RXRPC sockets that can be used to talk to AFS servers, or serve
answers to AFS clients. KerberosIV security is fully supported. The patches
and some example test programs can be found in:
http://people.redhat.com/~dhowells/rxrpc/
This will eventually replace the old implementation of kernel-only RxRPC
currently resident in net/rxrpc/.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
It is far too large to be an inline and not in any hot paths.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The seq_file operations stuff can be marked constant to
get it out of dirty cache.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Now that network timestamps use ktime_t infrastructure, we can add a new
SOL_SOCKET sockopt SO_TIMESTAMPNS.
This command is similar to SO_TIMESTAMP, but permits transmission of
a 'timespec struct' instead of a 'timeval struct' control message.
(nanosecond resolution instead of microsecond)
Control message is labelled SCM_TIMESTAMPNS instead of SCM_TIMESTAMP
A socket cannot mix SO_TIMESTAMP and SO_TIMESTAMPNS : the two modes are
mutually exclusive.
sock_recv_timestamp() became too big to be fully inlined so I added a
__sock_recv_timestamp() helper function.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
CC: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Fix whitespace around keywords. Fix indentation especially of switch
statements.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Now network timestamps use ktime_t infrastructure, we can add a new
ioctl() SIOCGSTAMPNS command to get timestamps in 'struct timespec'.
User programs can thus access to nanosecond resolution.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
CC: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
We currently use a special structure (struct skb_timeval) and plain
'struct timeval' to store packet timestamps in sk_buffs and struct
sock.
This has some drawbacks :
- Fixed resolution of micro second.
- Waste of space on 64bit platforms where sizeof(struct timeval)=16
I suggest using ktime_t that is a nice abstraction of high resolution
time services, currently capable of nanosecond resolution.
As sizeof(ktime_t) is 8 bytes, using ktime_t in 'struct sock' permits
a 8 byte shrink of this structure on 64bit architectures. Some other
structures also benefit from this size reduction (struct ipq in
ipv4/ip_fragment.c, struct frag_queue in ipv6/reassembly.c, ...)
Once this ktime infrastructure adopted, we can more easily provide
nanosecond resolution on top of it. (ioctl SIOCGSTAMPNS and/or
SO_TIMESTAMPNS/SCM_TIMESTAMPNS)
Note : this patch includes a bug correction in
compat_sock_get_timestamp() where a "err = 0;" was missing (so this
syscall returned -ENOENT instead of 0)
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
CC: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@linux-foundation.org>
CC: John find <linux.kernel@free.fr>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
sk_backlog is a critical field of struct sock. (known famous words)
It is (ab)used in hot paths, in particular in release_sock(), tcp_recvmsg(),
tcp_v4_rcv(), sk_receive_skb().
It really makes sense to place it next to sk_lock, because sk_backlog is only
used after sk_lock locked (and thus memory cache line in L1 cache). This
should reduce cache misses and sk_lock acquisition time.
(In theory, we could only move the head pointer near sk_lock, and leaving tail
far away, because 'tail' is normally not so hot, but keep it simple :) )
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Turning up the warnings on gcc makes it emit warnings
about the placement of 'inline' in function declarations.
Here's everything that was under net/
Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch fixes a typo in compat_sock_common_getsockopt.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Many struct file_operations in the kernel can be "const". Marking them const
moves these to the .rodata section, which avoids false sharing with potential
dirty data. In addition it'll catch accidental writes at compile time to
these shared resources.
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Stick NFS sockets in their own class to avoid some lockdep warnings. NFS
sockets are never exposed to user-space, and will hence not trigger certain
code paths that would otherwise pose deadlock scenarios.
[akpm@osdl.org: cleanups]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Steven Dickson <SteveD@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Acked-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
[ Fixed patch corruption by quilt, pointed out by Peter Zijlstra ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Replace all uses of kmem_cache_t with struct kmem_cache.
