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sctp: Fix out-of-bounds reading in sctp_asoc_get_hmac() 

The sctp_asoc_get_hmac() function iterates through a peer's hmac_ids
array and attempts to ensure that only a supported hmac entry is
returned.  The current code fails to do this properly - if the last id
in the array is out of range (greater than SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX), the
id integer remains set after exiting the loop, and the address of an
out-of-bounds entry will be returned and subsequently used in the parent
function, causing potentially ugly memory corruption.  This patch resets
the id integer to 0 on encountering an invalid id so that NULL will be
returned after finishing the loop if no valid ids are found.

Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This commit is contained in:
Dan Rosenberg 2010-10-01 11:51:47 +00:00 committed by David S. Miller
parent d7e0d19aa0
commit 51e97a12be
1 changed files with 6 additions and 2 deletions
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8
net/sctp/auth.c
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@ -543,16 +543,20 @@ struct sctp_hmac *sctp_auth_asoc_get_hmac(const struct sctp_association *asoc)
id = ntohs(hmacs->hmac_ids[i]);
/* Check the id is in the supported range */
if (id > SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX)
if (id > SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX) {
id = 0;
continue;
}
/* See is we support the id. Supported IDs have name and
* length fields set, so that we can allocated and use
* them. We can safely just check for name, for without the
* name, we can't allocate the TFM.
*/
if (!sctp_hmac_list[id].hmac_name)
if (!sctp_hmac_list[id].hmac_name) {
id = 0;
continue;
}
break;
}