From 7898e1f8e9eb1bee88c92d636e0ab93f2cbe31c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Mon, 17 Jan 2011 08:05:27 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 01/33] Subject: [PATCH] Smack: mmap controls for library
 containment

  In the embedded world there are often situations
  where libraries are updated from a variety of sources,
  for a variety of reasons, and with any number of
  security characteristics. These differences
  might include privilege required for a given library
  provided interface to function properly, as occurs
  from time to time in graphics libraries. There are
  also cases where it is important to limit use of
  libraries based on the provider of the library and
  the security aware application may make choices
  based on that criteria.

  These issues are addressed by providing an additional
  Smack label that may optionally be assigned to an object,
  the SMACK64MMAP attribute. An mmap operation is allowed
  if there is no such attribute.

  If there is a SMACK64MMAP attribute the mmap is permitted
  only if a subject with that label has all of the access
  permitted a subject with the current task label.

  Security aware applications may from time to time
  wish to reduce their "privilege" to avoid accidental use
  of privilege. One case where this arises is the
  environment in which multiple sources provide libraries
  to perform the same functions. An application may know
  that it should eschew services made available from a
  particular vendor, or of a particular version.

  In support of this a secondary list of Smack rules has
  been added that is local to the task. This list is
  consulted only in the case where the global list has
  approved access. It can only further restrict access.
  Unlike the global last, if no entry is found on the
  local list access is granted. An application can add
  entries to its own list by writing to /smack/load-self.

  The changes appear large as they involve refactoring
  the list handling to accomodate there being more
  than one rule list.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 include/linux/xattr.h         |   2 +
 security/smack/smack.h        |   9 +-
 security/smack/smack_access.c |  52 +++--
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c    | 269 ++++++++++++++++++++----
 security/smack/smackfs.c      | 370 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 5 files changed, 524 insertions(+), 178 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/xattr.h b/include/linux/xattr.h
index e6131ef98d8..6050783005b 100644
--- a/include/linux/xattr.h
+++ b/include/linux/xattr.h
@@ -42,11 +42,13 @@
 #define XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT "SMACK64IPOUT"
 #define XATTR_SMACK_EXEC "SMACK64EXEC"
 #define XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE "SMACK64TRANSMUTE"
+#define XATTR_SMACK_MMAP "SMACK64MMAP"
 #define XATTR_NAME_SMACK XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX
 #define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN	XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPIN
 #define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT	XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT
 #define XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC	XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_EXEC
 #define XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE
+#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_MMAP
 
 #define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability"
 #define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 129c4eb8ffb..e365d455ceb 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -52,13 +52,16 @@ struct socket_smack {
 struct inode_smack {
 	char		*smk_inode;	/* label of the fso */
 	char		*smk_task;	/* label of the task */
+	char		*smk_mmap;	/* label of the mmap domain */
 	struct mutex	smk_lock;	/* initialization lock */
 	int		smk_flags;	/* smack inode flags */
 };
 
 struct task_smack {
-	char		*smk_task;	/* label used for access control */
-	char		*smk_forked;	/* label when forked */
+	char			*smk_task;	/* label for access control */
+	char			*smk_forked;	/* label when forked */
+	struct list_head	smk_rules;	/* per task access rules */
+	struct mutex		smk_rules_lock;	/* lock for the rules */
 };
 
 #define	SMK_INODE_INSTANT	0x01	/* inode is instantiated */
@@ -202,7 +205,7 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *);
 /*
  * These functions are in smack_access.c
  */
-int smk_access_entry(char *, char *);
+int smk_access_entry(char *, char *, struct list_head *);
 int smk_access(char *, char *, int, struct smk_audit_info *);
 int smk_curacc(char *, u32, struct smk_audit_info *);
 int smack_to_cipso(const char *, struct smack_cipso *);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 7ba8478f599..86453db4333 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -70,10 +70,11 @@ int log_policy = SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED;
  * smk_access_entry - look up matching access rule
  * @subject_label: a pointer to the subject's Smack label
  * @object_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
+ * @rule_list: the list of rules to search
  *
  * This function looks up the subject/object pair in the
- * access rule list and returns pointer to the matching rule if found,
- * NULL otherwise.
+ * access rule list and returns the access mode. If no
+ * entry is found returns -ENOENT.
  *
  * NOTE:
  * Even though Smack labels are usually shared on smack_list
@@ -85,13 +86,13 @@ int log_policy = SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED;
  * will be on the list, so checking the pointers may be a worthwhile
  * optimization.
  */
-int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label)
+int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label,
+			struct list_head *rule_list)
 {
-	u32 may = MAY_NOT;
+	int may = -ENOENT;
 	struct smack_rule *srp;
 
-	rcu_read_lock();
-	list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &smack_rule_list, list) {
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, rule_list, list) {
 		if (srp->smk_subject == subject_label ||
 		    strcmp(srp->smk_subject, subject_label) == 0) {
 			if (srp->smk_object == object_label ||
@@ -101,7 +102,6 @@ int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label)
 			}
 		}
 	}
-	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	return may;
 }
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label)
 int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
 	       struct smk_audit_info *a)
 {
-	u32 may = MAY_NOT;
+	int may = MAY_NOT;
 	int rc = 0;
 
 	/*
@@ -181,13 +181,14 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
 	 * Beyond here an explicit relationship is required.
 	 * If the requested access is contained in the available
 	 * access (e.g. read is included in readwrite) it's
-	 * good.
+	 * good. A negative response from smk_access_entry()
+	 * indicates there is no entry for this pair.
 	 */
-	may = smk_access_entry(subject_label, object_label);
-	/*
-	 * This is a bit map operation.
-	 */
-	if ((request & may) == request)
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	may = smk_access_entry(subject_label, object_label, &smack_rule_list);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	if (may > 0 && (request & may) == request)
 		goto out_audit;
 
 	rc = -EACCES;
@@ -212,12 +213,27 @@ out_audit:
  */
 int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
 {
+	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+	char *sp = smk_of_task(tsp);
+	int may;
 	int rc;
-	char *sp = smk_of_current();
 
+	/*
+	 * Check the global rule list
+	 */
 	rc = smk_access(sp, obj_label, mode, NULL);
-	if (rc == 0)
-		goto out_audit;
+	if (rc == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * If there is an entry in the task's rule list
+		 * it can further restrict access.
+		 */
+		may = smk_access_entry(sp, obj_label, &tsp->smk_rules);
+		if (may < 0)
+			goto out_audit;
+		if ((mode & may) == mode)
+			goto out_audit;
+		rc = -EACCES;
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Return if a specific label has been designated as the
@@ -228,7 +244,7 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
 		goto out_audit;
 
 	if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
-		return 0;
+		rc = 0;
 
 out_audit:
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 533bf3255d7..123a499ded3 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -84,6 +84,56 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
 	return isp;
 }
 
+/**
+ * new_task_smack - allocate a task security blob
+ * @smack: a pointer to the Smack label to use in the blob
+ *
+ * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
+ */
+static struct task_smack *new_task_smack(char *task, char *forked, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp;
+
+	tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp);
+	if (tsp == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	tsp->smk_task = task;
+	tsp->smk_forked = forked;
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_rules);
+	mutex_init(&tsp->smk_rules_lock);
+
+	return tsp;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_copy_rules - copy a rule set
+ * @nhead - new rules header pointer
+ * @ohead - old rules header pointer
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
+ */
+static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
+				gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct smack_rule *nrp;
+	struct smack_rule *orp;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(nhead);
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(orp, ohead, list) {
+		nrp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_rule), gfp);
+		if (nrp == NULL) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			break;
+		}
+		*nrp = *orp;
+		list_add_rcu(&nrp->list, nhead);
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
 /*
  * LSM hooks.
  * We he, that is fun!
@@ -102,23 +152,17 @@ static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
 {
 	int rc;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
-	char *sp, *tsp;
+	char *tsp;
 
 	rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
 
-	sp = smk_of_current();
 	tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ctp));
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ctp);
 
-	/* we won't log here, because rc can be overriden */
-	rc = smk_access(sp, tsp, MAY_READWRITE, NULL);
-	if (rc != 0 && capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
-		rc = 0;
-
-	smack_log(sp, tsp, MAY_READWRITE, rc, &ad);
+	rc = smk_curacc(tsp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -134,23 +178,17 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
 {
 	int rc;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
-	char *sp, *tsp;
+	char *tsp;
 
 	rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(ptp);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
 
+	tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ptp));
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ptp);
 
-	sp = smk_of_current();
-	tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ptp));
-	/* we won't log here, because rc can be overriden */
-	rc = smk_access(tsp, sp, MAY_READWRITE, NULL);
-	if (rc != 0 && has_capability(ptp, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
-		rc = 0;
-
-	smack_log(tsp, sp, MAY_READWRITE, rc, &ad);
+	rc = smk_curacc(tsp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -474,7 +512,7 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 {
 	char *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
 	char *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
-	u32 may;
+	int may;
 
 	if (name) {
 		*name = kstrdup(XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -483,14 +521,17 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 	}
 
 	if (value) {
-		may = smk_access_entry(smk_of_current(), dsp);
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		may = smk_access_entry(smk_of_current(), dsp, &smack_rule_list);
+		rcu_read_unlock();
 
 		/*
 		 * If the access rule allows transmutation and
 		 * the directory requests transmutation then
 		 * by all means transmute.
 		 */
-		if (((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) && smk_inode_transmutable(dir))
+		if (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) &&
+		    smk_inode_transmutable(dir))
 			isp = dsp;
 
 		*value = kstrdup(isp, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -716,7 +757,8 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
-	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
 		if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 			rc = -EPERM;
 		/*
@@ -773,6 +815,12 @@ static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 			isp->smk_task = nsp;
 		else
 			isp->smk_task = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
+	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
+		nsp = smk_import(value, size);
+		if (nsp != NULL)
+			isp->smk_mmap = nsp;
+		else
+			isp->smk_mmap = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
 	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
 		isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
 
@@ -815,7 +863,8 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
-	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP)) {
 		if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 			rc = -EPERM;
 	} else
@@ -829,6 +878,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 	if (rc == 0) {
 		isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
 		isp->smk_task = NULL;
+		isp->smk_mmap = NULL;
 	}
 
 	return rc;
@@ -1059,6 +1109,113 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 	return rc;
 }
 
+/**
+ * smk_mmap_list_check - the mmap check
+ * @sub: subject label
+ * @obj: object label
+ * @access: access mode
+ * @local: the task specific rule list
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if acces is permitted, -EACCES otherwise
+ */
+static int smk_mmap_list_check(char *sub, char *obj, int access,
+				struct list_head *local)
+{
+	int may;
+
+	/*
+	 * If there is not a global rule that
+	 * allows access say no.
+	 */
+	may = smk_access_entry(sub, obj, &smack_rule_list);
+	if (may == -ENOENT || (may & access) != access)
+		return -EACCES;
+	/*
+	 * If there is a task local rule that
+	 * denies access say no.
+	 */
+	may = smk_access_entry(sub, obj, local);
+	if (may != -ENOENT && (may & access) != access)
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_mmap :
+ * Check permissions for a mmap operation.  The @file may be NULL, e.g.
+ * if mapping anonymous memory.
+ * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
+ * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
+ * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
+ * @flags contains the operational flags.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+static int smack_file_mmap(struct file *file,
+			   unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
+			   unsigned long flags, unsigned long addr,
+			   unsigned long addr_only)
+{
+	struct smack_rule *srp;
+	struct task_smack *tsp;
+	char *sp;
+	char *msmack;
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+	struct dentry *dp;
+	int rc;
+
+	/* do DAC check on address space usage */
+	rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
+	if (rc || addr_only)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (file == NULL || file->f_dentry == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	dp = file->f_dentry;
+
+	if (dp->d_inode == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	isp = dp->d_inode->i_security;
+	if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	msmack = isp->smk_mmap;
+
+	tsp = current_security();
+	sp = smk_of_current();
+	rc = 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	/*
+	 * For each Smack rule associated with the subject
+	 * label verify that the SMACK64MMAP also has access
+	 * to that rule's object label.
+	 *
+	 * Because neither of the labels comes
+	 * from the networking code it is sufficient
+	 * to compare pointers.
+	 */
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &smack_rule_list, list) {
+		if (srp->smk_subject != sp)
+			continue;
+		/*
+		 * Matching labels always allows access.
+		 */
+		if (msmack == srp->smk_object)
+			continue;
+
+		rc = smk_mmap_list_check(msmack, srp->smk_object,
+					 srp->smk_access, &tsp->smk_rules);
+		if (rc != 0)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
 /**
  * smack_file_set_fowner - set the file security blob value
  * @file: object in question
@@ -1095,6 +1252,7 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	 * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file
 	 */
 	file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
+
 	/* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
 	rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
 	if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
@@ -1145,9 +1303,14 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
  */
 static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
 {
-	cred->security = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp);
-	if (cred->security == NULL)
+	struct task_smack *tsp;
+
+	tsp = new_task_smack(NULL, NULL, gfp);
+	if (tsp == NULL)
 		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	cred->security = tsp;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1156,13 +1319,24 @@ static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
  * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
  * @cred: the credentials in question
  *
- * Smack isn't using copies of blobs. Everyone
- * points to an immutable list. The blobs never go away.
- * There is no leak here.
  */
 static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 {
-	kfree(cred->security);
+	struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
+	struct smack_rule *rp;
+	struct list_head *l;
+	struct list_head *n;
+
+	if (tsp == NULL)
+		return;
+	cred->security = NULL;
+
+	list_for_each_safe(l, n, &tsp->smk_rules) {
+		rp = list_entry(l, struct smack_rule, list);
+		list_del(&rp->list);
+		kfree(rp);
+	}
+	kfree(tsp);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1178,13 +1352,16 @@ static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 {
 	struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
 	struct task_smack *new_tsp;
+	int rc;
 
-	new_tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp);
+	new_tsp = new_task_smack(old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task, gfp);
 	if (new_tsp == NULL)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
-	new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
+	rc = smk_copy_rules(&new_tsp->smk_rules, &old_tsp->smk_rules, gfp);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
 	new->security = new_tsp;
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -1203,6 +1380,11 @@ static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 
 	new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
 	new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
+	mutex_init(&new_tsp->smk_rules_lock);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_tsp->smk_rules);
+
+
+	/* cbs copy rule list */
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2419,6 +2601,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
 			}
 		}
 		isp->smk_task = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
+		isp->smk_mmap = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
 
 		dput(dp);
 		break;
@@ -2478,6 +2661,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
 static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
 			     void *value, size_t size)
 {
+	int rc;
 	struct task_smack *tsp;
 	struct task_smack *oldtsp;
 	struct cred *new;
@@ -2513,13 +2697,16 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
 	new = prepare_creds();
 	if (new == NULL)
 		return -ENOMEM;
-	tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
+
+	tsp = new_task_smack(newsmack, oldtsp->smk_forked, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (tsp == NULL) {
 		kfree(new);
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
-	tsp->smk_task = newsmack;
-	tsp->smk_forked = oldtsp->smk_forked;
+	rc = smk_copy_rules(&tsp->smk_rules, &oldtsp->smk_rules, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
 	new->security = tsp;
 	commit_creds(new);
 	return size;
@@ -3221,6 +3408,7 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 	.file_ioctl = 			smack_file_ioctl,
 	.file_lock = 			smack_file_lock,
 	.file_fcntl = 			smack_file_fcntl,
+	.file_mmap =			smack_file_mmap,
 	.file_set_fowner = 		smack_file_set_fowner,
 	.file_send_sigiotask = 		smack_file_send_sigiotask,
 	.file_receive = 		smack_file_receive,
@@ -3334,23 +3522,20 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
 	struct cred *cred;
 	struct task_smack *tsp;
 
-	tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops))
+		return 0;
+
+	tsp = new_task_smack(smack_known_floor.smk_known,
+				smack_known_floor.smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (tsp == NULL)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops)) {
-		kfree(tsp);
-		return 0;
-	}
-
 	printk(KERN_INFO "Smack:  Initializing.\n");
 
 	/*
 	 * Set the security state for the initial task.
 	 */
 	cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
-	tsp->smk_forked = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
-	tsp->smk_task = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
 	cred->security = tsp;
 
 	/* initialize the smack_know_list */
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 362d5eda948..90d1bbaaa6f 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ enum smk_inos {
 	SMK_NETLBLADDR	= 8,	/* single label hosts */
 	SMK_ONLYCAP	= 9,	/* the only "capable" label */
 	SMK_LOGGING	= 10,	/* logging */
+	SMK_LOAD_SELF	= 11,	/* task specific rules */
 };
 
 /*
@@ -135,104 +136,30 @@ static void smk_netlabel_audit_set(struct netlbl_audit *nap)
 #define SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN	9
 #define SMK_NETLBLADDRMAX	42
 
-/*
- * Seq_file read operations for /smack/load
- */
-
-static void *load_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
-{
-	if (*pos == SEQ_READ_FINISHED)
-		return NULL;
-	if (list_empty(&smack_rule_list))
-		return NULL;
-	return smack_rule_list.next;
-}
-
-static void *load_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
-{
-	struct list_head *list = v;
-
-	if (list_is_last(list, &smack_rule_list)) {
-		*pos = SEQ_READ_FINISHED;
-		return NULL;
-	}
-	return list->next;
-}
-
-static int load_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
-{
-	struct list_head *list = v;
-	struct smack_rule *srp =
-		 list_entry(list, struct smack_rule, list);
-
-	seq_printf(s, "%s %s", (char *)srp->smk_subject,
-		   (char *)srp->smk_object);
-
-	seq_putc(s, ' ');
-
-	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_READ)
-		seq_putc(s, 'r');
-	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_WRITE)
-		seq_putc(s, 'w');
-	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_EXEC)
-		seq_putc(s, 'x');
-	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_APPEND)
-		seq_putc(s, 'a');
-	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
-		seq_putc(s, 't');
-	if (srp->smk_access == 0)
-		seq_putc(s, '-');
-
-	seq_putc(s, '\n');
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void load_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
-{
-	/* No-op */
-}
-
-static const struct seq_operations load_seq_ops = {
-	.start = load_seq_start,
-	.next  = load_seq_next,
-	.show  = load_seq_show,
-	.stop  = load_seq_stop,
-};
-
-/**
- * smk_open_load - open() for /smack/load
- * @inode: inode structure representing file
- * @file: "load" file pointer
- *
- * For reading, use load_seq_* seq_file reading operations.
- */
-static int smk_open_load(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
-{
-	return seq_open(file, &load_seq_ops);
-}
-
 /**
  * smk_set_access - add a rule to the rule list
  * @srp: the new rule to add
+ * @rule_list: the list of rules
+ * @rule_lock: the rule list lock
  *
  * Looks through the current subject/object/access list for
  * the subject/object pair and replaces the access that was
  * there. If the pair isn't found add it with the specified
  * access.
  *
+ * Returns 1 if a rule was found to exist already, 0 if it is new
  * Returns 0 if nothing goes wrong or -ENOMEM if it fails
  * during the allocation of the new pair to add.
  */
-static int smk_set_access(struct smack_rule *srp)
+static int smk_set_access(struct smack_rule *srp, struct list_head *rule_list,
+				struct mutex *rule_lock)
 {
 	struct smack_rule *sp;
-	int ret = 0;
-	int found;
-	mutex_lock(&smack_list_lock);
+	int found = 0;
 
-	found = 0;
-	list_for_each_entry_rcu(sp, &smack_rule_list, list) {
+	mutex_lock(rule_lock);
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(sp, rule_list, list) {
 		if (sp->smk_subject == srp->smk_subject &&
 		    sp->smk_object == srp->smk_object) {
 			found = 1;
@@ -241,19 +168,21 @@ static int smk_set_access(struct smack_rule *srp)
 		}
 	}
 	if (found == 0)
-		list_add_rcu(&srp->list, &smack_rule_list);
+		list_add_rcu(&srp->list, rule_list);
 
-	mutex_unlock(&smack_list_lock);
+	mutex_unlock(rule_lock);
 
