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linux-2.6/include/linux/xattr.h

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Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
/*
File: linux/xattr.h
Extended attributes handling.
Copyright (C) 2001 by Andreas Gruenbacher <a.gruenbacher@computer.org>
Copyright (c) 2001-2002 Silicon Graphics, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright (c) 2004 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
*/
#ifndef _LINUX_XATTR_H
#define _LINUX_XATTR_H
#define XATTR_CREATE 0x1 /* set value, fail if attr already exists */
#define XATTR_REPLACE 0x2 /* set value, fail if attr does not exist */
[PATCH] move xattr permission checks into the VFS ) From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> The xattr code has rather complex permission checks because the rules are very different for different attribute namespaces. This patch moves as much as we can into the generic code. Currently all the major disk based filesystems duplicate these checks, while many minor filesystems or network filesystems lack some or all of them. To do this we need defines for the extended attribute names in common code, I moved them up from JFS which had the nicest defintions. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@austin.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-10 04:51:56 +00:00
/* Namespaces */
#define XATTR_OS2_PREFIX "os2."
#define XATTR_OS2_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_OS2_PREFIX) - 1)
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
#define XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX "security."
[PATCH] move xattr permission checks into the VFS ) From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> The xattr code has rather complex permission checks because the rules are very different for different attribute namespaces. This patch moves as much as we can into the generic code. Currently all the major disk based filesystems duplicate these checks, while many minor filesystems or network filesystems lack some or all of them. To do this we need defines for the extended attribute names in common code, I moved them up from JFS which had the nicest defintions. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@austin.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-10 04:51:56 +00:00
#define XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)
#define XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX "system."
#define XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX) - 1)
#define XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX "trusted."
#define XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX) - 1)
#define XATTR_USER_PREFIX "user."
#define XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_USER_PREFIX) - 1)
security: move LSM xattrnames to xattr.h Make the security extended attributes names global. Updated to move the remaining Smack xattrs. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-01 19:07:43 +00:00
/* Security namespace */
evm: re-release EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs) against integrity attacks. This patchset provides the framework and an initial method. The initial method maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the security extended attributes, storing the HMAC value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. Other methods of validating the integrity of a file's metadata will be posted separately (eg. EVM-digital-signatures). While this patchset does authenticate the security xattrs, and cryptographically binds them to the inode, coming extensions will bind other directory and inode metadata for more complete protection. To help simplify the review and upstreaming process, each extension will be posted separately (eg. IMA-appraisal, IMA-appraisal-directory). For a general overview of the proposed Linux integrity subsystem, refer to Dave Safford's whitepaper: http://downloads.sf.net/project/linux-ima/linux-ima/Integrity_overview.pdf. EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it with a trusted/encrypted key for the HMAC-sha1 operation. The key is loaded onto the root's keyring using keyctl. Until EVM receives notification that the key has been successfully loaded onto the keyring (echo 1 > <securityfs>/evm), EVM can not create or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN. Loading the key and signaling EVM should be done as early as possible. Normally this is done in the initramfs, which has already been measured as part of the trusted boot. For more information on creating and loading existing trusted/encrypted keys, refer to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt. A sample dracut patch, which loads the trusted/encrypted key and enables EVM, is available from http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM. Based on the LSMs enabled, the set of EVM protected security xattrs is defined at compile. EVM adds the following three calls to the existing security hooks: evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(), and evm_inode_removexattr. To initialize and update the 'security.evm' extended attribute, EVM defines three calls: evm_inode_post_init(), evm_inode_post_setattr() and evm_inode_post_removexattr() hooks. To verify the integrity of a security xattr, EVM exports evm_verifyxattr(). Changelog v7: - Fixed URL in EVM ABI documentation Changelog v6: (based on Serge Hallyn's review) - fix URL in patch description - remove evm_hmac_size definition - use SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE (removed both MAX_DIGEST_SIZE and evm_hmac_size) - moved linux include before other includes - test for crypto_hash_setkey failure - fail earlier for invalid key - clear entire encrypted key, even on failure - check xattr name length before comparing xattr names Changelog: - locking based on i_mutex, remove evm_mutex - using trusted/encrypted keys for storing the EVM key used in the HMAC-sha1 operation. - replaced crypto hash with shash (Dmitry Kasatkin) - support for additional methods of verifying the security xattrs (Dmitry Kasatkin) - iint not allocated for all regular files, but only for those appraised - Use cap_sys_admin in lieu of cap_mac_admin - Use __vfs_setxattr_noperm(), without permission checks, from EVM Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
2011-03-15 20:12:09 +00:00
#define XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX "evm"
#define XATTR_NAME_EVM XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX
