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spec: minor fixes, wrap text

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Oliver Smith 2020-04-14 14:31:29 +02:00
parent b053436e0f
commit a281464e6c
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docs/imsi-pseudo-spec.adoc
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@ -7,8 +7,8 @@
A long-standing issue in the 3GPP specifications is, that mobile phones and
other mobile equipment (ME) have to send the International Mobile Subscriber
Identity (IMSI) unencrypted over the air. Each IMSI is a unique identifier for
the subscriber Therefore most people can be uniquely identified by recording the
IMSI that their ME is sending. The 3GPP specifications provide means for
the subscriber. Therefore most people can be uniquely identified by recording
the IMSI that their ME is sending. The 3GPP specifications provide means for
implementations to send the IMSI less often by using the Temporary Mobile
Subscriber Identity (TMSI) where possible.
@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ the next Location Updating Procedure with the old pseudonymous IMSI. Because
the HLR has both the old and the new pseudonymous IMSI allocated at this point,
the subscriber is not locked out of the network.
=== Next Pseudonymous IMSI SMS arrives out of order
=== Next Pseudonymous IMSI SMS Arrives Out of Order
The next pseudonymous IMSI SMS may arrive out of order. Either, because the
network is not able to deliver them in order, or even because an attacker would
@ -402,10 +402,10 @@ pseudonymous IMSI in the SMS was changed, the SIM would be locked out of the
network.
The safest way to protect the next pseudonymous IMSI SMS is a layer of end to
end encryption from the HLR to the SIM. The existing means for OTA SMS security
(3GPP TS 23.048) provide mechanisms for integrity protection, confidentiality
as well as replay protection and must be implemented when using IMSI
pseudonymization.
end encryption from the HLR to the SIM. The existing means for OTA SMS
security (3GPP TS 23.048) provide mechanisms for integrity protection,
confidentiality as well as replay protection and must be implemented when using
IMSI pseudonymization.
=== User-configurable Minimum Duration Between IMSI Changes