The patch was generated using the following script:
#!/bin/sh
#
# Replace one string by another in all the kernel sources.
#
set -e
for file in `find * -name "*.c" -o -name "*.h"|xargs grep -l $1`; do
quilt add $file
sed -e "1,\$s/$1/$2/g" $file >/tmp/$$
mv /tmp/$$ $file
quilt refresh
done
The script was run like this
sh replace kmem_cache_t "struct kmem_cache"
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Spotted by Ian McDonald, tentatively fixed by Gerrit Renker:
http://www.mail-archive.com/dccp%40vger.kernel.org/msg00599.html
Rewritten not to unroll sk_receive_skb, in the common case, i.e. no lock
debugging, its optimized away.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
We have seen a couple of __alloc_pages() failures due to
fragmentation, there is plenty of free memory but no large order pages
available. I think the problem is in sock_alloc_send_pskb(), the
gfp_mask includes __GFP_REPEAT but its never used/passed to the page
allocator. Shouldnt the gfp_mask be passed to alloc_skb() ?
Signed-off-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This annotation makes it possible to assign a subclass on lock init. This
annotation is meant to reduce the _nested() annotations by assigning a
default subclass.
One could do without this annotation and rely on lockdep_set_class()
exclusively, but that would require a manual stack of struct lock_class_key
objects.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@mail.ru>
Function sk_filter() is called from tcp_v{4,6}_rcv() functions with arg
needlock = 0, while socket is not locked at that moment. In order to avoid
this and similar issues in the future, use rcu for sk->sk_filter field read
protection.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
Signed-off-by: Kirill Korotaev <dev@openvz.org>
Change net/core, ipv4 and ipv6 sysctl variables to __read_mostly.
Couldn't actually measure any performance increase while testing (.3%
I consider noise), but seems like the right thing to do.
Signed-off-by: Brian Haley <brian.haley@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This adds security for IP sockets at the sock level. Security at the
sock level is needed to enforce the SELinux security policy for
security associations even when a sock is orphaned (such as in the TCP
LAST_ACK state).
This will also be used to enforce SELinux controls over data arriving
at or leaving a child socket while it's still waiting to be accepted.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Teach sk_lock semantics to the lock validator. In the softirq path the
slock has mutex_trylock()+mutex_unlock() semantics, in the process context
sock_lock() case it has mutex_lock()/mutex_unlock() semantics.
Thus we treat sock_owned_by_user() flagged areas as an exclusion area too,
not just those areas covered by a held sk_lock.slock.
Effect on non-lockdep kernels: minimal, sk_lock_sock_init() has been turned
into an inline function.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Teach special (multi-initialized, per-address-family) locking code to the lock
validator. Has no effect on non-lockdep kernels.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
This patch implements an API whereby an application can determine the
label of its peer's Unix datagram sockets via the auxiliary data mechanism of
recvmsg.
Patch purpose:
This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the
security context of the peer of a Unix datagram socket. The application
can then use this security context to determine the security context for
processing on behalf of the peer who sent the packet.
Patch design and implementation:
The design and implementation is very similar to the UDP case for INET
sockets. Basically we build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for
retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user
credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages
that are bundled together with a normal message). To retrieve the security
context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by
setting the SO_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application
retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism.
An example server application for Unix datagram socket should look like this:
toggle = 1;
toggle_len = sizeof(toggle);
setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len);
recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0);
if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) {
cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr);
if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) &&
cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET &&
cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) {
memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext));
}
}
sock_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option SOCK_PASSSEC to allow
a server socket to receive security context of the peer.
Testing:
We have tested the patch by setting up Unix datagram client and server
applications. We verified that the server can retrieve the security context
using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.
Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Adds an async_wait_queue and some additional fields to tcp_sock, and a
dma_cookie_t to sk_buff.
Signed-off-by: Chris Leech <christopher.leech@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Put a comment in there explaining why we double the setsockopt()
caller's SO_RCVBUF. People keep wondering.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
No code changes, just tidying up, in some cases moving EXPORT_SYMBOLs
to just after the function exported, etc.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch extends {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer in order to
move protocol specific parts to their place and avoid huge universal
net/compat.c file in the future.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch implements an application of the LSM-IPSec networking
controls whereby an application can determine the label of the
security association its TCP or UDP sockets are currently connected to
via getsockopt and the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.
Patch purpose:
This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the
security context of an IPSec security association a particular TCP or
UDP socket is using. The application can then use this security
context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of
the peer at the other end of this connection. In the case of UDP, the
security context is for each individual packet. An example
application is the inetd daemon, which could be modified to start
daemons running at security contexts dependent on the remote client.