-	return ret;
+	return found;
 }
 
 /**
- * smk_write_load - write() for /smack/load
+ * smk_write_load_list - write() for any /smack/load
  * @file: file pointer, not actually used
  * @buf: where to get the data from
  * @count: bytes sent
  * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ * @rule_list: the list of rules to write to
+ * @rule_lock: lock for the rule list
  *
  * Get one smack access rule from above.
  * The format is exactly:
@@ -263,21 +192,19 @@ static int smk_set_access(struct smack_rule *srp)
  *
  * writes must be SMK_LABELLEN+SMK_LABELLEN+SMK_ACCESSLEN bytes.
  */
-static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
-			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+static ssize_t smk_write_load_list(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos,
+				struct list_head *rule_list,
+				struct mutex *rule_lock)
 {
 	struct smack_rule *rule;
 	char *data;
 	int rc = -EINVAL;
 
 	/*
-	 * Must have privilege.
 	 * No partial writes.
 	 * Enough data must be present.
 	 */
-	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
-		return -EPERM;
-
 	if (*ppos != 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	/*
@@ -372,11 +299,13 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		goto out_free_rule;
 	}
 
-	rc = smk_set_access(rule);
-
-	if (!rc)
-		rc = count;
-	goto out;
+	rc = count;
+	/*
+	 * smk_set_access returns true if there was already a rule
+	 * for the subject/object pair, and false if it was new.
+	 */
+	if (!smk_set_access(rule, rule_list, rule_lock))
+		goto out;
 
 out_free_rule:
 	kfree(rule);
@@ -385,6 +314,108 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
+
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/load
+ */
+
+static void *load_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	if (*pos == SEQ_READ_FINISHED)
+		return NULL;
+	if (list_empty(&smack_rule_list))
+		return NULL;
+	return smack_rule_list.next;
+}
+
+static void *load_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	struct list_head *list = v;
+
+	if (list_is_last(list, &smack_rule_list)) {
+		*pos = SEQ_READ_FINISHED;
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return list->next;
+}
+
+static int load_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+	struct list_head *list = v;
+	struct smack_rule *srp =
+		 list_entry(list, struct smack_rule, list);
+
+	seq_printf(s, "%s %s", (char *)srp->smk_subject,
+		   (char *)srp->smk_object);
+
+	seq_putc(s, ' ');
+
+	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_READ)
+		seq_putc(s, 'r');
+	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_WRITE)
+		seq_putc(s, 'w');
+	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_EXEC)
+		seq_putc(s, 'x');
+	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_APPEND)
+		seq_putc(s, 'a');
+	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
+		seq_putc(s, 't');
+	if (srp->smk_access == 0)
+		seq_putc(s, '-');
+
+	seq_putc(s, '\n');
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void load_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+	/* No-op */
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations load_seq_ops = {
+	.start = load_seq_start,
+	.next  = load_seq_next,
+	.show  = load_seq_show,
+	.stop  = load_seq_stop,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_load - open() for /smack/load
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "load" file pointer
+ *
+ * For reading, use load_seq_* seq_file reading operations.
+ */
+static int smk_open_load(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return seq_open(file, &load_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_load - write() for /smack/load
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ *
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+
+	/*
+	 * Must have privilege.
+	 * No partial writes.
+	 * Enough data must be present.
+	 */
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	return smk_write_load_list(file, buf, count, ppos, &smack_rule_list,
+					&smack_list_lock);
+}
+
 static const struct file_operations smk_load_ops = {
 	.open           = smk_open_load,
 	.read		= seq_read,
@@ -1288,6 +1319,112 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_logging_ops = {
 	.write		= smk_write_logging,
 	.llseek		= default_llseek,
 };
+
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/load-self
+ */
+
+static void *load_self_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+
+	if (*pos == SEQ_READ_FINISHED)
+		return NULL;
+	if (list_empty(&tsp->smk_rules))
+		return NULL;
+	return tsp->smk_rules.next;
+}
+
+static void *load_self_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+	struct list_head *list = v;
+
+	if (list_is_last(list, &tsp->smk_rules)) {
+		*pos = SEQ_READ_FINISHED;
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return list->next;
+}
+
+static int load_self_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+	struct list_head *list = v;
+	struct smack_rule *srp =
+		 list_entry(list, struct smack_rule, list);
+
+	seq_printf(s, "%s %s", (char *)srp->smk_subject,
+		   (char *)srp->smk_object);
+
+	seq_putc(s, ' ');
+
+	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_READ)
+		seq_putc(s, 'r');
+	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_WRITE)
+		seq_putc(s, 'w');
+	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_EXEC)
+		seq_putc(s, 'x');
+	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_APPEND)
+		seq_putc(s, 'a');
+	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
+		seq_putc(s, 't');
+	if (srp->smk_access == 0)
+		seq_putc(s, '-');
+
+	seq_putc(s, '\n');
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void load_self_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+	/* No-op */
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations load_self_seq_ops = {
+	.start = load_self_seq_start,
+	.next  = load_self_seq_next,
+	.show  = load_self_seq_show,
+	.stop  = load_self_seq_stop,
+};
+
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_load_self - open() for /smack/load-self
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "load" file pointer
+ *
+ * For reading, use load_seq_* seq_file reading operations.
+ */
+static int smk_open_load_self(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return seq_open(file, &load_self_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_load_self - write() for /smack/load-self
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ *
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_load_self(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+
+	return smk_write_load_list(file, buf, count, ppos, &tsp->smk_rules,
+					&tsp->smk_rules_lock);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_load_self_ops = {
+	.open           = smk_open_load_self,
+	.read		= seq_read,
+	.llseek         = seq_lseek,
+	.write		= smk_write_load_self,
+	.release        = seq_release,
+};
 /**
  * smk_fill_super - fill the /smackfs superblock
  * @sb: the empty superblock
@@ -1304,23 +1441,26 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 	struct inode *root_inode;
 
 	static struct tree_descr smack_files[] = {
-		[SMK_LOAD]	=
-			{"load", &smk_load_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
-		[SMK_CIPSO]	=
-			{"cipso", &smk_cipso_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
-		[SMK_DOI]	=
-			{"doi", &smk_doi_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
-		[SMK_DIRECT]	=
-			{"direct", &smk_direct_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
-		[SMK_AMBIENT]	=
-			{"ambient", &smk_ambient_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
-		[SMK_NETLBLADDR] =
-			{"netlabel", &smk_netlbladdr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
-		[SMK_ONLYCAP]	=
-			{"onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
-		[SMK_LOGGING]	=
-			{"logging", &smk_logging_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
-		/* last one */ {""}
+		[SMK_LOAD] = {
+			"load", &smk_load_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_CIPSO] = {
+			"cipso", &smk_cipso_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_DOI] = {
+			"doi", &smk_doi_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_DIRECT] = {
+			"direct", &smk_direct_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_AMBIENT] = {
+			"ambient", &smk_ambient_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_NETLBLADDR] = {
+			"netlabel", &smk_netlbladdr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_ONLYCAP] = {
+			"onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_LOGGING] = {
+			"logging", &smk_logging_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_LOAD_SELF] = {
+			"load-self", &smk_load_self_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+		/* last one */
+			{""}
 	};
 
 	rc = simple_fill_super(sb, SMACK_MAGIC, smack_files);

From ced3b93018a9633447ddeb12a96f25e08154cbe7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Shan Wei <shanwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Date: Wed, 19 Jan 2011 17:21:44 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 02/33] security:selinux: kill unused MAX_AVTAB_HASH_MASK and
 ebitmap_startbit

Kill unused MAX_AVTAB_HASH_MASK and ebitmap_startbit.

Signed-off-by: Shan Wei <shanwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.h   | 1 -
 security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h | 1 -
 2 files changed, 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
index dff0c75345c..3417f9cc1cb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -86,7 +86,6 @@ void avtab_cache_destroy(void);
 
 #define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS 11
 #define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS)
-#define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_MASK (MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS-1)
 
 #endif	/* _SS_AVTAB_H_ */
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
index 1f4e93c2ae8..922f8afa89d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ struct ebitmap {
 };
 
 #define ebitmap_length(e) ((e)->highbit)
-#define ebitmap_startbit(e) ((e)->node ? (e)->node->startbit : 0)
 
 static inline unsigned int ebitmap_start_positive(struct ebitmap *e,
 						  struct ebitmap_node **n)

From 821404434f3324bf23f545050ff64055a149766e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 2010 14:48:35 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 03/33] CacheFiles: Add calls to path-based security hooks

Add calls to path-based security hooks into CacheFiles as, unlike inode-based
security, these aren't implicit in the vfs_mkdir() and similar calls.

Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 fs/cachefiles/namei.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 security/security.c   |  3 +++
 2 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/cachefiles/namei.c b/fs/cachefiles/namei.c
index 42c7fafc8bf..a0358c2189c 100644
--- a/fs/cachefiles/namei.c
+++ b/fs/cachefiles/namei.c
@@ -275,6 +275,7 @@ static int cachefiles_bury_object(struct cachefiles_cache *cache,
 				  bool preemptive)
 {
 	struct dentry *grave, *trap;
+	struct path path, path_to_graveyard;
 	char nbuffer[8 + 8 + 1];
 	int ret;
 
@@ -287,10 +288,18 @@ static int cachefiles_bury_object(struct cachefiles_cache *cache,
 	/* non-directories can just be unlinked */
 	if (!S_ISDIR(rep->d_inode->i_mode)) {
 		_debug("unlink stale object");
-		ret = vfs_unlink(dir->d_inode, rep);
 
-		if (preemptive)
-			cachefiles_mark_object_buried(cache, rep);
+		path.mnt = cache->mnt;
+		path.dentry = dir;
+		ret = security_path_unlink(&path, rep);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			cachefiles_io_error(cache, "Unlink security error");
+		} else {
+			ret = vfs_unlink(dir->d_inode, rep);
+
+			if (preemptive)
+				cachefiles_mark_object_buried(cache, rep);
+		}
 
 		mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
 
@@ -379,12 +388,23 @@ try_again:
 	}
 
 	/* attempt the rename */
-	ret = vfs_rename(dir->d_inode, rep, cache->graveyard->d_inode, grave);
-	if (ret != 0 && ret != -ENOMEM)
-		cachefiles_io_error(cache, "Rename failed with error %d", ret);
+	path.mnt = cache->mnt;
+	path.dentry = dir;
+	path_to_graveyard.mnt = cache->mnt;
+	path_to_graveyard.dentry = cache->graveyard;
+	ret = security_path_rename(&path, rep, &path_to_graveyard, grave);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		cachefiles_io_error(cache, "Rename security error %d", ret);
+	} else {
+		ret = vfs_rename(dir->d_inode, rep,
+				 cache->graveyard->d_inode, grave);
+		if (ret != 0 && ret != -ENOMEM)
+			cachefiles_io_error(cache,
+					    "Rename failed with error %d", ret);
 
-	if (preemptive)
-		cachefiles_mark_object_buried(cache, rep);
+		if (preemptive)
+			cachefiles_mark_object_buried(cache, rep);
+	}
 
 	unlock_rename(cache->graveyard, dir);
 	dput(grave);
@@ -448,6 +468,7 @@ int cachefiles_walk_to_object(struct cachefiles_object *parent,
 {
 	struct cachefiles_cache *cache;
 	struct dentry *dir, *next = NULL;
+	struct path path;
 	unsigned long start;
 	const char *name;
 	int ret, nlen;
@@ -458,6 +479,7 @@ int cachefiles_walk_to_object(struct cachefiles_object *parent,
 
 	cache = container_of(parent->fscache.cache,
 			     struct cachefiles_cache, cache);
+	path.mnt = cache->mnt;
 
 	ASSERT(parent->dentry);
 	ASSERT(parent->dentry->d_inode);
@@ -511,6 +533,10 @@ lookup_again:
 			if (ret < 0)
 				goto create_error;
 
+			path.dentry = dir;
+			ret = security_path_mkdir(&path, next, 0);
+			if (ret < 0)
+				goto create_error;
 			start = jiffies;
 			ret = vfs_mkdir(dir->d_inode, next, 0);
 			cachefiles_hist(cachefiles_mkdir_histogram, start);
@@ -536,6 +562,10 @@ lookup_again:
 			if (ret < 0)
 				goto create_error;
 
+			path.dentry = dir;
+			ret = security_path_mknod(&path, next, S_IFREG, 0);
+			if (ret < 0)
+				goto create_error;
 			start = jiffies;
 			ret = vfs_create(dir->d_inode, next, S_IFREG, NULL);
 			cachefiles_hist(cachefiles_create_histogram, start);
@@ -692,6 +722,7 @@ struct dentry *cachefiles_get_directory(struct cachefiles_cache *cache,
 {
 	struct dentry *subdir;
 	unsigned long start;
+	struct path path;
 	int ret;
 
 	_enter(",,%s", dirname);
@@ -719,6 +750,11 @@ struct dentry *cachefiles_get_directory(struct cachefiles_cache *cache,
 
 		_debug("attempt mkdir");
 
+		path.mnt = cache->mnt;
+		path.dentry = dir;
+		ret = security_path_mkdir(&path, subdir, 0700);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto mkdir_error;
 		ret = vfs_mkdir(dir->d_inode, subdir, 0700);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			goto mkdir_error;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 739e40362f4..b84a89dd59c 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -360,6 +360,7 @@ int security_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
 		return 0;
 	return security_ops->path_mkdir(dir, dentry, mode);
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mkdir);
 
 int security_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
@@ -374,6 +375,7 @@ int security_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 		return 0;
 	return security_ops->path_unlink(dir, dentry);
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_unlink);
 
 int security_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 			  const char *old_name)
@@ -400,6 +402,7 @@ int security_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
 	return security_ops->path_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir,
 					 new_dentry);
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_rename);
 
 int security_path_truncate(struct path *path)
 {

From 2a7dba391e5628ad665ce84ef9a6648da541ebab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2011 11:05:39 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 04/33] fs/vfs/security: pass last path component to LSM on
 inode creation

SELinux would like to implement a new labeling behavior of newly created
inodes.  We currently label new inodes based on the parent and the creating
process.  This new behavior would also take into account the name of the
new object when deciding the new label.  This is not the (supposed) full path,
just the last component of the path.

This is very useful because creating /etc/shadow is different than creating
/etc/passwd but the kernel hooks are unable to differentiate these
operations.  We currently require that userspace realize it is doing some
difficult operation like that and than userspace jumps through SELinux hoops
to get things set up correctly.  This patch does not implement new
behavior, that is obviously contained in a seperate SELinux patch, but it
does pass the needed name down to the correct LSM hook.  If no such name
exists it is fine to pass NULL.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 fs/btrfs/inode.c               | 13 +++++++------
 fs/btrfs/xattr.c               |  6 ++++--
 fs/btrfs/xattr.h               |  3 ++-
 fs/ext2/ext2.h                 |  2 +-
 fs/ext2/ialloc.c               |  5 +++--
 fs/ext2/namei.c                |  8 ++++----
 fs/ext2/xattr.h                |  6 ++++--
 fs/ext2/xattr_security.c       |  5 +++--
 fs/ext3/ialloc.c               |  5 +++--
 fs/ext3/namei.c                |  8 ++++----
 fs/ext3/xattr.h                |  4 ++--
 fs/ext3/xattr_security.c       |  5 +++--
 fs/ext4/ialloc.c               |  2 +-
 fs/ext4/xattr.h                |  4 ++--
 fs/ext4/xattr_security.c       |  5 +++--
 fs/gfs2/inode.c                |  7 ++++---
 fs/jffs2/dir.c                 |  9 ++++-----
 fs/jffs2/nodelist.h            |  2 +-
 fs/jffs2/security.c            |  5 +++--
 fs/jffs2/write.c               | 18 ++++++++++--------
 fs/jffs2/xattr.h               |  5 +++--
 fs/jfs/jfs_xattr.h             |  5 +++--
 fs/jfs/namei.c                 |  8 ++++----
 fs/jfs/xattr.c                 |  6 ++++--
 fs/ocfs2/namei.c               |  4 ++--
 fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c        |  3 ++-
 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c               | 10 ++++++----
 fs/ocfs2/xattr.h               |  4 +++-
 fs/reiserfs/namei.c            |  9 +++++----
 fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c   |  3 ++-
 fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_iops.c    |  9 +++++----
 include/linux/ext3_fs.h        |  3 ++-
 include/linux/reiserfs_xattr.h |  2 ++
 include/linux/security.h       |  9 +++++++--
 mm/shmem.c                     |  9 +++++----
 security/capability.c          |  3 ++-
 security/security.c            |  6 ++++--
 security/selinux/hooks.c       |  5 +++--
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c     |  5 ++++-
 39 files changed, 136 insertions(+), 94 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/btrfs/inode.c b/fs/btrfs/inode.c
index a0ff46a4789..49c04bec6a9 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/inode.c
@@ -90,13 +90,14 @@ static noinline int cow_file_range(struct inode *inode,
 				   unsigned long *nr_written, int unlock);
 
 static int btrfs_init_inode_security(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
-				     struct inode *inode,  struct inode *dir)
+				     struct inode *inode,  struct inode *dir,
+				     const struct qstr *qstr)
 {
 	int err;
 
 	err = btrfs_init_acl(trans, inode, dir);
 	if (!err)
-		err = btrfs_xattr_security_init(trans, inode, dir);
+		err = btrfs_xattr_security_init(trans, inode, dir, qstr);
 	return err;
 }
 
@@ -4675,7 +4676,7 @@ static int btrfs_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 	if (IS_ERR(inode))
 		goto out_unlock;
 
-	err = btrfs_init_inode_security(trans, inode, dir);
+	err = btrfs_init_inode_security(trans, inode, dir, &dentry->d_name);
 	if (err) {
 		drop_inode = 1;
 		goto out_unlock;
@@ -4736,7 +4737,7 @@ static int btrfs_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 	if (IS_ERR(inode))
 		goto out_unlock;
 
-	err = btrfs_init_inode_security(trans, inode, dir);
+	err = btrfs_init_inode_security(trans, inode, dir, &dentry->d_name);
 	if (err) {
 		drop_inode = 1;
 		goto out_unlock;
@@ -4864,7 +4865,7 @@ static int btrfs_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
 
 	drop_on_err = 1;
 
-	err = btrfs_init_inode_security(trans, inode, dir);
+	err = btrfs_init_inode_security(trans, inode, dir, &dentry->d_name);
 	if (err)
 		goto out_fail;
 
@@ -6946,7 +6947,7 @@ static int btrfs_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 	if (IS_ERR(inode))
 		goto out_unlock;
 
-	err = btrfs_init_inode_security(trans, inode, dir);
+	err = btrfs_init_inode_security(trans, inode, dir, &dentry->d_name);
 	if (err) {
 		drop_inode = 1;
 		goto out_unlock;
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/xattr.c b/fs/btrfs/xattr.c
index 698fdd2c739..3338a7e61d2 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/xattr.c
@@ -352,7 +352,8 @@ int btrfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 }
 
 int btrfs_xattr_security_init(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
-			      struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir)
+			      struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+			      const struct qstr *qstr)
 {
 	int err;
 	size_t len;
@@ -360,7 +361,8 @@ int btrfs_xattr_security_init(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 	char *suffix;
 	char *name;
 
-	err = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, &suffix, &value, &len);
+	err = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, &suffix, &value,
+					   &len);
 	if (err) {
 		if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 			return 0;
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/xattr.h b/fs/btrfs/xattr.h
index 7a43fd640bb..b3cc8039134 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/xattr.h
+++ b/fs/btrfs/xattr.h
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ extern int btrfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 extern int btrfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
 
 extern int btrfs_xattr_security_init(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
-				     struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir);
+				     struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+				     const struct qstr *qstr);
 
 #endif /* __XATTR__ */
diff --git a/fs/ext2/ext2.h b/fs/ext2/ext2.h
index 6346a2acf32..1b48c337087 100644
--- a/fs/ext2/ext2.h
+++ b/fs/ext2/ext2.h
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ extern struct ext2_dir_entry_2 * ext2_dotdot (struct inode *, struct page **);
 extern void ext2_set_link(struct inode *, struct ext2_dir_entry_2 *, struct page *, struct inode *, int);
 
