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Revert "CRED: Fix regression in cap_capable() as shown up by sys_faccessat() [ver #2]" 

This reverts commit 14eaddc967.

David has a better version to come.
This commit is contained in:
James Morris 2009-01-07 09:21:54 +11:00
parent 76f7ba35d4
commit 29881c4502
9 changed files with 35 additions and 129 deletions
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17
include/linux/capability.h
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@ -529,21 +529,8 @@ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
*
* Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
*/
#define has_capability(t, cap) (security_task_capable((t), (cap)) == 0)
/**
* has_capability_noaudit - Determine if a task has a superior capability available (unaudited)
* @t: The task in question
* @cap: The capability to be tested for
*
* Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
* currently in effect, false if not, but don't write an audit message for the
* check.
*
* Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
*/
#define has_capability_noaudit(t, cap) \
(security_task_capable_noaudit((t), (cap)) == 0)
#define has_capability(t, cap) (security_capable((t), (cap)) == 0)
#define has_capability_noaudit(t, cap) (security_capable_noaudit((t), (cap)) == 0)
extern int capable(int cap);

49
include/linux/security.h
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@ -48,9 +48,7 @@ struct audit_krule;
* These functions are in security/capability.c and are used
* as the default capabilities functions
*/
extern int cap_capable(int cap, int audit);
extern int cap_task_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
int cap, int audit);
extern int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit);
extern int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz);
extern int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
@ -1197,18 +1195,9 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
* @permitted contains the permitted capability set.
* Return 0 and update @new if permission is granted.
* @capable:
* Check whether the current process has the @cap capability in its
* subjective/effective credentials.
* @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>.
* @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
* Return 0 if the capability is granted for @tsk.
* @task_capable:
* Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability in its
* objective/real credentials.
* Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability.
* @tsk contains the task_struct for the process.
* @cred contains the credentials to use.
* @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>.
* @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
* Return 0 if the capability is granted for @tsk.
* @acct:
* Check permission before enabling or disabling process accounting. If
@ -1301,9 +1290,7 @@ struct security_operations {
const kernel_cap_t *effective,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
int (*capable) (int cap, int audit);
int (*task_capable) (struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
int cap, int audit);
int (*capable) (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit);
int (*acct) (struct file *file);
int (*sysctl) (struct ctl_table *table, int op);
int (*quotactl) (int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
@ -1569,9 +1556,8 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
const kernel_cap_t *effective,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
int security_capable(int cap);
int security_task_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
int security_task_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
int security_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
int security_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
int security_acct(struct file *file);
int security_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op);
int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
@ -1768,31 +1754,14 @@ static inline int security_capset(struct cred *new,
return cap_capset(new, old, effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
static inline int security_capable(int cap)
static inline int security_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
{
return cap_capable(cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
return cap_capable(tsk, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
}
static inline int security_task_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
static inline int security_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
{
int ret;
rcu_read_lock();
ret = cap_task_capable(tsk, __task_cred(tsk), cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
static inline
int security_task_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
{
int ret;
rcu_read_lock();
ret = cap_task_capable(tsk, __task_cred(tsk), cap,
SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
return cap_capable(tsk, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
}
static inline int security_acct(struct file *file)

2
kernel/capability.c
View File

@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ int capable(int cap)
BUG();
}
if (security_capable(cap) == 0) {
if (has_capability(current, cap)) {
current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
return 1;
}

1
security/capability.c
View File

@ -826,7 +826,6 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capset);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, acct);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capable);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_capable);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, quotactl);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, quota_on);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sysctl);

