We could return some sort of error in the case where someone asks for secinfo
on an export without the secinfo= option set--that'd be no worse than what
we've been doing. But it's not really correct. So, hack up an approximate
secinfo response in that case--it may not be complete, but it'll tell the
client at least one acceptable security flavor.
Signed-off-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Adds oid values to the gss_api mechanism structures. On the NFSV4 server
side, these are required as part of the security triple (oid,qop,service)
information being sent in the response of the SECINFO operation.
Signed-off-by: Usha Ketineni <uketinen@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We want it to be possible for users to restrict exports both by IP address and
by pseudoflavor. The pseudoflavor information has previously been passed
using special auth_domains stored in the rq_client field. After the preceding
patch that stored the pseudoflavor in rq_pflavor, that's now superfluous; so
now we use rq_client for the ip information, as auth_null and auth_unix do.
However, we keep around the special auth_domain in the rq_gssclient field for
backwards compatibility purposes, so we can still do upcalls using the old
"gss/pseudoflavor" auth_domain if upcalls using the unix domain to give us an
appropriate export. This allows us to continue supporting old mountd.
In fact, for this first patch, we always use the "gss/pseudoflavor"
auth_domain (and only it) if it is available; thus rq_client is ignored in the
auth_gss case, and this patch on its own makes no change in behavior; that
will be left to later patches.
Note on idmap: I'm almost tempted to just replace the auth_domain in the idmap
upcall by a dummy value--no version of idmapd has ever used it, and it's
unlikely anyone really wants to perform idmapping differently depending on the
where the client is (they may want to perform *credential* mapping
differently, but that's a different matter--the idmapper just handles id's
used in getattr and setattr). But I'm updating the idmapd code anyway, just
out of general backwards-compatibility paranoia.
Signed-off-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add a new field to the svc_rqst structure to record the pseudoflavor that the
request was made with. For now we record the pseudoflavor but don't use it
for anything.
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We don't need the BKL when wrapping and unwrapping; and experiments by Avishay
Traeger have found that permitting multiple encryption and decryption
operations to proceed in parallel can provide significant performance
improvements.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Cc: Avishay Traeger <atraeger@cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Add a refcount in order to ensure that the gss_auth doesn't disappear from
underneath us while we're freeing up GSS contexts.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
We should almost always be deferencing the rpc_auth struct by means of the
credential's cr_auth field instead of the rpc_clnt->cl_auth anyway. Fix up
that historical mistake, and remove the macro that propagated it.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Fix a memory leak in gss_create() whereby the rpc credcache was not being
freed if the rpc_mkpipe() call failed.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
The leak only affects the RPCSEC_GSS caches, since they are the only ones
that are dynamically allocated...
Rename the existing rpcauth_free_credcache() to rpcauth_clear_credcache()
in order to better describe its role, then add a new function
rpcauth_destroy_credcache() that actually frees the cache in addition to
clearing it out.
Also move the call to destroy the credcache in gss_destroy() to come before
the rpc upcall pipe is unlinked.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Currently, the downcall queue is tied to the struct gss_auth, which means
that different RPCSEC_GSS pseudoflavours must use different upcall pipes.
Add a list to struct rpc_inode that can be used instead.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
It used to be possible for an rpc.gssd daemon to stuff the RPC credential
cache for any rpc client simply by creating RPCSEC_GSS contexts and then
doing downcalls. In practice, no daemons ever made use of this feature.
Remove this feature now, since it will be impossible to figure out which
mechanism a given context actually matches if we enable more
than one gss mechanism to use the same upcall pipe.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cleans up an issue whereby rpcsec_gss uses the rpc_clnt->cl_auth. If we want
to be able to add several rpc_auths to a single rpc_clnt, then this abuse
must go.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
If I send a RPC_GSS_PROC_DESTROY message to NFSv4 server, it will reply with a
bad rpc reply which lacks an authentication verifier. Maybe this patch is
needed.
Send/recv packets as following:
send:
RemoteProcedureCall
xid
rpcvers = 2
prog = 100003
vers = 4
proc = 0
cred = AUTH_GSS
version = 1
gss_proc = 3 (RPCSEC_GSS_DESTROY)
service = 1 (RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE)
verf = AUTH_GSS
checksum
reply:
RemoteProcedureReply
xid
msg_type
reply_stat
accepted_reply
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
I have been investigating a module reference count leak on the server for
rpcsec_gss_krb5.ko. It turns out the problem is a reference count leak for
the security context in net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c.
The problem is that gss_write_init_verf() calls gss_svc_searchbyctx() which
does a rsc_lookup() but never releases the reference to the context. There is
another issue that rpc.svcgssd sets an "end of time" expiration for the
context
By adding a cache_put() call in gss_svc_searchbyctx(), and setting an
expiration timeout in the downcall, cache_clean() does clean up the context
and the module reference count now goes to zero after unmount.