 /* ialloc.c */
-extern struct inode * ext2_new_inode (struct inode *, int);
+extern struct inode * ext2_new_inode (struct inode *, int, const struct qstr *);
 extern void ext2_free_inode (struct inode *);
 extern unsigned long ext2_count_free_inodes (struct super_block *);
 extern void ext2_check_inodes_bitmap (struct super_block *);
diff --git a/fs/ext2/ialloc.c b/fs/ext2/ialloc.c
index ad70479aabf..ee9ed31948e 100644
--- a/fs/ext2/ialloc.c
+++ b/fs/ext2/ialloc.c
@@ -429,7 +429,8 @@ found:
 	return group;
 }
 
-struct inode *ext2_new_inode(struct inode *dir, int mode)
+struct inode *ext2_new_inode(struct inode *dir, int mode,
+			     const struct qstr *qstr)
 {
 	struct super_block *sb;
 	struct buffer_head *bitmap_bh = NULL;
@@ -585,7 +586,7 @@ got:
 	if (err)
 		goto fail_free_drop;
 
-	err = ext2_init_security(inode,dir);
+	err = ext2_init_security(inode, dir, qstr);
 	if (err)
 		goto fail_free_drop;
 
diff --git a/fs/ext2/namei.c b/fs/ext2/namei.c
index f8aecd2e329..368d7049ac8 100644
--- a/fs/ext2/namei.c
+++ b/fs/ext2/namei.c
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ static int ext2_create (struct inode * dir, struct dentry * dentry, int mode, st
 
 	dquot_initialize(dir);
 
-	inode = ext2_new_inode(dir, mode);
+	inode = ext2_new_inode(dir, mode, &dentry->d_name);
 	if (IS_ERR(inode))
 		return PTR_ERR(inode);
 
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ static int ext2_mknod (struct inode * dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_
 
 	dquot_initialize(dir);
 
-	inode = ext2_new_inode (dir, mode);
+	inode = ext2_new_inode (dir, mode, &dentry->d_name);
 	err = PTR_ERR(inode);
 	if (!IS_ERR(inode)) {
 		init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode, rdev);
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ static int ext2_symlink (struct inode * dir, struct dentry * dentry,
 
 	dquot_initialize(dir);
 
-	inode = ext2_new_inode (dir, S_IFLNK | S_IRWXUGO);
+	inode = ext2_new_inode (dir, S_IFLNK | S_IRWXUGO, &dentry->d_name);
 	err = PTR_ERR(inode);
 	if (IS_ERR(inode))
 		goto out;
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ static int ext2_mkdir(struct inode * dir, struct dentry * dentry, int mode)
 
 	inode_inc_link_count(dir);
 
-	inode = ext2_new_inode (dir, S_IFDIR | mode);
+	inode = ext2_new_inode(dir, S_IFDIR | mode, &dentry->d_name);
 	err = PTR_ERR(inode);
 	if (IS_ERR(inode))
 		goto out_dir;
diff --git a/fs/ext2/xattr.h b/fs/ext2/xattr.h
index a1a1c218461..5e41cccff76 100644
--- a/fs/ext2/xattr.h
+++ b/fs/ext2/xattr.h
@@ -116,9 +116,11 @@ exit_ext2_xattr(void)
 # endif  /* CONFIG_EXT2_FS_XATTR */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_EXT2_FS_SECURITY
-extern int ext2_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir);
+extern int ext2_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+			      const struct qstr *qstr);
 #else
-static inline int ext2_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir)
+static inline int ext2_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+				     const struct qstr *qstr)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/fs/ext2/xattr_security.c b/fs/ext2/xattr_security.c
index 3004e15d5da..5d979b4347b 100644
--- a/fs/ext2/xattr_security.c
+++ b/fs/ext2/xattr_security.c
@@ -47,14 +47,15 @@ ext2_xattr_security_set(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 }
 
 int
-ext2_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir)
+ext2_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+		   const struct qstr *qstr)
 {
 	int err;
 	size_t len;
 	void *value;
 	char *name;
 
-	err = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, &name, &value, &len);
+	err = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, &name, &value, &len);
 	if (err) {
 		if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 			return 0;
diff --git a/fs/ext3/ialloc.c b/fs/ext3/ialloc.c
index 9724aef2246..bfc2dc43681 100644
--- a/fs/ext3/ialloc.c
+++ b/fs/ext3/ialloc.c
@@ -404,7 +404,8 @@ static int find_group_other(struct super_block *sb, struct inode *parent)
  * For other inodes, search forward from the parent directory's block
  * group to find a free inode.
  */
-struct inode *ext3_new_inode(handle_t *handle, struct inode * dir, int mode)
+struct inode *ext3_new_inode(handle_t *handle, struct inode * dir,
+			     const struct qstr *qstr, int mode)
 {
 	struct super_block *sb;
 	struct buffer_head *bitmap_bh = NULL;
@@ -589,7 +590,7 @@ got:
 	if (err)
 		goto fail_free_drop;
 
-	err = ext3_init_security(handle,inode, dir);
+	err = ext3_init_security(handle, inode, dir, qstr);
 	if (err)
 		goto fail_free_drop;
 
diff --git a/fs/ext3/namei.c b/fs/ext3/namei.c
index bce9dce639b..a900033efcc 100644
--- a/fs/ext3/namei.c
+++ b/fs/ext3/namei.c
@@ -1707,7 +1707,7 @@ retry:
 	if (IS_DIRSYNC(dir))
 		handle->h_sync = 1;
 
-	inode = ext3_new_inode (handle, dir, mode);
+	inode = ext3_new_inode (handle, dir, &dentry->d_name, mode);
 	err = PTR_ERR(inode);
 	if (!IS_ERR(inode)) {
 		inode->i_op = &ext3_file_inode_operations;
@@ -1743,7 +1743,7 @@ retry:
 	if (IS_DIRSYNC(dir))
 		handle->h_sync = 1;
 
-	inode = ext3_new_inode (handle, dir, mode);
+	inode = ext3_new_inode (handle, dir, &dentry->d_name, mode);
 	err = PTR_ERR(inode);
 	if (!IS_ERR(inode)) {
 		init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode, rdev);
@@ -1781,7 +1781,7 @@ retry:
 	if (IS_DIRSYNC(dir))
 		handle->h_sync = 1;
 
-	inode = ext3_new_inode (handle, dir, S_IFDIR | mode);
+	inode = ext3_new_inode (handle, dir, &dentry->d_name, S_IFDIR | mode);
 	err = PTR_ERR(inode);
 	if (IS_ERR(inode))
 		goto out_stop;
@@ -2195,7 +2195,7 @@ retry:
 	if (IS_DIRSYNC(dir))
 		handle->h_sync = 1;
 
-	inode = ext3_new_inode (handle, dir, S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO);
+	inode = ext3_new_inode (handle, dir, &dentry->d_name, S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO);
 	err = PTR_ERR(inode);
 	if (IS_ERR(inode))
 		goto out_stop;
diff --git a/fs/ext3/xattr.h b/fs/ext3/xattr.h
index 377fe720116..2be4f69bfa6 100644
--- a/fs/ext3/xattr.h
+++ b/fs/ext3/xattr.h
@@ -128,10 +128,10 @@ exit_ext3_xattr(void)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_EXT3_FS_SECURITY
 extern int ext3_init_security(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
-				struct inode *dir);
+			      struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr);
 #else
 static inline int ext3_init_security(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
-				struct inode *dir)
+				     struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/fs/ext3/xattr_security.c b/fs/ext3/xattr_security.c
index 03a99bfc59f..b8d9f83aa5c 100644
--- a/fs/ext3/xattr_security.c
+++ b/fs/ext3/xattr_security.c
@@ -49,14 +49,15 @@ ext3_xattr_security_set(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 }
 
 int
-ext3_init_security(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir)
+ext3_init_security(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+		   const struct qstr *qstr)
 {
 	int err;
 	size_t len;
 	void *value;
 	char *name;
 
-	err = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, &name, &value, &len);
+	err = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, &name, &value, &len);
 	if (err) {
 		if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 			return 0;
diff --git a/fs/ext4/ialloc.c b/fs/ext4/ialloc.c
index 1ce240a23eb..49b6cfd1fc4 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/ialloc.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/ialloc.c
@@ -1042,7 +1042,7 @@ got:
 	if (err)
 		goto fail_free_drop;
 
-	err = ext4_init_security(handle, inode, dir);
+	err = ext4_init_security(handle, inode, dir, qstr);
 	if (err)
 		goto fail_free_drop;
 
diff --git a/fs/ext4/xattr.h b/fs/ext4/xattr.h
index 1ef16520b95..25b7387ff18 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/xattr.h
+++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.h
@@ -145,10 +145,10 @@ ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea(struct inode *inode, int new_extra_isize,
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_SECURITY
 extern int ext4_init_security(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
-				struct inode *dir);
+			      struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr);
 #else
 static inline int ext4_init_security(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
-				struct inode *dir)
+				     struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/fs/ext4/xattr_security.c b/fs/ext4/xattr_security.c
index 9b21268e121..007c3bfbf09 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/xattr_security.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/xattr_security.c
@@ -49,14 +49,15 @@ ext4_xattr_security_set(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 }
 
 int
-ext4_init_security(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir)
+ext4_init_security(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+		   const struct qstr *qstr)
 {
 	int err;
 	size_t len;
 	void *value;
 	char *name;
 
-	err = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, &name, &value, &len);
+	err = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, &name, &value, &len);
 	if (err) {
 		if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 			return 0;
diff --git a/fs/gfs2/inode.c b/fs/gfs2/inode.c
index 2232b3c780b..de35ca7d798 100644
--- a/fs/gfs2/inode.c
+++ b/fs/gfs2/inode.c
@@ -791,14 +791,15 @@ fail:
 	return error;
 }
 
-static int gfs2_security_init(struct gfs2_inode *dip, struct gfs2_inode *ip)
+static int gfs2_security_init(struct gfs2_inode *dip, struct gfs2_inode *ip,
+			      const struct qstr *qstr)
 {
 	int err;
 	size_t len;
 	void *value;
 	char *name;
 
-	err = security_inode_init_security(&ip->i_inode, &dip->i_inode,
+	err = security_inode_init_security(&ip->i_inode, &dip->i_inode, qstr,
 					   &name, &value, &len);
 
 	if (err) {
@@ -882,7 +883,7 @@ struct inode *gfs2_createi(struct gfs2_holder *ghs, const struct qstr *name,
 	if (error)
 		goto fail_gunlock2;
 
-	error = gfs2_security_init(dip, GFS2_I(inode));
+	error = gfs2_security_init(dip, GFS2_I(inode), name);
 	if (error)
 		goto fail_gunlock2;
 
diff --git a/fs/jffs2/dir.c b/fs/jffs2/dir.c
index 92978658ed1..82faddd1f32 100644
--- a/fs/jffs2/dir.c
+++ b/fs/jffs2/dir.c
@@ -215,8 +215,7 @@ static int jffs2_create(struct inode *dir_i, struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
 	   no chance of AB-BA deadlock involving its f->sem). */
 	mutex_unlock(&f->sem);
 
-	ret = jffs2_do_create(c, dir_f, f, ri,
-			      dentry->d_name.name, dentry->d_name.len);
+	ret = jffs2_do_create(c, dir_f, f, ri, &dentry->d_name);
 	if (ret)
 		goto fail;
 
@@ -386,7 +385,7 @@ static int jffs2_symlink (struct inode *dir_i, struct dentry *dentry, const char
 
 	jffs2_complete_reservation(c);
 
-	ret = jffs2_init_security(inode, dir_i);
+	ret = jffs2_init_security(inode, dir_i, &dentry->d_name);
 	if (ret)
 		goto fail;
 
@@ -530,7 +529,7 @@ static int jffs2_mkdir (struct inode *dir_i, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
 
 	jffs2_complete_reservation(c);
 
-	ret = jffs2_init_security(inode, dir_i);
+	ret = jffs2_init_security(inode, dir_i, &dentry->d_name);
 	if (ret)
 		goto fail;
 
@@ -703,7 +702,7 @@ static int jffs2_mknod (struct inode *dir_i, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, de
 
 	jffs2_complete_reservation(c);
 
-	ret = jffs2_init_security(inode, dir_i);
+	ret = jffs2_init_security(inode, dir_i, &dentry->d_name);
 	if (ret)
 		goto fail;
 
diff --git a/fs/jffs2/nodelist.h b/fs/jffs2/nodelist.h
index 5a53d9bdb2b..e4619b00f7c 100644
--- a/fs/jffs2/nodelist.h
+++ b/fs/jffs2/nodelist.h
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ int jffs2_write_inode_range(struct jffs2_sb_info *c, struct jffs2_inode_info *f,
 			    struct jffs2_raw_inode *ri, unsigned char *buf,
 			    uint32_t offset, uint32_t writelen, uint32_t *retlen);
 int jffs2_do_create(struct jffs2_sb_info *c, struct jffs2_inode_info *dir_f, struct jffs2_inode_info *f,
-		    struct jffs2_raw_inode *ri, const char *name, int namelen);
+		    struct jffs2_raw_inode *ri, const struct qstr *qstr);
 int jffs2_do_unlink(struct jffs2_sb_info *c, struct jffs2_inode_info *dir_f, const char *name,
 		    int namelen, struct jffs2_inode_info *dead_f, uint32_t time);
 int jffs2_do_link(struct jffs2_sb_info *c, struct jffs2_inode_info *dir_f, uint32_t ino,
diff --git a/fs/jffs2/security.c b/fs/jffs2/security.c
index 239f51216a6..cfeb7164b08 100644
--- a/fs/jffs2/security.c
+++ b/fs/jffs2/security.c
@@ -23,14 +23,15 @@
 #include "nodelist.h"
 
 /* ---- Initial Security Label Attachment -------------- */
-int jffs2_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir)
+int jffs2_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+			const struct qstr *qstr)
 {
 	int rc;
 	size_t len;
 	void *value;
 	char *name;
 
-	rc = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, &name, &value, &len);
+	rc = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, &name, &value, &len);
 	if (rc) {
 		if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 			return 0;
diff --git a/fs/jffs2/write.c b/fs/jffs2/write.c
index c819eb0e982..30d175b6d29 100644
--- a/fs/jffs2/write.c
+++ b/fs/jffs2/write.c
@@ -424,7 +424,9 @@ int jffs2_write_inode_range(struct jffs2_sb_info *c, struct jffs2_inode_info *f,
 	return ret;
 }
 
-int jffs2_do_create(struct jffs2_sb_info *c, struct jffs2_inode_info *dir_f, struct jffs2_inode_info *f, struct jffs2_raw_inode *ri, const char *name, int namelen)
+int jffs2_do_create(struct jffs2_sb_info *c, struct jffs2_inode_info *dir_f,
+		    struct jffs2_inode_info *f, struct jffs2_raw_inode *ri,
+		    const struct qstr *qstr)
 {
 	struct jffs2_raw_dirent *rd;
 	struct jffs2_full_dnode *fn;
@@ -466,15 +468,15 @@ int jffs2_do_create(struct jffs2_sb_info *c, struct jffs2_inode_info *dir_f, str
 	mutex_unlock(&f->sem);
 	jffs2_complete_reservation(c);
 
-	ret = jffs2_init_security(&f->vfs_inode, &dir_f->vfs_inode);
+	ret = jffs2_init_security(&f->vfs_inode, &dir_f->vfs_inode, qstr);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 	ret = jffs2_init_acl_post(&f->vfs_inode);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	ret = jffs2_reserve_space(c, sizeof(*rd)+namelen, &alloclen,
-				ALLOC_NORMAL, JFFS2_SUMMARY_DIRENT_SIZE(namelen));
+	ret = jffs2_reserve_space(c, sizeof(*rd)+qstr->len, &alloclen,
+				ALLOC_NORMAL, JFFS2_SUMMARY_DIRENT_SIZE(qstr->len));
 
 	if (ret) {
 		/* Eep. */
@@ -493,19 +495,19 @@ int jffs2_do_create(struct jffs2_sb_info *c, struct jffs2_inode_info *dir_f, str
 
 	rd->magic = cpu_to_je16(JFFS2_MAGIC_BITMASK);
 	rd->nodetype = cpu_to_je16(JFFS2_NODETYPE_DIRENT);
-	rd->totlen = cpu_to_je32(sizeof(*rd) + namelen);
+	rd->totlen = cpu_to_je32(sizeof(*rd) + qstr->len);
 	rd->hdr_crc = cpu_to_je32(crc32(0, rd, sizeof(struct jffs2_unknown_node)-4));
 
 	rd->pino = cpu_to_je32(dir_f->inocache->ino);
 	rd->version = cpu_to_je32(++dir_f->highest_version);
 	rd->ino = ri->ino;
 	rd->mctime = ri->ctime;
-	rd->nsize = namelen;
+	rd->nsize = qstr->len;
 	rd->type = DT_REG;
 	rd->node_crc = cpu_to_je32(crc32(0, rd, sizeof(*rd)-8));
-	rd->name_crc = cpu_to_je32(crc32(0, name, namelen));
+	rd->name_crc = cpu_to_je32(crc32(0, qstr->name, qstr->len));
 
-	fd = jffs2_write_dirent(c, dir_f, rd, name, namelen, ALLOC_NORMAL);
+	fd = jffs2_write_dirent(c, dir_f, rd, qstr->name, qstr->len, ALLOC_NORMAL);
 
 	jffs2_free_raw_dirent(rd);
 
diff --git a/fs/jffs2/xattr.h b/fs/jffs2/xattr.h
index cf4f5759b42..7be4beb306f 100644
--- a/fs/jffs2/xattr.h
+++ b/fs/jffs2/xattr.h
@@ -121,10 +121,11 @@ extern ssize_t jffs2_listxattr(struct dentry *, char *, size_t);
 #endif /* CONFIG_JFFS2_FS_XATTR */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_JFFS2_FS_SECURITY
-extern int jffs2_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir);
+extern int jffs2_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+			       const struct qstr *qstr);
 extern const struct xattr_handler jffs2_security_xattr_handler;
 #else
-#define jffs2_init_security(inode,dir)	(0)
+#define jffs2_init_security(inode,dir,qstr)	(0)
 #endif /* CONFIG_JFFS2_FS_SECURITY */
 
 #endif /* _JFFS2_FS_XATTR_H_ */
diff --git a/fs/jfs/jfs_xattr.h b/fs/jfs/jfs_xattr.h
index 88b6cc535bf..e9e100fd7c0 100644
--- a/fs/jfs/jfs_xattr.h
+++ b/fs/jfs/jfs_xattr.h
@@ -62,10 +62,11 @@ extern ssize_t jfs_listxattr(struct dentry *, char *, size_t);
 extern int jfs_removexattr(struct dentry *, const char *);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_JFS_SECURITY
-extern int jfs_init_security(tid_t, struct inode *, struct inode *);
+extern int jfs_init_security(tid_t, struct inode *, struct inode *,
+			     const struct qstr *);
 #else
 static inline int jfs_init_security(tid_t tid, struct inode *inode,
-				    struct inode *dir)
+				    struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/fs/jfs/namei.c b/fs/jfs/namei.c
index 4414e3a4226..030b9174e41 100644
--- a/fs/jfs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/jfs/namei.c
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static int jfs_create(struct inode *dip, struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
 	if (rc)
 		goto out3;
 
-	rc = jfs_init_security(tid, ip, dip);
+	rc = jfs_init_security(tid, ip, dip, &dentry->d_name);
 	if (rc) {
 		txAbort(tid, 0);
 		goto out3;
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ static int jfs_mkdir(struct inode *dip, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
 	if (rc)
 		goto out3;
 
-	rc = jfs_init_security(tid, ip, dip);
+	rc = jfs_init_security(tid, ip, dip, &dentry->d_name);
 	if (rc) {
 		txAbort(tid, 0);
 		goto out3;
@@ -932,7 +932,7 @@ static int jfs_symlink(struct inode *dip, struct dentry *dentry,
 	mutex_lock_nested(&JFS_IP(dip)->commit_mutex, COMMIT_MUTEX_PARENT);
 	mutex_lock_nested(&JFS_IP(ip)->commit_mutex, COMMIT_MUTEX_CHILD);
 
-	rc = jfs_init_security(tid, ip, dip);
+	rc = jfs_init_security(tid, ip, dip, &dentry->d_name);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out3;
 
@@ -1395,7 +1395,7 @@ static int jfs_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 	if (rc)
 		goto out3;
 