security: move LSM xattrnames to xattr.h Make the security extended attributes names global. Updated to move the remaining Smack xattrs. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-01 19:07:43 +00:00
#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
#define XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX "SMACK64"
#define XATTR_SMACK_IPIN "SMACK64IPIN"
#define XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT "SMACK64IPOUT"
This patch adds a new security attribute to Smack called SMACK64EXEC. It defines label that is used while task is running. Exception: in smack_task_wait() child task is checked for write access to parent task using label inherited from the task that forked it. Fixed issues from previous submit: - SMACK64EXEC was not read when SMACK64 was not set. - inode security blob was not updated after setting SMACK64EXEC - inode security blob was not updated when removing SMACK64EXEC
2010-12-02 14:43:39 +00:00
#define XATTR_SMACK_EXEC "SMACK64EXEC"
Smack: Transmute labels on specified directories In a situation where Smack access rules allow processes with multiple labels to write to a directory it is easy to get into a situation where the directory gets cluttered with files that the owner can't deal with because while they could be written to the directory a process at the label of the directory can't write them. This is generally the desired behavior, but when it isn't it is a real issue. This patch introduces a new attribute SMACK64TRANSMUTE that instructs Smack to create the file with the label of the directory under certain circumstances. A new access mode, "t" for transmute, is made available to Smack access rules, which are expanded from "rwxa" to "rwxat". If a file is created in a directory marked as transmutable and if access was granted to perform the operation by a rule that included the transmute mode, then the file gets the Smack label of the directory instead of the Smack label of the creating process. Note that this is equivalent to creating an empty file at the label of the directory and then having the other process write to it. The transmute scheme requires that both the access rule allows transmutation and that the directory be explicitly marked. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <ext-jarkko.2.sakkinen@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2010-12-07 11:34:01 +00:00
#define XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE "SMACK64TRANSMUTE"
Subject: [PATCH] Smack: mmap controls for library containment In the embedded world there are often situations where libraries are updated from a variety of sources, for a variety of reasons, and with any number of security characteristics. These differences might include privilege required for a given library provided interface to function properly, as occurs from time to time in graphics libraries. There are also cases where it is important to limit use of libraries based on the provider of the library and the security aware application may make choices based on that criteria. These issues are addressed by providing an additional Smack label that may optionally be assigned to an object, the SMACK64MMAP attribute. An mmap operation is allowed if there is no such attribute. If there is a SMACK64MMAP attribute the mmap is permitted only if a subject with that label has all of the access permitted a subject with the current task label. Security aware applications may from time to time wish to reduce their "privilege" to avoid accidental use of privilege. One case where this arises is the environment in which multiple sources provide libraries to perform the same functions. An application may know that it should eschew services made available from a particular vendor, or of a particular version. In support of this a secondary list of Smack rules has been added that is local to the task. This list is consulted only in the case where the global list has approved access. It can only further restrict access. Unlike the global last, if no entry is found on the local list access is granted. An application can add entries to its own list by writing to /smack/load-self. The changes appear large as they involve refactoring the list handling to accomodate there being more than one rule list. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2011-01-17 16:05:27 +00:00
#define XATTR_SMACK_MMAP "SMACK64MMAP"
security: move LSM xattrnames to xattr.h Make the security extended attributes names global. Updated to move the remaining Smack xattrs. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-01 19:07:43 +00:00
#define XATTR_NAME_SMACK XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX
#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPIN
#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT
This patch adds a new security attribute to Smack called SMACK64EXEC. It defines label that is used while task is running. Exception: in smack_task_wait() child task is checked for write access to parent task using label inherited from the task that forked it. Fixed issues from previous submit: - SMACK64EXEC was not read when SMACK64 was not set. - inode security blob was not updated after setting SMACK64EXEC - inode security blob was not updated when removing SMACK64EXEC
2010-12-02 14:43:39 +00:00
#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_EXEC
Smack: Transmute labels on specified directories In a situation where Smack access rules allow processes with multiple labels to write to a directory it is easy to get into a situation where the directory gets cluttered with files that the owner can't deal with because while they could be written to the directory a process at the label of the directory can't write them. This is generally the desired behavior, but when it isn't it is a real issue. This patch introduces a new attribute SMACK64TRANSMUTE that instructs Smack to create the file with the label of the directory under certain circumstances. A new access mode, "t" for transmute, is made available to Smack access rules, which are expanded from "rwxa" to "rwxat". If a file is created in a directory marked as transmutable and if access was granted to perform the operation by a rule that included the transmute mode, then the file gets the Smack label of the directory instead of the Smack label of the creating process. Note that this is equivalent to creating an empty file at the label of the directory and then having the other process write to it. The transmute scheme requires that both the access rule allows transmutation and that the directory be explicitly marked. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <ext-jarkko.2.sakkinen@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2010-12-07 11:34:01 +00:00