I also verified that if the context expires and then the client makes a new
request, a new context is established.
Here is the patch to fix the kernel, I will start a separate thread to discuss
what expiration time should be set by rpc.svcgssd.
Acked-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Frank Filz <ffilzlnx@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
It's not necessarily correct to assume that the xdr_buf used to hold the
server's reply must have page data whenever it has tail data.
And there's no need for us to deal with that case separately anyway.
Acked-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There's an initialization step here I missed.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
We're kfree()'ing something that was allocated on the stack!
Also remove an unnecessary symbol export while we're at it.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
I think I botched an attempt to keep an spkm3 patch up-to-date with a recent
crypto api change.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
The tk_pid field is an unsigned short. The proper print format specifier for
that type is %5u, not %4d.
Also clean up some miscellaneous print formatting nits.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Return error and prevent from loading module when gss_mech_register()
failed.
Cc: Andy Adamson <andros@citi.umich.edu>
Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Acked-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
To avoid tying up server threads when nfsd makes an upcall (to mountd, to get
export options, to idmapd, for nfsv4 name<->id mapping, etc.), we temporarily
"drop" the request and save enough information so that we can revisit it
later.
Certain failures during the deferral process can cause us to really drop the
request and never revisit it.
This is often less than ideal, and is unacceptable in the NFSv4 case--rfc 3530
forbids the server from dropping a request without also closing the
connection.
As a first step, we modify the deferral code to return -ETIMEDOUT (which is
translated to nfserr_jukebox in the v3 and v4 cases, and remains a drop in the
v2 case).
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
The memory leak here is embarassingly obvious.
This fixes a problem that causes the kernel to leak a small amount of memory
every time it receives a integrity-protected request.
Thanks to Aim Le Rouzic for the bug report.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
We're currently not actually using seed or seed_init.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
The sealalg is checked in several places, giving the impression it could be
either SEAL_ALG_NONE or SEAL_ALG_DES. But in fact SEAL_ALG_NONE seems to
be sufficient only for making mic's, and all the contexts we get must be
capable of wrapping as well. So the sealalg must be SEAL_ALG_DES. As
with signalg, just check for the right value on the downcall and ignore it
otherwise. Similarly, tighten expectations for the sealalg on incoming
tokens, in case we do support other values eventually.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Remove some unnecessary goto labels; clean up some return values; etc.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
We're doing some pointless translation between krb5 constants and kernel
crypto string names.
Also clean up some related spkm3 code as necessary.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Previous changes reveal some obvious cruft.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
We also only ever receive one value of the signalg, so let's not pretend
otherwise
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
We designed the krb5 context import without completely understanding the
context. Now it's clear that there are a number of fields that we ignore,
or that we depend on having one single value.
In particular, we only support one value of signalg currently; so let's
check the signalg field in the downcall (in case we decide there's
something else we could support here eventually), but ignore it otherwise.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
This updates the spkm3 code to bring it up to date with our current
understanding of the spkm3 spec.
In doing so, we're changing the downcall format used by gssd in the spkm3 case,
which will cause an incompatilibity with old userland spkm3 support. Since the
old code a) didn't implement the protocol correctly, and b) was never
distributed except in the form of some experimental patches from the citi web
site, we're assuming this is OK.
We do detect the old downcall format and print warning (and fail). We also
include a version number in the new downcall format, to be used in the
future in case any further change is required.
In some more detail:
- fix integrity support
- removed dependency on NIDs. instead OIDs are used
- known OID values for algorithms added.
- fixed some context fields and types
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Since process_xdr_buf() is useful outside of the kerberos-specific code, we
move it to net/sunrpc/xdr.c, export it, and rename it in keeping with xdr_*
naming convention of xdr.c.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
This code is never called from interrupt context; it's always run by either
a user thread or rpciod. So KM_SKB_SUNRPC_DATA is inappropriate here.
Thanks to Aimé Le Rouzic for capturing an oops which showed the kernel
taking an interrupt while we were in this piece of code, resulting in a
nested kmap_atomic(.,KM_SKB_SUNRPC_DATA) call from
xdr_partial_copy_from_skb().
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Dumping all this data to the logs is wasteful (even when debugging is turned
off), and creates too much output to be useful when it's turned on.
Fix a minor style bug or two while we're at it.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
If the request is denied after gss_accept was called, we shouldn't try to wrap
the reply. We were checking the accept_stat but not the reply_stat.
To check the reply_stat in _release, we need a pointer to before (rather than
after) the verifier, so modify body_start appropriately.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