42
security/commoncap.c
View File

@ -43,44 +43,28 @@ int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
/**
* cap_capable - Determine whether current has a particular effective capability
* cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
* @tsk: The task to query
* @cap: The capability to check for
* @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
*
* Determine whether the nominated task has the specified capability amongst
* its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not. Note that
* this uses current's subjective/effective credentials.
* its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not.
*
* NOTE WELL: cap_capable() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()
* function. That is, it has the reverse semantics: cap_capable() returns 0
* when a task has a capability, but the kernel's capable() returns 1 for this
* case.
*/
int cap_capable(int cap, int audit)
int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit)
{
return cap_raised(current_cap(), cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
}
__u32 cap_raised;
/**
* cap_has_capability - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
* @tsk: The task to query
* @cred: The credentials to use
* @cap: The capability to check for
* @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
*
* Determine whether the nominated task has the specified capability amongst
* its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not. Note that
* this uses the task's objective/real credentials.
*
* NOTE WELL: cap_has_capability() cannot be used like the kernel's
* has_capability() function. That is, it has the reverse semantics:
* cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the
* kernel's has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
*/
int cap_task_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred, int cap,
int audit)
{
return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
/* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */
rcu_read_lock();
cap_raised = cap_raised(__task_cred(tsk)->cap_effective, cap);
rcu_read_unlock();
return cap_raised ? 0 : -EPERM;
}
/**
@ -176,7 +160,7 @@ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
/* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
* capability
*/
if (cap_capable(CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
if (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
return 0;
#endif
return 1;
@ -885,7 +869,7 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
& (new->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/
|| ((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/
|| (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
|| (cap_capable(CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/
|| (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/
/*
* [1] no changing of bits that are locked
* [2] no unlocking of locks
@ -966,7 +950,7 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
{
int cap_sys_admin = 0;
if (cap_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
if (cap_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
}

1
security/root_plug.c
View File

@ -77,7 +77,6 @@ static struct security_operations rootplug_security_ops = {
.capget = cap_capget,
.capset = cap_capset,
.capable = cap_capable,
.task_capable = cap_task_capable,
.bprm_set_creds = cap_bprm_set_creds,

25
security/security.c
View File

@ -154,31 +154,14 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
int security_capable(int cap)
int security_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
{
return security_ops->capable(cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
return security_ops->capable(tsk, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
}
int security_task_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
int security_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
{
const struct cred *cred;
int ret;
cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
ret = security_ops->task_capable(tsk, cred, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
put_cred(cred);
return ret;
}
int security_task_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
{
const struct cred *cred;
int ret;
cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
ret = security_ops->task_capable(tsk, cred, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
put_cred(cred);
return ret;
return security_ops->capable(tsk, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
}
int security_acct(struct file *file)

26
security/selinux/hooks.c
View File

@ -1433,13 +1433,12 @@ static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
const struct cred *cred,
int cap, int audit)
{
struct avc_audit_data ad;
struct av_decision avd;
u16 sclass;
u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
int rc;
@ -1866,27 +1865,15 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
}
static int selinux_capable(int cap, int audit)
static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit)
{
int rc;
rc = secondary_ops->capable(cap, audit);
rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap, audit);
if (rc)
return rc;
return task_has_capability(current, current_cred(), cap, audit);
}
static int selinux_task_capable(struct task_struct *tsk,
const struct cred *cred, int cap, int audit)
{
int rc;
rc = secondary_ops->task_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
if (rc)
return rc;
return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
return task_has_capability(tsk, cap, audit);
}
static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
@ -2050,7 +2037,7 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
{
int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
rc = selinux_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
rc = selinux_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
if (rc == 0)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
@ -2893,7 +2880,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name
* and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
* in-core context value, not a denial.
*/
error = selinux_capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
error = selinux_capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
if (!error)
error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
&size);
@ -5581,7 +5568,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.capset = selinux_capset,
.sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
.capable = selinux_capable,
.task_capable = selinux_task_capable,
.quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
.quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
.syslog = selinux_syslog,

1
security/smack/smack_lsm.c
View File

@ -2827,7 +2827,6 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
.capget = cap_capget,
.capset = cap_capset,
.capable = cap_capable,
.task_capable = cap_task_capable,
.syslog = smack_syslog,
.settime = cap_settime,
.vm_enough_memory = cap_vm_enough_memory,