#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE
Subject: [PATCH] Smack: mmap controls for library containment In the embedded world there are often situations where libraries are updated from a variety of sources, for a variety of reasons, and with any number of security characteristics. These differences might include privilege required for a given library provided interface to function properly, as occurs from time to time in graphics libraries. There are also cases where it is important to limit use of libraries based on the provider of the library and the security aware application may make choices based on that criteria. These issues are addressed by providing an additional Smack label that may optionally be assigned to an object, the SMACK64MMAP attribute. An mmap operation is allowed if there is no such attribute. If there is a SMACK64MMAP attribute the mmap is permitted only if a subject with that label has all of the access permitted a subject with the current task label. Security aware applications may from time to time wish to reduce their "privilege" to avoid accidental use of privilege. One case where this arises is the environment in which multiple sources provide libraries to perform the same functions. An application may know that it should eschew services made available from a particular vendor, or of a particular version. In support of this a secondary list of Smack rules has been added that is local to the task. This list is consulted only in the case where the global list has approved access. It can only further restrict access. Unlike the global last, if no entry is found on the local list access is granted. An application can add entries to its own list by writing to /smack/load-self. The changes appear large as they involve refactoring the list handling to accomodate there being more than one rule list. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2011-01-17 16:05:27 +00:00
#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_MMAP
security: move LSM xattrnames to xattr.h Make the security extended attributes names global. Updated to move the remaining Smack xattrs. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-01 19:07:43 +00:00
#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability"
#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX
evm: posix acls modify i_mode The posix xattr acls are 'system' prefixed, which normally would not affect security.evm. An interesting side affect of writing posix xattr acls is their modifying of the i_mode, which is included in security.evm. This patch updates security.evm when posix xattr acls are written. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
2011-08-18 22:07:44 +00:00
#define XATTR_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS "posix_acl_access"
#define XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX XATTR_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS
#define XATTR_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT "posix_acl_default"
#define XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX XATTR_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT
xattr.h: expose string defines to userspace af4f136056c9 ("security: move LSM xattrnames to xattr.h") moved the XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX define from capability.h to xattr.h. This makes sense except it was previously exports to userspace but xattr.h does not export it to userspace. This patch exports these headers to userspace to fix the ABI regression. There is some slight possibility that this will cause problems in other applications which used these #defines differently (wrongly) and I could JUST export the capabilities xattr name that we broke. Does anyonehave an idea how exposing these headers could cause a problem? Below is what is being exposed to userspace, included here since it isn't clear exactly what is going to be made available from the patch. /* Namespaces */ #define XATTR_OS2_PREFIX "os2." #define XATTR_OS2_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_OS2_PREFIX) - 1) #define XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX "security." #define XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) #define XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX "system." #define XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX) - 1) #define XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX "trusted." #define XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX) - 1) #define XATTR_USER_PREFIX "user." #define XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_USER_PREFIX) - 1) /* Security namespace */ #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux" #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX #define XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX "SMACK64" #define XATTR_SMACK_IPIN "SMACK64IPIN" #define XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT "SMACK64IPOUT" #define XATTR_NAME_SMACK XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX #define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPIN #define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT #define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability" #define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX Reported-by: Ozan Çaglayan <ozan@pardus.org.tr> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-05-25 00:13:13 +00:00
#ifdef __KERNEL__
#include <linux/types.h>
[PATCH] cleanup include/linux/xattr.h - reduce the userspace visible part - fix the in-kernel compilation Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-10 09:46:24 +00:00
struct inode;
struct dentry;
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
struct xattr_handler {
fs: xattr_handler table should be const The entries in xattr handler table should be immutable (ie const) like other operation tables. Later patches convert common filesystems. Uncoverted filesystems will still work, but will generate a compiler warning. Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2010-05-14 00:53:14 +00:00
const char *prefix;
sanitize xattr handler prototypes Add a flags argument to struct xattr_handler and pass it to all xattr handler methods. This allows using the same methods for multiple handlers, e.g. for the ACL methods which perform exactly the same action for the access and default ACLs, just using a different underlying attribute. With a little more groundwork it'll also allow sharing the methods for the regular user/trusted/secure handlers in extN, ocfs2 and jffs2 like it's already done for xfs in this patch. Also change the inode argument to the handlers to a dentry to allow using the handlers mechnism for filesystems that require it later, e.g. cifs. [with GFS2 bits updated by Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>] Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-11-13 09:52:56 +00:00