Patch design approach:
- Design for TCP
The patch enables the SELinux LSM to set the peer security context for
a socket based on the security context of the IPSec security
association. The application may retrieve this context using
getsockopt. When called, the kernel determines if the socket is a
connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket and, if so, uses the dst_entry
cache on the socket to retrieve the security associations. If a
security association has a security context, the context string is
returned, as for UNIX domain sockets.
- Design for UDP
Unlike TCP, UDP is connectionless. This requires a somewhat different
API to retrieve the peer security context. With TCP, the peer
security context stays the same throughout the connection, thus it can
be retrieved at any time between when the connection is established
and when it is torn down. With UDP, each read/write can have
different peer and thus the security context might change every time.
As a result the security context retrieval must be done TOGETHER with
the packet retrieval.
The solution is to build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for
retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user
credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages
that are bundled together with a normal message).
Patch implementation details:
- Implementation for TCP
The security context can be retrieved by applications using getsockopt
with the existing SO_PEERSEC flag. As an example (ignoring error
checking):
getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERSEC, optbuf, &optlen);
printf("Socket peer context is: %s\n", optbuf);
The SELinux function, selinux_socket_getpeersec, is extended to check
for labeled security associations for connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED ==
sk->sk_state) TCP sockets only. If so, the socket has a dst_cache of
struct dst_entry values that may refer to security associations. If
these have security associations with security contexts, the security
context is returned.
getsockopt returns a buffer that contains a security context string or
the buffer is unmodified.
- Implementation for UDP
To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to
the kernel such desire by setting the IP_PASSSEC option via
getsockopt. Then the application retrieves the security context using
the auxiliary data mechanism.
An example server application for UDP should look like this:
toggle = 1;
toggle_len = sizeof(toggle);
setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_IP, IP_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len);
recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0);
if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) {
cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr);
if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) &&
cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_IP &&
cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) {
memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext));
}
}
ip_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option IP_PASSSEC to allow
a server socket to receive security context of the peer. A new
ancillary message type SCM_SECURITY.
When the packet is received we get the security context from the
sec_path pointer which is contained in the sk_buff, and copy it to the
ancillary message space. An additional LSM hook,
selinux_socket_getpeersec_udp, is defined to retrieve the security
context from the SELinux space. The existing function,
selinux_socket_getpeersec does not suit our purpose, because the
security context is copied directly to user space, rather than to
kernel space.
Testing:
We have tested the patch by setting up TCP and UDP connections between
applications on two machines using the IPSec policies that result in
labeled security associations being built. For TCP, we can then
extract the peer security context using getsockopt on either end. For
UDP, the receiving end can retrieve the security context using the
auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.
Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
net: Use <linux/capability.h> where capable() is used.
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
So that we can share several timewait sockets related functions and
make the timewait mini sockets infrastructure closer to the request
mini sockets one.
Next changesets will take advantage of this, moving more code out of
TCP and DCCP v4 and v6 to common infrastructure.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
From: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com>
This is the net/ part of the big kfree cleanup patch.
Remove pointless checks for NULL prior to calling kfree() in net/.
Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@conectiva.com.br>
Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
- added typedef unsigned int __nocast gfp_t;
- replaced __nocast uses for gfp flags with gfp_t - it gives exactly
the same warnings as far as sparse is concerned, doesn't change
generated code (from gcc point of view we replaced unsigned int with
typedef) and documents what's going on far better.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
I have been experimenting with loadable protocol modules, and ran into
several issues with module reference counting.
The first issue was that __module_get failed at the BUG_ON check at
the top of the routine (checking that my module reference count was
not zero) when I created the first socket. When sk_alloc() is called,
my module reference count was still 0. When I looked at why sctp
didn't have this problem, I discovered that sctp creates a control
socket during module init (when the module ref count is not 0), which
keeps the reference count non-zero. This section has been updated to
address the point Stephen raised about checking the return value of
try_module_get().
The next problem arose when my socket init routine returned an error.
This resulted in my module reference count being decremented below 0.
My socket ops->release routine was also being called. The issue here
is that sock_release() calls the ops->release routine and decrements
the ref count if sock->ops is not NULL. Since the socket probably
didn't get correctly initialized, this should not be done, so we will
set sock->ops to NULL because we will not call try_module_get().
