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net: Make CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE per user namespace 

Allow privileged users in any user namespace to bind to
privileged sockets in network namespaces they control.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This commit is contained in:
Eric W. Biederman 2012-11-16 03:03:12 +00:00 committed by David S. Miller
parent b51642f6d7
commit 3594698a1f
3 changed files with 10 additions and 6 deletions
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6
net/ipv4/af_inet.c
View File

@ -474,6 +474,7 @@ int inet_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
struct sockaddr_in *addr = (struct sockaddr_in *)uaddr;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
unsigned short snum;
int chk_addr_ret;
int err;
@ -497,7 +498,7 @@ int inet_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
goto out;
}
chk_addr_ret = inet_addr_type(sock_net(sk), addr->sin_addr.s_addr);
chk_addr_ret = inet_addr_type(net, addr->sin_addr.s_addr);
/* Not specified by any standard per-se, however it breaks too
* many applications when removed. It is unfortunate since
@ -517,7 +518,8 @@ int inet_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
snum = ntohs(addr->sin_port);
err = -EACCES;
if (snum && snum < PROT_SOCK && !capable(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
if (snum && snum < PROT_SOCK &&
!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
goto out;
/* We keep a pair of addresses. rcv_saddr is the one

2
net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
View File

@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
return -EINVAL;
snum = ntohs(addr->sin6_port);
if (snum && snum < PROT_SOCK && !capable(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
if (snum && snum < PROT_SOCK && !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
return -EACCES;
lock_sock(sk);

8
net/sctp/socket.c
View File

@ -335,6 +335,7 @@ static struct sctp_af *sctp_sockaddr_af(struct sctp_sock *opt,
/* Bind a local address either to an endpoint or to an association. */
SCTP_STATIC int sctp_do_bind(struct sock *sk, union sctp_addr *addr, int len)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
struct sctp_endpoint *ep = sp->ep;
struct sctp_bind_addr *bp = &ep->base.bind_addr;
@ -378,7 +379,8 @@ SCTP_STATIC int sctp_do_bind(struct sock *sk, union sctp_addr *addr, int len)
}
}
if (snum && snum < PROT_SOCK && !capable(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
if (snum && snum < PROT_SOCK &&
!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
return -EACCES;
/* See if the address matches any of the addresses we may have
@ -1161,7 +1163,7 @@ static int __sctp_connect(struct sock* sk,
* be permitted to open new associations.
*/
if (ep->base.bind_addr.port < PROT_SOCK &&
!capable(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE)) {
!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE)) {
err = -EACCES;
goto out_free;
}
@ -1790,7 +1792,7 @@ SCTP_STATIC int sctp_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk,
* associations.
*/
if (ep->base.bind_addr.port < PROT_SOCK &&
!capable(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE)) {
!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE)) {
err = -EACCES;
goto out_unlock;
}