int flags; /* fs private flags passed back to the handlers */
size_t (*list)(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t list_size,
const char *name, size_t name_len, int handler_flags);
int (*get)(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, void *buffer,
size_t size, int handler_flags);
int (*set)(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *buffer,
size_t size, int flags, int handler_flags);
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
};
security: new security_inode_init_security API adds function callback This patch changes the security_inode_init_security API by adding a filesystem specific callback to write security extended attributes. This change is in preparation for supporting the initialization of multiple LSM xattrs and the EVM xattr. Initially the callback function walks an array of xattrs, writing each xattr separately, but could be optimized to write multiple xattrs at once. For existing security_inode_init_security() calls, which have not yet been converted to use the new callback function, such as those in reiserfs and ocfs2, this patch defines security_old_inode_init_security(). Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
2011-06-06 19:29:25 +00:00
struct xattr {
char *name;
void *value;
size_t value_len;
};
VFS/Security: Rework inode_getsecurity and callers to return resulting buffer This patch modifies the interface to inode_getsecurity to have the function return a buffer containing the security blob and its length via parameters instead of relying on the calling function to give it an appropriately sized buffer. Security blobs obtained with this function should be freed using the release_secctx LSM hook. This alleviates the problem of the caller having to guess a length and preallocate a buffer for this function allowing it to be used elsewhere for Labeled NFS. The patch also removed the unused err parameter. The conversion is similar to the one performed by Al Viro for the security_getprocattr hook. Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-05 06:29:39 +00:00
ssize_t xattr_getsecurity(struct inode *, const char *, void *, size_t);
xattr: add missing consts to function arguments Add missing consts to xattr function arguments. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 07:59:41 +00:00
ssize_t vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *, const char *, void *, size_t);
[PATCH] Introduce vfs_listxattr This patch moves code out of fs/xattr.c:listxattr into a new function - vfs_listxattr. The code for vfs_listxattr was originally submitted by Bill Nottingham <notting@redhat.com> to Unionfs. Sorry about that. The reason for this submission is to make the listxattr code in fs/xattr.c a little cleaner (as well as to clean up some code in Unionfs.) Currently, Unionfs has vfs_listxattr defined in its code. I think that's very ugly, and I'd like to see it (re)moved. The logical place to put it, is along side of all the other vfs_*xattr functions. Overall, I think this patch is benefitial for both kernel.org kernel and Unionfs. Signed-off-by: Josef "Jeff" Sipek <jsipek@cs.sunysb.edu> Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-09 20:10:48 +00:00
ssize_t vfs_listxattr(struct dentry *d, char *list, size_t size);
VFS: Factor out part of vfs_setxattr so it can be called from the SELinux hook for inode_setsecctx. This factors out the part of the vfs_setxattr function that performs the setting of the xattr and its notification. This is needed so the SELinux implementation of inode_setsecctx can handle the setting of the xattr while maintaining the proper separation of layers. Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-03 18:25:56 +00:00
int __vfs_setxattr_noperm(struct dentry *, const char *, const void *, size_t, int);
xattr: add missing consts to function arguments Add missing consts to xattr function arguments. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 07:59:41 +00:00
int vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *, const char *, const void *, size_t, int);
int vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *, const char *);
[PATCH] add vfs_* helpers for xattr operations Add vfs_getxattr, vfs_setxattr and vfs_removexattr helpers for common checks around invocation of the xattr methods. NFSD already was missing some of the checks and there will be more soon. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> (James, I haven't touched selinux yet because it's doing various odd things and I'm not sure how it would interact with the security attribute fallbacks you added. Could you investigate whether it could use vfs_getxattr or if not add a __vfs_getxattr helper to share the bits it is fine with?) For NFSv4: instead of just converting it add an nfsd_getxattr helper for the code shared by NFSv2/3 and NFSv4 ACLs. In fact that code isn't even NFS-specific, but I'll wait for more users to pop up first before moving it to common code. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@austin.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-10 04:51:55 +00:00
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
ssize_t generic_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size);
ssize_t generic_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
int generic_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
int generic_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
xattr: define vfs_getxattr_alloc and vfs_xattr_cmp vfs_getxattr_alloc() and vfs_xattr_cmp() are two new kernel xattr helper functions. vfs_getxattr_alloc() first allocates memory for the requested xattr and then retrieves it. vfs_xattr_cmp() compares a given value with the contents of an extended attribute. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
2011-03-09 19:23:34 +00:00
ssize_t vfs_getxattr_alloc(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
char **xattr_value, size_t size, gfp_t flags);
int vfs_xattr_cmp(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
const char *value, size_t size, gfp_t flags);
[PATCH] cleanup include/linux/xattr.h - reduce the userspace visible part - fix the in-kernel compilation Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-10 09:46:24 +00:00
#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
#endif /* _LINUX_XATTR_H */
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