-	rc = jfs_init_security(tid, ip, dir);
+	rc = jfs_init_security(tid, ip, dir, &dentry->d_name);
 	if (rc) {
 		txAbort(tid, 0);
 		goto out3;
diff --git a/fs/jfs/xattr.c b/fs/jfs/xattr.c
index 2d7f165d0f1..3fa4c32272d 100644
--- a/fs/jfs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/jfs/xattr.c
@@ -1091,7 +1091,8 @@ int jfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_JFS_SECURITY
-int jfs_init_security(tid_t tid, struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir)
+int jfs_init_security(tid_t tid, struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+		      const struct qstr *qstr)
 {
 	int rc;
 	size_t len;
@@ -1099,7 +1100,8 @@ int jfs_init_security(tid_t tid, struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir)
 	char *suffix;
 	char *name;
 
-	rc = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, &suffix, &value, &len);
+	rc = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, &suffix, &value,
+					  &len);
 	if (rc) {
 		if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 			return 0;
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/namei.c b/fs/ocfs2/namei.c
index d14cad6e2e4..bd8d6461a68 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/namei.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/namei.c
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ static int ocfs2_mknod(struct inode *dir,
 	}
 
 	/* get security xattr */
-	status = ocfs2_init_security_get(inode, dir, &si);
+	status = ocfs2_init_security_get(inode, dir, &dentry->d_name, &si);
 	if (status) {
 		if (status == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 			si.enable = 0;
@@ -1665,7 +1665,7 @@ static int ocfs2_symlink(struct inode *dir,
 	}
 
 	/* get security xattr */
-	status = ocfs2_init_security_get(inode, dir, &si);
+	status = ocfs2_init_security_get(inode, dir, &dentry->d_name, &si);
 	if (status) {
 		if (status == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 			si.enable = 0;
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c b/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c
index b5f9160e93e..cd3f5b4832e 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c
@@ -4325,7 +4325,8 @@ static int ocfs2_reflink(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
 
 	/* If the security isn't preserved, we need to re-initialize them. */
 	if (!preserve) {
-		error = ocfs2_init_security_and_acl(dir, new_orphan_inode);
+		error = ocfs2_init_security_and_acl(dir, new_orphan_inode,
+						    &new_dentry->d_name);
 		if (error)
 			mlog_errno(error);
 	}
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
index 67cd4391464..6bb602486c6 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
@@ -7185,7 +7185,8 @@ out:
  * must not hold any lock expect i_mutex.
  */
 int ocfs2_init_security_and_acl(struct inode *dir,
-				struct inode *inode)
+				struct inode *inode,
+				const struct qstr *qstr)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 	struct buffer_head *dir_bh = NULL;
@@ -7193,7 +7194,7 @@ int ocfs2_init_security_and_acl(struct inode *dir,
 		.enable = 1,
 	};
 
-	ret = ocfs2_init_security_get(inode, dir, &si);
+	ret = ocfs2_init_security_get(inode, dir, qstr, &si);
 	if (!ret) {
 		ret = ocfs2_xattr_set(inode, OCFS2_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY,
 				      si.name, si.value, si.value_len,
@@ -7261,13 +7262,14 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_security_set(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 
 int ocfs2_init_security_get(struct inode *inode,
 			    struct inode *dir,
+			    const struct qstr *qstr,
 			    struct ocfs2_security_xattr_info *si)
 {
 	/* check whether ocfs2 support feature xattr */
 	if (!ocfs2_supports_xattr(OCFS2_SB(dir->i_sb)))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-	return security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, &si->name, &si->value,
-					    &si->value_len);
+	return security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, &si->name,
+					    &si->value, &si->value_len);
 }
 
 int ocfs2_init_security_set(handle_t *handle,
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.h b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.h
index aa64bb37a65..d63cfb72316 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.h
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.h
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ int ocfs2_has_inline_xattr_value_outside(struct inode *inode,
 					 struct ocfs2_dinode *di);
 int ocfs2_xattr_remove(struct inode *, struct buffer_head *);
 int ocfs2_init_security_get(struct inode *, struct inode *,
+			    const struct qstr *,
 			    struct ocfs2_security_xattr_info *);
 int ocfs2_init_security_set(handle_t *, struct inode *,
 			    struct buffer_head *,
@@ -94,5 +95,6 @@ int ocfs2_reflink_xattrs(struct inode *old_inode,
 			 struct buffer_head *new_bh,
 			 bool preserve_security);
 int ocfs2_init_security_and_acl(struct inode *dir,
-				struct inode *inode);
+				struct inode *inode,
+				const struct qstr *qstr);
 #endif /* OCFS2_XATTR_H */
diff --git a/fs/reiserfs/namei.c b/fs/reiserfs/namei.c
index ba5f51ec345..d5b22ed0677 100644
--- a/fs/reiserfs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/reiserfs/namei.c
@@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ static int reiserfs_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
 	new_inode_init(inode, dir, mode);
 
 	jbegin_count += reiserfs_cache_default_acl(dir);
-	retval = reiserfs_security_init(dir, inode, &security);
+	retval = reiserfs_security_init(dir, inode, &dentry->d_name, &security);
 	if (retval < 0) {
 		drop_new_inode(inode);
 		return retval;
@@ -667,7 +667,7 @@ static int reiserfs_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
 	new_inode_init(inode, dir, mode);
 
 	jbegin_count += reiserfs_cache_default_acl(dir);
-	retval = reiserfs_security_init(dir, inode, &security);
+	retval = reiserfs_security_init(dir, inode, &dentry->d_name, &security);
 	if (retval < 0) {
 		drop_new_inode(inode);
 		return retval;
@@ -747,7 +747,7 @@ static int reiserfs_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
 	new_inode_init(inode, dir, mode);
 
 	jbegin_count += reiserfs_cache_default_acl(dir);
-	retval = reiserfs_security_init(dir, inode, &security);
+	retval = reiserfs_security_init(dir, inode, &dentry->d_name, &security);
 	if (retval < 0) {
 		drop_new_inode(inode);
 		return retval;
@@ -1032,7 +1032,8 @@ static int reiserfs_symlink(struct inode *parent_dir,
 	}
 	new_inode_init(inode, parent_dir, mode);
 
-	retval = reiserfs_security_init(parent_dir, inode, &security);
+	retval = reiserfs_security_init(parent_dir, inode, &dentry->d_name,
+					&security);
 	if (retval < 0) {
 		drop_new_inode(inode);
 		return retval;
diff --git a/fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c b/fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c
index 237c6928d3c..ef66c18a933 100644
--- a/fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c
+++ b/fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ static size_t security_list(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t list_len,
  * of blocks needed for the transaction. If successful, reiserfs_security
  * must be released using reiserfs_security_free when the caller is done. */
 int reiserfs_security_init(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode,
+			   const struct qstr *qstr,
 			   struct reiserfs_security_handle *sec)
 {
 	int blocks = 0;
@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ int reiserfs_security_init(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode,
 	if (IS_PRIVATE(dir))
 		return 0;
 
-	error = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, &sec->name,
+	error = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, &sec->name,
 					     &sec->value, &sec->length);
 	if (error) {
 		if (error == -EOPNOTSUPP)
diff --git a/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_iops.c b/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_iops.c
index 94d5fd6a297..d9298cf6026 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_iops.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_iops.c
@@ -103,7 +103,8 @@ xfs_mark_inode_dirty(
 STATIC int
 xfs_init_security(
 	struct inode	*inode,
-	struct inode	*dir)
+	struct inode	*dir,
+	const struct qstr *qstr)
 {
 	struct xfs_inode *ip = XFS_I(inode);
 	size_t		length;
@@ -111,7 +112,7 @@ xfs_init_security(
 	unsigned char	*name;
 	int		error;
 
-	error = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, (char **)&name,
+	error = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, (char **)&name,
 					     &value, &length);
 	if (error) {
 		if (error == -EOPNOTSUPP)
@@ -195,7 +196,7 @@ xfs_vn_mknod(
 
 	inode = VFS_I(ip);
 
-	error = xfs_init_security(inode, dir);
+	error = xfs_init_security(inode, dir, &dentry->d_name);
 	if (unlikely(error))
 		goto out_cleanup_inode;
 
@@ -368,7 +369,7 @@ xfs_vn_symlink(
 
 	inode = VFS_I(cip);
 
-	error = xfs_init_security(inode, dir);
+	error = xfs_init_security(inode, dir, &dentry->d_name);
 	if (unlikely(error))
 		goto out_cleanup_inode;
 
diff --git a/include/linux/ext3_fs.h b/include/linux/ext3_fs.h
index 6ce1bca0172..87312a81dab 100644
--- a/include/linux/ext3_fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/ext3_fs.h
@@ -874,7 +874,8 @@ extern int ext3fs_dirhash(const char *name, int len, struct
 			  dx_hash_info *hinfo);
 
 /* ialloc.c */
-extern struct inode * ext3_new_inode (handle_t *, struct inode *, int);
+extern struct inode * ext3_new_inode (handle_t *, struct inode *,
+				      const struct qstr *, int);
 extern void ext3_free_inode (handle_t *, struct inode *);
 extern struct inode * ext3_orphan_get (struct super_block *, unsigned long);
 extern unsigned long ext3_count_free_inodes (struct super_block *);
diff --git a/include/linux/reiserfs_xattr.h b/include/linux/reiserfs_xattr.h
index 3b94c91f20a..6deef5dc95f 100644
--- a/include/linux/reiserfs_xattr.h
+++ b/include/linux/reiserfs_xattr.h
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ extern const struct xattr_handler reiserfs_xattr_trusted_handler;
 extern const struct xattr_handler reiserfs_xattr_security_handler;
 #ifdef CONFIG_REISERFS_FS_SECURITY
 int reiserfs_security_init(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode,
+			   const struct qstr *qstr,
 			   struct reiserfs_security_handle *sec);
 int reiserfs_security_write(struct reiserfs_transaction_handle *th,
 			    struct inode *inode,
@@ -130,6 +131,7 @@ static inline void reiserfs_init_xattr_rwsem(struct inode *inode)
 #ifndef CONFIG_REISERFS_FS_SECURITY
 static inline int reiserfs_security_init(struct inode *dir,
 					 struct inode *inode,
+					 const struct qstr *qstr,
 					 struct reiserfs_security_handle *sec)
 {
 	return 0;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index c642bb8b8f5..05dd5a64aa7 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
 #include <linux/signal.h>
 #include <linux/resource.h>
 #include <linux/sem.h>
@@ -315,6 +316,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	then it should return -EOPNOTSUPP to skip this processing.
  *	@inode contains the inode structure of the newly created inode.
  *	@dir contains the inode structure of the parent directory.
+ *	@qstr contains the last path component of the new object
  *	@name will be set to the allocated name suffix (e.g. selinux).
  *	@value will be set to the allocated attribute value.
  *	@len will be set to the length of the value.
@@ -1435,7 +1437,8 @@ struct security_operations {
 	int (*inode_alloc_security) (struct inode *inode);
 	void (*inode_free_security) (struct inode *inode);
 	int (*inode_init_security) (struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
-				    char **name, void **value, size_t *len);
+				    const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
+				    void **value, size_t *len);
 	int (*inode_create) (struct inode *dir,
 			     struct dentry *dentry, int mode);
 	int (*inode_link) (struct dentry *old_dentry,
@@ -1696,7 +1699,8 @@ int security_sb_parse_opts_str(char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts);
 int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
 void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode);
 int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
-				  char **name, void **value, size_t *len);
+				 const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
+				 void **value, size_t *len);
 int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode);
 int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
 			 struct dentry *new_dentry);
@@ -2023,6 +2027,7 @@ static inline void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
 
 static inline int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
 						struct inode *dir,
+						const struct qstr *qstr,
 						char **name,
 						void **value,
 						size_t *len)
diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c
index 5ee67c99060..7c9cdc6fe13 100644
--- a/mm/shmem.c
+++ b/mm/shmem.c
@@ -1843,8 +1843,9 @@ shmem_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
 
 	inode = shmem_get_inode(dir->i_sb, dir, mode, dev, VM_NORESERVE);
 	if (inode) {
-		error = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, NULL, NULL,
-						     NULL);
+		error = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir,
+						     &dentry->d_name, NULL,
+						     NULL, NULL);
 		if (error) {
 			if (error != -EOPNOTSUPP) {
 				iput(inode);
@@ -1983,8 +1984,8 @@ static int shmem_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *s
 	if (!inode)
 		return -ENOSPC;
 
-	error = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, NULL, NULL,
-					     NULL);
+	error = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, &dentry->d_name, NULL,
+					     NULL, NULL);
 	if (error) {
 		if (error != -EOPNOTSUPP) {
 			iput(inode);
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 2a5df2b7da8..383d14dc12e 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ static void cap_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
 }
 
 static int cap_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
-				   char **name, void **value, size_t *len)
+				   const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
+				   void **value, size_t *len)
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index b84a89dd59c..4830f36e1ab 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -336,11 +336,13 @@ void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
 }
 
 int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
-				  char **name, void **value, size_t *len)
+				 const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
+				 void **value, size_t *len)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-	return security_ops->inode_init_security(inode, dir, name, value, len);
+	return security_ops->inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, name, value,
+						 len);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security);
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index e276eb46853..099bbd07732 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
 #include <linux/swap.h>
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
 #include <linux/namei.h>
@@ -2509,8 +2510,8 @@ static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
-				       char **name, void **value,
-				       size_t *len)
+				       const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
+				       void **value, size_t *len)
 {
 	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
 	struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 123a499ded3..0c91a906b3f 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
 #include "smack.h"
 
 #define task_security(task)	(task_cred_xxx((task), security))
@@ -501,6 +502,7 @@ static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
  * smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode
  * @inode: the inode
  * @dir: unused
+ * @qstr: unused
  * @name: where to put the attribute name
  * @value: where to put the attribute value
  * @len: where to put the length of the attribute
@@ -508,7 +510,8 @@ static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
  * Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory
  */
 static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
-				     char **name, void **value, size_t *len)
+				     const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
+				     void **value, size_t *len)
 {
 	char *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
 	char *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);

From 652bb9b0d6ce007f37c098947b2cc0c45efa3f66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2011 11:05:40 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 05/33] SELinux: Use dentry name in new object labeling

Currently SELinux has rules which label new objects according to 3 criteria.
The label of the process creating the object, the label of the parent
directory, and the type of object (reg, dir, char, block, etc.)  This patch
adds a 4th criteria, the dentry name, thus we can distinguish between
creating a file in an etc_t directory called shadow and one called motd.

There is no file globbing, regex parsing, or anything mystical.  Either the
policy exactly (strcmp) matches the dentry name of the object or it doesn't.
This patch has no changes from today if policy does not implement the new
rules.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c            |  15 ++--
 security/selinux/include/security.h |   8 +-
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.h         |  22 ++---
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c      | 130 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.h      |  14 ++-
 security/selinux/ss/services.c      |  45 +++++++---
 6 files changed, 197 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 099bbd07732..6ae19fd28be 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1301,10 +1301,8 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 
 		/* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
 		isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
-		rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
-					     sbsec->sid,
-					     isec->sclass,
-					     &sid);
+		rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
+					     isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out_unlock;
 		isec->sid = sid;
@@ -1579,7 +1577,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
 		return rc;
 
 	if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
-		rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
+		rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, NULL, &newsid);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 	}
@@ -2061,7 +2059,8 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	} else {
 		/* Check for a default transition on this program. */
 		rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
-					     SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid);
+					     SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
+					     &new_tsec->sid);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 	}
@@ -2532,7 +2531,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 	else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
 		rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
 					     inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
-					     &newsid);
+					     qstr, &newsid);
 		if (rc) {
 			printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  "
 			       "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
@@ -4845,7 +4844,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 		 * message queue this message will be stored in
 		 */
 		rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
-					     &msec->sid);
+					     NULL, &msec->sid);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 	}
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 671273eb111..348eb00cb66 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 #ifndef _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_
 #define _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_
 
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
 #include <linux/magic.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include "flask.h"
@@ -28,13 +29,14 @@
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP		22
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE	23
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY	24
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS	25
 
 /* Range of policy versions we understand*/
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN   POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX	CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE
 #else
-#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX	POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX	POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS
 #endif
 
 /* Mask for just the mount related flags */
@@ -106,8 +108,8 @@ void security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 			     u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd);
 
-int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-			    u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
+int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+			    const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid);
 
 int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 				 u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
index 3417f9cc1cb..63ce2f9e441 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2003 Tresys Technology, LLC
  *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- *  	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
  *	the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
  *
  * Updated: Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
@@ -27,16 +27,16 @@ struct avtab_key {
 	u16 source_type;	/* source type */
 	u16 target_type;	/* target type */
 	u16 target_class;	/* target object class */
-#define AVTAB_ALLOWED     1
-#define AVTAB_AUDITALLOW  2
-#define AVTAB_AUDITDENY   4
-#define AVTAB_AV         (AVTAB_ALLOWED | AVTAB_AUDITALLOW | AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
-#define AVTAB_TRANSITION 16
-#define AVTAB_MEMBER     32
-#define AVTAB_CHANGE     64
-#define AVTAB_TYPE       (AVTAB_TRANSITION | AVTAB_MEMBER | AVTAB_CHANGE)
-#define AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD    0x80000000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
-#define AVTAB_ENABLED    0x8000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
+#define AVTAB_ALLOWED		0x0001
+#define AVTAB_AUDITALLOW	0x0002
+#define AVTAB_AUDITDENY		0x0004
+#define AVTAB_AV		(AVTAB_ALLOWED | AVTAB_AUDITALLOW | AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
+#define AVTAB_TRANSITION	0x0010
+#define AVTAB_MEMBER		0x0020
+#define AVTAB_CHANGE		0x0040
+#define AVTAB_TYPE		(AVTAB_TRANSITION | AVTAB_MEMBER | AVTAB_CHANGE)
+#define AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD   0x80000000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
+#define AVTAB_ENABLED		0x8000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
 	u16 specified;	/* what field is specified */
 };
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index be9de387283..159c8180676 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -123,6 +123,11 @@ static struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = {
 		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
 		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM,
 	},
+	{
+		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS,
+		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM,
+	},
 };
 
 static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version)
@@ -704,6 +709,7 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
 	int i;
 	struct role_allow *ra, *lra = NULL;
 	struct role_trans *tr, *ltr = NULL;
+	struct filename_trans *ft, *nft;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
 		cond_resched();
@@ -781,6 +787,15 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
 		}
 		flex_array_free(p->type_attr_map_array);
 	}
+
+	ft = p->filename_trans;
+	while (ft) {
+		nft = ft->next;
+		kfree(ft->name);
+		kfree(ft);
+		ft = nft;
+	}
+
 	ebitmap_destroy(&p->policycaps);
 	ebitmap_destroy(&p->permissive_map);
 
@@ -1788,6 +1803,76 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
+static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+	struct filename_trans *ft, *last;
+	u32 nel, len;
+	char *name;
+	__le32 buf[4];
+	int rc, i;
+
+	if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS)
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+	printk(KERN_ERR "%s: nel=%d\n", __func__, nel);
+
+	last = p->filename_trans;
+	while (last && last->next)
+		last = last->next;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		ft = kzalloc(sizeof(*ft), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!ft)
+			goto out;
+
+		/* add it to the tail of the list */
+		if (!last)
+			p->filename_trans = ft;
+		else
+			last->next = ft;
+		last = ft;
+
+		/* length of the path component string */
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+		len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		name = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!name)
+			goto out;
+
+		ft->name = name;
+
+		/* path component string */
+		rc = next_entry(name, fp, len);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+		name[len] = 0;
+
+		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: ft=%p ft->name=%p ft->name=%s\n", __func__, ft, ft->name, ft->name);
+
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 4);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		ft->stype = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		ft->ttype = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+		ft->tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+		ft->otype = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
 static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 {
 	int i, j, rc;
@@ -2251,6 +2336,10 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 		lra = ra;
 	}
 