While searching for another bug, I also noticed that sys_accept() has
a possibility of doing a module_put() when it did not do an
__module_get so I re-ordered the call to security_socket_accept().
Signed-off-by: Frank Filz <ffilzlnx@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
proto_unregister holds a lock while calling kmem_cache_destroy, which
can sleep.
Noticed by Daniele Orlandi <daniele@orlandi.com>.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
One of my x86_64 (linux 2.6.13) server log is filled with :
schedule_timeout: wrong timeout value ffffffffffffff06 from ffffffff802e63ca
schedule_timeout: wrong timeout value ffffffffffffff06 from ffffffff802e63ca
schedule_timeout: wrong timeout value ffffffffffffff06 from ffffffff802e63ca
schedule_timeout: wrong timeout value ffffffffffffff06 from ffffffff802e63ca
schedule_timeout: wrong timeout value ffffffffffffff06 from ffffffff802e63ca
This is because some application does a
struct linger li;
li.l_onoff = 1;
li.l_linger = -1;
setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, &li, sizeof(li));
And unfortunatly l_linger is defined as a 'signed int' in
include/linux/socket.h:
struct linger {
int l_onoff; /* Linger active */
int l_linger; /* How long to linger for */
};
I dont know if it's safe to change l_linger to 'unsigned int' in the
include file (It might be defined as int in ABI specs)
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The ipv4 and ipv6 protocols need to access it unconditionally.
SYSCTL=n build failure reported by Russell King.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Out of tcp_create_openreq_child, will be used in
dccp_create_openreq_child, and is a nice sock function anyway.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This paves the way to generalise the rest of the sock ID lookup
routines and saves some bytes in TCPv4 TIME_WAIT sockets on distro
kernels (where IPv6 is always built as a module):
[root@qemu ~]# grep tw_sock /proc/slabinfo
tw_sock_TCPv6 0 0 128 31 1
tw_sock_TCP 0 0 96 41 1
[root@qemu ~]#
Now if a protocol wants to use the TIME_WAIT generic infrastructure it
only has to set the sk_prot->twsk_obj_size field with the size of its
inet_timewait_sock derived sock and proto_register will create
sk_prot->twsk_slab, for now its only for INET sockets, but we can
introduce timewait_sock later if some non INET transport protocolo
wants to use this stuff.
Next changesets will take advantage of this new infrastructure to
generalise even more TCP code.
[acme@toy net-2.6.14]$ grep built-in /tmp/before.size /tmp/after.size
/tmp/before.size: 188646 11764 5068 205478 322a6 net/ipv4/built-in.o
/tmp/after.size: 188144 11764 5068 204976 320b0 net/ipv4/built-in.o
[acme@toy net-2.6.14]$
Tested with both IPv4 & IPv6 (::1 (localhost) & ::ffff:172.20.0.1
(qemu host)).
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
On Sparc, SO_DONTLINGER support resulted in sock_reset_flag being
called without lock_sock().
Signed-off-by: Kyle Moffett <mrmacman_g4@mac.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
From: Victor Fusco <victor@cetuc.puc-rio.br>
Fix the sparse warning "implicit cast to nocast type"
Signed-off-by: Victor Fusco <victor@cetuc.puc-rio.br>
Signed-off-by: Domen Puncer <domen@coderock.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Kept this first changeset minimal, without changing existing names to
ease peer review.
Basicaly tcp_openreq_alloc now receives the or_calltable, that in turn
has two new members:
->slab, that replaces tcp_openreq_cachep
->obj_size, to inform the size of the openreq descendant for
a specific protocol
The protocol specific fields in struct open_request were moved to a
class hierarchy, with the things that are common to all connection
oriented PF_INET protocols in struct inet_request_sock, the TCP ones
in tcp_request_sock, that is an inet_request_sock, that is an
open_request.
I.e. this uses the same approach used for the struct sock class
hierarchy, with sk_prot indicating if the protocol wants to use the
open_request infrastructure by filling in sk_prot->rsk_prot with an
or_calltable.
Results? Performance is improved and TCP v4 now uses only 64 bytes per
open request minisock, down from 96 without this patch :-)
Next changeset will rename some of the structs, fields and functions
mentioned above, struct or_calltable is way unclear, better name it
struct request_sock_ops, s/struct open_request/struct request_sock/g,
etc.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Ross moved. Remove the bad email address so people will find the correct
one in ./CREDITS.
Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <juhl-lkml@dif.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
David Howells
Patrick McHardy