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Smack: onlycap limits on CAP_MAC_ADMIN 

Smack is integrated with the POSIX capabilities scheme,
using the capabilities CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE and CAP_MAC_ADMIN to
determine if a process is allowed to ignore Smack checks or
change Smack related data respectively. Smack provides an
additional restriction that if an onlycap value is set
by writing to /smack/onlycap only tasks with that Smack
label are allowed to use CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE.

This change adds CAP_MAC_ADMIN as a capability that is affected
by the onlycap mechanism.

Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This commit is contained in:
Casey Schaufler 2012-06-05 15:28:30 -07:00
parent eb982cb4cf
commit 1880eff77e
4 changed files with 34 additions and 26 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

13
security/smack/smack.h
View File

@ -282,6 +282,19 @@ static inline char *smk_of_current(void)
return smk_of_task(current_security());
}
/*
* Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged
* by the onlycap rule.
*/
static inline int smack_privileged(int cap)
{
if (!capable(cap))
return 0;
if (smack_onlycap == NULL || smack_onlycap == smk_of_current())
return 1;
return 0;
}
/*
* logging functions
*/

9
security/smack/smack_access.c
View File

@ -220,14 +220,9 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
}
/*
* Return if a specific label has been designated as the
* only one that gets privilege and current does not
* have that label.
* Allow for priviliged to override policy.
*/
if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != sp)
goto out_audit;
if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
if (rc != 0 && smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
rc = 0;
out_audit:

17
security/smack/smack_lsm.c
View File

@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
int rc = 0;
char *sp = smk_of_current();
if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
if (sp != smack_known_floor.smk_known)
@ -821,7 +821,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
rc = -EPERM;
/*
* check label validity here so import wont fail on
@ -831,7 +831,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
smk_import(value, size) == NULL)
rc = -EINVAL;
} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
rc = -EPERM;
if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
@ -927,7 +927,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 ||
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP)) {
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
rc = -EPERM;
} else
rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
@ -1716,7 +1716,8 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
* state into account in the decision as well as
* the smack value.
*/
if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) || has_capability(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) ||
has_capability(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
rc = 0;
/* we log only if we didn't get overriden */
out_log:
@ -2717,7 +2718,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
if (p != current)
return -EPERM;
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL)
@ -2780,7 +2781,7 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
#endif
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
/*
@ -2816,7 +2817,7 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
#endif
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
return rc;

21
security/smack/smackfs.c
View File

@ -595,13 +595,12 @@ static int smk_open_load(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
/*
* Must have privilege.
* No partial writes.
* Enough data must be present.
*/
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, NULL, NULL,
@ -787,7 +786,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
* No partial writes.
* Enough data must be present.
*/
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (*ppos != 0)
return -EINVAL;
@ -1090,7 +1089,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
* "<addr/mask, as a.b.c.d/e><space><label>"
* "<addr, as a.b.c.d><space><label>"
*/
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (*ppos != 0)
return -EINVAL;
@ -1267,7 +1266,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_doi(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
char temp[80];
int i;
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
@ -1334,7 +1333,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_direct(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
char temp[80];
int i;
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
@ -1412,7 +1411,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_mapped(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
char temp[80];
int i;
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
@ -1503,7 +1502,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_ambient(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
char *data;
int rc = count;
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
@ -1586,7 +1585,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
char *sp = smk_of_task(current->cred->security);
int rc = count;
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
/*
@ -1664,7 +1663,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_logging(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
char temp[32];
int i;
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
@ -1885,7 +1884,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load2(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
/*
* Must have privilege.
*/
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, NULL, NULL,