+	rc = filename_trans_read(p, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
 	rc = policydb_index(p);
 	if (rc)
 		goto bad;
@@ -3025,6 +3114,43 @@ static int range_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int filename_trans_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+	struct filename_trans *ft;
+	u32 len, nel = 0;
+	__le32 buf[4];
+	int rc;
+
+	for (ft = p->filename_trans; ft; ft = ft->next)
+		nel++;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	for (ft = p->filename_trans; ft; ft = ft->next) {
+		len = strlen(ft->name);
+		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+
+		rc = put_entry(ft->name, sizeof(char), len, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+
+		buf[0] = ft->stype;
+		buf[1] = ft->ttype;
+		buf[2] = ft->tclass;
+		buf[3] = ft->otype;
+
+		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
 /*
  * Write the configuration data in a policy database
  * structure to a policy database binary representation
@@ -3135,6 +3261,10 @@ int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
+	rc = filename_trans_write(p, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
 	rc = ocontext_write(p, info, fp);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index 4e3ab9d0b31..732ea4a6868 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -77,6 +77,15 @@ struct role_trans {
 	struct role_trans *next;
 };
 
+struct filename_trans {
+	struct filename_trans *next;
+	u32 stype;		/* current process */
+	u32 ttype;		/* parent dir context */
+	u16 tclass;		/* class of new object */
+	const char *name;	/* last path component */
+	u32 otype;		/* expected of new object */
+};
+
 struct role_allow {
 	u32 role;		/* current role */
 	u32 new_role;		/* new role */
@@ -217,6 +226,9 @@ struct policydb {
 	/* role transitions */
 	struct role_trans *role_tr;
 
+	/* file transitions with the last path component */
+	struct filename_trans *filename_trans;
+
 	/* bools indexed by (value - 1) */
 	struct cond_bool_datum **bool_val_to_struct;
 	/* type enforcement conditional access vectors and transitions */
@@ -302,7 +314,7 @@ static inline int next_entry(void *buf, struct policy_file *fp, size_t bytes)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int put_entry(void *buf, size_t bytes, int num, struct policy_file *fp)
+static inline int put_entry(const void *buf, size_t bytes, int num, struct policy_file *fp)
 {
 	size_t len = bytes * num;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index a03cfaf0ee0..2e36e03c21f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1343,10 +1343,27 @@ out:
 	return -EACCES;
 }
 
+static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *p, struct context *newcontext,
+				  u32 scon, u32 tcon, u16 tclass,
+				  const struct qstr *qstr)
+{
+	struct filename_trans *ft;
+	for (ft = p->filename_trans; ft; ft = ft->next) {
+		if (ft->stype == scon &&
+		    ft->ttype == tcon &&
+		    ft->tclass == tclass &&
+		    !strcmp(ft->name, qstr->name)) {
+			newcontext->type = ft->otype;
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 				u32 tsid,
 				u16 orig_tclass,
 				u32 specified,
+				const struct qstr *qstr,
 				u32 *out_sid,
 				bool kern)
 {
@@ -1442,6 +1459,11 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 		newcontext.type = avdatum->data;
 	}
 
+	/* if we have a qstr this is a file trans check so check those rules */
+	if (qstr)
+		filename_compute_type(&policydb, &newcontext, scontext->type,
+				      tcontext->type, tclass, qstr);
+
 	/* Check for class-specific changes. */
 	if  (tclass == policydb.process_class) {
 		if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
@@ -1495,22 +1517,17 @@ out:
  * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was
  * computed successfully.
  */
-int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid,
-			    u32 tsid,
-			    u16 tclass,
-			    u32 *out_sid)
+int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+			    const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid)
 {
 	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
-				    out_sid, true);
+				    qstr, out_sid, true);
 }
 
-int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid,
-				 u32 tsid,
-				 u16 tclass,
-				 u32 *out_sid)
+int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid)
 {
 	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
-				    out_sid, false);
+				    NULL, out_sid, false);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1531,8 +1548,8 @@ int security_member_sid(u32 ssid,
 			u16 tclass,
 			u32 *out_sid)
 {
-	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, out_sid,
-				    false);
+	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, NULL,
+				    out_sid, false);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1553,8 +1570,8 @@ int security_change_sid(u32 ssid,
 			u16 tclass,
 			u32 *out_sid)
 {
-	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, out_sid,
-				    false);
+	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, NULL,
+				    out_sid, false);
 }
 
 /* Clone the SID into the new SID table. */

From 8e6c96935fcc1ed3dbebc96fddfef3f2f2395afc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lucian Adrian Grijincu <lucian.grijincu@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2011 18:42:22 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 06/33] security/selinux: fix /proc/sys/ labeling

This fixes an old (2007) selinux regression: filesystem labeling for
/proc/sys returned
     -r--r--r-- unknown                          /proc/sys/fs/file-nr
instead of
     -r--r--r-- system_u:object_r:sysctl_fs_t:s0 /proc/sys/fs/file-nr

Events that lead to breaking of /proc/sys/ selinux labeling:

1) sysctl was reimplemented to route all calls through /proc/sys/

    commit 77b14db502cb85a031fe8fde6c85d52f3e0acb63
    [PATCH] sysctl: reimplement the sysctl proc support

2) proc_dir_entry was removed from ctl_table:

    commit 3fbfa98112fc3962c416452a0baf2214381030e6
    [PATCH] sysctl: remove the proc_dir_entry member for the sysctl tables

3) selinux still walked the proc_dir_entry tree to apply
   labeling. Because ctl_tables don't have a proc_dir_entry, we did
   not label /proc/sys/ inodes any more. To achieve this the /proc/sys/
   inodes were marked private and private inodes were ignored by
   selinux.

    commit bbaca6c2e7ef0f663bc31be4dad7cf530f6c4962
    [PATCH] selinux: enhance selinux to always ignore private inodes

    commit 86a71dbd3e81e8870d0f0e56b87875f57e58222b
    [PATCH] sysctl: hide the sysctl proc inodes from selinux

Access control checks have been done by means of a special sysctl hook
that was called for read/write accesses to any /proc/sys/ entry.

We don't have to do this because, instead of walking the
proc_dir_entry tree we can walk the dentry tree (as done in this
patch). With this patch:
* we don't mark /proc/sys/ inodes as private
* we don't need the sysclt security hook
* we walk the dentry tree to find the path to the inode.

We have to strip the PID in /proc/PID/ entries that have a
proc_dir_entry because selinux does not know how to label paths like
'/1/net/rpc/nfsd.fh' (and defaults to 'proc_t' labeling). Selinux does
know of '/net/rpc/nfsd.fh' (and applies the 'sysctl_rpc_t' label).

PID stripping from the path was done implicitly in the previous code
because the proc_dir_entry tree had the root in '/net' in the example
from above. The dentry tree has the root in '/1'.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Lucian Adrian Grijincu <lucian.grijincu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c    |   1 -
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 120 ++++++---------------------------------
 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 103 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
index 09a1f92a34e..fb707e018a8 100644
--- a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
+++ b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
@@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ static struct inode *proc_sys_make_inode(struct super_block *sb,
 	ei->sysctl_entry = table;
 
 	inode->i_mtime = inode->i_atime = inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
-	inode->i_flags |= S_PRIVATE; /* tell selinux to ignore this inode */
 	inode->i_mode = table->mode;
 	if (!table->child) {
 		inode->i_mode |= S_IFREG;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 6ae19fd28be..c8b359fc294 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -44,7 +44,6 @@
 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
 #include <linux/namei.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
-#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
 #include <linux/tty.h>
@@ -71,7 +70,6 @@
 #include <net/ipv6.h>
 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
 #include <linux/personality.h>
-#include <linux/sysctl.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/selinux.h>
@@ -1121,39 +1119,35 @@ static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protoc
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
-static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
+static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
 				u16 tclass,
 				u32 *sid)
 {
-	int buflen, rc;
-	char *buffer, *path, *end;
+	int rc;
+	char *buffer, *path;
 
 	buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!buffer)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
-	end = buffer+buflen;
-	*--end = '\0';
-	buflen--;
-	path = end-1;
-	*path = '/';
-	while (de && de != de->parent) {
-		buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
-		if (buflen < 0)
-			break;
-		end -= de->namelen;
-		memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
-		*--end = '/';
-		path = end;
-		de = de->parent;
+	path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
+	if (IS_ERR(path))
+		rc = PTR_ERR(path);
+	else {
+		/* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
+		 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
+		 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
+		while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
+			path[1] = '/';
+			path++;
+		}
+		rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
 	}
-	rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
 	free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
 	return rc;
 }
 #else
-static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
+static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
 				u16 tclass,
 				u32 *sid)
 {
@@ -1315,10 +1309,9 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 		isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
 
 		if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
-			struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
-			if (proci->pde) {
+			if (opt_dentry) {
 				isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
-				rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
+				rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
 							  isec->sclass,
 							  &sid);
 				if (rc)
@@ -1861,82 +1854,6 @@ static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
 	return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
 }
 
-static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
-{
-	int buflen, rc;
-	char *buffer, *path, *end;
-
-	rc = -ENOMEM;
-	buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!buffer)
-		goto out;
-
-	buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
-	end = buffer+buflen;
-	*--end = '\0';
-	buflen--;
-	path = end-1;
-	*path = '/';
-	while (table) {
-		const char *name = table->procname;
-		size_t namelen = strlen(name);
-		buflen -= namelen + 1;
-		if (buflen < 0)
-			goto out_free;
-		end -= namelen;
-		memcpy(end, name, namelen);
-		*--end = '/';
-		path = end;
-		table = table->parent;
-	}
-	buflen -= 4;
-	if (buflen < 0)
-		goto out_free;
-	end -= 4;
-	memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
-	path = end;
-	rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
-out_free:
-	free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
-out:
-	return rc;
-}
-
-static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
-{
-	int error = 0;
-	u32 av;
-	u32 tsid, sid;
-	int rc;
-
-	sid = current_sid();
-
-	rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
-				    SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
-	if (rc) {
-		/* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
-		tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
-	}
-
-	/* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
-	 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
-	if (op == 001) {
-		error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
-				     SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
-	} else {
-		av = 0;
-		if (op & 004)
-			av |= FILE__READ;
-		if (op & 002)
-			av |= FILE__WRITE;
-		if (av)
-			error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
-					     SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
-	}
-
-	return error;
-}
-
 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
@@ -5398,7 +5315,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.ptrace_traceme =		selinux_ptrace_traceme,
 	.capget =			selinux_capget,
 	.capset =			selinux_capset,
-	.sysctl =			selinux_sysctl,
 	.capable =			selinux_capable,
 	.quotactl =			selinux_quotactl,
 	.quota_on =			selinux_quota_on,

From 4916ca401e3051dad326ddd69765bd0e3f32fb9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lucian Adrian Grijincu <lucian.grijincu@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2011 18:44:56 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 07/33] security: remove unused security_sysctl hook

The only user for this hook was selinux. sysctl routes every call
through /proc/sys/. Selinux and other security modules use the file
system checks for sysctl too, so no need for this hook any more.

Signed-off-by: Lucian Adrian Grijincu <lucian.grijincu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 include/linux/security.h | 13 -------------
 kernel/sysctl.c          |  5 -----
 security/capability.c    |  6 ------
 security/security.c      |  5 -----
 4 files changed, 29 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 05dd5a64aa7..14167f2eb35 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1259,12 +1259,6 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	@cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>.
  *	@audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
  *	Return 0 if the capability is granted for @tsk.
- * @sysctl:
- *	Check permission before accessing the @table sysctl variable in the
- *	manner specified by @op.
- *	@table contains the ctl_table structure for the sysctl variable.
- *	@op contains the operation (001 = search, 002 = write, 004 = read).
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @syslog:
  *	Check permission before accessing the kernel message ring or changing
  *	logging to the console.
@@ -1385,7 +1379,6 @@ struct security_operations {
 		       const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
 	int (*capable) (struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
 			int cap, int audit);
-	int (*sysctl) (struct ctl_table *table, int op);
 	int (*quotactl) (int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
 	int (*quota_on) (struct dentry *dentry);
 	int (*syslog) (int type);
@@ -1668,7 +1661,6 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 int security_capable(int cap);
 int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
 int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
-int security_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op);
 int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
 int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry);
 int security_syslog(int type);
@@ -1887,11 +1879,6 @@ int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static inline int security_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static inline int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id,
 				     struct super_block *sb)
 {
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index ae5cbb1e3ce..e24254c27ea 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -1691,13 +1691,8 @@ static int test_perm(int mode, int op)
 
 int sysctl_perm(struct ctl_table_root *root, struct ctl_table *table, int op)
 {
-	int error;
 	int mode;
 
-	error = security_sysctl(table, op & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC));
-	if (error)
-		return error;
-
 	if (root->permissions)
 		mode = root->permissions(root, current->nsproxy, table);
 	else
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 383d14dc12e..85b67c8632d 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -12,11 +12,6 @@
 
 #include <linux/security.h>
 
-static int cap_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static int cap_syslog(int type)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -881,7 +876,6 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capable);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, quotactl);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, quota_on);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sysctl);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, syslog);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, settime);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, vm_enough_memory);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 4830f36e1ab..8f28685ee0d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -182,11 +182,6 @@ int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-int security_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op)
-{
-	return security_ops->sysctl(table, op);
-}
-
 int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
 {
 	return security_ops->quotactl(cmds, type, id, sb);

From 0e0a070d3a47d279de66e08244769556deae2eee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2011 16:36:24 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 08/33] Smack: correct behavior in the mmap hook

The mmap policy enforcement was not properly handling the
  interaction between the global and local rule lists.
  Instead of going through one and then the other, which
  missed the important case where a rule specified that
  there should be no access, combine the access limitations
  where there is a rule in each list.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 123a499ded3..92cb71507f5 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1109,38 +1109,6 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 	return rc;
 }
 
-/**
- * smk_mmap_list_check - the mmap check
- * @sub: subject label
- * @obj: object label
- * @access: access mode
- * @local: the task specific rule list
- *
- * Returns 0 if acces is permitted, -EACCES otherwise
- */
-static int smk_mmap_list_check(char *sub, char *obj, int access,
-				struct list_head *local)
-{
-	int may;
-
-	/*
-	 * If there is not a global rule that
-	 * allows access say no.
-	 */
-	may = smk_access_entry(sub, obj, &smack_rule_list);
-	if (may == -ENOENT || (may & access) != access)
-		return -EACCES;
-	/*
-	 * If there is a task local rule that
-	 * denies access say no.
-	 */
-	may = smk_access_entry(sub, obj, local);
-	if (may != -ENOENT && (may & access) != access)
-		return -EACCES;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
 /**
  * smack_file_mmap :
  * Check permissions for a mmap operation.  The @file may be NULL, e.g.
@@ -1160,8 +1128,12 @@ static int smack_file_mmap(struct file *file,
 	struct task_smack *tsp;
 	char *sp;
 	char *msmack;
+	char *osmack;
 	struct inode_smack *isp;
 	struct dentry *dp;
+	int may;
+	int mmay;
+	int tmay;
 	int rc;
 
 	/* do DAC check on address space usage */
@@ -1199,16 +1171,57 @@ static int smack_file_mmap(struct file *file,
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &smack_rule_list, list) {
 		if (srp->smk_subject != sp)
 			continue;
+
+		osmack = srp->smk_object;
 		/*
 		 * Matching labels always allows access.
 		 */
-		if (msmack == srp->smk_object)
+		if (msmack == osmack)
+			continue;
+		/*
+		 * If there is a matching local rule take
+		 * that into account as well.
+		 */
+		may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject, osmack,
+					&tsp->smk_rules);
+		if (may == -ENOENT)
+			may = srp->smk_access;
+		else
+			may &= srp->smk_access;
+		/*
+		 * If may is zero the SMACK64MMAP subject can't
+		 * possibly have less access.
+		 */
+		if (may == 0)
 			continue;
 
-		rc = smk_mmap_list_check(msmack, srp->smk_object,
-					 srp->smk_access, &tsp->smk_rules);
-		if (rc != 0)
+		/*
+		 * Fetch the global list entry.
+		 * If there isn't one a SMACK64MMAP subject
+		 * can't have as much access as current.
+		 */
+		mmay = smk_access_entry(msmack, osmack, &smack_rule_list);
+		if (mmay == -ENOENT) {
+			rc = -EACCES;
 			break;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * If there is a local entry it modifies the
+		 * potential access, too.
+		 */
+		tmay = smk_access_entry(msmack, osmack, &tsp->smk_rules);
+		if (tmay != -ENOENT)
+			mmay &= tmay;
+
+		/*
+		 * If there is any access available to current that is
+		 * not available to a SMACK64MMAP subject
+		 * deny access.
+		 */
+		if ((may | mmay) != may) {
+			rc = -EACCES;
+			break;
+		}
 	}
 
 	rcu_read_unlock();

From db904aa8147440b750a35d58befed38155a1abb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Shan Wei <shanwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2011 19:58:11 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 09/33] security:smack: kill unused SMACK_LIST_MAX, MAY_ANY and
 MAY_ANYWRITE

Kill unused macros of SMACK_LIST_MAX, MAY_ANY and MAY_ANYWRITE.
v2: As Casey Schaufler's advice, also remove MAY_ANY.

Signed-off-by: Shan Wei <shanwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 security/smack/smack.h | 8 --------
 1 file changed, 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index e365d455ceb..b449cfdad21 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -154,12 +154,6 @@ struct smack_known {
  */
 #define SMACK_MAGIC	0x43415d53 /* "SMAC" */
 
-/*
- * A limit on the number of entries in the lists
- * makes some of the list administration easier.
- */
-#define SMACK_LIST_MAX	10000
-
 /*
  * CIPSO defaults.
  */
@@ -177,9 +171,7 @@ struct smack_known {
 /*
  * Just to make the common cases easier to deal with
  */
-#define MAY_ANY		(MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
 #define MAY_ANYREAD	(MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC)
-#define MAY_ANYWRITE	(MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND)
 #define MAY_READWRITE	(MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE)
 #define MAY_NOT		0
 

From 75a25637bf8a1b8fbed2368c0a3ec15c66a534f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2011 19:58:42 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 10/33] Smack: correct final mmap check comparison

The mmap policy enforcement checks the access of the
SMACK64MMAP subject against the current subject incorrectly.
The check as written works correctly only if the access
rules involved have the same access. This is the common
case, so initial testing did not find a problem.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 92cb71507f5..5ab3f39442f 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1218,7 +1218,7 @@ static int smack_file_mmap(struct file *file,
 		 * not available to a SMACK64MMAP subject
 		 * deny access.
 		 */
-		if ((may | mmay) != may) {
+		if ((may | mmay) != mmay) {
 			rc = -EACCES;
 			break;
 		}

From a68a27b6f2354273bacc39c3dd06456edb202230 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Nov 2010 10:10:56 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 11/33] IMA: convert i_readcount to atomic

Convert the inode's i_readcount from an unsigned int to atomic.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 include/linux/fs.h                |  3 +--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c |  7 ++++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 11 ++++++-----
 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index baf3e556ff0..ef85322863b 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -794,8 +794,7 @@ struct inode {
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA
-	/* protected by i_lock */
-	unsigned int		i_readcount; /* struct files open RO */
+	atomic_t		i_readcount; /* struct files open RO */
 #endif
 	atomic_t		i_writecount;
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
index c442e47b678..f0053552fd5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
@@ -137,10 +137,11 @@ void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
 {
 	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
 
-	if (inode->i_readcount)
-		printk(KERN_INFO "%s: readcount: %u\n", __func__, inode->i_readcount);
+	if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount))
+		printk(KERN_INFO "%s: readcount: %u\n", __func__,
+		       atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount));
 
-	inode->i_readcount = 0;
+	atomic_set(&inode->i_readcount, 0);
 
 	if (!IS_IMA(inode))
 		return;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 203de979d30..6e8cb931b8f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ void ima_counts_get(struct file *file)
 		goto out;
 
 	if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
-		if (inode->i_readcount && IS_IMA(inode))
+		if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode))
 			send_tomtou = true;
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ void ima_counts_get(struct file *file)
 out:
 	/* remember the vfs deals with i_writecount */
 	if ((mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
-		inode->i_readcount++;
+		atomic_inc(&inode->i_readcount);
 
 	spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
 
@@ -149,15 +149,16 @@ static void ima_dec_counts(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 	assert_spin_locked(&inode->i_lock);
 
 	if ((mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ) {
-		if (unlikely(inode->i_readcount == 0)) {
+		if (unlikely(atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) == 0)) {
 			if (!ima_limit_imbalance(file)) {
 				printk(KERN_INFO "%s: open/free imbalance (r:%u)\n",
-				       __func__, inode->i_readcount);
+				       __func__,
+				       atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount));
 				dump_stack();
 			}
 			return;
 		}
-		inode->i_readcount--;
+		atomic_dec(&inode->i_readcount);
 	}
 }
 

From a5c96ebf1d71df0c5fb77ab58c9aeb307cf02372 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Nov 2010 10:11:37 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 12/33] IMA: define readcount functions

Define i_readcount_inc/dec() functions to be called from the VFS layer.

Changelog:
- renamed iget/iput_readcount to i_readcount_inc/dec (Dave Chinner's suggestion)
- removed i_lock in iput_readcount() (based on comments:Dave Chinner,Eric Paris)

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 include/linux/fs.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index ef85322863b..a3e8f02b727 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -2186,6 +2186,26 @@ static inline void allow_write_access(struct file *file)
 	if (file)
 		atomic_inc(&file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_writecount);
 }
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
+static inline void i_readcount_dec(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	BUG_ON(!atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount));
+	atomic_dec(&inode->i_readcount);
+}
+static inline void i_readcount_inc(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	atomic_inc(&inode->i_readcount);
+}
+#else
+static inline void i_readcount_dec(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	return;
+}
+static inline void i_readcount_inc(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	return;
+}
+#endif
 extern int do_pipe_flags(int *, int);
 extern struct file *create_read_pipe(struct file *f, int flags);
 extern struct file *create_write_pipe(int flags);

From 890275b5eb79e9933d12290473eab9ac38da0051 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Nov 2010 10:13:07 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 13/33] IMA: maintain i_readcount in the VFS layer

ima_counts_get() updated the readcount and invalidated the PCR,
as necessary. Only update the i_readcount in the VFS layer.
Move the PCR invalidation checks to ima_file_check(), where it
belongs.

Maintaining the i_readcount in the VFS layer, will allow other
subsystems to use i_readcount.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 fs/file_table.c                   |  5 ++++-
 fs/open.c                         |  3 ++-
 include/linux/ima.h               |  6 ------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c |  2 --
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 25 ++++++++-----------------
 5 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c
index c3dee381f1b..0c724deb46f 100644
--- a/fs/file_table.c
+++ b/fs/file_table.c
@@ -190,7 +190,8 @@ struct file *alloc_file(struct path *path, fmode_t mode,
 		file_take_write(file);
 		WARN_ON(mnt_clone_write(path->mnt));
 	}
-	ima_counts_get(file);
+	if ((mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
+		i_readcount_inc(path->dentry->d_inode);
 	return file;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(alloc_file);
@@ -251,6 +252,8 @@ static void __fput(struct file *file)
 	fops_put(file->f_op);
 	put_pid(file->f_owner.pid);
 	file_sb_list_del(file);
+	if ((file->f_mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
+		i_readcount_dec(inode);
 	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
 		drop_file_write_access(file);
 	file->f_path.dentry = NULL;
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index 4197b9ed023..0d485c50bb9 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -688,7 +688,8 @@ static struct file *__dentry_open(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
 		if (error)
 			goto cleanup_all;
 	}
-	ima_counts_get(f);
+	if ((f->f_mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
+		i_readcount_inc(inode);
 
 	f->f_flags &= ~(O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_NOCTTY | O_TRUNC);
 
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 975837e7d6c..09e6e62f995 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ extern void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode);
 extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask);
 extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
 extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot);
-extern void ima_counts_get(struct file *file);
 
 #else
 static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -53,10 +52,5 @@ static inline int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline void ima_counts_get(struct file *file)
-{
-	return;
-}
-
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_H */
 #endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
index f0053552fd5..68efe3b8d99 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
@@ -141,8 +141,6 @@ void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
 		printk(KERN_INFO "%s: readcount: %u\n", __func__,
 		       atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount));
 
-	atomic_set(&inode->i_readcount, 0);
-
 	if (!IS_IMA(inode))
 		return;
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 6e8cb931b8f..69b4856af4d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -86,17 +86,16 @@ out:
 }
 
 /*
- * ima_counts_get - increment file counts
+ * ima_rdwr_violation_check
  *
- * Maintain read/write counters for all files, but only
- * invalidate the PCR for measured files:
+ * Only invalidate the PCR for measured files:
  * 	- Opening a file for write when already open for read,
  *	  results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
  *	- Opening a file for read when already open for write,
  * 	  could result in a file measurement error.
  *
  */
-void ima_counts_get(struct file *file)
+static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
 {
 	struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
@@ -104,13 +103,10 @@ void ima_counts_get(struct file *file)
 	int rc;
 	bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false;
 
-	if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+	if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || !ima_initialized)
 		return;
 
-	spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
-
-	if (!ima_initialized)
-		goto out;
+	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);	/* file metadata: permissions, xattr */
 
 	if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
 		if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode))
@@ -125,11 +121,7 @@ void ima_counts_get(struct file *file)
 	if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0)
 		send_writers = true;
 out:
-	/* remember the vfs deals with i_writecount */
-	if ((mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
-		atomic_inc(&inode->i_readcount);
-
-	spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
+	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
 
 	if (send_tomtou)
 		ima_add_violation(inode, dentry->d_name.name, "invalid_pcr",
@@ -158,7 +150,6 @@ static void ima_dec_counts(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 			}
 			return;
 		}
-		atomic_dec(&inode->i_readcount);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -203,8 +194,7 @@ static void ima_file_free_noiint(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
  * ima_file_free - called on __fput()
  * @file: pointer to file structure being freed
  *
- * Flag files that changed, based on i_version;
- * and decrement the i_readcount.
+ * Flag files that changed, based on i_version
  */
 void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
 {
@@ -318,6 +308,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
 	int rc;
 
+	ima_rdwr_violation_check(file);
 	rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
 				 mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
 				 FILE_CHECK);

From 854fdd55bfdd56cfc61bd30f2062a9268fcebba6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Nov 2010 10:14:22 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 14/33] IMA: remove IMA imbalance checking

Now that i_readcount is maintained by the VFS layer, remove the
imbalance checking in IMA. Cleans up the IMA code nicely.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c |   4 --
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 104 ++----------------------------
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 104 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
index 68efe3b8d99..4ae73040ab7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
@@ -137,10 +137,6 @@ void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
 {
 	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
 
-	if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount))
-		printk(KERN_INFO "%s: readcount: %u\n", __func__,
-		       atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount));
-
 	if (!IS_IMA(inode))
 		return;
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 69b4856af4d..2df90215119 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -36,55 +36,6 @@ static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
 }
 __setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
 
-struct ima_imbalance {
-	struct hlist_node node;
-	unsigned long fsmagic;
-};
-
-/*
- * ima_limit_imbalance - emit one imbalance message per filesystem type
- *
- * Maintain list of filesystem types that do not measure files properly.
- * Return false if unknown, true if known.
- */
-static bool ima_limit_imbalance(struct file *file)
-{
-	static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ima_imbalance_lock);
-	static HLIST_HEAD(ima_imbalance_list);
-
-	struct super_block *sb = file->f_dentry->d_sb;
-	struct ima_imbalance *entry;
-	struct hlist_node *node;
-	bool found = false;
-
-	rcu_read_lock();
-	hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, node, &ima_imbalance_list, node) {
-		if (entry->fsmagic == sb->s_magic) {
-			found = true;
-			break;
-		}
-	}
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-	if (found)
-		goto out;
-
-	entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_NOFS);
-	if (!entry)
-		goto out;
-	entry->fsmagic = sb->s_magic;
-	spin_lock(&ima_imbalance_lock);
-	/*
-	 * we could have raced and something else might have added this fs
-	 * to the list, but we don't really care
-	 */
-	hlist_add_head_rcu(&entry->node, &ima_imbalance_list);
-	spin_unlock(&ima_imbalance_lock);
-	printk(KERN_INFO "IMA: unmeasured files on fsmagic: %lX\n",
-	       entry->fsmagic);
-out:
-	return found;
-}
-
 /*
  * ima_rdwr_violation_check
  *
@@ -131,65 +82,20 @@ out:
 				  "open_writers");
 }
 
-/*
- * Decrement ima counts
- */
-static void ima_dec_counts(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
-{
-	mode_t mode = file->f_mode;
-
-	assert_spin_locked(&inode->i_lock);
-
-	if ((mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ) {
-		if (unlikely(atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) == 0)) {
-			if (!ima_limit_imbalance(file)) {
-				printk(KERN_INFO "%s: open/free imbalance (r:%u)\n",
-				       __func__,
-				       atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount));
-				dump_stack();
-			}
-			return;
-		}
-	}
-}
-
 static void ima_check_last_writer(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
 				  struct inode *inode,
 				  struct file *file)
 {
 	mode_t mode = file->f_mode;
 
-	BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&iint->mutex));
-	assert_spin_locked(&inode->i_lock);
-
+	mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
 	if (mode & FMODE_WRITE &&
 	    atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1 &&
 	    iint->version != inode->i_version)
 		iint->flags &= ~IMA_MEASURED;
-}
-
-static void ima_file_free_iint(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode,
-			       struct file *file)
-{
-	mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
-	spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
-
-	ima_dec_counts(inode, file);
-	ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file);
-
-	spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
 	mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
 }
 
-static void ima_file_free_noiint(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
-{
-	spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
-
-	ima_dec_counts(inode, file);
-
-	spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
-}
-
 /**
  * ima_file_free - called on __fput()
  * @file: pointer to file structure being freed
@@ -205,12 +111,10 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
 		return;
 
 	iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
+	if (!iint)
+		return;
 
-	if (iint)
-		ima_file_free_iint(iint, inode, file);
-	else
-		ima_file_free_noiint(inode, file);
-
+	ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file);
 }
 
 static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,

From 1adace9bb04a5f4a4dea9e642089102661bb0ceb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2011 10:19:43 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 15/33] ima: remove unnecessary call to ima_must_measure

The original ima_must_measure() function based its results on cached
iint information, which required an iint be allocated for all files.
Currently, an iint is allocated only for files in policy.  As a result,
for those files in policy, ima_must_measure() is now called twice: once
to determine if the inode is in the measurement policy and, the second
time, to determine if it needs to be measured/re-measured.

The second call to ima_must_measure() unnecessarily checks to see if
the file is in policy. As we already know the file is in policy, this
patch removes the second unnecessary call to ima_must_measure(), removes
the vestige iint parameter, and just checks the iint directly to determine
if the inode has been measured or needs to be measured/re-measured.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h      |  3 +--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c  | 13 +++----------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c |  6 +++---
 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index ac79032bdf2..08408bd7146 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -110,8 +110,7 @@ struct ima_iint_cache {
 };
 
 /* LIM API function definitions */
-int ima_must_measure(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode,
-		     int mask, int function);
+int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function);
 int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
 void ima_store_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			   const unsigned char *filename);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index d3963de6003..da36d2c085a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -105,20 +105,13 @@ err_out:
  * 	mask: contains the permission mask
  *	fsmagic: hex value
  *
- * Must be called with iint->mutex held.
- *
- * Return 0 to measure. Return 1 if already measured.
- * For matching a DONT_MEASURE policy, no policy, or other
- * error, return an error code.
+ * Return 0 to measure. For matching a DONT_MEASURE policy, no policy,
+ * or other error, return an error code.
 */
-int ima_must_measure(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode,
-		     int mask, int function)
+int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
 {
 	int must_measure;
 
-	if (iint && iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)
-		return 1;
-
 	must_measure = ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask);
 	return must_measure ? 0 : -EACCES;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 2df90215119..39d66dc2b8e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	rc = ima_must_measure(NULL, inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK);
+	rc = ima_must_measure(inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK);
 	if (rc < 0)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 	if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
 		return 0;
 
-	rc = ima_must_measure(NULL, inode, mask, function);
+	rc = ima_must_measure(inode, mask, function);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
 retry:
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ retry:
 
 	mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
 
-	rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, mask, function);
+	rc = iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED ? 1 : 0;
 	if (rc != 0)
 		goto out;
 

From 8f82a6880d8d03961181d973388e1df2772a8b24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Feb 2011 12:54:33 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 16/33] selinux: Fix check for xfrm selinux context algorithm

selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc accidentally checks the xfrm domain of
interpretation against the selinux context algorithm. This patch
fixes this by checking ctx_alg against the selinux context algorithm.

Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/xfrm.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index fff78d3b51a..728c57e3d65 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
 	if (!uctx)
 		goto not_from_user;
 
-	if (uctx->ctx_doi != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX)
+	if (uctx->ctx_alg != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	str_len = uctx->ctx_len;

From b9679a76187694138099e09d7f5091b73086e6d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Feb 2011 12:55:21 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 17/33] selinux: Fix wrong checks for selinux_policycap_netpeer

selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat and selinux_ip_postroute_compat are just
called if selinux_policycap_netpeer is not set. However in these
functions we check if selinux_policycap_netpeer is set. This leads
to some dead code and to the fact that selinux_xfrm_postroute_last
is never executed. This patch removes the dead code and the checks
for selinux_policycap_netpeer in the compatibility functions.

Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 24 ++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index c8b359fc294..b4e1ca021fc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3915,7 +3915,6 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 {
 	int err = 0;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
-	u32 peer_sid;
 	u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	char *addrp;
@@ -3934,20 +3933,10 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 			return err;
 	}
 
-	if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
-		err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
-		if (err)
-			return err;
-		err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
-				   SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
-		if (err)
-			selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
-	} else {
-		err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
-		if (err)
-			return err;
-		err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
-	}
+	err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -4442,9 +4431,8 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
 				 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
 			return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
 
-	if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
-		if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
-			return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+	if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
+		return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
 
 	return NF_ACCEPT;
 }

From 4a7ab3dcad0b66a486c468ccf0d6197c5dbe3326 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Feb 2011 12:56:23 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 18/33] selinux: Fix packet forwarding checks on postrouting

The IPSKB_FORWARDED and IP6SKB_FORWARDED flags are used only in the
multicast forwarding case to indicate that a packet looped back after
forward. So these flags are not a good indicator for packet forwarding.
A better indicator is the incoming interface. If we have no socket context,
but an incoming interface and we see the packet in the ip postroute hook,
the packet is going to be forwarded.

With this patch we use the incoming interface as an indicator on packet
forwarding.

Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 23 +++++------------------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index b4e1ca021fc..8ffed9f2004 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4475,27 +4475,14 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
 	 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
 	sk = skb->sk;
 	if (sk == NULL) {
-		switch (family) {
-		case PF_INET:
-			if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
-				secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
-			else
-				secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
-			break;
-		case PF_INET6:
-			if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
-				secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
-			else
-				secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
-			break;
-		default:
-			return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
-		}
-		if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
+		if (skb->skb_iif) {
+			secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
 			if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
 				return NF_DROP;
-		} else
+		} else {
+			secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
 			peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+		}
 	} else {
 		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 		peer_sid = sksec->sid;

From 47ac19ea429aee561f66e9cd05b908e8ffbc498a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2011 15:39:20 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 19/33] selinux: drop unused packet flow permissions

These permissions are not used and can be dropped in the kernel
definitions.

Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
---
 security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 7ed3663332e..4227e5fa786 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -132,8 +132,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	{ "appletalk_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "packet",
-	  { "send", "recv", "relabelto", "flow_in", "flow_out",
-	    "forward_in", "forward_out", NULL } },
+	  { "send", "recv", "relabelto", "forward_in", "forward_out", NULL } },
 	{ "key",
 	  { "view", "read", "write", "search", "link", "setattr", "create",
 	    NULL } },

From 0b24dcb7f2f7a0ce9b762eef0362c21c88f47b32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2011 15:39:20 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 20/33] Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking"

This reverts commit 242631c49d4cf39642741d6627750151b058233b.

Conflicts:

	security/selinux/hooks.c

SELinux used to recognize certain individual ioctls and check
permissions based on the knowledge of the individual ioctl.  In commit
242631c49d4cf396 the SELinux code stopped trying to understand
individual ioctls and to instead looked at the ioctl access bits to
determine in we should check read or write for that operation.  This
same suggestion was made to SMACK (and I believe copied into TOMOYO).
But this suggestion is total rubbish.  The ioctl access bits are
actually the access requirements for the structure being passed into the
ioctl, and are completely unrelated to the operation of the ioctl or the
object the ioctl is being performed upon.

Take FS_IOC_FIEMAP as an example.  FS_IOC_FIEMAP is defined as:

FS_IOC_FIEMAP _IOWR('f', 11, struct fiemap)

So it has access bits R and W.  What this really means is that the
kernel is going to both read and write to the struct fiemap.  It has
nothing at all to do with the operations that this ioctl might perform
on the file itself!

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 8ffed9f2004..8294dbfd1f1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -24,9 +24,11 @@
  */
 
 #include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kd.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
@@ -36,6 +38,7 @@
 #include <linux/mman.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
 #include <linux/swap.h>
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
@@ -2849,16 +2852,47 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 			      unsigned long arg)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-	u32 av = 0;
+	int error = 0;
 
-	if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
-		av |= FILE__WRITE;
-	if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
-		av |= FILE__READ;
-	if (!av)
-		av = FILE__IOCTL;
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case FIONREAD:
+	/* fall through */
+	case FIBMAP:
+	/* fall through */
+	case FIGETBSZ:
+	/* fall through */
+	case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
+	/* fall through */
+	case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
+		error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
+		break;
 
-	return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
+	case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
+	/* fall through */
+	case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
+		error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
+		break;
+
+	/* sys_ioctl() checks */
+	case FIONBIO:
+	/* fall through */
+	case FIOASYNC:
+		error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
+		break;
+
+	case KDSKBENT:
+	case KDSKBSENT:
+		error = task_has_capability(current, cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
+					    SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+		break;
+
+	/* default case assumes that the command will go
+	 * to the file's ioctl() function.
+	 */
+	default:
+		error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
+	}
+	return error;
 }
 
 static int default_noexec;

From eae61f3c829439f8f9121b5cd48a14be04df451f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2011 16:54:24 +0900
Subject: [PATCH 21/33] TOMOYO: Fix memory leak upon file open.

In tomoyo_check_open_permission() since 2.6.36, TOMOYO was by error
recalculating already calculated pathname when checking allow_rewrite
permission. As a result, memory will leak whenever a file is opened for writing
without O_APPEND flag. Also, performance will degrade because TOMOYO is
calculating pathname regardless of profile configuration.
This patch fixes the leak and performance degrade.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 security/tomoyo/file.c | 5 +----
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/tomoyo/file.c b/security/tomoyo/file.c
index 9d32f182301..cb09f1fce91 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/file.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/file.c
@@ -927,7 +927,7 @@ int tomoyo_check_open_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
 				 struct path *path, const int flag)
 {
 	const u8 acc_mode = ACC_MODE(flag);
-	int error = -ENOMEM;
+	int error = 0;
 	struct tomoyo_path_info buf;
 	struct tomoyo_request_info r;
 	int idx;
@@ -938,9 +938,6 @@ int tomoyo_check_open_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
 	buf.name = NULL;
 	r.mode = TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED;
 	idx = tomoyo_read_lock();
-	if (!tomoyo_get_realpath(&buf, path))
-		goto out;
-	error = 0;
 	/*
 	 * If the filename is specified by "deny_rewrite" keyword,
 	 * we need to check "allow_rewrite" permission when the filename is not

From 4bc6c2d5d8386800fde23a8e78cd4f04a0ade0ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2011 13:46:08 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 22/33] SELinux: Auto-generate security_is_socket_class

The security_is_socket_class() is auto-generated by genheaders based
on classmap.h to reduce maintenance effort when a new class is defined
in SELinux kernel. The name for any socket class should be suffixed by
"socket" and doesn't contain more than one substr of "socket".

Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
---
 scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 security/selinux/include/classmap.h     |  4 ++++
 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+)

diff --git a/scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c b/scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c
index 58a12c27870..539855ff31f 100644
--- a/scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c
+++ b/scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c
@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	int i, j, k;
 	int isids_len;
 	FILE *fout;
+	const char *needle = "SOCKET";
+	char *substr;
 
 	progname = argv[0];
 
@@ -88,6 +90,24 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 		fprintf(fout, "%2d\n", i);
 	}
 	fprintf(fout, "\n#define SECINITSID_NUM %d\n", i-1);
+	fprintf(fout, "\nstatic inline bool security_is_socket_class(u16 kern_tclass)\n");
+	fprintf(fout, "{\n");
+	fprintf(fout, "\tbool sock = false;\n\n");
+	fprintf(fout, "\tswitch (kern_tclass) {\n");
+	for (i = 0; secclass_map[i].name; i++) {
+		struct security_class_mapping *map = &secclass_map[i];
+		substr = strstr(map->name, needle);
+		if (substr && strcmp(substr, needle) == 0)
+			fprintf(fout, "\tcase SECCLASS_%s:\n", map->name);
+	}
+	fprintf(fout, "\t\tsock = true;\n");
+	fprintf(fout, "\t\tbreak;\n");
+	fprintf(fout, "\tdefault:\n");
+	fprintf(fout, "\t\tbreak;\n");
+	fprintf(fout, "\t}\n\n");
+	fprintf(fout, "\treturn sock;\n");
+	fprintf(fout, "}\n");
+
 	fprintf(fout, "\n#endif\n");
 	fclose(fout);
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 4227e5fa786..b8c53723e09 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -12,6 +12,10 @@
 #define COMMON_IPC_PERMS "create", "destroy", "getattr", "setattr", "read", \
 	    "write", "associate", "unix_read", "unix_write"
 
+/*
+ * Note: The name for any socket class should be suffixed by "socket",
+ *	 and doesn't contain more than one substr of "socket".
+ */
 struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	{ "security",
 	  { "compute_av", "compute_create", "compute_member",

From 6f5317e730505d5cbc851c435a2dfe3d5a21d343 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2011 13:32:33 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 23/33] SELinux: Socket retains creator role and MLS attribute

The socket SID would be computed on creation and no longer inherit
its creator's SID by default. Socket may have a different type but
needs to retain the creator's role and MLS attribute in order not
to break labeled networking and network access control.

The kernel value for a class would be used to determine if the class
if one of socket classes. If security_compute_sid is called from
userspace the policy value for a class would be mapped to the relevant
kernel value first.

Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
---
 security/selinux/ss/mls.c      |  5 +++--
 security/selinux/ss/mls.h      |  3 ++-
 security/selinux/ss/services.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index 1ef8e4e8988..e96174216bc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -512,7 +512,8 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
 		    struct context *tcontext,
 		    u16 tclass,
 		    u32 specified,
-		    struct context *newcontext)
+		    struct context *newcontext,
+		    bool sock)
 {
 	struct range_trans rtr;
 	struct mls_range *r;
@@ -531,7 +532,7 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
 			return mls_range_set(newcontext, r);
 		/* Fallthrough */
 	case AVTAB_CHANGE:
-		if (tclass == policydb.process_class)
+		if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true))
 			/* Use the process MLS attributes. */
 			return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, scontext);
 		else
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
index cd9152632e5..037bf9d82d4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
@@ -49,7 +49,8 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
 		    struct context *tcontext,
 		    u16 tclass,
 		    u32 specified,
-		    struct context *newcontext);
+		    struct context *newcontext,
+		    bool sock);
 
 int mls_setup_user_range(struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
 			 struct context *usercon);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 2e36e03c21f..3e7544d2a07 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -201,6 +201,21 @@ static u16 unmap_class(u16 tclass)
 	return tclass;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Get kernel value for class from its policy value
+ */
+static u16 map_class(u16 pol_value)
+{
+	u16 i;
+
+	for (i = 1; i < current_mapping_size; i++) {
+		if (current_mapping[i].value == pol_value)
+			return i;
+	}
+
+	return pol_value;
+}
+
 static void map_decision(u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
 			 int allow_unknown)
 {
@@ -1374,6 +1389,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 	struct avtab_node *node;
 	u16 tclass;
 	int rc = 0;
+	bool sock;
 
 	if (!ss_initialized) {
 		switch (orig_tclass) {
@@ -1391,10 +1407,13 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 
 	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 
-	if (kern)
+	if (kern) {
 		tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
-	else
+		sock = security_is_socket_class(orig_tclass);
+	} else {
 		tclass = orig_tclass;
+		sock = security_is_socket_class(map_class(tclass));
+	}
 
 	scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
 	if (!scontext) {
@@ -1425,7 +1444,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 	}
 
 	/* Set the role and type to default values. */
-	if (tclass == policydb.process_class) {
+	if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true)) {
 		/* Use the current role and type of process. */
 		newcontext.role = scontext->role;
 		newcontext.type = scontext->type;
@@ -1482,7 +1501,8 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 
 	/* Set the MLS attributes.
 	   This is done last because it may allocate memory. */
-	rc = mls_compute_sid(scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified, &newcontext);
+	rc = mls_compute_sid(scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified,
+			     &newcontext, sock);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out_unlock;
 

From 2ad18bdf3b8f84c85c7da7e4de365f7c5701fb3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2011 13:32:34 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 24/33] SELinux: Compute SID for the newly created socket

The security context for the newly created socket shares the same
user, role and MLS attribute as its creator but may have a different
type, which could be specified by a type_transition rule in the relevant
policy package.

Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
[fix call to security_transition_sid to include qstr, Eric Paris]
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 8294dbfd1f1..3decf07b8dc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3591,9 +3591,16 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
 
 /* socket security operations */
 
-static u32 socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec)
+static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
+				 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
 {
-	return tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
+	if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
+		*socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
+				       socksid);
 }
 
 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
@@ -3617,12 +3624,16 @@ static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
 	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
 	u32 newsid;
 	u16 secclass;
+	int rc;
 
 	if (kern)
 		return 0;
 
-	newsid = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec);
 	secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
+	rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
 	return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
 }
 
@@ -3634,12 +3645,16 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
 	int err = 0;
 
+	isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
+
 	if (kern)
 		isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
-	else
-		isec->sid = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec);
+	else {
+		err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
 
-	isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
 	isec->initialized = 1;
 
 	if (sock->sk) {

From ff36fe2c845cab2102e4826c1ffa0a6ebf487c65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2011 16:09:14 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 25/33] LSM: Pass -o remount options to the LSM

The VFS mount code passes the mount options to the LSM.  The LSM will remove
options it understands from the data and the VFS will then pass the remaining
options onto the underlying filesystem.  This is how options like the
SELinux context= work.  The problem comes in that -o remount never calls
into LSM code.  So if you include an LSM specific option it will get passed
to the filesystem and will cause the remount to fail.  An example of where
this is a problem is the 'seclabel' option.  The SELinux LSM hook will
print this word in /proc/mounts if the filesystem is being labeled using
xattrs.  If you pass this word on mount it will be silently stripped and
ignored.  But if you pass this word on remount the LSM never gets called
and it will be passed to the FS.  The FS doesn't know what seclabel means
and thus should fail the mount.  For example an ext3 fs mounted over loop

# mount -o loop /tmp/fs /mnt/tmp
# cat /proc/mounts | grep /mnt/tmp
/dev/loop0 /mnt/tmp ext3 rw,seclabel,relatime,errors=continue,barrier=0,data=ordered 0 0
# mount -o remount /mnt/tmp
mount: /mnt/tmp not mounted already, or bad option
# dmesg
EXT3-fs (loop0): error: unrecognized mount option "seclabel" or missing value

This patch passes the remount mount options to an new LSM hook.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 fs/namespace.c           |  4 ++++
 include/linux/security.h | 13 +++++++++++++
 security/capability.c    |  6 ++++++
 security/security.c      |  5 +++++
 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index 3ddfd9046c4..1b3f2ac59c5 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -1800,6 +1800,10 @@ static int do_remount(struct path *path, int flags, int mnt_flags,
 	if (path->dentry != path->mnt->mnt_root)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	err = security_sb_remount(sb, data);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	down_write(&sb->s_umount);
 	if (flags & MS_BIND)
 		err = change_mount_flags(path->mnt, flags);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 14167f2eb35..d11ac43ecc4 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -268,6 +268,12 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	@orig the original mount data copied from userspace.
  *	@copy copied data which will be passed to the security module.
  *	Returns 0 if the copy was successful.
+ * @sb_remount:
+ *	Extracts security system specifc mount options and verifys no changes
+ *	are being made to those options.
+ *	@sb superblock being remounted
+ *	@data contains the filesystem-specific data.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @sb_umount:
  *	Check permission before the @mnt file system is unmounted.
  *	@mnt contains the mounted file system.
@@ -1394,6 +1400,7 @@ struct security_operations {
 	int (*sb_alloc_security) (struct super_block *sb);
 	void (*sb_free_security) (struct super_block *sb);
 	int (*sb_copy_data) (char *orig, char *copy);
+	int (*sb_remount) (struct super_block *sb, void *data);
 	int (*sb_kern_mount) (struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data);
 	int (*sb_show_options) (struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb);
 	int (*sb_statfs) (struct dentry *dentry);
@@ -1676,6 +1683,7 @@ int security_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb);
 void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb);
 int security_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy);
+int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data);
 int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data);
 int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb);
 int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry);
@@ -1955,6 +1963,11 @@ static inline int security_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static inline int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 {
 	return 0;
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 85b67c8632d..ab3d807accc 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -54,6 +54,11 @@ static int cap_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int cap_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int cap_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -887,6 +892,7 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_alloc_security);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_free_security);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_copy_data);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_remount);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_kern_mount);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_show_options);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_statfs);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 8f28685ee0d..b1d6134548b 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -267,6 +267,11 @@ int security_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_copy_data);
 
+int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+{
+	return security_ops->sb_remount(sb, data);
+}
+
 int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 {
 	return security_ops->sb_kern_mount(sb, flags, data);

From 026eb167ae77244458fa4b4b9fc171209c079ba7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2011 16:09:14 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 26/33] SELinux: implement the new sb_remount LSM hook

For SELinux we do not allow security information to change during a remount
operation.  Thus this hook simply strips the security module options from
the data and verifies that those are the same options as exist on the
current superblock.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 86 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 3decf07b8dc..f2f3cf2e806 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2363,6 +2363,91 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
+static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+{
+	int rc, i, *flags;
+	struct security_mnt_opts opts;
+	char *secdata, **mount_options;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+
+	if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!data)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
+		return 0;
+
+	security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
+	secdata = alloc_secdata();
+	if (!secdata)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_free_secdata;
+
+	rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_free_secdata;
+
+	mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
+	flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
+		u32 sid;
+		size_t len;
+
+		if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
+			continue;
+		len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
+		rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid);
+		if (rc) {
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
+			       "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
+			       mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
+			goto out_free_opts;
+		}
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		switch (flags[i]) {
+		case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
+				goto out_bad_option;
+			break;
+		case CONTEXT_MNT:
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
+				goto out_bad_option;
+			break;
+		case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
+			struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
+			root_isec = sb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
+
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
+				goto out_bad_option;
+			break;
+		}
+		case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
+				goto out_bad_option;
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto out_free_opts;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = 0;
+out_free_opts:
+	security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
+out_free_secdata:
+	free_secdata(secdata);
+	return rc;
+out_bad_option:
+	printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
+	       "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
+	       sb->s_type->name);
+	goto out_free_opts;
+}
+
 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
@@ -5356,6 +5441,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.sb_alloc_security =		selinux_sb_alloc_security,
 	.sb_free_security =		selinux_sb_free_security,
 	.sb_copy_data =			selinux_sb_copy_data,
+	.sb_remount =			selinux_sb_remount,
 	.sb_kern_mount =		selinux_sb_kern_mount,
 	.sb_show_options =		selinux_sb_show_options,
 	.sb_statfs =			selinux_sb_statfs,

From 4fdef2183e6598cc977a9bb9321ef99a44125da3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Sat, 5 Mar 2011 02:18:02 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 27/33] AppArmor: Cleanup make file to remove cruft and make it
 easier to read

Cleanups based on comments from Sam Ravnborg,

* remove references to the currently unused af_names.h
* add rlim_names.h to clean-files:
* rework cmd_make-XXX to make them more readable by adding comments,
  reworking the expressions to put logical components on individual lines,
  and keep lines < 80 characters.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
---
 security/apparmor/Makefile | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
index f204869399e..81e5b169bc4 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
@@ -6,19 +6,47 @@ apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
               resource.o sid.o file.o
 
-clean-files: capability_names.h af_names.h
+clean-files: capability_names.h rlim_names.h
 
+
+# Build a lower case string table of capability names
+# Transforms lines from
+#    #define CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE     1
+# to
+#    [1] = "dac_override",
 quiet_cmd_make-caps = GEN     $@
-cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *capability_names[] = {" > $@ ; sed -n -e "/CAP_FS_MASK/d" -e "s/^\#define[ \\t]\\+CAP_\\([A-Z0-9_]\\+\\)[ \\t]\\+\\([0-9]\\+\\)\$$/[\\2]  = \"\\1\",/p" $< | tr A-Z a-z >> $@ ; echo "};" >> $@
+cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *capability_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
+	sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e '/CAP_FS_MASK/d' \
+	-e 's/^\#define[ \t]+CAP_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
+	echo "};" >> $@
 
+
+# Build a lower case string table of rlimit names.
+# Transforms lines from
+#    #define RLIMIT_STACK		3	/* max stack size */
+# to
+#    [RLIMIT_STACK] = "stack",
+#
+# and build a second integer table (with the second sed cmd), that maps
+# RLIMIT defines to the order defined in asm-generic/resource.h  Thi is
+# required by policy load to map policy ordering of RLIMITs to internal
+# ordering for architectures that redefine an RLIMIT.
+# Transforms lines from
+#    #define RLIMIT_STACK		3	/* max stack size */
+# to
+# RLIMIT_STACK, 
 quiet_cmd_make-rlim = GEN     $@
-cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *rlim_names[] = {" > $@ ; sed -n --e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "s/^\# \\?define[ \\t]\\+RLIMIT_\\([A-Z0-9_]\\+\\)[ \\t]\\+\\([0-9]\\+\\)\\(.*\\)\$$/[\\2]  = \"\\1\",/p" $< | tr A-Z a-z >> $@ ; echo "};" >> $@ ; echo "static const int rlim_map[] = {" >> $@ ; sed -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "s/^\# \\?define[ \\t]\\+\\(RLIMIT_[A-Z0-9_]\\+\\)[ \\t]\\+\\([0-9]\\+\\)\\(.*\\)\$$/\\1,/p" $< >> $@ ; echo "};" >> $@
+cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *rlim_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
+	sed $< >> $@ -r -n \
+	    -e 's/^\# ?define[ \t]+(RLIMIT_([A-Z0-9_]+)).*/[\1] = "\L\2",/p';\
+	echo "};" >> $@ ;\
+	echo "static const int rlim_map[] = {" >> $@ ;\
+	sed -r -n "s/^\# ?define[ \t]+(RLIMIT_[A-Z0-9_]+).*/\1,/p" $< >> $@ ;\
+	echo "};" >> $@
 
 $(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
 $(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
 $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h
 	$(call cmd,make-caps)
-$(obj)/af_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h
-	$(call cmd,make-af)
 $(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/asm-generic/resource.h
 	$(call cmd,make-rlim)

From 633e804e89464d3875e59de1959a53f9041d3094 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2011 15:05:51 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 28/33] KEYS: Add an RCU payload dereference macro

Add an RCU payload dereference macro as this seems to be a common piece of code
amongst key types that use RCU referenced payloads.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 include/linux/key.h          | 4 ++++
 security/keys/encrypted.c    | 3 +--
 security/keys/trusted.c      | 3 +--
 security/keys/user_defined.c | 3 +--
 4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index 3db0adce1fd..a6b1edcffc3 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -275,6 +275,10 @@ static inline key_serial_t key_serial(struct key *key)
 	return key ? key->serial : 0;
 }
 
+#define rcu_dereference_key(KEY)					\
+	(rcu_dereference_protected((KEY)->payload.rcudata,		\
+				   rwsem_is_locked(&((struct key *)(KEY))->sem)))
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
 extern ctl_table key_sysctls[];
 #endif
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted.c
index 9e7e4ce3fae..69907a58a68 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted.c
@@ -765,8 +765,7 @@ static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
 	size_t asciiblob_len;
 	int ret;
 
-	epayload = rcu_dereference_protected(key->payload.data,
-				  rwsem_is_locked(&((struct key *)key)->sem));
+	epayload = rcu_dereference_key(key);
 
 	/* returns the hex encoded iv, encrypted-data, and hmac as ascii */
 	asciiblob_len = epayload->datablob_len + ivsize + 1
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index 83fc92e297c..c99b9368368 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -1076,8 +1076,7 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
 	char *bufp;
 	int i;
 
-	p = rcu_dereference_protected(key->payload.data,
-			rwsem_is_locked(&((struct key *)key)->sem));
+	p = rcu_dereference_key(key);
 	if (!p)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	if (!buffer || buflen <= 0)
diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c
index 02807fb1634..c6ca8662a46 100644
--- a/security/keys/user_defined.c
+++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c
@@ -184,8 +184,7 @@ long user_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
 	struct user_key_payload *upayload;
 	long ret;
 
-	upayload = rcu_dereference_protected(
-		key->payload.data, rwsem_is_locked(&((struct key *)key)->sem));
+	upayload = rcu_dereference_key(key);
 	ret = upayload->datalen;
 
 	/* we can return the data as is */

From b9fffa3877a3ebbe0a5ad5a247358e2f7df15b24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2011 15:05:59 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 29/33] KEYS: Add a key type op to permit the key description
 to be vetted

Add a key type operation to permit the key type to vet the description of a new
key that key_alloc() is about to allocate.  The operation may reject the
description if it wishes with an error of its choosing.  If it does this, the
key will not be allocated.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 Documentation/keys.txt   |  7 +++++++
 include/linux/key-type.h |  3 +++
 net/rxrpc/ar-key.c       | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 security/keys/key.c      |  8 ++++++++
 4 files changed, 37 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/keys.txt b/Documentation/keys.txt
index e4dbbdb1bd9..cf68d1fed95 100644
--- a/Documentation/keys.txt
+++ b/Documentation/keys.txt
@@ -1062,6 +1062,13 @@ The structure has a number of fields, some of which are mandatory:
      viable.
 
 
+ (*) int (*vet_description)(const char *description);
+
+     This optional method is called to vet a key description.  If the key type
+     doesn't approve of the key description, it may return an error, otherwise
+     it should return 0.
+
+
  (*) int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen);
 
      This method is called to attach a payload to a key during construction.
diff --git a/include/linux/key-type.h b/include/linux/key-type.h
index 65833d4d599..fc8525e838b 100644
--- a/include/linux/key-type.h
+++ b/include/linux/key-type.h
@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@ struct key_type {
 	 */
 	size_t def_datalen;
 
+	/* vet a description */
+	int (*vet_description)(const char *description);
+
 	/* instantiate a key of this type
 	 * - this method should call key_payload_reserve() to determine if the
 	 *   user's quota will hold the payload
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c b/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c
index d763793d39d..43ea7de2fc8 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <keys/user-type.h>
 #include "ar-internal.h"
 
+static int rxrpc_vet_description_s(const char *);
 static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *, const void *, size_t);
 static int rxrpc_instantiate_s(struct key *, const void *, size_t);
 static void rxrpc_destroy(struct key *);
@@ -52,12 +53,30 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_type_rxrpc);
  */
 struct key_type key_type_rxrpc_s = {
 	.name		= "rxrpc_s",
+	.vet_description = rxrpc_vet_description_s,
 	.instantiate	= rxrpc_instantiate_s,
 	.match		= user_match,
 	.destroy	= rxrpc_destroy_s,
 	.describe	= rxrpc_describe,
 };
 
+/*
+ * Vet the description for an RxRPC server key
+ */
+static int rxrpc_vet_description_s(const char *desc)
+{
+	unsigned long num;
+	char *p;
+
+	num = simple_strtoul(desc, &p, 10);
+	if (*p != ':' || num > 65535)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	num = simple_strtoul(p + 1, &p, 10);
+	if (*p || num < 1 || num > 255)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * parse an RxKAD type XDR format token
  * - the caller guarantees we have at least 4 words
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 1c2d43dc510..8e315ef2e88 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -249,6 +249,14 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
 	if (!desc || !*desc)
 		goto error;
 
+	if (type->vet_description) {
+		ret = type->vet_description(desc);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			key = ERR_PTR(ret);
+			goto error;
+		}
+	}
+
 	desclen = strlen(desc) + 1;
 	quotalen = desclen + type->def_datalen;
 

From fdd1b94581782a2ddf9124414e5b7a5f48ce2f9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2011 15:06:09 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 30/33] KEYS: Add a new keyctl op to reject a key with a
 specified error code

Add a new keyctl op to reject a key with a specified error code.  This works
much the same as negating a key, and so keyctl_negate_key() is made a special
case of keyctl_reject_key().  The difference is that keyctl_negate_key()
selects ENOKEY as the error to be reported.

Typically the key would be rejected with EKEYEXPIRED, EKEYREVOKED or
EKEYREJECTED, but this is not mandatory.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 Documentation/keys-request-key.txt |  9 ++++---
 Documentation/keys.txt             | 10 ++++++--
 include/linux/key-type.h           | 11 +++++++-
 include/linux/key.h                |  1 +
 include/linux/keyctl.h             |  1 +
 security/keys/compat.c             |  3 +++
 security/keys/internal.h           |  1 +
 security/keys/key.c                | 19 ++++++++------
 security/keys/keyctl.c             | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 security/keys/keyring.c            |  4 +--
 security/keys/request_key.c        |  2 +-
 11 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/keys-request-key.txt b/Documentation/keys-request-key.txt
index 09b55e46174..69686ad12c6 100644
--- a/Documentation/keys-request-key.txt
+++ b/Documentation/keys-request-key.txt
@@ -127,14 +127,15 @@ This is because process A's keyrings can't simply be attached to
 of them, and (b) it requires the same UID/GID/Groups all the way through.
 
 
-======================
-NEGATIVE INSTANTIATION
-======================
+====================================
+NEGATIVE INSTANTIATION AND REJECTION
+====================================
 
 Rather than instantiating a key, it is possible for the possessor of an
 authorisation key to negatively instantiate a key that's under construction.
 This is a short duration placeholder that causes any attempt at re-requesting
-the key whilst it exists to fail with error ENOKEY.
+the key whilst it exists to fail with error ENOKEY if negated or the specified
+error if rejected.
 
 This is provided to prevent excessive repeated spawning of /sbin/request-key
 processes for a key that will never be obtainable.
diff --git a/Documentation/keys.txt b/Documentation/keys.txt
index cf68d1fed95..a6a97fdfadd 100644
--- a/Documentation/keys.txt
+++ b/Documentation/keys.txt
@@ -657,6 +657,8 @@ The keyctl syscall functions are:
 
 	long keyctl(KEYCTL_NEGATE, key_serial_t key,
 		    unsigned timeout, key_serial_t keyring);
+	long keyctl(KEYCTL_REJECT, key_serial_t key,
+		    unsigned timeout, unsigned error, key_serial_t keyring);
 
      If the kernel calls back to userspace to complete the instantiation of a
      key, userspace should use this call mark the key as negative before the
@@ -669,6 +671,10 @@ The keyctl syscall functions are:
      that keyring, however all the constraints applying in KEYCTL_LINK apply in
      this case too.
 
+     If the key is rejected, future searches for it will return the specified
+     error code until the rejected key expires.  Negating the key is the same
+     as rejecting the key with ENOKEY as the error code.
+
 
  (*) Set the default request-key destination keyring.
 
@@ -1240,8 +1246,8 @@ example, the KDE desktop manager).
 The program (or whatever it calls) should finish construction of the key by
 calling KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE, which also permits it to cache the key in one of
 the keyrings (probably the session ring) before returning. Alternatively, the
-key can be marked as negative with KEYCTL_NEGATE; this also permits the key to
-be cached in one of the keyrings.
+key can be marked as negative with KEYCTL_NEGATE or KEYCTL_REJECT; this also
+permits the key to be cached in one of the keyrings.
 
 If it returns with the key remaining in the unconstructed state, the key will
 be marked as being negative, it will be added to the session keyring, and an
diff --git a/include/linux/key-type.h b/include/linux/key-type.h
index fc8525e838b..9efd081bb31 100644
--- a/include/linux/key-type.h
+++ b/include/linux/key-type.h
@@ -105,11 +105,20 @@ extern int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
 				    size_t datalen,
 				    struct key *keyring,
 				    struct key *instkey);
-extern int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key,
+extern int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
 			       unsigned timeout,
+			       unsigned error,
 			       struct key *keyring,
 			       struct key *instkey);
 extern void complete_request_key(struct key_construction *cons, int error);
 
+static inline int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key,
+				      unsigned timeout,
+				      struct key *keyring,
+				      struct key *instkey)
+{
+	return key_reject_and_link(key, timeout, ENOKEY, keyring, instkey);
+}
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 #endif /* _LINUX_KEY_TYPE_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index a6b1edcffc3..b2bb0171956 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ struct key {
 		struct list_head	link;
 		unsigned long		x[2];
 		void			*p[2];
+		int			reject_error;
 	} type_data;
 
 	/* key data
diff --git a/include/linux/keyctl.h b/include/linux/keyctl.h
index bd383f1944f..7022974def0 100644
--- a/include/linux/keyctl.h
+++ b/include/linux/keyctl.h
@@ -53,5 +53,6 @@
 #define KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY		16	/* assume request_key() authorisation */
 #define KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY		17	/* get key security label */
 #define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT	18	/* apply session keyring to parent process */
+#define KEYCTL_REJECT			19	/* reject a partially constructed key */
 
 #endif /*  _LINUX_KEYCTL_H */
diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
index 07a5f35e397..17c99d0149e 100644
--- a/security/keys/compat.c
+++ b/security/keys/compat.c
@@ -85,6 +85,9 @@ asmlinkage long compat_sys_keyctl(u32 option,
 	case KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT:
 		return keyctl_session_to_parent();
 
+	case KEYCTL_REJECT:
+		return keyctl_reject_key(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
+
 	default:
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index a52aa7c88b4..286c0959ee5 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -214,6 +214,7 @@ extern long keyctl_assume_authority(key_serial_t);
 extern long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer,
 				size_t buflen);
 extern long keyctl_session_to_parent(void);
+extern long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t, unsigned, unsigned, key_serial_t);
 
 /*
  * Debugging key validation
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 8e315ef2e88..f7f9d93f08d 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -511,26 +511,29 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_instantiate_and_link);
 
 /**
- * key_negate_and_link - Negatively instantiate a key and link it into the keyring.
+ * key_reject_and_link - Negatively instantiate a key and link it into the keyring.
  * @key: The key to instantiate.
  * @timeout: The timeout on the negative key.
+ * @error: The error to return when the key is hit.
  * @keyring: Keyring to create a link in on success (or NULL).
  * @authkey: The authorisation token permitting instantiation.
  *
  * Negatively instantiate a key that's in the uninstantiated state and, if
- * successful, set its timeout and link it in to the destination keyring if one
- * is supplied.  The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage
- * collected after the timeout expires.
+ * successful, set its timeout and stored error and link it in to the
+ * destination keyring if one is supplied.  The key and any links to the key
+ * will be automatically garbage collected after the timeout expires.
  *
  * Negative keys are used to rate limit repeated request_key() calls by causing
- * them to return -ENOKEY until the negative key expires.
+ * them to return the stored error code (typically ENOKEY) until the negative
+ * key expires.
  *
  * If successful, 0 is returned, the authorisation token is revoked and anyone
  * waiting for the key is woken up.  If the key was already instantiated,
  * -EBUSY will be returned.
  */
-int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key,
+int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
 			unsigned timeout,
+			unsigned error,
 			struct key *keyring,
 			struct key *authkey)
 {
@@ -556,6 +559,7 @@ int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key,
 		atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys);
 		set_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
 		set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags);
+		key->type_data.reject_error = -error;
 		now = current_kernel_time();
 		key->expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout;
 		key_schedule_gc(key->expiry + key_gc_delay);
@@ -585,8 +589,7 @@ int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key,
 
 	return ret == 0 ? link_ret : ret;
 }
-
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_negate_and_link);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_reject_and_link);
 
 /*
  * Garbage collect keys in process context so that we don't have to disable
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 31a0fd8189f..0d7b1946ff9 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1012,13 +1012,43 @@ error:
  * If successful, 0 will be returned.
  */
 long keyctl_negate_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, key_serial_t ringid)
+{
+	return keyctl_reject_key(id, timeout, ENOKEY, ringid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Negatively instantiate the key with the given timeout (in seconds) and error
+ * code and link the key into the destination keyring if one is given.
+ *
+ * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
+ * work (see keyctl_assume_authority).  No other permissions are required.
+ *
+ * The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected
+ * after the timeout expires.
+ *
+ * Negative keys are used to rate limit repeated request_key() calls by causing
+ * them to return the specified error code until the negative key expires.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 will be returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, unsigned error,
+		       key_serial_t ringid)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	struct request_key_auth *rka;
 	struct key *instkey, *dest_keyring;
 	long ret;
 
-	kenter("%d,%u,%d", id, timeout, ringid);
+	kenter("%d,%u,%u,%d", id, timeout, error, ringid);
+
+	/* must be a valid error code and mustn't be a kernel special */
+	if (error <= 0 ||
+	    error >= MAX_ERRNO ||
+	    error == ERESTARTSYS ||
+	    error == ERESTARTNOINTR ||
+	    error == ERESTARTNOHAND ||
+	    error == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been
 	 * assumed before calling this */
@@ -1038,7 +1068,7 @@ long keyctl_negate_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, key_serial_t ringid)
 		goto error;
 
 	/* instantiate the key and link it into a keyring */
-	ret = key_negate_and_link(rka->target_key, timeout,
+	ret = key_reject_and_link(rka->target_key, timeout, error,
 				  dest_keyring, instkey);
 
 	key_put(dest_keyring);
@@ -1492,6 +1522,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
 	case KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT:
 		return keyctl_session_to_parent();
 
+	case KEYCTL_REJECT:
+		return keyctl_reject_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
+					 (unsigned) arg3,
+					 (unsigned) arg4,
+					 (key_serial_t) arg5);
+
 	default:
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 5620f084ded..cdd2f3f88c8 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 			goto error_2;
 		if (key->expiry && now.tv_sec >= key->expiry)
 			goto error_2;
-		key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+		key_ref = ERR_PTR(key->type_data.reject_error);
 		if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE))
 			goto error_2;
 		goto found;
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ descend:
 
 		/* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */
 		if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) {
-			err = -ENOKEY;
+			err = key->type_data.reject_error;
 			continue;
 		}
 
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index a3dc0d460de..df3c0417ee4 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -585,7 +585,7 @@ int wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr)
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags))
-		return -ENOKEY;
+		return key->type_data.reject_error;
 	return key_validate(key);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_key_construction);

From ee009e4a0d4555ed522a631bae9896399674f064 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2011 15:06:20 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 31/33] KEYS: Add an iovec version of KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE

Add a keyctl op (KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV) that is like KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE, but
takes an iovec array and concatenates the data in-kernel into one buffer.
Since the KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE copies the data anyway, this isn't too much of a
problem.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
 Documentation/keys.txt   |  15 ++++--
 arch/x86/Kconfig         |   5 ++
 include/linux/keyctl.h   |   1 +
 security/keys/compat.c   |  47 ++++++++++++++++++
 security/keys/internal.h |   7 +++
 security/keys/keyctl.c   | 103 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 6 files changed, 167 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/keys.txt b/Documentation/keys.txt
index a6a97fdfadd..6523a9e6f29 100644
--- a/Documentation/keys.txt
+++ b/Documentation/keys.txt
@@ -637,6 +637,9 @@ The keyctl syscall functions are:
 	long keyctl(KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE, key_serial_t key,
 		    const void *payload, size_t plen,
 		    key_serial_t keyring);
+	long keyctl(KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV, key_serial_t key,
+		    const struct iovec *payload_iov, unsigned ioc,
+		    key_serial_t keyring);
 
      If the kernel calls back to userspace to complete the instantiation of a
      key, userspace should use this call to supply data for the key before the
@@ -652,6 +655,9 @@ The keyctl syscall functions are:
 
      The payload and plen arguments describe the payload data as for add_key().
 
+     The payload_iov and ioc arguments describe the payload data in an iovec
+     array instead of a single buffer.
+
 
  (*) Negatively instantiate a partially constructed key.
 
@@ -1244,10 +1250,11 @@ hand the request off to (perhaps a path held in placed in another key by, for
 example, the KDE desktop manager).
 
 The program (or whatever it calls) should finish construction of the key by
-calling KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE, which also permits it to cache the key in one of
-the keyrings (probably the session ring) before returning. Alternatively, the
-key can be marked as negative with KEYCTL_NEGATE or KEYCTL_REJECT; this also
-permits the key to be cached in one of the keyrings.
+calling KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV, which also permits it to
+cache the key in one of the keyrings (probably the session ring) before
+returning.  Alternatively, the key can be marked as negative with KEYCTL_NEGATE
+or KEYCTL_REJECT; this also permits the key to be cached in one of the
+keyrings.
 
 If it returns with the key remaining in the unconstructed state, the key will
 be marked as being negative, it will be added to the session keyring, and an
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index d5ed94d30aa..b46b75bef49 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2138,6 +2138,11 @@ config SYSVIPC_COMPAT
 	def_bool y
 	depends on COMPAT && SYSVIPC
 
+config KEYS_COMPAT
+	bool
+	depends on COMPAT && KEYS
+	default y
+
 endmenu
 
 
diff --git a/include/linux/keyctl.h b/include/linux/keyctl.h
index 7022974def0..9b0b865ce62 100644
--- a/include/linux/keyctl.h
+++ b/include/linux/keyctl.h
@@ -54,5 +54,6 @@
 #define KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY		17	/* get key security label */
 #define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT	18	/* apply session keyring to parent process */
 #define KEYCTL_REJECT			19	/* reject a partially constructed key */
+#define KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV		20	/* instantiate a partially constructed key */
 
 #endif /*  _LINUX_KEYCTL_H */
diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
index 17c99d0149e..338b510e902 100644
--- a/security/keys/compat.c
+++ b/security/keys/compat.c
@@ -12,8 +12,51 @@
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/keyctl.h>
 #include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
+/*
+ * Instantiate a key with the specified compatibility multipart payload and
+ * link the key into the destination keyring if one is given.
+ *
+ * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
+ * work (see keyctl_assume_authority).  No other permissions are required.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 will be returned.
+ */
+long compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
+	key_serial_t id,
+	const struct compat_iovec __user *_payload_iov,
+	unsigned ioc,
+	key_serial_t ringid)
+{
+	struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack;
+	long ret;
+
+	if (_payload_iov == 0 || ioc == 0)
+		goto no_payload;
+
+	ret = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc,
+					   ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack),
+					   iovstack, &iov);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+	if (ret == 0)
+		goto no_payload_free;
+
+	ret = keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, iov, ioc, ret, ringid);
+
+	if (iov != iovstack)
+		kfree(iov);
+	return ret;
+
+no_payload_free:
+	if (iov != iovstack)
+		kfree(iov);
+no_payload:
+	return keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, NULL, 0, 0, ringid);
+}
+
 /*
  * The key control system call, 32-bit compatibility version for 64-bit archs
  *
@@ -88,6 +131,10 @@ asmlinkage long compat_sys_keyctl(u32 option,
 	case KEYCTL_REJECT:
 		return keyctl_reject_key(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
 
+	case KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV:
+		return compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
+			arg2, compat_ptr(arg3), arg4, arg5);
+
 	default:
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 286c0959ee5..07a025f8190 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -215,6 +215,13 @@ extern long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer,
 				size_t buflen);
 extern long keyctl_session_to_parent(void);
 extern long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t, unsigned, unsigned, key_serial_t);
+extern long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t,
+				       const struct iovec __user *,
+				       unsigned, key_serial_t);
+
+extern long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t,
+					  const struct iovec __user *,
+					  unsigned, size_t, key_serial_t);
 
 /*
  * Debugging key validation
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 0d7b1946ff9..427fddcaeb1 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -912,6 +912,21 @@ static int keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(struct key *key)
 	return commit_creds(new);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Copy the iovec data from userspace
+ */
+static long copy_from_user_iovec(void *buffer, const struct iovec *iov,
+				 unsigned ioc)
+{
+	for (; ioc > 0; ioc--) {
+		if (copy_from_user(buffer, iov->iov_base, iov->iov_len) != 0)
+			return -EFAULT;
+		buffer += iov->iov_len;
+		iov++;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * Instantiate a key with the specified payload and link the key into the
  * destination keyring if one is given.
@@ -921,10 +936,11 @@ static int keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(struct key *key)
  *
  * If successful, 0 will be returned.
  */
-long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id,
-			    const void __user *_payload,
-			    size_t plen,
-			    key_serial_t ringid)
+long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id,
+				   const struct iovec *payload_iov,
+				   unsigned ioc,
+				   size_t plen,
+				   key_serial_t ringid)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	struct request_key_auth *rka;
@@ -953,7 +969,7 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id,
 	/* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
 	payload = NULL;
 
-	if (_payload) {
+	if (payload_iov) {
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!payload) {
@@ -965,8 +981,8 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id,
 				goto error;
 		}
 
-		ret = -EFAULT;
-		if (copy_from_user(payload, _payload, plen) != 0)
+		ret = copy_from_user_iovec(payload, payload_iov, ioc);
+		if (ret < 0)
 			goto error2;
 	}
 
@@ -996,6 +1012,72 @@ error:
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Instantiate a key with the specified payload and link the key into the
+ * destination keyring if one is given.
+ *
+ * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
+ * work (see keyctl_assume_authority).  No other permissions are required.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 will be returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id,
+			    const void __user *_payload,
+			    size_t plen,
+			    key_serial_t ringid)
+{
+	if (_payload && plen) {
+		struct iovec iov[1] = {
+			[0].iov_base = (void __user *)_payload,
+			[0].iov_len  = plen
+		};
+
+		return keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, iov, 1, plen, ringid);
+	}
+
+	return keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, NULL, 0, 0, ringid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Instantiate a key with the specified multipart payload and link the key into
+ * the destination keyring if one is given.
+ *
+ * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
+ * work (see keyctl_assume_authority).  No other permissions are required.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 will be returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t id,
+				const struct iovec __user *_payload_iov,
+				unsigned ioc,
+				key_serial_t ringid)
+{
+	struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack;
+	long ret;
+
+	if (_payload_iov == 0 || ioc == 0)
+		goto no_payload;
+
+	ret = rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc,
+				    ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack), iovstack, &iov);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+	if (ret == 0)
+		goto no_payload_free;
+
+	ret = keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, iov, ioc, ret, ringid);
+
+	if (iov != iovstack)
+		kfree(iov);
+	return ret;
+
+no_payload_free:
+	if (iov != iovstack)
+		kfree(iov);
+no_payload:
+	return keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, NULL, 0, 0, ringid);
+}
+
 /*
  * Negatively instantiate the key with the given timeout (in seconds) and link
  * the key into the destination keyring if one is given.
@@ -1528,6 +1610,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
 					 (unsigned) arg4,
 					 (key_serial_t) arg5);
 
+	case KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV:
+		return keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
+			(key_serial_t) arg2,
+			(const struct iovec __user *) arg3,
+			(unsigned) arg4,
+			(key_serial_t) arg5);
+
 	default:
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}

From 0f8250265623e57971cbb57fc8d92e58dd883a19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Date: Fri, 7 Jan 2011 15:03:02 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 32/33] AppArmor: cleanup generated files correctly

clean-files should be defined as a variable not a target.

Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/Makefile | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
index 81e5b169bc4..2dafe50a2e2 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
               resource.o sid.o file.o
 
-clean-files: capability_names.h rlim_names.h
+clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h
 
 
 # Build a lower case string table of capability names

From 1936113c820bc3bfac49c266ccf972f7f8552aae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Shan Wei <shanwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Date: Fri, 21 Jan 2011 10:13:13 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 33/33] AppArmor: kill unused macros in lsm.c

Remove unused macros.

Signed-off-by: Shan Wei <shanwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/lsm.c | 2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index b7106f192b7..d21a427a35a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -693,11 +693,9 @@ static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = {
 
 static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
 static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
-#define param_check_audit(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
 
 static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
 static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
-#define param_check_mode(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
 
 /* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters
  * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation.